Amicus Curiae Brief — John Doe, et al., Petitioners v. X Corp., fka Twitter, Inc.

No. 25-949

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_______________

JOHN DOE 1 AND JOHN DOE 2,

v.

X CORP., FKA TWITTER, INC.,

_______________

Petitioners,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

BRIEF OF FLORIDA AND 16 OTHER

STATES AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONERS

_________________________________

JAMES UTHMEIER

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

Attorney General

Solicitor General

JEFFREY P. DESOUSA

RYAN D. NEWMAN

Chief Deputy

Chief Deputy Attorney

Solicitor General

General

Counsel of Record

JASON J. MUEHLHOFF

OFFICE OF THE FLORIDA

Chief Deputy

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Solicitor General

PL-01, The Capitol

THOMAS F. KELLY

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Fellow

(850) 414-3300

Jason.Muehlhoff@myfloridalegal.com

March 12, 2026

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................2

ARGUMENT ...............................................................4

I.

SOCIAL-MEDIA PLATFORMS ARE HOTBEDS OF

CHILD SEX ABUSE. ...............................................4

II.

LOWER COURTS HAVE MISCONSTRUED SECTION

230 AND STIFLED EFFORTS TO PROTECT KIDS

FROM SEXUAL PREDATORS. .................................9

III. SECTION 230 DOES NOT BAR PETITIONERS’ SEXTRAFFICKING CLAIMS. ....................................... 13

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 17

ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES................................. 18

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc.,

243 P.3d 521 (Wash. 2010) .................................... 12

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544 (2007)................................................ 16

Children’s Health Def. v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

112 F.4th 742 (9th Cir. 2024) ................................ 11

Daniel v. Armslist, LLC,

926 N.W.2d 710 (Wis. 2019) .................................. 10

Dist. of Columbia v. Meta Platforms, Inc.,

No. 2023-CAB-006550 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,

2025) .........................................................................8

Doe 1 v. Twitter, Inc.,

148 F.4th 635 (9th Cir. 2025) ................ 4, 14, 15, 16

Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,

724 F. Supp. 3d 882 (N.D. Cal. 2024).................... 12

Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc.,

824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016).............................. 3, 12

Doe v. McKesson,

71 F.4th 278 (5th Cir. 2023) .................................. 11

Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,

528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).................................. 12

Doe v. Snap, Inc.,

144 S. Ct. 2493 (2024)................................ 3, 6, 9, 11

Force v. Facebook, Inc.,

934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) ............................. 2, 9, 10

iii

Goddard v. Google, Inc.,

2008 WL 5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008)......... 10

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991)............................................ 3, 13

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris,

512 U.S. 246 (1994)................................................ 13

Herrick v. Grindr, LLC,

306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) .................... 10

Kimzey v. Yelp Inc.,

21 F. Supp. 3d 1120 (W.D. Wash. 2014) ............... 10

L.W. through Doe v. Snap Inc.,

675 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (S.D. Cal. 2023) .................. 12

Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA,

141 S. Ct. 13 (2020)............................................ 9, 14

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,

603 U.S. 707, (2024)............................................... 11

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,

458 U.S. 886 (1982)................................................ 11

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,

591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009).................................. 10

Pennekamp v. Florida,

328 U.S. 331 (1946)................................................ 11

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh,

598 U.S. 471 (2023)............................................ 4, 16

United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres.

Ass’n,

590 U.S. 604 (2020) ................................................ 13

United States v. Cano-Guel,

167 F.3d 900 (5th Cir. 1999).................................. 16

iv

United States v. Kimbrough,

69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995)................................ 4, 14

United States v. Parker,

587 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2009).................................. 17

Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,

478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007) .................................. 10

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) .................................................... 16

18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4) ................................................ 16

18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) .................................................... 15

47 U.S.C. § 230 ............................................................1

47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) ................................................. 15

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) .............................................. 9, 14

47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1).................................................. 15

47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A) ......................................... 4, 15

Other Authorities

Agnieszka McPeak, Platform Immunity Redefined,

62 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1557 (2021) .......................9

