Amicus Curiae Brief — International Partners for Ethical Care, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Bob Ferguson, Governor of Washington, et al.

No. 25-840

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS FOR ETHICAL CARE, INC.,

ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

BOB FERGUSON, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE PARENTAL RIGHTS

FOUNDATION AND THE WAGNER CENTER

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

February 13, 2026

WILLIAM WAGNER

Counsel of Record

GREAT LAKES JUSTICE CENTER

5600 West Mount Hope Hwy

Lansing, MI 48917

(517) 643-1765

Prof.WWJD@gmail.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether parents have standing to challenge a law

or policy that deliberately displaces their decisionmaking role as to “gender transitions” of their

children, and in so doing creates present and likely

future impediments to their ability to parent their

children as they deem best for them.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...........................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................. 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................ 3

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4

STATE POLICIES THAT DELIBERATELY

DISPLACE PARENTAL DECISIONMAKING IMMEDIATELY IMPLICATE

ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION’S MOST

FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTERESTS............. 4

A. Context ........................................................... 4

B. The Parental Right to Direct the

Upbringing of Children Is a

Fundamental and Unalienable Liberty

Protected by the Constitution ........................ 6

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 18

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Page(s)

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,

508 U.S. 520 (1993) ................................................ 15

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,

414 U.S. 632 (1974) ................................................ 16

Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) .............................................. 6, 7

Fulton v. Philadelphia,

593 U. S. 522 (2021) ............................................... 15

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

606 U.S. __ (No. 24-297), slip op.

(U.S. June 27, 2025) ............................. 12, 13, 14, 15

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923) .............................. 6, 7, 8, 15, 17

Moore v. East Cleveland,

431 U.S. 494 (1977) ................................................ 16

Parham v. J. R.,

442 U.S. 584 (1979) .......................................... 16, 17

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names

of Jesus and Mary,

268 U.S. 510 (1925) ................................ 8, 10, 15, 17

Prince v. Massachusetts,

321 U.S. 158 (1944) ............................................ 8, 17

Quilloin v. Walcott,

434 U.S. 246 (1978) ................................................ 16

iv

Reno v. Flores,

507 U.S. 292 (1993) ................................................ 16

Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982) ................................................ 16

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,

431 U.S. 816 (1977) ................................................ 16

Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645 (1978) ................................................ 16

Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000) .......................... 11, 12, 15, 17, 18

Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702 (1997) ................................................ 10

Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205 (1972) .......... 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17

Statutes and Other Authorities:

U.S. Const., amend. I ...................................... 8, 13, 14

U.S. Const., amend. XIV .................... 7, 8-9, 10, 11, 12

1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries ..............................6-7

Estrada, Homeschooling in the United States:

A Seismic Parental Rights Victory,

18 Liberty L. Rev. 865 (2024) .................................. 7

2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law .............. 7

John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil

Government, 1690 .................................................... 6

v

Phillips, Liberating Liberty: How the

Glucksberg Test Can Solve the Supreme

Court’s Confusing Jurisprudence on

Parental Rights, 16 Liberty L. Rev 347

(2022), https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/

cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1319&context=lu

_law_review (last visited February 6, 2026) ......... 11

Wagner, Revisiting Divine, Natural, and

Common Law Foundations Underlying

Parental Liberty to Direct and Control the

Upbringing of Children, 5 W. Australian

Jurist 1 (2014), https://classic.austlii.edu.au/

au/journals/WAJurist/2014/1.pdf (last visited

February 6, 2026) ............................................... 7, 11

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(2)(c) ........................... 4

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(2)(d) ........................... 4

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3) ............................... 4

Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(b)(i)........................ 5

1

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY

AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, Amici Curiae,

Parental Rights Foundation and the Wagner Center

submit this brief.1

The Parental Rights Foundation (PRF) is a

national,

nonprofit,

nonpartisan

advocacy

organization with supporters in all fifty states. The

PRF is concerned about the erosion of the legal

protection of loving and fit parents to raise, nurture,

and educate their children without undue state

interference. The PRF is committed to protecting

children by preserving the liberty of their parents. It

advances this mission by educating public officials and

the broader public about the urgent need to reverse

intrusive state policies that have, in many cases,

caused more harm than benefit to children. The PRF

also works to strengthen fundamental parental rights

at all levels of government.

Housed on the campus of Spring Arbor University,

the Wagner Center serves as a national academic

voice for freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

1 Pursuant to Rule 37(2), Amici curiae gave 10-days’ notice of its

intent to file this brief to all counsel. Amici Curiae further state

that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No

person or entity, other than Amici curiae, its members or its

counsel, made a monetary contribution to the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

Most importantly for this case, the Wagner Center

works to preserve the freedom of parents to direct and

control the upbringing of their children and is a

leading academic voice in this area.

