Respondents Brief — Benancio Garcia, III, Petitioner v. Steven Hobbs, Secretary of State of Washington, et al.

No. 25-901

In the Supreme Court of the United States

BENANCIA GARCIA III,

Petitioner,

v.

STEVEN HOBBS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SECRETARY OF STATE OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF WASHINGTON

NICHOLAS W. BROWN

Attorney General

NOAH G. PURCELL

Solicitor General

CRISTINA SEPE

Deputy Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

PETER B. GONICK

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW R.W. HUGHES

ERICA R. FRANKLIN

Assistant Attorney General

1125 Washington Street SE

Olympia, WA 98504-0100

360-753-6200

Cristina.Sepe@atg.wa.gov

Attorneys for State of Washington

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

After a bipartisan commission adopted

Washington’s 2020 redistricting plan, voters filed a

Voting Rights Act case (Soto Palmer) challenging

Legislative District 15 under Section 2. They alleged

that LD 15 denied Hispanic voters an equal

opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Months

later, Petitioner Benancio Garcia III filed a separate

case (Garcia), claiming that the commission racially

gerrymandered the same district.

The Soto Palmer district court held that LD 15

violated Section 2 and drew a new district. The threejudge panel in Garcia then dismissed Petitioner’s

claim as moot, concluding that his challenge to

an invalidated district no longer presented a live

controversy. The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed

Soto Palmer and also held that Garcia was moot

because Petitioner did not experience a continuing

injury from the commission based on a remedial

district crafted by the district court.

In Soto Palmer, the State asks that this Court

grant, vacate, and remand to the Ninth Circuit to

apply this Court’s analysis in Louisiana v. Callais,

146 S. Ct. 1131 (2026). The State thus asks that the

Court take the same steps here. But on the merits of

the cert petition, the question presented is:

Whether

Petitioner’s

equal

protection

challenge to a legislative district drawn by the

redistricting commission is moot in light of the district

court’s invalidation of the legislative district and

adoption of a new district.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 2

A.

The Washington Redistricting

Commission and Adoption of

Legislative District 15 ...................................... 2

B.

The Soto Palmer and Garcia Lawsuits ............ 7

C.

The Soto Palmer District Court

Determines LD 15 Violates Section 2,

and the Garcia District Court

Dismisses the Racial Gerrymandering

Case as Moot ..................................................... 9

D.

The Soto Palmer District Court

Adopts a Map Remedying the

Section 2 Violation .......................................... 11

E.

The Ninth Circuit Affirms in

Soto Palmer and Garcia, Holding

Garcia Is Moot ................................................ 12

F.

This Court’s Decision in

Louisiana v. Callis .......................................... 14

DISCUSSION ............................................................ 15

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 20

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023) ......................................................9

Allen v. Caster,

No. 25-243, 2026 WL 1282800

(U.S. May 11, 2026) ...............................................15

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,

568 U.S. 85 (2013) ..................................................16

Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. NAACP,

No. 25-234, 2026 WL 1377105

(U.S. May 18, 2026) ...............................................15

Garcia v. Hobbs,

144 S. Ct. 994 (2024) ..............................................11

Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,

569 U.S. 66 (2013) ..................................................16

Growe v. Emison,

507 U.S. 25 (1993) ..................................................16

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399 (2006) ................................................20

Louisiana v. Callais,

146 S. Ct. 1131 (2026) ........................................1, 14

Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,

485 U.S. 439 (1988) ................................................19

Montes v. City of Yakima,

40 F. Supp. 3d 1377 (E.D. Wash. 2014) .............. 3-4

iv

Moore v. Harper,

600 U.S. 1 (2023) ........................................ 16, 18-19

North Carolina v. Covington,

585 U.S. 969 (2018) ................................................17

Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,

557 U.S. 193 (2009) ................................................19

Palmer v. Hobbs,

150 F.4th 1131 (9th Cir. 2025),

petition docketed, No. 25-918

(U.S. Jan. 23, 2026)...................................... 3, 12-13

Palmer v. Hobbs,

No. 3:22-cv-05035-RSL, 2024 WL 1138939

(W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2024) ..................................11

Rosado v. Wyman,

397 U.S. 397 (1970) ................................................19

Soto Palmer v. Hobbs,

686 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (W.D. Wash. 2023) ...............9

Thomas v. Reeves,

961 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)............ 16-17

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986) ..................................................20

Trevino v. Palmer,

144 S. Ct. 873 (2024) ..........................................9, 12

Turtle Mountain Band v. Howe,

No. 25-253, 2026 WL 1377069

(U.S. May 18, 2026) ...............................................15

United States v. Juvenile Male,

564 U.S. 932 (2011) ................................................. 16

v

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. XIV ...................................... 1, 7-8

U.S. Const. art. III .....................................................10

Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(2) ........................................ 2

Statutes

Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.090 ......................................3

Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(1) ..................................2

Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(2) ..................................3

Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(3) .................................. 3

Other Authorities

H. Con. Res. 4407,

67th Leg., Reg. Sess.

(Wash. Feb. 2, 2022) (enacted) ............................ 6-7

1

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Benancio Garcia III filed an equal

protection challenge to a state legislative district

that no longer exists. The lower courts correctly

determined that his claim was moot. In ordinary

circumstances, the petition should be denied. In light

of subsequent developments in a related case,

however, this Court should grant, vacate, and remand

the court of appeals’ opinion here.

Washington’s Constitution provides for a

bipartisan commission to draw legislative and

congressional districts. After the Commission finished

its work in 2021, a group of Hispanic voters in

Washington’s Yakima Valley challenged Legislative

District (LD) 15 in the enacted map, alleging that

it violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Months

later, Petitioner Garcia filed this case, alleging

that the same district was racially gerrymandered,

violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases

were tried together, and the district court ruled

that LD 15 violated Section 2 and needed to be

redrawn. The court in this action therefore deemed

Petitioner’s claim moot, because the legislative

district he claimed was racially gerrymandered no

longer existed.

The Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed

the district court’s Section 2 and mootness holdings,

correctly applying this Court’s precedent and creating

no split of authority. But this Court then decided

Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131 (2026),

dramatically altering the principles governing

Section 2 claims. In light of that opinion, the State has

requested that this Court grant, vacate, and remand

2

the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as to the Section 2 claim in

the related case of Trevino v. Hobbs, No. 25-918. Given

that the mootness holding here relates to a parallel

challenge to the same legislative district, it would be

reasonable for this Court to do the same with this

petition. Alternatively, this Court could simply deny

the petition, as it fails the Court’s ordinary standards

for certiorari.1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The

Washington

Commission

and

Legislative District 15

Redistricting

Adoption

of

Washington’s Constitution provides for a

bipartisan Redistricting Commission to draw

state legislative and congressional districts. The

Commission consists of four voting members and

one non-voting chairperson. See Wash. Const. art. II,

§ 43(2). The voting members are appointed by the

legislative leaders of the two largest political

parties in each house of the Legislature. Id. Under

Washington law, the Commission must agree, by

majority vote, to a redistricting plan by November 15

of the redistricting year and then transmit the plan

to the Legislature. Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(1);

Wash. Const. art. II, § 43(2). Thus, the Commission

cannot propose a plan without bipartisan agreement

amongst the Commissioners. Upon submission of the

plan by the Commission, the Legislature has thirty

1 Consistent with his position throughout this litigation,

Washington Secretary of State Steve Hobbs takes no position on

the merits of the petition. The Secretary’s interest in this

litigation is to ensure that election officials are able to meet

election deadlines.

3

days to amend the plan by a two-thirds vote.

Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(2). The redistricting plan

becomes final upon the Legislature’s approval of any

amendment or after expiration of the thirty-day

window for amending the plan, whichever occurs

sooner. Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100(3).

Washington’s redistricting statute sets forth

requirements for redistricting plans, including that

district lines coincide with boundaries of political

subdivisions to the extent possible, that communities

of interest be kept together as much as practicable,

that city and county splits be kept to a minimum, and

that districts be contiguous and compact. Wash. Rev.

Code § 44.05.090.

In addition to state-law requirements, the 2021

Commission sought to comply with Section 2 of

the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The 2020 Census

showed dramatic growth of Washington’s Hispanic

population, centered in the Yakima Valley region

in central Washington. See Palmer v. Hobbs, 150

F.4th 1131, 1138 (9th Cir. 2025), petition docketed,

No. 25-918 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2026); ECF No. 64 at 3-4,

Garcia v. Hobbs, No. 3:22-cv-05152-RSL-DGE-LJCV

(W.D. Wash. May 24, 2023).2 In the years leading up

to 2021, three separate cases found violations of the

federal Voting Rights Act or the Washington Voting

Rights Act related to local elections in that region. In

Montes v. City of Yakima, a federal district court

concluded that Yakima’s at-large voting system for

city council elections violated Section 2 of the VRA.

40 F. Supp. 3d 1377 (E.D. Wash. 2014). The court

2 Filings from the Garcia v. Hobbs district court docket

will be short cited as Garcia, ECF No. __.

4

reviewed evidence regarding the three Gingles factors

and concluded that each was satisfied with respect to

Latino voters in Yakima. Id. at 1390-1407. The court

also found that the totality of the circumstances

demonstrated that the City’s electoral process was not

equally open to Latino voters. Id. at 1407-14. In Glatt

v. City of Pasco, a challenge to Pasco’s at-large voting

system, a federal district court entered a consent

decree in which the parties stipulated to each Gingles

factor as well as a finding that the totality of the

circumstances showed an exclusion of Latinos from

meaningfully participating in the political process.

See Partial Consent Decree, Glatt v. City of Pasco,

No. 4:16-cv-05108-LRS (E.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 2016),

ECF No. 16 at ¶¶ 15-22; see also Mem. Op. and Order,

Glatt v. City of Pasco, No. 4:16-cv-05108-LRS

(E.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2017), ECF No. 40 at 29. And

in Aguilar v. Yakima County, No. 20-2-00180-19

(Kittitas Cnty. Super. Ct.), a challenge to the at-large

voting system used in Yakima County, the parties

entered into and the court approved a settlement

agreement finding that the conditions for a violation

of the Washington Voting Rights Act, including a

showing of racially polarized voting, had been met in

Yakima County. Garcia, ECF No. 64 at 11.

On September 21, 2021, shortly after the

Commission received Census data, and shortly

after the Aguilar v. Yakima County settlement, the

four voting Commissioners publicly released their

first proposed legislative maps. Garcia, ECF No. 64

at 8, 11. The Senate Democratic Caucus then retained

Dr. Matt Barreto of the UCLA Voting Rights Project

to evaluate the extent of racially polarized voting in

the Yakima Valley and assess the proposed maps’

5

compliance with the VRA. In his analysis, Dr. Barreto

concluded that there was “clear” evidence “of racially

polarized voting” in the Yakima Valley. Garcia, Trial

Ex. 179. He opined that to comply with the VRA,

the Commission needed to include a district with

a majority-Hispanic citizen voting age population

(CVAP) in that area that allowed Latino voters to elect

candidates of their choice. Id.

Following

this

report,

two

voting

commissioners released new proposed maps designed

to better comply with the VRA by increasing the

Hispanic CVAP in the Yakima Valley district that

eventually became LD 15, while also improving on

the previous maps in other respects. See Garcia, Trial

Exs. 196, 197; see also Garcia, ECF No. 73 (Trial Tr.)

at 272:17-273:13; Trial Ex. 200; Trial Ex. 195.

Meanwhile, the other two voting commissioners

obtained a legal opinion from lawyers at Davis Wright

Tremaine LLP, who opined that a majority-minority

district in the Yakima Valley was not legally

necessary. Garcia, Trial Ex. 225. The opinion noted

that it was primarily a legal analysis and that

the authors had not “conduct[ed] factual research

regarding demographic trends, voting behavior, [or]

election results[.]” Id.

At trial, each of the voting Commissioners

testified as to their priorities in negotiating and

drafting maps. Each Commissioner prioritized

complying with the Voting Rights Act, though as trial

made clear, they differed in their understanding of

what that meant. Garcia, ECF No. 73 (Trial Tr.)

at 343:9-11; Trial Ex. 200; ECF No. 75 (Trial Tr.)

at 757:24-758:1; ECF No. 74 (Trial Tr.) at 434:16435:1. In addition, befitting a bipartisan negotiation,

6

the Commissioners sought to gain (or at least not lose)

partisan advantage through the negotiations. Garcia,

ECF No. 75 (Trial Tr.) at 707:20-23.

As the deadline for finalizing maps approached,

the Commissioners negotiated extensively in an effort

to reach bipartisan compromise. Each Commissioner

remained committed to their overarching goals, and

the sticking points, including with respect to LD 15,

primarily centered on partisan performance. Garcia,

ECF No. 75 (Trial Tr.) at 702:12-704:19. The racial

makeup of the district was just one of several factors

in the negotiations over LD 15. See, e.g., Garcia,

ECF No. 75 (Trial Tr.) at 756:20-757:18; Garcia, ECF

No. 73 (Trial Tr.) at 282:4-21; see also Pet. App. 10a12a n.4 (summarizing Commissioners’ testimony).

The

Commissioners

ultimately

voted

unanimously to approve a legislative redistricting

plan consisting primarily of an agreed set of partisan

metrics, which was then translated by staff into a

map. Garcia, ECF No. 73 (Trial Tr.) at 225:20-226:22,

326:11-21; ECF No. 74 (Trial Tr.) at 495:10-16; ECF

No. 75 (Trial Tr.) at 714:9-715:8. On November 16,

2021, the Commission transmitted the final map to

the Legislature. Garcia, ECF No. 64 at ¶ 73. In the

final map, LD 15 was 73% Hispanic and, according to

estimates based on the 2020 American Community

Survey, approximately 51.5% Hispanic by CVAP.

Garcia, ECF No. 64 at ¶ 76.

The Legislature exercised its statutory

prerogative to make minor amendments to the Plan.

The Legislature made minor changes to LD 15

without altering its demographic make-up. Garcia,

ECF No. 64 at ¶ 75. On February 8, 2022, the

7

Legislature passed House Concurrent Resolution

4407, adopting the amended redistricting plan.

H. Con. Res. 4407, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

Feb. 2, 2022) (enacted). Upon passage, the

Legislature’s amended redistricting plan became

State law. Wash. Rev. Code § 44.05.100.

B.

The Soto Palmer and Garcia Lawsuits

In January 2022, several voters filed suit in

Soto Palmer v. Hobbs, alleging that LD 15 diluted

Hispanic voting strength in violation of Section 2 of

the Voting Rights Act. Complaint for Declaratory and

Injunctive Relief, Soto Palmer v. Hobbs, No. 3:22-cv05035-RSL (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2022), ECF No. 1.3

The case was assigned to Judge Robert Lasnik of the

Western District of Washington. Nearly two months

later, Garcia filed this lawsuit, claiming that LD 15

was a racial gerrymander in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment, and requested a three-judge

panel. Garcia’s case was assigned to Judge Lasnik,

Chief Judge David Estudillo of the Western District of

Washington, and Judge Lawrence VanDyke of the

Ninth Circuit.

Two weeks after Garcia was filed, three

individuals—represented by the same counsel as

Garcia—moved to intervene in Soto Palmer to defend

LD 15 against the Soto Palmer Plaintiffs’ Section 2

claims. Soto Palmer, ECF No. 57. On May 6, 2022,

the Soto Palmer district court granted permissive

intervention to the intervenor-defendants, Soto

Palmer, ECF No. 69, and ordered the State of

3 Filings from the Soto Palmer district court docket will

be short cited as Soto Palmer, ECF No. __.

8

Washington joined as a party “to ensure that the

Court has the power to provide the relief plaintiffs

request,” Soto Palmer, ECF No. 68 at 5.

The two cases then proceeded with: (1) the Soto

Palmer Plaintiffs challenging LD 15 under Section 2;

(2) the Soto Palmer Intervenors arguing that LD 15

complied with Section 2; (3) the Garcia Plaintiff

challenging LD 15 under the Fourteenth Amendment;

and (4) the State of Washington defending LD 15.

But because Soto Palmer was filed first, the cases

proceeded on a staggered schedule, with Soto Palmer

generally going first. Following dueling motions by

the two sets of plaintiffs aimed at streamlining the

cases, Judge Lasnik found “that judicial efficiency

w[ould] best be served by hearing the Section 2 and

the equal protection claims together[,]” and thus

continued the Soto Palmer trial to coincide with the

Garcia trial. Soto Palmer, ECF No. 136 at 5. However,

to preserve the priority of Soto Palmer, Judge Lasnik

explained that “[a]t the close of evidence at the

consolidated trial, the undersigned will issue a

decision on the Section 2 claim, and the three-judge

district court will then consider the constitutional

claim.” Id. Ultimately, the two cases were heard

together in a joint trial, with the first day consisting

of Soto Palmer-only evidence, heard by Judge Lasnik,

and the remaining days consisting of joint evidence for

both Soto Palmer and Garcia heard by the three-judge

panel (which included Judge Lasnik). Soto Palmer,

ECF Nos. 187, 198-201 (minute entries); Garcia, ECF

Nos. 68-70 (minute entries). Trial ended June 8, 2023,

with written closings due in mid-July. Garcia, ECF

No. 70.

9

C.

The

Soto

Palmer

District

Court

Determines LD 15 Violates Section 2, and

the Garcia District Court Dismisses the

Racial Gerrymandering Case as Moot

On August 10, 2023, the district court issued a

Memorandum of Decision in Soto Palmer, finding that

LD 15 had the effect of discriminating against

Hispanic voters by denying them the equal right to

elect candidates of their choice. Soto Palmer v. Hobbs,

686 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Following

this Court’s reaffirmance of the Gingles framework in

Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023), the district court

analyzed the Gingles factors and concluded that the

Soto Palmer Plaintiffs had satisfied them all. Soto

Palmer, 686 F. Supp. 3d at 1223-27. The court then

undertook the totality of the circumstances analysis,

finding that seven of the nine Senate Factors

supported “the conclusion that the bare majority of

Latino voters in LD 15 fails to afford them equal

opportunity to elect their preferred candidates.” Id.

at 1234.

Soto Palmer Intervenors appealed the

district court’s liability order on the merits in

September 2023. This appeal was consolidated with

the Intervenors’ separate appeal on the remedy.

Meanwhile, Intervenors petitioned this Court for

certiorari before judgment. See Pet. for Writ of Cert.

Before J. 21-35, Trevino v. Soto Palmer, No. 23-484

(U.S. Nov. 3, 2023). This Court denied their petition

on February 20, 2024. Trevino v. Palmer, 144 S. Ct.

873 (2024).

10

One month after the Soto Palmer district

court’s decision on liability, the Garcia three-judge

district court issued its opinion, dismissing this case

as moot. Pet. App. 6a-16a. As the majority explained,

Garcia sought declaratory relief that LD 15, as

enacted, was unlawful, “an injunction ‘enjoining

[Washington] from enforcing or giving any effect to

the boundaries of [ ] [LD 15],’ ” and an order requiring

“a new legislative map be drawn.” Pet. App. 8a (second

and third alterations in original) (quoting Garcia’s

Amended Complaint). But the Soto Palmer court’s

decision invalidating LD 15 and ordering a new, VRAcompliant map meant “the Court cannot provide any

more relief to Plaintiff.” Id.; see also Pet. App. 12a

(“LD 15 will be redrawn and will not be used in its

current form for any future election. The Soto Palmer

court has therefore granted Plaintiff complete relief

for purposes of our mootness analysis.”). And the court

further explained that “Plaintiff does not assert

that any new district drawn by the Washington

State Redistricting Commission . . . would be a ‘mere

continuation[ ] of the old, gerrymandered district[ ].’ ”

Pet. App. 8a (quoting North Carolina v. Covington,

138 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (2018)). The court therefore

dismissed Garcia’s claims under Article III without

addressing the merits or ruling on Garcia’s requested

injunction. Pet. App. 6a-16a. Judge VanDyke

dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s mootness

conclusion. Pet. App. 17a-53a.

Garcia then appealed to this Court, presenting

two issues: Whether this Court had appellate

jurisdiction and whether the three-judge district court

erred in finding the case moot. See Jurisdictional

Statement, Garcia v. Hobbs, No. 23-467 (U.S. Oct. 31,

11

2023). Presumably because this Court lacked

appellate jurisdiction, it vacated the district court’s

judgment and instructed the district court to enter a

fresh judgment so that Garcia could timely appeal

to the Ninth Circuit. Garcia v. Hobbs, 144 S. Ct. 994,

995 (2024). The district court entered an amended

judgment, Pet. App. 4a, which Garcia appealed to the

Ninth Circuit.

D.

The Soto Palmer District Court Adopts a

Map Remedying the Section 2 Violation

Meanwhile, after the Section 2 liability order in

Soto Palmer, the district court engaged in a lengthy

remedial process to adopt a new map, aided by

extensive briefing and argument by the parties, an

evidentiary hearing, and a respected non-partisan

redistricting special master.