David Finkelhor et al., Online Child Sexual

Exploitation and Abuse Findings from a National

Survey, Crimes Against Children Research Center

2 (2023), ....................................................................2

Gregory M. Dickinson, The Internet Immunity

Escape Hatch, 47 BYU L. Rev. 1435 (2022) .......... 10

v

Hidden Harms: Examining Whistleblower

Allegations that Meta Buried Child Safety

Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Priv.,

Tech., and the L. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,

119th Cong. 1 (2025) ................................................8

Jeff Horwitz & Katherine Blunt, Instagram Connects

Vast Pedophile Network, Wall Street Journal (June

7, 2023) .....................................................................6

Letter from Senators Richard Blumenthal and

Marsha Blackburn to Mark Zuckerberg (June 21,

2023) .........................................................................6

Man Sentenced to 70 Months in Nationwide

Sextortion Case, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 29,

2023) .........................................................................5

Mary G. Leary, The Indecency and Injustice of

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,

41 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 553 (2018).................. 12

Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet

is Overrun with Images of Child Sexual Abuse.

What Went Wrong, N.Y. Times (Sep. 29, 2019) ......2

Neil Fried, The Myth of Internet Exceptionalism,

American Affairs (Summer 2021) ......................... 13

Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, Whistleblower Tells

Congress that Facebook Products Harm Kids and

Democracy, NPR (Oct. 5, 2021) ...............................9

Social Media and Youth Mental Health: The U.S.

Surgeon General’s Advisory, Off. of the Surgeon

Gen. 11 (2023) ..........................................................9

vi

Tawnell D. Hobbs, “Every Parent’s Nightmare”:

TikTok is a Venue for Child Sexual Exploitation,

Wall Street Journal (Feb. 15, 2023) ........................7

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Federal Sentencing of Child

Pornography: Production Offenses 3 (2021)............9

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE *

As social-media use has exploded, so too has child

sex abuse. That is no coincidence. Social-media

platforms have given sexual predators unprecedented

access to kids, and these platforms have loaded their

products with design features that facilitate abuse.

Platforms arm predators with tools like self-deleting

messages, which conceal grooming, sextortion, and

trafficking. They let adults pose as children when

creating accounts. Their algorithms connect predators

to each other, recommending to them accounts

associated with child sexual abuse material.

Platforms’ search bars even help predators find child

sexual abuse material by suggesting terms and

hashtags to them.

Social-media companies know these features aid

predators, yet they have refused to reform their

products. That is because they have not had to answer

for their role in the child-sexual-abuse epidemic. They

have escaped liability by exploiting courts’ expansion

of “publisher” immunity under Section 230 of the

Communications Decency Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.

Amici States have a significant interest in

returning Section 230 to its proper scope. Courts’

approach to the statute has hampered States’ ability

to protect children from sexual predators. States have

historically used tort and unfair-trade-practices laws

to protect their citizens from dangerous products, but

Section 230’s “mission creep” has defanged those laws

* Amici States timely notified counsel for all parties of

their intention to file this brief as required by Supreme

Court Rule 37.2.

2

on the internet. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53,

80 (2d Cir. 2019) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part). This Court should grant

certiorari, reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and

rein in publisher immunity under Section 230.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. Child sex abuse is rampant on social media. One

out of every six kids is a victim of online sex abuse, 1

and law enforcement agencies are “besieged” by

reports of child sexual abuse material on social media

companies like X (formerly, Twitter). 2

Social-media companies have fueled this epidemic

of abuse by employing a host of design features that

help predators abuse kids. The companies know the

features facilitate abuse, but rather than fix them, the

companies have doubled down on their nothing-to-seehere approach, using the same playbook that tobacco

companies and opioid manufacturers deployed years

ago. They cover up their wrongs and use their armies

of lawyers to evade liability.

2. Social-media companies have escaped

responsibility for their role in the child-sex-abuse

epidemic because lower courts have wrongly granted

them sweeping immunity under Section 230. Section

David Finkelhor et al., Online Child Sexual

Exploitation and Abuse Findings from a National Survey,

Crimes Against Children Research Center 2 (2023),

https://perma.cc/A8J3-BG4L.

2 Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J.X. Dance, The Internet

is Overrun with Images of Child Sexual Abuse. What Went

Wrong, N.Y. Times (Sep. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/PG68LLKC.

