Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jaterron Williamson, Petitioner v. United States

NO. _________

In the Supreme Court of the United States

________________

JATERRON WILLIAMSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

________________

J. Matthew Wright

Counsel of Record

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S

OFFICE

600 South Tyler Street

Suite 2300

Amarillo, Texas 79101

(806) 324-2370

Matthew_Wright@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

June 22, 2026

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.

Federal law bans the possession of firearms by anyone who has ever been

convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1). What rule(s) should the lower courts apply when evaluating whether a

prosecution or conviction under that statute is consistent with the Second

Amendment to the Constitution?

2.

Under the prevailing interpretation of the nexus-with-commerce element of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a former felon possesses “in or affecting commerce” a firearm if the

firearm was made in another state or country. Does Congress have the constitutional

authority to enact such a law?

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Jaterron Williamson, an individual, who was DefendantAppellant below. Respondent is the United States of America, who was PlaintiffAppellee below.

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States v. Jaterron Williamson, No. 4:24-cr-260 (N.D. Tex. April 29, 2025)

United States v. Jaterron Williamson, No. 25-10565 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented .................................................................................................... ii

Parties to the Proceeding ........................................................................................... iii

Directly Related Proceedings ..................................................................................... iii

Table of Authorities .................................................................................................... vi

Opinions Below ............................................................................................................ 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................. 1

Constitutional and statutory Provisions Involved ..................................................... 2

Statement ..................................................................................................................... 3

A. Legal Background .......................................................................................... 3

1.

The federal possession ban first appeared, almost by accident, in the

1960s. ..................................................... 4

2.

For most of the Twentieth Century, judges assumed that the

Constitution posed no barrier to Congressional efforts to regulate

gun possession. ...................................... 6

3.

Early advocates of the Individual Rights model of the Second

Amendment simply assumed that felon bans were historically

supported. .............................................. 7

4.

In Heller, this Court described felon bans as both “longstanding”

and “presumptively lawful.” Scholars were quick to challenge the

former assertion. ................................... 8

5.

In Bruen, the Court recognized that the Constitution presumptively

protects the very same conduct prohibited by § 922(g)(1). 9

B. Facts and Procedural History ....................................................................... 9

Reasons for Granting the Petition ............................................................................ 11

I.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION TO

EXPLAIN WHETHER AND WHEN § 922(g)(1) COMPORTS

WITH THE SECOND AMENDMENT. .............................................................. 11

iv

II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION AND

ADDRESS WHETHER A FIREARM’S PRIOR MOVEMENT

ACROSS STATE LINES MEETS THE MINIMUM

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

FOR PROVING A NEXUS WITH COMMERCE. .............................................. 13

Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 18

v

Petition Appendix

Appendix A

Fifth Circuit Opinion ................................................................................................. 1a

Appendix B

District Court Order Denying Motion to Dismiss .................................................... 7a

Appendix C

Indictment ................................................................................................................ 11a

Appendix D

Motion to Dismiss Indictment ................................................................................. 13a

Appendix E

Factual Resume for Guilty Plea .............................................................................. 15a

Appendix F

Judgment of Conviction ........................................................................................... 26a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alderman v. United States,

562 U.S. 1163 (2011) ............................................................................................ 15

Barrett v. United States,

423 U.S. 212 (1976) .............................................................................................. 17

District Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) ...................................................................................... 8, 9, 14

Jacobellis v. Ohio,

378 U.S. 184 (1964) .............................................................................................. 12

Lewis v. United States,

445 U.S. 55 (1980) .................................................................................................. 7

McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) .............................................................................................. 13

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) .................................................................................. 9, 10, 11, 13

vi

Rehaif v. United States,

588 U.S. 225 (2019) .............................................................................................. 15

Scarborough v. United States,

431 U.S. 563 (1977) ........................................................................................ 15, 16

United States v. Bass,

404 U.S. 336 (1971) ................................................................................................ 5

United States v. Diaz,

116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) ................................................................... 10, 11, 12

