Amicus Curiae Brief — Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung, Petitioner v. Isabella County, Michigan

No. 25-95

IN THE

MICHAEL PUNG, Personal Representative of the

Estate of Timothy Scott Pung,

v.

Petitioner,

ISABELLA COUNTY, MICHIGAN,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari

To the United States Court of Appeals

For the Sixth Circuit

_____________

BRIEF OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LEGAL

CENTER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

COUNTIES, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES,

INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL LAWYERS

ASSOCIATION, GOVERNMENT FINANCE

OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, AND

INTERNATIONAL CITY/COUNTY

MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

AS AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

Amanda Karras

Erich Eiselt

INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION

51 Monroe Street, Suite 404

Rockville, MD 20850

Meaghan VerGow

Counsel of Record

Nina Oat

Alyssa Negvesky

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

1625 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 383-5400

mvergow@omm.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................... 3

ARGUMENT .............................................................. 5

I.

Local governments depend on property

tax enforcement to fund essential

services and maintain fiscal equity ..... 5

II.

State and local tax administrators

employ a variety of enforcement

mechanisms that are structured to

provide a fair value ............................. 13

III.

Tax foreclosure regimes are remedial,

not punitive ......................................... 19

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 22

APPENDIX A ........................................................... 1a

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Austin v. United States,

509 U.S. 602 (1993) ........................................ 19, 20

BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp.,

511 U.S. 531 (1994) .................................... 8, 14, 18

Bowles v. Sabree,

121 F.4th 539 (6th Cir. 2024) ................... 15, 18, 21

Freed v. Thomas,

81 F.4th 655 (6th Cir. 2023) ............... 14, 15, 18, 21

Hudson v. United States,

522 U.S. 93 (1997) ................................................ 21

Jones v. Flowers,

547 U.S. 220 (2006) ........................................ 16, 18

Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams,

462 U.S. 791 (1983) .............................................. 16

Slater v. Maxwell,

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 268 (1867) ........................... 14, 18

Timbs v. Indiana,

586 U.S. 146 (2019) .............................................. 19

Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty.,

598 U.S. 631 (2023) ............. 8, 11, 13, 16, 18, 20-22

United States v. Bajakajian,

524 U.S. 321 (1998) ............................ 19, 20, 21, 22

United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,

339 U.S. 121 (1950) .......................................... 7, 12

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

Constitutions

U.S. Const. amend. VIII........................................... 19

Ill. Const. art. IX § 8(a) ............................................ 15

Statutes

35 ILCS 200/21-75 .................................................... 15

Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 3694 .................................. 15

Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 3699 .................................. 15

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78 ..................................... 20

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78a(2) ............................... 16

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78b ................................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78b(g) ............................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78g(1) ............................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78g(3) ............................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78i .................................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78j .................................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78k ................................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78k(5)............................... 17

Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.78k(6)............................... 17

Minn. Stat. § 282.005, subd. 4 ................................. 12

Neb. Code § 40‑10‑120 ............................................. 17

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77‑1824......................................... 17

O.C.G.A. § 48‑4‑40.................................................... 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page(s)

S.C. Code Ann. § 12‑51‑90 ....................................... 17

Other Authorities

Andrey Yushkov, Property Taxes by State and

County, 2025, Tax Found. (2025)

https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/state/propertytaxes-by-state-county/ ............................................ 6

Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, A Primer on Price Discount

of REO Properties (Sept. 17, 2012) ...................... 10

Michael Chirico et al., Deterring Property Tax

Delinquency in Philadelphia: An Experimental

Evaluation of Nudge Strategies, Nat’l Bureau of

Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 23243 (Mar.

2017),

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers

/w23243/w23243.pdf ............................................... 7

Rita Jefferson & Galen Hendricks, How Local

Governments Raise Revenue – And What It Means

For Tax Equity, Inst. Taxation & Econ. Pol’y (Dec.

5, 2024),

https://itep.org/how-local-governments-raiserevenue-2024 .......................................................... 6

U.S. Census Bureau, Annual State and Local

Government Finances Summary: 2021 .................. 6

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Local Government Legal Center (“LGLC”) is

a coalition of government organizations formed in

2023 to provide education to local governments

regarding the Supreme Court and its impact on local

governments and officials and to advocate for local

government positions at the Supreme Court in

appropriate cases.

The National Association of

Counties, the National League of Cities, and the

International Municipal Lawyers Association are the

founding members of the LGLC. The Government

Finance Officers Association and the International

City/County Management Association are associate

members of the LGLC.

The National Association of Counties (“NACo”) is

the only national organization that represents county

governments in the United States. Founded in 1935,

NACo provides essential services to the nation’s 3,069

counties through advocacy, education, and research.

The National League of Cities (“NLC”), founded

in 1924, is the oldest and largest organization

representing U.S. municipal governments. NLC

works to strengthen local leadership, influence

federal policy, and drive innovative solutions. In

partnership with 49 state municipal leagues, NLC

advocates for over 19,000 cities, towns, and villages

where more than 218 million Americans live.

1 Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici curiae state

that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part and no entity or person, other than amici curiae, their

members, or their counsel, made any monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

The

International

Municipal

Lawyers

Association (“IMLA”) is the nation’s largest

organization devoted solely to local government law.

Founded in 1935, IMLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit,

professional association of counsel encompassing

more than 2,500 local government entities (including

cities,

counties,

and

subdivisions

thereof),

represented through their chief legal officers, state

municipal leagues, and individual attorneys. IMLA

advocates for the responsible development of

municipal law and presents the collective viewpoint

of local governments around the country in lawsuits

before the United States Supreme Court, federal

Courts of Appeal, and state supreme and appellate

courts in cases that raise issues of concern to its

members.

The Government Finance Officers Association

(“GFOA”) is the professional association of state,

provincial, and local finance officers in the United

States and Canada. GFOA has served the public

finance profession since 1906 and continues to

provide

leadership

to

government-finance

professionals through research, education, and the

identification and promotion of best practices. Its

more than 30,000 members are dedicated to the sound

management of government financial resources.

The International City/County Management

Association (“ICMA”) is a nonprofit professional

association of more than 13,500 appointed chief

executives, assistants, and local government leaders

serving cities, counties, towns, and regional entities.

ICMA’s mission is to create excellence in local

governance by advocating and developing the

3

professional management

throughout the world.

of

local

governments

State and local governments depend on the

regular enforcement of property tax obligations to

maintain the revenue base for the critical services

they provide. Around the country, localities have

adopted a variety of protections to provide procedural

fairness to tax obligors and maximize the value

recognized in tax sales; there is no endemic problem

in tax foreclosure systems that requires a “one-sizefits-all” constitutional fix. Petitioner’s broad-based

theories, if applied wholesale to taxing jurisdictions

nationwide, would undermine the ability of local

officials to secure and collect taxes, impeding their

ability to provide vital services to their communities.

