Amicus Curiae Brief — E. D., a Minor, By Her Parent and Next Friend, Lisa Duell, et al., Petitioners v. Noblesville School District, et al.

No. 25-906

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

E. D., a Minor, By Her Parent and Next Friend,

LISA DUELL, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

NOBLESVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE STATES OF

KANSAS, ALABAMA, ALASKA, FLORIDA,

GEORGIA, INDIANA, LOUISIANA, MISSOURI,

MONTANA, NEBRASKA, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH

CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND WEST

VIRGINIA AND THE ARIZONA LEGISLATURE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Office of the Kansas

Attorney General

120 SW 10th Ave.,

2nd Floor

Topeka, KS 66612

(785) 296-2215

Anthony.Powell@ag.ks.gov

KRIS W. KOBACH

Attorney General

ANTHONY J. POWELL*

Solicitor General

ADAM T. STEINHILBER

Assistant Solicitor General

Counsel for Amici

(additional counsel listed inside)

March 4, 2026

*Counsel of Record

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................ 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 3

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 4

I.

Readily turning student speech into school

speech silences students and weakens our

civic health ............................................................ 7

II. Noncurricular student groups help students

develop civic engagement and leadership skills .... 11

III. The Seventh Circuit’s sweeping approach

to school speech empowers vague speech

policies ......................................................... 15

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 18

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Albach v. Odle,

531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976) ....................... 12, 14

B. A. v. Tri Cnty. Area Schs.,

156 F.4th 782 (6th Cir. 2025) ............................... 8

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,

478 U.S. 675 (1986) ............................... 4, 8, 12, 13

Board of Education of Westside Community Schools

v. Mergens By & Through Mergens,

496 U.S. 226 (1990) ....................................... 13, 14

Burch v. Barker,

861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) ............................. 15

Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,

158 F.4th 732 (6th Cir. 2025) ............................... 9

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,

484 U.S. 260 (1988) ............... 2, 5, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15

J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.,

650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) ............................ 8, 10

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y.,

385 U.S. 589 (1967) ............................................... 8

L. M. by & through Morrison v. Town of Middleborough,

145 S. Ct. 1489 (2025) ........................................... 8

Leroy v. Livingston Manor Cent. Sch. Dist.,

158 F.4th 414 (2d Cir. 2025) ............................... 10

Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. by & through Levy,

594 U.S. 180 (2021) ................................. 7, 8, 9, 10

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,

285 U.S. 262 (1932) ............................................... 7

ii

Rivera v. E. Otero Sch. Dist. R-1,

721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989) ...................... 10

S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ.,

333 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003) .................................. 5

Shelton v. Tucker,

364 U.S. 479 (1960) ............................................... 8

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,

393 U.S. 503 (1969) ............................................. 10

Turning Point USA at Ark. State Univ. v. Rhodes,

973 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2020) ......................... 16, 17

Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield,

249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003).................... 13

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. I ............................................. 1, 17

Statutes, Rules and Other Authorities

S. Con. Res. 1615, 2026 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2026) ......... 1

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 ............................................................ 1

U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 2025 Respect Life Month

Resources, https://www.respectlife.org/respectlife-month (last accessed Feb. 2, 2026)

[https://perma.cc/NDJ8-934U] ............................ 17

iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici curiae the States of Kansas, Alabama,

Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,

Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South

Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia and the

Arizona Legislature operate and oversee schools,

colleges, and universities full of students with

differing viewpoints. Amici have a strong interest in

ensuring student speech—especially non-disruptive

speech

by

age-appropriate,

student-led

organizations—is not silenced by disagreement or

arbitrary decision-making. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 1615,

2026 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2026) (recognizing Charlie Kirk

Free Speech Day and noting “the importance of free

speech, the values of the First Amendment and our

nation’s commitment to civil debate”).

Because

educational

institutions

have

historically served as pathways to new ideas and

prepared students to embrace active citizenship

through debate, discussion, critical thinking, and

resiliency, schools today should welcome engaged

students who are eager to respectfully share their

interests and ideas. Reality, however, stands in stark

contrast with this ideal, as administrators,

instructors, students, and even outsiders routinely

minimize or outright silence unpopular speech. Thus,

it too often falls to the judiciary to ensure schools

comply with constitutional and statutory guarantees

1 Amici provided timely notice to the parties of their intent to file

this brief. See Rule 37.2.

