Amicus Curiae Brief — Daniel Grand, Petitioner v. City of University Heights, Ohio, et al.

No. 25-965

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

DANIEL GRAND,

Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, OHIO, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

William H. Hurd

Eckert Seamans Cherin

& Mellott, LLC

901 East Byrd Street,

Suite 1105

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Ilya Shapiro

Trevor Burrus

Manhattan Institute

52 Vanderbilt Avenue

New York, NY 10017

Michael W. Thomas

Counsel of Record

Edward J. Longosz, II

Eckert Seamans Cherin

& Mellott, LLC

1717 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,

12th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 659-6623

mthomas@eckertseamans.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

396400

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

I.

The City Violates the First Amendment

by Giving Religious Speech Second-Class

Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

II. There Is No Need to Wait and See If the

City Will Issue a Permit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

A. RLUIPA Allows Immediate Access

to Court When First Amendment

Liberties Are Harmed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

B. Williamson County Does Not Require

the Petitioner to Wait . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

III. The Court Should Use This Case to

Promote Religious Tolerance and Protect

Religious Liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,

372 U.S. 58 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Carson v. Makin,

596 U.S. 767 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Church of Our Lord & Savior Jesus Christ v.

City of Markham, Ill.,

913 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Congregation Anshei Roosevelt v.

Plan. & Zoning Bd. of Borough of Roosevelt,

338 F. App’x 214 (3d Cir. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14

Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347 (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Emp. Div., Dep’ of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,

533 U.S. 98 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6

Grace Cmty. Church v. Lenox Twp.,

544 F.3d 609 (6th Cir. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio,

159 F. 4th 507 (6th Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8, 12

iii

Cited Authorities

Page

Guatay Christian Fellowship v.

Cnty. of San Diego,

670 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.,

569 U.S. 513 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 15

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Lamb’s Chapel v.

Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,

508 U.S. (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Madison v. Riter,

355 F. 3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,

366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Miles Christi Religious Ord. v.

Twp. of Northville,

629 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n,

402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal.,

594 U.S. 474 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13

Roman Cath. Bishop of Springfield v.

City of Springfield,

724 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,

592 U.S. 14 (2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6, 8, 9, 12

Rowan v. U.S. Post Off. Dep’t,

397 U.S. 728 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Tandon v. Newsom,

593 U.S. 61 (2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6

Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v.

City of Sunny Isles Beach, Fla.,

727 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

United States v. Weaver,

808 F. 3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Widmar v. Vincent,

454 U.S. 263 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,

473 U.S. 172 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 11, 12, 13

Statutes and Other Authorities

U.S. Const. Amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4, 6, 8-13, 15

U.S. Const. Amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 13

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

U.S. Const. Art. III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 14

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and

Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:

Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L.

Rev. 2105 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The Manhattan Institute (MI) is a nonprofit public

policy research foundation whose mission is to develop

and disseminate new ideas that foster greater economic

choice and individual responsibility. MI has a strong

interest in ensuring that courts safeguard the freedoms

that enable individuals and organizations to live out their

convictions without undue government interference.

Robust protection of religious liberty is essential to a free

and vibrant society, and MI believes this case presents

issues of significant importance to its mission and to the

broader public.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case involves yet another example of government

discrimination against religious speech. The petitioner,

Daniel Grand, has been told by the City of University

Heights that he cannot bring others into his home for

religious study and worship without first obtaining a

permit, because holding such meetings would turn his

home into a “house of worship” in violation of local zoning

laws. Yet there are apparently no such restrictions on the

use of residences for secular meetings.

The requirement that Grand obtain a permit for his

contemplated religious gatherings has caused—and is

causing—irreparable harm. Neither the text nor the

1. Rule 37 statement: Amicus Curiae affirms that no counsel

for any party authored any part of this brief and that nobody but

amicus funded its preparation and submission. Further, amicus

gave timely notice to all parties of its intent to file this brief.

2

purpose of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) require him to exhaust the

administrative procedures of the city’s zoning laws before

filing his case in federal court. The Sixth Circuit—and

three other circuits—have relied on Williamson Cnty.

Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson

City, 473 U.S. 172 (1986), to justify imposing such an

exhaustion requirement. That reliance is misplaced.

Indeed, the rationale of Williamson County counsels in

favor of Grand having immediate access to federal court

without delay.