1

3

230 has a “narrow focus”: It shields platforms from

publisher liability, preventing them from being held

strictly liable for transmitting defamatory content.

Doe ex rel. Roe v. Snap, Inc., 144 S. Ct. 2493, 2493

(2024) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of

certiorari, joined by Gorsuch, J.). Yet lower courts

have construed the statute as an “all purpose get-outof-jail-free card,” which immunizes platforms that

host third-party content from defective-design claims,

unfair-trade-practices claims, contract claims, and

more. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853

(9th Cir. 2016). That interpretation of Section 230 has

stifled state efforts to protect kids from sexual

predators. Social-media companies have exploited the

interpretation to avoid liability for their defective

products.

Nothing in Section 230 permits that incursion on

states’ traditional police power. To displace state laws

regulating dangerous products, Congress must “make

its intention to” do so “unmistakably clear in the

language of” the preemption “statute.” Gregory v.

Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quotations

omitted). But Section 230 includes no language clearly

displacing state products-liability regulations.

3. This case is an opportunity to rein in the judicial

expansion of Section 230. The Ninth Circuit

misconstrued Section 230 and granted X immunity for

its own egregious conduct. This Court should reverse

that decision and clarify the scope of Section 230.

The Ninth Circuit was wrong that Petitioners’ sextrafficking claims treat X as a publisher. The claims

neither seek to hold X strictly liable nor punish it for

any information posted by third parties. Petitioners

4

allege that X knowingly maintained and distributed

child sexual abuse material—which is “illegal

contraband,” not mere information. United States v.

Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 1995).

But even if Petitioners’ claims treat X as a

publisher, Section 230’s sex-trafficking carveout

applies. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A). Even

assuming—as the Ninth Circuit held—that the

carveout requires a platform to actively participate in

sex trafficking, Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient.

Taking the allegations as true, X did not “merely

turn[] a blind eye” to sex trafficking. Doe 1 v. Twitter,

Inc., 148 F.4th 635, 644 (9th Cir. 2025). Instead, it

“help[ed] make [a sex-trafficking venture] succeed.”

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471, 497 (2023).

Twitter knowingly pushed out to thousands of users

child sexual abuse material depicting Petitioners.

Those actions assisted the predators that abused

Petitioners by distributing the material to potential

buyers.

ARGUMENT

I.

SOCIAL-MEDIA PLATFORMS ARE HOTBEDS OF

CHILD SEX ABUSE.

Children are sexually abused every day on social

media. Predators use Instagram, Snapchat, X, and

other platforms to groom, sextort, and traffic kids.

Evidence of their crimes pervades the platforms:

There are millions of photos and videos of child sexual

abuse material circulating on social media. 3 As

Senators Marsha Blackburn and Richard Blumenthal

3 Keller & Dance, supra n.2.

5

recently observed, platforms are “open-air market[s]

for the sale of child sexual abuse material.” 4 Predators

use hashtags like “#pedowhore” and “#preteensex” to

“advertise child-sex material for sale.” 5 And their

account profiles boast of “incest toddlers” and parade

pictures of “teenager[s] with the word WHORE

scrawled across [their] face[s].” 6

Brandon Huu Le is one of the predators who used

social media to abuse children. 7 Using Snapchat, Le

“contact[ed] at least 270 girls,” and “[i]f a girl

responded,” he “turned the conversation to sexual

topics” and coerced her into sexual acts. 8 Le would

first “threaten[] to publicly disclose the sexually

charged conversation unless the girl sent him an

explicit picture” (“Either f-----g send the pic now or I’m

not gonna give your [sic] anymore chances.”). 9 But

after the girl sent the picture, Le would only escalate

his threats. He would “threaten[] to release the

picture unless the girl sent him an explicit video”

(“[D]o you want me to post your nudes? Do you want

to ruin your chances of ever going to a good college?

Do you want to ruin your chances of getting a good

Letter from Senators Richard Blumenthal and

Marsha Blackburn to Mark Zuckerberg (June 21, 2023),

https://perma.cc/EK7A-6WHY.

