Amicus Curiae Brief — Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung, Petitioner v. Isabella County, Michigan
Supreme Court briefDec 8, 2025
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No. 25-95
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MICHAEL PUNG,
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Timothy Scott Pung,
Petitioner,
v.
ISABELLA COUNTY, MICH.,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE CYRUS SANAI AND PEYMAN
ROSHAN IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER MICHAEL PUNG
Frances L. Diaz
SB#159837
Law Offices of Frances L. Diaz
8306 Wilshire Boulevard, #263
Beverly Hills, California 90211
(310) 927-5086
francesdiaz@frontier.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................................... ii
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................ 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ................................................................................ 5
A. IN SEARLE, THE NINTH CIRCUIT ARTICULATED AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
APPLICABLE TO MR. PUNG. ................................................................. 5
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION WOULD REQUIRE
DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION. ................................................................ 7
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ROOKER-FELDMAN ANALYSIS IN THE
TAKINGS AND OTHER CONTEXTS IS WRONG. ................................... 13
1. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine ............................................... 13
2. This Court Should Articulate a Comprehensive Test for
Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. ............................... 29
3. The Searle Court’s Mootness Analysis Conflicts with Supreme
Court Precedent.............................................................................. 34
CONCLUSION ...........................................................................35
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wells,
265 U.S. 101 (1924) ...................................................... 16
Barrow v. Hunton,
99 U.S. (9 Otto) 80 (1878) ............................... 14, 15, 29
CMLS Management, Inc. v. Fresno County Superior
Court, No. 11-cv-1756-A WI-SKO, 2012 WL
2931407 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2012) ...................... 25, 30
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U. S. 462 (1983) ....................... 10, 13, 17, 18, 20, 30
Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano,
252 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) ...................................... 2
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005) .......................................... 19, 24, 27
Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs.,
111 F.4th 754, 761 (2024)(en banc) .................. 3, 4, 29
Gonzalez v. Thaler 565 U.S. 134 (2012) ........................ 4
In re Gruntz,
202 F. 3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000)(en banc) ............ 13, 15
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,
359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................. 15, 29
Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 (1990) ...... 34
Marciano v. White,
431 Fed.Appx. 611 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................... 25, 27
Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court,
410 F.3d 602 (9th Cir.2005) ................................. 25, 29
NIH v. APHA, 606 U. S. ____, Docket No. 25A103
(August 21, 2025)(Opn. Of Gorsuch, J.) .................. 24
Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) .......... 18, 30
Parker v. Lyons, 757 F. 3d 701 (7th Cir. 2014) .......... 27
Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cty.,
505 Mich. 429, 952 N.W.2d 4346 (2020)................. 12
iii
Reed v. Goertz,
143 S.Ct. 955 (2023) ....................... 1, 4, 5, 12, 13, 21, 22
RLR Invs., LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, Tennessee,
4 F.4th 380 (6th Cir. 2021)(Clay, C.J. diss.).... 28, 30
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923) .................................... 13, 16, 17, 30
Roshan v. Lawrence,
N.D. Cal. Case No. 4:21-cv-01235-JST .................... 12
Santos v. Sup. Ct. Guam,
Case No. 15-16854 (mem. disp. Feb. 14, 2018)25, 27
Scheer v. Kelly, 817 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2016) ........... 19
Searle v. Allen, 148 F.4th 1121 (9th Cir. 2025) .. 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 22, 34, 35
Skinner v. Switzer,
562 U.S. 521 (2011) ............................ 4, 5, 12, 13, 21, 22
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of
Env’t. Prot., 560 US 702 (2010) ........................... 20, 21
Williams v Reed, 145 S.Ct. 465 (2025)........................... 1
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985) ...................................................... 20
Other Authorities
Sam Roberts, Stephen Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of
Federal Court, Dies at 87, N. Y. Times, April 3,
2018, at B13. .................................................................. 30
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend V.......................................................... 4
U.S. Const. amend VIII ..................................................... 4
1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici Cyrus Sanai (“Sanai”) and Peyman Roshan
(“Roshan”) are California attorneys who individually
and jointly have challenged California attorney
discipline proceedings. This Court denied petitions
for certiorari they filed earlier this year in Roshan v.
Lawrence, Case No. 24-586 and Sanai v. U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 25-196.
Shortly thereafter, this Court issued Williams v
Reed, 145 S.Ct. 465 (2025), a decision which holds
that administrative proceedings which grant the Ex
Parte Young defendants immunity under state law
applicable in state court violate the Supremacy
Clause. Both Sanai and Roshan have ongoing
lawsuits against Ex Parte Young defendants in
federal court relying upon Williams v. Reed, supra,
but have been stymied by the refusal of the courts in
the Ninth Circuit to properly apply this Court’s
precedent interpreting the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
particularly Reed v. Goertz, 143 S.Ct. 955 (2023)
(“Reed”).
While Amici’s challenges in district courts and
Court of Appeals were ongoing, the Ninth Circuit
issued a published decision in which it rejected the
correct interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and held that a legal challenge to a tax
foreclosure sale - indistinguishable from the
challenge of Petitioner Pung (“Pung”) - was outside of
No part of this brief was written by counsel for any
party. No party, or any other person or entity other
than amici, monetarily contributed to the
preparation or submission of this brief.
1
2
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Searle v. Allen, 148
F.4th 1121 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Searle”). Amici Roshan
sought to intervene in order to have the Ninth
Circuit correct its error, but was denied. He has
obtained an extension of time to file a petition for a
writ of certiorari challenging that denial. Roshan v.
Searle, Application No. 25A574.