New and minority religious groups are especially

vulnerable to the use of zoning codes to stifle religious

gatherings. The Court should find for Grand to clarify

RLUIPA’s full sweep and uphold the religious liberties it

was enacted to protect.

ARGUMENT

I.

The City Violates the First Amendment by Giving

Religious Speech Second-Class Status.

The petitioner, Daniel Grand, is a devoted Orthodox

Jew who invites others of his faith into his home for

religious study and worship. But suppose it were someone

else:

• an ardent football fan who brings friends into his

basement every weekend to watch games and talk

sports.

• an avid reader who hosts weekly book club

discussions about the latest New York Times

bestsellers.

3

• a political activist—Democrat, Republican, or

anything else—who holds kitchen-table meetings

to organize the next door-to-door campaign.

There is no suggestion that any of these secular

activities would be subject to any licensing requirement

by the city (nor should they be). But because Grand was

using his home for religious speech, the city told him he

had to stop because he did not have official permission

to do so. Such discrimination against religious speech is

patently unconstitutional. This Court has repeatedly said

so. It should now say so again.

In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), the

University of Missouri would not allow a group of

Christian students access to the meeting halls regularly

used by secular student groups. In an 8–1 decision, this

Court ruled that such discrimination is unconstitutional.

In his lone dissent, Justice White rejected “the proposition

that because religious worship uses speech, it is protected

by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”

Id. at 284 (White, J., dissenting). Instead, the dissent

contended that, because the Christian group wanted to

use the meeting hall for religious worship, the University

could refuse without violating free speech rights.

Labeling the dissent’s theory a “novel argument,” the

majority explained that the distinction between religious

worship and other speech lacked “intelligible content,”

was not “within the judicial competence to administer,”

and had no “relevance” to the university’s treatment of

the Christian group. Id. at 269, n. 6. Indeed, far from

being disfavored by the Constitution, religious speech—

including religious worship—is doubly protected, guarded

4

by both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise

Clause. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S.

507, 523 (2022) (“Where the Free Exercise Clause protects

religious exercises, whether communicative or not, the

Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for

expressive religious activities.”) (citations omitted).

Widmar should have put an end to the theory

that government officials can impose discriminatory

restrictions on private religious speech. But governments

can be slow to learn, and the Court has needed to repeat

the lesson. For example:

• In Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free

Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 392 (1993), a school district

prohibited a religious film from being shown on

public school property “solely because” the film

featured religious subject matter. Id. at 393–94. In

striking down the restriction, the Court reminded

the nation that “the First Amendment forbids the

government to regulate speech in ways that favor

some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.”

Id. at 394.

• In Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.

98 (2001), a school district prohibited a religious

group from using a school-created limited public

forum “for the purpose of conducting religious

instruction and Bible study.” Id. at 105. The Court

held that the prohibition against religious speech

constituted viewpoint discrimination and struck it

down. Id. at 112.

5

• In Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61, 64 (2021), the

Court entered an injunction against California

COVID-19 restrictions that “treat[ed] some

comparable secular activities [including movie

theaters and concerts] more favorably than athome religious exercise.” See also Roman Cath.

Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 17

(2020) (striking down restrictions that “single[d] out

houses of worship for especially harsh treatment”

when compared to secular gatherings and facilities).

• In Kennedy, a high school football coach was

punished by his school district for saying private

prayers midfield after a football game. In ruling for

the coach, the Court again explained that private

religious speech cannot be relegated to secondclass status: “The Constitution and the best of our

traditions counsel mutual respect and tolerance,

not censorship and suppression, for religious and

nonreligious views alike.” Id. at 514 (emphasis

added).

• In Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767 (2022), the

government of Maine operated a tuition assistance

program for parents in rural school districts lacking

access to a public secondary school. Parents could

use the funds to pay for tuition at accredited private

schools, and those schools had wide latitude in

designing their own courses of study. But in order

for a school to participate in the funding program,

its curriculum had to be “nonsectarian.” The Court

struck down the “nonsectarian” requirement on the

grounds that it is “discrimination against religion.”

Id. at 781.

6

Despite such repeated lessons, some governments—

including the City of University Heights—continue to treat

religious speech as an inferior form of First Amendment

activity. In Widmar, Lamb’s Chapel, Good News Club, and

Carson, government officials at least had the argument

(wrong though it was) that the Establishment Clause

compelled them to discriminate. And, in Tandon and

Cuomo, the novelty of the pandemic may have led some

officials to slip from their normal constitutional moorings.

But neither the Establishment Clause nor the pandemic

are at issue in this case. There is no excuse for the city’s

discrimination against in-home religious gatherings.

The city’s permit requirement is reminiscent of

the old religious establishments, which prohibited

unlicensed religious meetings. See Michael W. McConnell,

Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,

Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L.

Rev. 2105, 2113 (2003). Moreover, “[t]he ancient concept

that ‘a man’s home is his castle’ into which ‘not even the

king may enter’ has lost none of its vitality.” Rowan v.

U.S. Post Off. Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). A home

represents the most private space, and an “individual’s

interest in protecting the privacy of his home is of the

highest order.” United States v. Weaver, 808 F. 3d 26, 37

(D.C. Cir. 2015). Government has no business prying into a

home to see whether the owner and his guests are saying

prayers or playing gin rummy. 2

2. The city could, perhaps, adopt a content-neutral regulation

limiting the number of vehicles that could be parked on the street

in connection with a residential event. But such a regulation would

not do the job of curtailing events at Grand’s home, a venue to

which participants typically walk on their Sabbath.

7

But prying is exactly what the city has been doing,

starting with the cease-and-desist letter that told Grand

he could not use his home as a place of “religious assembly”

(e.g., group prayer and worship) and that doing so could

result in “building code citations” (i.e., punishment).

Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio, 159 F. 4th

507, 510 (6th Cir. 2025). The mayor also “emphasized that

Grand could not operate a ‘house of worship’ without a

permit” and he “asked community members to report any

violations” of the zoning laws. Id. at 510. In addition, the

city’s police “directed patrol units to drive past Grand’s

house and check for code violations,” and “a housing

inspector searched the house for violations.” Id. at 511.

It is no answer for the city to say that it would

apply its requirement equally to all religions. First, it

is probably not true. These are Orthodox Jews, whose

men typically wear beards and distinctive black garb,

and who do not drive on their Sabbath. The prospect of

such strangers walking through the neighborhood once a

week to reach the Grand home was likely a factor in the

displeased neighbor’s complaint to the city. See id. at 509

(explaining that the city’s action against Grand began with

a neighbor’s complaint). If they had been Presbyterians

wearing polo shirts and driving their SUVs to an evening

Bible study, probably no one would have cared. Second, in

this context, “evenhandedness” does not matter. The city

cannot avoid a constitutional violation against one religion

by touting its unfavorable treatment of all religions.

The Court should now use this case to explain to the

city and other local governments that they cannot treat

in-home religious speech and assembly, including prayer

and worship, less favorably than other forms of in-home

speech and assembly.

8

II. There Is No Need to Wait and See If the City Will

Issue a Permit.

Grand filed his complaint under RLUIPA. In response,

the city argued —and the lower courts agreed—that he

filed his complaint prematurely. He must wait, they say,

until he has applied for a special-use permit and, if denied,

wait some more until he has obtained a final decision from

the Board of Zoning Appeals. Only then, they say, may he

come to court. Grand, 159 F.4th at 513. But such a theory

disregards the harm inflicted on Grand by the city through

its demands, threats, and investigations—all of which

were clearly calculated to chill Grand in the exercise of

his First Amendment rights.

As this Court has explained, “informal sanctions,”

including “the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other

means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation,” are

sufficient to cause a First Amendment injury. Bantam

Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67, 71–72 (1963).

Moreover, “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for

even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes

irreparable injury.” Cuomo, 592 U.S. at 19 (quoting Elrod

v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion))

(emphasis added). These are basic principles of First

Amendment law. But the Sixth Circuit overlooked them,

mistakenly concluding instead that “Grand will not be

prejudiced by any delay.” 159 F.4th at 513.

Every day when citizens are forbidden to meet with

others for prayer in their homes is another day of injury.

And this is especially true for Grand, whose faith requires

an assembly of ten men—a minyan—for certain rituals

and prayers. “The restrictions at issue here, by effectively

9

barring many from attending religious services, strike

at the very heart of the First Amendment’s guarantee of

religious liberty.” Cuomo, 592 U.S. at 19. Thus, it would

not remedy the constitutional violation even if we could

know for sure that, at the end of the process, the permit

demanded by the city would be granted. And, of course,

there is no such assurance.

A.

RLUIPA Allows Immediate Access to Court

When First Amendment Liberties Are Harmed.

Congress enacted RLUIPA to vindicate religious

liberties (and, in some cases, to expand such liberties

beyond those available under prevailing constitutional

jurisprudence). 3 The protections of the Act clearly

encompass the prayer meetings that Grand wishes to

hold in his home. See 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 at *S7776

(explaining that RLUIPA was intended to “provide critical

protection for houses of worship and other religious

assemblies from restrictive land-use regulation that all

too often thwarts the practice of faith in our nation.”)

(emphasis added).

It would be odd, to say the least, if in enacting a

statute designed to vindicate religious liberties, Congress

intended plaintiffs to endure protracted deprivations of

those liberties before seeking such vindication. Nothing

in RLUIPA’s text says that Grand must wait. Indeed, it

points in the opposite direction. RLUIPA says:

3. See Emp. Div., Dep’ of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494

U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (limiting constitutional free exercise rights

when asserted against a neutral statute of general applicability)

and Madison v. Riter, 355 F. 3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that

the Smith court invited Congress to “provide greater protection

to religious exercise through legislative action.”).

10

A person may assert a violation of this chapter

as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and

obtain appropriate relief against a government.

Standing to assert a claim or defense under

this section shall be governed by the general

rules of standing under Article III of the

Constitution.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (emphasis added). Those general

rules of standing require a plaintiff to show three

elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an

“injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical,

Second, there must be a causal connection

between the injury and the conduct complained

of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant, and not the

result of the independent action of some third

party not before the court.

Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)

(emphasis added) (cleaned up).

All three Lujan elements are present here. First,

because the injury is the deprivation of First Amendment

11

rights, the injury has already occurred and continues to

occur every day that Grand is not allowed to conduct his

preferred form of religious worship in his home. Second,

the cause of the injury is the city’s demand that he cease

holding such worship services unless and until he obtains

a special-use permit. Third, the injunction against the city

sought by Grand would vindicate his rights and allow his

in-home worship to resume.

RLUIPA also states: “This chapter shall be construed

in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the

maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter

and the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3 (emphasis

added). To impose the procedural hurdle of administrative

exhaustion would narrow rather than broaden the

protection of religious exercise. Thus, where, as here,

there is Article III standing, the exhaustion requirement

is inconsistent with RLUIPA and should be rejected.

B. Williamson County Does Not Require the

Petitioner to Wait.

In holding that Grand must wait, the Sixth Circuit

improperly applied the finality standard articulated in

Williamson County. 473 U.S. at186. To begin, Williamson

County did not involve any free exercise or free speech

issues. Instead, the case involved the ripeness of a real

estate developer’s Fifth Amendment claim that his

property was being taken without just compensation.

The Court found that the claim was not ripe because (1)

the developer still had an opportunity to seek a variance

from the appeals board and (2) the developer had not

sought compensation through “the [inverse condemnation]

procedures the State ha[d] provided” for seeking just

12

compensation. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180,

187–88 (2019) (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186-94).

The Sixth Circuit applied this finality standard to

Grand’s RLUIPA claim, finding that his claim was unripe

because he withdrew his application for a special use permit

before the application process was completed. Grand,

159 F. 4th at 512. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “[i]n

the land use context, one important factor in a dispute’s

fitness for judicial decision is a ‘finality’ requirement—a

concrete and final decision by local authorities.” Id. at 511

(citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 193). Thus, it held

that “land-use challenges are generally unripe until the

‘relevant administrative agency resolve[s] the appropriate

application of the zoning ordinance to the property in

dispute.” Id. at 512 (quoting Miles Christi Religious Ord.

v. Twp. of Northville, 629 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2010)).

This reasoning, while applicable in other factual

contexts, was improperly applied to Grand’s RLUIPA

claim. First, Grand is asserting injuries to his First

Amendment rights—injuries of the sort this Court has

repeated said are “irreparable.” See., e.g., Cuomo, 592

U.S. at 17. By contrast, counsel are unaware of any case

where this Court has said that injuries to property rights

are irreparable. Thus, this case presents an urgency not

present in Williamson County.

Second, this Court has explained that the Williamson

County finality requirement is “relatively modest” and

is only meant to show “that a plaintiff has actually ‘been

injured by the Government’s action’ and is not prematurely

suing over a hypothetical harm.” Pakdel v. City & Cnty.

of San Francisco, Cal., 594 U.S. 474, 479 (2021) (quoting

13

Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013)).4 There

is nothing hypothetical about the harm suffered by Grand.

