Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Hadsell, Petitioner v. Catherine Isham
Supreme Court briefNov 12, 2025
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Jn the Supreme Court of the United States
of PLR 2 No
IN RE ESTATE OF CHARLES HADSELL,
Deceased,
CHRISTOPHER HADSELL,
Petitioner,
-y-
CATHERINE ISHAM,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
o
Service on States’ and Territories’ Attorneys General
Sd
Christopher Hadsell
Petitioner In Propria Persona
9000 Crow Canyon Rd., S-399,
Danville, CA 94506
@ (925) 482-6502 e CJHadsellLaw@gmail.com
————
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Are States’ Vexatious-Litigant Law (“States’ VL
Law”), and specifically, California’s Vexatious-
Litigant Law (“CA VL Law’, Cal. Code Civ. Proc.?
§§391-391.8), unconstitutional facially because they
do not involve an actual, compelling state interest, or
are not narrowly tailored?
2. Are States’ VL Law, and specifically CA VL Law,
unconstitutional as applied?
3. Is the Supreme Court of the United States’
(SCOTUS”) writ of certiorari process (“Writ
Process”) unconstitutional facially because it violates:
i) U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 2 (“Congressional
Regulation of SCOTUS’), or ii) U.S. Const. amend. |
(“1st Amend.”).
4. Is SCOTUS’ Writ Process unconstitutional as
applied?
1 “States” includes the 50 States, D.C., and the 5 inhabited U.S.
Territories.
2 Subsequent references to the Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. will be
designated “CCP”.
i
Il. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Christopher Hadsell (“Hadsell”). He
was:
Petitioner in the Superior Court of California,
Contra Costa County (“Trial Court’).
Appellant in the Court of Appeal of the State of
California, First Appellate District, No Division
Assigned, (“1DCA”).
Petitioner in the Supreme Court of California
(“Cal. Sup. Ct.”).
Respondent is Catherine Isham (fka Porter, Howard,
Hadsell, “Isham”), real party in interest. Isham was:
Respondent in the Trial Court.
Respondent in the 1DCA.
Respondent in the Cal. Sup. Ct.
ill
III. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............:::eeeeeeeeees i
II. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ................. i
III. TABLE OF CONTENTS ...........:eeeeceeeeseeeeees il
IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIEG..............:::eeceees vii
V. JUDGMENTS BELOW. ............ccceseeeeeeeeeennees 1
VI. JURISDICTION ivwvsssssssssccecssssencccsevessasssscaves 1
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS ........:ccccseeceesseeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeesenes 1
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........000cceeeeeeee 2
A. INTRODUCTION scvssssesassacsnsoacenneneonassensersennonrsonase 2
1. Access to the Courts is The People’s Most
Precious Judiciary Right ............:::sseeeeeeeees 2
2. States’ VL Law Is Unconstitutional............ 3
3. Constitutional Checks and Balances.......... 5
4, SCOTUS’ Writ Process...........sccceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 6
B. THIS COURT HAS IDENTIFIED FOUR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS ESSENTIAL TO THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY AND JUSTICE .........0scesereeeeee 9
1. The Four Fundamental Rights Cannot Be
Abridged ..............cccsecceeeesereerrereaeseeenennens 10
lv
2. Notwithstanding No Abridgement,
Legislatures Can Prohibit Abuses That
Arise from The Four Fundamental Rights 11
C. THIS CASE IS THE POSTER CHILD FOR THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CA VL LAW ..........0000e5 11
1. CAVLLaw’s History Provides the
Necessary Context for Constitutionality
AmallySis..........:cccccsssssssceeeseeeeseeneneaneseenens 12
2. CAVL Law Is Unconstitutional Facially ... 20
Applied .....sccesseccersccsessnssdesessreseesssvesscons» 29
D. CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND BALANCES ...........++ 39
E. SCOTUS’ WRIT PROCESS ..........csscssecsecveseeseserees Al
IX. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 44
A. WHEN TYRANNICAL STATES OBLITERATE
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
ADDITIONAL LAWS GOVERN GRANTING CERT ......... 44
B. THEISSUES ARE IMPORTANT AND RECURRING......... 45
X. CONCLUSION... ..ssroreccecccerrerecerenssssesssescesa 45
APPENDICES
Court Opinions:
Appendix A
Cal. Sup. Ct.: Judgment (8/13/25) ........ccssccceeseereeeeees la
1DCA: Judgment (5/6/25) .....cccccssscseceressssssereeeeseneees 2a
1LDCA: Judgment (5/6/25) ssisnsssssssscssesesseoncovennsoeressone 3a
1LDCA: Judgment (4/17/25) .......ccccseeceeseeseeeeeseeeeeeeens 4a
Constitutional Provisions/Statutes:
Appendix B
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
Involved in this Case ..........cccsssccseeeeeeeeesrereereeereeeetens Ta
States’ VL Law:
AYUZONA ooo secccecesesssseeseessssneeeseseesenscenecescesensenpanseeeeseesens 9a
California sseressoseescoovassveoenceropnevseneencenseesensenssersoncessees lla
PIOvICA’ . sciaveisannsnnsaacuacinacdacnssyeskocstsvnuhenoubaasemssbaseseeneneens 16a
Hawaiil...........01.0000steesvesdeuasnseusscadasnssneennnansnomawensorens 21a
TL GIAUTO ressesasscossnarmcmncecnennernmmcmoicg ae ea emnteanst 26a
TOW diensneornvenenesesnasenconenensindcanepadsvesdesese weuassemibeseseeasatiens 30a
Michigan .gisscssissensaseswaceancavansiesesstvcsiaswercecsassonsssues 30a
Mil NCS 6 tateswesswexcocowavsncssnanweceansevsaecsnnennronsyererteneonunts 33a
vi
Nevada...ccccccscccccssssstscssnsecescostecceneeseeeeesseneneeeeseesegeens 34a
New Hampshire ........-ccossssssccsscnssscvsvesasessnertssdcossonas 37a
North Dakata ........ccccssssccscccccesseccesersceeeveseesseseeereveee 38a
Northern Mariana Islands............ccesssseseeeeeeeeeeeees 40a
ON I0.........01:000000- cagnnannavensleniinapnaugeneegnens teasubpnnlasedeoeeas 46a
Pennsylvania ........scccsscescsssvessecesssesesstnecsseneesneesreraes 53a
TOXAS sisscsvsiunsasswasnnwnseasnnsenaanaweoanekermenenmenemnnnnnxsennes 54a
Utah ssaavecorannonsenseverennnnvenensonenyysnnagienaooass (wed uasasd oss ises 59a
EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1
Newspaper Bibliography .........c:sscceeesessseseereeeeenes 66a
Exhibit 2
California Senate Calendar ........ccccccccccseeeesesseneees 78a
Exhibit 3
Reporter’s Transcript 4/28/16 Excerpt .........0s00 79a
Exhibit 4
Judge Mockler Reversal Examples .........:.:ceees 80a
vil
IV.TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB (2002)
536 U.S. 516. .nnissssavenusenscesnuyatacevsnsuesactesesetscevececaasss 21
Bill Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB (1983)
AGB1 U.S. 731........cccccsseeesasipanaabiepeseeatarenccansererones 9, 25
Boddie v. Connecticut (1971)
AOL U.S. 371. céssisssissecacsesseccatassssecsassavenveansoeesveccvnes 26
Bounds v. Smith (1977)
430 U.S. 817... ccccecccsseccctseeestevarceeneescesspecssaanerecauess 25
Christopher v. Harbury (2002)
B36 U.S. 4038.........ccscsesscccsssssrrssossssneesssoeennseseerenseeees 9
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center
(1985)
AT3 U.S. 482... ..cccssccccsssssceccessssseecerssessenesensneessssaneees 22
Cruz v. Beto (1972)
AOB U.S. B19... cceccccnesereeeeenseseeensctenenscessesseecneenes 21
De Jonge v. Oregon (1937)
299 U.S. 3538... ..cc.sssssebdsesenaviewennacensus.. 9, 10, 11, 41
Difani v. Riverside County Oil Co. (1927)
201 Cal. 21 Ossvccssssussusesevevesescasssssvssvivennseiesasccsavevens 36
Goldberg v. Kelly (1970)
397 U.S. 254.... .ccrssscessussswcnwesswscawnvessamennes 8, 22, 30, 45
Griffin v. Illinois (1956)
BBL U.S. 12. ccccccccccsscceneesanenenessseesateneesceesseneeeanees 26
In Re Thomas Schmidt (2025)
No. SCPW-24-Q000356 .....cccovscsovecccnereccncracerseecens 38
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Mun. Employees, Council 31 (2018)
138 S.Ct. 2448.........ccccccsssseeeetinaioniasbasuacsssuvasenaussvess 26
vill
John v. Superior Court (2016)
63 Cal Ath 91 6.........csscccssccssceccssvseecnnescesseneceneeess 22, 35
Johnson v. California (2005)
BAS U.S. 499 ......cccsccsscescesevscccasovceesuscosscceeedeseeseseeess 25
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America (1994)
511 U.S. 375. ...... sescgessscstessastestectenssavansscevecassisewsess 42
Lefebvre v. Southern California Edison (2016)
244 Cal. App.4th 148 oc eesseeeeseerreeeeteeeneenenes 36
Los Angeles v. Morgan (1951)
105 Cal. App.2d. 726 .......ccccsccsssseeceseseeseeeereeteresenes 33
Marlow v. Campbell (1992)
T Cal. App.4th 921 ssiusssessesoneoasessovesnnooresneecennmnnones 36
Nelson v. Tucker Ellis LLP (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 827
Spee cesar rarer gonna NEnoINe-comeLco asta these terteaees 34
Parker v. Bowron (1953)
AO Cal 2d 844.0... cceccceseccnseereeseeesersscuenecseeeeesensenees 36
People v. Lind (2014)
230 Cal. App.Ath 709 ......cccsssssrsessesstveeracseosscnesees 30
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (1978)
ABB U.S. 265.......ccsccssascevseceverncesccacecectonccsscsvecesssssers 25
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1923)
263 U.S. 4138 ........ccceeececsvasectasesenceasacensscaesvecwessewssves 42
Speiser v. Randall (1958)
B57 ULS, 518 wc ecccscctsscccnececeeecesecnssesaseosctseneneeseaees 10
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005)
35 Cal. 4th 180 vu... ccccsesecseeeeveneeeesneeesaneeseerees 33, 36
Statutes
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5109...........ccssssosovesegnesssesenssesoeses 39
2B U.S.C. §1257 ccssccccrerosescnorevcssvergecesovecessceronsorensoansss 42
DS U.S.C. §1257(a) seseccssssssessssesssesssecsuecssecsnseseensenneensees 1
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§170.4(a)(1) to (6) .cccececeeeeeeee 30
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§391(b)(1)-(5) ....ceccceseseceeeeeeeeees 20
ix
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§391-391.8...1, 11, 12, 13, 19, 20,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 35
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §10138...........cceeseeseeeeereeseerenerenens 30
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1088.......cccesssesrereeeeeeetesetenees 26
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §128.d.wsisssicsssssussacacsssossneovnsasonnns 26
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §170......... ce eceecsseeseserecreeesesenenees 37
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1 70.1 ......ccceeceeeseceeseveverenseneeas 30
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §170.8(d) ......ccsceccsceceeeseeseeeeeeees 30
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §170.5(f) .......eceescsesescesveceeseeeeees 37
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391(D)(1) uu... ee eeeceesserreeeeeee 20, 27
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §891(0D)(5) ...... ce cccccsccesceseestneeeeees 21
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391(C)...cccecccesessesnenneeeeeeees 24, 32
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §891.3(8) ....ccccccssercseeeeeeserreeeeeees 32
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391.4........ccscccseeeeeeeeeeeeesereeneees 24
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §391.7(a) ......sccsesseerreeeees 22, 23, 28
Cal. Const. art. VI, §14......... ce eesseseeseeeeeseeseesereeereees 37
Cal. Const. art. VI, §2......sssssessisscconcssveisersssvonssossaaesis 37
Cal. Elec. Code §13109(4)........ccesssseeeeerteeeeeeretnnes 23
Cal. Gov. Code §§68200-68202 ........::cssceeceeeeereetereee 23
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826., 41
Haw. Rev. Stat. §634d-Lissscscccsccssscsnsssscccssevereeseessseees 38
Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936 ......ccceeseeeeeeees 42
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, 102 Stat.
66 QD csccrrssnccsaccsscineupeueneisivenessteaxcanssnsacssweseasserecnunssene 42
U.S. Const. ccsccvssisansiasscasmenssescsesstanastaaseretecnerencrnneacs 44
U.S. Const. amend. I..............06 i, 9, 10, 25, 26, 41, 44
U.S. Const. amend. V ......ccesesessseecsesssrseseerenneeneeeeeeennens 9
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ......ccecececeeeeeeeeeeee 9, 10, 21, 22
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18 .......cssssssssssssassnanecnnsaneees 40
U.S. Const. art. TIT, §2, cl. 2 voc. cccesccssseeeeeeeeees 1, 41, 42
U.S. Const. art. IV, §2, cl. 1 ....ccssssisvsssossscsssntsaceetsoceess 9
Other Authorities
A Few Good Men (Castle Rock Entertainment 1992)
sibccndidav sSEGAIN TRENCH ONES WeaRUsaERNa sa eVRUANNS TeareNEAKMRNEAN TIER EKOND EES 32
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ET AL., THE FEDERALIST (‘The
Easton Press ed. 1979) (10/27/1787—4/2/1788) ....40
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)... eee 12
Born Yesterday (Buena Vista Pictures 1993)........... 12
Final Senate History (19638) ........ccceecesesssesseseeeeeeenenes 19
Judicial Council of California, 2015-2024 Court
Statistics Reports (2015-2024) oo... eee Ol
Judicial Council of California, 2022 Court Statistics
Report (2022)....jssseisssivenssaconisscvrcavevnanvensrarevesssevsss 27
Lee W. Rawles, The California Vexatious Litigant
Statute: A Viable Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever
Obstructionists Access? (1998)
72 So.Cal. L. Rev. 275....ssssoscssasicnswstassesacswaccsassunewbs 13
Oxford English Dictionary 1190 (2d ed., CD-ROM
VEL. 4.0) rsrrerorasnnassssviendsrsseaasddedbovessacseusishavounadineersvees 27
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION, THE PEOPLE DEBATE
THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788.......ccccccseeseseseeeeeeees 40
Staff Writer, Mosk Criticized, Ukiah Daily Journal,
Sep. 25, 1962, 1 sivsisseawcssesasesccvewinsswanssreeceessvsanvesses 17
U.S. Department of Transportation
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/50intersta
te2.cfm (last visited February 19, 2024)........... 14
U.S. Inflation Calculator
https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited
February 19, 2024)................-sssaseseadaboceesnvereaceceetes 15
V. JUDGMENTS BELOW
The Cal. Sup. Ct.’s judgment is reproduced as follows:
Judgment (8/13/25) ....sscscscscccceccseeeerersrerecesssesrersees la.
Estate of Estate of Hadsell (Aug. 13, 2025, No.
$290917)__Cal.5th__.
The 1DCA’s judgments are reproduced as follows:
Judgment (5/6/25) ..ssssssssscssesesesssssesssneeessnecenneeeesneeees 2a.
Judgment (5/6/25) csscsesssssecsscssssesecseessueeesneeesneeesee 3a.
Judgment (4/17/25) ..essssssssssssesssscsssnecesnecsnuteessnesen da.
VI.JURISDICTION
On 8/13/25, the Cal. Sup. Ct. issued its Judgment
(8/13/25).
This Court’s jurisdiction is timely invoked under 28
U.S.C. §1257(a).
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
Relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are
at 7a et seq.
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. INTRODUCTION
1. ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS THE
PEOPLE’S MOST PRECIOUS JUDICIARY RIGHT
This Court identifies four fundamental rights as
essential to the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions: i) freedom of speech, ii) freedom of the
press, iii) peaceable assembly, and iv) redress of
grievances, (“Four Fundamental Rights”). This Court
recognizes that “redress of grievances” includes “the
right of access to the courts”.
This Court has held that the Four Fundamental
Rights cannot be abridged by legislatures.
Notwithstanding, because exercising these inviolable
rights can result in abuses, the legislatures, can, and
should, prohibit such abuses.
Thus, there is a bright-line rule between abridging the
Four Fundamental Rights (unconstitutional), and
prohibiting abuses that arise from the exercise of the
rights (constitutional).
This case is the poster child for when state
legislatures have unconstitutionally abridged the
right of access to the courts.
2. STATES’ VL LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
States’ VL Law comprises four major concepts:
e Vexatious Litigant (“VL”) definition;
e Inapplicable to defendants;
e Absent prior-court approval, VLs are banned
for life from access to the court;
e If allowed access, VLs must post security equal
to the opposing party’s predicted costs
(including attorney’s fees);
o If a VL loses his/her cause, the security is
forfeited to the opposing party; or
o A VUs cause is dismissed if the security is
not posted.
This case arises in California, so will focus primarily
upon CA VL Law. That presents no problem because:
e CAVL Law includes all four major VL concepts;
e California implemented VL Law _ first;
therefore,
e All subsequent states adopted some or all of
California’s concepts, typically verbatim; thus
e If CA VL Law’s quicksand foundation fails, so
does every other state’s VL Law; and
e Numerous examples from other states’ failures
are also provided.
Regarding a facial challenge, CA VL Law:
Thus,
Abridges the right to access courts;
There is no actual, compelling state interest;
and
It is not narrowly tailored.
CA VL Law cannot survive the strict scrutiny
standard applicable to laws that infringe fundamental
rights.
Regarding an as-applied challenge:
It is undisputed that Hadsell has never violated
any CA VL Law;
Yet, it is undisputed that a judge, without
subject matter jurisdiction (“SMJ”)—therefore,
her actions were ultra vires, and legal
nullities—illegally placed him on the California
Vexatious Litigant List (“CA VL List’);
The Law of the Case is that Hadsell is the
“defendant” in these proceedings, and CA VL
Law doesn’t apply to defendants;
Yet, 1DCA refused to file Hadsell’s appeal solely
because his name illegally appears on the CA
VL List;
And when 10 Concerned Citizens filed motions
with the Cal. Sup. Ct. that required the court to
resolve the CA VL Law issues;
e The Cal. Sup. Ct. refused to file the 10-
Concerned-Citizens’ motions; thereby keeping
its record intact for refusing to address the
constitutionality of CA VL Law’s preventing
access to the court;
e Ofthe 227 VLapplications to file a pleading, the
Cal. Sup. Ct. has granted none.
Thus, CA VL Law cannot survive an as-applied
constitutional challenge because:
e There is no valid court order making Hadsell
subject to CA VL Law;
e He is a “defendant”; thus, CA VL Law is
inapplicable;
e Although required by law to file, and
adjudicate, the 10-Concerned-Citizens motions
regarding CA VL Law, the court refused; and
e The Cal. Sup. Ct. has never granted a VL
application to file a pleading.
The facial, and as-applied, challenges to CA VL Law
equally apply to other states’ VL Law, and significant
non-Californian examples are provided.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS AND
BALANCES
Power checks power. That is the Constitutional
lifeblood behind how “checks and balances” prevent
government tyranny.
In addition to the checks and balances within
government (viz., among the three branches of
government), checks and balances also exist between
governments (viz., the federal and _ states’
governments).
Thus, as required by the U.S. Constitution, and each
justice’s two Oaths of Office to “support and defend”
and “bear true faith and allegiance” to the
Constitution, this Court is required to resolve the
unconstitutionality of the States’ VL Law—especially
since, despite numerous opportunities, all the States’
highest courts have refused to address it.
4. SCOTUS’ WRIT PROCESS
The Constitution establishes SCOTUS’ appellate
jurisdiction and Congress’ power to regulate SCOTUS’
appellate jurisdiction. However, as with all
enumerated powers, Congress’ power is circumscribed
by the Constitution.
Here, Congress’ power is limited to creating
“Exceptions” to SCOTUS’ appellate jurisdiction. And
no such “exception” can include abridging The People’s
right to redress of grievances.
Here, Congress not only passed statutes abridging
The People’s right to access a federal court to redress
an unconstitutional-state-court judgment (unconstitutional facially), but in combination with SCOTUS
case law, the statutes make SCOTUS’ appellate
jurisdiction entirely discretionary for unconstitutional-state-court judgments, and likewise for
federal-court review except for three-judge-district-
court judgments. Thus, in combination, Congress and
SCOTUS eliminated the only opportunity a person
has to invoke a federal court’s power to check the
states’ tyrannical power of eliminating access to state
courts.
In the 2023 term, SCOTUS ’ “discretion” resulted in 60
out of 4,223 cases (1.4%) being granted cert. For all
practical purposes, that is elimination of review and
therefore, unconstitutional facially.
Assuming arguendo that eliminating 98.6% of all
cases from SCOTUS’ review isn't effectively
elimination rather than an “exception”, of the 60 cases
granted cert, each case involved one or more of the
following highly placed government employees:
e Current Solicitor General (“SG”) employees.
e Former SG employees.
e Former SCOTUS law clerks.
e Current State Attorneys General.
Lest one think that a former SCOTUS law clerk is not
“highly placed”: i) not a single word of a cert gets read
by a justice until it has first been approved by the law
clerks; ii) for more than the last 20 years, all but 1 of
the last 8 SGs was a SCOTUS law clerk; iii) 6 of the
current 9 justices were SCOTUS law clerks; iv) 56 of
the 60 cases involved at least one former SCOTUS law
clerk; and vi) a total of 151 former SCOTUS law clerks
were involved with the 60 cases.