5 Jeff Horwitz & Katherine Blunt, Instagram Connects

Vast Pedophile Network, Wall Street Journal (June 7,

2023), https://perma.cc/H5XN-XBUY.

6 Id.

7 Man Sentenced to 70 Months in Nationwide Sextortion

Case, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 29, 2023),

https://perma.cc/5N87-UW6Z.

8 Id.

9 Id.

4

6

job?”). 10 Then he would “threaten[] to release the video

unless the girl engaged in a live video call in which

[she] followed [Le’s] sexual commands.” 11

Snapchat and other platforms are hotbeds of child

sex abuse not only because they give predators like Le

access to children but also because they employ design

features that support predators. Messages on

Snapchat, for instance, are “self-deleting,” which

allows predators to conceal their crimes. Snap, Inc.,

144 S. Ct. at 2493 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial

of certiorari, joined by Gorsuch, J.). Instagram’s

recommendation algorithms connect predators to

each other, recommending to them accounts that use

terms associated with child sexual abuse. 12 Instagram

has even allowed users to view content that its

algorithms identified as child sexual abuse material.

Until recently, it had a “See results anyway” option

for posts that appeared to “contain images of child

sexual abuse”: 13

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Horwitz & Blunt, supra n.5.

13 Id.

7

On X, when a predator searches for child sexual abuse

material, the search bar suggests terms and hashtags

to help facilitate the search: 14

TikTok lets predators pose as children when they

create an account. 15 And on both TikTok and

Instagram, users can keep operating accounts even

after evidence of child sexual abuse is discovered on

one of their accounts. 16

Social-media companies know their platforms are

dangerous for children, but rather than protect kids,

they have tried to conceal the risks the platforms pose.

Companies like Meta and TikTok have refused “access

to [their] data” and “bur[ied] evidence” of the harm

App.175a–78a. “#Megalinks” is a hashtag associated

with child sexual abuse material. Id.

15 Tawnell D. Hobbs, “Every Parent’s Nightmare”:

TikTok is a Venue for Child Sexual Exploitation, Wall

Street Journal (Feb. 15, 2023), https://perma.cc/EAY9DUTU.

16 See id.; Horwitz & Blunt, supra n.5.

14

8

they are inflicting on children. 17 “Meta’s counsel” has

even advised “researchers” at Meta “to block or

redesign research about” the danger that Meta

platforms pose to adolescents. 18

Because social-media companies have been

unwilling to fix their platforms’ design defects, child

exploitation is at a “breaking point.” 19 Over the past

20 years—as social-media use has skyrocketed—

online exploitation and abuse of children has

increased 422%. 20 One out of every six kids is now a

victim of online sexual abuse, 21 and law enforcement

agencies across the country are “besieged” by reports

of child sexual abuse material. 22 “With so many

Social Media and Youth Mental Health: The U.S.

Surgeon General’s Advisory, Off. of the Surgeon Gen. 11

(2023), https://tinyurl.com/33u2t7kn (first quote); Hidden

Harms: Examining Whistleblower Allegations that Meta

Buried Child Safety Research: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Priv., Tech., and the L. of the S. Comm. on

the Judiciary, 119th Cong. 1 (2025) (written statement of

Jason Sattizahn), https://tinyurl.com/37jmj2a8 (second

quote); see also Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn,

Whistleblower Tells Congress that Facebook Products

Harm Kids and Democracy, NPR (Oct. 5, 2021),

https://tinyurl.com/yc4zex93 (Meta whistleblower exposing

that “Facebook executives hide research about the social

network’s risks to keep its business humming”).

18 Dist. of Columbia v. Meta Platforms, Inc., No. 2023CAB-006550, slip op. at 10 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2025).

19 Keller & Dance, supra n.2.

20 U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Federal Sentencing of Child

Pornography:

Production

Offenses

3

(2021),

https://perma.cc/A2BT-P99X.

21 Finkelhor, et al., supra n.1.

22 Keller & Dance, supra n.2.

17

9

reports of the abuse coming their way,” some agencies

are forced to “focus[] on imagery depicting the

youngest victims.” 23

II.