Amici Curiae hold a significant interest in the

preservation of parental rights. Amici Curiae have

special knowledge, helpful to this Court in this case,

about the inalienable fundamental nature of a

parent's right to direct and control the upbringing of

their children as it relates to Article III standing.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court should grant the Petition for Certiorari

because whether parents have standing to challenge a

state’s action that encourages or assists a child’s

gender transition without parental knowledge or

consent is a question of great and growing national

importance.

The constitutional liberty at issue here, by its very

nature, is exercised in the present, is relational rather

than episodic, and is gravely and immediately

impaired when a state deliberately supplants the

rightful

citizen

decisionmaker.

Indeed,

the

unalienable parental right to direct the upbringing of

one’s children is among the oldest and most

fundamental of these liberties. Your Amici Curiae,

therefore, address the nature of the parental liberty

that the challenged policies intentionally displace; the

gravity, immediacy, and constitutional importance of

that liberty underscore why this case warrants this

Court’s review.

4

ARGUMENT

STATE POLICIES THAT DELIBERATELY

DISPLACE PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING

IMMEDIATELY IMPLICATE ONE OF THE

CONSTITUTION’S

MOST

FUNDAMENTAL

LIBERTY INTERESTS

As outlined in the Petition, this Court should grant

the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari because the

question presented is of great and growing national

importance.

A. Context

This case arises from a challenge by parents and

child-advocacy organizations to recent amendments of

Washington law that authorize state officials and

licensed shelters to bypass fit parents when their child

seeks or receives “gender-affirming treatment” (e.g.

after running away to do so). In 2023, the State of

Washington

amended

the

State’s

Family

Reconciliation Act to permit shelters to withhold

notice from parents and instead notify the

Department of Children, Youth, and Families

whenever a runaway child seeks “protected health

care services,” including gender-affirming treatment.

See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(2)(c)–(d), and (3)

(2023); Pet. 4–6; App. 155a; App. 172a. Under the

amended regime, the State may refer a parent’s child

for behavioral health services, restrict parental access

to information regarding the child’s condition and

location, and delay family reunification for an

indeterminate period, even absent any finding of

5

abuse or neglect. See e.g., Wash. Rev. Code §

13.32A.082(3)(b)(i) (2023); Pet. 6–16; App. I; App. J;

App. K; App. L.

Petitioners

include

parents

of

children

experiencing gender confusion, several of whom have

socially transitioned at school without parental

knowledge, and one of whom previously ran away, who

assert the challenged laws presently chill their ability

to parent and create a substantial risk that the State

will facilitate medical or psychological transition of

their children over parental objection. Pet. 16–18;

App. 70a–77a.

In conclusory fashion, with no oral argument, the

district court dismissed the parents’ constitutional

claims for lack of Article III standing; the Ninth

Circuit affirmed, contending the parents’ alleged

present injuries were “self-inflicted” and that the risk

of future harm was too speculative and not sufficiently

immediate, despite a cogent dissent (from a denial of

rehearing en banc) warning that Washington’s

statutory scheme “will obliterate” parental rights if

left unreviewed. Pet. 1–3, 18–19; App 4a-5a; App. 14a–

25a; App. 28a–31a; 47a; 55a.

The Petition squarely presents a question of

standing; the answer to that question cannot be

divorced from the nature of the liberty interest

allegedly displaced. This Court has long recognized

that the constitutional liberty at issue here, by its very

nature, is exercised in the present, is relational rather

than episodic, and is gravely impaired when the State

deliberately

supplants

the

rightful

citizen

6

decisionmaker. Indeed, the parental right to direct

and control the upbringing of one’s children is among

the oldest and most fundamental of our liberties. To

assist this Court, your Amicus, therefore, addresses

the character of the parental liberty that the

challenged policies intentionally displace, because the

gravity, immediacy, and constitutional importance of

that liberty underscore why this case warrants the

Court’s review.