While having a highly placed government employee
doesn’t guarantee cert being granted, what is true, is
that not a single cert was granted without one, and
not a single civilian-only cert was granted.
Therefore, by shutting out civilians, SCOTUS’ Writ
Process was unconstitutional as-applied.
Because four VL-Law states are populous states,
about 150 million Americans have the Sword of
Damocles hanging over their heads regarding access
to the courts. Nine of 16 states maintain a VL List.
They list about 4,000 Americans who are banned for
life from access to the courts. None of them deserved
to be banned when the courts have a plethora of tools
to manage bad actors: summary judgment; sanctions;
penalties; awards of attorney’s fees and court costs;
malicious prosecution; and contempt of court. While
many deserve punishment, many others have violated
no law, yet have been deprived of their most precious
judiciary right.
This Court should find that situation intolerable—
especially when it occurs, as here, without due process
of law because throughout these proceedings, in
violation of Goldberg, 267, not a single hearing was
held on any application to file a pleading, yet Hadsell
has been denied his fundamental rights when he has
not violated any law.
For these reasons, this case is certworthy and Hadsell
prays that the Court grants certiorari.
B. THIS COURT HAS IDENTIFIED FOUR
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ESSENTIAL TO
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
LIBERTY AND JUSTICE
The 1st Amend. lists the Four Fundamental Rights: 1)
freedom of speech, ii) freedom of the press, iil)
peaceable assembly, and iv) redress of grievances.
This Court stated (De Jonge v. Ore 1937) 299 U.S.
353, 364, emphasis added):
Freedom of speech and of the press are
fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. [Citations.] The right of
peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of
free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental. As this Court said in United States v.
Cruikshank...: “The very idea of a government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in
respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress
of grievances.”
This Court recognizes that “redress of grievances”
includes “the right of access to the courts”, Bill
Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB (1983) 461 U.S. 731, 7413;
and that the lst Amend., is applicable to the states,
[see Speiser_v. Randall (1958) 357 U.S. 513, 530
3 As stated in Christopher v. Harbury (2002) 536 U.S. 403, 415,
fn. 12, besides the 1st Amend., this Court has grounded “the right
of access to courts” in the Privileges and Immunities Clause (U.S.
Const. art. IV, §2, cl. 1), the Sth Amend,, and the 14th Amend,
10
(concurring) where Justice Black collects 15 of this
Court’s cases where the 14th Amend. makes the 1st
Amend., “applicable in all its particulars to the
States.”
Access to the courts is the sine qua non to The People’s
access to the judiciary—civilization’s refuge from:
vigilantism, might makes right, and mob rule.
Therefore, it is The People’s most precious judiciary
right.
1. THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
CANNOT BE ABRIDGED
Immediately following the first De Jonge quote supra,
this Court states (De Jonge, 364, emphasis added):
The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution
expressly guarantees that right against abridgment
by Congress. But explicit mention there does not
argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that
ented it iolati
fund [orincipies of Ii 1 facts hicl
lie at the base of all civil and political institutions, —
principles which the Fourteenth Amendment
embodies in the general terms of its due process
clause. [Citations.]
Thus, no legislature can abridge the Four
Fundamental Rights.
11
2. NOTWITHSTANDING NO
ABRIDGEMENT, LEGISLATURES CAN
PROHIBIT ABUSES THAT ARISE FROM THE
FOUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Despite an absolute prohibition against abridging the
Four Fundamental Rights, any abuse from exercising
the rights can, and should be, prohibited.
Immediately following the second De Jonge quote
supra, this Court states (De Jonge, 364-365, emphasis
added):
These rights may be abused... to incite to violence
and crime. The people through their legislatures
may protect themselves against that abuse. But the
legislative intervention can find constitutional
justification only by dealing with the abuse. The
rights themselves must not be curtailed.
Thus, there is a bright-line rule between abridging the
Four Fundamental Rights (unconstitutional) and
prohibiting abuses that arise from the exercise of the
rights (constitutional).
C. THIS CASE IS THE POSTER CHILD
FOR THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CA VL LAW
Regarding a facial challenge, CA VL Law: i)
abridges/curtails the right to access courts, 1i) is not
narrowly tailored, and ili) there is no actual,
compelling state interest.
Regarding an as-applied challenge, the undisputed
facts are: i) the law of the case is that Hadsell is the
12
defendant in these matters—thus, CA VL Law is
inapplicable, ii) Hadsell has never violated any CA VL
Law, and iii) a rogue trial judge, with no SMJ, illegally
placed Hadsell on the CA VL List. Other than the one
1DCA instance holding Hadsell is the defendant in
these matters, not a single California court judgment
has acknowledged any of these facts. Instead, it has
ignored the facts and used boilerplate as pretext to
deny Hadsell access to the courts.
1. CAVL LAW’S HISTORY PROVIDES THE
NECESSARY CONTEXT FOR
CONSTITUTIONALITY ANALYSIS
a. The False History
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines
common knowledge as, “A fact that is so widely known
that a court may accept it as true without proof.”
There is no time to fully research everything. So,
common knowledge is a wonderful thing—except
when it’s wrong, as it is here.
An entertaining film, Born Yesterday (Buena Vista
Pictures 1993), starred Melanie Griffith as Billie
Dawn, John Goodman as Harry Brock, and Don
Johnson as Paul Verrall.
Harry is a wealthy businessman who takes beautiful
Billie on an extended business trip to Washington D.C.
where she promptly embarrasses Harry socially
13
because she’s uneducated. Harry hires Paul* to
“smarten her up”. And boy does he. Billie proceeds to
charmingly skewer the wealthy, well-educated, elite of
Washington D.C. when the newly educated Billie
enlightens the Washington elites that the common
knowledge (that they take for granted) is wrong.
That is exactly the situation here.
Read any California court opinion, treatise, or article,
they all say the same wrong thing: CA VL Law was
enacted to stop the “clogging” of courts with VLs. Not
only is that light years away from the actual, sordid
truth, but, as discussed infra (p. 27), it is
mathematically impossible to be true. Additionally,
discussed infra (p. 19), no factual support has been
found in any history—legislative or otherwise. The
only case-law reference is to Lee W. Rawles, The
California Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable
Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever Obstructionists
Access? (1998) 72 So.Cal. L.Rev. 275. Yet, the article
itself states that there is a, “[T]otal absence of studies
specifically tracking vexatious behavior...”, id. 310, fn
20.
b. The Actual History
CA VL Law was enacted on 7/13/63. This was right in
the midst of what the U.S. Department of
Transportation calls, “The Greatest Decade 1956-
1966” for building the Interstate Highways,
4 His last name, Verrall being a play on the Latin veritas (truth)
meaning his character is all truth.
14
US. Department of Transportation,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/50interstate
2.cfm (last visited February 19, 2024).
Unfortunately, with massive funding, comes massive
corruption (id., emphasis added):
[T]he press regularly repeated tales of alleged
corruption and bungling that the former President
[Eisenhower] considered “almost hair-raising.” A
sympathetic article in The Cincinnati Enquirer for
July 3, 1960, summarized the criticism:
Now critics are proclaiming it “our great big
highway bungle,” a “nightmare,” a “rat hole” of
waste and extravagance, and a scandal of such
potential that Teapot Dome [a scandal during the
early 1920s] will be peanuts by comparison.
Mendocino County was so rife with government
corruption that it had a standing, annual, grand jury
for government corruption. (See Exhibit 1,
“Newspaper Bibliography’, p. 66a for newspaper
articles regarding the history.)
The political weaponizing of the grand jury into the
“Warrant War” ostensibly began with Deputy Robert
Morton (“Morton”). However, given Morton’s
involvement with County Supervisor Oscar Klee
(“Klee”) and Judges Glenn Evans (“Evans”) and
5 There is nothing new under the sun. Weaponizing government
is as old as Ancient Rome with Cicero v. Cataline, and as current
as President Trump, and President Biden, and his son, Hunter
Biden.
15
Maurice Tindall (“Tindall”) within the Volunteers for
Good Government organization (“VGG’), this history
properly begins with Klee.
Prior to becoming County Supervisor, Klee was a
judge. He requested law books for his office totaling
$720 [about $7,200 today, U.S. Inflation Calulator,
https://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited
February 19, 2024)]. His books arrived, but his pay
was docked the $720 to pay for them (from his $2,277
annual salary). This began political bickering that
escalated into Klee being indicted twice by the grand
jury—the most serious being for six counts of
misappropriation of funds totaling $50.85. Even at
$500 today, it’s a trivial amount.
Thus, the issue wasn’t becoming wealthy at the
government’s trough, it was the penalty of legal
defense fees and potential imprisonment.
Fortunately for Klee, he was acquitted both times, and
a legal defense fund covered his legal fees.
But, he also fought back. At the 1/17/62 Annual Grand
Jury meeting with the Board of Supervisors, Klee
introduced a letter accusing DA Frank Petersen
(“Petersen”) of “aiding and abetting the board of
supervisors and the county road department in
wasting a million dollars of the taxpayers' money.”6
6 Nothing much came of the charges—especially after Road
Commissioner, Walter Severance, after 34 years of service, had
his three-sentence resignation letter (viz., Mr. Severance’s
16
These and other Klee travails were certainly impetus
for his involvement in VGG.
This is where Morton and VGG intersect.
1962 was an election year. Sherriff-Coroner Reno
Bartolomie (“Bartolomie”) was up for re-election.
Morton found a hand-written list with his name, along
with four other deputies’ names. Morton confronted
Bartolomie stating that the deputies on the list were
to be fired if Bartolomie won re-election.
Morton’s suspicion about being fired was because he
had been making noises that Bartolomie was not
running a good ship by, inter alia: i) failing to serve an
arrest warrant on a suspected wife-beater, ii) failing
to report embezzlement in his office by an employee,
and iii) failing to arrest teenagers drinking alcohol.
Morton’s concerns ended up being well founded for at
least the first two concerns since: i) the suspected
wife-beater was later convicted and his marriage
annulled, and ii) Bartolomie’s employee indeed
admitted to embezzling about $300, or $3,000 today.
In a public display, during an election year, Morton
and the four other sheriffs on the list resigned en
masse at a public County Supervisor’s meeting at
which Bartolomie was speaking.
severance letter) read to the Board of Supervisors by the clerk in
his absence while he was on vacation.
17
Morton then unsuccessfully approached Petersen to
indict Bartolomie.
Unsuccessful with Petersen, and likely spurred on by
his friends at VGG, Morton utilized an obscure law
where a judge can issue a warrant based upon a
complaint from a private citizen.
Morton was unsuccessful with two judges, but with
Judges Evans and Tindall (members of VGG) he was
successful in obtaining about 50 arrest warrants for
Bartolomie, Petersen, and a few others.
Amongst this flurry of warrants, Petersen, as the
sitting DA, was humiliated by being arrested, and
booked, on four separate occasions.
Notwithstanding, obtaining the warrants resulted in
a debacle.
Based upon Attorney General Stanley Mosk’s (“Mosk’”,
later, Cal. Sup. Ct., Associate Justice) public
statements about the warrants, and an affidavit from
Klee, Tindall issued a summons for an order to show
cause why Mosk shouldn’t be held in contempt of
court.”
This was a bridge too far. Mosk not only put aside his
state duties to insert himself into Mendocino county’s
7 Judge Comstock dismissed the contempt charge, however, he
admonished Mosk stating, “ ‘If Mosk’s remarks had been made in
court he would have been liable for contempt.’ ”, Staff Writer,
Mosk Criticized, Ukiah Daily Journal, Sep. 25, 1962, 1.
18
affairs to win a successful motion to have Tindall
disqualified from his case, he continued beyond his
case to have all charges stemming from any of the
warrants dropped, and then he convened a special
session of the Mendocino grand jury® that indicted
Evans, Morton, Ms. Shon Salisbury®, and Tindall.
All four were found guilty. The sentences were: i) Ms.
Salisbury received 30 days in jail; ii) Evans and
Tindall both received 5-years’ probation and fined
$2,000 and $4,000, respectively ($20,000 and $40,000
today), both lost their judgeships; and ii) Morton
received 5-years’ prison probation and one year in
county jail.
But this sordid, political mess doesn’t end here. As an
election year, Petersen became the newly elected,
first-time, and single-term, State Senator.
8 A rare exercise of AG powers.
® Strangely enough, the former wife of the convicted wife-beater,
the homeowner where the teenage drinking occurred, and
girl-Friday for VGG; the last item being the offense for her
indictment.
10 On 7/30/63, the Anderson Valley Advertiser ran a cartoon that
seemed to capture the moment of Mosk’s involvement in local
county affairs. It depicted a California Penal Code book wearing
a pirate’s eye patch with the line, “Must it be hidden behind a
Mosk?”
[OCR skipped on page(s) 31-58]
[Read from a scan; the first 30 pages.]
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.