Amici are filing this brief to point out the Ninth
Circuit’s jurisdictional ruling (which might be raised
by counsel to Isabella County or independently by
this Court) so that this Court can correct the Ninth
Circuit’s repeated refusal to properly apply the
doctrine and prevent the lower courts from avoiding
whatever resolution on the merits this Court reaches
by applying the Ninth Circuit’s fallacious case law.2
This case is not the only one currently being heard
by this Court where application of Ninth Circuit case
law on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would require
dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit continues to apply
case law which holds that interlocutory state court
decisions concerning investigative subpoenas trigger
Rooker-Feldman, stripping federal courts of
jurisdiction to hear lawsuits attacking such
subpoenas in federal court. See Doe & Assocs. Law
Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir.
2001). Application of this analysis would require
dismissal of this Court’s current case First Choice
Women’s Resource Centers v. Platkin, No. 24-781.
The application of Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory
decisions is the subject of at least two past petitions
for certiorari and one pending petition, T. M. v.
2
3
In so doing Amici are proposing a comprehensive test
for the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
which, if adopted, will assist lower courts that are
confused about its application. See, e.g.,. Gilbank v.
Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 761
(2024)(en banc)(“Gilbank”).
INTRODUCTION
Eight weeks before this Court granted Mr. Pung’s
petition for certiorari, the Ninth Circuit published
Searle, in which an unfortunate homeowner suffered
the same wrong as him. Searle involved Arizona’s
prior property tax regime which has one major
difference from the Michigan system at issue in this
case. In Arizona, the tax liens themselves were
auctioned to private purchasers, who then foreclose
on the property either to retain or sell it. Searle at
1126. In Michigan, the state entity forecloses and
sells the property to a private purchaser.
Like Pung, plaintiff Christine Searle sued the
county involved, but she also sued the private
purchaser of the lien. The Ninth Circuit held that
the lawsuit against the County was barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, because the lawsuit was a
challenge of the prior state proceeding. This
analysis, if applied to Pung’s lawsuit, would require
this Court to dismiss the proceeding based on
absence of federal court jurisdiction.
While Pung addressed the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in his complaint, the issue was never raised
University of Maryland Medical System Corp., Case
No. 25-171.
4
by Isabella County, presumably because under Reed,
and Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011)
(“Skinner”), the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply. However, even if this Court rules in favor of
Pung in this lawsuit, the Searle decision is a barrier
to its application in the Ninth Circuit as against the
state entity that initiates the tax enforcement
process.
Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
jurisdictional, this Court is required to address it
even if the parties do not raise it. Gonzalez v. Thaler
565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). Amici’s brief raises this
issue then puts forward a comprehensive test for
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine created
by Amicus Sanai. If this Court adopts it, it will put
an end to the confusion and uncertainty in the lower
courts regarding application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See, e.g., Gilbank at 761 (“[A]ll members of
the en banc court agree that our different
understandings of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine may
help show a need for the Supreme Court to clarify
application of the doctrine…”.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Ninth Circuit addressed the same kind of
takings and Eighth Amendment challenges to a
property tax enforcement scheme in Arizona in
Searle as is presented in this case. U.S. Const.
amend. V, VIII. The Ninth Circuit refused under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, to address the
merits of the as-applied attack. Applied to Petitioner
Pung’s case, the Ninth Circuit analysis would also
5
require dismissal, since Pung’s attack is as-applied,
not facial.
Because this issue is jurisdictional, this Court
must address the issue and should find that the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis is wrong because it does not
recognize this Court’s decisions in Reed and Skinner.
In doing so, it should adopt a comprehensive test for
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as
suggested below.
ARGUMENT
A. In Searle, the Ninth Circuit Articulated
an Interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine Applicable to Mr. Pung.
In Searle, the Ninth Circuit articulated an
interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which
would require dismissal of Pung’s case if it were
adopted here. The facts as set forth in the opinion
and its view of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine were as
follows:
Christine Searle failed to pay
property taxes on her home in
Maricopa County, Arizona. To secure
payment, Maricopa County sold the
tax liens on Searle's property for 2015
and 2016 to Arapaho, LLC Tesco.
Arapaho ultimately filed a foreclosure
action against Searle. When Searle
failed to respond, Arapaho obtained a
default judgment against her. The
judgment declared that Searle has "no
further legal or equitable right, title,
6
or interest in the Property." Upon
presentation of the judgment and
pursuant to state law, Maricopa
County Treasurer John Allen executed
and delivered a deed to Arapaho
conveying all rights and interest in the
home, which Searle values at over
$400,000. Arapaho promptly
transferred the property to American
Pride Properties, LLC.
Searle sued Arapaho, American
Pride, Maricopa County, and Allen
(collectively, "Defendants") in district
court, challenging the foreclosure of
her home, Defendants' retention of the
equity in her home exceeding the tax
debt and related costs, and the facial
constitutionality of the then-governing
state law, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 4218204(B) (2008). She alleged both
federal and state claims, seeking
damages, an injunction against
eviction, and a declaratory judgment
that the statute was unconstitutional.
….Searle's claims directly
attacking the state court foreclosure
judgment—on the grounds that the
foreclosure violated the United States
and Arizona Constitutions because it
was a taking without a legitimate
public purpose[2] or constituted an
excessive fine—are barred.
Searle at 1125.
7
In Searle, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
a person whose property is sold in a tax auction from
the suing the state entity to challenge the state
action. That’s exactly Pung’s claim.
1. Whether taking and selling a home
to satisfy a debt to the government, and
keeping the surplus value as a windfall,
violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment when the compensation is
based on the artificially depressed
auction sale price rather than the
property’s fair market value?
2. Whether the forfeiture of real
property worth far more than needed to
satisfy a tax debt but sold for a fraction
of its real value constitutes an excessive
fine under the Eighth Amendment,
particularly when the debt was never
actually owed?
Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at i.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation Would
Require Dismissal of this Action.
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Rooker-Feldman
would require dismissal of this lawsuit. It held that:
Rooker-Feldman bars Searle from directly
challenging the state court foreclosure
judgment in federal court. The judgment
foreclosed Searle's right to redeem the tax
8
lien on her property, ordered the county
treasurer to execute and deliver a deed
conveying the property to Arapaho upon
its payment of the required fee, and
decreed that Searle "ha[d] no further
legal or equitable right, title, or interest
in the Property." Arapaho, LLC Tesco v.
Searle, 2021 WL 10425563, at *1.
Searle seeks relief under the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause and its
Arizona analogue because the sale of the
liens to Arapaho and the subsequent
foreclosure judgment constituted a
taking without a legitimate public use.
She further alleges that the taking of the
house constituted an excessive fine
under the Eighth Amendment and
Arizona's constitutional analogue
because the value of the house far
exceeded her tax debt. These allegations
are described in claims one, three, four,
five, and seven of the SAC, although
those enumerated claims also contain
challenges to Defendants' retention of
the surplus equity, which we discuss
separately below.
Applying the Exxon test to determine
whether Rooker-Feldman bars Searle's
claims challenging the foreclosure as an
invalid taking or an excessive fine, we
conclude that it does and that the
district court properly dismissed those
claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See 544 U.S. at 284, 125
9
S.Ct. 1517. Before Searle filed her
federal suit, the state court entered a
default judgment against her, and,
although she sought to vacate the
default judgment, she was unsuccessful.
In the words of the Supreme Court, she
was a "state-court loser[]." Id. Further,
her federal suit complains of injuries
caused by the foreclosure judgment, and
she invites the district court to review
and reject that judgment on the grounds
that it constituted an unconstitutional
taking and an excessive fine. See id.
We held that Rooker-Feldman applied
in an analogous context in Henrichs v.
Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609
(9th Cir. 2007). There, Valley View
prevailed in a state court action and
obtained a judgment quieting title to a
piece of property ("the Balboa lot")
against which Henrichs and two others
asserted a lien. Id. at 612. While the
state court proceeding was pending,
Valley View sold the Balboa lot to a third
party. Id. at 613. After the state court
entered the quiet title judgment,
Henrichs filed a federal suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the state
court judgment was void because of
several alleged jurisdictional defects. Id.
at 613-14. We held that Rooker-Feldman
"squarely barred" this claim. Id. at 614.
Henrichs also sought an injunction
preventing Valley View from receiving
10
the proceeds from the sale of the Balboa
lot. Id. at 615. We held that RookerFeldman also barred this claim because
the injury— Valley View's entitlement to
the proceeds —was caused by the state
court judgment and because "[g]ranting
the injunction would require the district
court to determine that the state court's
decision was wrong and thus void." Id. at
616.
Searle at 1130.
The Ninth Circuit recognizes several exceptions to
Rooker-Feldman, the primary one of which is based
on a general challenge of state law under District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462
(1983) (“Feldman”). However, the Court refuses to
apply it when invoked unless one can show a
forward-looking application:
Searle's facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the Arizona statute
allowing the enforcement of tax liens by
private parties without providing just
compensation, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 4218204(B), is not barred by RookerFeldman. However, it is moot, and we
therefore lack jurisdiction under Article
III to consider it. See McDonald v.
Lawson, 94 F.4th 864, 868 (9th Cir.
2024).
Rooker-Feldman does not bar facial
challenges to the constitutionality of the
statutory or regulatory scheme under
11
which the plaintiff lost a state court
action. That is because such challenges
"do not require review of a judicial
decision in a particular case." Feldman,
460 U.S. at 487, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The
Supreme Court emphasized this point in
Skinner v. Switzer when it explained that
"a state-court decision is not reviewable
by lower federal courts, but a statute or
rule governing the decision may be
challenged in a federal action." 562 U.S.
521, 532, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233
(2011).
While Searle's facial challenge to the
statutory scheme is not barred by RookerFeldman, it is moot because the Arizona
legislature has amended the governing
statute since she filed her original
complaint. See American Diabetes Ass'n
v. United States Dep't of the Army, 938
F.3d 1147, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2019)
(applying mootness doctrine to policy
change based on timing of plaintiff's
original complaint). A "`repeal,
amendment, or expiration of legislation'
gives rise to `a presumption that the
action is moot, unless there is a
reasonable expectation that the
legislative body is likely to enact the
same or substantially similar legislation
in the future.'" McDonald, 94 F.4th at 868
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of Glazing Health &
Welfare Tr. v. Chambers, 941 F.3d 1195,
1197 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc)); see also
12
Teter v. Lopez, 125 F.4th 1301, 1306-07
(9th Cir. 2025) (en banc). "A reasonable
expectation of the same or similar
legislation being re-adopted `must be
founded in the record.'" McDonald, 94
F.4th at 869 (quoting Glazing Health, 941
F.3d at 1199).
Searle at 1133-4.
This same logic was applied to Amicus Roshan. In
his order dismissing Roshan’s case, the district court
judge stated that “Rooker-Feldman bars this Court
from granting only requested relief that would
redress the continuing adverse effects.” Roshan v.
Lawrence, N.D. Cal. Case No. 4:21-cv-01235-JST,
Dkt. No. 139 at 9. As discussed below, this is
incorrect. Under Reed and Skinner entering a
declaratory judgment that the State Bar Court Rules
of Procedure, as authoritatively construed by the
State Bar Court and California Supreme Court, are
unconstitutional, does not encounter the RookerFeldman jurisdictional bar.