LOWER COURTS HAVE MISCONSTRUED SECTION

230 AND STIFLED EFFORTS TO PROTECT KIDS

FROM SEXUAL PREDATORS.

Section 230 has a “narrow focus”: It shields

platforms from publisher liability. Snap, 144 S. Ct. at

2493 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari,

joined by Gorsuch, J.). Under the statute, platforms

cannot be “treated as the publisher or speaker of any

information provided” by a user. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

That means platforms cannot be held “strictly liable

for transmitting” defamatory content. Malwarebytes,

Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, 141 S. Ct. 13, 14

(2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of

certiorari). But platforms are still subject to liability

for reckless or negligent conduct. See id. If they know

“content [i]s illegal” and they distribute it anyway,

they can be held liable for their actions. Id. So too if

they negligently design their products. See Force, 934

F.3d at 77 (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

Lower courts, however, have read Section 230

“expansive[ly].”

Agnieszka

McPeak,

Platform

Immunity Redefined, 62 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1557,

1574 (2021). “[R]el[ying] on policy and purpose

arguments,” they have “granted sweeping protection

to internet platforms.” Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 15

(Thomas, J., statement respecting denial of

certiorari). In the name of “Congress’s objectives,”

23 Id.

10

lower courts “favor . . . immunity,” Force, 934 F.3d at

64, and construe Section 230 as a shield against

“liability stemming from any activity in which . . .

publishing companies commonly engage.” Id. at 81

(Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part). Under that view of Section 230, platforms

cannot be held liable for any “decisions” related to

what “third-party content” they distribute or how they

distribute it. Id. at 67 (majority op.).

That construction of Section 230 has resulted in

widespread derogation of state laws. See Gregory M.

Dickinson, The Internet Immunity Escape Hatch, 47

BYU L. Rev. 1435, 1471 (2022). Internet companies

have used Section 230 to thwart state-law claims for

breach of contract, Goddard v. Google, Inc., No. C 082738, 2008 WL 5245490, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17,

2008); unlawful and unfair competition, Kimzey v.

Yelp Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1121–23 (W.D. Wash.

2014); cyberstalking and securities violations,

Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d

413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007); tortious interference with a

business expectancy, Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 252–53 (4th

Cir. 2009); negligence, Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926

N.W.2d 710, 726 (Wis. 2019); and products liability,

negligent design, and failure to warn, Herrick v.

Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588–92 (S.D.N.Y.

2018).

Worse, social-media companies wield this Section

230 shield while swinging the sword of free speech—

arguing their content “curation” constitutes

expressive

activity

that

invalidates

states’

regulations. See, e.g., Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603

11

U.S. 707, 721 (2024). And where state tort liability

ordinarily checks First Amendment freedom, Section

230’s excessive immunity eviscerates any balance. See

Doe v. McKesson, 71 F.4th 278, 291–92 (5th Cir. 2023)

(“[T]he First Amendment does not prohibit States

from imposing tort liability even if the tort occurs in

the context of expressive activity.” (citing NAACP v.

Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982));

Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 356 (1946)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (First Amendment

freedom is “not a freedom from responsibility for its

exercise.”).

Yet despite courts’ “broad construction of § 230,”

Internet providers have “no plausible claim to a

constitutional entitlement to full immunity for

publishing

or

distributing

constitutionally

unprotected [tortious] content.” Children’s Health Def.

v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 112 F.4th 742, 779–80 (9th

Cir. 2024) (Collins, J., concurring in part). But by

calling upon both the protections of Section 230 and

the First Amendment, social-media companies

effectively demand full immunity.

And as relevant here, Social-media companies

have exploited this sweeping reading of Section 230 to

escape liability for their role in the child-sexual-abuse

epidemic. See Snap, 144 S. Ct. at 2493 (Thomas, J.,

dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by

Gorsuch, J.). Unlike brick-and-mortar businesses that

must answer for defective products, platforms have

avoided responsibility for the harm they have caused

by wielding Section 230 as an “all purpose get-out-ofjail-free card.” Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d at 853.

