Amicus Curiae Brief — Anoka Hennepin Education Minnesota, (American Federation of Teachers Local 7007), Petitioner v. Don Huizenga, et al.

No. 25-888

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

ANOKA HENNEPIN EDUCATION MINNESOTA,

(AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

LOCAL 7007),

v.

Petitioner,

DON HUIZENGA, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Eighth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE STATES

MINNESOTA, ARIZONA, HAWAI‘I, MICHIGAN,

NEVADA, VERMONT, AND WEST VIRGINIA

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER ANOKA

HENNEPIN EDUCATION MINNESOTA

Keith Ellison

Attorney General of the State of Minnesota

Liz Kramer

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Nick Pladson

Assistant Attorney General

445 Minnesota Street, Suite 600

St. Paul, MN 55101

(651) 757-1010

liz.kramer@ag.state.mn.us

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

State of Minnesota

390557

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Should this Court repudiate the municipal taxpayer

exception to the general rule against taxpayer

standing?

2.

If there is a municipal taxpayer exception to the

general rule against taxpayer standing, must a

municipal taxpayer challenging a municipal policy at

least show that the policy imposes a measurable cost

on the municipality and that the policy necessarily

implicates funds attributable to municipal taxes?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

I.

ARTICLE III PREVENTS COURTS

FROM T U R N I NG P OLI T ICA L

DISPUTES INTO CONSTITUTIONAL

LITIGATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A. Plaintiffs Challenge an Electorally

Accountable, Cost-Neutral Contract

Choice—Not a Concrete Pocketbook

Injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

B. State Decisions to Govern Through

Local Instrumentalities Should Not

Trigger Federal Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

C. I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l F i n a n c e

Makes the Eighth Circuit’s Rule a

Standing Template to Federalize

Contested Policy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

iii

Table of Contents

Page

II. A N Y M U N I C I PA L T A X PA Y E R

E XCEP T ION M US T R EQU I R E

A N E T C O S T T R A C E A BL E T O

MUNICIPAL TAXES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

A. Injury in Fact Requires a Net Fiscal

Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

B. Traceability Requires a Municipal

Tax Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT REMOVED

T WO ARTICLE III GUARDRAILS,

CREATING ONE CIRCUIT SPLIT

AND ENTRENCHING ANOTHER . . . . . . . . 18

A. Split One: Net Fiscal Impact . . . . . . . . . . . 19

B. Split Two: Municipal Tax Nexus . . . . . . . . 20

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

ADDITIONAL AMICI STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

iv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

ACLU-NJ v. Township Of Wall,

246 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17

Am. Humanist Ass’n v.

Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1,

859 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 20

Cammack v. Waihee,

932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Cantrell v. City of Long Beach,

241 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v.

Village of Chestnut Ridge,

98 F.4th 386 (2d Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia,

858 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19-21

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

547 U.S. 332 (2006) . . . . 1, 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 15-18, 20, 21

Dep’t of Com. v. New York,

588 U.S. 752 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

v

Cited Authorities

Page

Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist.,

70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321,

177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Doremus v. Bd. Of Ed. Of Borough of Hawthorne,

342 U.S. 429 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med.,

602 U.S. 367 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Olson,

566 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.N.D. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Frothingham v. Mellon,

262 U.S. 447 (1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 4, 13, 14, 18

Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,

207 U.S. 161 (1907) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Lance v. Coffman,

549 U.S. 437 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13, 15-17

Nichols v. City of Rehoboth Beach,

836 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

vi

Cited Authorities

Page

Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League,

541 U.S. 125 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9

Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chi. Park Dist.,

971 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 19, 20

Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs,

641 F.3d 197 (6th Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 19

Thomson v. County of Franklin,

15 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

United States v. Richardson,

418 U.S. 166 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.,

289 U.S. 36 (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES:

U.S. Const. amend. IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

U.S. Const. amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

34 U.S.C. § 10381(g) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Complaint, Huizenga, et al. v. Indep. Sch. Dist.

