Amicus Curiae Brief — American Gas Association, et al., Petitioners v. Department of Energy, et al.

NO. 25-879

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ET AL.,

Respondents.

__________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Ondray T. Harris

Counsel of Record

Soriya R. Chhe

Marin Murdock

COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

1310 L Street NW, 7th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 331-2265

ondray.harris@cei.org

February 20, 2026

SUPREME COURT PRESS

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

♦

(888) 958-5705

♦

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I.

The Circuit Improperly Relied on DOE

and Petitioner’s Agreed Interpretation to

Improperly Interpret Key Provisions of the

Underlying Statute in Violation of EPCA’s

Statutory Protection of Consumer Choice,

When Setting Energy Efficiency Standards ... 3

A. The Plain Meaning of the Phrase

“Performance Characteristics” Can Be

Enforced Without an Absurd Result .......... 3

B. Textual Analysis of the Statute Does

Not Support the Court’s Deferential

Interpretation of “Performance Characteristics” ...................................................... 8

II. Legislative History Does Not Support the

Circuit’s Interpretation of EPCA ................... 10

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 16

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Am. Gas Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Energy, 157 F.4th 476 (D.C. Cir. 2025) ... 3-11, 15

Campos-Chaves v. Garland,

602 U.S. 447 (2024) ............................................. 9

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union

Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000) .......... 5, 7

Lamie v. U.S. Tr.,

540 U.S. 526 (2004) ..................................... 4, 6, 7

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) ..................................... 2, 4, 5

Loughrin v. United States,

573 U.S. 351 (2014) ............................................. 9

Perrin v. United States,

444 U.S. 37 (1979) ............................................... 4

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,

442 U.S. 330 (1979) ............................................. 9

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 6295 .......................................................... 2

42 U.S.C. § 6295 (o)(2)(B)(i)(IV) ................................. 9

42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)...................................................... 2

42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(4) ..................................... 3, 6, 8, 9

42 U.S.C. § 6295(q)(1) ............................................... 15

Pub. L. No. 100-12, § 325, 101 Stat. 103

(1987), National Appliance Energy

Conservation Act of 1987 .................................. 14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont.)

JUDICIAL RULES

Page

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2(a) ....................................................... 1

REGULATIONS

10 C.F.R. § 430.32 ....................................................... 2

2021 Interpretive Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 73948 .............. 4

Consumer Furnaces Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 87563 .......... 7

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

H.R. 5465, National Appliance Energy

Conservation Act of 1986 ...................... 10, 11, 12

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Gas Association,

National Appliance Energy Conservation

Act of 1986: Hearing on H.R. 5465 Before

the H. S. Comm. on Energy Conservation

and Power Comm. on Energy and

Commerce, 99th Cong. 146 (1998) .............. 10, 11

Ronald Reagan,

Memorandum of Disapproval of the

Appliance Energy Conservation Bill, The

American Presidency Project (Nov. 1,

1986), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

node/254420 ....................................................... 12

1

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE1

Amicus Curiae, Competitive Enterprise Institute

(CEI), is a nonprofit educational and research institute

headquartered in Washington, D.C., dedicated to

promoting the principles of free markets and limited

government. Since its founding in 1984, the institute

has focused on raising public understanding of the

problems of overregulation through policy analysis,

commentary, and litigation. CEI also pursues publicinterest litigation to ensure that federal agencies act

within the constraints of the United States Constitution,

the Administrative Procedures Act, and its enabling

statutes. CEI’s mission is to develop and advocate for

policies that advance the right to freedom, fairness,

property, and prosperity for Americans. CEI’s Center

for Energy and Environment (“the Center”) advocates

for free market reforms that ensure abundant and

affordable energy and better protect personal energy

choices of Americans.

1 Amicus affirms that no counsel for a party authored this brief

in whole or in part, that no person other than amicus and its

counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or

submission of this brief. Counsel notified the parties’ counsel of

record of the intent to file this brief. Counsel for Petitioner (AGA)

and Respondent (DOE) received timely notice as required by rule

37.2(a). Counsel of record for Intervenor (Earthjustice) was

notified within a shortened timeframe due to them being added

as a counsel of record after original notice was given. Intervenor

has consented to CEI submitting this brief and to the shortened

notice period.

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit (the Circuit) upheld the Department

of Energy’s (DOE) 2023 energy efficiency standards

for residential furnaces and commercial water heaters.

10 C.F.R. § 430.32. The Circuit’s decision violates the

Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 6295, by effectively eliminating non-condensing technology and in effect mandating the use of condensing

technology or shifting consumer choice in energy sources

(i.e. electricity). The Circuit’s decision denies tens of

millions of American families a consumer choice and

in certain cases, energy choice.

The Circuit’s interpretation of the statute at issue,

42 U.S.C. § 6295(o), not only frustrates the purpose of

that very provision, but also deviates from this Court’s

requirements on deference under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) and canons of

statutory interpretation. Rather than engaging in an

independent analysis to interpret the statute, the

Circuit deferred to “agreed upon” interpretations of the

statutory provision that underlies this case. CEI

submits that the Circuit’s interpretation is flawed and

the process that the Court undertook to arrive at its

interpretation deviates from the requirements of this

Court in Loper Bright. CEI respectfully urges this

Court to grant Petitioner’s request for certiorari to

reinforce the Court’s role when it comes to interpreting

statutes under the Loper Bright standard and protect

consumer choice in accordance with EPCA. Id.

3

ARGUMENT

I.

The Circuit Improperly Relied on DOE

and Petitioner’s Agreed Interpretation to

Improperly Interpret Key Provisions of the

Underlying Statute in Violation of EPCA’s

Statutory Protection of Consumer Choice,

When Setting Energy Efficiency Standards

A. The Plain Meaning of the Phrase

“Performance Characteristics” Can Be

Enforced Without an Absurd Result

EPCA expressly prohibits DOE from prescribing

energy standards that are “likely to result in the

unavailability . . . in any product type (or class) of

performance characteristics . . . that are substantially

the same as those generally available in the United

States at the time . . . . ” 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(4)

(emphasis added). But the Circuit’s ruling in the case

below resulted in the undisputed elimination of noncondensing gas furnaces currently used in millions of

households across America. See Am. Gas Ass’n v.

United States Dep’t of Energy, 157 F.4th at 487 at 502

(Rao, N., dissenting) (D.C. Cir. 2025). In support of its

findings, the Circuit determined that the venting mechanism, installation factors, or space-related attributes of

non-condensing furnaces did not constitute “performance characteristics” within the meaning of EPCA. 42

U.S.C. § 6295(o)(4). Thus, the issue before this Court

is whether the Circuit properly interpreted the phrase

“performance characteristic” under EPCA when it

evaluated the venting features of condensing and noncondensing furnaces. Id.

4

“A fundamental canon of statutory construction

is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be

interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary,

common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,

42 (1979). “It is well established that when the statute’s

language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at

least where the disposition required by the text is not

absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” Lamie

v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (internal quotations

omitted). “Courts must exercise their independent

judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted

within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.”

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412

(2024)

Here, the Circuit appropriately began with a

recitation of the dictionary definition of the word

“performance” and “characteristics.” Am. Gas Ass’n v.

United States Dep’t of Energy, 157 F.4th 476, 487 (D.C.

Cir. 2025). Thereafter, without stopping to independently interpret the plain meaning of those words in

the context of EPCA, the Circuit determined the phrase

to be “broad” based on the agreement of the parties and

the dissent. Id. at 488. Referring again to the parties’

agreement, the court found “the plain text of ‘performance characteristic’ means a product attribute that

provides utility to consumers desiring the use of the

product.” Id. Then, citing to DOE’s Interpretive Rules,

the Circuit found “because every appliance offers a

unique function to consumers, the concept of a feature

or performance characteristic is very case-specific . . .

and no single definition could capture the potential for

features across the broad array of consumer products

. . . ” subject to EPCA. Id. citing 2021 Interpretive

Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 73948.

5

Without engaging in any independent textual

analysis of the statute, the Circuit again cites to the

parties’ agreements and DOE’s analysis of

“performance characteristic” to find that “the plain

text of the statute does not get us home” and set out

to resolve the “specific ambiguity” as it relates to

consumer furnaces and commercial water heaters. Id.

at 488. From that point on, the Circuit evaluated each

attribute presented by Petitioners in the context of

“utility” rather than the actual definition of “performance characteristics” because it essentially determined

performance characteristic to be a measure of utility.

Id.

This was the first mistake the Circuit committed

in its interpretation of the law. The Circuit had a duty

to analyze the statute to independently determine

whether the statute is in fact ambiguous. This step is

necessary for them to “exercise their independent

judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted

within its statutory authority, as the APA requires.”

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412

(2024). By failing to independently determine whether

there was an ambiguity based on the statutory text

and instead relying on DOE’s analysis in its rulemaking,

the Circuit failed to follow this Court’s directive under

Loper Bright.

Resolving the meaning of “performance characteristics” is a question of law to be carried out by the

courts. Had the Circuit examined the statute’s text, it

could have stopped its analysis of the phrase at its

plain meaning. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.

Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (when

the statute’s language is plain, the court must enforce it

according to its terms.) While it is true that examples

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of “performance characteristic” may differ from one

product to the next, the definition of the phrase can

stay the same and still make sense of the statute,

which provides:

The Secretary may not prescribe an amended

or new standard under this section if the

Secretary finds . . . that interested persons

have established by a preponderance of the

evidence that the standard is likely to result

in the unavailability in the United States in

any covered product type (or class) of performance characteristics (including reliability),

features, sizes, capacities, and volumes that

are substantially the same as those generally

available in the United States at the time of

the Secretary’s finding.

42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(4). The definition of “performance”

and “characteristics” can be combined to mean a

distinguishing trait, quality or property of a product’s

execution of an action. See Am. Gas Ass’n v. United

States Dep’t of Energy, 157 F.4th at 487 (D.C. Cir.

2025) (quoting Performance and Characteristics,

Merriam-Webster, Inc. (Ninth New Collegiate 1985).

The plain meaning of this phrase is sufficient to resolve

the question of whether the different venting features

of condensing and non-condensing gas furnaces

constitute a “performance characteristic” without reaching an absurd result. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526,

534 (2004). Therefore, the Court erred in determining

the statutory language was broad and deferring to

DOE’s interpretation of this phrase. Am. Gas Ass’n v.

United States Dep’t of Energy, 157 F.4th 476, 487

(D.C. Cir. 2025).

7

As the Circuit summarized in its technical/factual

analysis of condensing and non-condensing furnaces,

all gas furnaces burn gas to heat the air. Id. at 483. In

non-condensing furnaces, excess heated gas vent out

of the building through an unpowered heat exchanger

such as a vertical chimney. Id. Venting is necessary

“to avoid excessive condensate production in the vent.”

Id. quoting Consumer Furnaces Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. at

87563 n.111. “Non-condensing appliances are currently

used in millions of homes and commercial buildings.”

Id. at 502 (Rao, N., dissenting).

On the other hand, in condensing gas furnaces,

excess heat is not vented through a vertical chimney.

Id. at 483. Instead, excess heat is vented into a powered

heat exchanger, which captures the excess heat and

turns it into condensed water vapor. Id. This feature

makes it more energy efficient because the excess heat

is captured for use and not wasted. Id. This additional

process results in leftover liquid condensate, which is

then deposited into a drain. Id. at 43. Because water is

involved, the vents for non-condensing furnaces must

be “corrosion-resistant.” Id. This means non-condensing

appliances cannot share vents with condensing

appliances” Id. (internal quotations and cites omitted).

Applying the dictionary definition of “performance,” the “action being executed” by the furnace is the

burning of gas to heat air and releasing the heated air

to warm homes. The performance characteristic would

be the furnace’s “distinguishing trait” or “quality,”

when it executes the action of heating air. In a noncondensing furnace, the gas is burned, heat is released

to warm the house and excess heat is immediately

vented out as hot air to prevent the unit from overheating and failing. In a condensing furnace, gas is

8

burned and heat is released, but excess heat is vented

for further treatment to capture additional heat

before it is finally released as condensate.

Whereas non-condensing furnaces produce heat

for use in a single step and can work with a vertical

vent, condensing furnaces produce more heat, but over

two steps, requiring more (usually horizontal) vent

space to allow for the second capture of heat. Thus,

while they may both perform the same act of burning

gas and releasing hot air, the different ways in which

hot air is treated afterwards are characteristics that

distinguish non-condensing from condensing furnaces.

As such, under the plain meaning of the phrase “performance characteristics,” non-condensing furnaces have

different performance characteristics from condensing

furnaces. Non-condensing furnaces possess performance

characteristics that are distinct from condensing

furnaces and are in wide use amongst older homes

in America. Thus, they should be protected from

elimination under EPCA under the plain meaning of

EPCA.

B. Textual Analysis of the Statute Does Not

Support the Court’s Deferential Interpretation of “Performance Characteristics”

Without attempting to apply the plain meaning

of the phrase, the Circuit declared it to be ambiguous

and relied on the Parties’ agreement to define “performance characteristics” as the products “useful output.”

Id. at 487. This definition, however, is inconsistent with

the statute because it effectively treats performance

and utility as one and the same, even though the word

“utility” appears nowhere in the provision at issue. See

42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(4). Under the provision at issue, the

factors for consideration include performance character-

9

istics (including reliability), features, sizes, capacities,

and volumes. Id. The word “utility” is not amongst

factors to be considered. “Utility” does, however, appear

in a different part of the statute — the standard for

evaluating economic justification at 42 U.S.C. § 6295

(o)(2)(B)(i)(IV), which provides:

In determining whether a standard is

economically justified, the Secretary shall

. . . conside[r] . . . any lessening of the utility

or the performance of the covered products

likely to result from the imposition of the

standard . . . .

(emphasis added).

What is more, when the word “utility” appears in

the statute, it is separated from “performance” by an

“or.” “The word ‘or’ is almost always disjunctive and is

generally used to indicate an alternative.” CamposChaves v. Garland, 602 U.S. 447, 457 (2024) (internal

quotations omitted). “Canons of construction ordinarily

suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given

separate meanings unless the context dictates otherwise. . . . ” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339

(1979). But here interpreting “or” as a disjunctive

makes sense because performance is used elsewhere,

independent of “utility.” Therefore, both words must

be given meaning when they appear together. Id. at.

339 (“In construing a statute we are obliged to give

effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.”)

Moreover, because Congress did not use the word

“utility” in 42 U.S.C. § 6295(o)(4), it is inappropriate

for the Circuit to interpret performance characteristic

as being about “useful output” or utility. See Loughrin

v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (internal

10

quotation omitted) (“when Congress includes particular

language in one section of a statute but omits it in

another—let alone in the very next provision—this

Court presumes that Congress intended a difference

in meaning.”) Utility should not have played a role in

the Circuit’s evaluation of performance characteristics

of non-condensing furnaces. In fact, its application

yielded a rather different interpretation. It resulted in

the Circuit completely ignoring the critical difference

between condensing and non-condensing furnaces that

forms the subject of Petitioner’s claims. It resulted in

the complete failure to recognize the literal retrofitting

that millions of consumers must make to their homes

when forced to transition to condensing furnaces to

accommodate their different performance characteristics.

II. Legislative History Does Not Support the

Circuit’s Interpretation of EPCA

The Circuit’s takeaway from the legislative history

related to AGA’s statements to Congress is misplaced.

The Circuit found that “Congress was well aware of

Petitioner’s perspective regarding venting mechanics

for small gas furnaces when it amended EPCA in

1987” because the AGA submitted a statement to the

Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power in

1986 . . . . ” Am. Gas Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of

Energy, 157 F.4th at 487, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2025) citing

National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1986:

Hearing on H.R. 5465 Before the H. S. Comm. on Energy

Conservation and Power Comm. on Energy and

Commerce, 99th Cong. 146 (1998) (Statement of the

American Gas Association). The Circuit further reasoned that “[i]f Congress intended particular methods

of venting such as unpowered venting to be a perform-

11

ance characteristic, it had an opportunity to say it, but

it did not.” Id. at 489. The Circuit’s findings are plain

wrong. It not only mischaracterizes AGA’s statement

to the Subcommittee but fails to account for the

actions Congress took in what appears to be a direct

response to AGA’s statement.

Unsurprisingly, AGA’s 1986 statement to the

Subcommittee had nothing to do with the venting

systems of condensing or non-condensing furnaces.

See National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of

1986: Hearing on H.R. 5465 Before the H. S. Comm.

on Energy Conservation and Power Comm. on Energy

and Commerce, 99th Cong. 146 (1998) (Statement of

the American Gas Association). Rather, the statement

asked Congress to amend H.R. 5465, because the bill

as written would ban atmospherically vented furnaces

because of the defined test procedures and prescribed

AFUE level of no less than 78%. Id. at 149. At the

time, the AFUE for mid-efficiency furnaces ran from

71% to 80%. Id. The statement did not contain any

discussion related to the venting features of gas

furnaces. AGA was concerned that the bill would exclude

the bulk of conventional non-induced draft gas furnaces,

and drive consumers to opt for the least energyefficient option of electric resistance baseboard heating

and electric furnaces. Id. AGA, therefore, asked Congress to amend the bill to lower the AFUE standard to

71% for small gas furnaces to protect the availability

of small gas furnaces in the market. Id. at 150.

Critically, the Circuit failed to mention in its

analysis that H.R. 5465 as written at the time (which

would have eliminated small gas furnaces), never

became law during that legislative session because it

was vetoed by President Reagan who expressed concerns

12

of the bill’s impact on eliminating consumer choice and

raising costs:

The bill intrudes unduly on the free market,

limits the freedom of choice available to

consumers who would be denied the opportunity to purchase lower-cost appliances, and

constitutes a substantial intrusion into traditional State responsibilities and prerogatives.

H.R. 5465 fails to advance this goal in a

manner that takes account of the tremendous

cost to consumers, who would have to spend

an estimated extra $1.4 billion per year on

appliance purchases. Higher prices would

force many to buy more expensive appliances

than they would prefer, and make some delay

or forgo some appliance purchases altogether.

By eliminating the lower-priced models, the

bill would hit low-income consumers particularly hard. It could also discourage and slow

the introduction of useful product innovations.

Ronald Reagan, Memorandum of Disapproval of the

Appliance Energy Conservation Bill, (Nov. 1, 1986),

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/254420. The

concerns shared by President Reagan track those

shared by AGA today as it relates to the DOE’s new

energy standards.

In response to President Reagan’s veto, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resource introduced the

following amendments:

New section 325(j) [which] establishes the

criteria by which the Secretary may prescribe

new or amended standards . . . . With respect

to the small gas furnace, it is the Committee’s

13

intent that should the Secretary determine

that significant switching is occurring as a

result of the small gas furnace standard,

then he has the authority to review the

standard and through a rulemaking establish

a new standard, otherwise consistent with

this Act, which the Secretary determines will

avoid such switching. Obviously, in this case,

the Secretary is authorized to lower an

energy conservation standard notwithstanding section 325(j)(1), but he may not lower

the standard below 71 percent.

S. Rep. 100-6 (1987).

While the Circuit is correct about the Committee

not addressing venting methods (because it was never

raised), it is clear from the foregoing statement that

they most definitely addressed concerns raised in

AGA’s statement and the adverse impact the energy

standards at the time would have on consumers and

small gas furnaces. The Committee not only authorized

the Secretary to drop the standard to 71%, if the new

standard resulted in energy switching, but more importantly, the Committee introduced the precise statutory

provision that underlies this case to protect consumer

choice and against the elimination of appliances that

are widely in use, providing as follows:

New section 325(j)(4) . . . prohibits the Secretary from prescribing a new or amended

standard if he finds that the standard is

likely to result in the unavailability in the

United States in any covered product type or

class of performance characteristics (including

reliability), features, sizes, etc.

14

With respect to the small gas furnace standard (section 325(f)(1)(B)), the Secretary must

consider the impact of any lessening of

competition that is likely to result from the

establishment of a standard for small furnaces. He must consider the economic impact

of the standard on manufacturers and consumers . . . .

Finally, section 325(j)(4) forbids a standard

being set so as to result in the unavailability

in the United States in any covered product

type (or class) of performance characteristics,

such as size or capacity. This paragraph,

upon a sufficient showing, would forbid a

standard for small gas furnaces being set at

a level that would increase the price to the

point that the product would be noncompetitive and that would result in minimal demand

for the product.

S. Rep. 100-6 (emphasis added).

These provisions were later passed into law

under the National Appliance Energy Conservation

Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-12, § 325, 101 Stat. 103,

116 (1987). The legislative history clearly shows that

Congress passed this provision with the express intent

of forbidding what will happen if the Circuit’s decision

is allowed to move forward. The Circuit’s failure to

consider or even mention this in its review of AGA’s

Statements and related legislative history undermines

its interpretation. But, more importantly, President

Reagan’s veto and Congress’ actions clearly support

reversal of the Circuit’s decision and works against

application of the DOE’s new energy standards to

eliminate non-condensing furnaces. Notably, as the

15

dissent noted, the statute gives DOE an out because

it can choose to put non-condensing in a separate

class. Am. Gas Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Energy,

157 F.4th at 487 at 504 (Rao, N., dissenting) (D.C. Cir.

2025) citing 42 U.S.C. § 6295(q)(1) (“the unavailability

provision, which ensures products with valued characteristics remain on the market, is paired for consumer

appliances with a requirement that the Secretary ‘shall

specify’ a separate efficiency standard for any product

with a ‘performance-related feature’ that provides

‘utility to the consumer.’” DOE is not left without a

path forward to improve America’s energy efficiency.

The path to America’s improved standards on energy

efficiency cannot be one that unlawfully deprives

consumers of choice.

16

CONCLUSION

For these reasons this court should grant

Petitioners’ petition for writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Ondray T. Harris

Counsel of Record

Soriya R. Chhe

Marin Murdock

COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

1310 L Street NW, 7th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 331-2265

ondray.harris@cei.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

February 20, 2026