Amicus Curiae Brief — International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Bob Ferguson, Governor of Washington, et al.
Supreme Court briefFeb 13, 2026
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No. 25-840
In the Supreme Court of the United States
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS FOR ETHICAL CARE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
BOB FERGUSON, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE
OUR DUTY–USA AND CHILD & PARENTAL
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
C. ERIN FRIDAY
OUR DUTY - USA
P.O. Box 442
San Carlos, CA
94070
MARY E. MCALISTER
Counsel of Record
Vernadette R. Broyles
Kevin R. Smith
CHILD & PARENTAL RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN
5425 Peachtree Pkwy, Suite 110
Norcross, GA 30092
(770) 448-4525
mmcalister@childparentrights.org
Counsel for Amici Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... iii
INTRODUCTION AND INTEREST OF AMICI
CURIAE ................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6
I.
II.
Washington’s Statutory Scheme Infringes
Parents’ Fundamental Right to Direct the
Upbringing of Their Children. ....................... 6
A.
The Law Is Unconstitutional on Its
Face. ........................................................ 6
B.
The Law Is Unconstitutional As
Applied to Fit Parents Who Disagree
with State Ideology. ................................ 9
Washington's Laws Violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by Depriving Parents of Their
Fundamental Rights Without Procedural
Due Process................................................... 12
A.
The Law Is Unconstitutional for
Failing to Provide Any Pre-Deprivation
Process. .................................................. 12
B.
Application of the Mathews v. Eldridge
Factors Confirms the Procedural Due
Process Violation. .................................. 14
III. The Ninth Circuit’s Standing Analysis
Creates a Chilling Effect on Parental
Rights. ........................................................... 16
ii
IV. Amicus Our Duty Members’ Stories Show
the Real Harms of Washington’s Statutory
Scheme. ......................................................... 18
Julie Barrett ................................................. 18
Diana L. ........................................................ 20
Kristina S. ..................................................... 21
Brooke G. ...................................................... 22
Katie S. ......................................................... 24
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 27
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398
(2013)...................................................................... 17
Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532(1985)................................................................ 12
FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. 289
(2022)........................................................................5
International Partners for Ethical Care Inc v.
Ferguson, 146 F.4th 841 (9th Cir. 2025) ............... 16
International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v.
Ferguson, 161 F.4th 604 (9th Cir. 2025) ..... 6, 11, 17
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
(1992)...................................................................... 16
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............. 17
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ........... 5, 14
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) ............ 3, 7, 8, 15
Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 (1944) .............7
Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1997). ..... 6, 17
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) ................. 15
Smith v. Seibly, 431 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1967)............. 23
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ... 4, 9, 13, 15, 16
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) ........ 2, 6-9, 12
United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (2025)........ 16
iv
Statutes
SB5599, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2023) ..............3
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.082..............3-5, 11, 13, 14
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.005 ................................... 23
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.505 ................................... 23
WASH. REV. CODE §70.02.010 ......................................2
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.34.500 ................................... 23
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.34.530 ................................... 23
WASH.REV. CODE §74.09.675 ............................. 2, 4, 11
Other Authorities
Abigail Shrier, When the State Comes for Your
Kids: Social Workers, Youth Shelters, and
the Threat to Parental Rights, CITY
JOURNAL, June 8, 2021 .............................. 18, 25, 26
House Floor Debate on SB 5599 (Apr. 12,
2023) (statement of Rep. Jamila Taylor) ................9
Michael Torres, We Thought She Was a Great
Teacher, CITY JOURNAL, Winter 2024 ................... 26
Senate Floor Debate on SB 5599 (Mar. 1,
2023) (statement of Sen. Marko Liias) ...................9
Wash. State Dep’t of Child., Youth & Fams.,
Admin. Policy ch. 6.04 (Oct. 20, 2022) .................. 23
Regulations
182 WASH. ADMIN. CODE 505-0211 (2024) ................ 23
1
INTRODUCTION AND
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Our Duty-USA (“Our Duty”) is a nonprofit
whose members across the United States have
varied political backgrounds, ethnicities, and sexual
orientations, but
share
the
experience
of
raising children
who formerly or currently reject
their sex. Members have had schools secretly
socially transition their children, deceive them
when they inquire about their children’s identities,
refuse to comply with their demands to cease
affirming their child’s rejection of their sex, and
report them to child welfare agencies for refusing
to endorse their child’s sex rejection. As detailed
below, some Our Duty members are directly affected
by the Washington legislative scheme at issue in
this case.
Child & Parental Rights Campaign, Inc.