As in Searle’s case, the law changed during
Petitioner Pung’s litigation. As explained in the
opposition to the petition for certiorari filed by
Isabella County, while Pung was litigating, the
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the state could
not confiscate the entirety of the surplus obtained
from the foreclosure. Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cty.,
505 Mich. 429, 473, 477, 482-4, 952 N.W.2d 434, 460,
462, 465-6 (2020). Pung’s challenge morphed from
being based on receiving no compensation under the
law, an as-applied and facial challenge, to one
involving inadequate compensation in his particular
13
case. Pung’s current theory is not a true facial
challenge, because it is always possible that a
particular tax sale of a property could result in a fair
market value price for the property. Instead, Pung is
making an as-applied challenge to the results in his
case. In the Ninth Circuit, such challenge would be
forbidden under Searle. However, the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation is clearly wrong under Reed and
Skinner.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Rooker-Feldman
Analysis in the Takings and Other
Contexts is Wrong.
1.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is comprised of two
separate propositions. The first is that the federal
district court must adhere to the common-law
understanding of “original jurisdiction” except as
varied by Congress. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (“Rooker”). The second, in
Feldman, is that a district courts may invalidate
directly or indirectly a state judgment if it is
supported by a correct application of state or federal
law which application violates the United States
constitution facially, on an overbreadth basis, or as
applied. Feldman, supra.
“At its core, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine stands
for the unremarkable proposition that federal district
courts are courts of original, not appellate,
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.” In re
Gruntz, 202 F. 3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2000)(en banc).
This principle, the Rooker part of Rooker-Feldman,
predates Rooker. Anticipating the Rooker-Feldman
14
doctrine, this Court wrote in Barrow v. Hunton, 99
U.S. (9 Otto) 80 (1878) that:
The question presented with
regard to the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court is, whether the
proceeding ... is or is not in its
nature a separate suit, or whether
it is a supplementary proceeding so
connected with the original suit as
to form an incident to it, and
substantially a continuation of it. If
the proceeding is merely
tantamount to the common-law
practice of moving to set aside a
judgment for irregularity, or to a
writ of error, or to a bill of review
or an appeal, it would belong to the
latter category, and the United
States court could not properly
entertain jurisdiction of the case.
Otherwise, the Circuit Courts of
the United States would become
invested with power to control the
proceedings in the State courts, or
would have appellate jurisdiction
over them in all cases where the
parties are citizens of different
States. Such a result would be
totally inadmissible.
On the other hand, if the
proceedings are tantamount to a
bill in equity to set aside a decree
for fraud in the obtaining thereof,
15
then they constitute an original and
independent proceeding, and
according to the doctrine laid down
in Gaines v. Fuentes (92 U.S. [(2
Otto)] 10, 23 L.Ed. 524), the case
might be within the cognizance of
the Federal courts. The distinction
between the two classes of cases
may be somewhat nice, but it may
be affirmed to exist. In the one class
there would be a mere revision of
errors and irregularities, or of the
legality and correctness of the
judgments and decrees of the State
courts; and in the other class, the
investigation of a new case arising
upon new facts, although having
relation to the validity of an actual
judgment or decree, or the party's
right to claim any benefit by reason
thereof.
Id. at 82-83 (emphasis added); see also
MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 543-44
(9th Cir.1987) (quoting the above
passage).
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th
Cir. 2004) (italics in original), quoting Barrow, supra.
The respective scopes of original jurisdiction and
appellate jurisdiction thus overlap in several areas.
One overlap is fraud on the court. A second is
jurisdiction. In re Gruntz, supra. Under common
law, a court has the power to vacate another court’s
judgment if that other court lacked personal or
16
subject matter jurisdiction. This was made explicit in
Rooker:
It affirmatively appears from the
bill that the judgment was rendered in a
cause wherein the circuit court had
jurisdiction of both the subject matter and
the parties; that a full hearing was had
therein; that the judgment was
responsive to the issues, and that it was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
State on an appeal by the plaintiffs. 191
Ind. 141. If the constitutional questions
stated in the bill actually arose in the
cause, it was the province and duty of the
state courts to decide them; and their
decision, whether right or wrong, was an
exercise of jurisdiction. If the decision
was wrong, that did not make the
judgment void, but merely left it open to
reversal or modification in an appropriate
and timely appellate proceeding. Unless
and until so reversed or modified, it
would be an effective and conclusive
adjudication.
Rooker at 415.
Rooker thus made valid jurisdiction a prerequisite
to protecting a state court judgment. Just one year
after Rooker, this Court made clear that federal
district courts can entertain independent actions that
attack state-court judgments as void. See Atchison, T.
& S. F. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924). In
Atchison, the plaintiff secured a default judgment
17
over a railroad in Texas state court. Id. at 102. Once
the railroad received notice of the action and
judgment, it sued in federal court to enjoin
enforcement of the state-court judgment. Id. The
railroad argued that the state court lacked personal
jurisdiction when it entered judgment. Id. at 102–03.
This Court in Atchison agreed and held that “[r]elief
against the void judgments entered was properly
sought by the [railroad] in the federal court,” and
“[t]he [railroad] was not obliged to assert its rights in
the courts of Texas.” Id. at 103.
These principles fall directly from common law.
However, in Feldman, this Court created a new
exception to Rooker not present in common law: the
“general attack” upon a rule or statute.
To the extent that Hickey and
Feldman mounted a general challenge to
the constitutionality of Rule 461(b)(3),
however, the District Court did have
subject-matter jurisdiction over their
complaints.