No. 11, et al., No. 0:20-cv-02445 (D. Minn. filed

December 2, 2020) (ECF No. 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

vii

Cited Authorities

Page

Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Minn. Stat. § 126C.10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Minn. Stat. § 126C.17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Minn. Stat. § 127A.09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Minn. Stat. § 179A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Minn. Stat. ch. 123A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Minn. Stat. ch. 123B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The 287(g) Program: State and Local Immigration

Enforcement (CRS IF11898) (Aug. 12, 2021) . . . . . 10

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1

The States of Minnesota, Arizona, Hawai‘i, Michigan,

Nevada, Vermont, and West Virginia file this brief as amici

curiae in support of Petitioner.

Amici have a direct institutional interest in the proper

application of Article III limits to municipal taxpayer

suits, particularly given modern funding structures

that blend federal, state, and local revenue. Modern

public programs are commonly delivered through local

entities using accounts that blend federal, state, and local

revenue. If plaintiffs can sue without a net municipal

cost or a meaningful municipaltax nexus, municipal

taxpayer standing stops being municipal. It becomes

generalized-grievance litigation under a different label.

See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345–47

(2006) (rejecting state taxpayer standing); Frothingham

v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–87 (1923) (rejecting federal

taxpayer standing). The decision below illustrates that

risk.

By untethering municipal taxpayer standing from

Article III limits, the Eighth Circuit creates one circuit

split, entrenches another, and leaves courts without

administrable rules to enforce standing limits. The

resulting expansion of municipal taxpayer standing is not

abstract. It creates a substantial risk that routine disputes

over how States deliver public services will increasingly

wind up in federal court, compelling federal judges to

1. Counsel for all parties received at least 10 days’ notice that

this amicus brief would be filed under Rule 37.2.

2

supervise fiscal administration of local governments when

they are charged by State or Federal law to implement.

Amici have an interest in ensuring the municipal

taxpayer standing does not persist as an Article III

anomaly. And even if the Court declines to repudiate

the doctrine in this case, municipal taxpayer standing

must at minimum be confined by two administrable

guardrails that track Article III’s injury and traceability

requirements. Those limitations are especially important

when the challenged program is financed overwhelmingly

by federal and state dollars that are commingled in local

budgets, and federal and state programs are administered

by local government actors. Here, the challenged practice

imposes no measurable net municipal cost, is not traceable

to uniquely municipal funds, and yields an asserted

injury that is indistinguishable from a generalized policy

grievance. The Eighth Circuit’s decision deepens circuit

conflicts and warrants this Court’s review.

Amici take no position on the merits of the underlying

policy dispute. The questions here relate only to whether

plaintiffs may invoke federal jurisdiction to litigate it.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case shows why municipal taxpayer standing

should be repudiated—and why, if retained, it should

remain a narrow, pocketbook doctrine with administrable

Article III limits. Plaintiffs challenge expenditures that

fund one term in a collective-bargaining agreement

approved by an elected school board under state law. But

they cannot show any measurable depletion of the school

district’s treasury: the district sets the reimbursement

rate and may adjust it unilaterally, and the challenged

payments—like other payroll expenses—flow through

a general operating fund that blends federal, state, and

local revenue. Plaintiffs therefore cannot show that the

challenged outlay was funded by uniquely municipal taxes,

or by any municipal taxes at all.

On those facts, the Eighth Circuit nonetheless held

that Plaintiffs had municipal taxpayer standing. Pet.

App. 1a-17a. That was error. The decision departs from

core Article III limits, creates an end-run around the

prohibition on state taxpayer standing, and creates or

entrenches circuit splits on two recurring questions.

The Petition correctly asks this Court to repudiate

municipal taxpayer standing, which sits uneasily within

modern Article III doctrine and risks functioning as stateor federal-taxpayer standing by proxy. In the alternative,

if the Court declines to repudiate the doctrine, it cannot be

“dispensed in gross,” and requires administrable Article

III guardrails. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 353. This Court should

at minimum require two administrable guardrails: that

municipal taxpayer standing requires (1) a measurable

4

net fiscal injury, and (2) a nexus between the challenged

expenditure and uniquely municipal tax revenues. The

Eighth Circuit removed both guardrails—treating a fully

reimbursed outlay as injury based on an alleged “misuse,”

and holding that commingling in a general fund does

not “dilute” the taxpayer’s interest even when plaintiffs

cannot trace the expenditure to municipal taxes. Pet. App.

8a–10a. Because modern state programs are routinely

administered through local entities using blended funds,

the rule below risks turning ordinary state administrative

arrangements into standing triggers—expanding federal

jurisdiction where political accountability and state-law

remedies are ordinarily the primary checks.

Because the challenged expenditures are fully

reimbursed and drawn from a commingled general fund,

Respondents cannot satisfy either guardrail on these

undisputed facts. Reversal therefore follows whether the

Court municipal taxpayer standing altogether, adopts

both guardrails, or enforces either.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner persuasively argues that this Court should

repudiate municipal taxpayer standing, and this case is

the vehicle to do so. Pet. Br. 11–21. Amici agree that the

doctrine cannot be reconciled with modern Article III

principles. Taxpayer objections to government spending

are ordinarily generalized grievances, not concrete

personal injuries. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. 486–87;

Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345–46; Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S.

437, 439 (2007) (per curiam). And whatever historical logic

once supported a municipal carveout is harder to defend

today, when local budgets routinely blend municipal, state,

5

and federal revenues—making an unbounded exception

a potential pathway around the settled bar on state and

federal taxpayer standing. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345–47.

The Court should reach that question. But if the

Court chooses not to repudiate the doctrine, the Court

can resolve this case by adopting modest, administrable

guardrails that properly cabin the doctrine: requiring a

plausible net municipal cost or a meaningful municipal-tax

nexus. On undisputed facts, respondents cannot satisfy

either requirement. And the Eighth Circuit created circuit

splits by rejecting both guardrails.

I.

ARTICLE III PREVENTS COURTS FROM

T U R N I NG POLI T ICA L DISPU T E S I N T O

CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION.

This case shows why Article III keeps political

disputes out of federal court. Plaintiffs invoke federal

jurisdiction to challenge a cost-neutral policy choice

made by an elected school board under state law. Absent

a concrete pocketbook injury and a non-speculative

municipal-tax nexus, Article III leaves that dispute

to democratic correction—not federal adjudication.

Standing doctrine preserves the separation of powers

by limiting federal court jurisdiction to cases involving

redressable, concrete injuries, not where they are asked

to supervise policy decisions correctable through electoral

accountability or state law.

Modern States deliver public services through layered

structures and intergovernmental finance. Discarding

net-cost and municipal tax-nexus limits turns those

ordinary design choices into standing triggers, expanding

6

federal jurisdiction precisely where political accountability

is supposed to do the work.

A.

Pl a i n t i f f s C h a l l e n g e a n E l e c t o r a l l y

Accountable, Cost-Neutral Contract Choice—

Not a Concrete Pocketbook Injury.

Plaintiffs invoke municipal taxpayer standing to obtain

federal-court review of a cost-neutral policy disagreement

arising from a local school board’s implementation of

Minnesota’s constitutionally mandated public-education

system and statutorily governed public-sector bargaining

framework. That use of standing doctrine turns routine

administration of a statewide program into federal

litigation by proxy.

The Minnesota Constitution requires the Legislature

to establish a “general and uniform system of public

schools” to ensure the “stability of a republican form of

government.” 2 Minnesota creates local school districts

to deliver public education, financed by federal, state,

and local tax revenues. 3 Minnesota law permits and

governs collective bargaining between school districts

and their employees.4 Within this state structured public

education regime, Plaintiffs object to one leave provision

2. Minn. Const. art. XIII, § 1.

3. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. chs. 123A, 123B (authorizing creation

of local school districts and providing powers and limitations); Minn.

Stat. § 127A.09 (providing for acceptance and administration of

Federal Aid for Education funds and disbursement to local school

districts); Minn. Stat. 126C.10 (providing state per-pupil funding

to local school districts); Minn. Stat. § 126C.17 (authorizing and

prescribing rules for school district referenda).

4. See Minn. Stat. § 179A, et seq.

7

in a collective-bargaining agreement that was negotiated

and approved by their elected school board: the AHEM

leave provision.5 The term allows paid leave up to a cap and

requires the union to reimburse substitute teacher costs

dollar-for-dollar at a rate the school board unilaterally

sets—making the arrangement budget-neutral. Any

payroll outlay also comes from a commingled operating

fund, so attributing a payment to uniquely municipal

taxes is speculation. The decision below nonetheless found

Article III standing—an approach with no administrable

stopping point for modern, multi-source local budgets or

self-financed expenditures.