Courts have repeatedly held that Section 230 shields

12

platforms from liability for their product designs

because the designs relate “to [platforms’] role as a

publisher.” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416,

420 (5th Cir. 2008); id. at 416 (Section 230 immunizes

platforms that fail to “implement basic safety

measures to prevent sexual predators from

communicating with minors”); Doe v. Backpage.com,

LLC, 724 F. Supp. 3d 882, 885 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (same

for platforms that facilitate “sex trafficking by

creating, suggesting, and encouraging connections

between sex traffickers and vulnerable persons”);

L.W. through Doe v. Snap Inc., 675 F. Supp. 3d 1087,

1097 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (same for platforms that use

“design features” that conceal child sexual abuse); see

also Mary G. Leary, The Indecency and Injustice of

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 41

Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 553, 578–82 (2018) (surveying

similar decisions).

Those

decisions

have

had

devastating

consequences. Tort and unfair-trade-practices laws

have historically protected the public from dangerous

products,

including

cigarettes,

opioids,

and

automobiles. They have provided victims a remedy

and incentivized companies to reform their products

by forcing them to internalize costs that their

products impose on the public. See, e.g., Affiliated FM

Ins. Co. v. LTK Consulting Servs., Inc., 243 P.3d 521,

528 (Wash. 2010) (“Tort liability . . . force[s] negligent

[businesses] to internalize the costs of their

unreasonable conduct, making them more likely to

take due care.”). But many courts’ approach to Section

230 has neutered tort and unfair-trade-practices laws

on the internet, leaving social-media companies little

reason to clean up their platforms. “Free from

13

potential liability, platforms have a financial interest

in minimizing spending on . . . measures to” combat

child sexual abuse. 24

None of this can be squared with this Court’s

precedent. This Court has repeatedly said that federal

preemption of state efforts to protect health and safety

“should not be lightly inferred.” Hawaiian Airlines,

Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (quotation

omitted). To displace state laws protecting citizens

from dangerous products, Congress must “make its

intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language

of the [preemption] statute.” Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 460

(quotation omitted). Section 230 includes no such

language. It does not use “exceedingly clear language”

immunizing platforms from all tort and unfair-tradepractices claims related to their design features.

United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres.

Ass’n, 590 U.S. 604, 622 (2020).

III.

SECTION 230 DOES NOT BAR PETITIONERS’ SEXTRAFFICKING CLAIMS.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision here is more of the

same: The court read Section 230 as bestowing

sweeping immunity on platforms and wrongly held

that X is immune from Petitioners’ sex-trafficking

claims. The claims do not treat X as a publisher, and

even if they did, Section 230’s sex-trafficking carveout

applies.

Neil Fried, The Myth of Internet Exceptionalism,

American Affairs (Summer 2021), https://perma.cc/Q94YEH3S.

24

14

A. The Ninth Circuit erred out of the gate by

concluding that Petitioners’ “theory for liability”

treats X as a publisher. Doe 1, 148 F.4th at 643. As

explained above, a claim treats a platform as a

publisher if it seeks to hold the platform “strictly

liable for transmitting” third-party information.

Malwarebytes, 141 S. Ct. at 14 (2020) (Thomas, J.,

statement respecting denial of certiorari). But

Petitioners’ claims neither seek to hold X strictly

liable nor punish it for any information posted by

third parties. Petitioners allege that X knowingly

maintained and distributed child sexual abuse

material, see App.160a–61a, which is “illegal

contraband,” not information. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d at

731.

Those allegations have nothing to do with

“publishing.” Sexual predators abused Petitioners,

created child sexual abuse material, and trafficked

that contraband on X. X then knowingly possessed

and disseminated the contraband. X cannot label the

contraband “information” and drape Section 230 over

itself just because child sexual abuse material is

accessed via a computer screen. A platform that

knowingly distributes child sexual abuse material is

no more a “publisher or speaker” of “information” than

a drug runner. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

The Ninth Circuit incorrectly assumed that child

sexual abuse material is “information” under Section

230(c)(1). That provision says: “No [platform] shall be

treated as the publisher or speaker of any information

provided by” a user. In 1996, when Congress passed

Section 230, no one would have understood

“information” in that sentence to include child sexual

15

abuse material. “Information” referred to “something

told; knowledge” or “items of knowledge; news.”