On March 15, 2024, the Soto Palmer district

court ordered a new map, in which the previously

enacted LD 15 was reconfigured and redesignated

LD 14. In a detailed order, the court explained that

the remedy it adopted was necessary to remedy the

VRA violation it had previously found. Palmer v.

Hobbs, No. 3:22-cv-05035-RSL, 2024 WL 1138939,

at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2024). As the court

explained, “the new configuration provides Latino

voters with an equal opportunity to elect candidates

of their choice to the state legislature, especially with

the shift into an even-numbered district, which

ensures that state Senate elections will fall on a

presidential year when Latino voter turnout is

generally higher.” Id. at *2.

12

Following the district court’s remedial order,

Soto Palmer Intervenors filed a second motion for a

stay in the Ninth Circuit, which was again

unanimously denied. See Order Den. Mot. Stay,

Palmer v. Hobbs, No. 24-1602 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2024),

DktEntry 18.1. Intervenors then sought a stay from

this Court. See Em. App. for Stay, Trevino v. Soto

Palmer, No. 23A862 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2024). This Court

denied that stay application with no dissents noted.

Trevino v. Palmer, 144 S. Ct. 1133 (2024).

E.

The Ninth Circuit Affirms in Soto Palmer

and Garcia, Holding Garcia Is Moot

The Soto Palmer and Garcia appeals were then

argued and submitted to the same Ninth Circuit panel

comprised of Judges Margaret McKeown, Ronald

Gould, and John Owens.

In the Soto Palmer appeal, the Ninth Circuit

concluded that “none of the Intervenors has standing

to challenge the liability determination” because

none alleged any harm that flowed from that order.

Palmer v. Hobbs, 150 F.4th 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2025).

Reviewing the record, the panel held that

“Intervenors have not provided any evidence that, in

reaching its liability determination, the district

court classified them based on their race,” nor “that

the liability determination ‘required [them] to do

anything or to refrain from doing anything’ because of

[their] race or otherwise.” Id. at 1142 (quoting Food &

Drug Admin. v. All. For Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.

367, 385 (2024)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that

Intervenor Trevino had standing to challenge the

remedial order as a racial gerrymander since he was

moved into the remedial district, but it held that he

13

failed to show that the district court’s remedial map

unconstitutionally sorted him by race. Id. at 1144-45,

1148-50.4 Applying then-prevailing precedent, the

Ninth Circuit held that “[n]othing in the record . . .

supports a claim that race predominated in the

redistricting process.” Id. at 1146. “To the contrary,”

the court explained:

The district court accomplished three

distinct, non-racial objectives when it

adopted a map that: (1) starts with, and

avoids gratuitous changes to, the

enacted map while remedying the Voting

Rights Act violation at issue; (2) keeps

the vast majority of the lands that are of

interest to the Yakama Nation together;

and (3) is consistent with the other state

law and traditional redistricting criteria.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth

Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s remedial map

on the merits. Intervenors now seek certiorari. See

Pet. for a Writ of Cert., Trevino v. Hobbs, No. 25-918

(U.S. Jan. 23, 2026).

Turning next to Garcia, the Ninth Circuit

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Garcia’s

challenge as moot based on its affirmance of the

district court’s invalidation of LD 15 and the adoption

of a remedial map that replaced LD 15 with a new

legislative district. See Pet. App. 2a (also accessible at

4 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Trevino failed to raise

his racial gerrymandering argument during the remedial phase

in the district court but nonetheless exercised its discretion to

consider the argument for the first time on appeal. Palmer, 150

F.4th at 1145-46.

14

Garcia v. Hobbs, No. 24-2603, 2025 WL 2466997 (9th

Cir. Aug. 27, 2025)). The lower court rejected Garcia’s

argument that the remedial district merely continued

his prior injury, explaining that Garcia’s case

“centered entirely on the Commission’s actions” in

alleging that race predominated in the Commission’s

actions in drawing the districting map, but the

remedial district “was crafted by an entirely different

party—the district court[.]” Pet. App. 3a. Thus,

the character of the system had changed, and the

Commission’s challenged conduct did not continue. Id.

Garcia then filed this petition for certiorari.

F.

This Court’s Decision in Louisiana v.

Callis

On April 29, this Court decided Callais, which

substantially altered how courts are to address claims

under Section 2 of the VRA. See Callais, 146 S. Ct.

at 1152-60; see also id. at 1165 (Kagan, J., dissenting)

(“The majority claims only to be ‘updat[ing]’ our

Section 2 law, as though through a few technical

tweaks . . . . But in fact, those ‘updates’ eviscerate the

law[.]”(first alteration in original)). In particular, the

Court modified the first Gingles condition such that

“in drawing illustrative maps, plaintiffs” may no

longer “use race as a districting criterion[,]” and must

“meet all the State’s legitimate districting objectives,

including . . . the State’s specified political goals.” Id.

at 1159. And on the second and third Gingles

conditions, plaintiffs now “must provide an analysis

that controls for party affiliation.” Id.

In light of this decision, the State of

Washington has asked this Court to grant, vacate,

and remand to the Ninth Circuit in Soto Palmer in

15

order to apply Callais. See Br. of Resp’t State of

Washington, Trevino v. Hobbs, No. 25-919 (U.S.

June 2, 2026). The State’s request is consistent

with how this Court has decided other petitions

raising Section 2 issues following Callais. See, e.g.,

Turtle Mountain Band v. Howe, No. 25-253, 2026

WL 1377069 (U.S. May 18, 2026) (granting the

petition, vacating the judgment, and remanding

case to the Eighth Circuit for further consideration in

light of Callais); Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. NAACP,

No. 25-234, 2026 WL 1377105 (U.S. May 18, 2026)

(similar and remanding to three-judge district court);

Allen v. Caster, No. 25-243, 2026 WL 1282800 (U.S.

May 11, 2026) (granting petition for a writ of

certiorari before judgment, vacating the judgment,

and remanding for further consideration because of

Callais).

DISCUSSION

The district court and Ninth Circuit correctly

determined that Garcia’s case challenging LD 15 as a

racial gerrymander was moot based on the VRA

Section 2 judgment and remedy entered in Soto

Palmer. The State has requested that this Court

vacate the judgment in Soto Palmer and remand that

case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in

light of Callais. Based on the State’s request to vacate

the judgment in Soto Palmer, the State asks this

Court to grant this petition, vacate the judgment, and

remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for further

proceedings.

16

In the alternative, this Court should deny

this petition because the Ninth Circuit correctly

determined that Garcia’s challenge to a no-longerexisting district was moot.

“A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer

a ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ for purposes of Article III—

‘when the issues presented are no longer “live” or

the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

outcome.’ ” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91

(2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481

(1982) (per curiam)). “Throughout the litigation,

the party seeking relief must have suffered, or be

threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the

defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.” United States v. Juvenile Male,

564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011) (citation modified). Thus, if

an intervening circumstance during the litigation

addresses the plaintiff’s alleged injury and deprives

him of a personal stake in the lawsuit’s outcome, the

case is moot. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 14 (2023);

see also Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S.

66, 72 (2013).

The Ninth Circuit correctly treated Garcia’s

request for invalidation of LD 15 and an injunction to

redraw the map as moot based on its affirmance of

the remedial map, which replaced LD 15 with a new

district. See Pet. App. 2a; see, e.g., Growe v. Emison,

507 U.S. 25, 39 (1993) (explaining that after a state

court declared a redistricting plan unconstitutional,

a separate federal suit “claim[ing] that the . . . plan

violated the Voting Rights Act became moot, unless

those claims also related to the superseding plan[ ]”);

Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800, 801 (5th Cir. 2020)

(en banc) (holding that a VRA challenge “has become

17

moot” because “the current district lines will neither

be used nor operate as a base for any future

election[ ]”).

The unpublished decision below does not

conflict with North Carolina v. Covington, 585 U.S.

969 (2018), which Garcia relies on to argue that his

request for injunctive relief remains live because the

remedial district (entered by the court) perpetuates

his alleged injuries. Pet. 18. Covington presents a

starkly different scenario than here. In Covington,

voters alleged that the North Carolina general

assembly had gerrymandered their districts, the

general assembly then redrew maps, and voters again

objected to those remedial maps, alleging that they

perpetuated the unconstitutional aspects of the

original plan. Id. at 974-75. Here, by contrast, the

remedial district is not a “mere continuation[ ] of the

old, gerrymandered district[ ].” Id. at 976. It is a

fundamentally different district, selected by a

different decisionmaker. Unlike in Covington, the

evidence that would be needed to show that race

predominated in the minds of the Commission and

Legislature is entirely distinct from the evidence that

would be needed to show that race predominated in

the Soto Palmer district court’s mind. Covington,

moreover, involved a single suit; plaintiffs brought a

challenge, the General Assembly tried to address it,

and when it allegedly failed, plaintiffs were able to

maintain their challenge. So, as the Ninth Circuit

correctly concluded, Covington offers no support

for Garcia’s attempt to keep his case live. See Pet.

App. 2a-3a. As the court explained, Garcia’s

“operative complaint alleged that race was the

predominant factor motivating the Commission’s

18

decision to draw the lines encompassing Legislative

District 15.” Pet. App. 3A (citation modified). But

“LD 14 was crafted by an entirely different party—the

district court—from the Commission, the party that

drew LD 15[.]” Pet. App. 3a.

Nor does the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflict

with Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1 (2023). There, the

petitioners had asked for reinstatement of North

Carolina’s legislatively enacted 2021 districting plan,

which had been invalidated by North Carolina state

courts on state law grounds. Id. at 12. The petitioners

argued that the federal Elections Clause prohibited

the North Carolina courts from reviewing and

altering the plan enacted by the legislature. Id. After

the Supreme Court granted review on that issue, the

North Carolina courts reversed course and held that

state courts would not review claims of partisan

gerrymandering under the state constitution. But the

North Carolina courts did not reinstate the 2021

legislatively enacted map. Id. at 13. This Court

therefore concluded that the North Carolina courts’

change of heart did not moot the case, because the

petitioners could still obtain the relief they sought—

reinstatement of the 2021 maps—by prevailing in this

Court. Indeed, the petitioners’ only “path to complete

relief” (the use of the 2021 maps) “runs through

this Court,” and the petitioners therefore retained a

“personal stake” in the case. Id. at 15. Moore’s posture

is profoundly different from the case here. In Moore,

the only way the petitioners could obtain the relief

they wanted was if the Supreme Court heard the case

and ruled in their favor. Id. at 15. Here, by contrast,

Garcia has already obtained the relief he originally

requested: the district he challenged will not be used

19

in future elections. His claim is that he may lose that

relief and need it again if the decision in another case

(Soto Palmer) is reversed. But that is not enough for

Garcia to retain a “ ‘personal stake’ in th[is] litigation.”

Id. at 14 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204

(1962)).

Finally,

Garcia’s

argument

that

the

district court used disreputable “strategic docket

manipulation” to divest the Garcia three-judge

district court of jurisdiction, Pet. 27, is unfounded and

does not warrant granting certiorari. As a practical

matter, Soto Palmer was filed months before Garcia,

the cases initially proceeded on a staggered schedule

reflecting that difference, and in consolidating the

cases for trial, the Soto Palmer district court

preserved the priority of Soto Palmer. And as a

prudential matter, one of the most “fundamental and

longstanding principle[s] of judicial restraint” is that

courts should “avoid reaching constitutional questions

in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v.

Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439,

445 (1988). This Court has thus repeatedly held that

it normally “ ‘will not decide a constitutional question

if there is some other ground upon which to dispose

of the case[.]’ ” Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.

Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009) (quoting Escambia

County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per

curium)); see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,

402 (1970) (explaining that a three-judge district

court “would have been obliged to adjudicate t[he]

statutory claim in preference to deciding the original

constitutional claim” and that the Supreme Court

“decide[s] the statutory question in order to avoid a

constitutional ruling”). Applying this doctrine, courts

20

routinely address VRA claims without reaching

constitutional claims in redistricting cases. See, e.g.,

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S.

399, 442 (2006); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478

U.S. 30, 38 (1986). In short, by declining to reach

Garcia’s constitutional claim—particularly once that

claim had become moot—the three-judge district court

did not engage in docket manipulation.

CONCLUSION

Should the Court grant, vacate, and remand

Soto Palmer in light of Callais, it should likewise

grant this petition, vacate the judgment, and remand

this case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.

Otherwise, the Court should deny the petition.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

NICHOLAS W. BROWN

Attorney General

NOAH G. PURCELL

Solicitor General

CRISTINA SEPE

Deputy Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

PETER B. GONICK

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW R.W. HUGHES

ERICA R. FRANKLIN

Assistant Attorneys General

June 2, 2026

1125 Washington Street SE

Olympia, WA 98504-0100

360-753-6200