1

of free speech—and to hold accountable those who

silence students.

Instead of forcefully rejecting viewpoint

discrimination, the Seventh Circuit tacitly blessed it,

allowing school administrators to hide behind a broad

speech policy, so long as the policy furthers even

broader goals. The court justified this censorship

because it deemed the speech at issue—a

noncurricular, pro-life student group’s flyers—to be

the school’s speech, and so subject to the school’s nearcomplete editorial control.

The student behind the flyers, E.D., did not

attempt to promote her group and views by co-opting

an unrelated classroom session or trying to publish an

inflammatory article in the school newspaper.

Instead, she sought to do what countless students

before her have done to advertise their own studentled groups: hang flyers. Yet the Seventh Circuit,

defying both Hazelwood’s core reasoning and common

sense, effectively equated a noncurricular student

group’s flyer with classroom instruction and

organized activity.

As this Court has continually affirmed,

America’s public schools play a critical role in

preparing students for life and instilling in them the

fundamental traits necessary to become the active

citizens on whom our system of government depends.

In addition to teaching the three Rs, schools can—and

should—help students prepare for citizenship. This

occurs, in part, when students have appropriate

opportunities to debate and discuss issues. And

2

student-led noncurricular groups play an important

role: They provide a forum outside classrooms and

structured activities for students to discuss ideas with

their peers and to take charge of an organization.

More than many classes, these groups provide

students with the practical skills and experience

necessary for productive citizenship.

The Seventh Circuit weakened student speech

by effectively turning all student-led noncurricular

groups into curricular activities, converting student

speech into school speech and empowering broad

speech policies. The court undermined the ability of

students to prepare for active citizenship. And it

deepened a circuit split that impacts public schools

nationwide. This Court’s intervention is necessary.

Accordingly, the Court should grant the petition for a

writ of certiorari and reverse the Seventh Circuit.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

By turning the meeting flyer of a noncurricular,

student-led group into school speech and blessing a

broad and arbitrary speech policy, the Seventh Circuit

undermined the ability of high school students to

meaningfully prepare to contribute to civil society.

This Court has long considered America’s

public schools to be the nurseries of democracy for

good reason: These are communities where students

debate and discuss new ideas and learn from their

peers. And noncurricular student groups—i.e., groups

or clubs based purely on student interest that are not

tethered to a school’s curriculum or a structured

activity—are critical to preparing students for active

3

citizenship. Through these groups, students develop

the critical thinking and leadership skills necessary to

help them with any manner of important civic

decision, whether that be weighing the platforms of

competing candidates or deciding how to be active

community leaders.

Because the Seventh Circuit did not identify

any materially significant link between the school and

the speech at issue, the court erased any distinction

between curricular activities and noncurricular

groups, meaning that students will have fewer

opportunities to meaningfully use these groups to

debate and discuss new and important ideas. By

weakening student speech and the role of

noncurricular

groups

while

vindicating

an

extraordinarily broad speech policy, the decision will

inevitably weaken our Nation.

ARGUMENT

American public schools play a critical role in

the continued prosperity of our Nation. Certainly,

they instruct students in the fundamental skills

necessary for college and the workforce. More

importantly, public schools “prepare pupils for

citizenship in the Republic.” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403

v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quotation marks

omitted). Schools do so by instilling in students the

“fundamental values of habits and manners of civility

essential to a democratic society,” which, “of course,

include tolerance of divergent political and religious

views, even when the views expressed may be

unpopular.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Schools,

naturally, are not forums for every manner of

4

expression and idea. See id. And what is appropriate

in a high school may not be appropriate in an

elementary school. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (recognizing the

ability of schools to ensure that students “are not

exposed to material that may be inappropriate for

their level of maturity”); see also, e.g., S.G. ex rel. A.G.

v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir.

2003) (recognizing “that a school’s authority to control

student speech in an elementary school setting is

undoubtedly greater than in a high school setting”).

It also matters whether the speech at issue is,

or would fairly be considered, the school’s speech, as

opposed to speech by its students. This distinction

boils down to whether or not the speech would be

facilitated through formal curriculum, instruction, or

similar structured activity. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S.

at 271. It is important for schools to control what is

unquestionably their own speech. But school

administrators should not be permitted to

unnecessarily sweep broadly, turning student speech

into school speech. Such a course of action limits the

ability of students to meaningfully hear about new

ideas, engage in appropriate debate and discourse,

and ultimately develop the critical thinking and

resiliency skills that will contribute to the future

success of both the students and our Nation.

