Amicus Curiae Brief — International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Bob Ferguson, Governor of Washington, et al.

No. 25-840

In the Supreme Court of the United States

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS FOR ETHICAL CARE, INC.;

ADVOCATES PROTECTING CHILDREN; PARENTS 1A, 1B,

2A, 2B, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 5A, AND 5B, Petitioners,

v.

ROBERT FERGUSON, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, IN HIS

OFFICIAL CAPACITY; NICK BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL

OF WASHINGTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND TANA

SENN, SECRETARY OF THE WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF

CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY, Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR LIBERTY COUNSEL AS

AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

ANITA L. STAVER

HORATIO G. MIHET

DANIEL J. SCHMID

KRISTINA S. HEUSER

LIBERTY COUNSEL

P.O. Box 540774

Orlando, FL 32854

(407) 875-1776

MATHEW D. STAVER

Counsel of Record

LIBERTY COUNSEL

109 Second Street NE

Washington, D.C. 20002

(202) 289-1776

court@lc.org

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................. ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ....................................1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ....................................2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .................4

I. The Ninth Circuit erred in dismissing the

complaint for lack of standing. ............................. 4

II. Washington’s statutory scheme violates the

parents’ right to free exercise of religion by

providing their children the means to escape their

supervision and access irreversible medical

procedures without parental consent and in

contravention of their religious convictions....... 10

A. Washington’s statutory scheme impermissibly

burdens the parents’ right to raise their

children in a manner consistent with their

religious beliefs. ............................................. 11

B. Strict scrutiny is the appropriate test to assess

the constitutionality of the Act. .................... 12

C. Washington’s statutory scheme cannot survive

strict scrutiny because there is no compelling

state interest in hiding children away from

their parents while facilitating secret sex

change procedures, particularly where such

procedures are at odds with the parents’

religious beliefs. ............................................. 13

CONCLUSION ..................................................................17

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) .......................... 10

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)...................... 14

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508

U.S. 520 (1993) ...................................................... 13

Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (2021) ........... 13

H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) ................... 14

Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom,

141 S. Ct. 1289 (2021) ............................................. 1

Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom,

141 S. Ct. 889 (2020) ............................................... 1

Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)............ 16

Intl. Partners for Ethical Care Inc v. Ferguson,

146 F.4th 841 (9th Cir. 2025) ................................. 8

Larson v. Valente,

456 U.S. 228 (1982) ................................................. 9

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

606 U.S. 522 (2025) ........................2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).................. 16

Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) ...................... 15

Pierce v. Socy. of the Sisters of the Holy Names of

Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) .................. 14

Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth,

428 U.S. 52 (1976) ................................................. 17

School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,

374 U.S. 203 (1963) ........................................... 8, 10

Trump v. Hawaii,

585 U.S. 667 (2018) ................................................. 8

United States v. Skrmetti,

605 U.S. 495 (2025) ............................................... 12

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ..... 11, 12, 13

iii

Statutes

2023 Wash. Legis. Serv., ch. 151, § 2 (West)............. 7

2023 Wash. Legis. Serv., ch. 408, § 2 (West)............. 4

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082 .......................... 4, 7, 8

Other Authorities

Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care

Decisionmaking Authority: A Suggested Interest

Analysis, 62 Va.L.Rev. 285 (1976) ........................ 15

Goldstein, Medical Case for the Child at Risk: On

State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 Yale

L.J. 645 (1977)....................................................... 15

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Liberty Counsel is a national civil liberties

organization that provides education and legal

defense on issues relating to religious liberty, the

sanctity of life, and the family. Liberty Counsel is

committed to upholding the historical understanding

and protection of the rights to free speech and free

exercise of religion and ensuring those rights remain

an integral part of the country’s cultural identity.

Liberty Counsel has been substantially involved in

advocating for the religious liberty of Americans

whose sincerely held religious beliefs compel

adherence to Biblical positions on education, sexual

orientation, gender, and marriage. Liberty Counsel

attorneys have represented clients before this Court,

including in a number of cases in which the Free

Exercise Clause was a seminal issue, e.g., Harvest

Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 889 (2020);

Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1289

(2021), and frequently represent clients in free

exercise cases in every federal circuit court of appeals

and federal district courts. Its attorneys have also

spoken and testified before Congress on matters

relating to government infringement on First

Amendment rights.

Amicus has an interest in ensuring that

parents are not deprived of their First Amendment

right to direct the religious upbringing of their

children by overzealous state legislative majorities

1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no person other than Amicus or its counsel made a

monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation

or submission.

2

that subscribe to radical gender ideology. Parents –

not the government – are best positioned to assist

their children as they navigate questions of gender

identity that many adolescents grapple with, and

their right to do so in accordance with the dictates of

their faith must be preserved.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Just about a month after this Court

unequivocally “reject[ed] this chilling vision of the

power of the state to strip away the critical right of

parents to guide the religious development of their

children” in Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522, 559

(2025), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a

challenge to a series of Washington State laws that

require state funded agencies providing shelter to

runaway youth to hide children from their parents

and facilitate medical intervention for gender

transition and abortion without parental knowledge

or consent, even where parents object to such

interventions on the basis of their sincerely held

religious beliefs.

Although the lower court rejected the parents’

challenge to the statutory scheme on standing

grounds, the notion that parents who—consistent

with their religious beliefs, are guiding their child

away from gender transition and whose child has

threatened to or actually run away before—lack

standing to seek redress in the courts before their

child is secreted away by the State and led down an

irreversible path to living a life in contravention of the

parents’ religious beliefs is absurd.

The petitioner parents enjoy a God-given right

and mandate, protected by the First Amendment, to

3

parent their children in accordance with their

religious beliefs, and “when a deprivation of First

Amendment rights is at stake, a plaintiff need not

wait for the damage to occur before filing suit.” Id. at

559-60.

It is clearly alleged in the First Amended

Complaint that Parents 3A & 3B and 4A & 4B (“the

objecting parents”) maintain religious objections to

their respective children attempting to change their

gender to something other than their biological sex,

which was ordained by a perfect God. In spite of this

clearly articulated religious basis for these parents’

legal challenge to Washinton’s usurpation of their

parental rights, the Ninth Circuit made no mention of

the Free Exercise Clause in its decision dismissing

the action. The court below seemingly did not consider

these parents’ faith-based objections to the challenged

statutory scheme and showed no regard for the

protections afforded to them by the First Amendment.

Amicus requests that this Court grant

certiorari to make clear that parents have a First

Amendment right to direct the religious upbringing of

their children, and that this right is infringed when

the State takes physical custody of the children of fit

parents and ushers them into medical procedures

without the knowledge or consent of their parents.

This Court has already recognized that “[m]any

Americans…believe that biological sex reflects divine

creation, that sex and gender are inseparable, and

that children should be encouraged to accept their sex

and to live accordingly.” Mahmoud at 552. Because

Washington’s statutory scheme “substantially

interferes with the religious development of the

4

parents’ children and those policies pose a very real

threat of undermining the religious beliefs and

practices that the parents wish to instill in their

children,” the challenged statutes must be subjected

to strict scrutiny. Mahmoud at 565 (cleaned up). Once

that happens, the State laws necessarily fail.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The Ninth Circuit erred in dismissing the

complaint for lack of standing.

The lower court’s conclusion that the objecting

parents lacked standing to sue was clear error. The

argument that these parents did not have standing to

challenge Washington’s statutory scheme is nothing

more than a red herring. “When a deprivation of First

Amendment rights is at stake, a plaintiff need not

wait for the damage to occur before filing

suit…Instead, to pursue a pre-enforcement challenge,

a plaintiff must show that the threatened injury is

certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk

that the harm will occur.” Mahmoud at 559-60

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The

objecting parents met this standard. Accordingly,

their claims must be allowed to proceed.

