Amicus Curiae Brief — Eric Tyrell Johnson, Petitioner v. United States

No. 25-774

In the

Supreme Court of the United States



ERIC TYRELL JOHNSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Respondent.



On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit



BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

RESTORE THE FOURTH, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER



MAHESHA P. SUBBARAMAN

Counsel of Record

SUBBARAMAN PLLC

80 S. 8th St., Ste. 900

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 315-9210

mps@subblaw.com

February 2, 2026

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities ................................................

ii

Interest of the Amicus Curiae ................................

1

Summary of the Argument .....................................

2

Argument ................................................................

3

I. The Court should grant review to uphold

the central place of history and common

law in Fourth Amendment cases ................

3

II. The Court should grant review to uphold

the common law’s egalitarian maxim that

“every man’s house is his castle” .................

8

Conclusion ............................................................... 16

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025) ............................ 1

Bovat v. Vermont, 141 S. Ct. 22 (2020) ...................... 6

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ........... 3, 5

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ......... 7

Bruce v. Rawlins (C.P. 1770), reported in:

3 GEORGE WILSON, REPORTS OF THE

CASES ARGUED & ADJUDGED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS (1792) ........................ 10

Carpenter v. United States,

585 U.S. 296 (2018) ................................. 3, 4, 5, 12

Case v. Montana,

No. 24-624, 2026 LX 97314

(U.S. Jan. 14, 2026) ........................................... 7, 8

Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586 (2018) .................. 15

Conejo Arias v. Noem,

No. 5:26-cv-415, slip op.

(W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2026) (ECF No. 9) ................. 7

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) ..................... 14

Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) ................. 10

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)............ 7

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) ......... 1, 3, 5

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013)...................... 5

Mumford v. Iowa, 146 S. Ct. 92 (2025) .................. 6, 7

Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816) ...................... 12

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont’d

Page(s)

CASES—CONT’D

People v. Glennon,

74 N.Y.S. 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902) ..................... 14

Pierce v. Hicks, 34 Ga. 259 (1866) ............................ 13

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014)..................... 5

Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604) ...... 8, 9

State v. Bovat, 224 A.3d 103 (Vt. 2019) ..................... 6

State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018) ....... 1

State v. Goode, 41 S.E. 3 (N.C. 1902) ................... 8, 13

State v. Mumford, 14 N.W.3d 346 (Iowa 2024)...... 6, 7

Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) ....................... 1

United States v. Carloss,

818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................. 16

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) .............. 3

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) .............. 4

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) ........ 5, 15

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ..... 16

United States v. Whitaker,

820 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2016) ............................... 15

Verdun v. City of San Diego,

51 F.4th 1033 (9th Cir. 2022) ................................ 6

Verdun v. City of San Diego, 144 S. Ct. 73 (2023) ..... 6

Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) ...................... 4

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) ................... 9

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—cont’d

Page(s)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. CONST. amend. IV ..........................1–9, 12, 14–16

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN

(Charles Monroe trans., 1904) .............................. 8

3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES (1878).............................. 12

3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND (1768) ................................................ 9

4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND (1768) ................................................ 9

15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND

(T.C. Hansard ed., 1813) ..................................... 10

HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL

MAXIMS (1845) ....................................................... 8

John Adams, ‘Abstract of the Argument’

(ca. Apr. 1761), FOUNDERS ONLINE ..................... 11

T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS (1878) .............................................. 12

1

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 1

Restore the Fourth, Inc. is a non-partisan

nonprofit dedicated to robust enforcement of the

Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of privacy in one’s

person, home, papers, and effects. Restore the Fourth

oversees a nationwide series of local chapters whose

membership includes lawyers, academics, advocates,

and ordinary citizens. Restore the Fourth also files

amicus briefs in Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g.,

Brief of Amicus Curiae Restore the Fourth, Inc. in

Support of Neither Party, Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73

(2025) (No. 23-1239); Brief of Amicus Curiae Restore

the Fourth, Inc. in Support of the Petitioner, Torres v.

Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021) (No. 19-292).

Restore the Fourth is interested in Johnson

because the decision below erodes the “firm line” that

the Fourth Amendment draws “at the entrance to the

house.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).

“[P]eople cannot be secure in their homes—whether

the home is an apartment, a townhome, or a singlefamily house—if trained [police] dogs can sniff the

immediate surroundings of those dwellings without a

search warrant.” State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512,

528 (Minn. 2018) (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). Yet, the

decision below denies this security to persons who live

in apartments accessed via common hallways.