Amici submit this brief to aid the Court’s

understanding of how local tax foreclosure systems

operate in practice and to offer considerations, based

on IMLA members’ experience across jurisdictions,

that will be relevant to the Court’s resolution of this

case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Property taxes are critical to local governance.

They provide the substantial majority of local funding

for essential services like public schools, police and

emergency response, sanitation, and maintenance of

roads and community facilities. The collection of

property taxes is accordingly a core responsibility of

local governments. Localities, like homeowners,

prefer to resolve tax debts without a public sale:

stability strengthens local communities along with

the tax base. But tax sales are a critical measure of

last resort to support compliance with local tax rules,

4

and to support in turn all the services that local

governments provide.

Across the country, a variety of procedural

protections exist to help homeowners avoid public tax

sales altogether and to ensure that properties are

sold, if they are sold at all, for amounts that reflect

their fair market value. The protections are designed

to ensure that tax obligors are fairly treated every

step of the way, providing homeowners with notice,

time, and mechanisms to avoid a public sale,

including redemption and other ways to retain their

property. Petitioner’s contention that tax obligors

have a constitutionally protected interest in the value

that could be obtained under different conditions

ignores the realities inherent to a public sale, where

localities lack the rights of access and improvement

that contribute to the value that can be realized in a

private sale. Public sales are structured to maximize

the value that can be generated under the

circumstances—but

those

circumstances

are

necessarily different from what a private sale entails.

A judicial ruling that the output of a public sale

invariably does not reflect fair value for a property,

regardless of the many protections afforded to

homeowners under diverse enforcement mechanisms

across the nation, would throw local tax systems into

disarray. Jurisdictions around the country use a

variety of processes to avoid the fairness concerns

petitioner raises in this case, yet petitioner’s theory

would require courts everywhere to disregard the

price produced by a procedurally fair tax foreclosure

process and to substitute a judicially determined

retail value. Requiring localities to remit to tax

5

obligors the value that could have been generated in

a private sale would deliver a windfall to tax obligors

who declined to initiate a private sale themselves.

Such a result would be particularly unjust inasmuch

as the locality does not itself receive the proceeds from

a private sale, meaning the payment would have to

come from revenue generated from the tax obligor’s

tax-paying neighbors. That is not a result required by

the Takings Clause.

The Excessive Fines Clause also is not implicated

in this case. The Excessive Fines Clause concerns

punishment, not the remedial collection of public

revenue. And tax foreclosure is very much remedial:

The process is directed at the nonpayment of a

financial obligation, not the redress of culpable

conduct. It provides the debtor with opportunities for

cure and redemption, unlike punishment schemes.

When the sale produces residual value, that value is

returned to the debtor. If the system does not work

as designed in a particular instance, problems can be

addressed through other measures, including the Due

Process Clause. But a tax system is not punitive as a

rule simply because it permits enforcement through

foreclosure of the taxed property.

ARGUMENT

I.

Local governments depend on property

tax enforcement to fund essential

services and maintain fiscal equity.

A. Property taxes are a principal source of

revenue used to finance key public services like public

schools, police and fire protection, sanitation, and

6

maintenance of roads and public facilities.2 In fiscal

year 2022, for example, property taxes accounted for

70.2% of local tax collections and 27.4% of total state

and local tax collections in the United States, more

than any other single source of tax revenue. Andrey

Yushkov, Property Taxes by State and County, 2025,

Tax

Found.

(2025)

https://taxfoundation.org/

data/all/state/property-taxes-by-state-county/; U.S.

Census Bureau, Annual State and Local Government

Finances Summary: 2021, at 1–2 (reporting that taxes

were 51.6% of state and local general revenue in 2021,

30% of which came from property taxes); see also, e.g.,

IMLA Survey 33a–34a (W.Va.) (reflecting that school

boards receive 66.3% of property taxes collected).3

B. Because property tax revenue is such a

significant component of municipal budgets, local

governments treat property tax enforcement as a

routine operational responsibility. When taxes go

unpaid, there is no corresponding reduction in the

See Rita Jefferson & Galen Hendricks, How Local

Governments Raise Revenue – And What It Means For Tax

Equity, Inst. Taxation & Econ. Pol’y (Dec. 5, 2024),

https://itep.org/how-local-governments-raise-revenue-2024/.

2

IMLA conducted a member survey to collect descriptive

information about local tax foreclosure administration across

jurisdictions, including owner “off-ramps,” marketing and

inspection constraints, auction formats, and post-sale title and

possession issues. Unless otherwise noted, citations of “IMLA

Survey” refer to Int’l Mun. Laws Ass’n, Survey of Local Tax

Foreclosure Practices (Dec. 2025) (responses from local

government attorneys and officials; cited responses attached as

Appendix A; all responses on file with counsel). Citations

referring to particular jurisdictions refer to the named survey

responses (Appendix A).

3

7

demands for community services. The budgetary

pressure is instead absorbed through deferred

maintenance, reduced service levels, or redistributed

burdens on compliant taxpayers. See United States v.

Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950);

IMLA Survey 33a–34a (W.Va.) (describing delinquent

property tax enforcement as “a critical mechanism for

counties to ensure revenue collection for public

services like schools, when property owners fail to pay

their taxes”).

The consequences of nonpayment, if left

unchecked, can snowball. When nonpayment shifts

costs to the public, it distorts the incentive to comply

with property tax requirements. That is why public

finance analysis treats tax compliance as a collective

action problem: when public services are provided

broadly, nonpayment shifts costs to the rest of the tax

base and weakens incentives for future compliance.

See, e.g., Michael Chirico et al., Deterring Property

Tax Delinquency in Philadelphia: An Experimental

Evaluation of Nudge Strategies, Nat’l Bureau of Econ.

Rsch., Working Paper No. 23243, at 1–4 (Mar. 2017),

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w

23243/w23243.pdf (“[F]ailure to collect the property

tax on time creates budget uncertainty at best and

budget deficits at worst.”).

The “just compensation” framework captures the

same institutional concept. What is “just” must

account for both the owner and “the public that must

pay the bill.” Commodities Trading, 339 U.S. at 123.

In the property tax context, that “public” consists of

the residents and taxpayers who continue funding

shared services even when particular owners do not.

8

If core services must continue to be provided, the

system necessarily requires an enforcement

mechanism that preserves equitable funding.

C. To head off the consequences of property tax

nonpayment, states have long treated foreclosure and

public sale as a necessary collection backstop—one

that must operate at scale, through standardized

procedures, and within the legal constraints that

attend any forced transfer of property rights. See

Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 598 U.S. 631, 637–38 (2023).

Under those constraints, the auction price is the

appropriate measure of value. In the ordinary

market, a seller can access and prepare a property;

make

improvements;

permit

showings

and

inspections; provide disclosures; negotiate warranties

or price adjustments; and time the offering of a

property to market conditions.

Tax foreclosure

authorities generally cannot replicate those

conditions. Foreclosure sales occur under statutory

procedures and practical constraints grounded in

property law that shape the information available to

bidders and the risks bidders must price. See BFP v.