…..
Applying this standard to the
respondents' complaints, it is clear that
their allegations that the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying
their petitions for waiver and that the
court acted unreasonably and
discriminatorily in denying their petitions
in view of its former policy of granting
waivers to graduates of unaccredited law
schools, see n. 3, supra, required the
District Court to review a final judicial
18
decision of the highest court of a
jurisdiction in a particular case. These
allegations are inextricably intertwined
with the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals' decisions, in judicial
proceedings, to deny the respondents'
petitions. The District Court, therefore,
does not have jurisdiction over these
elements of the respondents' complaints.
The remaining allegations in the
complaints, however, involve a general
attack on the constitutionality of Rule
461 (b)(3). See n. 3, supra. The
respondents' claims that the rule is
unconstitutional because it creates an
irrebuttable presumption that only
graduates of accredited law schools are fit
to practice law, discriminates against
those who have obtained equivalent legal
training by other means, and
impermissibly delegates the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' power to
regulate the bar to the American Bar
Association, do not require review of a
judicial decision in a particular case. The
District Court, therefore, has subjectmatter jurisdiction over these elements of
the respondents' complaints
Feldman at 486-7 (footnotes omitted).
The Ninth Circuit integrated Rooker and Feldman
in Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003)(“Noel”).
Noel presents a two-step test to determine whether
(1) a federal plaintiff brings a forbidden de facto
19
appeal of the state court decision, and, if so, (2) to bar
from federal review any issue inextricably
intertwined with the issues decided in the state case.
The first step has two prongs: (i) a federal plaintiff
asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous
decision by a state court, and (ii) seeks relief from a
state court judgment based on that decision. Noel was
cited with approval by this Court in 2005. Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 293 (2005)(“Exxon Mobil”).
The requirement that Rooker-Feldman applies
only where a federal plaintiff “asserts as a legal
wrong an allegedly erroneous decision” raises the
question of two possible interpretations. The first
possible interpretation is that for Rooker-Feldman
purposes, a decision is asserted as erroneous for its
application of a state or federal statute or rule, which
application is wrong under state or federal law
(excluding unconstitutionality of the statute or rule);
a decision that correctly applies state law or federal
law (without reference to federal constitutionality) is
not excluded from federal court jurisdiction attacking
that statute or rule on an as-applied or facial basis.
The second possible interpretation is that an asapplied violation of constitutional law for the
application of state statutes or rules is barred under
Rooker-Feldman, but an attack for facial
unconstitutionality, including overbreadth, is not
barred.
The Ninth Circuit case law took the second
interpretation; facial attacks are not barred, but asapplied attacks are. See, e.g., Scheer v. Kelly, 817
F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016).
20
This Court addressed this question indirectly two
years after Feldman in Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985). This Court held that a person
aggrieved by a state taking had to first exhaust all
remedies provided under state law, and if the person
was a “state court loser”, his claims were ripe to
proceed in federal court.
The question still remained, however, whether the
federal court even had jurisdiction under RookerFeldman after the state-court loser finished in state
court on an as-applied challenge. This Court did not
directly address it until 2010 in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Env’t. Prot., 560
US 702 (2010) (“Stop the Beach”) where it applied the
Williamson County takings ripeness test to pure
judicial decisions, finding that "the Takings Clause
bars the State from taking private property without
paying for it, no matter which branch is the
instrument of the taking. ... [A] legislative, executive,
or judicial restriction of property use may or may not
be [a taking], depending on its nature and extent. But
the particular state actor is irrelevant." Stop the
Beach at 715 (italics in original). But, for this right to
attack judicial takings to be viable, it had to bypass
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This Court held that
Rooker-Feldman never applied; instead, as there was
always district court jurisdiction for state court losers
to assert that state law procedures were inadequate,
it was issue and claim preclusion that had to be
overcome:
Finally, the city and county argue that
applying the Takings Clause to judicial
decisions would force lower federal courts
21
to review final state-court judgments, in
violation of the so-called Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415-416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68
L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206
(1983). That does not necessarily follow.
The finality principles that we regularly
apply to takings claims, see Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172, 186-194, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d
126 (1985), would require the claimant to
appeal a claimed taking by a lower court
to the state supreme court, whence
certiorari would come to this Court. If
certiorari were denied, the claimant
would no more be able to launch a lowercourt federal suit against the taking
effected by the state supreme-court
opinion than he would be able to launch
such a suit against a legislative or
executive taking approved by the state
supreme-court opinion; the matter would
be res judicata.
Stop the Beach at 729.
Stop the Beach received little attention on this
point, perhaps because while it clearly set out that
takings claims were not subject to Rooker-Feldman,
there was no supporting reasoning.
In Reed the appellant was granted partial relief,
so his lawsuit was not and could not be a facial
22
challenge. Citing Skinner, Reed articulated that
under Feldman a federal challenge to the state court’s
application of a state law or rule that does not get the
state law wrong may then be attacked in federal court
on the grounds that the state law or rule is
unconstitutional, either facially or as applied.
The Searle panel cited the formulation of this rule
in Skinner as follows:
The Supreme Court emphasized this
point in Skinner v. Switzer when it
explained that “a state-court decision is
not reviewable by lower federal courts, but
a statute or rule governing the decision
may be challenged in a federal action.” 562
U.S. 521, 532 (2011).
Searle at 1133.
The Ninth Circuit’s error is refusing to accept that
“a statute or rule governing the decision may be
challenged in a federal action” includes challenges on
an as-applied basis. The claims the panel teases out
of the three causes of action in Searle are as-applied
challenges. They meet the Skinner test just as much
as a facial challenge. Though Searle cited and argued
Reed in her briefing, the panel did not address the
case, let alone the mode of analysis used by this Court
in Reed.