App.11a–17a. This conclusion demeans the privacy

that the Framers fought so hard to guarantee.

1

This amicus brief is filed with timely notice to all parties.

S. Ct. R. 37.2(a). No counsel for a party wrote this amicus brief

in whole or in part; nor has any person or any entity, other than

Restore the Fourth and its counsel, contributed money intended

to fund the preparation or submission of this amicus brief.

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

“Every man’s house is his castle.”

In this simple expression resides centuries of

accumulated legal wisdom that privacy of the home

must be protected against unwarranted intrusions no

matter the particular form a given “home” may take.

The Fourth Amendment incorporates this wisdom in

its guarantee of “the right of the people to be secure in

their … houses … against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” With this text, the Framers enshrined a

right whose preservation could be readily assured by

reference to both history and common law.

The decision below demolishes this safeguard.

Affirming a warrantless canine sniff of the front door

to an apartment, the Fourth Circuit concludes that

constitutional protection against this kind of search

depends on having a private porch (or its equivalent).

This holding defies the castle maxim’s prescription of

legal equality among homes, precluding architecture

from obscuring substance. For this reason alone, the

Court should grant review here and reverse.

At the same time, the Fourth Circuit’s disregard

of any source of history or common law tradition in its

decision-making points to a much deeper problem

requiring the Court’s attention. Despite this Court’s

repeated admonition over the last two decades that

history and common law matter in the assessment of

Fourth Amendment protections, lower courts have

allowed mere judicial intuition to control (and erode)

these protections in case after case. This case affords

a substantive opportunity to fix this problem.

3

ARGUMENT

I.

The Court should grant review to uphold

the central place of history and common

law in Fourth Amendment cases.

“[A]fter consulting the lessons of history,” the

Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment “to place

obstacles in the way of a too permeating police

surveillance.” United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,

595 (1948). The Fourth Amendment subsequently

prohibits all “unreasonable searches”—a protection

“watchful [of] the constitutional rights of the citizen”

against “stealthy encroachments thereon.” Boyd v.

United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). And over the

last 20 years, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that

the vitality of this protection hinges on courts taking

“the long view,” from “the original meaning of the

Fourth Amendment forward.” Kyllo v. United States,

533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); see, e.g., Carpenter v. United

States, 585 U.S. 296, 305 (2018) (“We have kept …

attention to Founding-era understandings in mind

when applying the Fourth Amendment ….”).

The problem is: “[lower] courts are pretty rusty

at applying the traditional approach to the Fourth

Amendment.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 398 (Gorsuch, J.,

dissenting). The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in this case

exemplifies this reality. Addressing the Fourth

Amendment rights of persons living in apartments

accessed via common hallways, the opinion concludes

the traditional approach poses no bar to warrantless

canine sniffs of apartment doors to detect narcotics.

App.11a–17a. So what historical evidence from the

4

founding era or common law lessons does the opinion

cite to support this conclusion? See Virginia v. Moore,

553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008) (“In determining whether a

search or seizure is unreasonable, we begin with

history. We look to the statutes and common law of

the founding era to determine the norms that the

Fourth Amendment was meant to preserve.”).

Absolutely none. See App.11a–17a.

The words “history” and “common law” do not

appear even once in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion. Id.

The opinion’s application of the traditional approach

(or “property-based approach,” as the opinion calls it)

instead consists solely of judicial intuition. App.11a.

The opinion invokes United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.

294 (1987)—a case decided by the Court at a time

when judicial intuition monopolized the evaluation of

Fourth Amendment rights under the inkblot phrase

“reasonable expectations of privacy.” Carpenter, 585

U.S. at 386 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In Dunn, the

Court named “[four] factors that bear upon whether

an individual reasonably may expect that an

area in question should be treated as the home

itself” for Fourth Amendment purposes. 480 U.S. at

300 (bold added). Applying these factors, the opinion

below finds that the area “just outside” the front door

of Petitioner’s apartment “is not properly treated

‘as part of the home itself.’” See App.11a–17a.

The result is another contribution to an already

“unbelievable … [Fourth Amendment] jurisprudence”

that “undermin[es] public confidence in the courts.”

Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 394 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

This jurisprudence proclaims that “a police helicopter

5

hovering 400 feet above a person’s property invades

no reasonable expectation of privacy” and “people

[who] spot[] a neighbor rummaging through their

garbage would think they lack[] reasonable grounds to

confront the rummager.” Id. at 394–95. To these jawdropping takes, the Fourth Circuit now adds the

conclusion that an apartment-dweller’s front door is

less secure against warrantless searches than his

luggage because only “physical [police] manipulation

of soft luggage from the outside invades a reasonable

expectation of privacy.” See App.9a–10a n.5.

It never occurs to the Fourth Circuit to ask: had

British agents during the founding era asserted the

power to inspect house doors abutting public roads for

odors of contraband (e.g., untaxed liquor), would the

same American revolutionaries “who proposed” the

Fourth Amendment “have approved?” Boyd, 116 U.S.

at 635. But asking this question—no matter the

answer—is “an irreducible constitutional minimum”

in search-and-seizure cases. United States v. Jones,

565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

Even when the Framers could have barely imagined

the conduct at issue (like smartphone inspections),

courts remain bound to consider whether the conduct

treads upon “the protection for which the Founders

fought.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014);

see, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013)

(Scalia, J. dissenting) (asking in DNA collection case

whether the Framers “would have … open[ed] their

mouths for royal inspection”). Otherwise, the Fourth

Amendment no longer serves its most basic function:

to preserve that baseline “degree of privacy against

government that existed” when the Framers adopted

the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.

6

Yet, as Fourth Circuit shows here, the dominant

instinct of courts today is to disregard (if not disdain)

both history and common law in Fourth Amendment

cases. When drivers challenge the blanket use of tire

chalking to enforce parking limits as a suspicionless

search contrary to founding-era history, the Ninth

Circuit derides the claim as “grandiose.” See Verdun

v. City of San Diego, 51 F.4th 1033, 1046 (9th Cir.

2022); but see id. at 1055 (Bumatay, J., dissenting)

(concluding blanket tire chalking is an “unreasonable

search” given extensive “historical evidence” of the

Framers’ “aversion to suspicionless searches”). When

a homeowner challenges a game warden’s 15-minute

warrantless driveway peek into a closed garage, the

Vermont Supreme Court rules the homeowner has no

reasonable expectation of privacy, disregarding more

protective common law standards. See State v. Bovat,

224 A.3d 103, 106–09 (Vt. 2019); but see id. at 109,

114–16 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting) (concluding game

warden’s conduct was “an unconstitutional search”

because common law norms preclude “warrantless

search[es] within the curtilage [of a home] even in an

area that is impliedly held open to the public”).

Addressing a certiorari petition in the latter case,

three members of the Court exclaimed that the Fourth

Amendment’s “historic protections … demand more

respect.” Bovat v. Vermont, 141 S. Ct. 22, 24 (2020)

(statement of Gorsuch, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ.). But

the Court still denied review. See id. at 22. So too in

the tire-chalking case and in other cases disregarding

or diminishing the traditional approach to the Fourth

Amendment. See Verdun v. City of San Diego, 144 S.

Ct. 73 (2023) (cert. denial); see also, e.g., State v.

Mumford, 14 N.W.3d 346, 352–53 (Iowa 2024)

7

(upholding canine sniff of car interior without review

of history or common law), cert. denied sub nom.

Mumford v. Iowa, 146 S. Ct. 92 (2025).

This reality has not been lost on lower courts—or

on the government. “[A]ny privilege of search

and seizure without warrant” that the Court leaves

standing, the government “will push to the limit.”

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949)

(Jackson, J., dissenting). Disregard of history and

common law in applying the Fourth Amendment has

thus reached the point where the government needs

to be reminded that home entry “must … as a rule …

be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman.”

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see

Conejo Arias v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-415, op. at 2 (W.D.

Tex. Jan. 31, 2026) (ECF No. 9) (“Civics lesson to the

government: [a]dministrative warrants issued by the

executive … to itself do not pass [muster].”).

In Case v. Montana, No. 24-624, 2026 LX 97314

(U.S. Jan. 14, 2026), Justice Gorsuch observes that

“application of the Fourth Amendment ought to be

informed by the common law’s lessons” and that any

“confusion” on this point “cannot last forever.” Id. at

*24 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). “[A] question lingers:

Why?” Id. at *22. So long as lower courts may rely on

this Court’s lassitude in enforcing the traditional

approach to the Fourth Amendment, lower courts will

continue to make search-and-seizure cases about

“nothing more than current judicial instincts.” Id. at

*24. To show that Fourth Amendment rights do not

“hang on so thin a thread,” the Court should review

Johnson—a case in which the common law’s lessons

make all the difference, as detailed below. Id.

8

II.

The Court should grant review to uphold

the common law’s egalitarian maxim that

“every man’s house is his castle.”

This Court has long recognized that at the “very

core” of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against

“unreasonable searches and seizures” is “the right of

a man to retreat into his own home and there be free

from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Case,

2026 LX 97314, at *8. This right carries forward a

lesson going back nearly 1,500 years to Justinian I’s

codification of Roman law (Corpus Juris Civilis). See

State v. Goode, 41 S.E. 3, 5 (N.C. 1902). On the use of

legal process (called a “citation”) to compel persons to

appear “for the purpose of a trial” (de in jus vocando),

Justinian’s codification declared: “[m]ost writers hold

that it is not lawful to cite any person from his own

house; a man’s house, they say, being his most secure

shelter and retreat, so … anyone who should cite him

out of it must be held to be using violence.” 2

So was born the legal maxim domus sua cuique

est tutissimum refugium: “every man’s house is his

castle.” 3 See Goode, 41 S.E. at 5. In 1604. Semayne’s

Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) cemented the concept in

English common law. Resolving a dispute over the

authority of sheriffs to enter a home and seize goods

upon legal process, Semayne’s Case pronounced the

baseline that every person’s “house … is to him ... his

castle and fortress … for his defense against injury

and violence, as for his repose.” Id. at 195.

2

See 1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 73, 78 (Charles Monroe trans.,

1904), https://tinyurl.com/yc7u72z8.

3

HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 143–45

(1845), https://tinyurl.com/4wu938u5.

9

The force of this principle then imposed limits on

even the King. Before a sheriff could break into a

house “either to arrest … or to do other execution of

the [King’s] process,” the sheriff had to “signify the

cause of his coming, and to make [a] request to open

doors.” Id.; see Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930–

31 (1995) (discussing Semayne’s Case in holding that

the “common-law knock and announce principle” is “a

part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness

inquiry”). Semayne’s Case emphasizes “the reason of

all this is because domus sua cuique est tutissimum

refugium”—every man’s house is his castle. 77 Eng.

Rep. at 195 (internal punctuation omitted).

Sir William Blackstone’s detailed 1768 treatise

on English common law reinforced this maxim: “[f]or

every man’s house is looked upon by the law to be his

castle of defense and asylum, wherein he should suffer

no violence.” 4 Observing the maxim’s ancient origins,

Blackstone explained “[the] [castle] principle is

carried so far in the [Roman] civil law, that for

the most part not so much as a common citation or

summons, much less an arrest, can be executed upon

a man within his own walls.” 5 Blackstone also made

clear the maxim’s egalitarian operation, protecting

persons and houses of all kinds—not just the rich or

mansions. The common law thus regarded “a room or

lodging, in any private house” as “the mansion for the

time being of the lodger,” and viewed a “chamber in a

college or an inn of court” the same way. 6

4

3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

288 (1768), https://tinyurl.com/356b5yz3.

5

Id.

6

4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

225 (1768), https://tinyurl.com/ycxyxj23.

10

English courts took the egalitarian force of the

castle maxim seriously. Consider Bruce v. Rawlins

(C.P. 1770). 7 A jury awarded substantial damages to

a butcher whose home was invaded by customs-house

officers searching for untaxed goods. 8 Rejecting the

officers’ motion for a reduction of the award, Chief

Justice Wilmot (writing in seriatim) denounced the

officers’ “unlawful entry into a man’s house (which is

his castle)” and concomitant “invasion” of the “peace

and quietness” of the butcher’s family. 9 Chief Justice

Wilmot underscored “[t]he plaintiff being a butcher”

made no difference: “it is the same damage to him as

if he was the greatest merchant in London.” 10

The castle maxim’s egalitarian operation gained

its fullest expression during a public debate in 1763

over a tax on cider that authorized excise officers to

enter homes. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378–

79 (1959). Pitt the Elder rebuked the measure on the

ground that “[e]very man’s house [is] his castle,” 11 to

which legend adds the following apocryphal remark:

“[t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to

all the force of the Crown. It may be frail—its roof may

shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may

enter, the rain may enter—but the King of England

cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the

threshold of the ruined tenement!” Id.

Reported in: 3 GEORGE WILSON, REPORTS OF THE CASES

ARGUED & ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 61–63

(1792), https://tinyurl.com/aebfcsws.

8

See id. at 61.

9

Id. at 62–63.

10

Id.

11

See 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1307 (T.C.

Hansard ed., 1813), https://tinyurl.com/yztf8bat.

7

11

Across the pond, the Framers of the American

Revolution opposed freewheeling Crown searches of

homes through similar egalitarian language. In a

1761 case seeking termination of the colonial writs of

assistance that permitted these searches, James Otis

confronted the argument of the Crown’s advocate that

“the necessity of having public taxes effectually and

speedily collected is of infinitely greater moment to

the whole, than the liberty of any individual.” 12 The

Crown’s advocate went so far as to argue the writs

served an objective “more important than the

imprisonment of thieves” or “murderers.” 13

Otis responded that “one of the most essential

branches of English liberty is the freedom of one’s

house.” 14 Because “[a] man’s house is his castle,” the

writs were a “monster of oppression” as they placed

“the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty

officer.” 15 Otis illustrated the egalitarian force of this

contention by describing the actions of “Mr. Ware”—a

Crown officer possessing the writ. When a justice

of the peace called Ware “before him, by a constable,

to answer for … profane swearing,” Ware responded

by commanding the justice to permit Ware “to search

[the justice’s] house for uncustomed goods.” 16 Ware

proceeded “to search [the justice’s] house from the

garret to the cellar” and next subjected the ordinary

constable involved to the “same” inquisition. 17

12

John Adams’s ‘Abstract of the Argument’ (ca. Apr. 1761),

FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://tinyurl.com/5n7ycu9k.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id. (bold added).

16

Id.

17

Id.

12

Otis’s condemnation of writs of assistance “was

‘the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of

Great Britain’ and helped [to] spark the Revolution

itself.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 303–04. And after the

Revolution, the Framers made “[t]he [legal] maxim

that ‘every man’s house is his castle’ … a part of …

constitutional law” through the Fourth Amendment’s

guarantee of “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures.” 18 U.S. CONST.

amend. IV (bold added). Indeed, as Justice Story

explained in 1833, the Fourth Amendment generally

represented the Framers’ “affirmance” of the “great

constitutional doctrine of the common law.” 19

American courts readily assimilated and built on

the egalitarian operation of the castle maxim. For

instance, in Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816), the

Massachusetts Supreme Court determined the

“inviolability of dwelling-houses” was not limited to

the homeowner and his immediate family, but also

included “domestic servants,” “permanent boarders,”

and all others who “made the house their home.” Id.

at 523. The “purpose” of the castle maxim, after all,

was to preserve “repose and tranquility” within the

home—values that would be “as much disturbed by a

forcible entry to arrest a boarder or a servant, who had

acquired, by contract, express or implied, a right to

enter the house at all times, and to remain in it as long

as they pleased.” Id. The castle maxim then had to be

understood to include the latter parties. Id.

T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,

367–68 (1878), https://tinyurl.com/29nj2xeh.

19

3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES 748 (1878), https://tinyurl.com/2m7t9nrr.

18

13

Such fidelity to the castle maxim led American

courts in the 1800s and early 1900s to reject any

dilution of the maxim’s egalitarian operation, going

beyond search-and-seizure cases. In an 1866 case

where a liquor shop owner struck an abusive, knifewielding patron and the patron sued, the Georgia

Supreme Court affirmed a verdict for the shop owner

based on a jury instruction that the owner’s shop was

“his castle.” Pierce v. Hicks, 34 Ga. 259, 261 (1866).

The court explained that while individuals of “refined

cultivation” might struggle to view a “shop redolent

with the perfume of corn whisky” the same way as “the

proud keep of Windsor,” the law required one to “strip

this shop of its accessories” and “contemplate it not in

the concrete.” Id. Anything less would compromise

Pitt the Elder’s “splendid declamation” of the rights of

the “poorest man … in his cottage.” Id.

The same understanding may be seen in the

North Carolina Supreme Court’s 1902 reversal of a

woman’s conviction for striking a debt collector. See

Goode, 41 S.E. at 5–6. The woman “was in her own

house” when the debt collector entered, engaged in

“violent conduct,” and refused “to behave or to leave.”

Id. Citing the castle maxim and Pitt the Elder’s

declamation, the court declared that the woman “by

means of the wooden wand” that she “touched to the

back” of the debt collector’s head “communicated

electrically to his brain the same conception more

effectually than if she had read [the maxim] to him.”

Id. The debt collector’s pursuit of property that “may

not have been fully paid for” made no difference. Id.

The debt collector “had no right to enter th[e] home

and misbehave, or refuse to leave when ordered out,”

much less “to carry off any property.” Id.

14

In sum: the “far-reaching” legal maxim that

“every man’s house is his castle” has “a history and a

literature all its own” that is “still as expressive and

pregnant of … individual rights” as when the maxim

first emanated from the laws of ancient Rome. People

v. Glennon, 74 N.Y.S. 794, 798 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1902).

The maxim is “as vital now” as when Pitt the Elder

championed “[t]he poorest man … in his cottage.” Id.

And in our nation, the maxim honors the Framers’

“burst[ing] asunder [of] the bonds of despotic power.”

Id. The maxim is a stalwart reminder that if “we are

all open to have our houses invaded, ransacked and

searched by policemen on nothing except what they …

choose to call their suspicions,” then “[we are] no

longer living under a free government.” Id.

Against this common-law backdrop, the Fourth

Circuit’s affirmation of a warrantless canine sniff of

the front door to Petitioner’s apartment—his castle—

merits this Court’s review. In Florida v. Jardines, 569

U.S. 1 (2013), the Court ruled that introducing “a

trained police dog to explore the area around the home

in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence” falls

under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 9, 11–12. The

Fourth Circuit concludes this rule does not apply to

Petitioner because of where officers were standing

when their trained police dog sniffed and alerted on

the “seam” of Petitioner’s apartment door. App.13a.

While the officers in Jardines stood on the “front

porch”—an area they had no right to be without the

homeowner’s permission—the officers in Petitioner’s

case stood in “the area of the common hallway just

outside Johnson’s door.” App.11a. The Fourth Circuit

reasons Petitioner’s inability to exclude officers from

this area takes Jardines off the table. App.16a.

15

Not so. The facts of United States v. Jones, 565

U.S. 400 (2012) furnish a helpful analogy. “[A]gents

installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage

of [Antoine Jones’s] Jeep while it was parked in a

public parking lot.” Id. at 403. The Court held the

Fourth Amendment applied as the police “physically

occupied private property”—the Jeep’s under-body—

“for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id. at 404.

That the police were standing in a public parking lot

when they took this action was irrelevant. See id. at

410–11. Even if Jones could not exclude officers from

the lot, this fact afforded no license for the officers’

actions. “By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers

encroached on a protected area.” Id. Similarly, here,

by having a trained police dog examine Petitioner’s

apartment door—an indisputable part of Petitioner’s

home from which he could exclude anyone—officers

encroached on a protected area. See App.13a.

The Fourth Circuit’s validation of the canine sniff

in this case then reduces to the proposition that

Fourth Amendment protection of the home belongs

only “to those persons with the financial means to

afford residences with [front porches]” of some kind.

Collins, 584 U.S. at 601. The panel admits as much in

stating “[w]e go no further in deciding th[is] case”

because “[m]ulti-dwelling units come in all kinds of

configurations.” App.16a. But down this road lies the

“apportion[ment] [of] Fourth Amendment protections

on grounds that correlate with income, race, and

ethnicity." United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849,

854–55 (7th Cir. 2016). Gone is the castle maxim and

its egalitarian protection of “the most frail cottage”

against government as if the cottage were “the most

majestic mansion.” Collins, 584 U.S. at 601.

16

CONCLUSION

“The Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect

the people at least as much now as it did when [it was]

adopted ….” United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988,

1011 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Such

protection is illusory, however, so long as lower courts

feel free to “disregard … the historic materials

underlying the Amendment”—even those common

law lessons that have stood the test of time like the

egalitarian maxim “every man’s house is his castle.”

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). To help roll back this

tide, the Court should grant review in this case. The

Fourth Amendment protects apartment-dwellers like

Petitioner no less than persons able to afford homes

with front porches. The Court should say so.

Respectfully submitted,

MAHESHA P. SUBBARAMAN

Counsel of Record

SUBBARAMAN PLLC

80 S. 8th St., Ste. 900

Minneapolis, MN 55402

(612) 315-9210

mps@subblaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Restore the Fourth, Inc.

Dated: February 2, 2026