United States v. Emerson,

270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................. 8

United States v. Graves,

554 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1977) ...................................................................................... 6

United States v. Hemani,

No. 24-1234, 2026 WL 1751710 (U.S. June 18, 2026) ................................... 13, 15

United States v. Jackson,

110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 121 F.4th 656,

cert. denied, No. 24-6517, 2025 WL 1426707 (U.S. May 19,

2025)...................................................................................................................... 12

United States v. Kimble,

142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025) ............................................................................... 11

United States v. Lopez,

514 U.S. 549 (1995) .................................................................................... 6, 14, 15

United States v. Miller,

307 U.S. 174 (1939) ............................................................................................ 6, 7

United States v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598 (2000) .............................................................................................. 17

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) .............................................................................................. 13

United States v. Seekins,

52 F.4th 988 (5th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................. 15

United States v. Williams,

113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................... 12

vii

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const., amend. II .......................................... 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15

U.S. Const., art. I, § 8 ............................................................................................ 2, 14

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ...................................................................... 2, 3, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) .....................................................................3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16

18 U.S.C. § 925(c) ....................................................................................................... 13

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ...................................................................................................... 1

Gun-Free School Zones Act, Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844

(1990) .................................................................................................................... 14

Pub. L. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) ........................................................................... 4

Pub. L. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961) ............................................................................. 4

Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 ........................................................................................ 6

Texas Penal Code § 22.05 ............................................................................................ 2

Rules

S. Ct. R. 13.1 ................................................................................................................ 1

Other Authorities

114 Cong. Rec. 14773 (1968)........................................................................................ 5

114 Cong. Rec. 14774 ............................................................................................... 5, 6

114 Cong. Rec. 16226 ................................................................................................... 6

The Beatles, Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band (Capitol

Records 1967).......................................................................................................... 4

C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32

Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 708 (2009) ................................................................ 8

Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory:

District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60

Hastings L.J. 1371 (2009) ...................................................................................... 8

viii

Don B. Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second

Amendment, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1211, 1212 (2009) ................................................. 7

Emily Tiry et al., Prosecution of Federal Firearms Offenses 200016, Tables 1 & 2 (Urban Institute Oct. 2021) ...................................................... 17

FBI, Active Entries in the NICS Indices (May 31, 2026),

https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/cjis/active_records_in_the_nics-indices.pdf.......................................... 4

Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the

Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 & n.47

(1983) ...................................................................................................................... 7

Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial

Distribution of People With Felony Records in the United

States, 1948–2010 ................................................................................................... 4

U.S. Sentencing Commission, Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)

Firearms Offenses: Fiscal Year 2024 at 1,

https://perma.cc/4GKE-JHVA ................................................................................ 3

William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States

(2d ed. 1829).......................................................................................................... 14

ix

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_________________________

No. ______

JATERRON WILLIAMSON,

v.

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

_________________________

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________________________________

Petitioner Jaterron Williamson asks the Court to issue a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision below is published at 170 F.4th 435.

JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit entered its judgment on March 23, 2026. This petition is

timely under S. Ct. R. 13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent

part:

The Congress shall have Power … To regulate Commerce with

foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the

Indian Tribes.

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free

State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

infringed.

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 922(g) provides, in pertinent part:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable

by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year …

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess

in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to

receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or

transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

Texas Penal Code § 22.05 provides, in pertinent part:

(b) A person commits an offense if he knowingly discharges a

firearm at or in the direction of:

(1) one or more individuals; or

(2) a habitation, building, or vehicle and is reckless as to

whether the habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied.

(c) Except as otherwise provided by this subsection, recklessness

and danger are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm

at or in the direction of another whether or not the actor believed

the firearm to be loaded. The presumption under this subsection

does not apply to a peace officer engaged in the lawful discharge

of the officer's official duties.

2

****

(e) An offense under Subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. An

offense under Subsection (b) is a felony of the third degree.

(f) Subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a peace officer if, at the time

of the offense, the officer:

(1) was engaged in the actual discharge of the officer's official

duties; and

(2) reasonably believed the discharge of the officer's firearm

was justified under Chapter 9.

STATEMENT

After a federal grand jury indicted Petitioner Jaterron Williamson for unlawful

possession of a firearm, he challenged the Government’s authority to criminalize his

conduct under Congress’s enumerated powers and the Second Amendment. App.,

infra, 1a, 13a–23a. After the district court denied his motion to dismiss the

indictment, (App., infra, 7a–10a), he pleaded guilty without waiving any appellate

rights. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

A. Legal Background

A federal statute criminalizes the possession “in or affecting commerce” of a

firearm by nine categories of “prohibited persons.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The vast

majority of prosecutions under this statute—more than 90%—are against defendants

previously “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see U.S. Sentencing Commission, Quick

Facts:

18

U.S.C.

§ 922(g)

Firearms

Offenses:

Fiscal

Year

2024

at

1,

https://perma.cc/4GKE-JHVA (reporting 7,419 convictions under § 922(g); “90.4%

were convicted … because of a prior felony conviction.”).

3

Of course, § 922(g)(1) applies far beyond the thousands of people convicted and

sentenced every year. According to the FBI, its background-check database includes

more than 5.8 million “active entries” for people covered by § 922(g)(1). See FBI,

Active Entries in the NICS Indices (May 31, 2026), https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/cjis/active_records_in_the_nics-indices.pdf. That staggering number is

still too low; it excludes “millions of people who have passed through the criminal

justice system and completed their sentences” in non-reporting jurisdictions, or before

the FBI started collecting records. Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and

Spatial Distribution of People With Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010,

54 Demography 1795, 1799 (2017); see also id. at 1806 (estimating the total

population of former felons who had completed their sentences as 14.5 million as of

2010).

1.

The federal possession ban first appeared, almost by accident,

in the 1960s.

Nationwide, life-long firearm bans are a thoroughly modern phenomenon. The

original federal law banning simple possession of firearms by felons emerged after

manned space flight, the countertop microwave oven, and Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts

Club Band.

Congress had banned interstate firearm transactions by people convicted of a

few violent felonies in 1938. Pub. L. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250. Congress expanded that

law to reach all felons in 1961. See Pub. L. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961). The ban on

simple possession appeared as “a last-minute Senate amendment” to a sprawling

4

1968 crime bill: “The Amendment was hastily passed, with little discussion, no

hearings and no report.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971).

Senator Russell Long proposed the possession ban in reaction to the

assassinations of President Kennedy in 1963 and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in

1968. 114 Cong. Rec. 14773 (1968). As the son of an assassinated politician, Long was

especially interested in that problem. Id. at 14774. Long recognized that his

contemporaries in Congress harbored “a constitutional doubt that the Federal

Government could outlaw the mere possession of weapons.” Id. at 13868. But Long

thought there was an easy way around that problem: Congress could “simply (find)

that the possession of these weapons by the wrong kind of people is either a burden

on commerce or a threat that affects the free flow of commerce.” Id. at 13869.

Despite his assurances, his fellow senators were skeptical. Senator John

McClellan asked, “Can we, under the Constitution, deny a man the right to keep a

gun in his home?” 114 Cong. Rec. 14774. He worried that a possession prohibition

“may go too far.” Id. Senator Peter Dominick agreed: “I believe there are a number of

instances in which it would be going too far to say that a man could no longer

participate in duck shooting or pheasant shooting. . . . I have a feeling that perhaps

we have gone too far, but perhaps this matter can be worked out in conference.” Id.

at 14774–75. Senator Thomas Dodd was “a little uneasy about” the federal

government banning mere possession: “[W]e will study it. I do not believe it would do

any harm.” Id. at 14774. McClellan also agreed to “accept” Long’s proposed

5

amendment “for the purpose of studying it” and to “try to understand it.” Id. On May

23, 1968, the Senate agreed to Long’s amendment on a voice vote. Id. at 14775.

Twelve days later, Sirhan Sirhan shot Senator Robert Kennedy, who was the

brother of the late president and a frontrunner in the 1968 race for that same office.

Senator Kennedy died on the morning of June 6. Later that day, after a somber

announcement of the death, the House agreed to all of the Senate amendments,

including Senator Long’s gun-possession ban, without any Conference Committee

and without any further study. 114 Cong. Rec. 16226, 16299–16300. President

Johnson signed the law on June 19, 1968. See Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.

2.

For most of the Twentieth Century, judges assumed that the

Constitution posed no barrier to Congressional efforts to

regulate gun possession.

For many years, the federal gun possession ban avoided serious constitutional

scrutiny. Throughout the Twentieth century, courts “found no conflict between federal

gun laws and the Second Amendment, narrowly construing the latter to guarantee

the right to bear arms as a member of a militia.” United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d

65, 66 n.2 (3d Cir. 1977) (discussing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–82

(1939), and its progeny). Beginning in the late 1930s—around 140 years after

ratification—many judges and many members of expressed a very broad view of

Congressional powers and a much narrower view of the Second Amendment. See

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) (discussing “an era of Commerce

Clause jurisprudence” beginning in 1937 “that greatly expanded the previously

defined authority of Congress under that Clause”) ; see also Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (

6

“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a [shortbarrel shotgun] has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of

a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the

right to keep and bear such an instrument.”).

Federal firearms laws enacted during this period—and the cases interpreting

them—reflected this maximalist view of Congress’s power. In 1980, this Court went

so far as to assert that felon bans “are neither based upon constitutionally suspect

criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.” Lewis v.

United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing Miller).

3.

Early advocates of the Individual Rights model of the Second

Amendment simply assumed that felon bans were historically

supported.

Scholars wrote very little about the Second Amendment before 1980, but

thereafter they quickly coalesced around the view that the Amendment protected an

individual right to possess weapons for self-defense. Don B. Kates, A Modern

Historiography of the Second Amendment, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1211, 1212 (2009). The

authors of two early (and influential) articles advocating the individual rights model

assumed that a government could ban ex-felons from possessing firearms. See Kates,

supra, at 217 & n.54 (“The Founders would not have understood the amendment as

extending to felons, children or those so physically or mentally impaired as to

preclude militia service.”); see also Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the

Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 65, 96 & n.47 (1983)

(citing Thomas Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 57 (7th ed. 1903)).

7

The first federal appellate decision embracing the Individual Rights model also

embraced these authors’ assumption that felons could be disarmed. See United States

v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is clear that felons, infants and

those of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms.”).

4.

In Heller, this Court described felon bans as both “longstanding”

and “presumptively lawful.” Scholars were quick to challenge

the former assertion.

This Court adopted the Individual Rights model in District Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008). Heller also spoke approvingly of felon bans, albeit in dictum:

“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full

scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt

on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally

ill.” Id. at 626; see also id. at 627 n.27 (describing felon bans as “presumptively lawful

regulatory measures”). The Court promised that there would be “time enough to

expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if

and when those exceptions come before us.” Id. at 635.

Almost immediately, historical and legal scholars called Heller’s “historical”

assumption into doubt. “Though recognizing the hazard of trying to prove a negative,

one can with a good degree of confidence say that bans on convicts possessing firearms

were unknown before World War I.” C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart

Have A Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 708 (2009); see also Carlton F.W. Larson,

Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial

Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371, 1374 (2009) (“Indeed, so far as I can determine, no

8

colonial or state law in eighteenth-century America formally restricted the ability of

felons to own firearms.”).

Despite this disconnect between what the Court wrote in Heller and what

historical record actually reveals, the Court has thus far refused to “expound” upon

the “historical justifications” for laws like § 922(g)(1). 554 U.S. at 635.

5.

In Bruen, the Court recognized that the Constitution

presumptively protects the very same conduct prohibited by

§ 922(g)(1).

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), this

Court chastised lower courts for their knee-jerk deference to statutes restricting

firearm rights: “while that judicial deference to legislative interest balancing is

understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not deference that the

Constitution demands here.” 597 U.S. at 26. Instead of deferring to a legislature’s

“interest balancing,” Bruen propounded a test focused on the Second Amendment’s

text and America’s historical tradition of firearm regulation: When the “plain text” of

the Second Amendment covers an individual’s conduct, “the Constitution

presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. at 17. To justify a regulation that burdens

presumptively protected conduct, “the government must affirmatively prove that its

firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds

of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19.

B. Facts and Procedural History

In July 2024, police officers in Fort Worth, Texas, went looking for Mr.

Williamson to execute an arrest warrant. App., infra, 25a. They found him as he was

9

walking out of a convenience store. Id. He immediately informed the officers that he

was carrying a Smith and Wesson pistol. Id. Officers removed the gun and arrested

him. Id.

The following October, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging

Petitioner under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). App., infra, 11a–12a. Mr. Williamson moved

to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the law (as commonly understood and

applied) exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and that it violated the Second

Amendment on its face and as applied. App., infra, 13a–23a. After the district court

denied the motion (App., infra,7a–10a), Mr. Williamson pleaded guilty without

waiving his right to appeal. App., infra, 24a–25a. The district court sentenced him to

46 months’ incarceration, followed by two years of supervised release. App., infra,

27a.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in a published decision. App., infra, 1a–

2a. The Court acknowledged its earlier decision in United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th

458 (5th Cir. 2024), which rejected the Government’s broad assertion of authority to

ban gun possession by former felons. App., infra, 2a; see Diaz, 116 F.4th at 465–74.

But the court felt bound to follow subsequent decisions that had upheld § 922(g)(1) as

applied to others convicted of similar prior offenses.

Judge Willett, joined by Judge Wilson, wrote separately to express dismay

about the inconsistent legal standards the Fifth Circuit uses to resolve Second

Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). App., infra, 5a–6a (“In an appropriate case, our

full court—or the Supreme Court—should supply the clarity this unsettled corner of

10

Second Amendment law now lacks.”). He also expressed doubt about whether the

Fifth Circuit’s “precedent rejecting enumerated-powers challenges to § 922(g)(1) was

correctly decided.” App., infra, 3a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION TO EXPLAIN

WHETHER AND WHEN § 922(g)(1) COMPORTS WITH THE

SECOND AMENDMENT.

Section 922(g)(1) bans the very same conduct protected by the plain text of the

Second Amendment—the keeping of arms. And before the Twentieth Century, there

was no comparable tradition of banning millions of Americans from even possessing

firearms based on Congress’s say-so.

For many years, courts assumed that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was constitutional

in all its applications—or at least in the vast majority of applications. After New York

State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), that unison devolved into

cacophony. Until this Court steps in to address the issue, lower courts will continue

to flounder.

Lower courts have made irreconcilable (and unpersuasive) attempts to

reconcile Heller’s assurance that felon bans are constitutional with Bruen’s text-andtradition test. The Fifth Circuit’s jurisprudence illustrates the confusion. According

to one decision, each § 922(g)(1) prosecution should be evaluated based on the “prior

convictions that are ‘punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.’”

United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-6625,

2025 WL 1727419 (U.S. June 23, 2025); see also United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th

11

308, 315 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Diaz, 116 F.4th at 469) (“Although Congress can

label certain classes of people—such as felons—dangerous, courts cannot grant those

determinations blanket deference because the ‘shifting benchmark’ of felony status

‘should not define the limits of the Second Amendment.’”). In other published

decisions, however, the Fifth Circuit has held that § 922(g)(1) can be constitutionally

applied where the defendant’s felony convictions (or perhaps the allegations

surrounding those convictions) indicate dangerousness. App., infra, 2a.

According to the Sixth Circuit, a former felon bears the burden of proving “that

he is not dangerous,” and a court must evaluate dangerousness “considering the

individual’s entire criminal record—not just the predicate offense for purposes of

§ 922(g)(1).” United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 657–58 (6th Cir. 2024).

Channeling Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,

197 (1964), the Sixth Circuit expressed confidence in district courts’ ability to assess

which predicate offenses are dangerous enough to warrant lifelong disarmament and

which are not. Williams, 113 F.4th at 660 (“We are therefore confident that the

dangerousness inquiry is workable for resolving as-applied challenges to

§ 922(g)(1).”).

The Eighth Circuit disagreed: “we conclude that there is no need for felony-byfelony litigation regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).” United States v.

Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 2024), reh’g denied, 121 F.4th 656, cert. denied,

No. 24-6517, 2025 WL 1426707 (U.S. May 19, 2025).

12

None of these approaches is entirely satisfactory. Perhaps recognizing this, the

government recently revived the relief-from-disability procedure under 18 U.S.C.

§ 925(c). See generally Pet. Br. 40–42, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S.

filed Dec. 12, 2025). That mechanism was unavailable to Petitioner when he

possessed the firearms at issue here.

As Respondent will surely point out, members of this Court have repeatedly

expressed agreement with Heller’s assertion that felon bans are presumptively

lawful. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality op.) (“We

repeat those assurances here.”); see also Bruen, 597 U.S. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J.,

concurring); United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 699 (2024); United States v.

Hemani, No. 24-1234, 2026 WL 1751710, at *17 (U.S. June 18, 2026) (Alito, J.,

concurring). But none of those decisions grappled with the historical record as related

to felons.

This Court should grant the petition and explain whether and when the Second

Amendment allows a defendant to be imprisoned for simply possessing a firearm, the

very same conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment.

II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION AND ADDRESS

WHETHER A FIREARM’S PRIOR MOVEMENT ACROSS STATE

LINES

MEETS

THE

MINIMUM

STATUTORY

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVING A NEXUS

WITH COMMERCE.

When the Founders decided to form a stronger national government, they had

to overcome objections that Congress would eventually utilize its power to disarm

disfavored citizens. Federalists believed that the enumeration of limited and specific

13

powers would keep Congress from disarming anyone. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.

Antifederalists worried that those limits might not hold, and the Government would

later disarm citizens in favor of a standing army or organized militia. The Second

Amendment was designed to allay those fears. Id. at 598–600. After ratification of

the Bill of Rights, Americans understood that their right to keep arms had twofold

protection: “No clause in the Constitution could by any rule of construction be

conceived to give to congress a power to disarm the people. … But if in any blind

pursuit of inordinate power,” Congress did attempt it, “this amendment may be

appealed to as a restraint.” William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United

States 125–26 (2d ed. 1829). A nationwide Congressional ban on keeping arms would

have scandalized the founding generation. Nothing like it existed during the first 180

years of our nation’s existence.

One of Congress’s “few and defined” powers is the power “[t]o regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian

Tribes.” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), this

Court held that the commerce power does not authorize regulation of a purely local,

non-economic activity like “possession of a gun in a school zone.” Id. at 560. The

original version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”) exceeded Congress’s

commerce power. Id. at 561 (discussing Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990)).

Unlike the original GFSZA, § 922(g)’s possession prong requires proof of a

nexus element—that the defendant possessed “in or affecting commerce” a firearm.

Lopez assumed that this nexus element “would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry,

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that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.” Id. If that were

true, then the element would often present “a complicated legal question” that would

delight “students of constitutional law.” Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 250,

(2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).

But this Court construed the nexus element in a predecessor statute to reach

any possession of a firearm if the firearm itself previously moved in interstate or

foreign commerce. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977). The

constitutional logic of Lopez cannot be reconciled with the statutory holding of

Scarborough. See Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163 (2011) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also United States v. Seekins, 52 F.4th 988,

989 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g); accord Hemani, 2026 WL

1751710, at *12 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court, and lower courts, should

revisit the constitutionality of § 922(g).”). In the decision below, Judges Willett and

Wilson both agreed that this Court should resolve the tension between Commerce

Clause jurisprudence and the prevailing interpretation of § 922(g)’s nexus-withcommerce element. App., infra, 3a–5a.

While there is a thriving debate among judges and scholars about the original

meaning of the Second Amendment, no one has persuasively argued that the

Commerce Clause, as originally understood, granted Congress the power to say who

could and who could not possess items if those items had ever crossed a state or

national boundary. After all, if Congress had that power under the unamended

Constitution, then it had the power to forbid weapon possession entirely and thereby

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disarm the state militias. Even at the founding, most firearms were manufactured in

states other than their final

In Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), this Court considered

the first, hastily passed possession ban and found “no indication that Congress

intended to require any more than the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at

some time, in interstate commerce.” Id. at 575.

This Court has never considered whether that same interpretation governs the

post-1986 version of § 922(g)(1). The defendant in Scarborough argued that

possession required proof of a present connection to commerce, whereas a past

connection would satisfy the nexus element for receipt. 431 U.S. at 569. The Court

rejected that argument because, at the time, possession was prohibited only in a lastminute addendum, without much care for verb tense, in an entirely separate title. Id.

at 569–70. But in 1986 Congress combined the prohibitions into a single statute, with

three different nexus elements depending on the prohibited activity:

It shall be unlawful for any [prohibited] person:

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce,

or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or

ammunition;

or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been

shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (emphases added).

In § 922(g)’s current form, there are two textual distinctions between the nexus

elements for “possess” and “receive.” First, for possession, the Government must

prove a nexus for the possession itself; for receipt, the nexus element modifies

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“firearm” or “ammunition.” Id. Second, because the phrase “in or affecting commerce”

modifies the present-tense verb “possess,” the text requires a present connection with

commerce (even if that connection is unspecified). For receipt, “the proscribed act, ‘to

receive any firearm,’ is in the present tense, the interstate commerce reference is in

the present perfect tense, denoting an act that has been completed.” Barrett v. United

States, 423 U.S. 212, 216 (1976).

Given the differences in language and the post-Lopez understanding of the

Commerce Power, there are reasons to reject Scarborough’s interpretation of the 1968

possession ban, when applied to the post-1986 version of § 922(g). And even if that

interpretation of statutory language were correct, the statute would exceed Congress’s

power under the Constitution. The movement of a durable item like a firearm from

one state to another may be “commerce,” but the item does not remain “in commerce”

forever. There is “no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied

the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent

crime and vindication of its victims.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618

(2000).

The current version of the possession ban makes up more than 10% of federal

prosecutions. See Emily Tiry et al., Prosecution of Federal Firearms Offenses 2000-16

at 4–5, Tables 1 & 2 (Urban Institute Oct. 2021).1 Despite repeated calls for additional

guidance, this Court has never explained how the prevailing interpretation of 18

1

Available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/254520.pdf (accessed

May 7, 2024).

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U.S.C. § 922(g)’s possession-nexus element is consistent with the original

understanding of the Constitution.

Under the prevailing interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the statute entirely

bans millions of Americans from possessing and carrying firearms, on pain of up to

fifteen years in prison. This Court should grant certiorari to explain whether that

interpretation is consistent with Congress’s enumerated powers.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition and set this case for a decision on the

merits.

Respectfully submitted,

________________________

J. Matthew Wright

Counsel of Record

FEDERAL PUBLIC

DEFENDER’S OFFICE

600 South Tyler Street

Suite 2300

Amarillo, Texas 79101

(806) 324-2370

Matthew_Wright@fd.org

June 22, 2026

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