This is yet another iteration of a never-ending
problem recently called out by Justice Gorsuch:
Lower court judges may sometimes
disagree with this Court’s decisions, but
they are never free to defy them….
….
23
Of course, decisions regarding interim
relief are not necessarily “conclusive as to
the merits” because further litigation may
follow. Trump v. Boyle, 606 U. S. ___
(2025) (slip op., at 1). But regardless of a
decision’s procedural posture, its
“reasoning—its ratio decidendi”—carries
precedential weight in “future cases.”
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. 83, 104
(2020) (opinion of GORSUCH, J.); see also
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 136
(2019) (“[J]ust as binding as [a] holding is
the reasoning underlying it”).
…..
If the district court’s failure to abide
by California were a one-off, perhaps it
would not be worth writing to address it.
But two months ago another district court
tried to “compel compliance” with a
different “order that this Court ha[d]
stayed.” Department of Homeland
Security v. D.V.D., 606 U.S. ___, ___
(2025) (KAGAN, J., concurring) (slip op.,
at 1). Still another district court recently
diverged from one of this Court’s
decisions even though the case at hand
did not differ “in any pertinent respect”
from the one this Court had decided.
Boyle, 606 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1). So
this is now the third time in a matter of
weeks this Court has had to intercede in
a case “squarely controlled” by one of its
precedents. Ibid. All these interventions
should have been unnecessary, but
24
together they underscore a basic tenet of
our judicial system: Whatever their own
views, judges are duty-bound to respect
“the hierarchy of the federal court system
created by the Constitution and
Congress.” Hutto, 454 U. S., at 375.
NIH v. APHA, 606 U. S. ____, Docket No. 25A103
(August 21, 2025)(Opn. Of Gorsuch, J.)(slip op., at 4).
In the Rooker-Feldman arena, the Ninth Circuit is
the most aggressively disdainful of this Court’s
precedents and indeed its own published precedents,
particularly in cases chosen to be subject to
unpublished dispositions. To take one example
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished case
law universally holds that Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies to state court litigation ongoing when the
federal lawsuit is filed. See fn. 2, supra, citing Doe v.
Napolitano Law Offices, supra. However, the Ninth
Circuit’s published case law recognized the opposite
rule after Exxon Mobil. This has been recognized by
district courts within the Ninth Circuit and other by
circuits.
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit held that
Rooker-Feldman applies to interlocutory
orders. See Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v.
Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir.
2001) (approving of Richardson v. D.C.
Ct. of App., 83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir.
1996)). In 2005, relying on Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indust. Corp., 544
U.S. 280 (2005), the Ninth Circuit stated
that Rooker-Feldman only applies after
state court proceedings have ended, i.e.
25
"when the state courts finally resolve the
issue that the federal court plaintiff seeks
to relitigate in a federal forum. . . ."
Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 607 n.3
(amended opinion). After 2005, however,
the Ninth Circuit in several unpublished
cases cited Doe & Assocs. for the
proposition that Rooker-Feldman applied
to interlocutory orders. See, e.g., Hanson
v. Firmat, 272 Fed. Appx. 571, 572 (9th
Cir. 2008); Melek v. Kayashima, 262 Fed.
Appx. 784, 785 (9th Cir. 2007); Bugoni v.
Thomas, 259 Fed. Appx. 11, 11-12 (9th
Cir. 2007); see also Ismail v. County of
Orange, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65793,
*25-*26 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012); cf.
Marciano, 431 Fed. Appx. at 613
(discussing only Mothershed).
CMLS Management, Inc. v. Fresno County Superior
Court, No. 11-cv-1756-A WI-SKO, 2012 WL 2931407
(E.D. Cal. July 18, 2012) at *10 (“CMLS Mgmt.”); see
also Marciano v. White, 431 Fed.Appx. 611 (9th Cir.
2011)(decision of circuit judges Silverman, Tallman
and Clifton explicitly refusing to follow the published
Mothershed precedent); Santos v. Sup. Ct. Guam,
Case No. 15-16854 (9th Cir. mem. disp. Feb. 14,
2018)(a decision of Circuit Judges Ikuta, O’Scannlain
and Clifton, upholding dismissal of challenge to
interlocutory order while case was ongoing).
The decision cited in CMLS Mgmt. by District
Court Judge Ishi, Mothershed v. Justices of the
Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n. 1 (9th Cir.
2005), authored by Judge O’Scannlain and joined by
26
Judges Goodwin and Beezer, was addressed by the
Seventh Circuit as follows:
On appeal, Parker first challenges the
district court's application of the RookerFeldman doctrine. We conclude that
Rooker-Feldman does not apply here for
two reasons. First, that doctrine divests
district courts of jurisdiction only in
cases where "the losing party in state
court filed suit in federal court after the
state proceedings ended." Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 291, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161
L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (emphasis added).
Parker sued in federal court while his
appeal from the state circuit court's
judgment was pending in Illinois
Appellate Court. Since Saudi Basic
Industries, all federal circuits that have
addressed the issue have concluded that
Rooker-Feldman does not apply if, as
here, a state-court appeal is pending
when the federal suit is filed. See
Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279
(11th Cir.2009); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446
F.3d 1027, 1032 n. 2 (10th Cir.2006);
Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 92324 (8th Cir.2005); Mothershed v.
Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d
602, 604 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005); Federación
de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de
Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico,
410 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir.2005). As the
27
Ninth Circuit explained, Saudi Basic
Industries clarified that "[p]roceedings
end for Rooker-Feldman purposes when
the state courts finally resolve the issue
that the federal court plaintiff seeks to
relitigate in a federal forum."
Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 604 n. 1
(emphasis added). It added that if the
state-court appeal is pending at the time
the federal action is filed, the necessary
final resolution in the state system is
not present. We agree with this
reasoning and conclude that RookerFeldman does not bar the claims of
federal-court plaintiffs who, like Parker,
file a federal suit when a state-court
appeal is pending.
Parker v. Lyons, 757 F. 3d 701, 705-706 (7th Cir.
2014)(citing Exxon Mobil as “Saudi Basic”).
As Judge Ishi pointed out, the unpublished Ninth
Circuit case law subsequent to Mothershed has never
followed Mothershed, sometimes, as in the case of
Marciano v. White, supra, explicitly so. This is not
the product of ignorance by the subsequent panels.
Mothershed was a panel decision of Circuit Judges
Goodwin, Beezer and O’Scannlain. Each of them
subsequently signed unpublished opinions that did
not follow Mothershed. See, e.g., Santos, supra.
In a case for which review was unsuccessfully
sought before this Court, a dissenting Sixth Circuit
judge called out the Ninth Circuit’s predilection for
saying one thing in published case law and another
thing in its unpublished dispositions:
28
Seeking to create a veneer of nonunanimity, the majority points to an
unpublished Ninth Circuit
memorandum that quoted a pre-Exxon
case for the proposition that RookerFeldman applies to "interlocutory
state court decisions." Santos v.
Superior Ct. of Guam, 711 F. App'x
419, 420 (9th Cir. 2018)
(memorandum) (quoting Doe & Assocs.
Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d
1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001)). But, as
noted above, published Ninth Circuit
precedent holds otherwise. See
Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 604 n.1.
RLR Invs., LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, Tennessee, 4
F.4th 380, 401 n.6 (6th Cir. 2021)(Clay, C.J.
diss.)(“RLR Invs.”).
For at least the third time, a petition for certiorari
is before this Court addressing whether RookerFeldman applies to an interlocutory decision where
the state court proceedings are ongoing when the
complaint is filed. T. M. v. University of Maryland
Medical System Corp., Case No. 25-171. The petition
for certiorari filed in that action does not cite or
discuss any Ninth Circuit case law, a suspicious
omission given that it relies on RLR Invs. to
demonstrate a circuit split. The petitioner’s reply is
also misleading, as it claims that:
Respondents also suggest (Br. in Opp. 23)
that, if the question presented here were
worthy of the Court’s review, the Court
would have considered it earlier. But the
29
Sixth Circuit’s decision in RLR Investments,
LLC v. City of Pigeon Forge, 4 F.4th 380
(2021), was the first to join respondents’ side
of the circuit conflict after Exxon Mobil. See
Pet. at 8-11, RLR Investments, LLC v. City of
Pigeon Forge, 142 S. Ct. 862 (2021) (No. 21703).
Petitioner’s Reply filed November 5, 2025, in
T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System
Corp., Case No. 25-171(“T.M.”).
The contention by the attorneys for
petitioner T.M. that the circuit split emerged in
2021 is false. The first person to present the
refusal to follow the majority rule on this issue
was Amicus Sanai in the petition for certiorari
filed sub nom. Sanai v. Sanai, Docket No. 05991, addressing an unpublished disposition by
Judge Beezer that refused to follow or
acknowledge the published decision he signed,
Mothershed. Be that is may, this case provides
a vehicle for this Court to finally resolve the
uncertainty involving the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine by adopting the comprehensive test for
its application which follows.
2. This Court Should Articulate a
Comprehensive Test for Application of
the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
Many judges have complained about the difficulty
of applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the
circuit courts disagree about the formulation of the
test and whether exceptions such as for voidness or
fraud exist. Compare Gilbank (reversing prior
30
precedent recognizing fraud exception) with
Kougasian, supra (re-affirming fraud exception based
on Barrow v. Hunton, supra). The circuit courts are
even divided as to whether Rooker-Feldman applies
when state proceedings are ongoing or not, an issue
which this Court is considering at this moment in
T.M. The Ninth Circuit issues published decisions
which follow one rule and then for decades in
unpublished dispositions goes the other way. See
CMLS Mgmt. and RLS Inv..
There are four reasons for the inconsistencies.
First, the lower courts often do not grasp that Rooker
is based on the common-law understanding of
“original jurisdiction” and thus there is some overlap
between proceedings which are original versus those
that are appellate in character. Second, Feldman’s
general jurisdiction challenge exception is not part of
the common-law conception of original jurisdiction or
of appellate function and thus cannot be derived from
the historical common-law origins supporting Rooker.
Third, this Court has not issued a comprehensive test
for its application. Fourth, in the Ninth Circuit, the
published precedents of this Court and the Ninth
Circuit itself are regularly ignored in unpublished
dispositions pursuant to the quasi-heraldic Circuit
motto coined by the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt:
“They can’t catch ‘em all.” Sam Roberts, Stephen
Reinhardt, Liberal Lion of Federal Court, Dies at 87,
N. Y. Times, April 3, 2018, at B13.
Amici propose a two-part, multi-prong test based
on the Ninth Circuit’s Noel v. Hall two-step, multiprong test as to each claim in a lawsuit as follows:
31
STEP 1: IS A CLAIM IN THE LAWSUIT A DE
FACTO APPEAL?
Question 1:
Does a claim in a lawsuit in
federal court seek relief from an order or judgment of
a state court or other state tribunal the proceedings of
which are judicial in nature and to which the federal
court plaintiff was a party?
Answer 1:
If yes, continue to Question 2 as to
such claim. If no, Rooker-Feldman does not apply to
such claim at all.
Question 2:
At the time the federal lawsuit
was filed, had the state proceeding ended such that it
had reached the stage where a petition for certiorari
could have been (or was) filed in this Court?
Answer 2:
If no, and the state proceeding
has not reached this stage, then Rooker-Feldman does
not apply to the lawsuit, period, as to any claims
regarding the state proceeding. Otherwise, if the
answer is yes and the litigation has reached the point
where a petition for certiorari could have been filed at
the time the federal litigation was filed, go to
Question 3.
Question 3:
Does a claim in the federal court
lawsuit contend that the order or judgment is void for
lack of personal jurisdiction or subject matter
jurisdiction under state or federal law?
Answer 3:
If the answer is yes, that claim is
not subject to Rooker-Feldman. As to other claims, go
to Question 4.
32
Question 4:
Does a claim in the federal
lawsuit allege the order or judgment was obtained by
extrinsic or intrinsic fraud?
Answer 4:
If it is alleged that a claim was
obtained by extrinsic or intrinsic fraud, that claim is
not subject to Rooker-Feldman. If there are other
claims, go to Question 5.
Question 5:
Does a claim in the federal
lawsuit contend that as authoritatively applied
against the plaintiff in the state proceeding, facially,
or on an overbreadth basis, a state law or rule was
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supremacy Clause, or under any other federal
Constitutional basis? Put another way, does a claim
assert the state tribunal in accordance with its
correct interpretation (without regard to federal
unconstitutionality) of state law or rules violated
federal constitutional law where the state law or rule
was a basis for the challenged final order or
judgment?
Answer 5:
If the answer is yes as to a claim,
such claim is not subject to Rooker Feldman. For any
claims remaining go to Question 6.
Question 6:
Does a claim in the federal
lawsuit contend that as authoritatively applied
against the plaintiff in the state proceeding, facially,
or on an overbreadth basis, a federal law or rule was
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment,
separation of powers, or under any other federal
Constitutional basis? Put another way, does a claim
assert that the state tribunal, in accordance with its
correct interpretation (without regard to federal
33
unconstitutionality) of federal law or rules, violated
federal constitutional law where the federal law or
rule was the basis for the challenged final order or
judgment?
Answer 6:
If the answer is yes as to a claim,
such claim is not subject to Rooker-Feldman. For any
claims that have not been excluded from application
of Rooker-Feldman, go to Step 2.
STEP 2: IS ANY DE FACTO APPEAL CLAIM
INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED?
If Answer 1 was “yes” as to any claim and Answer
2 was “yes” as to the lawsuit, then any claims as to
which all of Answers 3, 4, 5, and 6 are “no” could
potentially be inextricably intertwined with the state
tribunal’s final order or judgment. A claim is
inextricably intertwined with the final order or
judgment if success on that claim would necessarily
require the federal court to find that the state court
made an error in applying a state law or rule (without
regard to its unconstitutionality under federal law), a
federal law or rule (other than relating to
constitutionality) or that the state court was
necessarily wrong in resolving a disputed issue of fact
unaffected by any fraud on the court. A claim is not
inextricably intertwined if resolving the issue in the
federal plaintiff’s favor might, but not necessarily
will, cause the state court judge to change its mind on
the question of law of interpretation of state or
federal law or the disputed issue of fact.
Amici’s proposed test addresses all possible
grounds by which Rooker-Feldman might be applied
34
or not. Fundamentally, if the lawsuit is ongoing at
the time the federal lawsuit is filed, Rooker-Feldman
does not apply. If the federal court plaintiff was not a
party to the state court proceedings, Rooker-Feldman
does not apply. If no relief from a judgment or order
is requested, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. As to
specific claims, the federal court may only address
claims of fraud, lack of jurisdiction, and those
asserting that the state or federal law or rules, as
authoritatively applied in accordance with its terms,
is unconstitutional on an as-applied, overbreadth, or
facial basis.
On the other hand, Rooker-Feldman bars attacks
premised on a pure issue of disputed fact. RookerFeldman bars attacking a state court judgment on a
state law cause of action on the grounds that the
state court got the state law issues wrong as a matter
of state law. Rooker-Feldman bars attacking a state
court judgment on a federal cause of action unrelated
to constitutionality on the grounds that the state
court got the federal law wrong.
3. The Searle Court’s Mootness Analysis
Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent.
The Searle panel held that the change in Arizona
law rendered the facial claim moot. "[I]n instances
where [a case's] mootness is attributable to a change
in the legal framework governing the case, and where
the plaintiff may have some residual claim under the
new framework that was understandably not
asserted previously," this Court has counseled that
the best "practice is to vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings in which the parties
may, if necessary, amend their pleadings or develop
35
the record more fully." Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp.,
494 U.S. 472, 482 (1990). The Ninth Court should
have given Searle the opportunity to assert amended
retroactive claims, which may include recission of
deeds transferring the property.
CONCLUSION
The Court should address the Rooker-Feldman
issue, explicitly disapprove the Ninth Circuit’s
Rooker-Feldman analysis in Searle, hold that this
Court has jurisdiction to resolve Pung’s action, and in
so doing, articulate a comprehensive test for
application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as
outlined above.
If the Court is interested in additional input on
the proposed comprehensive test, it should issue an
order permitting direct intervention in this certiorari
proceeding only by Amici Sanai.
Dated this December 4, 2025.
Respectfully submitted,
Frances L. Diaz SB#159837
Law Offices of Frances L. Diaz
8306 Wilshire Boulevard, #263
Beverly Hills, California 90211
(310) 927-5086
francesdiaz@frontier.com
counsel for Amici
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.