Information, Oxford Modern English Dictionary 546

(1992); see also Information, Merriam-Webster

Collegiate Dictionary 599 (10th ed. 1993) (“the

communication or reception of knowledge or

intelligence”). Child sexual abuse material was

nothing of the sort—it was (and still is) illegal

contraband “involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in

sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1996).

Section 230 was never intended to protect such

material: Since 1996, the statute has specified that it

should not “be construed to impair” efforts to rid the

internet of material “relating to sexual exploitation of

children.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1); see also id. § 230(b)(5)

(stating that Congress intends “vigorous enforcement

of Federal criminal laws”).

B. Even if the Ninth Circuit were right that

Petitioners’ sex-trafficking claims treat X as a

publisher, the claims are not barred because Section

230’s sex-trafficking carveout applies. See 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(e)(5)(A) (“Nothing in this section . . . shall be

construed to impair or limit . . . any” federal civil sextrafficking claim.). The Ninth Circuit held that

Petitioners’ allegations do not trigger the carveout

because they do not establish that X “actively

participated” in sex trafficking. Twitter, 148 F.4th at

644. Even assuming that active participation is

required, but see Pet. Br. 20–34, Plaintiffs’ allegations

are sufficient. A platform actively participates in sex

trafficking if it “knowingly assist[s], support[s], or

facilitat[es]” a sex-trafficking “venture.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a), (e)(4). And taking Petitioners’ allegations

16

“as true,” X did exactly that. Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

Petitioners alleged that sexual predators coerced

them into commercial sex acts (creating child sexual

abuse material), App.179a–80a; the predators

advertised the material on X, App.182a–84a;

Petitioners notified X multiple times that the

predators had posted the material on its platform,

App.183a–89a; X knew that its algorithms and

search-suggestion feature would push out the

material to users, App.171a–79a; X nevertheless

refused to take down the material (or even stop its

algorithms and search-suggestion feature from

promoting the material), App.187a–89a; and X then

pushed out the material to thousands of users. See

App.191a–92a.

That is not “merely turn[ing] a blind eye” to sex

trafficking. Twitter, 148 F.4th at 644. Instead, X

“help[ed] make [the predators’ venture] succeed.”

Taamneh, 598 U.S. at 497. By knowingly hosting and

pushing out the child sexual abuse material, X put its

online-distribution machine to work for the venture.

Its actions facilitated the spread of child sexual abuse

material to thousands of potential buyers.

X, then, is just as culpable as a shipping company

that knowingly transports drugs for a cartel. If a

cartel gives a shipping company a package stuffed

with fentanyl, the company knows about the fentanyl,

and it nevertheless transports the package, then the

company would be guilty of participating in drug

distribution. See United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d

900, 904–05 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming conviction for

“possession of marijuana with intent to distribute”

17

because the evidence established that the defendant

“knew” he was transporting marijuana); United States

v. Parker, 587 F.3d 871, 881 (8th Cir. 2009) (similar).

X’s actions here are no different. It assisted a criminal

venture by knowingly distributing the venture’s

contraband.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant certiorari and reverse the

Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General

RYAN D. NEWMAN

Chief Deputy Attorney

General

DAVID M.S. DEWHIRST

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JASON J. MUEHLHOFF

Chief Deputy

Solicitor General

THOMAS F. KELLY

Fellow

OFFICE OF THE FLORIDA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

PL-01, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(850) 414-3300

Jason.Muehlhoff@myfloridalegal.com

March 12, 2026

18

ADDITIONAL SIGNATORIES

BRENNA BIRD

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF IOWA

RUSSELL COLEMAN

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF KENTUCKY

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF TENNESSEE

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF NEBRASKA

LYNN FITCH

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

RAÚL LABRADOR

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF IDAHO

JOHN MCCUSKEY

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

KEN PAXTON

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF TEXAS

TIM GRIFFIN

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ARKANSAS

CHRISTOPHER CARR

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF GEORGIA

STEVE MARSHALL

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ALABAMA

TODD ROKITA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF INDIANA

STEPHEN J. COX

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF ALASKA

DEREK BROWN

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF UTAH

DREW WRIGLEY

ATTORNEY GENERAL

ALAN WILSON

ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA