Amicus Curiae Brief — Jonathan Lee, et al., Petitioners v. Poudre School District R-1

Supreme Court briefAug 22, 2025

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No. 25-89

In the Supreme Court of the United States

JONATHAN LEE, ERIN LEE, NICOLAS JURICH, and

LINNAEA JURICH,

Petitioners,

POUDRE SCHOOL DISTRICT R-1,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth

Circuit

BRIEF FOR LIBERTY COUNSEL AND

DUSTIN GONZALEZ AS AMICI CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

HORATIO G. MIHET

MATHEW D. STAVER

DANIEL J. SCHMID

Counsel of Record

KRISTINA S. HEUSER LIBERTY COUNSEL

LIBERTY COUNSEL 109 Second Street NE

Washington, D.C. 20002

P.O. Box 540774

(202) 289-1776

Orlando, FL 32854

court@lc.org

Counsel for Amici

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........ 4

I. The Tenth Circuit’s Opinion must be reversed in

view of this Court’s recent holding in Mahmoud v.

Taylor, because the actions of the school district

substantially interfered with the religious

development of students, thereby impermissibly

burdening the parents’ religious exercise. ........... 4

A. The parents plausibly alleged a Free Exercise

claim by alleging that their sincerely held

religious beliefs dictate that gender is

determined by biological sex immutably

determined at birth, and that they desire to

instruct their children in accordance with these

beliefs. .............................................................. 5

B. The District violated the parents’ right to free

exercise of religion by providing instruction to

the children that contravened the religious

beliefs the parents sought to instill. ............... 6

1. Strict scrutiny is the appropriate test to

assess the District’s policies. ..................... 7

2. The District’s policies will not survive strict

scrutiny because there is no compelling

state interest in instructing children that

their gender may be inconsistent with their

biological sex immutably determined at

conception, particularly where such

instruction is at odds with the parents’

religious beliefs. ....................................... 11

II. The Tenth Circuit erred in dismissing the

complaint for failure to plausibly allege municipal

liability. ............................................................... 15

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 18

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ....................... 6

Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397 (1997) ............................................... 17

Bell Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)........ 6

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)...................... 12

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ............ 13

H. L. v Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) .................... 12

Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom,

141 S. Ct. 1289 (2021) ............................................. 1

Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom,

141 S. Ct. 889 (2020) ............................................... 1

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)............ 14

Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014) .......... 6

Lee v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1,

135 F.4th 924 (10th Cir. 2025) ................. 10, 15, 16

Lee v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1,

2024 WL 2212261 (D. Colo. May 16, 2024) ............ 5

Lozman v. Riviera Bch., 585 U.S. 87 (2018)............ 15

Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332 (2025) 3, 4, 5, 6,

7, 10, 11, 13

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).................. 14

Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) ...................... 12

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469 (1986) ............................................... 15

Pierce v. Soc’y. of the Sisters of the Holy Names of

Jesus and Mary,

268 U.S. 510 (1925) ............................................... 11

Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth,

428 U.S. 52 (1976) ................................................. 14

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ............. 3, 10

Other Authorities

Joseph Goldstein, Medical Case for the Child at Risk:

On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86

Yale L.J. 645 (1977) .............................................. 13

Robert Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care

Decisionmaking Authority: A Suggested Interest

Analysis, 62 Va. L. Rev. 285 (1976) ...................... 13

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 ........................................................ 7

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Liberty Counsel is a national civil liberties

organization that provides education and legal

defense on issues relating to religious liberty, the

family, and sanctity of life. Liberty Counsel is

committed to upholding the historical understanding

and protection of the rights to free speech and free

exercise of religion and ensuring those rights remain

an integral part of the country’s cultural identity.

Liberty Counsel has been substantially involved in

advocating for the religious liberty of Americans

whose sincerely held religious beliefs compel

adherence to Biblical positions on education, sexual

orientation, gender, and marriage. Liberty Counsel

attorneys have represented clients before this Court,

including in a number of cases in which the Free

Exercise Clause was a seminal issue, see, e.g., Harvest

Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 889 (2020);

Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1289

(2021), and frequently represent clients in free

exercise cases in every federal circuit court of appeals

and federal district courts. Its attorneys have also

spoken and testified before Congress on matters

relating to government infringement on First

Amendment rights.

Dustin Gonzalez is the father of a thirteen-yearold girl who attends public school in the Jefferson

County School District in Colorado. Recently, when

the child was twelve, the school counselor, acting in

accordance with District policy, aided the child in

1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person other than Amici or its counsel made a

monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation

or submission.

assuming a male gender identity at school, including

the use of a male name and pronouns, while

intentionally hiding this from Mr. Gonzalez. After

months of the clandestine double life, Mr. Gonzalez

discovered some clues among the child’s belonging

that caused him to question school officials and

eventually learn – over and in spite of the school’s

obstructionist tactics – what was occurring. Mr.