B. The Parental Right to Direct the

Upbringing of Children Is a Fundamental and

Unalienable

Liberty

Protected

by

the

Constitution

This Court looks to “history and tradition” in

determining Fourteenth Amendment liberty limits on

the exercise of government power. See, e.g., Dobbs v

Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 240 n.22

(2022). The liberty of parents to direct and control the

upbringing of their children is deeply rooted in the

legal history and traditions of this nation. This Court

first examined the issue of parental rights over a

century ago in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

In Meyer, the State made it unlawful to teach any

subject in languages other than English. Id. Prior to

the government's action in that case, no conflict

existed between the state and parents. The reason no

conflict existed is because deeply rooted historical and

legal traditions of the nation properly recognized the

family as the backbone of society. See e.g., John Locke,

Second Treatise of Civil Government, 1690, Sec. 56,

Sec. 63. (authority “to govern the minority of their

children” rests with parents); 1 W. Blackstone,

7

Commentaries * 447; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on

American Law * 190 (recognizing that natural bonds

of affection lead parents to act in the best interest of

the children). The deeply rooted historical and legal

traditions were well in place before the founding of our

nation and existed in the common law at the time we

ratified our Constitution. Wagner, Revisiting Divine,

Natural, and Common Law Foundations Underlying

Parental Liberty to Direct and Control the Upbringing

of Children, 5 W. Australian Jurist 1 (2014)

https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/WAJurist/20

14/1.pdf (last visited February 6, 2026); Estrada,

Homeschooling in the United States: A Seismic

Parental Rights Victory, 18 Liberty L. Rev. 865 (2024).

And see, Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 240 n.22 (looking to our

“history and tradition” in determining Fourteenth

Amendment liberty limits on the exercise of

government power).

Political and social activism in the early 20th

century sought to alter those deeply rooted historic

views on family and government. The Meyer Court

responded by holding that “it is the natural duty of the

parent to give his children education suitable to their

station in life.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. The Court

explained that “[t]he individual has certain

fundamental rights which must be respected. ... [The

individual] cannot be coerced by methods which

conflict with the Constitution — a desirable end

cannot be promoted by prohibited means.” Id. at 401.

Meyer recognized the family as the building block

of society -- rejecting Plato’s musing that “children are

to be common” as contrary to our nation’s founding. Id.

8

at 402. Meyer conclusively held that parental rights

are a constitutional right under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id. at 398.

Two years later the Court unanimously reaffirmed

that parental rights are a constitutional right under

the Fourteenth Amendment. Pierce v. Society of the

Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.

510 (1925) (striking down an Oregon law requiring

children between 8 and 16 to attend only public

schools). Building upon the foundation laid in Meyer,

the Pierce Court confirmed that “[t]he child is not the

mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and

direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high

duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional

obligations.” Pierce, 268 U.S at 535.

Later, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme

Court again recognized parental rights stating:

[i]t is cardinal with us that the

custody, care and nurture of the child

reside first in the parents, whose primary

function

and

freedom

include

preparation for obligations the state can

neither supply nor hinder. . . . It is in

recognition of this that these decisions

have respected the private realm of

family life which the state cannot enter.

321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

Thereafter, this Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder,

decisively reaffirmed the fundamental nature of

parental rights under both the First and Fourteenth

9

Amendments. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (confirming “the

fundamental interest of parents” in overturning

convictions of Amish citizens convicted of violating a

State’s compulsory attendance statute). The Court

reasoned,

“[t]he values of parental direction of

the religious upbringing and education of

their children in their early and

formative years have a high place in our

society. … Even more markedly than in

Prince, therefore, this case involves the

fundamental interest of parents, as

contrasted with that of the State, to

guide the religious future and education

of their children. The history and culture

of Western civilization reflect a strong

tradition of parental concern for the

nurture and upbringing of their children.

This primary role of the parents in the

upbringing of their children is now

established beyond debate as an

enduring American tradition.” Yoder,

406 U.S. at 213-214, 232.

After affirming the inalienable nature of the

parental rights, Yoder made clear that government

actions infringing on this constitutional liberty must

face strict scrutiny:

The essence of all that has been said

and written on the subject is that only

those interests of the highest order and

those not otherwise served can

10

overbalance legitimate claims to the free

exercise of religion. We can accept it as

settled, therefore, that, however strong

the State's interest in universal

compulsory education, it is by no means

absolute

to

the

exclusion

or

subordination of all other interests. Id. at

215.

In Washington v. Glucksberg, this Court upheld

Washington’s law banning assisted suicide. 521 U.S.

702 (1997). The Court in that case held that the

Fourteenth Amendment did not include a

fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, while

reaffirming that parental rights were a fundamental

right -- and that courts must use strict scrutiny in

reviewing governmental actions infringing upon

parental rights:

In a long line of cases, we have held

that, in addition to the specific freedoms

protected by the Bill of Rights, the

‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due

Process Clause includes the rights . . . to

direct the education and upbringing of

one's children. … The Fourteenth

Amendment forbids the government to

infringe ‘fundamental’ liberty interests

at all, no matter what process is

provided, unless the infringement is

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling

state interest. Id. at 720 - 721 (cleaned

up).