Standing is the line that prevents citizens from

converting their dissatisfaction with a democratically

accountable bargain into federal court supervision of

ordinary public administration. Without a concrete

municipal injury, federal litigation becomes a substitute

for school-board meetings, elections, and state-law

remedies. Article III does not allow federal courts to

referee contested local governance choices—especially

where the objector remains free to press the issue

“in the political forum or at the polls.” United States

v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175, 179 (1974) (rejecting

taxpayer standing to air “generalized grievances”). That

is especially true where the challenged term arises within

a State’s constitutional and statutory architecture for

providing core governmental services and regulating

public employment.

Minnesota structured public education to be delivered

locally, financed through intergovernmental revenue

streams, and governed by a public-sector bargaining

5. Pet. App. 64a.

8

framework tempered by local electoral accountability

and state-law remedies. Federal jurisdiction should not

be available where Plaintiffs’ objection is to a policy

choice that can be revisited by the same elected board

that adopted it. FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602

U.S. 367, 396–97 (2024) (rejecting “if not us, who?” as a

basis for standing; some disputes are left to “political and

democratic processes,” not federal litigation).

All these concerns are reasons why the Court should

repudiate municipal taxpayer standing. But whether the

Court does so or adopts the guardrails advocated here,

local taxpayers are not without recourse: they can press

the issue with the elected board, support candidates who

will bargain differently, and pursue state-law remedies—

including, as Plaintiffs did here, state labor-relations

claims.6 Those paths preserve political accountability.

B. State Decisions to Govern Through Local

Instrumentalities Should Not Trigger Federal

Jurisdiction.

States’ sovereign authority over municipal and other

subordinate units of government is a core feature of our

federal system. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541

U.S. 125, 140 (2004). Municipalities, whatever degree

of local autonomy state law may afford them, always

remain political subdivisions of the State. They “are

created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the

6. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges, inter alia, that the challenged

contract provision violates the Minnesota Public Employment Labor

Relations Act. See Complaint ¶¶ 31 – 33, 45 – 47, Huizenga, et al.

v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, et al., No. 0:20-cv-02445 (D. Minn. filed

December 2, 2020) (ECF No. 1).

9

governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted

to them in its absolute discretion.” Id. Necessarily, when

States retain the power to “create and regulate the affairs

of their own municipalities,” they retain the power to

abolish them, reorganize their boundaries, or alter their

powers. Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 289

U.S. 36, 40 (1933). States do not surrender sovereignty

by delegating governance to municipalities, and that

delegation should not supply the ‘something more’ needed

to trigger federal standing. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,

207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907).

An expansive municipal taxpayer standing doctrine

predictably reshapes state incentives. It turns a State’s

choice to deliver services through local instrumentalities

a jurisdictional vulnerability—inviting federal suits over

disputes that would otherwise be resolved through state

political accountability or state-law remedies. Cuno,

547 U.S. at 346. The consequence is structural: federal

jurisdiction expands precisely where States have chosen

cooperative, intergovernmental delivery—pressuring

States to retreat from governance designs that rely on

municipalities to implement state policy. Nixon, 541 U.S.

at 140–41.

That distortion is amplified by a second, modern

reality: intergovernmental finance. Article III should

not operate as a hidden lever that pressures States to

redesign how they administer routine public programs. A

State should not face broader federal-court exposure for

choosing local implementation over centralization merely

because local entities serve as the operational arms and

check-writers.

10

C.

Intergovernmental Finance Makes the

Eighth Circuit’s Rule a Standing Template to

Federalize Contested Policy Choices.

Modern intergovernmental finance routinely routes

federal and State dollars through local operating and

payroll accounts that also include some local-tax revenue.

In that setting, the Eighth Circuit decision makes

commingling dispositive in the wrong direction: once any

local-tax revenue is involved, the local disbursement itself

becomes the “injury,” and traceability is presumed.

Under the Eighth Circuit decision, federal and State

programs across the policy spectrum become vulnerable

to municipal taxpayer suits. For example, School Resource

Officer positions may be funded in substantial part

through COPS Hiring Program grants, which cap the

federal share at 75% of salary and fringe costs and require

a non-federal cash match—yet the officer is paid from a

commingled municipal payroll account.7 Immigrationenforcement partnerships may likewise be administered

through local payroll and operating accounts even where

the federal government reimburses incremental local

cost. 8 Under the Eighth Circuit rule, a municipal taxpayer

7. 34 U.S.C. § 10381(g) (grant share generally may not exceed

75% of the costs of a program, project, or activity unless the Attorney

General waives the non-federal contribution requirement).