Resol. Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 548–49 (1994).

First, foreclosure sales typically proceed on an

“as-is” basis with limited inspections. Until title and

possession change hands, the owner’s right to exclude

generally remains operative. Local officials typically

cannot authorize entry for themselves or prospective

bidders without the owner’s consent. As a result, tax

foreclosure sales frequently proceed with limited

information and limited opportunities for bidders to

conduct interior inspections.

9

IMLA’s survey of member jurisdictions confirms

that these access and inspection limits are common

across local tax foreclosure systems. In Middletown,

Connecticut, bidders cannot inspect tax foreclosed

properties before sale.

IMLA Survey 26a.

In

Charleston, South Carolina, bidders have no

inspection access unless the owner allows entry.

IMLA Survey 24a. In Philadelphia, bidders are

unable to inspect tax foreclosed properties before sale.

IMLA Survey 10a. Other jurisdictions described

inspection access, at most, as exterior observation

from a public right of way, rather than interior access

or retail-style showings. IMLA Survey 21a (City of

Rochester, N.Y.). Some respondents described the

absence of any statutory right to inspect in the tax

foreclosure setting.

IMLA Survey 19a (City of

Hampton, Va.).

In addition to uncertainty surrounding a

property’s physical condition, tax foreclosure auctions

commonly allocate legal and transactional risks to

bidders. Many jurisdictions sell property “as is”

without customary warranties or negotiated price

adjustments. Charleston’s respondent emphasized

that buyers often must undertake additional legal

work to obtain clear title, a cost rational bidders

incorporate into their offers. IMLA Survey 23a (City

of Charleston, S.C.).

Those constraints do not “artificially” depress

value, as petitioner claims. Pet. i (referring to “the

artificially depressed auction sale price”). They are

inherent to a sale with informational asymmetry not

characteristic of a private sale. When potential

purchasers have less information available to them

10

than they would with a right of entry and inspection,

they must price the resulting additional risk into

their bids. Likewise with the absence of the familiar

contingencies (inspection periods, repair credits,

warranties) that often support higher offers in private

transactions.

Rational bidders respond by

incorporating a margin to account for unknown

interior conditions, potential occupancy issues, and

the expected costs of obtaining possession after sale.

See, e.g., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, A Primer on Price

Discount of REO Properties 2–3 (Sept. 17, 2012)

(describing typical distressed-sale discounts).

Given these factors, comparisons between an

auction price and a later resale price are misleading.

Post-sale purchasers can invest capital and labor to

make properties habitable, code-compliant, and

marketable; they may also resolve title defects and

other legal uncertainties that suppress auction bids.

See, e.g., id. A higher subsequent resale price

therefore often reflects value added (and risk

removed) after the tax sale, rather than a defect in the

sale itself.

IMLA’s survey evidence aligns with that

dynamic. One county respondent reported that

“about [half] of the properties purchased at a tax sale

and not redeemed are improved or sold to another

party for their use.” IMLA Survey 3a (Delaware

Cnty., Ind.).

Where post sale legal steps are

required—such as quiet-title litigation—those steps

themselves can materially increase resale value by

converting a risky distressed asset into a marketable

one. IMLA Survey 23a–24a (City of Charleston, S.C.).

A later resale price therefore does not, without more,

11

establish

that

the

original

constitutionally defective.

auction

was

D. In a properly designed tax foreclosure system,

local governments benefit from competitive sales. A

higher sale price increases the likelihood that all

delinquent taxes, statutory interest, enforcement

expenses, and other public liens (such as unpaid

utility charges or demolition assessments, where

applicable) can be satisfied from the proceeds. See

Tyler, 598 U.S. at 637–38 (recognizing the State’s

ability to impose interest and fees and to sell property

to recover what is owed). In contrast, a poorly

attended auction that does not result in a sale can add

material administrative costs through re-noticing and

re-running auctions, as well as operational burdens of

managing the property.

Survey responses reflect that many jurisdictions,

within statutory constraints, use modern methods to

expand participation and strengthen competition in

public sales. For example, Fairfax County reported

that it conducts tax sales via online bidding; that

bidder participation and bid prices proved better

under that model; and that it opens auctions for

multiple days while providing advance notice to an

email list of interested bidders, along with newspaper

publications. IMLA Survey 15a–17a (Fairfax Cnty.,

Va.). Fairfax also reports a reasonableness check: the

sale terms permit the attorney conducting the sale to

call “no sale” when bids are not reasonable under the

circumstances. Id.

St. Louis County, Minnesota, similarly describes

its initial sale process as an unrestricted public online

auction available worldwide, adopted because the

12

County determined that online sales increase ease

and fairness by reaching the greatest number of

potential bidders. IMLA Survey 6a–8a (St. Louis

Cnty., Minn.). The County describes a layered

outreach designed to ensure that bidders learn of sale

opportunities through multiple channels.

Id.

Minnesota’s statutory public sale provisions promote

broad notice and participation by requiring

publication of notice in newspapers, websites, and

other forums that serve diverse communities in the

county where the property is located at least thirty

days before the sale commences. Minn. Stat.

§ 282.005, subd. 4.

These measures are consistent with the

institutional reality that local tax collection offices are

not indifferent to price. Local officials operate within

a framework that does not include all the tools

available to a retail seller, but they still have strong

incentives to maximize participation and ensure that

sales are transparent and competitive.

A constitutional rule requiring local governments

to pay owners the difference between a post hoc

“retail” valuation and the proceeds of a properly

conducted foreclosure auction would destabilize tax

enforcement nationwide.

It would force taxing

authorities who lack the legal ability to deliver retail

market conditions to litigate valuation in a large class

of routine collection cases, siphoning scarce public

resources away from core services. The predictable

result would be higher collection costs and increased

fiscal pressure on compliant taxpayers—the same

public that must fund local services and “pay the bill.”

Commodities Trading, 339 U.S. at 123.

13

Such a rule would also create a significant

practical problem for local governments and,

ultimately, for courts: it would require determining

the “fair market value” of a property in the first

instance. This would require determining when the

property should be valued, as market conditions can

fluctuate significantly over time, and different

valuation dates may produce materially different

results. External factors, such as stock market

changes or economic recessions, may temporarily

inflate or deflate a “market value,” and it would be

necessary to determine which party must bear the

risk of those fluctuations. And it would require

determining how to assess that value using

counterfactual assumptions about the conditions of

the sale, likely necessitating litigation and a “battle of

the experts” in every dispute over the proper value.

Creating a constitutional rule that a tax obligor must

be compensated based on a value that is, in reality, an

ever-moving target would be unworkable for both tax

authorities and for courts.

II.

State and local tax administrators

employ a variety of enforcement

mechanisms that are structured to

provide a fair value.

A. Tyler v. Hennepin County reaffirmed the

constitutional baseline for tax collection sales: States

may seize and sell property to recover delinquent

taxes and lawful charges, but they may not retain

value beyond what they are owed. 598 U.S. at 637–

42.