11

While physician-assisted suicide killing was not

deeply rooted in the legal history or traditions of the

nation, the right of parents to direct the upbringing and

education of their children was – and was part of our

common law at the founding of our Constitution, as

later amended by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus,

for the same reason the Court found no fundamental

right for physician-assisted suicide in the Constitution

under the Due Process Clause, it found there a

fundamental right for parents to direct the education

and upbringing of their children. See Phillips,

Liberating Liberty: How the Glucksberg Test Can

Solve the Supreme Court’s Confusing Jurisprudence

on Parental Rights, 16 Liberty L. Rev 347 (2022).

https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cg

i?article=1319&context=lu_law_review (last visited

February 6, 2026); Wagner, Revisiting Divine,

Natural, and Common Law Foundations Underlying

Parental Liberty to Direct and Control the Upbringing

of Children, 5 W. Australian Jurist 1 (2014).

https://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/WAJurist/20

14/1.pdf (last visited February 6, 2026)

In the grandparent visitation case of Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), this Court summed up

almost a century’s worth of precedence, stating,

“[t]he liberty interest at issue in this

case—the interest of parents in the care,

custody, and control of their children—is

perhaps the oldest of the fundamental

liberty interests recognized by this

Court. … In light of this extensive

precedent, it cannot now be doubted that

12

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment protects the fundamental

right of parents to make decisions

concerning the care, custody, and control

of their children. … The Due Process

Clause does not permit a State to

infringe on the fundamental right of

parents to make childrearing decisions

simply because a state judge believes a

‘better’ decision could be made.” Id. at 6566, 72-73.

Recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment

“provides heightened protection against government

interference with certain fundamental rights and

liberty interests,” a plurality of the Court in Troxel

reaffirmed the fundamental nature of parental rights

and found that the State’s nonparental visitation

statute “unconstitutionally infringe[d] on that

fundamental parental right” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 67.

While Troxel strongly reaffirmed a parent’s right to

direct and control the upbringing of their children as

a fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth

Amendment, the lack of consensus among the Justices

on the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to

government interference created a catalysis for

jurisprudential confusion. 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J.,

concurring).

In Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. __ (No. 24-297),

slip op. (U.S. June 27, 2025)) this Court recently

helped to clarify some of the jurisprudential confusion.

The Court did so by reaffirming the longstanding

recognition of parental rights as fundamental, and by

13

applying strict scrutiny to government actions

infringing on this inalienable liberty.

Focusing this time on the First Amendment,

Mahmoud reasserted the lesson in Yoder that:

A

government

burdens

the

[fundamental right] of parents when it

requires them to submit their children to

instruction that poses “a very real threat

of undermining” the ... beliefs and

practices that the parents wish to instill.

[Yoder, 406 U. S. at 218].

And a

government cannot condition the benefit

of free public education on parents’

acceptance

of

such

instruction.

Mahmoud, No. 24-297, slip op. at 1-2

In Mahmoud, the State of Maryland “introduced a

variety of LGBTQ+ inclusive storybooks into the

elementary school curriculum.” Id. The government

sought to “disrupt children’s thinking about sexuality

and gender” and to that end the government

mandated attendance of children and refused to notify

parents. Id. Relying on Yoder, the parents there

contended the government’s no parental notification /

no opt out policy “infringed on their right as parents

to the free exercise of their religion” in violation of the

First Amendment. Id at 14.

Based on the record before it, the Court agreed:

We hold that the Board’s introduction

of the “LGBTQ+-inclusive” storybooks—

14

combined with its decision to withhold

notice to parents and to forbid opt outs—

substantially

interferes

with

the

religious development of their children

and imposes the kind of burden on

religious exercise that Yoder found

unacceptable. Id. at 21-22

Relying on Yoder, the Mahmoud Court stated:

Here, the Board requires teachers to

instruct young children using storybooks

that explicitly contradict their parents’

religious views, and it encourages the

teachers to correct the children and

accuse them of being “hurtful” when they

express a degree of religious confusion.

Such instruction “carries with it

precisely the kind of objective danger to

the free exercise of religion that the First

Amendment was designed to prevent.”

Yoder, 406 U. S., at 218. (cleaned up)

Mahmoud, No. 24-297, slip op. at 26

Mahmoud confirmed that “when a law imposes a

burden of the same character as that in Yoder, strict

scrutiny is appropriate” even if the “law is neutral or

generally applicable.” Id. at 36 In Mahmoud,

the board’s policies, like the

compulsory-attendance requirement in

Yoder, substantially interfered with the

religious development of the parents’

children. And those policies pose “a very

15

real threat of undermining” the religious

beliefs and practices that the parents

wish to instill in their children. Id. at 37

Because the burden in Mahmoud was “of the exact

same character as the burden in Yoder,” the Court

applied strict scrutiny to the government action. Id.