The lower court summarized the challenged

statutory enactments thusly:

ESSB 5599

Enacted in 2023, ESSB 5599 approved a set

of amendments to Wash. Rev. Code §

13.32A.082. 2023 Wash. Legis. Serv., ch. 408, §

2 (West). That law, which was enacted in 1995,

sets forth a system of notification requirements

that apply when a licensed youth shelter

5

“shelters a child and knows at the time of

providing the shelter that the child is away

from a lawfully prescribed residence or home

without parental permission.” Wash. Rev. Code

§ 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i).[ ] Upon admitting such a

child, the shelter “must contact the youth's

parent within 72 hours, but preferably within

24 hours.” Id.[ ] However, in the presence of

“compelling

reasons,”

including

any

“[c]ircumstances that indicate that notifying

the parent or legal guardian will subject the

minor to abuse or neglect,” the shelter may

forego contacting the child's parents and

contact the Washington Department of

Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) instead.

Id. § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i), (2)(c)(i). Upon contact,

DCYF must “make a good faith attempt to

notify the parent that a report has been

received and offer services to the youth and the

family designed to resolve the conflict ... and

accomplish a reunification of the family.” Id. §

13.32A.082(3)(a).

ESSB 5599 adds to this framework by

creating a notification pathway that is specific

to youth “seeking or receiving protected health

care services,” including “gender-affirming

treatment” and “reproductive health care

services.” Id. § 13.32A.082(2)(c)(ii), (2)(d).[ ]

Under the existing framework set forth in

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082, licensed

shelters that took in such children were

obligated to notify their parents so long as

doing so would not “subject the minor to abuse

or neglect.” Id. § 13.32A.082(2)(c)(i). ESSB

6

5599 modifies this framework by providing

that the fact of a child's “seeking or receiving

protected health care services” creates an

additional instance in which the shelter's

obligation to notify the child's parents is

voided. Id. § 13.32A.082(2)(c)(ii). In these

situations, as when the shelter fears potential

abuse or neglect by the child's parents, the

shelter may again forego contacting the child's

parents and contact DCYF instead. Id. §

13.32A.082(1)(b)(i), (2)(c)(ii). 2

As in a case involving potential abuse or

neglect, a licensed shelter's report to DCYF will

again trigger DCYF's good-faith obligation “to

notify the parent that a report has been

received and offer services to the youth and the

family designed to resolve the conflict ... and

accomplish a reunification of the family.” Id. §

13.32A.082(3)(a). ESSB 5599 further specifies

that, if a licensed shelter notifies DCYF that it

has taken in a minor seeking or receiving

“protected health care services,” DCYF must

specifically offer two types of services. First,

DCYF must “[o]ffer to make referrals on behalf

of the minor for appropriate behavioral health

services.” Id. § 13.32A.082(3)(b)(i). Second,

DCYF must “[o]ffer services designed to resolve

the conflict and accomplish a reunification of

the family.” Id. § 13.32A.082(3)(b)(ii).

The court’s summary softens the blow. The statutory

language actually contains mandatory, not optional, language

regarding parental notification, to wit: “If there are compelling

reasons not to notify the parent, the shelter or organization must

instead notify the department.” Sec. 2(b)(i).

2

7

SHB 1406

Enacted during the same session as

ESSB 5599, SHB 1406 implements two

additional revisions to the framework set forth

in Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082. 2023 Wash.

Legis. Serv., ch. 151, § 2 (West). First, it creates

additional rules concerning DCYF's good-faith

obligation to notify a child's parents and offer

services after receiving a report of a runaway

child. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(a).

Specifically, in addition to “notify[ing] the

parent that a report has been received,” id.,

DCYF must offer “family reconciliation

services,” id., which are “services ... designed to

assess and stabilize the family with the goal of

resolving crisis and building supports, skills,

and connection to community networks and

resources,” id. § 13.32A.030(11). DCYF must

offer these services “as soon as possible, but no

later than three days, excluding weekends and

holidays, following the receipt of a report.” Id.

§ 13.32A.082(3)(a).

Second, SHB 1406 expressly recognizes

a pathway for qualifying minors to stay in a

licensed shelter for up to 90 days without

parental

permission.

See

id.

§

13.32A.082(1)(b)(i). This pathway is only

available in two situations: (1) if the shelter “is

unable to make contact with a parent despite

their notification efforts” to the parent or

DCYF, id. § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i)(A), or (2) if the

shelter “makes contact with a parent, but the

parent does not request that the child return

8

home,” id. § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i)(B). 3 In either

scenario, the shelter must re-contact DCYF,

which again must offer reconciliation services

to the family. Id. § 13.32A.082(3).

Intl. Partners for Ethical Care Inc v. Ferguson, 146

F.4th 841, 844-46 (9th Cir. 2025).

To establish standing “[i]n a case arising from

an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause, a

plaintiff must show, as in other cases, that he is

‘directly affected by the laws and practices against

which [his] complaints are directed.’” Trump v.

Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 697-98 (2018) (quoting School

Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,

224, n.9 (1963)). Here, Parents 3A & 3B—whose child

is autistic in addition to suffering from gender

confusion—allege that they have information that

their child recently arranged with a friend to leave the

home without their permission and seek refuge at a

friend’s home with a parent who is supportive of his

desired gender transition. Petition, p. 102a, ¶¶ 136137. Parents “3A and 3B also fear that should [their

child] run away to a shelter, they would be forced to

accept ‘gender affirming treatment’ for him or socially

affirm him as if he were female, such as using a

female name or pronouns, just to be allowed to bring

3 The new statutory language replaced the term ‘consent’ (of

the parent) with the caveat that ‘the parent does not request that

the child return home’, shifting the burden off of the State to

obtain parental consent and onto the parent who may not know

they have the right to request the return of their child. A parent

ignorant of the law may not make the request, in turn giving the

State carte blanche to retain custody of the child and facilitate

medical procedures in violation of the parent’s constitutional

rights.

9

him home. SB 5599 provides state actors with

arbitrary discretion to determine what 3A and 3B

would have to do to get their son back.” Id. at ¶ 41.

They also have a concern that due to his autism, he

would be easily coaxed by adults into receiving socalled “gender affirming care” without understanding

the breadth of the implications, perhaps until it is too

late. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40. Parents 4A & 4B allege that their

“children are part of social activities where they could

be especially at risk of pressure to take on an

alternate gender identity from their actual sex [and]

that their children, if they succumb to that pressure,

could run away knowing that 4A and 4B’s religious

beliefs do not support the idea that a child can change

from being a boy to a girl or from being a girl to a boy.”

Id. at ¶¶ 45-46. And the law is clear that the parents

need not wait until these direct harms caused by the

statute come to fruition to seek redress in the courts.

Mahmoud at 559-60. To require that, especially under

the circumstances presented in this case, would be

devastating not only to the objecting parents but to

the children who could quite literally have their still

developing bodies irreversibly mutilated if these

claims are not allowed to proceed until after the

anticipated harm actually comes to pass. That cannot

be what the law requires.

“The essence of the standing inquiry is whether

the parties seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction

have ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of

the controversy as to assure that concrete

adverseness which sharpens the presentation of

issues upon which the court so largely depends for

illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’”

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 238-39 (1982)

10

(internal citations omitted). There is nothing a parent

has a greater personal stake in than his or her child,

and even more so when the parent’s religious

convictions dictate how he or she is to raise that child.

“The concept of standing is a necessarily

flexible one” for this reason. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 267

(citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).

The Ninth Circuit skirted the constitutional

issues presented by this case by holding that the

objecting parents lack standing to sue. This Court

should push through the lower court’s pretextual

basis to the heart of the matter, and void

Washington’s statutory scheme as violative of the

First Amendment.

II.

Washington’s statutory scheme violates

the parents’ right to free exercise of

religion by providing their children the

means to escape their supervision and

access irreversible medical procedures

without parental consent and in

contravention

of

their

religious

convictions.

Washington’s statutory scheme substantially

interferes with the religious development of runaway

youth, thereby impermissibly burdening the parents’

religious exercise. In Mahmoud, this Court rightly

“reject[ed] [the dissent’s] chilling vision of the power

of the state to strip away the critical right of parents

to guide the religious development of their children.”

Mahmoud at 559. If “government burdens the

religious exercise of parents when it requires them to

submit their children to instruction that poses a very

real threat of undermining the religious beliefs and

11

practices that the parents wish to instill[]” (Id. at

534), how much more is the religious exercise of

parents burdened when the state absconds with their

children and provides the children with religiously

proscribed medical procedures? The court should

grant certiorari and reverse the judgment of the

Ninth Circuit.

A.

Washington’s

statutory

scheme

impermissibly burdens the parents’ right

to raise their children in a manner

consistent with their religious beliefs.

This Court held in Mahmoud that the

“[Montgomery County School] Board's introduction of

the ‘LGBTQ+-inclusive’ storybooks—combined with

its decision to withhold notice to parents and to forbid

opt outs—substantially interferes with the religious

development of their children and imposes the kind of

burden on religious exercise that Yoder found

unacceptable.” Id. at 550 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205 (1972)). Washington’s new statutory

scheme that not only withholds parental notice of

instruction regarding ideologies to which the parents

maintain opposing religious views, but actually

facilitates children’s physical transition, also without

offering religious opt outs or exceptions, imposes a far

greater burden on this sacred parental right.

The nature of the interference by the State of

Washington is more extreme than in both Yoder and

Mahmoud, and the consequences are even more dire.

“There is no dispute…that the decision-making

capacity of adolescents is developing, but not yet

complete…[and] that children's lack of maturity and

underdeveloped sense of responsibility often lead to

12

impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”

United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495, 540-41 (2025)

(Thomas, J., concurring) (cleaned up). “It is therefore

unsurprising that the risks associated with puberty

blockers and cross-sex hormones are difficult for

adolescents to comprehend and appreciate, as the

near certainty of infertility is likely to not be

appreciated until the age during which most

individuals consider having children.” Id. (cleaned

up). Notwithstanding this, the State of Washington

thought it prudent to enact a law allowing children to

run away and remain away from home for the purpose

of obtaining so-called gender affirming care without

the need for parental consent.

Washington’s statutory scheme poses “a very

real threat of undermining the religious beliefs that

the parents wish to instill in their children[,]”

(Mahmoud at 553-54), which, in turn, “present[s] the

same kind of objective danger to the free exercise of

religion” that this Court identified in Mahmoud and

in Yoder. Parental “rights are violated by government

policies that substantially interfere with the religious

development of children and…such interference…

carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger

to the free exercise of religion that the First

Amendment was designed to prevent.” Id. at 546

(cleaned up).

B.

Strict scrutiny is the appropriate test to

assess the constitutionality of the Act.

Because the “the burden imposed” upon the

objecting parents by Washington’s statutory scheme

“is of the same character as that imposed in Yoder”

(and Mahmoud), this Court “need not ask whether the

13

law at issue is neutral or generally applicable before

proceeding to strict scrutiny.” Mahmoud at 564.

The challenged statutory scheme burdens the

objecting parents’ right to direct the religious

upbringing of their children in that it directs state

employees to facilitate medical intervention for

children without the involvement of their parents,

which interventions can include irreversible

procedures and drug therapies that run afoul of the

parents’ religious beliefs and practices, and

potentially irreparably interfere with parents’ ability

to direct the religious upbringing of their children.

Because “the burden imposed is of the same character

as that imposed in Yoder, [a court] need not ask

whether the law at issue is neutral or generally

applicable before proceeding to strict scrutiny.”

Mahmoud at 561.

C.

Washington’s statutory scheme cannot

survive strict scrutiny because there is no

compelling state interest in hiding

children away from their parents while

facilitating secret sex change procedures,

particularly where such procedures are

at odds with the parents’ religious beliefs.

“To survive strict scrutiny, a government must

demonstrate that its policy ‘advances interests of the

highest order’ and is narrowly tailored to achieve

those interests.” Mahmoud at 565 (quoting Fulton v.

Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 541 (2021) and Church of

Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,

546 (1993)). It is unfathomable that sheltering a

runaway child without notifying the parents of the

child’s whereabouts, then helping the child to get

14

irreversible sex reassignment surgery or cross sex

hormones without parental consent, could be “of the

highest order.” In fact, this Court has articulated the

grave dangers of imposing these medical

interventions on children. See, e.g., Skrmetti at 532546 (Thomas, J., concurring).

“The child is not the mere creature of the state;

those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the

right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and

prepare him for additional obligations.” Pierce v. Socy.

of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,

268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). It is not for the state to stand

in the place of parents and make decisions about

children’s destiny without regard to the religiously

motivated desires of their parents. Nor do children

have an absolute right to make decisions apart from

their parents. This Court has “recognized three

reasons justifying the conclusion that the

constitutional rights of children cannot be equated

with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of

children; their inability to make critical decisions in

an informed, mature manner; and the importance of

the parental role in child rearing.” Bellotti v. Baird,

443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). Put differently, this Court

has recognized “that, during the formative years of

childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the

experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize

and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”

Id. at 635. “Consent and involvement by parents in

important decisions by minors long have been

recognized as protective of their immaturity.” Id. at

649. The graver the decision faced by the child, the

more important parental involvement becomes. See,

e.g., H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 (1981) (“The

15

Utah statute is reasonably calculated to protect

minors in appellant’s class by enhancing the potential

for parental consultation concerning a decision that

has

potentially

traumatic

and

permanent

consequences.”).

The argument that hiding children’s gender

confusion and transition from their parents is

necessary because parents may not support their

children’s espoused desire to live as members of a

different sex also fails. As this Court made clear in

Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979):

Simply because the decision of a parent is

not agreeable to a child…does not

automatically transfer the power to make

that decision from the parents to some

agency or officer of the state…Most

children, even in adolescence, simply are

not able to make sound judgments

concerning many decisions, including their

need for medical care or treatment. Parents

can and must make those judgments. The

fact that a child may balk…or complain

about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic

surgery does not diminish the parents’

authority to decide what is best for the

child.

Id. at 603-04 (citing Goldstein, Medical Case for the

Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental

Autonomy, 86 Yale L.J. 645, 664–668 (1977); Bennett,

Allocation of Child Medical Care Decisionmaking

Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62

Va.L.Rev. 285, 308 (1976)). In other words, it is not

the role of government to supplant its judgment for

16

that of parents. A majority of state legislators in the

State of Washington may think—and apparently do

think—that a minor’s choice of gender identity is in

all circumstances right and good and something to be

defended, but if a parent holds a different opinion in

accordance with the dictates of his or her faith and

conscience, it is the prerogative of the parent to deal

with the child and the situation in the manner the

parent deems appropriate.

The legislature overstepped its bounds in

enacting laws that require state agencies to facilitate

medical procedures for children without the

knowledge and consent of parents, and in secreting

the children away from the parents while such

procedures are underway. Even if we accept for

argument’s sake that parental support of a child’s

gender transition is a desirable societal norm, “it

cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the

Constitution—a desirable end cannot be promoted by

prohibited means.” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,

401 (1923). Excluding parents from such a serious

matter concerning their children is prohibited by a

parents’ First Amendment right to supervise and

direct their children consistent with the dictates of

their faith.

At bottom, it would be a departure from

precedent to hold that the State has a compelling

interest to exclude parents from the decision making

process regarding such consequential medical

decisions. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.

417, 456 (1990) (“We have concluded that the State

has a strong and legitimate interest in providing a

pregnant minor with the advice and support of a

parent during the decisional period.”) Just as

17

“permitting a child to obtain an abortion without the

counsel of an adult who has responsibility or concern

for the child would constitute an irresponsible

abdication of the State's duty to protect the welfare of

minors,” Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v.

Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-73 (1976), concealing a

child’s gender transition and depriving that child’s

parents from guiding their child through such a

physically and emotionally taxing time is equally

improper and irresponsible. Most importantly, it is

impermissible under the First Amendment.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant certiorari, review the

judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and

reverse it.

Respectfully Submitted,

ANITA L. STAVER

HORATIO G. MIHET

DANIEL J. SCHMID

KRISTINA S. HEUSER

LIBERTY COUNSEL

P.O. Box 540774

Orlando, FL 32854

(407) 875-1776

MATHEW D. STAVER

Counsel of Record

LIBERTY COUNSEL

109 Second Street NE

Washington, D.C. 20002

(202) 289-1776

court@lc.org

Counsel for Amicus

February 2026