This case presents an extraordinarily mundane

example of “controversial” student speech: a proposed

flyer from a high school noncurricular student group

contained a photo of people peacefully holding signs

5

that conveyed pro-life messages. See App. 4a–5a. And

the flyer would be displayed where flyers have

appeared since the advent of student groups—in

hallways and common areas. See App. 11a–12a. In

other words, nothing separated what E.D. sought to

do from what the vast majority of high school students

do in trying to promote their own student-led clubs.

The Seventh Circuit found the school’s

censorship to be constitutional because, the court

believed, the flyer “could reasonably be perceived as

bearing the school’s imprimatur.” See App. 11a. In

reaching this conclusion, the court turned an

administrator’s ministerial sign-off and the flyer’s

would-be placement in a hallway as hallmarks of

school speech. See App. 12a. The Seventh Circuit

effectively determined that any statement by a

noncurricular student group should be treated like a

formal statement from the school. Under such

expansive reasoning, it is difficult to imagine a

student group whose flyer would not qualify as the

school’s speech. Cf. App. 11a–12a. And that is what is

so concerning—there was nothing particularly special

or controversial about the flyers and their

relationship with the school.

Schools—especially high schools—help expose

students to new ideas and opportunities, and they

enable students to debate and discuss ideas and issues

with peers. In facilitating these occurrences, schools

prepare students for active citizenship, where they

will also have to debate, discuss, and consider myriad

important issues and viewpoints. Certainly, student

6

debate and discussion cannot dominate classroom

instruction, nor must schools cede control of curricular

activities. But the Seventh Circuit’s heavy-handed

approach to determining school speech effectively

erased any daylight between formal curriculum and

student-interest groups.

E.D.’s desired flyer was a tried-and-true

method of furthering her student group, which sought

to provide new ideas for high school students. It was

not disruptive or inappropriate by any measure, and

it should not be deemed speech by the school itself. It

is imperative that this Court intervene to protect the

constitutional rights of student and the health of our

Nation.

I.

Readily turning student speech into

school speech silences students and

weakens our civic health.

Schools are environments ripe for exposure to

new and different ideas. Students interact with peers

from various backgrounds, learn (hopefully) new

information from teachers, and participate in a

variety of activities that help them mature and grow.

Like the States, which are the laboratories of

democracy, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285

U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), public

schools play a foundational civic role as “the nurseries

of democracy,” Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L. by &

through Levy, 594 U.S. 180, 190 (2021).

Of course, “anything goes” is not—and should

not be—the rule. Parental rights must be respected,

classroom instruction should not be interrupted, and

7

schools cannot permit any and all messages. See

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. And it is necessary to consider

the age and maturity of the students who might hear

the speech at issue. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271;

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. Yet these important

limitations do not vest school administrators with

unfettered authority to “censor a student’s speech

merely because it is controversial.” See L. M. by &

through Morrison v. Town of Middleborough, 145 S.

Ct. 1489, 1494 (2025) (Alito, J., dissenting from the

denial of certiorari). It is vital for our Nation’s

continued success that students do not have their nondisruptive speech arbitrarily and needlessly silenced.

As this Court has “consistent[ly]” affirmed, “student

speech is not a constitutional afterthought, but a

protected and essential component of democratic

discourse.” B. A. v. Tri Cnty. Area Schs., 156 F.4th

782, 811 (6th Cir. 2025) (Bush, J., dissenting) (citing

Mahanoy, 594 U.S. at 190); see also, e.g., Shelton v.

Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant

protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more

vital than in the community of American schools.”).

“In order to maintain a thriving democracy,

students cannot be unreasonably encumbered in their

freedom to express moral, political, and social ideals

and beliefs.” J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch.

Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 944 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(Fisher, J., dissenting). Excessive restrictions

needlessly stifle student speech and undercut the

“free exchange” of ideas that is necessary for our

system of government. See B.L., 594 U.S. at 190; see

also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.

Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing that “[t]he

Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through

8

wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas”). In

turning a noncurricular student group into a

spokesman of the school, the Seventh Circuit

weakened the ability of high school students to

contribute to the marketplace of ideas.