He is suing over injuries that have already occurred

and that are continuing to occur. Thus, even under the

rationale of Williamson County, this case is ripe. There

is no need for Grand to wait.

The Court should find for Grand and correct the

misunderstanding about Williamson County and explain

that plaintiffs suffering harm to the First Amendment

liberties need not wait for their local government to make

a final decision on zoning issues before seeking judicial

relief.

III. The Court Should Use This Case to Promote

Religious Tolerance and Protect Religious Liberty.

Congress adopted the land use provisions of RLUIPA

to curb the widespread use of zoning laws to restrict the

free exercise of religion. But the mistreatment of Grand by

his city government shows that the practice continues. And

there is no reason to believe that this is an isolated case.

Unfortunately, four circuit courts—including the Sixth

Circuit—have debilitated the statute by refusing to allow

RLUIPA-based free exercise lawsuits until the plaintiff

has exhausted the local zoning process—a process that

can be complicated, costly and time-consuming. 5

4. See Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 479 (finding a Fifth Amendment

claim ripe when there was “no question that government’s

‘definitive position on the issue [has] inflict[ed] an actual concrete

injury.’”) (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 193).

5. See Guatay Christian Fellowship v. Cnty. of San Diego,

670 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2011); Congregation Anshei Roosevelt v.

14

Thus, there is a double blow: first, the locality requires

a special-use permit for in-home prayer meetings; then,

the courts refuse to hear the homeowner’s RLUIPA claim

until long after the damages pile up. These blows are

likely to fall especially hard on religious groups that are

minority faiths or new within their communities. These

groups are less likely to have formal houses of worship

and, thus, more likely to need a member’s living room for

study and worship. These groups are also more likely to

have intolerant neighbors looking at them askance and

calling upon their city to “do something.”6 And, often,

these groups will not have the resources to “fight city hall”

that larger and more well-established groups would enjoy.

Here, it is Orthodox Jews who need the protection of

RLUIPA. In a future case, it might be Roman Catholics, or

Baptists, or Mormons, or Muslims, or Sikhs, or Buddhists.

Whatever the faith, “[r]espect for religious expressions

is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic.”

Plan. & Zoning Bd. of Borough of Roosevelt, 338 F. App’x 214

(3d Cir. 2009); Grace Cmty. Church v. Lenox Twp., 544 F.3d 609

(6th Cir. 2008); Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402

F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005). Fortunately, three other circuits have

taken the opposite approach. See Church of Our Lord & Savior

Jesus Christ v. City of Markham, Ill., 913 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2019);

Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, Fla., 727

F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2013); Roman Cath. Bishop of Springfield v.

City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2013).

6. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d

1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that RLUIPA was intended to target

“zoning codes which use individualized and discretionary processes

to exclude churches, especially ‘new small or unfamiliar churches

. . . [like] black churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues.’”)

(citing 146 Cong. Rec. S7774-01 at *S7774) (emphasis added).

15

Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 543. The best way for the Court to

foreclose such future violations of religious liberty is to

vindicate religious liberty in the case now before it.

Requiring a license to practice a faith in the privacy

of one’s home runs afoul of the “mutual respect and

tolerance . . . for religious and nonreligious views alike”

that is the bedrock of the First Amendment. Id. at 514.

And requiring administrative delay before seeking judicial

protection of religious liberties runs afoul of the great

purposes for which the First and Fourteenth Amendments

were created. This case provides the Court with a muchneeded opportunity to insist upon such respect and to give

full sweep to RLUIPA and the religious liberties it was

enacted to protect. For this reason, too, the Court should

find for Grand.

16

CONCLUSION

The Court should find for Grand and reverse the

judgment of the Sixth Circuit.

September 8, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

Michael W. Thomas

Counsel of Record

Edward J. Longosz, II

Eckert Seamans Cherin

& Mellott, LLC

1717 Pennsylvania Avenue NW,

12th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 659-6623

mthomas@eckertseamans.com

William H. Hurd

Eckert Seamans Cherin

& Mellott, LLC

901 East Byrd Street,

Suite 1105

Richmond, Virginia 23219

Ilya Shapiro

Trevor Burrus

Manhattan Institute

52 Vanderbilt Avenue

New York, NY 10017

Counsel for Amicus Curiae