Amicus Curiae Brief — International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Bob Ferguson, Governor of Washington, et al.

No. 25-840

In the Supreme Court of the United States

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS FOR ETHICAL CARE, INC.,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

BOB FERGUSON, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

HARMEET K. DHILLON

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorneys General

SARAH M. HARRIS

Deputy Solicitor General

HARRY GRAVER

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

GREGORY DOLIN

SARAH WELCH

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

When a child runs away to a licensed shelter in Washington seeking “gender-affirming treatment,” the State

“shall” “[o]ffer to make referrals on behalf of the minor

for appropriate behavioral health services,” and will do

so if asked by the child, regardless of parental consent.

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(b). The question presented is whether parents who object to a scheme that

displaces their control over the medical care their child

may access have standing to challenge such a scheme.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Interest of the United States....................................................... 1

Introduction................................................................................... 2

Statement ...................................................................................... 4

A. Washington law ................................................................ 4

B. Factual background......................................................... 7

C. Procedural history ......................................................... 10

Summary of argument ............................................................... 12

Argument..................................................................................... 13

A. Petitioners have suffered here-and-now injuries

sufficient for Article III standing ................................ 14

B. The Ninth Circuit’s exclusive focus on imminence

is doctrinally wrong and practically untenable........... 23

Conclusion ................................................................................... 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) .................................. 22

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)............................ 16, 26

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections,

607 U.S. 71 (2026) .............................................. 19, 22, 25-27

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,

564 U.S. 786 (2011).............................................................. 22

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,

568 U.S. 398 (2013)........................................................ 25, 26

DHS v. New York, 589 U.S. 1173 (2020) ............................. 28

Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA,

606 U.S. 100 (2025) ......................................... 13, 20, 22, 23

FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine,

602 U.S. 367 (2024).............................................................. 21

FEC v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289 (2022) ......................................... 25

(III)

IV

Cases—Continued:

Page

First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v.

Davenport, 608 U.S. 174 (2026) ........................................... 2

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) ....................... 15

John & Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County

Board of Education, 78 F.4th 622 (4th Cir. 2023),

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2560 (2024) ................................... 16

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

606 U.S. 522 (2025)................................. 15, 18, 20, 27, 29, 30

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ....................... 26

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ............................. 16

Mirabelli v. Bonta,

607 U.S. 492 (2026) ............................ 2, 3, 14-19, 22, 23, 29

National Park Service v. National Trust for

Historic Preservation in the United States,

No. 26A203 (Aug. 31, 2026) ............................................. 13

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle

School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) ....................... 24

Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v. Eau Claire

Area School District, Wisconsin,

145 S. Ct. 14 (2024) ............................................................. 28

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) .................. 15, 16, 18, 25

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) .... 14, 23

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) .................... 16

Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) ................. 15, 16, 25

Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019) ................... 27

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197 (2020) .................... 24

Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U.S. 46 (2025) ..................... 8

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ............................... 15

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014)........................................................ 21, 23

V

Cases—Continued:

Page

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413 (2021).................................................... 3, 13, 16

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ......................... 14, 22

Statutes:

2023 Wash. Sess. Laws:

p. 2183, ch. 408:

§ 1 .................................................................................. 5

§ 2 .................................................................................. 5

p. 2184, ch. 408:

§ 2(c)(ii) ......................................................................... 5

§ 2(d) ............................................................................. 5

Wash. Rev. Code:

§ 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i) ...................................................... 5, 6

§ 13.32A.082(1)(c)(ii) .......................................................... 5

§ 13.32A.082(1)(d) .............................................................. 5

§ 13.32A.082(2)(c) .............................................................. 5

§ 13.32A.082(3)(a) .............................................................. 6

§ 13.32A.082(3)(b) ............................................................ 14

§ 13.32A.082(3)(b)(i) .......................................................... 6

§ 13.32A.082(3)(b)(ii) ......................................................... 6

§ 13.50.100(7) ...................................................................... 6

§ 70.02.265(1) ...................................................................... 7

§ 71.24.025(11) .................................................................... 6

§ 71.34.530 .................................................................... 7, 19

§ 74.09.675 .......................................................................... 5

Miscellaneous:

Department of Children, Youth, & Families,

Washington State, Administrative Policy 6.04

(Oct. 20, 2022), https://perma.cc/YU47-VDEW ................. 6

VI

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

Seattle Children’s Hospital Research Foundation,

What Is Washington’s Mental Health Referral

Service for Children and Teens?,

https://perma.cc/5W7T-TWFC ........................................... 7

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 25-840

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS FOR ETHICAL CARE, INC.,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

BOB FERGUSON, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States has a strong interest in protecting

the rights of parents over the care, custody, and control

of their children—including with respect to what medical care those children may have access to or receive.

The United States also has a strong interest in ensuring

that proper parties can sue to enforce those parental

rights, and that improper parties cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

(1)

2

INTRODUCTION

In 2023, Washington amended its laws to “remove”

what it saw as “barriers” to runaway children seeking

“gender-affirming treatment” at the State’s licensed

shelters. Under its revised scheme, Washington will now

offer to refer such children for what the State calls “appropriate behavioral-health services”—and will do so

without first notifying the child’s parents, and regardless of their consent. Petitioners are parents whose minor children have expressed gender confusion, and who

fear that their children may take Washington up on its

offer to be connected with behavioral-health services

that would otherwise be forbidden at home.

To the extent Article III standing comes down to the

basic question—“What’s it to you?”—the parents here

have a good answer. Washington has tried to wrest

away from them the fundamental right to control what

medical care their child may access. In providing a means

for children to circumvent their parents, the State has

inserted itself into the parent-child relationship, and

has displaced the traditional authority parents otherwise possess over who decides these vital questions.

That is “more than enough to establish injury in

fact.” First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v.

Davenport, 608 U.S. 174, 189 (2026). This Court has

long held that the Constitution protects the parentchild relationship itself. As part of that relationship,

this Court has further recognized that parents have the

right to control the medical care their children may access. See Mirabelli v. Bonta, 607 U.S. 492, 497 (2026)

(per curiam). Where the government restricts that control, and displaces parents’ authority to direct and manage the medical care their child receives, that inflicts a

here-and-now injury upon objecting parents.

3

Nothing more is necessary to resolve this case.

Such a loss of a fundamental parental right is an injury

in and of itself, creating a current and ongoing constitutional harm traditionally sufficient for standing, without

more. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,

425 (2021). To have standing to sue here, parents need

not wait to be injured again, by having their child actually take advantage of the State’s offer and access some

medical treatment that the parents would have stopped.

The Ninth Circuit held otherwise, reasoning that the

parents here lacked standing because they had not

shown it was sufficiently likely their children would actually run away to a licensed shelter to obtain these services. But that decision rests on a cramped view of parental rights, which incorrectly assumes parents are injured only when their child in fact receives medical care

against their parents’ wishes. Instead, the parent-child

relationship is defined by a parent’s ongoing authority

over his or her child, and with that the right to control

the entire process of deliberation—from the discussions

leading up to a medical decision, to the permission culminating in the decision itself. When a State provides a

mechanism to “shut out” parents from part of that process, Mirabelli, 607 U.S. at 497, that alone inflicts a

here-and-now injury upon objecting parents sufficient

for standing, regardless of whether their child takes advantage of the state-revised dynamic and regardless of

whether the parents ultimately prevail on their constitutional claim. In focusing solely on whether petitioners’ children would likely run away later to seek these

services at a licensed shelter, the Ninth Circuit lost

sight of the here-and-now injury that the State’s regime

is already inflicting.

4

The decision below would also unnecessarily create a

jurisprudence of chaos. By making a child’s ultimate

likelihood of accessing a forbidden medical treatment

the analytic touchstone, the Ninth Circuit’s approach

would have standing rest on judicial guesswork about

how another person’s child may behave in the future.

Suppose a State offered mifepristone to pregnant teens,

or mastectomies to consenting minors. A standing inquiry trained upon whether another person’s child is

about to accept such an offer would require a court to

determine whether a parent’s good-faith fears are wellfounded or too speculative, even as the child’s choices

may unfold swiftly and provoke immediate, irreversible

consequences. Any cases that did not immediately become moot would force courts to resolve these fraught

questions in emergency postures.

This Court should decline that course and adopt a

simple yet narrow rule, which reflects the unique aspects of the Court’s parental-rights jurisprudence: As

soon as a State restricts parents’ control over the medical care their child may access, objecting parents have

standing to contest that change. Because objecting parents suffer a here-and-now injury from such a scheme,

there is no reason to force them to show anything further, let alone to condition standing on a parent catching his or her child sneaking out the backdoor, waiting

in a doctor’s foyer, or whatever else would be needed

under the Ninth Circuit’s approach below.

STATEMENT

A. Washington Law

Before 2023, when a child ran away to a licensed shelter in Washington, that shelter generally needed to

“contact the youth’s parent within seventy-two hours,

but preferably within twenty-four hours,” and tell the

5

parent “the whereabouts of the youth, a description of

the youth’s physical and emotional condition, and the

circumstances surrounding the youth’s contact with the

shelter.” Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i). That

notice requirement had one longstanding exception,

where there were “compelling reasons not to notify the

parent.” Ibid. Washington had defined “compelling

reasons” by reference to one set of illustrative “circumstances,” where a “parent or legal guardian will subject

the minor to abuse or neglect.” Id. § 13.32A.082(2)(c);

see Pet. App. 154a-155a (showing changes to prior law).

In 2023, however, Washington decided this parentalnotification requirement was creating a “barrier[]” for

youth “seeking certain protected health care services”

at the State’s “licensed shelter[s].” 2023 Wash. Sess.

Laws, p. 2183, ch. 408, § 1. To “remove” this “barrier[],”

ibid., Washington changed its laws governing what licensed shelters and the State’s Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) must do when a runaway child comes to such a shelter seeking “gender affirming treatment.” Id. § 2; see, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code

§ 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i), (c)(ii), and (d). Namely, the State

expanded the definition of “compelling reasons” to include whenever a “minor is seeking or receiving protected health services”—and further provided that

“protected health services” includes “gender affirming

treatment.” 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, p. 2184, ch. 408,

§ 2(c)(ii) and (d); see Wash. Rev. Code § 74.09.675 (defining “gender-affirming treatment” to include any

“service or product” that is prescribed “to an individual

to support and affirm the individual’s gender identity”).

As a result, when a runaway child seeking “genderaffirming treatment” now goes to a licensed shelter, the

shelter must no longer “notify the parent[s]”; it “must

6

instead notify” DCYF.

Wash. Rev. Code

§ 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i). DCYF must then do three things:

•

First, DCYF “shall make a good faith attempt

to notify the parent.”

Wash. Rev. Code

§ 13.32A.082(3)(a). While the law says only that

DCYF must “notify the parent that a report has

been received,” ibid., the State represents that

the substance of this notice is no different from

what a licensed shelter would give, and DCYF

would (among other things) notify parents within

72 hours and reveal the child’s location. Br. in Opp.

7, 3a-4a, 6a; see Wash. Rev. Code § 13.50.100(7).

•

Second, DCYF “shall” “[o]ffer services designed

to resolve the conflict and accomplish a reunification of the family.”

Wash. Rev. Code

§ 13.32A.082(3)(b)(ii).

•

Third, DCYF “shall” “[o]ffer to make referrals

on behalf of the minor for appropriate behavioral

health

services.”

Wash.

Rev.

Code

§ 13.32A.082(3)(b)(i). Elsewhere, the State defines “behavioral health services” to include

“mental health services.” Id. § 71.24.025(11).

As for the third item, DCYF’s obligation to make certain referrals dovetails with the Department’s general

policy of “support[ing] children and youth identifying as

transgender, gender non-conforming, and intersex who

are seeking gender-affirming medical services by * * *

[f]acilitating access to gender-affirming resources.”

DCYF, Administrative Policy 6.04 § 1(b)(vi)(E) (Oct.

20, 2022), https://perma.cc/YU47-VDEW. Should a

child follow through on one of the State’s referrals, state

law also provides that minors 13 and older “may request

and receive outpatient treatment without the consent”

7

of their parents. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.530. Moreover, should such an adolescent take up these services,

the State will generally keep that information confidential, including from the child’s parents. E.g., id.

§ 70.02.265(1); see Seattle Children’s Hospital, What Is

Washington’s Mental Health Referral Service for Children and Teens?, https://perma.cc/5W7T-TWFC (“[F]or

Teens 13+”: “As per Washington state law, we will not

share your information with your parent/guardians

without your consent.”) (last visited Sept. 14, 2026).

As the State itself describes, the purpose and effect of

this new scheme is to guarantee that runaway youth will

have the “opportunity” to obtain select services—most

relevant, state-curated and facilitated medical referrals

for “appropriate behavioral health services”—before the

child is reunited with his or her parents. See Br. in Opp.

5-8. That specific guarantee is new. Id. at 2a-3a. Again,

before 2023, licensed shelters generally contacted parents when runaway children arrived, including when

seeking “gender-affirming treatment.” The 2023 laws

were enacted to provide those children with certain

“services” before this “notification requirement” kicked

in—indeed, that was a key part of the “barrier[]” to children accessing licensed shelters that the State wanted

to “remove[].” Id. at 5-6 (quotation marks omitted). As

one legislator summed up on the Washington House

floor, these laws enable the State to “step in” and “provide a [safe] place for the child”—even if temporary—

to receive certain assistance or materials that the runaway child would not otherwise receive “from their parents.” Pet. App. 95a-96a (quoting Rep. Jamila Taylor).

B. Factual Background

Petitioners are five sets of parents who do not want

their children to receive “gender-affirming treatment”

8

or behavioral-health services that would affirm that a

person may have a “gender identity” distinct from biological sex. Pet. App. 70a-77a. Petitioners further include two nonprofit organizations—International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc., and Advocates Protecting

Children—that oppose policies like Washington’s. Id. at

69a-70a. International Partners has among its members around “two dozen parents in the State of Washington, including at least one” who has a “minor child

who experiences gender confusion, has received counseling for such, and is at risk of running away.” Id. at 69a.*

As for the plaintiff parents, four allege their teenage

children are struggling with a sense of gender different

from their biological sex. Pet. App. 70a (1C), 72a (2D),

73a (3C), 76a (5C). All of these children have exhibited

signs of gender dysphoria or “gender confusion.” Ibid.

All have socially transitioned, in some form or another,

at school. Id. at 70a (“1C’s school encouraged her to socially ‘transition’ to being recognized as a boy.”), 72a

(“The school of 2D socially transitioned her without her

parents’ knowledge.”), 74a (“3C has been experimenting with a new name and female pronouns with friends

and at school.”), 77a (“5C’s school district transitioned

her behind her parents’ back, starting in [] 8th grade.”).

Some of the children have received mental-health treatment in connection with these issues. Id. at 74a (3C has

seen a “therapist”), 76a-77a (5C was “hospitalized for

suicidality” and has seen “therapists” and “specialists”

on the subject of “gender identity and ‘transitioning’ ”).

These parents are deeply fearful that their children

may run away as a result of Washington’s new scheme

* Because this case arises from the grant of a motion to dismiss,

the amended complaint’s well-pleaded allegations are taken as true.

See, e.g., Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U.S. 46, 49 (2025).

9

in order to seek out or obtain certain medical services

that their parents would not allow them to access at

home. Pet. App. 71a, 73a, 75a, 77a. For many of the

children, that concern is not theoretical. 5C “ran away

from home” once before, following an earlier conflict

over being called “by her birth name.” Id. at 77a. 2D

has “credibly threatened to run away,” with 2D’s sibling

offering “to provide transportation to take the younger

child (too young to drive) to an environment that would

provide gender affirmation.” Id. at 72a, 101a. 3C, who

is autistic, and whose brother was encouraged to run

away “when he was still ‘identifying as a girl,’ ” was

seemingly put in a similar situation by “parents of a

school friend,” who have insisted on using 3C’s “preferred name and preferred pronouns.” Id. at 75a, 102a.

All of these parents oppose having their child “adopt

a gender identity inconsistent with [their] biological

sex” because they believe that doing so would harm

their children’s development. Pet. App. 70a; see id. at

73a, 74a, 76a-77a. At least one set of parents roots this

belief in their religious faith. Id. at 74a, 97a-99a (3A/3B).

Because of the State’s new scheme, several petitioners have already changed their parenting styles, lest

their children run away. Parent 1A has been “hesitant

to discipline 1C” or actively “disagree[] with 1C” “for

fear it will cause a rift that others might take advantage

of.” Pet. App. 71a. Likewise, Parent 2A is now “afraid

to use 2D’s given name and pronouns that match her biology in most public places, so 2A [generally] does not

use 2D’s given name in public or use any pronouns when

referring to her.” Id. at 73a. “Parents 2A and 2B avoid

talking about gender at all with 2D or near her.” Ibid.

10

C. Procedural History

1. In August 2023, shortly after Washington’s new

laws took effect, petitioners brought this suit, and filed

their amended complaint that November. See Pet. App.

66a. Among other things, petitioners claimed the

State’s new scheme violated their parental rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought declaratory

and injunctive relief to that effect. See id. at 109a-137a.

2. The district court granted respondents’ motion to

dismiss on the ground that all petitioners lacked standing. Pet. App. 28a-31a. In a brief opinion, the court asserted petitioners failed to allege any actual or imminent injury, because whether their children would run

away to a licensed shelter was ultimately “speculative,”

and accordingly not “certainly impending.” Id. at 30a.

3. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1a-27a.

As for the parents’ alleged “current injuries”—including that the laws are already chilling their parenting

styles, or causing them to self-censor their speech—the

court held these to be self-inflicted harms, because the

parents had not alleged there was a sufficient risk that

their children would otherwise run away to a licensed

shelter and even avail themselves of this new scheme.

Id. at 14a-19a. As for the parents’ alleged “future injuries,” the court held that any harms from petitioners’

children receiving “gender-affirming treatment” in the

future were too remote. Id. at 19a-25a. For much the

same reason, the court also held that the organizational

plaintiffs lacked associational standing. Id. at 25a-26a.

4. The court of appeals denied a timely petition for

panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. Pet. App. 34a.

a. Judge VanDyke dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, joined by Judge Bumatay. Pet. App.

34a-51a. In his view, the panel decision fundamentally

11

“misunderst[ood] the nature and contours of parental

rights,” which extend beyond certain discrete decisions,

and also “protect[] the parent-child relationship” itself.

Id. at 39a, 41a. He reasoned that by giving children an

effective “veto” over their parents’ decisions as to what

medical care they may access, Washington has forced

objecting parents to “navigate” a transformed parentchild relationship. Id. at 38a-39a. That fundamental

change inflicts an actual injury upon objecting parents,

because it “presently interferes with the protected parent-child relationship by subverting a parent’s authority to direct the upbringing of her child.” Id. at 44a.

Judge VanDyke further argued that the panel’s focus on imminence—that is, its decision to have standing

turn on whether parents can adequately convince a

court their child is likely to run away—is “unworkable.”

Pet. App. 48a; see id. at 35a. He explained that courts

are ill-suited to evaluate whether parents who “live[] in

fear” do so reasonably, or determine “[w]hen exactly” a

child is at risk of fleeing home to obtain a state-sponsored service. Id. at 47a-48a. The better course is to

hold that laws like Washington’s necessarily injure objecting parents—“regardless of whether [the] sword of

Damocles ever falls on [a] particular parent.” Id. at 48a.

b. Judge Tung also dissented, joined by Judges

Bumatay and VanDyke. Pet. App. 51a-65a. He agreed

that Washington’s laws inflict an “actual injury” on objecting parents. Id. at 60a n.2. He added that the

“whole point” of Washington’s scheme was to “alter”

certain parents’ behavior, or at least to give select children access to resources their parents would otherwise

forbid. Id. at 63a, 57a. In his view, because such “parents are the clear ‘targets’ of the law[s]” at issue, they

should have standing to challenge them. Id. at 57a.

12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Washington law provides that runaway minors seeking “gender-affirming treatment” can obtain referrals

from state officials for certain “behavioral-health services.” Washington provides those referrals without

first notifying the child’s parents, and regardless of

their consent. Parents who object to that usurpation of

their constitutional right to control the medical care their

child may access have Article III standing to challenge it.

A. Washington’s interference with petitioners’ ability to direct and manage their children’s medical care

inflicts a traditional harm upon them, which gives these

parents standing under this Court’s precedents. This

Court has long held that the relationship between a parent and child is itself constitutionally protected. That

includes parents’ fundamental right to decide what

medical care their child may access. When a State restricts that control, and alters the authority parents

would otherwise possess over their children, that alone

inflicts a here-and-now injury upon objecting parents.

Here, Washington has inserted itself into the parentchild relationship and meaningfully displaced parents’

control over their children’s medical care, by giving

children an independent means to access services that

would otherwise be forbidden. In shutting parents out

from this decision, and providing such information without (indeed, against) their permission, the State arrogates to itself an important aspect of the traditional parent-child relationship, and has changed the preexisting

rule that parents decide these questions of care. Nothing more is needed for standing. It does not matter

whether petitioners’ children have taken advantage of

the state-revised parenting dynamic, or will do so soon.

13

B. The Ninth Circuit held otherwise, reasoning that

petitioners lacked standing because they had failed to

establish that it was sufficiently likely that any of their

children would soon run away to a licensed shelter, and

do so in the hopes of obtaining referrals for the professional services their parents would forbid at home.

That myopic approach is wrong. In focusing solely

on a child’s future behavior, the court below lost sight

of the here-and-now injury a scheme like Washington’s

inflicts. As soon as a State restricts parents’ control

over the medical care their children may access, and

thus alters the traditional authority those parents

would otherwise possess over their children, objecting

parents suffer a current harm. The court below instead

focused entirely on downstream injuries—an approach

that would also mire courts in impossible judgment calls

on emergency timetables, with standing turning on a

court’s independent assessment of parents’ good-faith

fears that their child is really about to flee home or otherwise take a State up on a direct offer of services.

ARGUMENT

To establish Article III standing, “a plaintiff must

show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that

the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and

(iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial

relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423

(2021). Put simply, “plaintiffs must show that they possess a personal stake in the dispute and are not mere

bystanders.” Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v.

EPA, 606 U.S. 100, 110 (2025) (quotation marks omitted);

see National Park Service v. National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States, No. 26A203

(Aug. 31, 2026), slip op. 2-4.

14

Petitioners—parents of gender-confused children

who do not want those children to avail themselves of

Washington’s new referral services for gender-confused children—are the opposite of “mere bystanders.”

They have standing to challenge a scheme that, by intent and design, displaces their authority as parents to

decide what medical care their children may access. See

Mirabelli v. Bonta, 607 U.S. 492, 498 (2026) (per curiam).

A. Petitioners Have Suffered Here-And-Now Injuries

Sufficient For Article III Standing

Washington now provides that if a child runs away to

a licensed shelter seeking “gender-affirming treatment,”

the State will offer to refer that child to what it deems

“appropriate behavioral health services,” without first

notifying the parents, and regardless of whether they

consent. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(b). Petitioners object to that referral scheme, because Washington is stripping away their control over what medical

care their children may access and imposing a substitute regime that cuts parents out of key information and

decisions. Nothing more is needed for petitioners to

have standing. When a State restricts a parent’s control

over their child’s medical care, that itself inflicts a hereand-now injury upon objecting parents sufficient for

standing, regardless of whether the child later takes advantage of the law and obtains surreptitious referrals.

1. The Court has long recognized “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the

fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality

opinion); see id. at 66-67 (collecting cases). That principle of parental control includes parents’ right to “direct

the upbringing” of their children, Pierce v. Society of

15

the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925), and also bring

them up within the bonds and bounds of their “religious

beliefs,” Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 547 (2025).

This Court has further held that parents have the

fundamental right to decide the “medical care or treatment” their children may access. Parham v. J.R., 442

U.S. 584, 603 (1979); see id. at 602-604. That parental

authority naturally extends to children’s mental health

as well. Mirabelli, 607 U.S. at 497; see id. at 499 (Barrett, J., concurring). Parents accordingly have “the

right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health”—from the discussions leading up to a decision, to actually making (or

granting permission for) the decision itself. Id. at 497;

accord Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 483 (1990)

(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and

dissenting in part) (explaining parents have a right “to

participate in the upbringing of [their] own children”

and the “common law historically has given recognition

to the right of parents, not merely to be notified of their

children’s actions, but to speak and act on their behalf”).

More broadly, this Court has repeatedly held that

the Constitution protects the traditional parent-child

“relationship” itself, which is defined by the authority

that a parent holds over his or her child, and the protective obligations that arise from that role. Quilloin v.

Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). By that light, this

Court’s cases affirm that parents have an interest in the

“integrity” of the parent-child relationship, Stanley v.

Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), and accordingly, the

parental powers that shape and define that relationship.

In this sense, this Court has treated parental rights

as distinct within “our constitutional system,” because

they go beyond simply the ability to take a discrete set

16

of actions, or merely make a fixed array of significant

life decisions on behalf of one’s child. See Parham, 442

U.S. at 602. A parent’s “primary function and freedom”

is to “prepar[e]” their child for the various “obligations”

of life, not just to make a series of major choices for him.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). Because parental rights protect that parent-child relationship itself, they also encompass a parent’s ongoing “authority” over their child, Parham, 442 U.S. at 602, and

their “right [to] control” the day-to-day guidance and

protection provided to one’s children as they grow up,

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); see John

& Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 78 F.4th 622, 640-641 (4th Cir. 2023) (Niemeyer,

J., dissenting), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2560 (2024).

When a State takes away or pares back that authority,

it reaches into the home and alters a basic aspect of the

traditional parent-child relationship. See Quilloin, 434

U.S. at 255. Such an “invasion” gives rise to a traditional Article III injury. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

154, 167 (1997); accord TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425.

Mirabelli illustrates this point, and shows how the

particular nature of parental rights shapes when parents have standing to defend them. There, California

had a policy where public schools would not “tell[] [parents] about their children’s efforts to engage in gender

transitioning at school unless the children consent[ed]

to parental notification.” 607 U.S. at 493. A class of

parents who “object[ed]” brought suit, and this Court

held that those parents “very likely” had standing, “because they are objects of the challenged exclusion policies.” Id. at 498. Notably, the Court did not require the

parental class to show that each of its members had a

child with gender confusion; nor did it require they each

17

establish their schools were actively (or imminently)

participating in their child’s social transition. Instead,

the nature of the injury, shared across class members,

was more foundational: The State had intervened in the

parent-child relationship, and through its intervention,

had restricted parents’ “rights to direct the upbringing”

of their children, and control “decisions regarding their

children’s mental health.” Id. at 497. Nothing more

than that severing of the “authority” that parents would

otherwise possess was necessary. Ibid.; see id. at 498;

see also America First Legal Foundation Amicus Br. 26.

Under this Court’s cases, a parent thus may suffer

an Article III injury when the government changes a

fundamental aspect of the parent-child relationship—

not just when a child takes advantage of that new relationship, and acts against their parents’ wishes. To take

another example, suppose a State said the government

would let a child decide the medical care he receives at

a public hospital, without notice to parents, and regardless of their consent. Parents “who object[ed]” to the

State coopting their “primary authority” over such decisions would of course have standing to challenge the

State’s attempt to displace their control. Mirabelli, 607

U.S. at 497-498. They would not need to first wait until

their child was wheeled into the operating room to have

their day in court. Instead, parents suffer a concrete

harm once a State engineers a scheme that “shut[s]

[them] out of participation in decisions regarding” their

child’s medical care. Id. at 497. That restriction on parents’ preexisting control alters the traditional day-today parenting relationship to which they are entitled,

and thereby inflicts a here-and-now injury for Article III.

2. Petitioners have standing to challenge Washington’s scheme, because the scheme wrests away a critical

18

aspect of their parental authority in connection with

their children. Even on the State’s own account, Washington now guarantees that a child who runs away to a

licensed shelter and seeks “gender-affirming care” will

receive the “opportunity” to be referred to a select set

of behavioral-health professionals, curated by the State,

before the child is reunited with his or her parents. Br.

in Opp. 7-8. The impetus for this change was to restrict

parents’ control over such decisions, and ensure runaway children would have the opportunity to be referred

to and learn about certain professional services their

parents would never allow them to access. P.7, supra.

By giving children an independent means to access

these particular services—without any notice to their

parents, and regardless of their consent—the State

“shut[s] out” parents from a decision that they would

otherwise have a claim to control. See Mirabelli, 607

U.S. at 497. That is, Washington’s scheme meaningfully

“transfer[s]” “the power to make [these] decision[s]

from the parents”—and the parents alone—to their

children, who no longer need to seek parental permission to access certain medical professionals. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 603. Further, that transfer is carried

out by “authority figures” in the government telling

children that they can independently seek out certain

services without their parent’s consent and even against

their parent’s best wishes. Mahmoud, 606 U.S. at 554.

Regardless of whether such a scheme is ultimately

constitutional, objecting parents have standing to challenge it. Washington has negated parents’ asserted

right to control what medical care their children may

access, and it has inserted a state-sanctioned means for

the “unconsented facilitation of a child’s gender transition,” accomplished via referrals for services that these

19

parents would never let their children inquire into at

home. Mirabelli, 607 U.S. at 496. That usurpation effects a “[d]eparture[]” from a “preordained rule[]”

structuring the parent-child relationship—that parents

are the deciders when it comes to these vital questions

of care. See Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections,

607 U.S. 71, 78-79 (2026). Objecting parents who must

operate under that revised dynamic suffer a “particularized and concrete harm” that is “in no sense common

to all members of the public.” Ibid. It is a cognizable

here-and-now injury that itself is sufficient for standing.

3. Washington seeks to downplay its laws, stressing

that it only offers referrals, and does not itself administer “gender-affirming care to minors.” Br. in Opp. 9.

But the State empowers minors to act upon such referrals, by allowing children thirteen and older to “request

and receive outpatient treatment without the consent of

the adolescent’s parent.” Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.530.

As the State accepts, Br. in Opp. 10, petitioners challenged this too as part of the State’s overall scheme,

Pet. App. 68a. Regardless, Washington’s referral-care

distinction does not matter to the Article III inquiry.

To start, Washington’s approach to standing would

apply equally to a scheme where the government did offer surgeries or similar services at its licensed shelters.

On the State’s view, parents cannot challenge that either, at least until a family could prove that their child

is on the verge of running away to a licensed shelter in

order to get a particular surgery. Cf. Br. in Opp. 29.

At any rate, Washington’s referral services inflict an

injury upon objecting parents that is different in degree, but not kind. The State is still limiting a parent’s

right to control what medical care their child may access

and is still inserting state intermediators in the parents’

20

stead. Even if less drastic, such informational referrals

are of course consequential:

When Washington

changed its laws in 2023, it did not do so to “change

nothing.” See Diamond, 606 U.S. at 118. Instead, the

State took legislative action to ensure runaway children

seeking “gender-affirming treatment” would be guaranteed the opportunity to learn about and be directed

to professional services that would otherwise be forbidden at home (and that, apparently, the State did not

think children could adequately access before). See p.7,

supra. That action comes with the imprimatur of the

government, see Mahmoud, 606 U.S. at 553-554, and

the risk of lasting consequences, see Pet. App. 91a

(“[A]pproximately 4 of every 5 minor children with gender dysphoria see it resolve * * * if not affirmed as the

opposite sex.”). The State cannot maintain that its new

laws “remove[d] barriers” to its licensed shelters, Br. in

Opp. 5, but then insist they have no real-world effects

on the parent-child relationships to which they respond.

Rather, Washington’s scheme directly infringes on

the parent-child relationship in a manner sufficient for

standing. As a result of that scheme, parents no longer

have the same manner of control over the medical care

their child may access, but share their authority with

their children, who now hold a state-fashioned “veto,”

with which they may independently access medical services their parents would otherwise forbid. Pet. App.

38a-39a (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see America First Legal Foundation

Amicus Br. 17-19. That on its own inflicts a here-andnow injury upon objecting parents, because it restricts

what would otherwise be their ongoing control over

their child, alters a fundamental aspect of parental

power, and ultimately transforms the parent-child

21

relationship itself. That suffices for standing, regardless of whether one’s child takes advantage of the new

state-revised relationship to access objectionable care.

4. The parental-rights context also cabins this case.

As explained, parental rights occupy a special place in

this Court’s precedent, because they concern the unique

protective authority that parents have over their children, which gives parents an enforceable interest in the

integrity of the parent-child relationship itself. That

sort of interest is different in kind from a substantive

right to take (or to be free from) some discrete action.

In the latter context, it is insufficient for someone to

just hold a right and point to a law that may reach some

aspect of its exercise. For instance, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), it was not

enough for the petitioners to assert that they had a

First Amendment right to speak; they needed to show

that they intended to speak in a given manner, but for a

“credible threat of enforcement.” Id. at 161, 164-167.

Likewise, gunowners would not have automatic standing to challenge every firearm restriction, nor libertarians every new surveillance program. Cf. FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367, 391-392

(2024). A universal rule that would suggest a rightsholder must always have standing to sue “[w]henever”

a law encompasses any “individual legal right” would

thus extend far too broadly. Contra Pet. Br. 2.

The nature of parental rights, however, makes this a

different case. Because parents have an interest in the

integrity of the parent-child relationship itself, and with

it the constitutive right to maintain their traditional authority over their children, parents suffer an immediate, concrete, and cognizable harm as soon as the government alters that authority and changes the dynamic

22

within which their children will grow up. See Bellotti v.

Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638-639 (1979) (plurality opinion);

accord Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564

U.S. 786, 824-834 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (tracing history of parents’ right to direct a child’s rearing).

Besides limiting any holding to the particular nature

of the rights at stake, two other limits bear emphasis.

First, to resolve this case, this Court need not define the

full constitutional contours of parental rights or prospectively identify every type of law that would inflict a

here-and-now harm upon parents. Cf. Bost, 607 U.S. at

82 n.7. While parents have the right over the “care, custody, and control of their children,” Troxel, 530 U.S. at

66 (plurality opinion), there is of course a difference between a state program that, say, encourages children to

support the Jets over the Giants, versus one that promotes the “unconsented facilitation of a child’s gender

transition.” Mirabelli, 607 U.S. at 496. But no such linedrawing is needed to resolve this case, because it is already well-established under this Court’s precedent that

the Constitution safeguards parents’ right to control

what medical care their child may access. See id. at 497.

Second, as in Mirabelli, standing here should be limited to “parents who object” to Washington’s new

scheme, see 607 U.S. at 498, because if parents do not

exercise their right to control the medical care their

children may access, Washington has not meaningfully

changed any aspect of their parent-child relationship,

and thus has not inflicted any here-and-now injury on

households that were already operating under such

rules. In that light, while this Court has said that the

“ ‘object’ of a government regulation” “ordinarily” has

standing to challenge that regulation, Diamond, 606

U.S. at 114, it has applied that point pragmatically, and

23

it has never held a law’s “direct object” means anyone

to whom a law nominally applies, see Driehaus, 573 U.S.

at 162-167. It is thus too broad to suggest any parent of

a competent minor would have standing. Contra Pet.

Br. 29-31, 33-34. If parents do not object to a scheme

like Washington’s—or if they do not clearly come within

the reach of Washington’s law (say, they live in Maine,

or the child is an infant incapable of running away to a

licensed shelter)—the real-world “personal stake” is

missing for those parents. Diamond, 606 U.S. at 110.

But for parents like petitioners, the stake is obvious.

The “whole point” of Washington’s scheme is to take

away an important element of these parents’ decisionmaking authority over what medical care their children may access. Pet. App. 63a (Tung, J., dissenting

from the denial of rehearing en banc). These parents

vigorously object to that loss of control, because they

vigorously oppose their children being connected with

behavioral-health professionals who endorse the notion

an individual may possess a “gender identity” distinct

from biological sex. See id. at 70a-79a, 101a-103a. Petitioners are thus the very “targets” of these laws, because they are the families whose parenting dynamics

are being intentionally altered, and the ones being required to play under a different set of rules. See Diamond, 606 U.S. at 125; cf. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535-536.

Those are the parents that need, and indeed may receive, judicial “relief.” See Mirabelli, 607 U.S. at 498.

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Exclusive Focus On Imminence Is

Doctrinally Wrong And Practically Untenable

The Ninth Circuit held that petitioners lacked standing, because they failed to show it was sufficiently likely

their children would run away to a licensed shelter to

seek “gender-affirming treatment,” thus rendering

24

their current chill-based harms self-inflicted, and their

alleged future harms too remote. Pet. App. 14a-25a,

27a. That approach is erroneous and unworkable.

1. In forcing the standing analysis here to turn

purely on whether any of petitioners’ children were sufficiently likely to run away, the Ninth Circuit lost sight

of the harm that Washington’s scheme presently inflicts. As explained, when the State takes away a fundamental stick in the bundle of parental rights—here,

the right of parents to control what medical care their

child may access—that inflicts a here-and-now injury

upon objecting parents. That Article III injury exists

on its own, irrespective of how the altered parent-child

relationship transpires in practice, and regardless of

whether someone’s child in fact takes advantage of the

state-revised regime. See Pet. App. 44a-45a (VanDyke,

J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

To that end, while parental rights possess a unique

place in our constitutional system, the notion of a hereand-now harm distinct from downstream consequences

recurs across this Court’s cases. Private parties hauled

before unconstitutionally structured federal agencies,

for instance, suffer a “here-and-now injury” from being

subjected to unconstitutional agency authority, separate and apart from any additional injury from a possible adverse decision at the end of the process. Seila

Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 212 (2020) (quotation

marks omitted). Students may challenge an admissions

process tainted by racial discrimination, separate and

apart from any additional injury from being denied admission at the end of the process. Parents Involved in

Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,

551 U.S. 701, 718-719 (2007). Both shoo-in and long-shot

candidates alike may challenge changes to the rules

25

governing elections, separate and apart from any injury

from actually losing votes, let alone losing the race.

Bost, 607 U.S. at 77. In such cases, this Court has held

that a party may have an enforceable “interest” in the

integrity of a process, distinct from whether that process ultimately yields a favorable result, which gives

rise to standing when the government takes an action

that alters or corrupts that process. See id. at 82-83.

The injuries to parental rights here should confer

standing a fortiori. The Court has held that parents

have a constitutional entitlement to the traditional parent-child “relationship.” Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.

Where, as here, the government alters one of the “preordained rules” governing that relationship—a relationship of “the most fundamental significance under

our constitutional structure”—objecting parents suffer

a “particularized and concrete harm.” See Bost, 607

U.S. at 77, 79, 82; see also Pet. Br. 41-42. That is this

case: Parents ordinarily have the right to control what

medical care their child may access; in restricting that

control, Washington has altered one of the fundamental

rules governing the parent-child relationship. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-604. That suffices for standing.

The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on cases like Clapper v.

Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), is

thus misplaced, because petitioners are suffering a current harm. The defect in Clapper was the plaintiffs

“could not show that they had been or were likely to be

subjected to [the] policy [at issue].” FEC v. Cruz, 596

U.S. 289, 297 (2022). But as explained, petitioners are

subject to the State’s scheme now; it has already

reached into their homes and restricted the control parents have over the medical care their child may access.

That “invasion” itself inflicts a here-and-now injury.

26

See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167; see also Pet. App. 47a (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

This Court likewise does not need to address petitioners’ fallback arguments for satisfying imminence—

in particular, petitioners’ expansive theory of probabilistic standing. See Pet. Br. 48-53. But if it does, this

Court should reject it. Standing does not operate on a

sliding scale. Contra id. at 52. Injury and causation are

separate inquiries, and a small harm that is remote does

not become “certainly impending” if it grows larger.

See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. Nothing in Massachusetts

v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), says anything different.

Contra Pet. Br. 51-52. There, in discussing redressability, the Court reasoned that the prospect of partial

relief from an “enorm[ous]” harm satisfies that prong,

because even though such a partial remedy may not

solve the whole problem, it would still supply real-world

relief. 549 U.S. at 525-526 & n.23. That is a far cry from

declaring that attenuated injuries are somehow imminent so long as they are deemed adequately large.

2. Besides ignoring the threshold here-and-now injury a scheme like Washington’s inflicts, the Ninth Circuit’s approach would also invite unworkable and unnecessary emergency litigation in the parental-rights context. By focusing solely on the future injury that occurs

when a child actually obtains medical services against

his or her parent’s wishes, the court below adopted a

standing analysis that would turn wholly on imminence.

In practice, then, standing would depend upon a parent’s ability to convince a federal court that their child

is sufficiently likely to run away (or otherwise accept a

similar direct offer for services from a State). That approach is “practically untenable.” Bost, 607 U.S. at 79.

27

Major aspects of an imminence-focused inquiry are

unusually difficult to gauge in the parental-rights context. It is “not clear” what “specific information” parents

would need to put forth to prove their child is at a sufficiently imminent risk of fleeing home. See Mahmoud,

606 U.S. at 560. A parent’s fear that a child may run

away or take some other immediate action typically results from intuition and parental expertise—often

gleaned from an unexpected outburst or unusual behavior—none of which is the typical fodder of a federal filing.

Also unclear is how federal courts would independently assess parents’ judgments. Getting inside

the mind of someone else’s child “invites findings on

matters as to which neither judges nor anyone else”—

besides the child’s parents—“can have any confidence.”

Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 711 (2019) (quotation marks omitted). It is the sort of a “determination[]” a court is “no better qualified to make,” and in

truth is far worse equipped to do. Bost, 607 U.S. at 81.

These problems would plague all sorts of parentalrights scenarios, not just Washington’s law. Suppose a

State offered to discreetly mail mifepristone to any

pregnant minor who wants an abortifacient. It is unclear

what objecting parents are plausibly supposed to marshal to prove their pregnant child is at imminent risk of

taking the State up on its offer, especially given that (by

definition) the parents’ views diverge from their child’s.

Likewise, imagine a State provided walk-in cosmetic

surgeries for self-conscious teens. There is not a clear

line for when ordinary body-image issues translate into

an imminent risk of elective surgery. Or consider a

State with different sensibilities than Washington, which

offered “conversion therapy” for youth without telling

their parents. If parents are worried their gay child

28

might seek such therapy against their wishes, it is anyone’s guess how they are supposed to show their child

is on the brink of pursuing such a course. Finally, take

an example given by Judge VanDyke, where a State offers an “assisted-suicide-in-secret program.” Pet. App.

47a. Judges would be hard-pressed to pinpoint just how

demonstrably troubled a child must be in order for

Article III to allow his parents to bring suit.

Indeed, it is difficult to see what would be enough to

satisfy the approach below short of a child actually running away, or walking into a shelter, or found dialing the

number of a behavioral-health professional. See also

Br. in Opp. 29. Yet the upshot of such an approach is

not the guarantee of bona fide cases and controversies,

but instead a system where parents cannot get a day in

court until it is “too late.” Pet. App. 35a (VanDyke, J.,

dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

At the very least, the Ninth Circuit’s approach would

channel parental-rights-related challenges into emergency litigation. Washington agreed below that under

its view of standing, these cases would likely be resolved

in hearings for a TRO or preliminary relief. See C.A.

Oral Argument at 27:00-27:35. The result of such “expedited” proceedings will be “rushed, high-stakes, lowinformation decisions” in cases of constitutional significance. See DHS v. New York, 589 U.S. 1173, 1174 (2020)

(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay). Those

practical problems are compounded by the reality that

States often endeavor to keep parents “in the dark”

about a child’s gender confusion, thus hiding from them

the very information they would need to plead an imminent injury. Parents Protecting Our Children, UA v.

Eau Claire Area School District, 145 S. Ct. 14, 14 (2024)

29

(Alito, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari);

see p.8, supra; see also, e.g., Pet. App. 105a.

3. Washington’s position mostly echoes the Ninth

Circuit. Br. in Opp. 16-17. But at times, the State seems

to accept—as Mirabelli and Mahmoud require—that

the analysis would be different if this case involved public schools. Washington suggests if its scheme “dictated

terms” to school counselors, such that they would offer

these referrals to students on request without notifying

parents, objecting parents would have standing without

having to show anything else. Id. at 26-27; see id. at 29.

The standing inquiry should not be straightforward

in the schooling context, yet practically insurmountable

if the State moves the service across the street. First,

each case involves the same here-and-now injury: The

“challenged policies” “intru[de]” on parental rights, because they reduce the control, and alter the authority,

parents otherwise exercise over their children. Mirabelli, 607 U.S. at 496, 498; see Pet. App. 46a-48a (VanDyke, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

Moreover, whether the policy is in the school setting

or somewhere outside of it, when a State “has clearly

stated how it intends to proceed” should a child take it

up on its offer, it is typically not “realistic,” or for that

matter acceptable, to require parents to “rely on afterthe-fact” events to make their claim, especially given

that such ex post reports are by definition coming after

the harm has been inflicted. Mahmoud, 606 U.S. at 560.

That same intuition should hold here. If Montgomery

County chose to move its LGBTQ program to nearby

afterschool facilities that were open to any child who arrived, regardless of parental consent, there is no reason

the justiciability analysis should radically differ.

30

Instead, here too, parents need not “wait and see”

whether their child tries to avail himself of a program

like Washington’s in order to challenge such a program.

See Mahmoud, 606 U.S. at 560. As soon as a State restricts a parent’s control over their child’s medical care,

objecting parents have standing to contest that change.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be vacated, and this case remanded for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

HARMEET K. DHILLON

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorneys General

SARAH M. HARRIS

Deputy Solicitor General

HARRY GRAVER

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

GREGORY DOLIN

SARAH WELCH

Attorneys

SEPTEMBER 2026