Gonzalez is a devout Christian and believes that each

person is created perfectly by God, and that biological

sex is immutably determined at conception by God,

who never makes mistakes. Mr. Gonzalez has taught

biblical values and a Christian worldview to his

daughter during her childhood, and strives to

continue to so in her adolescence and against what

she is being taught at school.

Amici have an interest in ensuring that parents

are not deprived of their First Amendment right to

direct the religious upbringing of their children by

public school districts and their policies of secrecy

regarding their children’s gender confusion. Parents

– not the government – are the rightful arbiters of

how to best address children questioning their gender

identity and other such consequential questions and

decisions

developing

children

grapple

with

throughout their adolescence and teenage years.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court recently, and once again, made clear in

Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332 (2025), that the

“government burdens the religious exercise of parents

when it requires them to submit their children to

instruction that poses ‘a very real threat of

undermining’ the religious beliefs and practices that

the parents wish to instill.” Id. at 2342 (quoting

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972)). In

Mahmoud, a Maryland school district perpetrated

this constitutional harm against parents by infusing

into its curriculum indoctrination about gender that

deviated from the parents’ religious beliefs. Here, a

Colorado school district has promulgated policies and

directives to its employees to guide adolescents and

young teenagers through – or even into – gender

confusion while intentionally hiding the children’s

struggles from their parents. The secrecy policies

maintained by the Poudre School District R-1 (the

“District”) intentionally divest parents of the

opportunity to guide their children through these very

consequential life questions based upon the tenets of

their faith.

What’s more, rather than dealing with the issue at

hand and relegating the District to its proper role, the

Tenth Circuit dodged the constitutional question and

upheld the district court’s dismissal of the initial

complaint on the grounds that petitioners (“the

parents”) failed to plausibly allege municipal liability.

The court denied the parents leave to amend as futile.

Amici request that this Court grant certiorari to

make clear (once again) that parents have a First

Amendment right to direct the religious upbringing of

their children, and that this right is infringed when

public school districts intentionally hide critical

information about children from their parents,

thereby effectively preventing parents from providing

advice, guidance, and direction to their children on

how to navigate a potentially life-altering

circumstance in accordance with the dictates of their

faith.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Tenth Circuit’s Opinion must be

reversed in view of this Court’s recent

holding in Mahmoud v. Taylor, because the

actions of the school district substantially

interfered with the religious development

students,

thereby

impermissibly

burdening the parents’ religious exercise.

In Mahmoud, this Court rightly “reject[ed] [the

dissent’s] chilling vision of the power of the state to

strip away the critical right of parents to guide the

religious development of their children.” 145 S.Ct. at

2358. This critical right must extend to a pivotal area

of development that has become quite widespread in

our culture – when adolescents are presented with the

possibility of embarking on a life altering and often

irreversible path to live as a gender that differs from

their biological sex determined at conception.

Though exposure to a variety of value systems may

be unavoidable by virtue of living in a pluralistic

society, parents understandably desire to instill the

values consistent with their faith in their children.

Conversely, parents work to shield their children

from ideologies they deem harmful or adverse to the

values promoted in the home. Parents have a First

Amendment right to guide their children on the

questions of biological sex and gender in accordance

with their religious beliefs. The Tenth Circuit’s

Opinion dismissing this action ought to be reversed as

inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in

Mahmoud.

The parents plausibly alleged a Free

Exercise claim by alleging that their

sincerely held religious beliefs dictate

that gender is determined by biological

sex immutably determined at birth, and

that they desire to instruct their children

in accordance with these beliefs.

Although the proposed Amended Complaint

“assert[ed]

sole

Fourteenth

Amendment

substantive due process claim against the District,

again invoking § 1983” (Lee v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1,

2024 WL 2212261, at *3 (D. Colo. May 16, 2024)), the

proposed Amended Complaint also contained the

following allegations:

•

The Jurich and Lee families both have strong

and sincere religious convictions regarding the

education of their children on these sensitive

topics; had they been notified of the highly

sexual nature of the topics discussed at the

GSA meetings, they would have had the

capacity to (1) direct their minor children not

to attend the GSA meetings; or (2) make an

informed decision on whether to seek an

alternative to public education at WMS. (Doc

64-2 at ¶ 142).

Had the Plaintiffs been provided notice of the

topics planned for discussion and germane to

GSA, they would have elected to opt their child

out of PSD public schools and sought

alternative education based on these deeply

held religious beliefs. (Id. at ¶ 143).