The Court then reaffirmed that “[t]o survive strict

scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that its

policy advances interests of the highest order and is

narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.” Id.,

citing, Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. 522, 541

(2021) (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.

Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993)). (cleaned up)

Under this standard of review, the Court found

Maryland’s action unconstitutional.

The appellate court's decision cannot be reconciled

with this Court’s decisions in Meyer, Pierce, Troxel,

Yoder, and Mahmoud. As relevant to Article III

standing, the parental right to direct and control the

upbringing of one’s child is, by its nature, a present

and ongoing liberty, relational rather than episodic,

and it is gravely impaired when the State deliberately

displaces the parent as the rightful decisionmaker. If

government policy empowers officials to knowingly

contradict parents and hide vital information from

them, no way exists for the parents to guide the future,

education, or healthcare, of their children. Yoder, 406

U.S. at 232. There is also no way that the parents can

exercise “parental concern for the nurture and

upbringing of their children.” Id.

16

Indeed,

the

appellate

court’s

reasoning

undermines the core teaching of this Court’s decision

in Yoder, and the Supreme Court’s recognition that

parents, not government officials are the ones with the

“primary role … in the upbringing of their children…”

Id. See also, Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,

414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974) (confirming “freedom of

personal choice in matters of marriage and family life”

as constitutionally protected liberties); Moore v. East

Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (holding that

“the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this

Nation’s history and tradition.”; Smith v.

Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845

(1977) (documenting the fundamental nature of

liberty associated with family matters as deeply

rooted in history and tradition of the American nation,

predating even the Bill of Rights); Quilloin v. Walcott,

434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (confirming that “the

relationship

between

parent

and

child

is

constitutionally protected”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405

U.S. 645, 651 (1978) (reaffirming the fundamental

nature of parental rights); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S.

584, 602-604 (1979) (reaffirming the fundamental

nature of parental rights, rejecting “any notion that a

child is the mere creature of the State”); Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 760 (1982) (reaffirming

“[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents

in the care, custody, and management of their child);

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-304 (1993)

(confirming that parental rights must be respected as

a constitutional limit on the exercise of state power,

even if nonparents think they would do a better job

making decisions for a child than the child’s parents).

17

This Court’s parental-rights jurisprudence has

long treated the authority of parents to direct the

upbringing of their children as a liberty exercised

continuously and embedded in the parent–child

relationship itself, rather than as a right that arises

only at isolated decision points or formal proceedings.

In cases like Meyer, Pierce, Prince, Yoder, Troxel, and

Parham, for example, the Court consistently

understood parental authority as operating

throughout the process of upbringing, informing daily

guidance, moral formation, education, and medical

decision-making, not merely at the moment of a final

outcome. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66

(plurality) (citing a long line of this Court’s precedents

emphasizing the “fundamental right of parents to

make decisions concerning the care, custody, and

control of their children” as a matter of ongoing

judgment and recognizing parents as the presumptive

decisionmakers

for

their

children).

This

understanding reflects an implicit but settled premise

of the Court’s cases: parental rights are present and

ongoing, relational rather than episodic, and integral

to the structure of family life protected by the

Constitution.

Consistent with that understanding, the Court has

treated the constitutional injury to parental rights as

occurring when the State deliberately displaces

parents as the primary decisionmakers, not merely

when the State imposes a final or irreversible

outcome. For example, in Pierce, the injury lay in the

State’s effort to “standardize” children by supplanting

parental choice; in Yoder, it arose from the State’s

override of parental direction in education; and in

18

Troxel, from a court’s substitution of its own judgment

for that of a fit parent. In each instance, the

constitutional problem was not simply what decision

was reached, but who was authorized to decide. That

framing is especially important in the Article III

standing context, because a governmental reordering

of decision-making authority inflicts a concrete injury

at the moment parental judgment is supplanted, even

before downstream consequences materialize. This

Court’s cases thus recognize that when the State

assumes control over decisions the Constitution

entrusts to parents, the injury to the parental liberty

interest is immediate, concrete, and real.

A century of U.S. Supreme Court precedents firmly

establishes that the Constitution protects the right of

a parent to direct and control the upbringing of their

children as a fundamental right.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Amici Curiae urge this

Court to grant the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM WAGNER

Counsel of Record

Great Lakes Justice Center

5600 West Mount Hope Hwy

Lansing, MI 48917

(517) 643-1765

Prof.WWJD@gmail.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae