Amicus Curiae Brief — Stephen Foote, Individually and as Guardian and Next Friend of B. F. and G. F., Minors, et al., Petitioners v. Ludlow School Committee, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 21, 2025

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No. 25-77

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

STEPHEN FOOTE, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS GUARDIAN AND

NEXT FRIEND OF B. F. AND G. F., MINORS, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

LUDLOW SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

____________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR SAMARITAN’S PURSE

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONERS

__________

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .....................................................ii

Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................................... 1

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 2

Reasons for Granting the Writ.................................... 4

I. The First Circuit erred in its understanding of

the necessary coercion or restraint on parental

rights................................................................... 4

A. Parents need not show direct coercion or

restraint. ....................................................... 4

B. Secret transitioning policies do involve

coercion and restraint. .................................. 8

1. The school’s actions restrained the

parents’ rights. .......................................... 9

2. The school’s actions coerced the parentchild relationship. ................................... 11

3. The school’s own explanation confirms the

point......................................................... 14

II. The parental right properly asserted here is

unlike any claimed right to access prohibited

medical interventions....................................... 18

Conclusion.................................................................. 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Abigail All. for Better Access to

Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach,

495 F.3d 695 (CADC 2007) .................................... 20

Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds,

339 U.S. 382 (1950) .................................................. 6

Anderson v. Celebrezze,

460 U.S. 780 (1983) .................................................. 6

Arizona Students’ Ass’n v. Arizona Bd. of Regents,

824 F.3d 858 (CA9 2016) ....................................... 11

Brandt v. Griffin, ___ F.4th ___, No. 23-2681,

2025 WL 2317546 (8th Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) ..... 20, 21

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976) ...................................................... 6

Carson v. Makin,

596 U.S. 767 (2022) .................................................. 5

Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health,

497 U.S. 261 (1990) ................................................ 21

Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

554 U.S. 724 (2008) .................................................. 6

Dent v. West Virginia,

129 U.S. 114 (1889) ................................................ 20

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org.,

597 U.S. 215 (2022) ................................................ 19

Doe v. Delaware Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ.,

2024 WL 5006711 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2024) ............... 5

iii

Doe v. Ladapo,

737 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (N.D. Fla. 2024) .................. 23

Edwards v. Aguillard,

482 U.S. 578 (1987) ................................................ 11

Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Alabama,

80 F.4th 1205 (CA11 2023) .............................. 19, 22

Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall,

603 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (M.D. Ala. 2022) ................. 19

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009) ................................................ 11

Gonzales v. Carhart,

550 U.S. 124 (2007) ................................................ 22

Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd.,

972 F.3d 586 (CA4 2020) ....................................... 15

Johnson v. Texas,

509 U.S. 350 (1993) ................................................ 11

K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of

Indiana, 121 F.4th 604 (CA7 2024)................. 20, 22

Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep’t of Health & Human

Servs., 927 F.3d 396 (CA6 2019) ........................... 21

L.W. v. Skrmetti,

83 F.4th 460 (CA6 2024) ...................... 20, 21, 22, 23

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

145 S. Ct. 2332 (2025) ................ 2, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14

Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego,

907 F.3d 1154 (CA9 2018) ..................................... 21

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390 (1923) .............................................. 6, 7

Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod of

Missouri, Ohio, & Other States v. McKelvie,

175 N.W. 531 (Neb. 1919) ........................................ 7

Parham v. J.R.,

442 U.S. 584 (1979) ................................................ 15

Parker v. Hurley,

514 F.3d 87 (CA1 2008) ......................................... 14

Prince v. Massachusetts,

321 U.S. 158 (1944) ............................................ 2, 18

Raich v. Gonzales,

500 F.3d 850 (CA9 2007) ....................................... 20

Reno v. Flores,

507 U.S. 292 (1993) ................................................ 23

Ricard v. USD 475 Geary Cnty., KS Sch. Bd.,

2022 WL 1471372 (D. Kan. May 9, 2022) ............... 9

Rutherford v. United States,

616 F.2d 455 (CA10 1980) ..................................... 20

Saenz v. Roe,

526 U.S. 489 (1999) .................................................. 6

Thomas v. Review Board,

450 U.S. 707 (1981) .................................................. 5

Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000) .............................................. 2, 18

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) .......................................... 18, 20

Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702 (1997) ................................ 2, 19, 22, 23

Whalen v. Roe,

429 U.S. 589 (1977) ................................................ 20

Wisconsin v. Yoder,

406 U.S. 205 (1972) ............................................ 8, 11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union

et al., Foote v. Ludlow Sch. Comm., No. 23-1069,

2023 WL 4558586 (CA1 July 6, 2023) ............. 16, 17

Pet. for Writ of Cert., L.W. v. Skrmetti, No. 23-466

(U.S. Nov. 1, 2023) ................................................. 19

Translate Gender, https://www.facebook.com/

reel/1453224735639289 (Mar. 31, 2025) ............... 12

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Samaritan’s Purse is a nondenominational,

evangelical Christian organization formed in 1970 to

provide spiritual and physical aid to hurting people

around the world. The organization seeks to follow the

command of Jesus to “go and do likewise” in response

to the story of the Samaritan who helped a hurting

stranger. Samaritan’s Purse operates in over 100

countries providing crisis relief, sharing the hope and

love of Jesus Christ with those in the gutters and

ditches of the world in their darkest hour of need. The

ministry operates relief programs around the world

for vulnerable women who are victims of war, famine,

and disaster and through maternal and child

healthcare. Samaritan’s Purse’s concern arises when

concepts of Biblical and scientific reality are

threatened by executive, legislative, or judicial action

compelling ideologies that diminish common grace

related to safety, fairness, privacy, speech, and

religious free exercise.*

* Under Rule 37.2, the parties’ counsel of record received timely

notice of the intent to file this brief. Under Rule 37.6, no counsel

for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person

other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a

monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court has held that the Constitution protects

parents’ rights “to direct the education and upbringing

of [their] children.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521

U.S. 702, 720 (1997). “[S]o long as a parent adequately

cares for his or her children,” the government

generally may not “inject itself into the private realm

of the family to further question the ability of that

parent to make the best decisions concerning the

rearing of that parent’s children.” Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (plurality opinion). Yet here,

Baird Middle School let its nonbinary librarian and a

guidance counselor transition an 11-year-old girl, then

withheld that information from her parents based on

its hostile assumption that parents by default cannot

be trusted to properly raise children who face gender

identity issues. The Constitution’s assumption, however, is that parents—not nonbinary school librarians

or other administrators—have the “primary function

and freedom” to educate and raise their children.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The

school’s active, intentional deception about the child’s

critical educational and developmental information

infringed these parents’ constitutional rights.

This brief makes two points in support of certiorari.

First, the First Circuit imposed an artificial coercionor-restraint test, then gerrymandered those terms so

that the conduct here purportedly fell outside of those

terms. The Court has recently rejected similar efforts,

see Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332, 2357–58 &

n.9 (2025), and it should do so again here. Parents’

rights, just like other constitutional rights, can be

infringed by government actions short of narrowly-

defined coercion or restraint. A substantial burden on

those rights suffices. Here, no matter how one

articulates the necessary burden, the parents have

shown that the school’s action implicates their

fundamental right to direct their child’s education and

upbringing. By deceiving the parents about their

child’s education and development, the school

restrained the parents’ ability to raise their child as

they saw fit. The school’s actions also coerced the child

to depart from the parents’ guidance, putting direct

tension on the parent-child relationship. Though the

complaint amply alleges these burdens, they are

proved by the school’s own defenses. The school

considered it necessary for “safety” to deceive the

parents—showing that the school’s actions were

designed to affect the parent-child relationship. The

school cannot now pretend that its actions had no

effect on the parents’ ability to direct their child’s

upbringing.

Second, the parental right to direct their child’s

education and upbringing is unlike the novel right

recently asserted in other cases for parents to obtain

generally prohibited drugs and surgeries for gender

transition. There is no American history or tradition

of parents accessing specific medical treatments that

are reasonably regulated by the government. Given

that neither parents nor children have a right to

access particular medical treatments, parents

purportedly acting on behalf of their children do not

either. That right does not exist and is unrelated to

the deeply-rooted right of parents to make decisions

on their child’s behalf. But parents’ ability to direct the

education and upbringing of their children is within

that right’s heartland. The Court should reverse.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The First Circuit erred in its understanding

of the necessary coercion or restraint on

parental rights.

The First Circuit’s determination that the school’s

actions did not implicate the parents’ fundamental

right to direct their child’s education and upbringing

was egregiously wrong. First, like other constitutional

rights, parental rights do not depend on a showing of

direct coercion or restraint; a substantial burden

easily suffices. Second, the parents here alleged all of

these elements. The school’s intentional deception of

the parents about their child’s identity at school

restrained their ability to direct the child’s

upbringing. The school’s encouragement of the child to

deviate from the parents’ guidance coerced the child

as well as the parent-child relationship. These are

easily substantial burdens. Indeed, burdening the

parent-child relationship was the entire point of the

school’s actions, by the school’s own account: the

school considered it necessary for the child’s “safety”

to deceive the parents. This infringement of the

parents’ fundamental right requires strict scrutiny.

A. Parents need not show direct coercion or

restraint.

According to the First Circuit and some other

courts, a school’s “[p]rotocol of deference to a student’s

decision about whether to disclose their gender

identity to their parents lacks the ‘coercive’ or

‘restraining’ conduct” that is supposedly a prerequisite

to the constitutional claim here. Pet. 32a; see, e.g., Doe

v. Delaware Valley Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 2024

WL 5006711, at *13 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2024) (claiming

no “proactive, coercive interference with the parentchild relationship”).

But the fundamental parental right to direct their

children’s upbringing can be infringed by actions short

of direct coercion and restraint. This Court has

recognized that many constitutional rights are

triggered by government action that even indirectly

burdens those rights. The Court should again reject

the “alarmingly narrow” view of a constitutional

“guarantee as nothing more than protection against

compulsion or coercion.” Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at

2357–58.

Across constitutional rights, this Court has

recognized that indirect burdens can infringe rights.

For instance, this Court just reiterated that “the Free

Exercise Clause protects against policies that impose

more subtle forms of interference,” including “with the

religious upbringing of children. Id. at 2352. That is

consistent with a long line of Free Exercise cases. In

Thomas v. Review Board, the Court held that a

substantial burden exists “[w]here the state . . . denies

[an important benefit] because of conduct mandated

by religious belief, thereby putting substantial

pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to

violate his beliefs.” 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981).

“While the compulsion may be indirect, the

infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless

substantial.” Id. at 718; see also, e.g., Carson v. Makin,

596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022) (“The Free Exercise Clause of

the First Amendment protects against indirect

coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion,

not just outright prohibitions.” (cleaned up)).

Likewise, the Court has recognized in Free Speech

cases that “indirect ‘discouragements’” can “have the

same coercive effect upon the exercise of

[constitutional] rights as imprisonment, fines,

injunctions or taxes.” Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds,

339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950); see, e.g., Davis v. Fed.

Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 739–40 (2008);

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976) (“[S]crutiny is

necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise

of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct

government action, but indirectly as an unintended

but inevitable result of the government's

conduct . . . .”).

The same rule applies in many other constitutional

contexts. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504

(1999) (“[T]he State’s argument that its welfare

scheme affects the right to travel only ‘incidentally’ is

beside the point.”); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.

780, 793 (1983) (asking “whether the challenged

restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens ‘the

availability of political opportunity’”).

The Court has applied the same rule to parents’

fundamental rights. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.

390 (1923), the Court invalidated a Nebraska statute

that restricted the teaching of a foreign language to

children in school. The law did not directly restrain

the parents or coerce students, at least in the sense of

coercion and restraint seemingly adopted by the First

Circuit here. The Nebraska law only applied “in any

private, denominational, parochial or public school.”

Id. at 397. So under the binding interpretation of the

law by the Nebraska Supreme Court, parents

remained free to “teach[] [a] [foreign] language on

Saturday or Sunday,” or outside school hours.

Nebraska Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod of

Missouri, Ohio, & Other States v. McKelvie, 175 N.W.

531, 535 (Neb. 1919). In fact, the Nebraska Supreme

Court concluded that even schools remained free to

teach foreign languages outside of “school hours.” Id.

at 534.

So to use the First Circuit’s language here, the

parents in Meyer “remain[ed] free to strive to mold

their child according to the Parents’ own beliefs,

whether through direct conversations, private

educational institutions [outside school hours],

religious programming, homeschooling, or other

influential tools.” Pet. 37a. The Nebraska Supreme

Court said much the same thing: “there is nothing in

the act to prevent parents, teachers, or pastors from

conveying religious or moral instruction in the

language of the parents.” McKelvie, 175 N.W. at 534.

But this Court held that the law burdened the parents’

fundamental right to direct their upbringing,

recognizing “the power of parents to control the

education of their own.” Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.

Likewise, this Court’s recent decision in Mahmoud

directly rejected the First Circuit’s rationale that a

burden on parental rights could be excused because of

the availability of “private educational institutions,

religious programming, homeschooling, or other

influential tools.” Pet. 37a. These are “no answer[s]”

because “[p]ublic education is a public benefit, and the

government cannot condition its availability on

parents’ willingness to accept a burden on their”

constitutional rights. Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2359

(cleaned up). The Court also rejected the notion that

“parents who send their children to public school must

endure any instruction that falls short of direct

compulsion or coercion and must try to counteract that

teaching at home.” Id. at 2360; compare Pet. 37a (the

First Circuit emphasizing that “[o]utside school,

parents can obtain information about their children’s

relationship to gender in many ways”).

Last, though this Court’s decision in Wisconsin v.

Yoder focused on Free Exercise, it too recognized a

burden when parents are forced to “submit their

children to instruction that would ‘substantially

interfer[e] with the[ir] religious development.’”

Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2359 n.10 (quoting 406 U.S.

205, 218 (1972)). Again, parents were not “prohibited”

“from engaging in religious teaching at home,” ibid.,

“but that made no difference to the [constitutional]

analysis,” id. at 2360.

In sum, a school’s active deception of parents

burdens their right to direct their children’s

upbringing even if there is no direct coercion or

restraint. This Court’s consistent precedents across

constitutional fields confirm that forcing parents to try

to work around or counteract the school’s deception

implicates fundamental parental rights.

B. Secret transitioning policies do involve

coercion and restraint.

At any rate, the First Circuit was wrong to think

that the school’s secret transitioning did not involve

coercion or restraint. The whole point of the school’s

secrecy was to restrain the parents’ ability to direct

their children’s upbringing—indeed, that’s how the

school itself explained the policy.

1. The school’s actions

parents’ rights.

restrained

the

Begin with restraint. By intentionally depriving

the parents of critical information about their child,

the school restrained their ability to direct the child’s

upbringing. The school counselor “directed” staff to

use the child’s real name “and she/her pronouns when

communicating with the Student’s parents, but during

school times, to address the Student” with the new

name and pronouns. Pet. 8a; see Pet. 89a. The

counselor “explicitly instruct[ed] staff that her parents

were not to be told.” Pet. 90a.

This intentional deception restrained the parents’

ability to raise their children, as even the First Circuit

recognized: “knowing that the Student had requested

the use of an alternative name and pronouns in school

might inform how the Parents respond to and direct

their child’s gender expressions outside of school.” Pet.

38a; see Pet. 34a (agreeing that the policy “makes

their parenting more challenging”). As another court

put it, “[i]t is difficult to envision why a school would

even claim—much less how a school could establish—

a generalized interest in withholding or concealing

from the parents of minor children, information

fundamental to a child’s identity, personhood, and

mental and emotional well-being such as their

preferred name and pronouns.” Ricard v. USD 475

Geary Cnty., KS Sch. Bd., 2022 WL 1471372, at *8 (D.

Kan. May 9, 2022).

Yet the First Circuit paradoxically concluded that

there was no restraint on the parents’ rights here. The

First Circuit agreed that, “[v]iewed in the light most

favorable to the Parents,” their allegations “arguably

challenge[] a restraining act by” the school—

“deceptive communication to the Parents about a

child’s expression of gender in school.” Pet. 33a. But

the First Circuit said this “theory” “is unavailing here”

because “[t]he complaint contains only general

allegations” about “affirmative misrepresentation.”

Pet. 34a. And, according to the First Circuit, these

allegations were “contradict[ed]” by the allegations

that one teacher mailed a postcard with the child’s

new name. Ibid. The First Circuit also noted that

“when the Parents tried to speak with school officials

about the Student,” the officials “just declined to

discuss” the issue—they did not affirmatively

“misrepresent[] the name.” Ibid.

But none of that affects the conclusion that the

school intended to—and did—use a different name in

parental communications precisely to deprive the

parents of information about their child. That one

teacher slipped up and mailed a postcard with the new

name says nothing about the school’s overall effort.

And that school officials did not repeat their lie when

the parents tried to discuss the issue—instead evading

it—says nothing about the school’s other, overt

deceptions. Even the district court found it

“disconcerting that [the school] adopted and

implemented a policy requiring school staff to actively

hide information from parents about something of

importance regarding their child.” Pet. 61a. That

active deception restrains the parents’ exercise of their

right to direct their child’s upbringing. Indeed, as

discussed below, the school said that was the whole

point of the policy.

2. The school’s actions coerced the parentchild relationship.

Next turn to coercion. The First Circuit claimed

that “there are no allegations of coercive conduct

towards the Student” here. Pet. 33a. Nonsense,

especially in the context of a school environment,

where “the inherent power asymmetry” between

school officials and students amps up the coerciveness

of even ordinary interactions. Arizona Students’ Ass’n

v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 869 (CA9

2016).

The coercive baseline here is also heightened

because of the student’s age: 11, in sixth grade, “many

years away from adulthood” (per the district court).

Pet. 64a. This Court’s precedents across a variety of

doctrines reflect the susceptibility of young people to

outside influence. See, e.g., Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at

2355 (“Young children . . . are often impressionable

and implicitly trust their teachers.” (cleaned up)); ibid.

(“The State exerts great authority and coercive power

through public schools because of the students’

emulation of teachers as role models and the children's

susceptibility to peer pressure.” (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482

U.S. 578, 584 (1987)); FCC v. Fox Television Stations,

Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009) (“[C]hildren mimic the

behavior they observe—or at least the behavior that is

presented to them as normal and appropriate.”);

Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (youth “is

a time and condition of life when a person may be most

susceptible to influence”); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211

(emphasizing the “crucial and formative adolescent

period of life”).

With this background coerciveness in mind, it is

hard to credit the First Circuit’s claim of “no

allegations of coercive conduct towards the Student.”

Pet. 33a (emphasis added). The complaint alleges that

school employees like the nonbinary librarian

“promote[d] the concept of gender-affirming social

transitioning” in various ways, including by “regularly

communicat[ing] privately with their children one-onone to discuss their gender identity (mental health)

issues, provide materials promoting exploration of

alternate gender identities, and otherwise encourage

children to experiment with alternate gender

identities without notifying parents.” Pet. 81a, 82a.

The librarian told “children not to use the terms

‘boys’ and ‘girls,’ but to use alternative terms rooted in

gender identity ideology.” Pet. 82a. The librarian

“directed 11-year-old B.F. to translategender.org, an

organization with which [the librarian] is affiliated

that ‘works to generate community accountability

individuals to self-determine their own genders and

gender expressions.’” Pet. 96a. The librarian used this

website and several of its workshops “to groom” the

child away from traditional conceptions of gender and

sex. Ibid. A typical Translate Gender offering is a

video it posted publicly, in which a very young child

celebrating “Trans Day of Visibility” advocates

“mak[ing] more trans and non-binary people in our

community.” Translate Gender, https://www.facebook.

com/reel/1453224735639289 (Mar. 31, 2025). The

school’s use of such material in regular, private

encouragement from an authority figure to a minor,

without parental knowledge, suggests a concerted

effort to influence the child.

Likewise, the school counselor told the child, “‘I

can’t be there to keep you safe,’ thereby signaling to

B.F. that her parents were not ‘safe.’” Pet. 97a. With

the child, she also questioned whether the child “was

as comfortable discussing issues with [the parents’]

counselor as she was discussing issues with” her. Ibid.

These highly coercive tactics served to alienate the

child from her parents and foster reliance on school

staff.

The First Circuit claimed that “providing

educational resources about LGBTQ-related issues to

a child who has shown interest imposes no more

compulsion to identify as genderqueer than providing

a book about brick laying could coerce a student into

becoming a mason.” Pet. 33a. But across a variety of

“contexts,” this Court has “recognized the potentially

coercive nature of classroom instruction of this kind.”

Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court has focused

on “the specific context in which the instruction or

materials at issue are presented.” Id. at 2353. “Are

they presented in a neutral manner, or are they

presented in a manner that is . . . designed to impose

upon students a ‘pressure to conform’?” Ibid.

Here, especially when the allegations are viewed in

the light most favorable to the parents, there is no

doubt that the school’s actions tended to coerce the

child to develop a non-traditional sense of gender,

urged on by the nonbinary librarian via one-on-one

interactions that are even more coercive than

standard classroom instructions. Cf. Mahmoud, 145 S.

Ct. at 2357 (referring to “direct, coercive interactions

between the State and its young residents”). As the

First Circuit said in a case relied on by the courts

below, “[i]t is a fair inference that” these materials

were “precisely intended to influence the listening

child[] toward” a certain value. Parker v. Hurley, 514

F.3d 87, 106 (CA1 2008). “That was the point of why

[they] w[ere] chosen and used.” Ibid.

The school’s actions also tended to coerce the child

to view her parents as obstacles, urged on by a

skeptical school counselor and official policies that

approved of intentionally deceiving parents. This was

no career day talk by a brick mason; it was a

coordinated, concentrated campaign to encourage the

child to adopt certain gender theories and break with

her parents. This “instruction” “carries with it”

“objective danger” to the parents’ exercise of their

right to direct their child’s upbringing. Mahmoud, 145

S. Ct. at 2356.

3. The school’s own explanation confirms the

point.

Beyond the allegations of the complaint, perhaps

the best indicator that the school sought to coerce

students to deviate from their parents’ upbringing—

and restrain the parents’ ability to act—is that school

officials said that was the whole point of their policy.

The school superintendent’s core argument for the

policy of affirmative deception was: “For many of our

students school IS their only safe place and that safety

evaporates when they leave the confines of our

buildings.” Pet. 151a. The school asserted that its

policy was supported by “the goal of providing

transgender and gender nonconforming students with

a safe school environment,” Pet. 65a, and that

opposition was rooted in “prejudice and bigotry,” Pet.

151a.

In other words, the school thought that it needed to

deceive parents because it viewed those parents as a

danger to students. The point of the deception is

precisely to deprive parents of information about their

children—information critical to the children’s

identity and thus to the parents’ upbringing. The First

Circuit’s disclaimer of any coercive or restraining

effect cannot be squared with the school’s own

explanation of its policy. The policy could not support

the school’s conception of “safety” unless its point was

to deceive parents—thereby coercing and restraining

the parent-child relationship. But this Court has long

rejected the “statist notion that governmental power

should supersede parental authority in all cases

because some parents abuse and neglect children” as

“repugnant to American tradition.” Parham v. J.R.,

442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).

Though the school lately has tried to obscure the

obvious point of its policy, its initial arguments were

not so shy. The school’s motion to dismiss opened with

the sententious pronouncement that “[t]he proudest

moments of the federal judiciary have been when we

affirm the burgeoning values of our bright youth,

rather than preserve the prejudices of the past.” D. Ct.

Dkt. 28, at 1 (quoting Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch.

Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 620 (CA4 2020)). The school said

that parents have no right “to prior notice and an

exemption from a school district’s intent (and

obligation) to not discriminate against a transgender

student.” Ibid. The school even portrayed the parents

as attacking their own child’s existence: “One cannot

‘opt out’ from having a transgender child.” Id. at 16.

So the school saw its deception of parents as necessary

to the equal treatment, safety, and (somehow)

existence of children. It cannot now pretend that its

deception does not affect the parent-child relationship.

Likewise, when asked at the motion to dismiss

hearing whether the school’s view was that children

“at the age of the students in this case[] could make

their own decisions as to whether or not the parents

should know,” the school repeated: “Yes, your Honor.

Yes, your Honor.” D. Ct. Dkt. 48, at 39. As the school

candidly explained, “the point” of the policy “is to

accept [the student’s] request” to “‘please don’t tell my

mom or dad.’” Id. at 38. And significantly, the school

conceded below that the information being withheld

“is important information for parents to have.” CA1

Oral Arg. at 28:10. Again, it is impossible to square

these explanations with the claim that the policy has

no meaningful effect on the parent-child relationship.

Confirming this is the defense of the policy offered

by the school’s allies. As amicus below, the ACLU

argued that the policy would satisfy strict scrutiny

because “[a]lthough many parents are supportive of

their children, it is not uncommon for parents to reject

their children’s transgender or gender nonconforming

identity, leading to significant familial conflict.” Brief

of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al.

19, Foote v. Ludlow Sch. Comm., No. 23-1069, 2023

WL 4558586 (CA1 July 6, 2023) (emphasis added).

This emphasis on familial conflict reflects the reality

that the policy actively interferes with the parentchild relationship; how else could a policy of

transparency lead to “familial conflict” and a

purported threat to “the safety of students” (id. at 21)?

The ACLU also argued that transparency would

interfere “with the trusting relationships between

educators and students.” Id. at 21. In the same way,

active deception interferes with the relationship

between the parents and children—which, unlike the

ACLU’s purported public school administratorstudent relationship, is protected as a fundamental

constitutional right.

Last, the ACLU defended the school’s actions as an

element of “awakening the child to cultural values.”

Id. at 22. Yet again, this defense gives away the game.

It only “works” if the school’s efforts have an element

of coercion, pushing the child away from their parents’

guidance and toward the school’s (and its nonbinary

librarian’s) vision of gender and parental detachment.

The school and the ACLU cannot have it both ways:

if the policy meaningfully affects the parent-child

relationship, it should be subject to strict scrutiny.

Everyone here—the parents, school officials, the

ACLU, and the courts below—seems to agree that the

purpose and effect of the school’s policy is to affect the

parent-child relationship by intentionally deceiving

parents.

This interference by the school with the parents’

right to direct their child’s upbringing could be

characterized in many ways. It could be described as

coercion: it coerces the ordinary parent-child

relationship and encourages the child to depart from

the parents’ guidance. It could be described as

restraint: it intentionally deprives the parents of

critical knowledge about their child’s development. Or

it could simply be described as a substantial burden

on the parents’ right to raise their child. No matter

how it is described, the implication is the same: the

parents here state a violation of their fundamental

right to direct their child’s education and upbringing.

The First Circuit egregiously erred in holding

otherwise.

II. The parental right properly asserted here is

unlike any claimed right to access prohibited

medical interventions.

This Court has said that the Constitution generally

“protects the fundamental right of parents to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of

their children.” Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (plurality

opinion). As shown above, core parental decisions over

education and upbringing are protected by this right.

But parents do not have a constitutional right to

everything that could conceivably bear on a child’s

“care, custody and control.” Ibid. “[R]ights of

parenthood are [not] beyond limitation,” and “the

state has a wide range of power for limiting parental

freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s

welfare.” Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67. Here, as in other

constitutional fields, the permissibility of a

government action depends on whether it “is

consistent with the [historical] principles that

underpin our regulatory tradition.” United States v.

Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).

Recently, some district courts have held that

parents “have a fundamental right to treat their

children with transitioning medications subject to

medically accepted standards” for purported gender

dysphoria. Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall, 603 F. Supp. 3d

1131, 1144 (M.D. Ala. 2022), vacated, Eknes-Tucker v.

Governor of Alabama, 80 F.4th 1205 (CA11 2023).

Indeed, the ACLU has argued for this position—that

parents have a deeply-rooted right to access

experimental

treatments

prohibited

the

government because of permanently sterilizing effects

and no proven benefits—while simultaneously

arguing here that parents have no right not to be

deceived about their child’s gender identity at school.

See generally Pet. for Writ of Cert., L.W. v. Skrmetti,

No. 23-466 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2023). This gets it backwards:

the real parental right asserted here—not to be

deceived about critical parts of their child’s education

and development—is unlike the novel asserted right

to access generally prohibited medical treatments.

Parents have never had the right to demand access to

illegal medical procedures. Deeply-rooted parental

rights revolve around who makes decisions on a child’s

behalf, not whether a parent gets special access to

reasonably banned treatments on their child’s behalf.

“In deciding whether a right” is fundamental and

thus protected by the Constitution, “the Court has

long asked whether the right is ‘deeply rooted in [our]

history and tradition’ and whether it is essential to our

Nation’s ‘scheme of ordered liberty.’” Dobbs v. Jackson

Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 237 (2022). “[A]

careful analysis of the history of the right” is

necessary, and the right must not be defined “at a high

level of generality.” Id. at 238, 257; see Glucksberg,

521 U.S. at 722 (courts must “carefully formulat[e] the

interest at stake”). Courts look for “historical

analogue[s]” to decide whether a particular regulation

is consistent with the constitutional right. Rahimi,

602 U.S. at 700–01.

As Chief Judge Sutton explained, this country

“does not have a ‘deeply rooted’ tradition of preventing

governments from regulating the medical profession

in general or certain treatments in particular,

whether for adults or their children.” L.W. v. Skrmetti,

83 F.4th 460, 473 (CA6 2024). “Quite to the contrary

in fact.” Ibid. The “Nation’s history and tradition”

show that “states can prohibit medical treatments for

adults and children.” Brandt v. Griffin, ___ F.4th ___,

No. 23-2681, 2025 WL 2317546, at *9 (CA8 Aug. 12,

2025); see, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,

122 (1889) (recognizing state power to regulate the

medical profession to “provide for the general

welfare”).

Courts have repeatedly rejected the proposition

that the Constitution guarantees a fundamental right

to a particular medical treatment. See Abigail All. for

Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach,

495 F.3d 695, 711 (CADC 2007) (en banc) (no “right to

procure and use experimental drugs”); Raich v.

Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 864–66 (CA9 2007) (no right

to medical marijuana); Rutherford v. United States,

616 F.2d 455, 456 (CA10 1980) (no right for terminally

ill patients “to take whatever treatment they wished”).

“A parent’s right to demand [a medical

intervention] for his child could not be stronger than

the child’s right to access it.” K.C. v. Individual

Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana, 121 F.4th

604, 627 (CA7 2024) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.

589, 604 (1977)). “The government has the power to

reasonably limit the use of drugs,” which is “true for

adults” and “assuredly true for their children.”

Skrmetti, 83 F.4th at 475. Given that neither the

parent nor the child has a personal, fundamental right

to access specific interventions, the parent acting on

the child’s behalf cannot access them, either. “This

country does not have a custom of permitting parents

to obtain banned medical treatments for their children

and to override contrary legislative policy judgments

in the process.” Ibid.

No doubt, “our longstanding traditions may give

individuals,” including parents, “a right to refuse

treatment” in some circumstances. Id. at 476; see

Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,

270 (1990). But this parental right stems from the

deeply-rooted right to make decisions on their child’s

behalf. When a State substitutes its judgment for a

parent to make certain medical decisions, it may

violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Kanuszewski v.

Michigan Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.3d

396, 419 (CA6 2019) (striking down Michigan’s choice

to take children’s blood samples without parental

consent because “it is logically the parents who

possess a fundamental right to direct the medical care

of their children”); Mann v. Cnty. of San Diego, 907

F.3d 1154, 1158, 1161 (CA9 2018) (holding that a

county violated parents’ rights to “make important

medical decisions for their children” when it

performed “gynecological and rectal exams” without

notifying parents or obtaining their consent).

Even in this sphere, though, “[p]arents do not have

unlimited authority to make medical decisions for

their children.” Brandt, 2025 WL 2317546, at *8. For

instance, “[e]very state, as well as the District of

Columbia, allows some minors to receive some medical

treatments without the consent of their parents.” Ibid.

And “[e]very state, as well as the District of Columbia,

includes failure to provide necessary medical care as

child neglect or abuse.” Ibid.

The affirmative right claimed by medical

transitioning proponents is much different than a

right to decline treatment, for it would entail more

than a parental right to make decisions on their child’s

behalf. It would mean a parental right to access

treatments that the child could not. But “there is no

historical support for an affirmative right to specific

treatments.” Skrmetti, 83 F.4th at 476. Many courts in

a variety of contexts “have drawn the same sensible

line, noting a material distinction between the State

effectively sticking a needle in someone over their

objection and the State prohibiting the individual from

filling a syringe with prohibited drugs.” Ibid.

(collecting cases). And this Court has said nothing

about what medical procedures a State must

affirmatively make available to a child—or anyone

else. Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007)

(“[I]t is clear the State has a significant role to play in

regulating the medical profession.”). Affirmative

access to a particular medical treatment lacks

historical grounding.

Even less is there support for the “more precise”

(Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723) claimed right to access

gender transitioning drugs and surgeries. See EknesTucker, 80 F.4th at 1220–21; K.C., 121 F.4th at 625–

26. “The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough

to doubt that ‘substantive due process’ sustains it,”

and “the alleged right certainly cannot be considered

so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people

as to be ranked as fundamental.” Reno v. Flores, 507

U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (cleaned up).

Thus, “[a]s long as it acts reasonably, [the

government] may ban even longstanding and

nonexperimental treatments for children.” Skrmetti,

83 F.4th at 477. “[A] parent’s right to control a child’s

medical treatment does not give the parent a right to

insist on treatment that is properly prohibited on

other grounds.” Doe v. Ladapo, 737 F. Supp. 3d 1240,

1287 (N.D. Fla. 2024). Holding otherwise would lead

to chaos. “If parents could veto legislative and

regulatory policies about drugs and surgeries

permitted for children, every such regulation—there

must be thousands—would come with a springing

easement: It would be good law until one parent in the

country opposed it.” Skrmetti, 83 F.4th at 475. “At that

point, either the parent would take charge of the

regulation or the courts would.” Ibid. “And all of this

in an arena—the care of our children—where sound

medical policies are indispensable and most in need of

responsiveness to the democratic process.” Ibid.

In sum, there is no fundamental parental right to

access sterilizing hormones and surgeries for gender

transition in minors. Parents’ right to make informed

decisions about crucial aspects of their child’s

upbringing has “been carefully refined by concrete

examples involving fundamental rights found to be

deeply rooted in our legal tradition.” Glucksberg, 521

U.S. at 722. A supposed parental right to override the

reasoned judgment of the state to access prohibited

medical treatment has not. That is why the former is

a constitutional right, while the latter falls within the

traditional power of state regulation. The parents’

claim in this case fits squarely within the deeplyrooted right for parents to make decisions on their

child’s behalf by directing the child’s education and

upbringing.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,