In determining if a complaint states a claim,

courts are to examine and evaluate the factual

allegations contained therein. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (“We next consider the

factual allegations in respondent's complaint to

determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to

relief.”); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (“[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.”) (cleaned up). Even if not labeled as such, the

factual allegations contained in the proposed

Amended Complaint stated a claim for relief under

the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. At

worst, if the court deemed the pleading insufficient to

state a claim for violation of the parents’ right to Free

Exercise, leave to amend should have been granted;

the case should not have been dismissed with

prejudice. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S.

10, 12 (2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).

The District violated the parents’ right to

free exercise of religion by providing

instruction

the

children

that

contravened the religious beliefs the

parents sought to instill.

Accepting the factual allegations of the Amended

Complaint as true, particularly when read in view of

Mahmoud, supra, 145 S.Ct. at 2332, it is clear that

the District violated the parents’ right to direct the

religious upbringing of their children by its policies

that substantially interfere with that right by

withholding morally consequential information from

parents. Id. at 2350.

1. Strict scrutiny is the appropriate test

to assess the District’s policies.

The District’s policies “substantially interfered

with the religious development of the parents’

children and posed a very real threat of undermining

the religious beliefs and practices that the parents

wish to instill in their children.” Mahmoud, 145 S.Ct

at 2361. Therefore, the court must apply strict

scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the

subject policies. See id.

The District’s written and de facto policies, which

the parents allege violate their parental rights, are

substantial and recounted in the Tenth Circuit’s

Opinion. The most pertinent and plainly

unconstitutional of these policies in light of Mahmoud

include:

•

“School personnel should not disclose

information that may reveal a student's

transgender or non-binary status to others,

including students, parents, or community

members, unless legally required to do so or

unless the student has authorized such

disclosure.” Id. at 311; see id. at 292 ¶ 163.

•

“When contacting or communicating with a

parent/guardian of a transgender or nonbinary student, school staff should use the

name and pronouns that the student's

parent/guardian use, unless the student

requests otherwise.” Id. at 311; id. at 293 ¶ 167.

•

“If a parent/guardian asks a staff member

about whether their student uses another

name/pronoun at school or has other genderrelated questions, the staff member should

refer them to the school counselor, who can

address questions and concerns that the

parent/guardian may have. If a school

counselor

receives

questions

from

parent/guardian, they should use their

professional judgment to determine how best to

follow up with the student and then the

parent/guardian.” Id. at 311; id. at 293 ¶¶ 167,

169–70.

Gender Support FAQ (“FAQ”). The district

provided official responses to frequently asked

questions about its handling of gender-identity

issues. In one response, the district advised that it

would not inform a parent of any private

discussions between staff and students about sex,

sexual orientation, or gender identity. In another,

the district said that to “the extent possible, a

school counselor will not out the student to their

parent(s)/guardian(s) before the student is ready to

come out themselves.” Id. at 294 ¶ 175 (alteration

accepted). And in another, the district expressed

that school counselors needed to “balance the

inherent right of parents and guardians to their

student's information and the potential impact

this sharing [of a child's transgender or non-binary

status at school] could have on the student and the

student's trust in sharing future concerns with the

school counselor.” Id. at 294–95 ¶ 176 (emphasis

omitted).

***

GSA Meetings. The district had a “de facto policy

of refusing to notify parents of the child's

participation” and of telling the students that the

meeting was confidential. Id. at 298 ¶¶ 198–99.

Personnel Training. The district encouraged

staff to attend training sessions on LGBTQ issues

at which staff were trained not to reveal a

student's non-conforming gender-identity to the

student's parents.

Circumventing Parental Notice. The district

stored on its record-keeping software students’

personal-identifying information, and any changes

needed to be made by a parent or by means that

would notify a parent. Even so, district staff

sometimes circulated lists of students’ preferred

names and pronouns without updating the recordkeeping software so parents would be unaware of

the district’s use of a preferred name or pronoun.

And the district's medical staff sought guidance

from the district on maintaining and using medical

records with a student's preferred name without

those records becoming legally accessible to

parents under federal-disclosure law.

Misleading Responses to Parental Inquiries.

After Riep repeatedly met privately with C.L. to

discuss gender-identity issues, and after C.L.

attended the GSA meeting, the Lees met with

Principal Benedict in 2022 and asked whether

Riep had an “appropriate relationship” with C.L.

Benedict said yes.

After the Juriches learned that H.J. had attended

two GSA meetings, they met with Benedict and

asked if the district had taught any lessons on

sexuality at GSA meetings during that academic

year. Benedict said it had not.

Lee v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 135 F.4th 924, 930–31

(10th Cir. 2025). The above policies burden the

parents’ right to direct the religious upbringing of

their children in that they direct school employees to

provide guidance to children regarding sexuality and

transgenderism without mandating the involvement

of parents. In fact, not only is parental notification not

required, but it is also discouraged and even

prohibited. The matters for which secrecy is

encouraged implicate religious doctrine, so excluding

parents from these discussions necessarily prevents

them from directing – or even meaningfully impacting

– the religious upbringing of their children. Because

“the burden imposed is of the same character as that

imposed in Yoder, [a court] need not ask whether the

law at issue is neutral or generally applicable before

proceeding to strict scrutiny.” Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct at

2361.

2. The District’s policies will not survive

strict scrutiny because there is no

compelling

state

interest

instructing children that their gender

may be inconsistent with their

biological sex immutably determined

at conception, particularly where such

instruction is at odds with the parents’

religious beliefs.

“To survive strict scrutiny, a government must

demonstrate that its policy advances interests of the

highest order and is narrowly tailored to achieve

those interests.” Mahmoud, 145 S.Ct at 2361 (cleaned

up). It is difficult to fathom any valid – let alone

compelling – state interest that would support the

government standing in the place of parents to advise

children regarding matters of sex and gender identity.

“The child is not the mere creature of the state;

those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the

right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and

prepare him for additional obligations.” Pierce v.

Soc’y. of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and

Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). The Court recognized

in Mahmoud and Yoder that public schools’ attempts

to instill values in students that undermine or

substantially interfere with the religious values their

parents seek to instill violate parental rights.

Lest the District allege that the minor children in

their temporary care have a right to the secrecy their

policies require, this Court has “recognized three

reasons justifying the conclusion that the

constitutional rights of children cannot be equated

with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of

children; their inability to make critical decisions in

an informed, mature manner; and the importance of

the parental role in child rearing.” Bellotti v. Baird,

443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). Put differently, this Court

has recognized “that, during the formative years of

childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the

experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize

and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”

Id. at 635. “Consent and involvement by parents in

important decisions by minors long have been

recognized as protective of their immaturity.” Id. at

649. The graver the decision faced by the child, the

more important parental involvement becomes. See,

e.g., H. L. v Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 (1981) (“The

Utah statute is reasonably calculated to protect

minors in appellant’s class by enhancing the potential

for parental consultation concerning a decision that

has

potentially

traumatic

and

permanent

consequences.”).

The District, and others like it across the nation,

purport to hide students’ gender confusion or

transition from their parents because parents may

hypothetically not support or otherwise react poorly –

in the estimation of the District – upon learning their

child’s wishes to assume a gender identity different

from his or her biological sex. But this is not a

justifiable basis for the District’s policies. As this

Court made clear in Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584

(1979):

Simply because the decision of a parent is not

agreeable to a child…does not automatically

transfer the power to make that decision from

the parents to some agency or officer of the

state…Most children, even in adolescence,

simply are not able to make sound judgments

concerning many decisions, including their need

for medical care or treatment. Parents can and

must make those judgments. The fact that a

child may balk…or complain about a parental

refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not

diminish the parents’ authority to decide what

is best for the child.

Id. at 603-04 (citing Joseph Goldstein, Medical Case

for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of

Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645, 664–668 (1977);

Robert Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care

Decisionmaking Authority: A Suggested Interest

Analysis, 62 Va. L. Rev. 285, 308 (1976)).

In other words, it is not the role of public schools

to supplant their judgment for that of parents. The

District may think – and apparently does think – a

minor student’s choice of gender identity is in all

circumstances right and good and something to be

defended, but if a parent holds a different opinion in

accordance with the dictates of his/her faith and

conscience, it is the prerogative of the parent to deal

with the child and the situation in the manner the

parent deems appropriate.

The District overstepped its bounds in providing

instruction to students about gender identity and

transition, and in secreting these matters from

parents. This Court has oft “recognized the

potentially coercive nature of classroom instruction of

this kind [and that ‘t]he State exerts great authority

and coercive power through’ public schools ‘because of

the students’ emulation of teachers as role models and

the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure.’”

Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Edwards v.

Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)). The law has also

long recognized that “the family has a privacy interest

in the upbringing and education of children…which is

protected by the Constitution against undue state

interference.” Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417,

446 (1990). Thus, even if we accept for argument’s

sake that parental support of a child’s gender

transition is a desirable societal norm, “it cannot be

coerced by methods which conflict with the

Constitution—a desirable end cannot be promoted by

prohibited means.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,

401 (1923). Excluding parents from such a serious

matter concerning their children violates their

constitutional rights.

At bottom, it would be a departure from precedent

to hold that it is in the best interests of the child that

a parent be excluded from the decision-making

process. See, e.g., Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 456 (“We have

concluded that the State has a strong and legitimate

interest in providing a pregnant minor with the

advice and support of a parent during the decisional

period.”) Just as “permitting a child to obtain an

abortion without the counsel of an adult who has

responsibility or concern for the child would

constitute an irresponsible abdication of the State's

duty to protect the welfare of minors,” Planned

Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.

52, 72-73 (1976), concealing a child’s gender

transition and depriving that child’s parents from

guiding their child through such a physically and

emotionally taxing time is equally improper and

irresponsible.

II.

The Tenth Circuit erred in dismissing the

complaint for failure to plausibly allege

municipal liability.

The Tenth Circuit skirted the constitutional issue

altogether by holding that the parents “failed to

plausibly allege municipal liability” because they

“have not plausibly alleged that policy was the

moving force behind their alleged constitutional

injury.” Lee, 135 F.4th 924, 934–35. Even if there was

a defect in the pleading, such defect could have been

cured

simple

amendment,

which

was

impermissibly disallowed by the courts below.

“It is well established that in a § 1983 case a city

or other local governmental entity cannot be subject

to liability at all unless the harm was caused in the

implementation of ‘official municipal policy.’” Lozman

v. Riviera Bch., 585 U.S. 87, 95 (2018) (quoting Monell

v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978)). “The ‘official policy’ requirement was

intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from

acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby

make clear that municipal liability is limited to action

for which the municipality is actually responsible.”

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986). “To be sure, ‘official policy’ often refers to

formal rules or understandings—often but not always

committed to writing—that are intended to, and do,

establish fixed plans of action to be followed under

similar circumstances consistently and over time.”

Id. at 480-81. Here, petitioners allege the existence of

both.

Notwithstanding the parents identifying both

written policies and what they term “de facto” – or

unwritten – policies, the lower court opined that the

parents failed to sufficiently allege causation between

the District’s policies and the harms they suffered.

The court held:

The parents don’t explain how policies that

presume the district knows better than

parents, or that discourage disclosure, directly

caused district staff to do any of the following:

recruit students to attend GSA meetings

(including by misleading one student to

coax her attendance),

• present dubious information to students

about being transgender and about suicide,

• award prizes to students if they identify as

transgender at the meeting,

• offer

the

staff’s

personal

contact

information to students so they could talk

any time, and

• tell students that they didn't have to tell

their parents about what happened at the

meeting, and that it might be unsafe to talk

with their parents about gender-identity

issues.

Though a formal regulation or widespread

practice that discourages disclosure may be “in

harmony” with what happened here, under our

rigorous causation standard, the parents

haven’t plausibly alleged it was the moving

force of their alleged injury.

•

Lee, 135 F.4th at 935.

The court of appeals’ reasoning is perplexing. In

accepting all the facts alleged in the complaint as

true, as the court was required to do at the relevant

juncture, the conclusion that the constitutional harms

alleged directly flowed from the District’s challenged

policies (recited in Section I. B. 1. above) was obvious

and unavoidable. The policies track almost verbatim

with the allegations of the actions perpetrated by

District employees against the parents and their

children.

The Court should see through the lower court’s

proffered basis for dismissal as pretextual. “Where a

plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action

itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do

so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is

straightforward.” Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Bryan Cnty.

v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). The District’s

policies, as alleged in the complaint, directed staff to

guide students through gender questioning and

transition, and to conceal the matters from parents.

These allegations satisfy the causation pleading

requirement. This Court has made clear:

[P]roof that a municipality's legislative body or

authorized decisionmaker has intentionally

deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected

right necessarily establishes that the

municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the

conclusion that the action taken or directed by

the

municipality

its

authorized

decisionmaker itself violates federal law will

also determine that the municipal action was

the moving force behind the injury of which the

plaintiff complains.

Id. at 405. Insofar as the district court dismissed the

case in its entirety at the pleading stage and before

the parents had an opportunity to offer proof in

support of their allegations that the District

intentionally deprived parents of their right to direct

the religious upbringing of their children without the

substantial interference of school personnel, the

parents have at this juncture established the

necessary causation to prevent dismissal of their

claims. Thus, the parents’ claims must be reinstated

and the parents afforded leave to amend, as necessary

to cure any pleading deficiencies.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully Submitted,

HORATIO G. MIHET

DANIEL J. SCHMID

KRISTINA S. HEUSER

LIBERTY COUNSEL