E.D. sought to provide a forum in her school

community for pro-life ideas and interests. Her group

was not attached to classroom instruction, nor was it

part of a structured activity. It was a club led by

students and based on student interests. And E.D.

naturally tried to advertise her group, utilizing

template flyers from a national pro-life student

organization. Through her group and proposed flyers,

E.D. wanted to contribute to the free exchange of ideas

in her high school in a non-disruptive and ageappropriate manner. “This free exchange facilitates

an informed public opinion, which, when transmitted

to lawmakers, helps produce laws that reflect the

People’s will.” B.L., 594 U.S. at 190.

Pro-life

views

necessarily

come

with

controversy. Under the Seventh Circuit’s decision and

the school “policy” at issue here, these views could

never come into the schoolhouse, even if conveyed by

students in a non-disruptive and age-appropriate

manner outside the classroom. That outcome is

untethered to the Constitution. Cf. Defending Educ. v.

Olentangy Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.4th 732,

759–60 (6th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (“When a political

debate has fractured our society in such a significant

way, the originalist case for giving schools greater

power to regulate a student’s personal speech loses its

force.”). Indeed, the “mere desire to avoid the

discomfort and unpleasantness that always

accompany an unpopular viewpoint” is not a

9

legitimate pedagogical interest for schools. Tinker v.

Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509

(1969). To the contrary, “the school itself has an

interest in protecting a student’s unpopular

expression.” B.L., 594 U.S. at 190.

High school students should not—and as a

practical matter, cannot—be shielded from important

issues like those E.D.’s group sought to highlight in a

respectful and non-disruptive manner. After all, some

students will be eligible to vote while still in school,

and others will turn eighteen sooner rather than later.

See Rivera v. E. Otero Sch. Dist. R-1, 721 F. Supp.

1189, 1194 (D. Colo. 1989) (“High school students, who

. . . include persons of voting age, must develop the

ability to understand and comment on the society in

which they live and to develop their own sets of values

and beliefs.”). “The ability to engage in civil discourse

with those with whom we disagree is an essential

feature of a liberal education. Teaching students that

they can and should be sheltered from speech that

offends them is not.” Leroy v. Livingston Manor Cent.

Sch. Dist., 158 F.4th 414, 427 (2d Cir. 2025). As this

Court has previously noted, “schools have a strong

interest in ensuring that future generations

understand the workings in practice of the wellknown aphorism, ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I

will defend to the death your right to say it.’” B.L., 594

U.S. at 190.

“Allowing for the expression of beliefs and

opinions in a robust but respectful environment

encourages engagement, promotes self-improvement,

and furthers the search for truth.” J.S., 650 F.3d at

944 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). E.D.

sought to respectfully further pro-life views through a

10

noncurricular group for high school students. Her

flyers were part and parcel of this effort. The pictures

on the flyer gave insight into the likely views of

members in the group in a mundane and respectful

manner. E.D.’s efforts and flyers were the ideal means

to inject new ideas and discussions into a high school.

To be sure, some students would not have

agreed with the views expressed on the flyers or held

by members of the group. And even after doing more

research and interacting with group members, some

still would not have agreed. Yet they would have had

the experience of considering and discussing these

important issues in a respectful manner. The flyers

would have helped students to evaluate issues, have

important discussions, and develop resiliency by

encountering other students with different views. In

other words, the flyers would have helped prepare the

students for active and informed citizenship.

If America’s public schools are to retain their

role as the nurseries of democracy, then school

administrators cannot be allowed to broadly sweep

student speech into school speech. Yet the Seventh

Circuit blessed just such an effort.

II.

Noncurricular student groups help

students develop civic engagement

and leadership skills.

Age-appropriate, student-led noncurricular

groups are a critical means through which students

can help infuse different views into the school

community. While schools certainly possess greater

control over classroom instruction and “formal” or

“structured” extracurricular activities, the same

11

cannot, and should not, be said for pure student

interest groups. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.

These groups help develop engaged and informed

citizens, and they are important forums that should

not be needlessly watered down.

The Seventh Circuit, like the school district,

justified the restriction on E.D.’s speech because the

flyer could have been perceived as being the school’s

speech. See App. 11a–13a. Such a conclusion is more

than a stretch. After all, surely not every flyer in a

school can qualify as school-sponsored speech. Under

that reasoning, just about any message displayed or

conveyed in a school would similarly qualify. Yet the

Seventh Circuit’s opinion tacitly endorses such a nearcategorical rule. Cf. App. 11a–13a. This is particularly

troubling because student groups ensure forums for

different voices and perspectives in schools.

“The process of educating our youth for

citizenship in public schools is not confined to books,

the curriculum, and the civics class.” Fraser, 478 U.S.

at 683. Attending class, though unquestionably

important, is not the only means through which

students gain important lessons and skills. See

Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983, 985 (10th Cir. 1976).

Activities like “membership in school clubs and social

groups” help to “provide an atmosphere of intellectual

and moral advancement” for students. Id.

As this Court has continually recognized when

speech in school is at issue, there is a meaningful

distinction between “when schools shape the bounds

of their curriculum” and “when schools try to shape

the bounds of private speech that occurs during noninstructional time between classes, during recess, in

12

the cafeteria, on the playing field, or other designated

free time during the school day.” Westfield High Sch.

L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98,

119 (D. Mass. 2003) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted) (collecting cases, including Tinker,

Fraser, and Hazelwood). This principle is rooted in

this Court’s common-sense recognition of the varying

relationships that schools have with the activities

that occur within their walls. Cf. Board of Education

of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens By &

Through Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240 (1990). While it

may be appropriate to find “school speech” when it

comes to the school newspaper or the National Honor

Society chapter, such a finding (and accompanying

deference)

is

inappropriate

for

student-led

organizations that bring students together over a

shared, noncurricular interest.

Simply because a student-led club is part of the

school community does not necessarily mean that the

club’s speech becomes the school’s speech. This

principle holds true even if the club is, to some extent,

facilitated by the school. Activities vary widely in

their ties to the school; if some “activities may fairly

be characterized as part of the school curriculum,”

then others certainly fall outside this realm. Cf.

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. Such an important

distinction is firmly rooted in this Court’s

jurisprudence.

As this Court recognized in Hazelwood and

Mergens (an Equal Access Act case that is helpful

here), school activities are on a spectrum when it

comes to the degree of control exercised over them by

a school. On one end are those activities that are part

of the school curriculum or wholly overseen and

13

organized by the school, such as the school newspaper

or marching band. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240. On

the other end are pure student interest groups, like “a

chess club” or “a stamp collecting club.” Id. Often,

these groups will have limited ties to the school, such

as official recognition and the attendant benefits (e.g.,

being able to reserve rooms for meetings and table at

activity fairs). To the extent administrators or

teachers are involved, they generally occupy a

ministerial role, such as serving as a sponsor and

handling administrative matters for students. E.D.’s

group falls on this end of the spectrum: the group was

not tied to any class or formal activity and it was

based around a shared student interest (pro-life

ideas). And as with other facets of education, the more

mature the students in the group (here, high school

students), the less need for teacher or administrator

involvement. Cf. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.

The Seventh Circuit improperly departed from

Hazelwood, this Court’s recognition of materially

significant differences among student groups, and any

consideration of the relevant students’ age and

maturity in favor of a near-categorical rule. The

decision does not come with a limiting principle, and

the rationale could be used to justify restrictions on

student speech untethered to a club so long as

someone could perceive the speech to reflect the

school’s views. But see Mergens, 496 U.S. at 244

(rejecting argument “that ‘curriculum related’ means

anything remotely related to abstract educational

goals”).

Student groups are an integral part of a robust

and fulfilling educational environment. See Albach,

531 F.2d at 985. They provide meaningful leadership

14

opportunities for students, enable students to discuss

and debate new ideas, and provide students with a

means to bring something of value to the school

community. See Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159

(9th Cir. 1988) (“Interstudent communication does not

interfere with what the school teaches; it enriches the

school environment for the students.”). Here, E.D.

sought to respectfully provide a new perspective in her

school community through a voluntary, student-run

club. The flyers were intertwined with her effort. If a

noncurricular student group always “speaks” for the

school, then these groups will always be subject to

significant school control. Students will be

disincentivized to start age-appropriate clubs, like

E.D.’s, that touch on important issues. Nothing would

stop the school from cracking down on discussion

among members at club meetings; after all, the club

would be treated just like a formal class. The end

result is that students will consider fewer new ideas

and lose out on the ability to meaningfully develop

citizenship and leadership skills.

In finding the flyers to be the school’s speech,

the Seventh Circuit weakened the important role of

student-led, student-interest clubs.

III.

The Seventh Circuit’s sweeping

approach

to

school

speech

empowers vague speech policies.

An overly generous approach to turning

student speech into the school’s speech, like the

Seventh Circuit employed here, is particularly

dangerous because it will inevitably be easier for

schools to deploy speech policies with full force within

their walls. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. Yet these

15

policies, to the extent they actually exist, often sweep

broadly and so pose myriad dangers to non-disruptive

free expression.

A broad, ambiguous speech policy like the one

employed against E.D. is readily susceptible to abuse

and uneven application, and it will inevitably result

in viewpoint discrimination. See Turning Point USA

at Ark. State Univ. v. Rhodes, 973 F.3d 868, 881 (8th

Cir. 2020) (Loken, J., concurring) (“[I]t is all too

common for petits fonctionnaires, arbitrarily

enforcing broad rules and policies, to take action that

may be politically correct but is not viewpoint

neutral.”). And the Seventh Circuit has now blessed

it, vesting administrators with wide discretion in

deeming speech “political” and liable to being silenced.

See App. 15a.

This case exemplifies the dangers of arbitrary

enforcement. It is difficult for anyone, let alone school

administrators dealing with myriad differing opinions

of students, to determine what qualifies as political

speech in the first place. Some will inevitably take the

easy way out and conflate “popular” with “apolitical,”

and “unpopular” with “political.” Opinions will vary

widely from person to person. One administrator may

view a poster with raised fists as an expression of

human rights and therefore not political. Another

might find it political, and therefore impermissible.

And innocuous, student-led religious activities could

be caught up as “political.” For example, a flyer

advertising a student group’s special before-school

prayer session or Bible study in honor of Respect Life

16

Month may wind up banned solely because the flyer

appears on a school wall and thus is subject to an

administrator’s near-unfettered discretion. 2

Under the Seventh Circuit’s near-categorical

rule, the First Amendment rights of students are at

the mercy of individual administrators arbitrarily

applying broad policies. See Rhodes, 973 F.3d at 881

(Loken, J., concurring). The opinion blesses this

situation because a policy that blindly prohibits

“political” speech is a powerful tool that can,

intentionally or not, capture just about any remotely

controversial topic. Politics is front and center in

many aspects of life, readily extending into just about

every facet of society, including how schools are run.

A policy against “political” speech is tantamount to a

policy against “controversial” or “unpopular” speech,

or even “speech that an administrator does not want

to deal with.”

When student speech gets twisted into the

school’s speech, it becomes easier to regulate. This

Court should not permit school administrators to

broadly suppress non-disruptive student speech.

See U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 2025 Respect Life Month

Resources, https://www.respectlife.org/respect-life-month (last

accessed Feb. 2, 2026) [https://perma.cc/NDJ8-934U].

2

17

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should

grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Office of the Kansas

KRIS W. KOBACH

Attorney General

Attorney General

120 SW 10th Ave.,

ANTHONY J. POWELL*

2nd Floor

Solicitor General

Topeka, KS 66612

ADAM T. STEINHILBER

(785) 296-2215

Anthony.Powell@ag.ks.gov Assistant Solicitor General

March 4, 2026

*Counsel of Record

Counsel for Amici

(additional counsel and signatories listed below)

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ADDITIONAL COUNSEL AND SIGNATORIES

STEVE MARSHALL

Alabama

Attorney General

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Montana

Attorney General

STEPHEN J. COX

Alaska

Attorney General

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Nebraska

Attorney General

JAMES UTHMEIER

Florida

Attorney General

GENTNER DRUMMOND

Oklahoma

Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Georgia

Attorney General

ALAN WILSON

South Carolina

Attorney General

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Indiana

Attorney General

MARTY J. JACKLEY

South Dakota

Attorney General

LIZ MURRILL

Louisiana

Attorney General

JOHN B. MCCUSKEY

West Virginia

Attorney General

CATHERINE L. HANAWAY

Missouri

Attorney General

STEVE MONTENEGRO

Speaker of the

Arizona House of Representatives

WARREN PETERSEN

President of the Arizona Senate

19