8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (authorizing written agreements

under which state or local officers may carry out immigration-officer

functions “at the expense of the State or political subdivision,”

subject to federal supervision and training requirements); see also

The 287(g) Program: State and Local Immigration Enforcement

(CRS IF11898) (Aug. 12, 2021) (discussing participation costs and

potential reimbursements).

11

could plead standing based on the payroll disbursement

itself and treat the mere presence of local-tax revenue

in the account as enough to press Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendment challenges to policing or immigrationenforcement practices—without any showing of net

municipal “pocketbook” loss, even when incremental

costs are fully reimbursed. The same standing template

would apply regardless of the program’s policy valence—

public safety, immigration cooperation, public health,

housing, climate resilience, or refugee services. Amici

offer these examples only to illustrate administrability

and federalism consequences of the standing rule, not to

endorse or oppose any program.

These intergovernmental arrangements are not a

loophole to avoid federal jurisdiction. They are simply

how States and the Federal Government deliver public

services at scale.9 And they underscore why municipal

taxpayer standing—whatever its continuing role—must

remain a narrow pocketbook doctrine. In a blendedfunding system, the mere presence of some municipal

revenue in a commingled fund cannot substitute for actual

injury or traceability. Otherwise, any payment from that

account becomes “municipal” by definition, simply because

municipal revenue once entered it.

Even while recognizing that the school district’s

operating fund contains multiple sources of revenue, the

Eighth Circuit concluded that a municipal taxpayers’

9. See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Olson, 566

F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.N.D. 2008) (in Establishment Clause litigation,

describing intergovernmental programs with commingled federal,

state, and local funding that complicate any administrable effort to

isolate “municipal” dollars).

12

interest is “not diluted where the General Fund contains

municipal, state, and federal funds.” Pet. App. 10a. But

absent a tracing requirement, the mere presence of any

municipal revenue becomes enough to re-label all mixedsource spending as “municipal” spending for standing

purposes. Plaintiffs can turn a municipality’s role as

administrator—or a nominal municipal contribution

to a commingled budget—into a jurisdictional lever to

challenge state- or federally-shaped programs in federal

court. But “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Cuno, 547

U.S. at 353. And then the “municipal taxpayer” exception

stops being municipal. And where budgets are fungible,

even a favorable judgment may not predictably reduce

any taxpayer’s burden—underscoring why speculative

attribution and fiscal substitution cannot do Article III

work. Id. at 350; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

562 (1992); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 768

(2019). That move erases cornerstone Article III limits.

This Court has warned against a taxpayer standing

doctrine that would “interpose the federal courts as

virtually continuing monitors” of a sovereign’s fiscal

administration, because it undermines fundamental

federalism principles. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 346. The rule

below invites that oversight not only of States, but of

the many local instrumentalities through which States

deliver policy—and, because the funds are commingled,

without any principled way to cabin the litigation or relief

to an actual municipal fiscal injury. In each instance, the

asserted “injury” would be the local disbursement from a

commingled account rather than any measurable net fiscal

loss. That is exactly this case: a local payroll outlay from

a commingled fund with no net municipal loss, recast as

a justiciable constitutional dispute. The rule below thus

13

furnishes a standing mechanism capable of federalizing

contested policy choices of every stripe whenever a local

entity helps administer the program or cuts a check.

This case presents a clean vehicle to repudiate

municipal taxpayer standing. In the alternative, the

Court can reverse by holding that Article III requires at

the very least a measurable net fiscal injury and a nonspeculative nexus to uniquely municipal tax revenues.

Plaintiffs cannot establish either.

II. ANY MUNICIPAL TAXPAYER EXCEPTION

MUST REQUIRE A NET COST TRACEABLE TO

MUNICIPAL TAXES.

Article III requires injury in fact and traceability.

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. In taxpayer cases, those

requirements prevent courts from adjudicating generalized

objections to public programs under the guise of financial

harms. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486–87; Cuno, 547 U.S.

at 344–46. And that is why municipal taxpayer standing—a

sui generis exception from general taxpayer standing

doctrine—should be abolished. But if it persists, the

municipal-taxpayer plaintiff must at least show a net cost

traceable to municipal taxes. These guardrails implement

Frothingham’s own explanation for why municipal

taxpayer suits were ever treated differently. Frothingham

distinguished municipal taxpayers on the premise that

their interest in municipal spending can be “direct and

immediate,” unlike the federal taxpayer’s diffuse stake

in a treasury funded “partly realized from taxation and

partly from other sources.” 262 U.S. at 486–87. But that

premise is not a self-serving label; it is an evidentiary

showing. The party invoking federal jurisdiction must

14

be able to show a concrete pocketbook impact and a nonspeculative link to municipal tax revenues—not merely

that they “suffer[] in some indefinite way in common

with people generally.” Id. at 488. The Eighth Circuit’s

approach drains Frothingham’s limiting principle of

content by allowing standing where the asserted injury is

neither direct (cost-neutral) nor immediate (not traceable

to uniquely municipal funds). Pet. App. 8a – 10a.

A.

Injury in Fact Requires a Net Fiscal Impact.

Municipal taxpayer standing cannot be reconciled with

Article III’s injury requirement. At a minimum, if the Court

declines to repudiate the doctrine, a municipal taxpayer

must show a “pocketbook” injury in substance, not just in

form. Doremus v. Bd. Of Ed. Of Borough of Hawthorne,

342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952). A clear injury requirement

screens out suits driven by policy disagreement, rather

than tangible fiscal harm. And it aligns municipal taxpayer

standing with the central premise of the doctrine: that

municipal taxpayers may feel the effects of municipal

spending in a more direct way than federal taxpayers

feel federal spending. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486–87.

If that founding premise has any continuing validity, the

asserted fiscal injury must have a net negative effect

on the municipal fisc. But where money merely moves

through a municipal account, or where disbursements

are reimbursed dollar-for-dollar, the municipal treasury

is not depleted. If there is no depletion—no measurable

net cost—there is no “pocketbook” injury to the taxpayer.

Even when some net cost can be alleged, municipal

taxpayer standing remains a doctrinal anomaly because it

invites courts to treat a single, integrated expenditure as

15

if it were divisible into separate “taxpayer injuries” based

on the provenance of commingled revenues. The case

below shows the problem: the district pays the challenged

expense from one General Fund fed by federal, state, and

municipal dollars and spent as a single, undifferentiated

outlay. Yet the doctrine would allow a taxpayer to litigate

the municipal “share” in federal court while Article III bars

the same taxpayer from challenging the state or federal

funding streams that finance the identical payment. That

mismatch confirms that municipal-taxpayer standing—

however narrowed by a net-cost requirement—remains an

exceptional departure from ordinary injury principles. Cf.

Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345, 350 (rejecting theories of taxpayer

injury that are speculative, attenuated, or shared by all

taxpayers).

Here, it is undisputed that the challenged payments

are reimbursed (or otherwise budget-neutral) to the

municipal entity.10 The only incremental budget outlay

Plaintiffs identify—substitute teacher pay to cover

absent teachers—is reimbursed at a rate set by the

elected school board. Under any sensible understanding

of “pocketbook injury,” that defeats standing—or at

least requires plaintiffs to plead and prove a concrete

net fiscal harm. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434; Lujan, 504

U.S. at 560–61. Article III injury cannot rest on gross

outlays while ignoring reimbursement that leaves the

public fisc unchanged. Absent a net fiscal impact, a

reimbursed municipal expenditure is not a pocketbook

injury. Otherwise, municipal taxpayer standing becomes

available whenever a municipality acts as a temporary

payor or an implementing agent of the federal or State

10. Pet. App. 5a, 29a, 33a, 64a.

16

government, even when the challenged expenditure is

budget neutral and imposes no municipal loss.

B. Traceability Requires a Municipal Tax Nexus.

Traceability is the line between a concrete fiscal

injury and an undifferentiated objection to government

finance. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Allen v. Wright, 468

U.S. 737, 759 (1984). In commingled-fund settings, it is

not enough to say that some municipal dollars are in the

pot. A plaintiff must show that the challenged expenditure

draws on uniquely municipal tax revenues consistent

with their fiscal injury theory. See Protect Our Parks,

Inc., v. Chi. Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 730, 735–36 (7th

Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.) (“It would be far too simplistic to

conclude that the City is spending tax money on a project

simply because it is spending some money on a project”)

(emphasis in original). That limiting principle keeps the

municipal taxpayer standing exception from swallowing

the Article III rule. When different sources of taxpayer

money are commingled, it is easy to say that all taxpayers

were injured (federal, State, and local), but much harder

to show a link between specific municipal tax revenues

and the challenged expenditure. Article III requires the

latter, not the former. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345–46; Lujan,

504 U.S. at 560–61.

Without a link between the challenged spending and

municipal tax revenues, the plaintiff’s asserted stake is

indistinguishable from the “minute and indeterminable”

interest this Court deems insufficient for State and federal

taxpayers. The Eighth Circuit’s rule allows municipal

taxpayer standing to become a pathway to federal court for

generalized grievances whenever a local entity contributes

a nominal amount of municipal taxes to a federal or State

17

program. In cases like this one, the municipal taxpayer

label does the work that injury and causation are supposed

to do. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61; Allen, 468 U.S. at

759. And when a challenged expenditure is funded by an

indistinguishable mix of federal, State, and local taxes,

municipal taxpayer standing becomes a proxy for State- or

federal-taxpayer standing. The decision here enables just

that outcome, which this Court rejected in Cuno. 547 U.S.

at 349–53 (rejecting plaintiffs’ effort to leverage municipal

standing to challenge state tax).

What’s more, a municipal-tax nexus requirement is

also administrable. It does not require precise dollar-fordollar tracing at the margins. Rather, it asks whether the

challenged expenditure necessarily draws on municipal

tax revenues in a way that plausibly affects the taxpayer’s

burden. Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 730. That inquiry

can be answered using ordinary budget documents, and

it aligns with how State and local budgeting works: if

a taxpayer cannot show that a challenged expenditure

is attributable to municipal tax sources, the taxpayer’s

asserted fiscal injury is not traceable to her status as a

municipal taxpayer.

Here, the school district’s general operating funds are

heavily supported by non-municipal sources, with only a

minority of operating revenue derived from municipal

property-tax levies and the balance from State and federal

coffers.11 An undifferentiated portion of that budget goes

11. Pet. App. 33a; see, e.g., Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch.

Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 222 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring)

(citing data showing that on average state governments supply 48.7%

of public school system funds, the federal government 8.5% of the

funds, and local sources 42.8% of the funds).

18

to pay staff salaries, and an undefined and much smaller

portion funds the leave provision Plaintiffs challenge

here, which is immediately reimbursed dollar-for-dollar.

Attributing the challenged spending to specific municipal

revenue is pure speculation. Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345–46.

III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT REMOV ED T WO

A RT ICLE III GUA RDR A I LS , CREAT I NG

ONE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ENTRENCHING

ANOTHER.

The Eighth Circuit removed both guardrails that

most courts require for municipal taxpayer standing:

a net fiscal injury and a municipal-tax nexus. Because

reimbursement and commingling are undisputed here,

this case cleanly presents both splits and permits

resolution as a matter of law. Viewed against the backdrop

of modern intergovernmental finance, the Eighth Circuit

decision is not a modest adjustment to a narrow doctrine.

By discarding the limiting principles that keep municipal

taxpayer standing confined, the court’s approach threatens

to convert municipal taxpayer standing into a generalpurpose vehicle for policy challenges. That circumvents

this Court’s repeated refusal to allow generalized taxpayer

standing to challenge state and federal fiscal policy. Cuno,

547 U.S. at 345–46; Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.

This petition presents two recurring questions that

often decide municipal taxpayer standing: net cost (injury)

and municipal-tax nexus (traceability). The Eighth Circuit

rejected both requirements on undisputed facts, creating

one circuit split and entrenching another.

19

A.

Split One: Net Fiscal Impact.

To establish municipal taxpayer standing, most courts

require a “good faith pocketbook” injury—an actual,

measurable municipal cost. See, e.g., Thomson v. County

of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 1994); Nichols v.

City of Rehoboth Beach, 836 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2016);

Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 408 (5th

Cir. 1995); Protect Our Parks, 971 F.3d at 733–35; Doe v.

Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir.

1999) (en banc); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Douglas Cnty.

Sch. Dist. RE-1, 859 F.3d 1243, 1258 (10th Cir. 2017)12;

D.C. Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1,

4 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

The Eighth Circuit adopted the opposite rule: a gross

budget outlay is a sufficient injury in fact even when

it poses no net fiscal injury on the municipal fisc. Pet.

App. 8a. The Eighth Circuit claimed to align itself with

the Sixth Circuit, but Smith v. Jefferson County did not

involve, and did not endorse, municipal taxpayer standing

based on a disbursement that does not impose a net fiscal

injury on the municipal fisc. 641 F.3d at 215. The Eighth

Circuit extends municipal taxpayer standing materially

beyond Smith’s facts and rationale.

12. Although the Tenth Circuit said it “need not decide whether

to adopt the good-faith pocketbook standard,” its standing analysis

functionally applied that standard by requiring a concrete, taxpayerpocketbook injury. 859 F.3d at 1259–60.

20

B. Split Two: Municipal Tax Nexus.

Most courts also require a meaningful municipal tax

nexus between the challenged expenditure and municipal

tax revenues, especially where accounts also contain nonmunicipal sources of revenue. See, e.g., Citizens United to

Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Village of Chestnut Ridge,

98 F.4th 386, 393 (2d Cir. 2024); Protect Our Parks, 971

F.3d at 735–36; ACLU-NJ v. Township Of Wall, 246

F.3d 258, 263 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.); Cantrell v. City of

Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 683–84 (9th Cir. 2001); Am.

Humanist Ass’n, 859 F.3d at 1260.

The Eighth Circuit again went the other way, creating

a circuit split by holding that commingling does not “dilute”

the municipal taxpayer interest in the revenue, and finding

that the taxpayer’s inability to trace the challenged

expenditure to specific municipal revenues could not

defeat standing. Pet. App. 10a.13 That rule transforms

13. The Eighth Circuit cited the D.C. and Ninth Circuits to

defend its relaxed traceability rule. Pet. App. 10a (citing Cammack

v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 771–72 (9th Cir. 1991), and D.C. Common

Cause, 858 F.2d at 6). But neither helps here.

Cammack arose in an Establishment Clause case, where lower

courts have extended “traditional judicial hospitality” to taxpayer

plaintiffs—an exceptional context that does not support loosening

municipal-tax traceability in ordinary challenges to municipal

governance. 932 F.2d at 772. The court also held that the plaintiff

had “standing as both state and municipal taxpayers to challenge

the expenditure.” Id. Because the plaintiffs invoked both taxpayer

capacities, the presence of state and municipal funding did not

present the commingled-funds traceability problem asserted here.

And Cammack predates this Court’s clarification that the rationale

for rejecting federal taxpayer standing applies “with undiminished

force” to state taxpayers—so it cannot be read to endorse post-Cuno

dilution of the municipal-tax nexus in commingled-funds cases.

21

municipal taxpayer standing into a jurisdictional lever

for challenging mixed-source programs—precisely the

sort of generalized budget grievance this Court rejected

in Cuno. 547 U.S. at 345–46.

CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, the Court should grant the

petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Keith Ellison

Attorney General of the State of Minnesota

Liz Kramer

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Nick Pladson

Assistant Attorney General

445 Minnesota Street, Suite 600

St. Paul, MN 55101

(651) 757-1010

liz.kramer@ag.state.mn.us

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

State of Minnesota

March 2, 2026

D.C. Common Cause is further removed still. The District of

Columbia is a federal creation, not a political subdivision of a State

exercising reserved state authority. D.C. Common Cause, 858 F.2d

at 6. The D.C. Circuit therefore did not confront the federalism

concerns that limit taxpayer standing in suits challenging state or

municipal fiscal decisions.

22

ADDITIONAL AMICI STATES

K ristin K. M ayes

Attorney General

State of Arizona

2005 North Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

A nne E. Lopez

Attorney General

State of Hawai‘i

425 Queen Street

Honolulu, HI 96813

Dana Nessel

Attorney General

State of Michigan

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, MI 48909

A aron D. Ford

Attorney General

State of Nevada

100 North Carson Street

Carson City, NV 89701

Charity R. Clark

Attorney General

State of Vermont

109 State Street

Montpelier, VT 05609

John B. McCuskey

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

1900 Kanawha Boulevard

East Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305