The judgment below applies that rule by

awarding petitioner the surplus proceeds generated

by the tax foreclosure sale (sale price minus the tax

14

debt and authorized costs), while rejecting his request

for an additional award measured by a distinct “fair

market value.”

Pet. App. 11a–12a, 43a–44a.

Petitioner’s challenge to that judgment would require

courts to disregard the price produced by a properly

conducted foreclosure auction and to substitute a

judicially determined “retail” valuation that

presumes conditions the foreclosure process does

not—and cannot—provide. See id.; see also BFP, 511

U.S. at 548.4

No court has ever accepted that theory, and this

Court should not do so now. Foreclosure “redefin[es]

the market in which the property is offered for sale,”

such that “normal free-market rules of exchange are

replaced by the far more restrictive rules governing

forced sales.” BFP, 511 U.S. at 548. For that reason,

courts have long has focused on sale integrity—i.e.,

whether the process is free from “fraud or

unfairness”—and have not treated “inadequacy of the

price,” standing alone, as a basis for invalidating a

properly conducted tax sale. Slater v. Maxwell, 73

U.S. (6 Wall.) 268, 273, 276 (1867). See, e.g., Freed v.

Thomas, 81 F.4th 655, 659 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he best

evidence of a foreclosed property’s value is the

property’s sales price, not what it was worth before

4 BFP addressed mortgage foreclosure and the Bankruptcy

Code’s “reasonably equivalent value” standard, but its

recognition that foreclosure “redefines the market” and makes

ordinary “fair market value” inapposite explains why, for

distressed property sold under statutory constraints, the fairly

conducted auction price is the best evidence of value under those

constraints. See 511 U.S. at 537–39, 548–49.

15

the foreclosure.”); Bowles v. Sabree, 121 F.4th 539,

548, 551 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Freed, 81 F.4th at

659). The difference between the value that might

have been realized through a hypothetical retail sale

and the value that was realized in fact through a

public sale is not “taken” from a homeowner—the

actual sale reflects the property’s value as it actually

existed at the time of the transaction, under the

conditions that applied to the sale.

B. Critically, the homeowner has the opportunity

to control those conditions. Homeowners can satisfy

a tax debt before foreclosure is even initiated. And

when localities must resort to foreclosure to support

tax enforcement, fairness is built into the process in a

number of ways.

For one, before foreclosure or tax sale proceedings

commence, tax authorities are typically required to

act pursuant to statutory processes and, in many

states, obtain authorization from a governing board

or court, underscoring that property disposition

occurs only through layered governmental approval

rather than unilateral action. In California, for

example, while the county tax collector administers

the tax sale process, the county board of supervisors

must first authorize the sale of tax defaulted

property, and the tax collector acts pursuant to that

authorization rather than independent discretion.

Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 3694, 3699. And in Illinois,

tax authorities may not foreclose on tax delinquent

property without judicial oversight and statutory

approvals. See 35 ILCS 200/21-75; Ill. Const. art. IX

§ 8(a).

16

For another, foreclosure systems provide owners

with multiple opportunities to protect their equity

before a forced sale. These procedures are designed

to provide notice, time, and lawful mechanisms for

cure before title is transferred and a sale occurs. See

Tyler, 598 U.S. at 637–38; see also Jones v. Flowers,

547 U.S. 220, 226–39 (2006); Mennonite Bd. of

Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798–800 (1983).

Before title is extinguished, owners receive notice,

have opportunities to redeem, and may avoid

foreclosure by paying in full, entering payment plans,

or selling the property through ordinary channels.

And in practice, many jurisdictions report that most

delinquent properties never reach auction. See, e.g.,

IMLA Survey 14a (Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska

reports that ”the vast majority” of foreclosure suits do

not proceed to sale).

Michigan’s General Property Tax Act illustrates

the basic structure.

Unpaid taxes become

“delinquent” and, if still unpaid, the property is

“forfeited,” enabling the county to petition for

foreclosure; the Act then requires notices and

hearings before a court may enter a foreclosure

judgment.5

Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 211.78a(2),

5 Although Michigan’s statutory structure includes a

forfeiture stage, forfeiture is not a feature of all state taxforeclosure systems, and forfeiture and non-forfeiture regimes

are not interchangeable with respect to the pre-sale conditions

that can affect auction outcomes. In forfeiture jurisdictions,

where a state may have possession of the property in advance of

sale, prospective buyers may have an opportunity for pre-sale

inspection, which can affect the pricing of the sale. Some

17

211.78g(1), 211.78b, 211.78i–78k. Up to the point

title vests, the owner has an “off‑ramp”: the taxpayer

may redeem by paying delinquent taxes and lawful

charges, removing the property from the foreclosure

pipeline.

Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 211.78g(3),

211.78k(5)–(6), 211.78b(g).

That “off-ramp”

necessarily includes the ability to dispose of the

property through a private sale, if the homeowner is

unable to satisfy the tax debt through alternative

means.

Some regimes provide redemption and equity

protection pathways even after a sale. Neb. Code

§ 40‑10‑120; O.C.G.A. § 48‑4‑40.6 Nebraska generally

provides a three‑year redemption period following a

tax certificate sale. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77‑1824. South

Carolina provides a one‑year redemption period

following a tax sale. S.C. Code Ann. § 12‑51‑90.

Alabama and Georgia likewise provide redemption

periods following tax sales.

forfeiture jurisdictions also make use of realtors in their sale

processes, though that can also affect the costs of the sale. See

IMLA Survey 29a (Maine Municipal Association) (noting that

Maine law requires municipalities, if possible, to use a realestate agent or broker to sell tax-acquired property); id. at 33a

(City of Boston Law Department) (noting that Massachusetts

requires municipalities to list foreclosed property with a licensed

real-estate agent or broker). Those resources are not available in

non-forfeiture jurisdictions, where the tax obligor retains

possession and control of the property until the sale.

6 The right of redemption is a protection for tax obligors but

a risk for purchasers, and thus necessarily affects the value that

can be realized in a public sale.

18

These “off‑ramps” matter to the constitutional

analysis of valuation because they preserve owner

agency before the strictures of foreclosure alter the

market. When an owner cures the delinquency or

arranges a voluntary transfer, the owner can access

ordinary market mechanisms that can support

potentially higher prices. But when those avenues

are not used, a forced sale proceeds under constraints

that can affect the price that can be realized. BFP,

511 U.S. at 548.

C. These foreclosure procedures—and the context

in which they operate—demonstrate the inherent

fairness in the process. But if the Court is concerned

about case-specific unfairness, it has a narrow and

administrable path that does not require a sweeping

valuation mandate for state and local governments

across the country. Material defects such as serious

notice failures, fraud, collusion, or deficient processes

can raise due process concerns and justify casespecific remedies focused on the fairness of the sale

process. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 226–39; Slater, 73

U.S. (6 Wall.) at 273, 276. But absent such defects—

particularly where the government is not paid and

therefore does not retain surplus value beyond the tax

debt—the Constitution does not require local

governments to guarantee a counterfactual retail

outcome to tax-delinquent residents. Tyler, 598 U.S.

at 637–42; Freed, 81 F.4th at 659; Bowles, 121 F.4th

at 551.

***

Thousands of local governments across the

country have used democratic processes to develop a

multiplicity of procedures, tailored to their local

19

communities, to enforce their tax laws fairly. All of

those procedures generally aim to give tax obligors

ample opportunity to keep their homes and to

maximize the value of their interests in their homes.

But tax enforcement schemes strive for fairness

across multiple constituencies—to homeowners who

fall behind on their taxes, and also to the taxpayers

who foot the bill for the many services that benefit the

community as a whole. No just compensation system

should require a community to pay financial subsidies

to individuals who fail to pay their taxes.

III.

Tax foreclosure regimes are remedial, not

punitive.

A. The Excessive Fines Clause is directed at

governmental “fines,” U.S. Const. amend. VIII, or

“payment[s] to sovereign as punishment for some

offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,

327 (1998) (quotations omitted).

It “limits the

government’s power to extract payments, whether in

cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’” Id.

at 328 (citation omitted). Although the Clause can

apply in civil settings, its trigger remains the same:

the challenged exaction must be at least partly

punitive, rather than “solely” remedial. Austin v.

United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610, 621–22 (1993); see

also Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146, 151 (2019).

When a state or local government conducts a

foreclosure sale, applies the proceeds to the

delinquency and authorized costs, and returns any

surplus to the former owner, it has not extracted any

payment beyond what the taxpayer owed.

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 342 (distinguishing

punishment from measures that reimburse the

20

government for losses). Treating that process as an

Eighth Amendment “fine” would elide the line

between punitive sanctions and routine collection of

public revenue for local governments. The Court

should thus decline to extend the Excessive Fines

Clause in a way that recasts ordinary lien

enforcement as punitive extraction.

Several indicia support this conclusion.

First, tax foreclosure is triggered by nonpayment

of a financial obligation, not by a finding of culpable

conduct. The process does not turn on intent or

blameworthiness; it proceeds regardless of whether

nonpayment resulted from hardship, mistake, or

willful refusal. That neutrality of purpose is a

hallmark of a remedial collection mechanism rather

than a punitive sanction. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610;

Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328.

Second, the structure of tax foreclosure systems

emphasizes cure and redemption—features that

reinforce that the system’s objective is payment of the

debt, not punishment of the debtor. See Tyler, 598

U.S. at 637–38; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 211.78 et seq. A

system designed to punish would not ordinarily

provide a standardized mechanism by which the

owner can defeat the sale by satisfying the obligation.

Third, the return of the former owner’s residual

value further confirms the remedial character of the

enforcement mechanism. Where the government

satisfies the delinquency and lawful charges and

returns the surplus proceeds to the former owner, the

collection action correlates to the government’s loss

(unpaid taxes and related costs) rather than

21

extracting value for punishment or revenue beyond

the debt. See Tyler, 598 U.S. at 639–42; Freed, 81

F.4th at 658–59; Bowles, 121 F.4th at 551.

To be sure, tax enforcement mechanisms can

have incidental deterrent effects. But deterrent effect

does not, by itself, transform a remedial scheme into

a punitive one. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.

93, 105 (1997) (recognizing that deterrence “may

serve civil as well as criminal goals” and is not

dispositive of whether a measure is punitive

(quotations omitted)). In local government practice,

foreclosure is not used to “punish” delinquent owners.

As explained above, foreclosure operates to maintain

the enforceability of property tax obligations across

the tax base and, in turn, the viability of local public

finance. See Tyler, 598 U.S. at 637–38.

B. A foreclosure sale is a mechanism for

liquidating property to satisfy a lien. When surplus

proceeds are returned, the government has not

extracted the property’s residual value. The former

owner receives the remaining sale proceeds after the

delinquency and authorized costs are paid. Pet. App.

11a–12a (describing the judgment below as awarding

petitioner surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale

while rejecting a further award based on asserted preforeclosure fair market value).

Under those

conditions, there is no governmental “payment”

extracted beyond the debt itself. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.

at 327–28.

The concern that tax forfeiture schemes might, in

certain circumstances, be viewed as punitive if they

operate to take and keep value substantially beyond

the tax debt (see Tyler, 598 U.S. at 645–46) does not

22

materialize here, where the surplus proceeds are

returned and the government retains only what the

taxpayer owed. Pet. App. 11a–12a. In this setting,

the hallmarks of a punitive forfeiture are absent

because the government is not extracting additional

value as retribution, and it is not imposing an added

sanction calibrated to an “offense.” Bajakajian, 524

U.S. at 327–28.

The proper constitutional boundary is thus the

one Tyler drew: the government may recover what it

is owed, but it may not retain the owner’s residual

equity. 598 U.S. at 637–42. Where that line is

honored, the Excessive Fines Clause provides no basis

to impose an additional, valuation-based award

untethered to the sale proceeds.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should

affirm the Sixth Circuit’s decision.

Respectfully submitted,

Amanda Karras

Erich Eiselt

INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL

LAWYERS ASSOCIATION

51 Monroe Street

Suite 404

Rockville, MD 20850

January 20, 2026

Meaghan VerGow

Counsel of Record

Nina Oat

Alyssa Negvesky

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

1625 Eye Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 383-5400

mvergow@omm.com

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A: IMLA Survey ..................................... 1a

1a

APPENDIX A

Delaware County, Indiana

Respondent #119017335431

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

Property value is determined based upon a value

made by the County Assessor from the assessment

value. The tax or deed sale auction price is

different (less than) from the assessed value in the

majority of properties sold.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

The list of properties to be sold is published in a

newspaper and made available in the County

offices. Prospective bidders are permitted to drive

by the properties, but are not allowed to enter the

properties unless permission is granted by the

owner.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

The County Treasurer can enter into a tax sale

2a

agreement with the property owner before the sale

on a payment arrangement for past due taxes.

This is usually an installment payment plan

process. A bidder that is successful at a tax sale in

obtaining a property is given a Tax Sale

Certificate. This allows the bidder to be paid in

the event of a redemption. A property owner that

has property sold at a tax sale is given a period of

redemption of one year from the date of the tax

sale to redeem the property by paying off the past

due taxes, penalties and costs of the tax sale along

with interest that is set by statute on the past due

taxes and any surplus. If a property is redeemed,

then any surplus is paid back to the bidder. If a

property is not redeemed, the holder of the Tax

Sale Certificate petitions the court for a tax deed

to own the property. If there is a surplus paid on

the amount due, the surplus is paid to the owner

of the property if requested. [N]o real property can

be sold to a buyer after a tax sale without the

property taxes being paid and the property

redeemed under the statutes. In a deed sale, the

property has been through at least 2 tax sales and

not sold and also taxes not paid during the interim

of the two tax sales. A deed sale is an absolute sale

for a bid amount from the County to the bidder.

there is no redemption time or ability of the owner

to redeem the property once it is sold at a deed

sale. An owner can redeem the property prior to

the sale or work out an installment arrangement

with the County Treasurer prior to the deed sale.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

3a

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

No, for a tax sale a minimum bid is established as

the amount of the taxes, penalties and cost of sale

due for the property to be sold. For a deed sale,

there is a minimum bid set and that is not tied to

the assessed value of the property or fair market

value.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

In Delaware County, about 1/2 of the properties

purchased at a tax sale and not redeemed are

improved or sold to another party for their use.

[M]any tax sale properties not redeemed end up on

tax sale list[s] in subsequent years.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

A typical tax sale conducted by Delaware County

will have around 800 parcels that are offered for

sale. About 50% will be sold and issued a tax sale

certificate. Before the sale, the property owner can

pay the taxes or work out a payment plan with the

County Treasurer. That occurs in about 2% of the

4a

total properties offered for sale and after the list is

published. Prior to the publication of the list of

eligible properties some owners of property will

make arrangements for full payment or

installment payments in about 2% to 3% of the

total properties eligible for the tax sale. After the

tax sale approximately 10% of the properties sold

and given a tax sale certificate will redeem the

property and keep from being foreclosed. At an

absolute deed sale, about one-half (50%) of the

properties are sold. The rest are either donated to

smaller municipalities, land banks, not for profit

tax exempt entities for rehab work like Habitat for

Humanity or left to go through another sale.

Generally industrial properties with some possible

environmental issues are not easily disposed of by

tax or deed sale. A number of properties are not

sold in an absolute deed sale because the owners

and/or entities with an interest in the real estate

did not get the proper notice, mostly because they

have disappeared or gone out of business.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

The Indiana Code requires that the list of

properties, property owners and parcel numbers

be sent a notice via mail and a publication in the

newspaper prior to the sale. Delaware County also

posts the list of tax sale eligible parcels on its

website. As for properties in the deed sale, two

notices are required to be sent to the listed

5a

property owner, any person, firm or entity that has

a legal interest in the property such as judgment

holders, mortgage holders or other lien holders are

given two notices of the opportunity to pay the

balance before the absolute deed sale is conducted.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

There are tax sale costs that are added to the past

due taxes which are required to be paid. Vendors

are permitted to add costs of sale as well as the

cost of title searches, advertising and

administrative fees to the amount that is to be

paid to either pay before the sale or as part of the

redemption. Demolition costs can be made a lien

that qualifies a property to be sold at a “tax sale”

for a tax sale certificate.

St. Louis County, Minnesota

Respondent #119015794828

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

In St. Louis County, the value used for tax

purposes, or Estimated Market Value (EMV), is

determined by the county assessor’s office using

historic sales information and valuation data

combined with periodic site inspections for

6a

property value reassessment. Taxes are billed and

collected by the County Auditor. The starting bid,

or auction price, for forfeitures is the same as the

most recent EMV for the initial auction within 6

months of forfeiture required under MN Stat

282.005. If no sale occurs in the initial EMV

auction, the parcel is offered in a second auction

with starting bid price being the “[m]inimum bid”

which means the sum of delinquent taxes, special

assessments, penalties, interests, and costs

assigned to the parcel.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

Yes, as long as there are no undue safety related

risks, potential bidders are allowed to

independently inspect offered forfeited properties

in St. Louis County. This entails contacting the

county Land and Minerals Department to sign a

liability waiver and to check out and return a key

upon completion of the inspection as the properties

are secured. A former owner’s consent is not

required by our county.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

7a

1. Redemption periods: Property owners have the

option to repurchase the property before final

auction as established under MN Stat 282.241.

2. Installment payment plans: The County

Auditor can negotiate payment plans with owners

of property in tax delinquent status.

3. Private sales: Private sale is a means to avoid

tax forfeiture. Delinquent taxes are required to be

paid and made current before sale transfer and

recording.

Delinquent taxes are sometimes

negotiated between buyer and seller.

4. Consent showings: Tax forfeited properties are

available for independent inspections for the

purpose of showing to potential bidders of the

auction. Former owner consent is not required.

Former owners can only enter property upon

request and approval.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

St. Louis County offers forfeited properties with

starting bid equal to the EMV in accordance with

MN Stat 282.05. The property is offered via an

unrestricted public online auction format that is

available to all with internet access, worldwide.

We have determined an unrestricted online

auction system maximizes ease and fairness to

reach and accommodate the maximum number of

8a

potential bidders.

In addition, MN Statute

282.005, subd. 4 requires notice of the sale must

be provided by publication in newspapers,

websites, and other forums that serve diverse

communities in the county where the property is

located at least 30 days before the commencement

of the sale.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

Many tax forfeited parcels come to the county in a

dilapidated or poor condition due to the nature of

tax forfeited property. It is common and often

necessary for the purchasers of tax forfeited

properties to make significant improvements

before reselling the property to compensate or

improve upon the purchase price of the property.

It is common for the county to have to clean up,

remediate, or demolish personal property in order

to bring many tax forfeited properties up to a

“saleable” condition or a condition which would

interest potential purchasers.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

*This this request would have to be further

analyzed to ensure an accurate response.*

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

9a

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

St. Louis County offers tax forfeited property via

an unrestricted public online auction format that

is available to all with internet access worldwide.

We have determined an unrestricted online

auction system that maximizes ease and fairness

to reach and accommodate the maximum number

of potential bidders. Property advertisement

meets the minimum required under MN Statute

282.005, [s]ubd. 4 which requires notice of the sale

must be provided by publication in newspapers,

websites, and other forums that serve diverse

communities in the county where the property is

located at least 30 days before the commencement

of the sale. The county also advertises by placing

signage at the property on-site, the county’s social

media platform, the county’s internet, site, and

flyers distributed across the county.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

MN Statute 282.005 requires a public auction

procedure with prior advertisement timelines and

requirements which is intended to maximize sale

proceeds and fairness in the sale process.

10a

City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Respondent #119015710014

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

The property is valued by the county assessors on

a bi-annual basis. The auction price is different

from that amount 100 percent of the time.

Sometimes it is higher, sometimes it is lower.

Property valuation is voodoo. It’s a guess.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

No.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

In Pennsylvania, property owners can 1) get into

payment agreements to pay the tax, 2) sell the

property and pay the tax, 3) declare [bankruptcy],

or depending on what statute the property is sold

under redeem the property.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

11a

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

In Pennsylvania, generally the first sales are

subject to the other encumbrances. If there is not

robust bidding, then there is an upset sale which

sells it free and clear. In Philadelphia and

Allegheny counties the sale prices are immediately

free and clear. Further, we now have online

bidding. Online bidding allows bidders from all

over the world to participate. Anecdotally, we

have seen a huge increase in sale prices from

online bidding.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

It’s a mixed bag. Usually they just hold for a short

period and then sell to a developer.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

In Philadelphia, the Law Department starts with

a list of usually 1-200 properties. In the weeks

before the sale we do substantial outreach and

winnow that down to a handful of properties that

go to auction. Further, we have a diversion

12a

program for owner occupants.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Properties are listed in multiple publications and

on the web.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

No.

Municipality of Anchorage, Alaska

Respondent #119015597472

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

By state law, property is assessed for its full and

true value, minus any allowed exemptions. The

auction price is always different than the assessed

value. Auction price is the outstanding taxes,

interest, penalties, admin fees, plus any costs of

maintaining/managing the property while in

municipal ownership; i.e. cleanup fees, HOA/condo

dues, demolition costs.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

13a

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

Only exterior inspection. The Municipality does

not open the property while holding clerk’s deed,

but the bidders are allowed to contact the

residents in the property to arrange an interior

inspection. The Municipality does not give contact

info or imply that bidders should make contact,

they do that on their own.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

Redemption period/Repurchase right up until the

auction closes. The Municipality has allowed for

private sale arrangements to be made.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

No, none of the above.

outstanding taxes and fees.

Minimum bid is

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

14a

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

We do not track this.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

The average number of cases over the last 10

years: 810 per year. On average, only 6 of those

are not resolved and included in the auction. So,

the vast majority (804) are resolved.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Auctioned properties are listed in the local

newspaper, posted on our website, and signage is

posted at the property for auction.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

No.

15a

Fairfax County, Virginia

Respondent #119013136553

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

Real estate values are to be assessed based on

100% of the fair market value of the property. For

judicial tax sales in Virginia, properties that are

assessed higher than $100,000 require an

appraisal to be submitted to the court prior to a

decree of sale permitting the auction of the real

estate. Typically, the appraisals are ‘exterior only’

so the information can be limited in some

instances.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

No, Virginia does not permit an on-site inspection

prior to the auction. We do encourage all bidders

to lawfully view the property and conduct their

own due diligence before bidding.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

16a

We endeavor to allow all properties to redeem

prior to auction and provide payment plans that

are reasonably intended to meet the competing

goals of paying off the delinquency timely, as well

as staying within the property owner’s budget. In

Virginia, anyone can redeem the property by

paying all taxes due up to the day of the auction.

Private sales are generally not conducted in

Virginia unless there are exigent circumstances.

An example is a parking lot of a condominium

complex where the defunct developer failed to

transfer the lot to the condo association.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

Taxing Authority Consulting Services, PC

conducts the auctions for Fairfax County. The

attorneys are very conscious of the assessed or

appraised values and operate with a term of sale

that the attorney can call ‘no sale’ if the bid price

is not reasonable under the circumstances.

Generally speaking, we attempt to achieve a bid

price over 60% of the assessed value or 75% of the

appraised value as a general rule of thumb.

Virginia does not permit upset bids, however,

courts in Virginia judicial sales are responsible for

making a determination of reasonableness of the

property sale price at a post-auction decree of

confirmation.

17a

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

Post-auction use of the property has not been

studied and is therefore unknown.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

Fairfax will typically begin tax sale proceedings to

sell 15 to 25 properties per year with

approximately one-half redeeming prior to the

auction. Fairfax also places accounts with Taxing

Authority Consulting Services, PC, before they are

aged sufficiently for a tax sale in order to start the

collections process early through other means

than by tax sale to attempt resolution of the

delinquency early.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Tax sales in Fairfax County are conducted via

online bidding, which began during COVID. The

participation, both in number of bidders and the

bid prices achieved, proved to be much better with

this model. Online auctions will open for bidding

approximately 2-3 weeks prior to the auction close

18a

date for bids to be received for multiple days.

TACS maintains a repository of approximately

28,000 emails for interested bidders that receive

notice of the auction 30 days prior to the close and

a reminder email two days prior to the close of

bidding. TACS includes the advertisement on its

website.

Newspaper publications are also

provided in the legal classifieds section of the

generally circulated local paper. TACS also fields

calls from interested bidders related to the

properties to explain the process and provide

information about the property.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

The only incentive designed to maximize pricing at

auctions is the provision for a special

commissioner of sale in judicial sales to receive as

compensation 5% of the purchase price for the first

$100,000 and 2% for all amounts over $100,000.

The tax sale provisions, however, do not allow for

compensation for the add-on attorney fees in

addition to the special commissioner's fee, so tax

sale attorneys typically are remunerated on the

higher of the two. If auctioneers are employed to

aid in the tax sales, they are generally

compensated with a buyer’s premium on a

percentage of the sale price that is borne by the

high bidder and is not taken from the sale price.

19a

City of Hampton, Virginia

Respondent #119008054787

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

For Tax Purposes - Fair Market Value No records

maintained re: comparison of auction price to fair

market value; [a]uction prices [are] subject to

judicial review for reasonableness.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

No statutory right to inspect tax-foreclosed

properties.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

Redemption period & [i]nstallment payment

plans.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

20a

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

Judiciary Review on majority to determine

reasonableness of sales price; [a]bility to sell

properties without judicial review limited

(primarily only certain unimproved parcels; or

certain condemned, derelict, blighted properties);

no incentives.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

No data.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

Not tracked; estimate based on recent action - 25%

redeemed prior to auction

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Third party auction platform, signage, newspaper,

public website.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

21a

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

To the extent available Sale proceeds are first paid

to taxes, costs, liens of record - all of which may or

may not get paid depending on the price achieved

at auction.

City of Rochester, New York

Respondent #119006664011

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

All properties have an assessed value based upon

a quadrennial citywide reassessment. I don’t

know how often the auction price is different than

assessed value.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

A list of properties subject to tax foreclosure is

published and those interested can conduct an

exterior inspection from the public right of way.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

22a

•

•

•

Installment payment plans

Private sales

Consent showings

We allow redemptions and tax delinquency

payment plans until a week prior to the auction

date.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

We advertise a public sale for six weeks in advance

of the auction. The auction approximates fair

market value.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

I don’t know.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

We commence the tax foreclosure action in April,

typically with over 4,000 parcels on the list. By

the time we get to the auction this number is

typically below 200 parcels, the remainder having

23a

been redeemed or having a payment plan.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Website, newspaper.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

No.

City of Charleston, South Carolina

Respondent #119006645917

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

The county assessor determines assessed value by

establishing fair market value then applying a

state-mandated assessment ratio based on the

property's use; the tax assessor reassesses

property every 5 years. The sales price at tax sale

is usually less than the assessed value, as clear

title is not warranted. Most properties will require

a subsequent quiet title action after a tax sale.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

24a

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

No, unless owner allows entry on the property.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

12 month redemption period post sale, private

sales.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

SC is a judicial foreclosure state but tax sales are

conducted separately by the county, by public

auction, under a very specific statutory

framework.

If the specific procedure is not

followed, the tax sale can be vacated. There are a

series of notices including certified mail, property

posting all before the sale and there is a 12 month

redemption period following the sale before the tax

deed is issued.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

25a

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

Very.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

I do not have this data but Charleston County will

most certainly. If no member provides this, I can

reach out to a contact there.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Tax sales are advertised in local newspapers

before each sale.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

No.

City of Middletown, Connecticut

Respondent #119006602213

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

26a

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

A revaluation of all real property is conducted

every 5 years. The auction sale price starts at the

amount of the taxes owed to the municipality, plus

any fees and court costs.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

No.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

If the foreclosure is a strict foreclosure, it is a

redemption period. If it is a foreclosure by sale,

none. in Connecticut, all tax foreclosures are

exempt from the court mandated mediation

program required for all other foreclosures.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

27a

Unknown.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

Unknown.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

Unknown.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

On the Connecticut judicial website.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

No, the City’s tax collector does not, since either

the City will be made whole for the delinquent

taxes during the foreclosure by sale, or if there are

no bidders, the City will acquire the property and

can then sell it or decide to keep it.

28a

Maine Municipal Association

Respondent # 119012469611

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

Property taxes are assessed based on just value as

required by Maine’s constitution and as defined in

statute. 36 MRS § 701-A. However, after a

property is tax-acquired, it may sell for

significantly less than the assessed value due to

title problems inherent in such property.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

State law does not address this. Access would be

determined by each municipality selling a specific

property. Generally, I believe it is occurs in most

situations.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

Maine’s tax lien mortgage process (36 MRS §§ 942943) includes several notices and an 18-month

redemption period before the lien forecloses and

29a

title passes to the municipality. After foreclosure,

if the property is sold to someone other than the

former owner, the sale process is governed by 36

MRS § 943-C, which requires a pre-sale notice 90

days before the property is listed for sale. Maine

law allows the municipal officers to sell taxacquired property back to a former owner on terms

determined locally, but which usually involve a

repurchase price based on the amount of back

taxes rather than market value.

Maine

municipalities may use installment payment

contracts to allow for repurchase over time. Maine

also has a number of property tax relief programs

and has a poverty abatement process that can help

a property owner avoid lien foreclosure.

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

Sale of tax acquired property to someone other

than the former owner is governed by 36 MRS

§ 943-C, which requires that the municipality use

a real estate broker/agent if possible and that the

property be listed for the highest reasonable price

the property is anticipated to sell - in consultation

with the real estate broker. If tax-acquired

property is retained for municipal use, an

appraisal must be procured to determine the value

and to use as a benchmark for calculating any

excess equity to be returned to the former owner

30a

(per Tyler v Hennepin). Maine’s statute was

revised after the Tyler v. Hennepin decision.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

Unknown.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

Unknown.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Generally they are marketed, per 36 MRS § 943C, through real estate broker/agent platforms.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

The law allows the municipality to recoup back

taxes, costs and a list of other expenses in 36 MRS

§ 943-C.

31a

City of Boston Law Department

Respondent # 119012651454

1. In your jurisdiction, how is the value of a

property determined for tax purposes? How

often is the auction price sale different from

that amount?

MGL Chapter 60 was amended in 2024 in

response to Tyler v. Hennepin. Section 64A was

added as a new section under Chapter 60 to create

a process to return surplus equity to foreclosed

owners. Chapter 60, Section 64A requires that

municipalities either a) list the property for sale

with a real estate agent or broker licensed in the

Commonwealth or b) appraise the parcel for the

highest and best use of the property as of the date

of the final judgment of foreclosure.

2. In your jurisdiction, are bidders allowed to

inspect tax-foreclosed properties before sale,

and, if so, can owners consent to such access

(e.g., through a consent judgment or some other

mechanism)?

Unknown.

3. What opportunities do property owners have

to avoid losing their property before the final

auction? Possible examples include:

• Redemption periods

• Installment payment plans

• Private sales

• Consent showings

Redemption periods and installment payment

plans.

32a

4. Does your jurisdiction use any procedures to

ensure that tax-foreclosed properties are sold

for a fair or reasonable value, such as upset-bid

rules, resale rights, or other remedies if a sale

price is considered too low? What incentives

does your jurisdiction have to maximize sale

price and ensure fairness?

MGL Chapter 60 was amended in 2024 in response

to Tyler v. Hennepin. Section 64A was added as a

new section under Chapter 60 to create a process

to return surplus equity to foreclosed owners.

Chapter 60, Section 64A requires that

municipalities either a) list the property for sale

with a real estate agent or broker licensed in the

Commonwealth or b) appraise the parcel for the

highest and best use of the property as of the date

of the final judgment of foreclosure.

5. How common is it for tax-sale purchasers in

your area to make significant improvements

(e.g., via building permits or renovations)

before reselling the property?

The City of Boston will address life safety

concerns, but not make signinificant [sic]

improvements/renovations.

6. How many property-tax foreclosure cases

occur annually in your jurisdiction, and what

proportion are resolved through redemption or

payment before sale—suggesting that most

homeowners have realistic “off-ramps” in

practice?

The City of Boston initiates between 150 and 200

tax foreclosures [sic] annually. The overwhelming

33a

vast majority (~95%) are redeemed prior to

foreclosure.

7. How are tax-foreclosed properties marketed

in your jurisdiction (e.g., public website,

newspaper, third-party auction platform, MLS,

signage), and do local governments take any

steps to attract competitive bids?

Chapter 60, Section 64A requires that

municipalities either list the foreclosed property

for sale with a real estate agent or broker licensed

in the Commonwealth.

8. Do your local tax offices or outside vendors

have financial or statutory incentives to

maximize

sale

proceeds

(for

instance,

commissions, offsets of administrative costs, or

subordination to IRS or demolition liens)?

Chapter 60, Section 64A requires that

municipalities either a) list the property for sale

with a real estate agent or broker licensed in the

Commonwealth or b) appraise the parcel for the

highest and best use of the property as of the date

of the final judgment of foreclosure.

West Virginia Municipal League

Respondent #N/A

Survey response submitted by email

In West Virginia, a delinquent land sale, often

referred to as a sheriff’s tax lien sale, is a public

auction conducted by the county sheriff’s tax office

to recover unpaid real estate taxes on properties

34a

that have become delinquent. This process is a

critical mechanism for counties to ensure revenue

collection for public services like schools, when

property owners fail to pay their taxes. The sale

involves offering tax liens on the delinquent

properties to the highest bidder, who may

eventually gain ownership if the original owner

does not redeem the property. The process is

governed by West Virginia Code § 11A-3-1 et seq.,

specifically § 11A-3-2 through § 11A-3-32, which

outline the steps, timelines, and rights involved.

The general framework for property tax levies in

West Virginia indicates that taxing authorities

include, among others, “municipal” taxing bodies.

County officials primarily administer the West

Virginia Property Tax.

Although the West

Virginia Tax Division plays a major role, less than

0.50 percent of the Property Tax collected goes to

State government. The primary beneficiaries of

the Property Tax are county boards of education

who get approximately 66.3% of property taxes

levied. Counties get 26.7%. While cities get 6%.