(CPRC) is a nonprofit, public-interest law firm that
represents parents like Petitioner parents across the
country in challenging governmental actions that
threaten parental rights, including, as is true here, a
statutory scheme to hide children who assert a
discordant “gender identity” from fit parents. CPRC
represents parents who have challenged policies
which conceal from parents that their children are
being treated as something other than their sex at
school or who have lost custody of their gender
confused child to child protective services. The
All parties were timely notified of the filing of this brief.
This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any
party and no person or entity other than amici curiae or their
counsel has made a monetary contribution toward the brief’s
preparation or submission.
1
2
Washington statute at issue here presents an even
more dangerous scenario for parental rights as
parents can be denied custody of their children
without due process if they fail to “affirm” their child’s
asserted discordant “gender identity.”
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Washington’s 2023 revisions to its Family
Reconciliation Act (“FRA”) eviscerate
the
fundamental right of Washington parents to direct the
care and upbringing of their children, “perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” this Court
has acknowledged. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000). Washington has made that fundamental right
contingent upon parents agreeing with the state’s
viewpoint on the controversial topic of providing
“gender-affirming
treatment” 2
to
children
experiencing confusion about their sex. Parents who
do not agree with their child’s request for such
treatment stand to lose custody of their child in favor
of a state-licensed youth shelter and the Department
of Children Youth and Families (“DCYF”) with no due
process. Under Washington’s legislative scheme,
parents are no longer the guardians of their children’s
health but are obstacles to be circumvented to fulfill
Washington
law
defines
“[G]ender-affirming
treatment” as “a service or product that a health care
provider *** prescribes to an individual to support and affirm
the
individual’s
gender
identity.”
W ASH.R EV.CODE
§74.09.675(3). This includes physical or mental health
services, §70.02.010(15), including “[f]acial feminization
surgeries”; “facial gender-affirming treatment”; “tracheal
shaves, hair electrolysis,” “mastectomies, breast reductions,
breast implants, or any combination of gender-affirming
procedures,” §74.09.675(2)(b).
2
3
the child’s request and the state’s agenda to facilitate
“gender affirming” treatment.
Prior to 2023, Washington’s FRA required that
a licensed youth shelter housing a runaway minor
notify the child’s parents within 72 hours and to
provide parents with the child’s location, a description
of the child’s physical and emotional condition and the
circumstances of the youth’s contact with the shelter.
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.082 (1)(b)(i), (2)(c) (2013).
The only exception to the mandatory parental
notification requirement was “compelling reasons,”
narrowly defined as circumstances indicating that
notification would subject the minor to abuse or
neglect. That framework respected the presumption
that fit parents act in their children’s best interests
while permitting state intervention only when
genuine danger existed. Id., See Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 602 (1979)
The 2023 amendments to the FRA radically
altered the rights and obligations governing runaway
youth who say they are experiencing confusion about
their sex, transforming a framework that respected
parental rights into one that supplants them unless
the parents adhere to the state’s viewpoint on “gender
affirming treatment.” SB5599, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2023). SB5599 expanded the definition of
“compelling reasons” to delay (or deny) parental notice
to also include “[w]hen a minor is seeking or receiving
protected health care services” and expanded the
definition of “protected health care services” to include
“gender-affirming treatment[.]” WASH. REV. CODE
§§13.32A.082(2)(c)(ii), (2)(d) (2023). By defining a
minor’s pursuit of “protected health care services,”
4
including “gender affirming treatment,” as a per se
“compelling reason” to bypass parental notification,
the State created an irrebuttable presumption that
non-affirming parents are dangerous, equating
disagreement
over
controversial
medical
interventions with abuse or neglect, and authorizing
intrusions into both physical and legal custody
without any individualized finding of unfitness, even
in cases involving concededly fit, loving parents. That
is precisely the kind of practice this Court condemned
in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–53, 656–57
(1972) where the State purported to dispense with
individualized hearings and simply assume that an
unwed father was unfit when fundamental family
integrity and custodial rights were at stake.
Under SB 5599 shelters must notify DCYF
instead of parents when a minor seeks or receives
“protected health care services,” now defined to
include surgeries, hormones, and behavioral health
services intended to affirm a child’s gender identity.
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.32A.082 (2)(c)(ii), (2)(d),
74.09.675. DCYF is required to make a “good faith
attempt” to notify the parent, but not to tell the parent
where the child is or provide information on the child’s
physical and emotional condition or to return the child
pending investigation. Instead, DCYF is to “offer
services to the youth and the family designed to
resolve the conflict, including offering family
reconciliation services, and accomplish a reunification
of the family.” WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.082(3)(a).
DCYF must also “offer to make referrals on behalf of
the minor for appropriate behavioral health services;
and [o]ffer services designed to resolve the conflict and
5
accomplish a reunification of the family.” WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 13.32A.082(3)(b).
In practice, this scheme authorizes the State to
conceal children from fit parents, assume decisionmaking authority over medical and psychological
care, and condition reunification on compliance with
State-managed “conflict resolution,” all without prior
notice, a hearing, or any judicial finding of abuse or
neglect. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i),
(2)(c)(ii), (3)(a)–(b). As a result, parents may be
excluded from any decision-making and even any
contact with their child for extended periods while the
State facilitates potentially irreversible medical
interventions. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976), the parents’ fundamental interest
and the severe risk of erroneous deprivation far
outweigh
any
generalized
state
interest,
demonstrating that the revised statutes violate
procedural due process.
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling upholding the lower
court’s conclusion that the parents lacked standing
because their alleged injuries were “self-inflicted”
misconstrues standing doctrine and the nature of the
injury and assumes, without authority, that parents
inflict injury when they choose to raise their child as
their sex. See FEC v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S.
289, 296-298 (2022) (The Court squarely rejects the
idea that a plaintiff’s injury is “self-inflicted” merely
because a plaintiff engaged in conduct that triggered
the challenged restriction). Parents are the express
objects of a statutory scheme designed to sideline
“non-affirming” parents. The panel’s decision conflicts
with this Court’s precedents and the Ninth Circuit’s
6
own parental rights cases, leaving parents with no
meaningful way to invoke pre-deprivation protections
before their rights are effectively eviscerated.
See International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc. v.
Ferguson, 161 F.4th 604, 608-612 (9th Cir. 2025)
(VanDyke, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en
banc); Ram v. Rubin, 118 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (9th Cir.
1997).
This Court’s intervention is necessary to
preserve parents’ fundamental rights to direct the
upbringing of their children, restore parents’
procedural due process rights, reaffirm the sanctity of
the parent‑child relationship, and ensure that fit and
loving parents remain the primary guardians of their
children.
ARGUMENT
I.
Washington’s Statutory Scheme Infringes
Parents’ Fundamental Right to Direct the
Upbringing of Their Children.
A. The Law Is Unconstitutional on
Its Face.
As was true of the Washington statute struck
down in Troxel, the legislative scheme here is an
unconstitutional infringement on Petitioner parents’
fundamental right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel, 530
U.S. at 72. Respondents have turned this Court’s longstanding precedent on the primacy of parental rights
on its head by enacting a presumption that parents
who do not adhere to the state’s viewpoint on “genderaffirming treatment” are unfit and their children the
mere creatures of the state.
7
In Troxel, this Court confirmed the long history
of recognizing parental rights as fundamental, in
conformance with its statement in Prince v.
Massachusetts that “it is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.” 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
This Court held:
[O]ur constitutional system long ago
rejected any notion that a child is the
mere creature of the State and, on the
contrary,
asserted
that
parents
generally have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare
[their children] for additional obligations
... The law’s concept of the family rests
on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life’s difficult
decisions. More important, historically it
has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (quoting Parham 442 U.S. at
602). “Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately
cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family to further question the
ability of that parent to make the best decisions
8
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” Id.
at 68-70.
As was true of the decisional framework in
Troxel, the framework adopted by the Washington
legislature here “directly contravenes the traditional
presumption that a fit parent will act in the best
interest of his or her child” and violates the parents’
fundamental rights. Id. at 69-70. By adding a minor’s
pursuit of “protected health care services” that
includes “gender affirming treatment” to the list of
“compelling reasons,” the State has enacted a
procedural presumption that a parent is unfit for
merely disagreeing with the state’s viewpoint on
“gender-affirming treatment.” This presumption
strips that parent of his or her authority over medical
decision-making and equates refusal to consent to
“gender affirming treatment” to abuse or neglect.
With no judicial determination that the parent is
unable to adequately care for his or her children,
Washington has supplanted fit parents with the State
in the very domain where parental authority is
strongest: decisions about profound medical and
psychological interventions. As this Court said in
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657, such bypassing of an
individualized judicial determination of fitness for a
procedural presumption cannot stand. Absent a
judicial determination of unfitness, parents “retain a
substantial, if not the dominant, role” in medical and
mental health decision-making. Parham, 442 U.S. at
604.
There is no set of circumstances under which a
State may constitutionally presume that a parent is
abusive or neglectful solely because he or she declines
9
to endorse the State’s preferred “gender affirming”
protocol for a child. Under this Court’s precedents, the
State’s interest becomes compelling enough to
override the decisions of fit parents only when a court
has made an individualized finding of unfitness—not
when the legislature simply declares that a particular
ideological disagreement constitutes harm. See
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58, Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
Washington’s revised FRA is an unconstitutional
infringement on fundamental parental rights that
should be addressed by this Court.
B. The Law Is Unconstitutional As
Applied to Fit Parents Who
Disagree with State Ideology.
As applied, the revisions to Washington’s FRA
target and disempower fit parents like Petitioners
who decline to adhere to the State’s agenda. The
legislative history shows that the revisions are
operating exactly as the Legislature intended.
Sponsors of the revisions to the FRA repeatedly
described the need to overcome parental opposition to
“gender-affirming treatment.” Proponents of the bill
frequently framed recalcitrant parents as the problem
SB 5599 was designed to solve. See App.93a–97a;
Senate Floor Debate on SB 5599 (Mar. 1, 2023)
(statement of Sen. Marko Liias); House Floor Debate
on SB 5599 (Apr. 12, 2023) (statement of Rep. Jamila
Taylor). For example, Sen. Marko Liias referred to the
“opposition and hostility from their family” children
seeking these services would face and how “a family is
standing between their young person and essential
health care services.” See App.93a–97a; Senate Floor
10
Debate on SB 5599 (Mar. 1, 2023) (statement of Sen.
Marko Liias).
As Petitioner parents alleged in their Verified
Complaint, the revisions are chilling Petitioners’
exercise of their fundamental rights to direct the
upbringing of their children. (App. 70a-77a). As fit
parents who have never been found abusive or
neglectful, Petitioners are being punished for
ideological disagreement with the State’s preferred
medical orthodoxy. Petitioners have children with
gender dysphoria, including children who have
previously run away or been socially transitioned at
school, and they seek to raise their children in
accordance with their sex. Because the statute
specifically targets runaway minors “seeking or
receiving protected health care services,” including
“gender affirming treatment,” these parents face a
state-created
threat.
Ordinary
discipline,
disagreement, or refusal to submit to the belief that
their child is born wrong may prompt their children to
flee to a licensed shelter that will conceal them and
trigger DCYF’s intervention. Once in DCYF’s care and
control, the child can obtain sex-rejecting
interventions. (See Note 5) And should DCYF
conclude that the non-affirming parents should lose
custody, the assigned guardian can consent to medical
treatments opposed by the otherwise fit parents. As a
result, their parenting decisions are overridden and
their speech chilled. They refrain from trying to
return their children to comfort in their sex so that
they can avoid the extreme medical impacts of sexrejecting interventions, lest they trigger the statutory
pathway that will remove their vulnerable child from
their home. See App. 70a-77a, International Partners
11
for Ethical Care, Inc. v. Ferguson, 161 F.4th at 608
(VanDyke, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
The intrusion is all the more egregious in light of
the nature of the interventions being instituted
without parental input. As described in WASH. REV.
CODE § 74.09.675(2)(3), the “gender affirming
treatment” can include irreversible surgical and lifealtering medical interventions. The state's usurpation
of parental authority is unconscionable given the
grave and permanent consequences of the
interventions it authorizes. WASH. REV. CODE §
74.09.675(2)(3) defines “gender affirming treatment”
to include double mastectomies and genital surgeries
administered to minors without parental consent.
Supplanting parents’ choice to raise their child as his
or her sex strikes at the very heart of parental
decision-making authority, leaving life-altering
decisions for minor children to state actors with no
judicial intervention.
Reunification—if it occurs at all—comes too late.
By the time parents regain custody of children who
have exploited WASH. REV. CODE § 13.32A.082's
shelter and harboring of a runaway provisions,
irreversible medical interventions may have already
been performed. Parents are left to cope with
permanent, life-altering consequences of decisions
made by others without their consent. This
unconscionable deprivation of fundamental parental
rights cannot be justified by the respondents'
ideological goals.
12
II.
Washington's
Laws
Violate
the
Fourteenth Amendment by Depriving Parents
of
Their
Fundamental
Rights
Without
Procedural Due Process.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause requires “notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case” before the
government may infringe upon a protected liberty
interest. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 542 (1985). Washington’s statutory scheme
authorizes the deprivation of parents’ fundamental
right to care, custody and control of their children, one
of the “oldest of the fundamental liberty interests”
recognized by this Court, Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65,
without providing any pre‑deprivation process.
Under
Washington’s
revised
FRA
state‑licensed shelters and DCYF may deprive
parents of physical and legal custody by concealing
the child and assuming decision‑making authority
over “protected health care services” with no notice to
parents or opportunity to be heard. The law is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to
Petitioners.
A. The Law Is Unconstitutional for
Failing to Provide Any PreDeprivation Process.
On its face, the amended FRA creates an
established state procedure for depriving an entire
class of parents of their fundamental rights without
any pre-deprivation legal safeguards. By expanding
what constitutes “compelling reasons” to include
when a minor is “seeking or receiving protected health
13
care
services,”
including
“gender
affirming
treatment,” the statute creates a legislative
presumption that a parent who does not consent to
sex-rejecting interventions is abusive or neglectful.
Instead of providing parents with a constitutionally
required notice and an individualized hearing on
parental fitness, the revised FRA bypasses parental
notification altogether. The shelter instead notifies
DCYF when a runaway minor is seeking sex-rejecting
interventions. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.32A.082
(1)(b)(i), (2)(c)(ii), 2(d).
Washington has created the same kind of
“procedure by presumption” to determine whether
parents will retain their fundamental right to the
care, custody and control of their children that this
Court condemned in Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656–57. As
was true in Stanley, Washington is depriving parents
of their fundamental rights without any judicial
process to determine that they are unfit to exercise
those rights, a result the Stanley Court found
“repugnant” to due process. Id. at 653. “Procedure by
presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination” Id. at 656. However,
when the presumption forecloses the ability for the
parent to be found fit to exercise his rights, “it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child. It
therefore cannot stand.” Id. at 656-57.
The same must be true here where the State
displaces parental custody before it even attempts
notice. The statutory trigger operates without any
prior judicial determination that the parents are unfit
or that notifying them would endanger the child.
14
Parents are displaced based solely on a child’s
unilateral statement to shelter staff or other third
parties that he or she is “seeking or receiving
protected health care services.” See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i), (3)(a). Because the statute
authorizes deprivation of parental rights without any
pre-deprivation notice or hearing, it violates
procedural due process on its face.
B. Application of the Mathews v.
Eldridge Factors Confirms the
Procedural
Due
Process
Violation.
The nature of the process due in particular
proceedings turns on a balancing of three factors: 1)
the private interests affected by the proceeding; 2) the
risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure;
and 3) the countervailing governmental interest
supporting use of the challenged procedure. Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. Balancing those factors
in this case confirms that the statutory scheme
violates procedural due process.
First, the private interest here is paramount.
Few state actions are as severe as interference with
the parent-child relationship. Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). Although Washington has
not formally instituted deprivation proceedings or a
court entered a termination decree, concealing
children for extended periods while assuming
unilateral authority over irreversible medical
interventions operates as a de facto termination of
parental rights for as long as the State maintains
control. It is, in practical effect, the kind of “severe
15
and…irreversible” intrusion on the family that this
Court has associated with termination proceedings.
See id.
The combination of concealment, prolonged
stage-managed separation, and control over a child’s
access to sex-rejecting treatments means that, for as
long as the statutory trigger is engaged, the core
incidents of custody are effectively transferred from
the parents to the State. Parents are stripped of the
physical possession of their child and the authority to
make consequential medical and psychological
decisions even though no court has found them unfit.
That severity of intrusion places Washington’s
scheme squarely within the category of state actions
that demand the most stringent procedural
safeguards
Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is
extreme. Washington’s laws operate on a blanket
presumption that “non-affirming” parents are
dangerous, a “procedure by presumption” that
“needlessly risks running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child.” Stanley,
405 U.S. at 657. The State is facilitating potentially
irreversible medical or surgical treatments for a
minor who claims a transgender identity contrary to
the judgment of fit parents whom the Constitution
presumes act in their children’s best interests. See
Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. The probable value of
additional safeguards, such as timely notice and an
opportunity for an individualized hearing before
parental authority is displaced, is immense, because
they are the only means of ensuring that the child’s
16
circumstances and the parents’ fitness are actually
evaluated. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656–57.
Third, the State’s interest is at its weakest
when it seeks to interfere with the decisions of fit
parents, and it “registers no gain towards its declared
goals when it separates children from the custody of
fit parents.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652–53. The state’s
interest is particularly weak here where the state is
not, as was true in United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S.
495 (2025), exercising its legitimate authority to
regulate the medical profession in a way that might
affect parental rights. Instead of exercising its
legitimate
authority
to
regulate
medicine,
Washington is interfering with parental decisionmaking solely to pursue a state-imposed ideological
agenda.
That kind of legislative decree contravenes
precedent. Washington cannot transform ideological
disagreement into a compelling interest that justifies
suspending the fundamental rights of fit parents.
III. The Ninth Circuit’s Standing Analysis
Creates a Chilling Effect on Parental Rights.
The Ninth Circuit panel mischaracterized
Petitioners’ injuries as “self-inflicted.” International
Partners for Ethical Care Inc v. Ferguson, 146 F.4th
841, 849 (9th Cir. 2025). However, the parents are not
choosing to cabin their conduct and speech but are
responding to a coercive statutory scheme that
expressly subordinates their rights. When, as is true
here, the plaintiff is an object of the action (or forgone
action) at issue “there is ordinarily little question that
the action or inaction has caused him injury”. Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).
17
Here, Washington has deliberately constructed a
framework that makes the ordinary exercise of
parental authority, including refusal to consent to
sex-rejecting interventions, dangerous by routing
disfavored families into a pathway of concealment and
State-directed intervention. The resulting chilling of
Petitioners’ parenting and compelled self-censorship
are therefore present injuries fairly traceable to the
statute’s coercive design, not voluntary choices that
somehow defeat Article III standing. See
International Partners for Ethical Care, 161 F.4th at
609-611 (VanDyke, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g
en banc).
The panel also improperly dismissed the
substantial risk of future harm. Petitioners’ children
have already exhibited gender dysphoria, and the
statute creates concrete incentives for children to run
away to obtain treatment they believe they want. This
substantial risk of de facto loss of custody suffices for
standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 414 n.5 (2013) (a “substantial risk” of harm can
satisfy the injury in fact requirement); Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–25 & n.23 (2007)
(recognizing standing based on risk of serious future
injury).
Finally, the decision conflicts with the Ninth
Circuit’s own parental rights jurisprudence affirming
that the State may not interfere with the fundamental
right of parents to the care and custody of their
children without pre-deprivation notice and a
hearing. In Ram v. Rubin, the court concluded that it
was clearly established that due process required
notice and a hearing before the state interfered with
18
a parent’s custodial rights. 118 F.3d at 1310–11. By
denying standing to parents in the disfavored
category of “non-affirming” until after their children
have been concealed and their rights have been
gravely impaired, the panel nullified those
protections.
This Court’s review is necessary to make clear
that courts cannot use Article III standing to shield a
statutory scheme that prospectively abolishes
fundamental parental rights without due process of
law.
IV.
Amicus Our Duty Members’ Stories Show
the Real Harms of Washington’s Statutory
Scheme.
Stories from Our Duty members illustrate how
Washington’s statutory framework and related
policies operate in practice: they separate children
from fit parents and pressure families to “affirm”
discordant gender identities under the constant
threat of DCYF intervention, producing the very
coercion, family fragmentation, and de facto loss of
custody described above.
Julie Barrett 3
Julie Barrett’s twin daughters, H1 and H2.
experienced unspeakable sexual trauma as young
children. Unsurprisingly, the trauma resulted in
severe mental health issues. H1 began to act out
3 Abigail Shrier, When the State Comes for Your Kids: Social
Workers, Youth Shelters, and the Threat to Parental Rights, CITY
JOURNAL,
June
8,
2021,
https://www.cityjournal.org/article/when-the-state-comes-for-your-kids.
19
during Covid lockdowns when she was 14. During
youth group at her church, H1. informed her pastor
that she was suicidal, and she was brought to Seattle
Children’s Hospital. Julie expected that the hospital
would partner with her to get H1 the help that she
needed but because of Washington’s laws permitting
minors aged 13 and older to decide their own inpatient
treatment, H1 discharged herself to a homeless youth
shelter (“Center”).
Julie’s attempts to contact her daughter were
blocked by the Center, where an unlicensed social
worker helped H1 engage an attorney from Legal
Counsel for Youth and Children to fill out a petition
for Child in Need of Services that would shift legal
guardianship to the Center. Reunification was clearly
not the goal.
Neither the hospital nor the Center called
DCYF to report suspected child abuse. The Center
seized control of the child without any due process.
Julie had to engage the police to forcibly extract H1
from the Center. Ultimately, Julie placed H1 in
various out-of-state inpatient facilities, not trusting
Washington. While the healing process had additional
impediments, H1 is an adult and with the help of her
mother, is living independently and working on
getting her GED.
H2 also struggled and due to her autism and
other mental health issues, had an individualized
education program. The same Center that interfered
with H1’s relationship with her family held a
presentation for H2’s class about transgender
identities, distributing “goodie bags” including the
number for the Center.
H2 then adopted a
transgender identity which was supported by the
20
school without Julie’s knowledge. H2 acknowledged
that she did it because “trans” students were given
favored status in the class. Julie removed H2 from
school, but her mental health continued to decline. H2
used the Center’s number when she was angry about
having to clean her room. Julie was able to intervene
before the Center got H2 in its clutches and enrolled
her in an out-of-state program for troubled teens.
H2, now 19, holds a job and is in technical
school. Julie never had any charges filed against her
for child abuse, but Washington’s child-shelter system
treated her as unfit trying to wrangle her children
with no due process.
Diana L. 4
Diana L. and her family live in Washington.
When her daughter T. was age 13, Diana discovered
that T.’s school had been secretly socially
transitioning her, using pronouns and a name that did
not align with her sex. The school counselor had
lunches with T. and her other trans-identified friends
during which she solidified T.’s self-rejection. T.
expressed fear that if her parents learned of her
identity she risked rejection and harm, a sentiment
with no factual basis. Diana unenrolled her from the
school, knowing that she risked being reported to
DCYF for not affirming T., who not only was suffering
from gender dysphoria but obsessive-compulsive
disorder.
T. was also being coached online that running
away would be a solution to non-affirming parents.
To protect against potential child welfare intervention,
some Our Duty members employ pseudonyms.
4
21
Diana learned that at least two of T.’s female friends
were also adopting male identities. Diana blocked T.’s
internet access after seeing T.’s obsession with
transgenderism. Predictably, T. re-identified with her
sex (as did one of T.’s friends whose parents also
unenrolled them from the school). Diana has younger
daughters and, fearing the aggressive transgenderism
push in Washington, explored moving.
Kristina S.
Kristina S. and her family resided in
Washington until 2022, when they relocated due to
concerns regarding their minor daughter Z.’s
transgender identification and Washington’s parental
authority laws. Z., exposed to gender identity concepts
through internet content, peers, and Anime
subculture,
experienced
sudden-onset
gender
dysphoria during early adolescence with no prior
childhood indicators.
Z. initially concealed her transgender
identification while obtaining parental consent for
menstrual suppression. At age 12, Z. requested male
pronouns and name usage, to which her parents
briefly complied. Z. subsequently requested a chest
binder, a precursor to a radical mastectomy.
Following the suicide of a peer in the school’s
Rainbow Club, Kristina researched gender identity
issues. She also discovered Z. had been consuming
transgender-affirming YouTube content, using
exclusively male identification at school, and avoiding
all restroom facilities out of fear. Kristina then shared
her research findings with Z., including material
addressing transition-related harms.
22
After the family relocated from Washington,
separating her from her peer group, Z., now almost an
adult, gradually discontinued her transgender
identity.
Brooke G.
Prior to age 12, Brooke G.’s daughter A.
demonstrated typical adolescent development,
maintaining
strong
academic
performance,
participating in athletics, engaging in multiple
hobbies, and sustaining an active social network.
When school closures occurred due to COVID-19, A.’s
online activity increased, including TikTok usage.
Shortly after A.’s thirteenth birthday, she
presented her parents with a written declaration of an
obviously fabricated childhood narrative of having a
male identity. A. requested “transition,” including
surgical intervention and to stop using her given
name and sex-based pronouns.
In eighth grade, A.’s public school counselor
met with A. without parental notification or consent,
completed administrative forms changing A.’s name
and sex designation in school records. School
personnel subsequently adopted male nomenclature
and pronouns for A. and mandated student
compliance. The school inquired whether A. was
suicidal, which was a concern A. had not previously
expressed.
Following the school’s secret social transition,
A.’s behavior deteriorated significantly. Academic
performance declined, and she engaged in property
vandalism, insubordination toward educators, theft
from peers, and self-harm. A. deliberately terminated
23
existing friendships, discontinued athletic and hobby
participation, and discarded personal possessions.
In response, Brooke restricted A.’s internet
access, mandated daily outdoor activities, and
increased family socialization efforts. Brooke secured
therapeutic services focused on identifying underlying
depression rather than gender affirmation. Brooke
withdrew A. from school when it refused to treat A. as
a female.
Brooke’s strategy resulted in A.’s return to her
previous
beneficial
behavior
patterns
and
reestablishment of comfort with her sex. A. now views
her transgender identification with regret. Brooke
subsequently learned that a former peer, who was
trans-identified, had been encouraging A. to run away
from home. This would have granted A. an
opportunity to obtain sex-rejecting interventions
without parental consent, pursuant to Washington’s
RFA law, especially when DCYF takes custody from
the parents. 5
5 See Wash. State Dep’t of Child., Youth & Fams., Admin.
Policy
ch.
6.04
(Oct.
20,
2022),
https://www.dcyf.wa.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/Admin-6.04.pdf
(requiring DCYF to “[a]ssist children, youth, and young adults”
who are “[s]eeking affirming medical, behavioral, and mental
health services”); see also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.34.500, .530
(permitting minors age thirteen and older to obtain inpatient and
outpatient mental health treatment without parental consent);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.43.005, .505 (defining minors who may
obtain health care without parental consent as “protected
individuals” and requiring insurers to restrict disclosure of
gender-affirming care to policyholders); Smith v. Seibly, 431 P.2d
719, 723 (Wash. 1967) (recognizing Washington’s mature minor
doctrine); 182 WASH. ADMIN. CODE 505-0211 (2024) WASH. REV.
CODE § 7.70.065(2)(a)(ii (authorizing Apple Health coverage for
sex-related medical interventions for minors and permitting
24
Katie S.
In 2020, during sixth grade, Katie’s daughter
B. adopted a “non-binary” identity. Katie initially
believed this identity crisis to be a developmental fad;
however, the identity evolved to a transgender male
identification. Upon return to in-person instruction
during B.’s eighth-grade year following COVID-19
school closures, B. experienced significant mental
health deterioration, with documented symptoms
including severe anxiety, depression, and impaired
academic functioning and school participation.
Katie retained a therapist for B. who without
knowledge or consent employed a transgenderaffirming treatment approach. The therapist coached
B. on disclosure strategies to parents, recommended
parental use of chosen name and pronouns, and
suggested parental participation in transgender
advocacy support groups. Both parents refused to
advance the child’s false identity.
B.’s mental health continued to deteriorate,
resulting in additional diagnoses of AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and anxiety disorder
secondary to Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. These
conditions necessitated withdrawal from traditional
school enrollment, psychotropic medication, and a
partial hospitalization treatment program. Despite
documented comorbid mental health conditions, the
healthcare providers continued to cement the
maladaptive “transgender” identity.
DCYF to assume medical decision-making authority for children
in care).
25
B’s parents privately disagreed with affirming
her trans identity but refrained from expressing this
position to providers, recognizing the potential
custody implications under Washington law.
Following a suicide attempt and a provider’s
suggestion for hormone therapy, Katie and her
husband determined that accessing appropriate care
was not feasible within Washington. Recognizing the
risk of state intervention and potential loss of custody,
Katie relocated with B. to Georgia, splitting the family
into two units.
Since relocating to Georgia, B.’s identity has
regressed from transgender to non-binary, concurrent
with improvement in overall mental health status. B.
recently disclosed to Katie that had she remained in
Washington, she had planned to run away with
another female peer presenting with sex rejection.
Our Duty’s members’ experiences are not
outliers. A Pakistani immigrant father fled with his
family from Washington after Seattle Children’s
Hospital recommended that he take his very
distressed neurodivergent teenage son to a gender
clinic in 2020. Fortunately, the father was counseled
by an attorney and a trusted psychiatrist to feign
support of his son’s newly acquired “transgender”
identity to regain control over his son’s medical
treatment and avoid DCYF attempting to sever his
parental rights. 6
In 2019, a then-16-year-old daughter who
struggled with an eating disorder, had other mental
health issues and had adopted a “transgender
identity” at age 13 following a sexual assault in
6
See note 3.
26
elementary school, was admitted into a Washington
State hospital due to a suicide attempt. Her parents
explained to the hospital’s social worker that they
were not affirming her transgender identity. A kind
nurse warned the parents that the hospital’s social
worker was working to remove their control over the
child. To dodge child welfare’s involvement, the
parents immediately took their daughter home. The
young girl ultimately stopped identifying as
transgender. 7
An Indian family went into hiding when they
discovered that their daughter’s Washington teacher
was aggressively promoting the transgender identity
foisted upon her. While the family was on the run, the
school administrator contacted the parents, querying
them about their whereabouts. The teacher who had
been promoting the transgender identity emailed the
minor that she could come live with her. The family
fled back to India. 8
These experiences are the foreseeable and
intended operation of Washington’s statutory scheme
as applied to fit, “non-affirming” parents. They
underscore that the constitutional injuries are not
abstract because they have already forced families to
flee the State, split households, and endure de facto
loss of custody and decision-making authority over
their own children.
Id.
Michael Torres, We Thought She Was a Great Teacher,
JOURNAL,
Winter
2024,
https://www.cityCITY
journal.org/article/we-thought-she-was-a-great-teacher.
7
8
27
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should
grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
February 17, 2026
MARY E. MCALISTER
Counsel of Record
Vernadette R. Broyles
Kevin R. Smith
CHILD & PARENTAL RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
5425 Peachtree Pkwy, Suite 110
Norcross, GA 30092
(770) 448-4525
mmcalister@childparentrights.org
C. ERIN FRIDAY
OUR DUTY - USA
P.O. BOX 442
San Carlos, CA 94070
Counsel for Amici Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.