Opposition Brief — Delco LLC, dba Delco Products, Petitioner v. Leviathan Group LLC

No. 25-88

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

DELCO LLC, DBA DELCO PRODUCTS,

Petitioner,

v.

LEVIATHAN GROUP LLC,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Kulwant Singh Boora

Counsel of Record

The Boora Law Group PLC

8110 Lewis Avenue, Suite B

Temperance, MI 48182

(734) 790-3909

booralaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Respondent

131612

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

i

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented are very simple. The

Petitioner Delco LLC (“Delco”) entered into a contract

with the Respondent, Leviathan Group LLC (“Leviathan”)

in which Leviathan provided marketing services to Delco

(collectively the “Parties”). Before signing the contract,

and as part of contract negotiations, the Parties agreed

that any and all disputes between them stemming from the

contract would be resolved by arbitration with a mutually

and collectively chosen arbitrator. Delco and Leviathan

agreed contractually when they signed the agreement that

the arbitrator’s authority to resolve the disputes between

them is sanctioned by the contractual provisions giving

the arbitrator the authority to resolve contract disputes

regarding deliverables and the award of attorney fees.

Delco therefore agreed to this contractual provision and

delegation of authority.

Following this, a contractual dispute arose between

the Parties, in which Delco breached the contract by not

making the contractually agreed payments to Leviathan

and Leviathan exercised the contractual right to file for

arbitration as agreed between the Parties. As litigation

ensured, Delco lost on all their counterclaims including

contractual deliverables and a Final Award was rendered

in Leviathan’s favor and one which also addressed attorney

fees. Delco disgruntled with the arbitrator’s result sought

to appeal the decision to vacate the arbitrator’s award

in the federal District Court and then appealed to Sixth

Circuit and lost on both occasions, not surprisingly given

the exceptionally high standard to vacate an arbitrator

award which Delco unfortunately could not meet and

ii

wanting the federal courts to revisit the merits of the

award. They now want this Court to vacate the award

which Leviathan is sure they will not do.

The questions presented by Delco L.L.C., the

Petitioner, are to be dismissed and the Petition denied

by this Court.

1.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not err by

not remanding the case to the District Court to

order Leviathan to provide all alleged outstanding

deliverables, which was already ruled upon by the

arbitrator in the Partial Final Award.

2.

The Sixth Circuit did not err by not remanding the

case to the District Court to order the invalidation of

the award of attorney fees, given that the arbitrator

followed Michigan law in awarding attorney fees

after a full hearing in July 2023 in which Delco

was informed via written communication from the

arbitrator that she would be following Michigan law

in considering attorney fees and which resulted in the

reduction of attorney fees after a full blown hearing.

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND

RELATED CASES

The Petitioner has stated the Parties correctly in this

matter.

iv

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, Respondent,

LEVIATHAN GROUP LLC states that it has no parent

corporation and that no publicly held company owns 10%

or more of its stock.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS

PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PA RTIES TO THE PROCEEDING A ND

RELATED CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT . . . . . . . iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

DELCO’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

IS MISPLACED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT . . . . . . . . . . . 8

A. The Sixth Circuit Did Not Err by Not

Including Delco’s award of deliverables

that was not included in the arbitration

award—Simply put Delco seeks to relitigate

the merits of the award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

vi

Table of Contents

Page

B. T he Si x th Ci rcu it and the Dist r ict

Court did not err by not invalidating the

arbitrator’s award for attorney fees . . . . . . . . . . 19

C. The District Court did not err by not vacating

the arbitration award that did not depart

from the essence of the contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

vii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers,

531 U.S. 57, 148 L. Ed. 2d 354, 121 S. Ct. 462 (2000) . . . 12

First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,

514 U.S. 938 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Golden Brands, LLC v. Castle Cheese, Inc.,

110 F App’x 666 (CA 6, 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Green v. Ameritech Corp.,

200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,

552 U.S. 576 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 18, 25-27

Jefferies LLC v. Gegenheimer,

849 F App’x 16 (2nd Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey,

532 U.S. 504; 121 S. Ct. 1724; 149 L. Ed. 2d 740

(2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 12, 18, 24, 26

Murray v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.,

511 F App’x 453 (CA 6, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Nathan v. Fieger & Fieger, PC (In re Romanzi),

31 F.4th 367 (CA 6, 2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

viii

Cited Authorities

Page

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,

569 U.S. 564 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10, 14, 17, 18, 24-26

Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc.,

484 U.S. 29, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 108 S. Ct. 364

(1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13, 19, 24

Physicians Ins. Capital v.

Praesidium Alliance Group,

562 F App’x 421 (CA 6, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp.,

427 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Solvay Pharms, Inc. v. Duramed Pharms., Inc.,

442 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,

363 U.S. 564, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403, 80 S. Ct. 1343

(1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13

T.Co. Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc.,

592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc.,

484 U.S. 29, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987) . . 27

United States Trinity Energy Services, L.L.C. v.

Southeast Directional Drilling, L.L.C.,

No. 24-10833, 2025 WL 1218096

(5th Cir. April 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

ix

Cited Authorities

Page

United Steelworkers of America v.

Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,

363 U.S. 593; 80 S. Ct. 1358; 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424

(1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 27

Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v.

Universal Constructors Inc.,

304 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Wallace v. Buttar,

378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5

U.S. Const. amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Statutes, Rules and Regulations

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct MRPC

1.5(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1

INTRODUCTION

The Petitioner, Delco LLC (“Delco”) seeks to Petition

this Court to overturn, vacate and/or set aside an

arbitrator’s award by revisiting the merits of the award

that was in favor of Leviathan Group LLC (“Leviathan”).

The Petitioner, Delco freely entered into a contract with

Leviathan in November 2021 in which Leviathan provided

digital marketing services to Delco for a monthly fee. Delco

later in early February 2022 breached the contract and

ceased paying for services despite attempts by Leviathan

to settle the unpaid account. More importantly, Delco in

the contract for services with Leviathan, freely negotiated

and contractually agreed to bound by a collectively chosen

arbitrator in the event a dispute arose between the Parties

that would be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the

American Arbitration Associations (“AAA”) Commercial

Rules of Arbitration and procedures for dispute resolution.

The Parties contractually and collectively gave the

arbitrator the sole authority and delegated the authority

to the arbitrator to decide any contractual disputes with

regards to the legal claims and merits of such claims

regarding Delco’s contract deliverables and any related

breaches as between the Parties. A breach did occur as

stated by Delco who stopped paying for services and the

matter referred to arbitration.

Delco collectively in agreement with Leviathan,

thoughtfully chose a highly educated and highly

experienced arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute from

a list provided by American Arbitration Association

(“AAA”). The Parties engaged in extensive litigation

and after a full blown week trial in which evidence and

testimony was submitted and presented by the Parties,

2

including Delco’s counterclaims and legal claims of not

being provided the contract deliverables which they were

provided, the arbitrator issued a ‘Partial Final Award’ in

June of 2023 and then subsequently issued a ‘Final Award’

in August of 2023, in which attorney fees were adjusted

after a hearing in conformity with the Michigan Rules

of Professional Conduct and relevant law. Prior to the

hearing on costs and attorney fees, Delco was notified via

written communication from the arbitrator in July 2023

that the arbitrator would be applying Michigan law in

deciding attorney fees after scrutinizing bills and services

in accordance with Michigan law. Delco has never ever

disputed that they did not receive the communication from

the arbitrator that outlined in detail the factors that the

arbitrator was going to discuss that covered Michigan law,

the District Court Judge referred to this at the motion

hearing, but Delco decided to ignore it.

Furthermore, one of the sole contractual disputed

issues on the merits of Delco’s legal counterclaims was

that they did not receive contract deliverables, which

when fully litigated on the merits before the arbitrator.

The arbitrator clearly found that Delco was provided

contract deliverables based on the evidence and not

convinced of Delco’s legal claims and counterclaims on the

merits, unfortunate for Delco they regrettably lost on all

counterclaims with respect to their legal claims alleging

that they did not receive the benefit that they contracted

for, which was found to be untrue by the arbitrator,

who decided the issues on the merits of the claim after

extensive litigation and trial by two of Delco’s attorneys.

Delco being disgruntled with the arbitrator’s decision,

now seeks to relitigate, return, retry, revisit the merits of

the award and to convince this Court to turn a blind eye

3

to the exceptionally high standard that is required, which

Delco did not meet despite to prior appeals to overturn

an arbitrator’s decision. What is crucially important is

that this honorable Court has noted that vacating an

arbitrator’s award is very, very sparingly and scarcely

applied. More importantly, and to Delco’s detriment,

nowhere did Delco ever request a remand for clarification

of the arbitrator’s decision in the District Court, since

they are now appealing the District Court’s decision that

is void of any request for remand for clarification of an

arbitrator’s decision which is now moot before this Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit were unpublished, and the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,

which were noted in the Petitioner’s Writ and referred to

herein in this Brief in Opposition.

JURISDICTION

The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Delco after a flown

blown trial on the contractual issues and merits of its

counterclaims for deliverables against Levithan lost in

June 2023, which also included award of attorney’s fees

after a hearing on such costs and fees. Leviathan moved

to confirm the award in the 38th Circuit Court for the

County of Monroe, City of Monroe, State of Michigan.

Delco removed the case on diversity jurisdiction to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Michigan; Southern Division seeking to overturn

and vacate the arbitrator’s award. The District Court,

4

after reviewing all the evidence, case law and hearing

oral arguments from the Parties, clearly understood the

weakness of Delco’s arguments and Delco inability to

meet the high standard to vacate an arbitrator’s award

ruled in Leviathan’s favor affirming the arbitrators award.

Delco then filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit which

affirmed the District Court’s decision and issued like the

District Court, a very well-reasoned and well explained

legal opinion. On May 23, 2025, Delco filed a request for

extension of time which was granted to July 19, 2025 by

this Court, Leviathan also filed for an extension of time

to respond to the Delco’s Petition which was granted to

November 20, 2025 and it timely filed.

DELCO’S CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS IS MISPLACED

Delco’s misstates the law and its position. They now

claim, which they did not at the District Court level

or in the Sixth Circuit or even before the arbitrator

of any deprivation of due process rights under the 5th

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Nor did the

Petitioner, Delco even file any motion with the arbitrator

for reconsideration of her decision and clarification of her

decision which they should have or seek remand from the

District Court on that basis which is now moot. Delco

had the privilege as noted in the Partial Final Award

of a flown blown trial on litigating all contractual issues

relating to the contract at issue and contract deliverables.

The 5th Amendment is violated when Delco was not

given due process, but here they were clearly afforded

the opportunity to be heard and notice of the hearings

and engaged in extensive litigation before an arbitrator

that was collectively agreed upon by the Parties in the

5

contract. Delco was not deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law and Delco cannot and has not

throughout this litigation cited one case in which a party

has been deprived of a 5th Amendment right when an

arbitrator renders an award that disfavors their position

in arbitration. Again Delco has made baseless arguments

without proper support.

They claim that the arbitrator “entered a judgement

that did not comport with Michigan law” and now

confusingly claim a violation of their 5th and 14 Amendment

rights of the U.S. Constitution. Yet nowhere in the District

and Sixth Circuit opinion was such an appellate claim

asserted under the 5th and 14th Amendment distinctly,

even though the standard on appeal is de novo. Such points

are moot and were not raised at the District Court level

or on appeal to the Sixth Circuit and again are now moot.

The real issue is that Delco did not meet the exceptionally

high standard to overturn or vacate an arbitrator’s award

and wanted the federal District Court and the Sixth

Circuit to revisit the merits of the award, which they

could not do, thus, “Courts are not authorized to review

the arbitrator’s decision on the merits . . . ” Major League

Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504; 121 S. Ct.

1724; 149 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2001) Id. at *509.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Parties in this case freely entered a contract

for marketing services and they agreed to the contract

provisions of the contract that included an arbitration

provision in the event of a dispute between the Parties

that would be resolved by recourse to a sole arbitrator.

Leviathan provided contractual services to Delco for a

6

monthly fee. When Delco LLC breached the contract

by not paying for the services at a rate of $100,000.00 a

month, Leviathan filed for arbitration with the American

Arbitration Association (“AAA”), despite Leviathan trying

to resolve the matter prior to litigation. Delco agreed

contractually to choose a highly experienced arbitrator

to hear the contractual dispute and to resolve all disputes

regarding the contractual breach via arbitration, including

any counterclaims that they could raise for Delco on the

merits of Delco’s legal claims.

Delco was exceptionally enthusiastic about having

an arbitrator resolve the dispute and were aggressively

adamant that the arbitrator’s authority to resolve the

dispute between the parties was clearly housed within

the four concerns of the contract, and that the arbitrator

drew her authority directly out of the contract in order

to decide the dispute and factual issues between the

Parties. Delco never ever raised any objection to the

arbitrator’s authority which stemmed from the contract

to resolve disputes, yet they amazingly now try raise it,

but not once at arbitration, District Court or Sixth Circuit

did they raise it, nor did Delco ever file a Motion for

Reconsideration of the arbitrator’s decision or clarification

of her decision nor did they file such a request with the

District Court.

Delco in conjunction and in agreement with Leviathan

collectively choose a highly skilled, experienced and

educated Michigan attorney conversed in Michigan law to

arbitrate the dispute, in fact, at one stage of the litigation

proceedings, Delco sought to remove the jurisdiction from

Michigan to Oklahoma, but on this legal issue they lost

given that Delco engaged in extensive multiple contacts

7

with the forum state. More importantly, with regards to

the contractual dispute, Delco and Leviathan engaged

in very extensive discovery, depositions, evidentiary

issues, motion practice, evidence, disclosures, hearing

of testimony from parties, presentation of issues and

legal claims, including Delco’s counterclaims regarding

contract deliverables before a very carefully chosen highly

experienced arbitrator and Delco has two attorneys

represent them not one, but two. Importantly, Delco were

aggressively adamant that the arbitrator would resolve all

contractual disputes and trier of all facts presented by the

parties, including any legal counterclaims for deliverables

presented by the Delco for an adjudication on the merits

of such claims.

Following this, the arbitrator after reviewing all the

evidence, facts, contract and hearing the Parties after

a full blown week trial, the arbitrator issued a Partial

Final Award on the all the litigated contractual claims

and counterclaims on the deliverables that were part

of Delco’s dispute, in which, the arbitrator taking into

account Delco’s counterclaims and legal arguments found

that Leviathan had provided all the contract deliverables,

thus fashioning the award as she did. The arbitrator being

the trier of fact regarding the contract deliverables noted

that Leviathan did not breach the contract, and stated in

the Partial Final Award the carefully crafted the word

“if any” expressing the clear reservation that no such

deliverables existed or needed to be provided and that

Delco’s counterclaims regarding deliverables lack merit,

which resulted in her issuing a Final Award shortly

thereafter, thus foreclosing Delco’s arguments and that

the Final Award was the resolution of all claims against

each other and final on such issues. Thus the Final Award

8

foreclosed and forfeited any claims in the Partial Final

Award, since the Final Award is what it meant, final and

not incorporating any prior award.

Delco displeased with the decision on the merits of the

award that resulted in a Final Award, sought to appeal

the decision to the federal District Court and then the

Sixth Circuit, which unfortunate for Delco did not go in

their favor, since Delco could not and did not meet the

exceptionally high standard of vacating an arbitrator’s

award. Since the arbitrator’s authority to resolve the

disputes stemmed right out of the contract that Delco

signed and agreed to arbitrate any such disputes relating

to contract deliverables. Moreover, Delco did not seek

any remand from the District Court to the arbitrator

for clarification of her decision nor did Delco ever file

any motions whatsoever seeking clarification of the

arbitrator’s decision or reconsideration of her decision,

thus foreclosing that avenue permanently and now which

clearly stands as a moot point before this Court.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The Petitioner seeks to relitigate and revisit the merits

of the arbitrator’s award, which a court is restrictively

opposed to do. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S.

564 (2013) and Hall v. Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,

Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). Delco contractually gave the

arbitrator the authority to decide all contractual disputes,

including those relating to Delco counterclaims, namely,

contract deliverables as they stemmed out of the contract

and were to be Soley decided by the collectively chosen

arbitrator. Delco asks this Court to ignore the contractual

authority that Delco gave the collectively chosen arbitrator,

9

the sole authority to decide disputed issues between the

Parties. Leviathan respectfully requests that Delco’s

Petition for Writ of Certiorari be denied by this Court,

given the prevailing U.S. Supreme Court precedent and

wealth of decisions, Sixth Circuit precedent, related law,

failure of Delco to meet the exceptionally high standard

to vacate the arbitrator’s award and that Delco is clearly

asking this Court to revisit the merits of the award. The

issues presented by Delco seek to relitigate the merits

of the arbitrator’s award when they lost their alleged

counterclaims against Leviathan for allegedly failing

to provide contract deliverables. Moreover, Delco fails

to meet the very high standard required to vacate an

arbitrator’s award, notwithstanding the fact that Delco

collectively agreed that the arbitrator would derive her

authority to decide disputed issues between the Parties

from the contract signed by the parties agreeing that

parties would submit such disputes to a sole arbitrator to

be decided on the merits. Furthermore, Leviathan asks

that this case be remanded to the federal District Court

for attorney fees. Delco has presented no compelling issue

for review, given this Court’s high standard for review of

the legal issues presented, which Delco, the Petitioner has

not met, and mostly, cannot meet.

It is clear that the U.S. Supreme Court will have no

issue legally and procedurally in affirming, blessing and

sanctioning the correctly decided judicial decisions of the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan

and the Sixth Circuit, who both cited U.S. Supreme Court

precedent and very, very carefully applied the law to the

exceptionally high standard that was not met by Delco

in vacating the arbitrator’s decision. And this Court has

clearly noted and can see that the District Court and Sixth

10

Circuit will save this honorable Court time on trivial and

mundane issues, which have clearly been decided when

one is trying to overturn an arbitrator’s decision [Oxford

Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013)] and

especially when the arbitrator derives there authority to

decide disputed issues and attorney fees right out of the

contractual document to which they collectively agreed to

be bound by the trier of fact and law and delegating such

authority to the arbitrator.

One cannot use the federal district courts to relitigate

an issue on the merits of the award, which Delco is trying

to get a second bite at the apple. Delco propounds three

arguments to try to convince this Court to take up the

issue of overturning an arbitrator’s decision and vacate the

arbitrator’s award to which Delco contracted to be bound

by and wants to relitigate the issue of fact before this

Court, which the Petitioner cannot. Furthermore, Delco

poses the wrong proposition before this Court, what they

should have sought to do is request that the arbitrator’s

decision be vacated first, then the District Court and then

the Sixth Circuit. Delco are not clear on what they are

asking themselves or seeking to do. The District Court

and the Sixth were clear that the arbitrator drew her

essence even arguably in applying and interpreting the

contract to the disputed issues, which Delco agreed to be

tried by a trier of fact and law being a single arbitrator.

And that great deference is given to an arbitrator’s award

and that federal courts cannot second guess an arbitrator’s

decision, which Delco is asking this Court to do and to

undermine the arbitration process and asking the U.S.

Supreme Court to turn a blind eye to the high standard

that is required to overturn an arbitrator’s decision.

11

The Final Award of the arbitrator decision made the

whole matter clear as did the Partial Final Award, which

noted that the Final Award was on Delco’s merits and

that’s what it was the “Final” award including the dispute

relating to contract deliverables. Notably, Delco is clearly

asking this Court to relitigate the merits of the award,

become a trier of fact and second guess the arbitrator,

since they are asking this Court to step in the shoes of the

arbitrator and render an award on the merits of the case,

when Delco contractually gave the power and authority

for the arbitrator to do it within the four corners of the

contract. Delco is speaking to the merits of their legal

claims and make it clear that they want a second bite at

the apple on the merits of the award when they say in their

Petition that “Delco failed to benefit from any reasonable

interpretation of the Contract. . . .” (p. 4 of Delco Petition

for Writ of Certiorari). This statement invokes fact finding

and a second attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome

and is asking this Court to revisit the merits of the award.

More importantly, Delco’s own Petition for Writ

of Certiorari admittedly is evidence before this Court

that this Court should dismiss and deny the Petition,

because Delco are asking this Court to revisit the merits

of award again, when Delco incriminatingly states that

“Delco does assert and will prove that the arbitrator

exceeded her authority and imperfectly executed them

in the final award and that award should be vacated or

modified” (p. 5 of Delco Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

This is dangerously damaging Delco’s Petition as this is

a clear statement that Delco is asking the U.S. Supreme

Court to revisit the merits of the award when they ask the

award to be vacated and modified to their liking and readjudicated in Delco’s favor, in essence what else is Delco

12

asking this Court to do? It was clearly stated by the U.S.

Supreme Court that “Courts are not authorized to review

the arbitrator’s decision on the merits . . . ” Major League

Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504; 121 S. Ct.

1724; 149 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2001) Id. at *509. In fact, the U.S.

Supreme Court stated in Major that:

“Courts are not authorized to review the

arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite

allegations that the decision rests on factual

errors or misinterprets the parties’ agreement.

Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36,

98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987). We

recently reiterated that if an ‘”arbitrator is even

arguably construing or applying the contract

and acting within the scope of his authority,’

the fact that ‘a court is convinced he committed

serious error does not suffice to overturn his

decision.’” Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v.

Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62, 148 L. Ed. 2d

354, 121 S. Ct. 462 (2000) (quoting Misco, supra,

at 38) . . . When an arbitrator resolves disputes

regarding the application of a contract, and

no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator’s

“improvident, even silly, factfinding” does

not provide a basis for a reviewing court to

refuse to enforce the award . . . discussing the

courts’ limited role in reviewing the merits of

arbitration awards, we have stated that “courts

. . . have no business weighing the merits of

the grievance [or] considering whether there

is equity in a particular claim.’” [*510] Id. at

37 (quoting Steelworkers v. American Mfg.

Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403, 80

13

S. Ct. 1343 (1960)).When the judiciary does so,

‘it usurps a function which . . . is entrusted

to the arbitration tribunal.’ Id. at 569; see

also Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra,

at 599 (‘It is the arbitrator’s construction [of

the agreement] which was bargained for . . .

’). Consistent with this limited role, we said

in Misco that “even in the very rare instances

when an arbitrator’s procedural aberrations

rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, as

a rule the court must not foreclose further

proceedings by settling the merits according

to its own judgment of the appropriate result.”

484 U.S. at 40-41, n. 10. That step, we explained,

“ would improperly substitute a judicial

determination for the arbitrator’s decision that

the parties bargained for” in their agreement.

Ibid.” Id at 509-511**.

Yet the Sixth Circuit clearly echoed the view of the

U.S. Supreme Court that “Courts must refrain from

reversing an arbitrator simply because the court disagrees

with the result or believes the arbitrator made a serious

legal or factual error . . . if a court can find any line of

argument that is legally plausible and supports the award

it must be confirmed.” Solvay Pharms, Inc. v. Duramed

Pharms., Inc., 442 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2006) Id. at *476.

Yet, Delco has no hesitation is asking this Court to second

guess the arbitrator on the merits of the award, second

guess the arbitrator on the factual and legal issues of their

claims, which this Court must respectfully refrain from

so doing, yet confusingly Delco agrees that “The standard

for modifying an arbitration award is high” (p. 5 of Delco

Petition for Writ of Certiorari) but still wants a second bite

14

at the apple, but Delco has not articulated in the District

Court or Sixth Circuit, how they met the high standard

let alone reached a level to even consider that they made

an effort to do so and thus warrant reconsideration of

their arguments.

Here, Delco contractually agreed to have the

arbitrator resolve all disputes between the parties

by recourse to arbitration governed by the American

Arbitration Association’s Commercial Rules of Arbitration

(“AAA”) and certainly as it related to the contract and

the contract deliverables. Like, Oxford, the arbitrator

did what the parties requested and that was to resolve

the contractual disputes, like Oxford, the arbitrator

provided an interpretation of the contract resolving the

disputed issue and such “interpretation went against”

Delco, “maybe mistakenly” as stated in Oxford, yet in

Oxford the award will not be vacated but affirmed. What

is amazing as noted in Oxford, the U.S. Supreme Court

noted even “improvident, even silly, factfinding does not

provide a basis” to meet the high standard that is required

by Delco, so how can Delco meet it and even alleged errors

of law are an insufficient basis to meet the high standard.

And as the U. S. Supreme Court noted in Oxford,

[since Delco] “ . . . does not get to rerun the matter in

a court. Under §10(a)(4), the question for a judge is not

whether the arbitrator construed the parties’ contract

correctly, but whether he construed it at all. Because he

did, and therefore did not “exceed his powers,” we cannot

give Oxford the relief it wants. We accordingly affirm the

judgment of the Court of Appeals.” Delco admits having

a full-blown trial on the merits and interpretation of the

contract with regards to the deliverables and attorney

15

fees. And now because they are disgruntledly unhappy

with the result they want to “rerun the matter in a court”

which they cannot.

It cannot even be argued by Delco at all that the

arbitrator did not even arguably construe the contract,

nowhere did Delco ever state in any pleading that the

arbitrator did not construe the contract at all, Delco’s

argument principally is that the arbitrator did not consider

deliverables highlighted in their counterclaims, she turned

a blind eye, not the contract underlying the deliverables.

Delco agreed that they presented the contract in

litigation that formed the basis of their contract claims

and as evidence into trial and agreed that the arbitrator

reviewed the contract. The contract clearly was the thrust

of the litigation, and the arbitrator gave full credence

to the interpretation and claims that stemmed out of it.

Therefore, this supports the claim that the arbitrator was

is even arguably applying the contract during the course

of the litigation and is to Delco’s detriment, because Delco

cannot state the arbitrator was not arguably applying

it, since Delco used it as a basis for their contractual

deliverables claims and any reference to it however

minimal bolsters the “arguably applying standard” in

favor of the arbitrator.

A. The Sixth Circuit Did Not Err by Not Including

Delco’s award of deliverables that was not included

in the arbitration award—Simply put Delco seeks

to relitigate the merits of the award.

Delco’s argument was called by the Sixth Circuit as

“cleverly framed” [see Pet. Appx. at 6a], in that rather than

arguing that the arbitrator erred, Delco mistakenly and as

16

unfortunate as it may seem for Delco try to shift the blame

to the District Court, which was rather an unfortunate

mistake by them. Arguing that the arbitrator’s Partial

Final Award intended to award outstanding contract

deliverables to Delco, and that the Final Award only

added attorney fees to the Partial Final Award, was not

convincing. See Pet. Appx. at 6a.

The Sixth Circuit correctly explained to Delco that to

the extent there is a contradiction between the two, the

Final Award clearly and understandably superseded the

Partial Final Award in closing out the matter. And that

the Partial Final Award “ . . . did not make any particular

findings about which deliverables were outstanding—

or even, given that it uses the words “if any,” that any

deliverables were outstanding. And the Final Award, by its

terms, is a final disposition of all claims and counterclaims

under the contract: ‘This Award is in full settlement of all

claims and counterclaims submitted to this Arbitration.

All claims not expressly granted herein, are hereby

denied.” DE 1-3, Final Award of Arbitrator, Page ID 27.

The Final Award refers back to the amount of damages

awarded against Delco in the Partial Final Award: it does

not refer back to its earlier language on deliverables.” See

Pet. Appx. at 7a.

The Sixth Circuit further explained that “The most

natural reading of these two orders is that at some point

the arbitrator decided either that no deliverables remained

outstanding or that no deliverables were ever outstanding

in the first place. Either way, Delco did not prevail on its

counterclaims regarding Leviathan’s performance under

the contract.” See Pet. Appx. 7a. Delco was afforded due

process of litigating all its counterclaims for contract

17

deliverables and lost on all points. Delco lost all of its legal

claims of merit at trial regarding its counterclaims and

now wants this Court to relitigate the issue by remanding

or as put by this Court “rerun the mater.” Delco no matter

how they put it, or address it, or what phraseology or

terminology they use in their grammatical presentation

to this honorable Court, Delco wants to revisit the merits

of the award and merits of what deliverables were or were

not provided.

And as this honorable Court has stated in Oxford

Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013) as Delco

is propounding and that it must be said with regards to

Delco that Delco “ . . . does not get to rerun the matter

in a court. Under §10(a)(4), the question for a judge is not

whether the arbitrator construed the parties’ contract

correctly, but whether he construed it at all. Because he

did, and therefore did not “exceed his powers,” we cannot

give Oxford the relief it wants. We accordingly affirm the

judgment of the Court of Appeals.” It was noted in Oxford

by this Court that, Like Delco that “In sum, Oxford chose

arbitration, and it must now live with that choice. Oxford

agreed with Sutter that an arbitrator should determine

what their contract meant. . . . The arbitrator did what

the parties requested . . . He provided an interpretation

of the contract resolving that disputed issue.

His interpretation went against Oxford, maybe

mistakenly so. But still, Oxford does not get to rerun

the matter in a court. Under §10(a)(4), the question for

a judge is not whether the arbitrator construed the

parties’ contract correctly, but whether he construed it

at all. Because he did, and therefore did not “exceed his

powers,” we cannot give Oxford the relief it wants. We

18

accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013)

and Hall v. Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552

U.S. 576 (2008).”

It was said that Delco’s legal counsel should have made

the agreement more specific for the arbitrator to explain

the decision which Delco did not, and as the Sixth Circuit

saw Delco’s cleverly framed argument as misplaced and

noted that “If parties to an arbitration agreement wish a

more detailed arbitral opinion, they should clearly state

in the agreement the degree of specificity required.”

Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 976 (6th Cir.

2000).” Pet. Appx. 7a. And as the U.S. Supreme states

with respect arbitrator’s decisions that in Oxford that “In

sum, Oxford chose arbitration, and it must now live with

that choice. Oxford agreed with Sutter that an arbitrator

should determine what their contract meant . . . The

arbitrator did what the parties requested . . . provided

an interpretation [including one on the counterclaims of

Delco] of the contract resolving that disputed issue [the

deliverables] . . . his interpretation went against Oxford

[or Delco], maybe mistakenly so. But still, Oxford does

not get to rerun the matter in a court. Under §10(a)(4),

the question for a judge is not whether the arbitrator

construed the parties’ contract correctly, but whether he

construed it at all. Because he did, and therefore did not

“exceed his powers,” [emphasis added by author]. Delco’s

argument must fail, and the Petition denied on all grounds.

Again the U.S. Supreme Court in Major League

Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504; 121

S. Ct. 1724; 149 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2001) Id. at *509, noted

that “Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator’s

19

decision on the merits despite allegations that the decision

rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties’

agreement. Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36,

98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).” This is Delco entire

argument in the Petition that the arbitrator made errors

of law and misinterpretation of the contract with respect

to the deliverables and to rerun the matter through a

federal court, which they cannot. That is why the Sixth

Circuit explained that “[a]n arbitrator does not exceed

his authority every time he makes an interpretive error,

or exceeds that authority only when the . . . bargaining

agreement does not commit the dispute to arbitration.

Mich. Fam. Res., 475 F.3d at 756. Delco does not and could

not argue that these issues, which spring from the contract

and the parties’ performance under it, were not committed

to arbitration.” Pet. Appx. 11a. Delco never argued that the

arbitrator engaged in wrong doing or bias, or that issues

committed to her should not have been arbitrated, only

that the District Court read her orders wrong. Pet. Appx.

12a. Delco gave the arbitrator the authority to render an

award in the event of a contractual disputes between the

Parties.

B. The Sixth Circuit and the District Court did not

err by not invalidating the arbitrator’s award for

attorney fees.

Only a manifest disregard for the law, in contrast to

a misinterpretation, misstatement, or misapplication of

the law, can constitute grounds to vacate an arbitration

decision, since Delco only contention is that the arbitrator

misapplied the law, since the law was cited by Leviathan

and Delco, Delco fail to show that the arbitrator engaged

in manifest disregard for the law which is a very high

20

standard. Judicial harmony across this nation has

collectively voiced the long-held view with regards to the

contrast between manifest disregard of the law when it is

mistakenly used in contrast to a litigant’s real contention

regarding the arbitrators interpreting and applying the

law:

Thus “ . . . a mere mistake of law by an arbitrator

cannot serve as the basis for judicial review. . . .”1, “A

federal court cannot vacate an arbitral award merely

because it is convinced that the arbitration panel made the

wrong call on the law”2 and “Only a manifest disregard for

the law, in contrast to a misinterpretation, misstatement,

or misapplication of the law, can constitute grounds to

vacate an arbitration decision.” 3 “Manifest disregard of

law is a doctrine of last resort-its use is limited only to

those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious

impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent.”4

Delco argument for remand here is also foreclosed

upon, since Delco has not met the very high standard

required to vacate an arbitrator’s decision and/or award.

Delco has not shown that the collectively bargained for

1. P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 32 (1st

Cir. 2005); see also T.Co. Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply,

Inc., 592 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2010) (vacating an award requires

more than error or misunderstanding of the law).

2. Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2004).

3. Univ. Commons-Urbana, Ltd. v. Universal Constructors

Inc., 304 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

4. Jefferies LLC v. Gegenheimer, 849 F App’x 16 (CA 2, 2021)

Id. at 17 (2nd Cir. 2021).

21

arbitrator who decided the merits of the case as it related

to the breach of contract by Delco and its counterclaims

failed to follow Michigan law, they are claiming an error

law. Yet, the Sixth Circuit clearly explained that an

error of law is not a ground for reversal, see Pet. Appx.

9a. However, what Delco failed to inform this Court is

that they had the benefit of a flown blown hearing on

attorney fees before the arbitrator resulting in a reduction

of attorney’s fees, which nowhere do they disclose in

their Petition to this Court or did they disclose at the

District Court, they left out that the arbitrator sent a

communication that she would be discussing Michigan

law with regards to attorney fees.

It was noted by the honorable District Court judge,

Judge Lawson, that Leviathan filed a motion for attorney

fees, which Delco opposed. Pet. Appx. 16a. It was also

clearly noted and observed that on July 31, 2023, the

arbitrator held a hearing on the attorney’s fee motion

and then issued a Final Award on August 14, 2023. This

decision in fact reduced the attorney fees requested by

Levithan after a flow blown hearing who heard proofs,

reviewed documents, reviewed case law, reviewed the

Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) and

applied the law correctly.

Judge Lawson noted in his very well thought-out and

reasoned opinion that “After a hearing, the arbitrator

awarded fees and costs in the amount of $68,017.60, a

reduction of nearly $35,000 from the plaintiff’s request.”

Pet. Appx. 23a. The District Court correctly noted that

with respect to factors that were used in determining

attorney fees pursuant to the Michigan Rules of

Professional Conduct MRPC 1.5(a) and by recourse to

22

the 2020 Bar Attorney Billing Rates, coupled with an

evidentiary hearing, and presentation of documentation

supporting the work undertaken, that when taken into

account with regards to the hours and rates, which

the arbitrator did not accept without question, which

resulted in a full blown hearing on July 31, 2023, that

such calculation of a fee award amounts to “quintessential

fact finding” and as Judge Lawson rightly stated further

eroded the Court’s ability to review the award. And that

Delco has not established that the arbitrator manifestly

disregarded the law. Pet. Appx. 26a. Especially since

there was a reduction of fees after a full blown thorough

assessment.

Adding to this, he Sixth Circuit clearly articulated

for Delco when an arbitrator exceeds their authority

stating that “‘[a]n arbitrator does not exceed his authority

every time he makes an interpretative error, he exceeds

that authority only when the . . . bargaining agreement

does not commit that dispute to arbitration.’ Mich. Fam.

Res., 475 F.3d at 756. Delco does not and could not argue

that these issues, which spring from the contract and

the parties’ performance under it, were not committed

to arbitration.” Pet. Appx. 11a. Delco cannot refute the

Sixth argument nor have they. More importantly, as

correctly observed by the Sixth Circuit, the law in the

State of Michigan is vast and wide and that other courts

in the State of Michigan have held that “detailed billing

records accompanied by an affidavit, can support a finding

of reasonableness even without a hearing and that the

arbitrators investigation into the reasonableness of fees

could be supported by the fact that she did not accept

the figures quoted by Leviathan without questions—she

23

awarded significantly less in fees than Leviathan asked

for.” Pet. Appx. 10a. Delco’s claim fails here as well. And

that “ . . . manifest disregard of the law is a ‘very narrow

standard of review . . . A mere error in interpretation or

application of the law is insufficient.’” Physicians Ins.

Capital v. Praesidium Alliance Group, 562 F App’x 421

(CA 6, 2014) Id. at *423. And with regards to the error

with regards to application of the law and interpretation

of the law by the arbitrator with regards to manifest

disregard of the law is insufficient that “A mere error in

interpretation or application of the law is insufficient . . . it

is all but impossible [for the court] to determine whether

they acted with manifest disregard of the law.” Physicians

Ins. Capital v. Praesidium Alliance Group, 562 F App’x

421 (CA 6, 2014) Id. at *243 & Murray v. Citigroup Global

Markets, Inc., 511 F App’x 453 (CA 6, 2013). Nor did Delco

“ . . . challenge the scope of the arbitrator’s authority in

the lower court.” Murray v. Citigroup Global Markets,

Inc., 511 F App’x 453 (CA 6, 2013) Id. at *454. Delco never

challenged in the District Cour the scope of authority

just that the arbitrator exceeded such authority, Delco

failed to build upon this scope of authority argument

and is now forever deceased and moot. In fact, the Sixth

Circuit made it clear, if an arbitrator’s fails to provide

a detailed explanation of an award “ . . . or produce a

detailed explanation of how the arbitration . . . reached

its conclusion, we will not vacate an award for failure

to provide such an explanation.” Murray v. Citigroup

Global Markets, Inc., 511 F App’x 453 (CA 6, 2013) Id. at

*455 & Golden Brands, LLC v. Castle Cheese, Inc., 110

F App’x 666 (CA 6, 2004). Thus, Delco loses on this point

also with regards to what deliverables were not provided.

24

C. The District Court did not err by not vacating the

arbitration award that did not depart from the

essence of the contract.

As stated in the foregoing, Delco has not shown or

provided any evidence that the arbitrator exceeded her

authority, let alone disregarded the law. In fact, as the

District Court and the Sixth Circuit correctly noted that

the parties bargained for a single arbitrator, which they

collectively choose to decide the contractual dispute that

included all the legal counterclaims asserted by Delco.

And which resulted in a reduction of attorney fees after a

full-blown hearing on July 31, 2025, and that the arbitrator

issued a Final Award in settlement of all legal claims

and counterclaims, deliverables, costs and attorney fees.

Delco did not take any further action even filing a motion

for reconsideration or reconsideration of the arbitrator’s

decision or seeking an explanation thereto.

Now Delco is asking this Court to do what it cannot

and that is to rerun the merits of the counterclaims and

contract deliverables which is the crux of Delco legal

claims on the merits. But as this Court stated time and

time again that in Major League Baseball Players Ass’n

v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504; 121 S. Ct. 1724; 149 L. Ed. 2d 740

(2001) Id. at *509 that “Courts are not authorized to review

the arbitrator’s decision on the merits despite allegations

that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets

the parties’ agreement. Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484

U.S. 29, 36, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).” Nor

on errors of law.

And again, to reiterate as this honorable Court has

stated in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S.

25

564 (2013)–as Delco is propounding and that it must be

said that Delco–“ . . . does not get to rerun the matter in

a court. Under §10(a)(4), the question for a judge is not

whether the arbitrator construed the parties’ contract

correctly, but whether he construed it at all. Because he

did, and therefore did not “exceed his powers,” we cannot

give Oxford the relief it wants. We accordingly affirm the

judgment of the Court of Appeals.” It was noted in Oxford

by this Court that “In sum, Oxford chose arbitration, and it

must now live with that choice. Oxford agreed with Sutter

that an arbitrator should determine what their contract

meant. . . . The arbitrator did what the parties requested

. . . He provided an interpretation of the contract resolving

that disputed issue.

His interpretation went against Oxford, maybe

mistakenly so. But still, Oxford does not get to rerun

the matter in a court. Under §10(a)(4), the question for

a judge is not whether the arbitrator construed the

parties’ contract correctly, but whether he construed it

at all. Because he did, and therefore did not “exceed his

powers,” we cannot give Oxford the relief it wants. We

accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”

Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013)

and Hall v. Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552

U.S. 576 (2008).”

CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit caught onto Delco’s subtility when

it stated that “Declo’s first argument is cleverly framed.

Rather than arguing that the arbitrator erred, it faults

the district court for not being faithful enough to the

arbitrator’s decisions.” And that “Delco seeks a remand

26

so that the district court can reconsider” the deliverables

as part of the Final Award, since the Partial Final Award

according to Delco–which are the merits of the award–be

rewritten, incorporated and restated in the Final Award.

In other words, Delco believed that the District Court

should have ordered the award to be rewritten in their

favor, and by implication revisiting the merits of the award.

Delco has failed to meet the exceptionally high standard in

vacating the award. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n

v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504; 121 S. Ct. 1724; 149 L. Ed. 2d 740

(2001) & Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564

(2013) and Hall v. Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,

552 U.S. 576 (2008).

Yet the Sixth Circuit caught onto this notion and

reminded Delco with regards to the Partial Final Award

and the Final Award that “ . . . Delco’s problem is that,

as the district court recognized, to the extent there

is a contradiction between the two, the Final Award

supersedes the Partial Final Award. The Partial Final

Award did not make any particular findings about which

deliverables were outstanding—or even, given that

it uses the words “if any,” that any deliverables were

outstanding.” Notwithstanding the fact that with regards

to the arbitrator’s authority stemming from the contract to

resolve disputes, she clearly did not exceed her authority

to resolve a dispute that was clearly submitted to her in

arbitration regarding contract deliverables and attorney

fees. Delco has not and cannot met the high standard that

is set to vacate an arbitrator’s award neither have they

done here, or in the Sixth Circuit or in the District Court.

27

Thus, Under the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s

decision “only in very unusual circumstances.” First

Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942

(1995) & Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,

552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). “That a court is convinced [the

arbitrator] committed serious error does not suffice to

overturn his decision.” United Paperworkers Int’l Union

v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 108 S. Ct.

364 (1987). “The refusal of courts to review the merits of

an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration

. . . ” United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel

& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593; 80 S. Ct. 1358; 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424

(1960) Id. at *596. Thus, Delco’s Petition for the Writ must

be dismissed and denied and remanded to the District

Court for Leviathan’s attorney fees or an order entered

to that effect.

In fact, more recently, federal appellate courts are

recognizing that manifest disregard of the law as a

basis to vacate an arbitrator’s award as a gloss over and

independent ground, is becoming far and few. See United

States Trinity Energy Services, L.L.C. v. Southeast

Directional Drilling, L.L.C., No. 24-10833, 2025 WL

1218096 at *4 (5th Cir. April 2025). It was well put by the

Sixth Circuit in finalizing this Brief that “ . . . the outrageous

circumstances required for this court to find manifest

disregard are clearly not here. . . . while it is possible to

argue that the arbitrators misapplied the law . . . that was

insufficient for manifest disregard . . . rejecting manifestdisregard claim . . . were instead . . . thinly veiled attempts

to relitigate factual determinations.” Nathan v. Fieger &

Fieger, PC (In re Romanzi), 31 F.4th 367 (CA 6, 2022) Id.

at *375. Furthermore, Leviathan request that this matter

be remanded solely for the purpose of attorney fees on

28

appeal, since the contract provided attorney fees would

be granted to the party who prevailed on the contract.

In closing Leviathan requests as it has throughout this

Brief in Opposition that Delco’s Petition Writ be denied

in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Kulwant Singh Boora

Counsel of Record

The Boora Law Group PLC

8110 Lewis Avenue, Suite B

Temperance, MI 48182

(734) 790-3909

booralaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Respondent

November 19, 2025