Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alma Garza, Petitioner v. United States

No.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALMA GARZA

PETITIONER,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESPONDENT

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

W. SCOTT QUINLAN

ATTORNEY AT LAW

2300 Tulare Street, Ste. 300

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 442-0634

egg nin ae a ae

Counsel of Record

I. Question Presented

Whether law enforcement authorities, who use possible administrative delay

in obtaining a warrant as justification for seizing a package containing suspected

contraband, shipping it to another state, and then applying for a warrant, violate

Fourth Amendment warrant requirements set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire

403 U.S. 443, 469-471 (1971), United States v. Place 462 U.S. 696, 701-702 (1983),

and Chapman v. United States 365 U.S. 610, 616 (1961).

Il. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Alma Garza, petitioner on review, was the appellant-defendant in

proceedings in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.

The United States of America, respondent on review, was the appellee-

plaintiff.

ii

Il. TABLE OF CONTENTS

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V. Petition for Writ of Certiorari oo... ccc ccecscececeseeseeseeeeseesesseseesseeessens 1

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VID. Jurisdiction 0. eee ceseeseeceeeteeseeeeeeceecaeeesaecsenseecseesessssesseeseeecseesseeseaes 2

VIII. Constitutional Provisions Involved

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IX. Statement of the Case sess sessncsamueasansenamaianmmmnsnwneneaiieae 2

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XII. REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .0....cccceceeeeseteseeeeeees 8

A. This Court Should Clarify That Suspected Contraband

May Not Be Seized Upon Probable Cause Without A

Warrant And Shipped To A Different Court Jurisdiction

To Avoid Administrative Delay in Seeking a Warrant In The

Jurisdiction Where It Was Seized ............ccccccsccsseseesessseesesseesesees 8

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United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

Case No. 25-2794

Memorandum Decision

Issued March 25, 2026 0... .sssesessseseecsseeseeseeeseseaeseseseseeesseeeseeeeas App-001

United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Order Denying Motion to Suppress

Issued, September 6; 2022 sssssvecaaxesmnsesssweeuasindiatessececeennenrnserenennees App-011

ii

United States District Court

For the Eastern District of California

Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Suppression

Motion Issued June 25, 2024... .cccecssssessesssssseeessssesesssessesseeeeees App-016

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit ; ;

Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en banc

Issued April 28, 2026 wc cceesessssesessssesesensnenceceeeevesseeeererseaceeetees App-024

Page 3 of Opposition to Motion to Suppress filed in

The district court and filed on the Ninth Circuit docket

AS 3-ER-415 ccc cccceeecsesesseeseseesecaeaescacsesesseseseseeseseeasaeneneneeeeeneeses App-025

Pages 42-43 of District Court Pre-trial Order Regardin

Evidence Suppression Issues, Issued September 16, 2024............ App-026

August 26, 2025 United States District Court for the

Eastern District of California Judgment In A Criminal Case ........ App-028

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

United States Supreme Court Cases

Chapman v. United States (1961)

365 U.S. 610 iccccccccsccsccccsscseeceeecseeseersessesscssssesscesssesseseesseseseseeeessseneeeseeeaees i, 8

Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971)

403 U.S. 443 vicccccccccccsccscsscssssessceeeseeseseceeaeeeesesssesesesecsesscssssecseeseneenessenes i, 5, 6

Jones v. United States (1958)

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Soldal v. Cook County, Ill (1992)

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United States v. Jones (2012)

565) U.S. 400 .ssconsoncacasseresarannine rear nnemnveerenenmnennsaversnvasesenconervoansuncereunns 6

United States v. Place (1983)

462 U.S. 696 veccccccssccscsscssescecceecseceterseecensessssesssessessesessesseesssesseeneneenees i, 2,5, 6

Appellate Court Cases

Corngold v. United States (9" Cir., 1966 en banc)

367 F.2d 1 ceeeecccscscccecsccsesscessecceesecessceeseneeeeseeecnseesesseseesesseseesesesseeeenseeseeeeens 6,8

United States v. Licata (9"" Cir., 1985)

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United States Constitution

Fourth Amendment to the United States

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Federal Rules

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 41(b)(1).... eee eeeeceeesseseeseeeeneeeeeeeees 3

Statutes

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08 ULS.C.. $1291. .cccsssmassaerscenmeneeme

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vi

V. Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Alma Garza, an inmate currently at FCI Victorville, in Victorville,

California, by and through W. Scott Quinlan, her CJA appointed counsel from the

Eastern District of California, respectfully petitions this Court for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewing

her conviction in district court Case No. 1:22-cr-00062-JLT-SKO-4 prosecuted by

the United States of America.

VI. Opinions Below

The unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Case No.

25-2794 denying Ms. Garza’s direct appeal by Memorandum decision filed March

25, 2026, together with Judge Lefkow’s dissent, is attached at Appendix (“App.”)

at 1-10.

The decision of the United States District Court denying Ms. Garza’s motion

to suppress evidence by order filed September 6, 2022 is attached at Appendix

(“App”) at 11-15.

The decision of the United States District Court denying Ms. Garza’s motion

for reconsideration by order filed June 25, 2024 is attached at Appendix (“App”) at

16-23.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Ms. Garza’s petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc in Case No. 25-2794 by order filed April 28, 2026,

with a dissent by Judge Lefkow. That order and Judge Lefkow’s dissent is attached

at Appendix (“App”) at 24.

VII. Jurisdiction

Ms. Garza’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on

April 28, 2026. Ms. Garza invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§1254(1), having timely filed this petition for a writ of certiorari within ninety days

of the denial of a timely petition for rehearing by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction in the first

instance pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1291 and 1294.

VIII. Constitutional Provisions Involved

United States Constitution, Amendment IV

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall

not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

IX. Statement of the Case

This case involves a package mailed by petitioner. Based upon wiretapped

conversations that were part of an ongoing investigation, law enforcement

authorities had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. The package

was shipped from Fresno, California to be delivered to Las Cruces, New Mexico in

two days, and was intercepted by law enforcement authorities in Texas en route

one day after mailing.

The general principles pertaining to such seizures were stated by this Court

in United States v. Place 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983), as follows:

“In the ordinary case, the Court has viewed a seizure of personal

property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment unless it is accompanied pursuant to a judicial warrant

issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be

seized. Where law enforcement authorities have probable cause to

believe that a container holds contraband or evidence of a crime, but have

not secured a warrant, the Court has interpreted the Amendment to permit

seizure of the property, pending issuance of a warrant to examine its

contents. . .”

Instead of temporarily detaining the package while applying for a warrant in

Texas or having a warrant ready in New Mexico when it arrived there the next day,

the officers seized the package without a warrant and directed it back to Fresno,

California. This was, under the above authority, a per se unreasonable seizure

under the Fourth Amendment.

The stated reason for shipping the package to Fresno, California was a

subjective belief a warrant could be obtained faster in Fresno. The package was

directed back to Fresno because the package had to be in the Eastern District of

California for an Eastern District Magistrate Judge to have venue to issue a warrant

under the provision of Rule 41(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

X. Trial Court Proceedings

Defendant Alma Garza was convicted of conspiracy to distribute a

controlled substance from November 2, 2021 to March 31, 2022 (Count One) and

of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance on January 27, 2022

in Fresno, California (Count Two), and sentenced to prison on September 30, 2024.

A third count was dismissed prior to trial.

Prior to trial, Ms. Garza filed a Motion to Suppress the unlawful seizure of a

package she mailed for JR Torrecillas on Thursday, January 27, 2022, in Fresno,

California.!

In her motion to suppress, Ms. Garza noted that as the mailer of the package

she had a possessory interest in the package. She had paid for the package to be

delivered in Las Cruces, New Mexico within two days(App-011, 012). Ms. Garza

also tracked the package and agreed to pick up the package for JR when notified it

was sent back to Fresno.

Facts establishing probable cause to seize and search the package were

known of by investigating officers on Thursday, the evening of January 27, 2022,

the day petitioner mailed it (App-012, 025).

The government acknowledged that “several hours after Ms. Garza mailed

the parcel, (on Thursday) the wiretap revealed additional evidence providing

probable cause that the parcel contained contraband.”* The next day, Friday

January 28, 2022, the package was located in Texas, seized, and rerouted back to

Fresno, California (App-012).

' Defendant moved pre-trial to suppress the contents of the package she

mailed, and later filed a “notice” informing the Court of her intent to move to

suppress her custodial interview and seizure of her cell phone based solely on her

arrest for mailing those drugs on January 27, 2022, as fruit of the poisonous tree, in

the event the denial of the suppression motion was reversed. The trial court agreed

with the government that there was no reason to take any action at that time with

respect to that “notice”(1-ER-65,66 set forth at App-026, 027).

? This acknowledgement of probable cause was conceded in the government’s

opposition to the suppression motion at 3-ER-415 set forth in the Appendix at

Appendix (“App”) 25.

The package arrived in Fresno on Saturday, January 29, the same day it was

guaranteed to arrive in New Mexico. Agents then applied for a warrant

electronically, which was verified telephonically to the magistrate on Sunday,

who at that time signed it (App-012, 013).

The investigation was centered in Fresno; the lead law enforcement agent

was employed out of Fresno; a Fresno AUSA was involved with the case; any

drugs seized would be stored in Fresno and would be tested at a Fresno-based

laboratory (App-012, 013).

The warrant affiant stated that he rerouted the package back to Fresno where

he planned to apply for a warrant to search the parcel id. He had probable cause to

seize the package on Thursday before he located it in Texas on Friday. He

contended that he could apply for a warrant faster in Fresno without any showing

that he had ever tried to apply for a warrant in Texas, where the package was

located, or in New Mexico where it was scheduled to be the next day (App-013).

The trial court cited that foundationless supposition about getting a warrant faster

in Fresno, California, in denying suppression. The trial court ruled that detaining

the package and shipping it back to California was a reasonable investigative

detention (App-015).

The trial court did not acknowledge that where police know in advance the

location of the evidence, and intend to seize it upon probable cause, a warrant to

seize it is required by Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 469-471 (1971),

and United States v. Place 462 U.S. 696, 701-702 (1983). Nor did the trial court

acknowledge Ms. Garza’s possessory interest in the package when it was seized

without a warrant and prevented from arriving in Las Cruces, New Mexico within

the guaranteed two-day delivery date.

XI. Appellate Proceedings

On appeal, defendant cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 469-

471 (1971), United States v. Place 462 U.S. 696 at 701-702 (1983), United States

vy. Licata 761 F.2d 537 (9"" Cir., 1985), and Corngold v. United States 367 F.2d 1 at

4 (9"" Cir, 1966 en banc), for the necessary showing the government must make for

a warrantless seizure of a package upon probable cause.

No amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure of property in

the absence of exigent circumstances Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443,

469 (1971). Where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and

intend to seize it, a warrant to seize it is required id at 471. For Fourth Amendment

purposes a seizure is any meaningful interference with a person’s possessory

interest in property Soldal v. Cook County, Ill 506 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1992) . An

attendant search is not required id at 68-69; accord United States v. Jones 565 U.S.

400, 408 (2012).

Petitioner asserted during oral argument on appeal that in directing the

package back to Fresno, California to arrive on Saturday, the case agent prevented

delivery that same Saturday to Las Cruces, New Mexico, as had been contracted by

petitioner. On appeal, neither the majority nor dissenting opinions disputed

petitioner’s possessory interest in the seized package. The majority opinion placed

the burden on petitioner to show that officers had acted “leisurely” in seeking the

warrant after probable cause was established, in violation of this Court’s precedent

requiring that the government establish exigent circumstances justifying the

warrantless seizure of contraband after probable cause is established.

The majority found that petitioner had failed to establish that the officers had

acted leisurely in seeking a warrant in Fresno, California while the dissenting

6

opinion found a Fourth Amendment violation because the delay in seeking a

warrant was not because of any investigatory need or unavoidable administrative

delay, but for the investigator’s convenience.

Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc with the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals, renewing her arguments that the package was seized

upon probable cause without a warrant in Texas when it was redirected back to

Fresno, California to arrive the same day it was guaranteed to arrive in Las Cruces,

New Mexico. Petitioner asserted that no facts were proffered that a warrant was

applied for in Texas or why one was not prepared in New Mexico to have ready

when the package arrived there the next day.

Petitioner asserted that the authorities cited in the majority opinion were

investigative detention cases that culminated in probable cause to search, whereas

here, agents had probable cause to seize and search the mailed package the day

before it was located in Texas on its way to New Mexico.

The case agent asserted administrative delay as a justification for not seeking

a warrant in Texas, asserting his belief that he could get one faster in Fresno,

California. However, he made no factual showing that he had attempted to obtain a

warrant in Texas, and offered no explanation at all for not seeking one in New

Mexico.

The issue presented to the en banc Appellate Court was whether an

unsubstantiated belief of the case officer that he could obtain a search warrant

faster in Fresno, California than in Texas or New Mexico can justify his

warrantless seizure of the package in Texas and shipping it to his home District in

California. Petitioner pointed out that the Appellate Court placed the burden on her

to show that the officers were acting “leisurely” instead of upon the government to

show exigent circumstances for the warrantless seizure in Texas.

The petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, with Judge

Lefkow dissenting from the order denying rehearing, and recommending rehearing

en banc.

XII. REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. This Court Should Clarify That Suspected Contraband May Not Be

Seized Upon Probable Cause Without A Warrant And Shipped To A

Different Court Jurisdiction To Avoid Administrative Delay In Seeking

A Warrant In The Jurisdiction Where It Was Seized

The subjective speculation of the case officer in this case that he could get a

warrant faster in Fresno, California than in Texas or New Mexico does not

constitute an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless seizure of the package

in Texas and its shipment to California. Administrative inconvenience is not

generally considered an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless seizure of

a package upon probable cause to believe it contains contraband Chapman v.

United States 365 U.S. 610, 615-616 (1961).

Corngold v. United States 367 F.2d 1 (9" Cir., 1966, en banc), citing

Chapman v. United States, supra, addressed the unlawful search of packages

delivered by the defendant to a common carrier in Las Angeles for transport to

New York. Addressing the lack of exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless

search in that case, id at 4:

“The officers had no warrant, and there were no circumstances

which might have justified a search without one. No arrest was made

to which a search without a warrant might be incident. The

government made no showing that the packages might be removed

8

before a warrant could be obtained. Appellant was not threatening to

remove them, nor was the airline, except under such conditions as the

officers saw fit to impose. From the time appellant left the packages

with the carrier in Los Angeles they were subject to the effective

control of the customs agents. There was nothing to prevent the agents

from securing a warrant on a pane showing, either before the,

peelaees were shipped from Los Angeles or after they arrived in New

ork. On this record, search without a warrant was not justified even

if the customs agents had probable cause to believe the packages

contained contraband.”

Other authority cited by the Court below offers no stronger support.

United States v. Licata 761 F.2d 537 (9" Cir., 1985), held that police are

allowed to seize property without a warrant where it is necessary to prevent

destruction or removal of evidence pending the application for a search warrant in

that jurisdiction id 543. The time it takes to secure a warrant in such circumstances

is considered a necessary exigent circumstance id 541-542. Under the Fourth

Amendment a finding of both probable cause and exigent circumstances must be

made to support a warrantless seizure id 542. The government bears a heavy

burden of demonstrating that exceptional circumstances justified departure from

the warrant requirement for seizure. “The burden cannot be satisfied by speculation

about what may or might have happened” id 543.

Petitioner submits that the government agents were on notice that

foundationless speculation that they could get a warrant issued upon probable

cause faster in another state did not constitute an exigent circumstance justifying

their warrantless seizure of the mailed package in Texas and sending it to

California.

The facts of this case do not support an investigative detention of the

package to develop or dispel probable cause, and present this Court with an

opportunity to establish the circumstances, if any, that perceived administrative

delay in obtaining a warrant justifies transporting that package to another court’s

jurisdiction for its issuance. The importance of maintaining clear standards for the

9

admission of evidence in conformity with the Fourth Amendment warrants this

Court granting certiorari Jones v. United States 357 U.S. 493, 494 (1958).

XIII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Garza respectfully requests that this Court

issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals.

Dated this 15" day of June, 2026.

Respectfully submitted

Bilt Cla

W. Scott Quinlan”

Counsel of Record

10

APPENDIX

11

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FI LED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 25 2026

MOLLY C, DWYER, CLERK

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-2794

D.C. No.

Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:22-cr-00062-JLT-SKO-4

Vv,

MEMORANDUM

ALMA GARZA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 6, 2026

San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and LEFKOW, District

Judge.

Dissent by Judge Lefkow.

Defendant-Appellant Alma Garza appeals her jury conviction and sentence

for drug conspiracy and possession charges. Because the parties are familiar with

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The Honorable Joan H. Lefkow, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Tlinois, sitting by designation.

App-001

Case: 25-2794, 03/25/2026, DktEntry: 49.1, Page 2 of 10

the facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our

ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did nor err in denying Garza’s motion to suppress. We

review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo, the district court’s underlying

factual findings for clear error, and the decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Quoc Viet Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1159,

1163 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]he main Fourth Amendment interest in a mailed package

attaches to the privacy of its contents, not the speed with which it is

delivered.” United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United

States v. Hillison, 733 ¥.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1984)). Once probable cause is

established, a longer warrantless detention is permitted to apply for and receive a

search warrant. See United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“Probable cause is sufficient to support the subsequent detention of the package.”

(cleaned up)).

Garza has not put forth any evidence that the investigators here were

“leisurely” in seeking the warrant. See Gill, 280 F.3d at 929. The less-than-threeday warrantless detention period here is shorter than the six-day period deemed

permissible in Gill, where the evidence showed that investigators acted

diligently. See id. at 929; see also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252—

53 (1970) (29-hour warrantless detention of the packages during the investigation

i)

25-2794

App-002

Case: 25-2794, 03/25/2026, DkiEntry: 49.1, Page 3 of 10

was justifiable based on clerk’s and officer’s reasonable suspicions). Nor was an

evidentiary hearing necessary where Garza failed to “allege facts with sufficient

definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that

contested issues of fact exist.” Quoc Viet Hoang, 486 F.3d at 1163 (cleaned up).

2. The district court did not err in giving the deliberate ignorance jury

instruction. We review the decision to give a deliberate ignorance instruction for

abuse of discretion, but the instruction’s substance de novo. United States y. Yi, 704

3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 2013). “An instruction is appropriate if it is supported by

law and has foundation in the evidence.” /d. (cleaned up).

Here, the deliberate ignorance instruction was appropriately given because

Garza argued she lacked actual knowledge of the package’s contents and trial

evidence supported a deliberate avoidance mens rea argument. See id. at 804; United

States v. Ramos-Atondo, 732 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2013). Nor was the substance

of the instruction deficient. We have previously upheld the use of the model

instruction at issue here. See, ¢.g., Yi, 704 F.3d at 805. The only drugs at issue in

Garza’s trial were federally controlled substances, so the district court did not err in

. using the word “drugs” to stand in for federally controlled substances.

3. The district court did not err in denying Garza’s motions for acquittal and

for a new trial. We review a motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of the

evidence de novo and the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse

3 25-2794

App-003

Case: 25-2794, 03/25/2026, DktEntry: 49.1, Page 4 of 10

of discretion. See United States v. Chhun, 744 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014).

Given Garza’s admissions regarding her suspicions about the package and her more

general knowledge of JR’s criminal activities, it was not irrational for the jury to

convict. See id. at 1117-18.

4. The district court did not err in overruling Garza’s sentencing objections.

We review “the district court’s identification of the correct legal standard [regarding

a sentencing issue] de novo and the district court’s factual findings for clear error,”

while “a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a

given case [is] reviewed for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852

F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We also review the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Carty, 520

F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

As to Garza’s argument that the district could erred in not granting a minorrole reduction, she failed to show she was “substantially less culpable than the

average participant in the charged criminal activity” as compared to her “coparticipants.” United States v. Diaz, 884 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

Nor was the district court required to “tick off sentencing factors to show that it

considered them.” Jd. at 914-15.

The district court similarly did not err in denying Garza’s requested downward

departure for acceptance of responsibility, as the reduction “is not intended to apply

4 25-2794

App-004

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to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the

essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and

expresses remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. This is not the rare circumstance

where the defendant put on a defense so minimal that she might still qualify for the

reduction.

Nor did the district court err by not independently addressing Garza’s

methamphetamine purity objection. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 992 (9th Cir. 2008); cf

Rita y. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (“[W]hen a judge decides simply to

apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require

lengthy explanation.”). It suffices that the district court read and considered the

presentence report, Garza’s objections to that report, and the sentencing memoranda.

Finally, the district court did not err in denying Garza’s request for a

downward departure based on her age and rehabilitation. The below-Guidelines

sentence reflected the district court’s review of the relevant papers and

understanding of the relevant facts, including the “very large amount of drugs at

issue.” Indeed, the sentence was below guidelines in part because the district court

“varlied| downward for [Garza’s| age.”

AFFIRMED,

5 25-2794

App-005

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FILED

United States of America v. Garza, No. 25-2794 MAR 25 2026

LEFKOW, District Judge, dissenting: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S, COURT OF APPEALS

T respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court

correctly denied Garza’s motion to suppress. The majority does not engage with

how the facts of Garza differ from most of the Fourth Amendment mailedpackages cases, in which packages are detained for further investigation based on

reasonable suspicion. See, ¢.g., United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2002);

United States y. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.1990). Garza’s package was detained,

the government admits, with sufficient evidence to seek a judicial finding of

probable cause, meaning there was no investigatory need to continue detaining the

package. It was held for almost three days for the government’s convenience. The

majority at once acknowledges that probable cause is different from reasonable

suspicion by citing United States v. Lozano, 623 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2010), for the

proposition that a package may continue to be held even after establishing probable

cause, but it proceeds to analyze the delay using Gi//, a reasonable suspicion case.

The majority holds that, “[o]nce probable cause is established, a longer

warrantless detention is permitted to apply for and receive a search warrant.”

Majority at 2 (citing Lozano, 623 F.3d at 1061 (“[P]robable cause is sufficient to

support the subsequent detention of the package.” (cleaned up))). Neither the

majority nor Lozano provides any reasoning to support their unequivocal

statements and neither expresses any limiting principles. In Lozano, it is not even

|

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clear to what extent, if at all, the agents detained the package after they had

evidence of probable cause before applying for the warrant. Lozano, 623 F.3d at

1059. Instead, Lozano relies on the same statement made in a footnote in United

States v. Quoc Viet Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1160 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (where there

was a 2.5 hour delay between obtaining probable cause and issuing a warrant),

which in turn offers no reasoning but a citation to United States v. Hernandez, 313

F.3d 1206, 1213, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002) (where there was a 20-hour delay between

obtaining probable cause and issuing a warrant). The cited portion of Hernandez

mentions probable cause only obliquely to note that in another case, United States

v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227 (9th Cir.1990), we held a five-hour delay between probable

cause and executing a warrant was not unreasonable because it was due to the

administrative hurdles of securing a warrant. Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1213 (citing

Aldaz, 921 F.2d at 1231). Simply put, neither the majority nor any of the cases it

relies on has articulated a principled reason for why a “longer warrantless

detention” of almost three days after probable cause has been established “is

permitted.” Majority at 2; compare United States v, Dass, 849 F.2d 414, 415 (9th

Cit. 1988) (citing, United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970)) CT We

are reluctant to extend the Van Leeuwen outer boundary of 29 hours [from

reasonable suspicion to warrant execution] to a period not measured in hours, but

rather in days[.]”).

to

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The majority goes on to reason that because the six-day delay between

package detention and search warrant execution in Gi// was reasonable, Garza

should be treated the same. But comparing the six days in Gil! to the almost-three

days in Garza is comparing apples to oranges. Finding the comparable time period

in Gill requires assessing when probable cause was established in that case. In Gill,

the package was detained under reasonable suspicion on Thursday to investigate it,

which the officer diligently did over the next several days. Gil/, 280 F.3d at 925—

26. By Monday, the investigating officer still had not developed probable cause.

See Gill, 280 F.3d at 926. The officer then continued his investigation, gathered

more information, and completed his search warrant application on Tuesday. Gi/l,

280 F.3d at 926-27. The warrant was signed on Wednesday, as the magistrate judge

was unavailable on Tuesday. Gi//, 280 F.3d at 927. Therefore, the comparable time

period in Gi//—the delay between obtaining probable cause and executing a

watrant—was about 24 hours. This makes Gi// similar to A/daz or Hernandez,

where the probable cause-to-warrant delay was a matter of hours, rather than a

period of days as it was here and in United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (9th Cir.

1988).

Garza should be compared to Dass, the Ninth Circuit case that grapples with

the effect on a sender’s Fourth Amendment rights when investigators purposefully

delay a package after obtaining sufficient evidence for probable cause. In Dass, we

we

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recognized that “short delays in obtaining a search warrant for mailed packages”

may be reasonable, citing United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), but

we held that the circumstances did not justify delays of seven and more days where

dog sniffs provided the immediate basis for probable cause. Dass, 849 F.2d at 415—

16. Van Leeuwen and Dass require us to assess the reasonableness of the delay

under the facts presented,

The difference between probable cause and reasonable suspicion matters

because it informs the reasonableness of a package’s delay. See Aldaz, 921 F.2d at

230. Ifa package is delayed for diligent investigation, courts often find such a

delay reasonable and therefore not a Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Gill,

280 F.3d at 929. If a package is delayed not because of an investigatory need or an

unavoidable administrative delay, but for the investigators’ convenience, as it was

here, the delay should be held unreasonable and thus a Fourth Amendment

violation.'

In Dass, we relied on two fundamental principles grounding the Fourth

Amendment: deterring unreasonable police behavior and requiring judicial

determination of probable cause. Dass, 849 F.2d at 416. We rejected the

government’s argument that the delay was acceptable because it did not benefit

| Moreover, unlike our guiding cases, we are in an age of electronic communication, This

counsels for allowing less than the 29 hours accepted in Van Leeuwen, rather than more.

4

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from the delay, stating, “The government’s theory would allow an unlimited period

of seizure without judicial intervention; to accept its argument would nullify the

seizure portion of the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment.” /d. at

416 (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215, 212 (1981)). We should

be guided by the principles articulated in Dass. Instead, we stretch the unsupported

language of Lozano towards their erosion. The holding today is contrary to Dass; it

allows investigators to pursue a warrant at their leisure after they have established

probable cause; and it opens the door to the very misconduct the Fourth

Amendment exists to prevent.

I respectfully dissent.

App-010

?)

26

$e 1:2?-cr-00062-JLT-SKO Document 220 *SEALED* Filed 09/06/22 Page 1 of5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

KASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No.: 1:22-cr-00062 JLT

Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

(Doc. 177)

Vv.

ALMA GARZA, TO BE FILED UNDER SEAL

Defendant.

Alma Garza moves the Court to suppress a package mailed by her in January 2022, Ms. Garza

contends that the seizure occurred without a warrant and, consequently, it violated the Fourth

Amendment. Because the Court finds that the officers lawfully seized the package, the motion is

DIN IUD.

1. Background

Around noon on January 27, 2022-—-a Thursday—officers intercepted a telephone call belween

a known drug trafficker, Horacio Torrecillas and Ms. Garza, in which Vorrecillas asked Ms. Garza to

mail a package for him, (Doc. 188 at 15) Initially, Garza protested, and asked questioned why the

person who was paid to do this work. could not do it. Id. Even still, Garza travelled to the post office

and deposited the package in the mail. Id. During the visit to the post office, at about 2:30 p.m., Garza

spoke by telephone with Torrecillas. Id. She told him that the package could not be delivered by the

next day, but it could be delivered by Saturday. Jd. She verified that she should send the package in

| |-ER-74

p-011

18

se 1:22-er-00062-JLT-SKO Document 220 *SEALED* Filed 09/06/22 Page 2 of 5

this manner, despite the $75 cost. Id. at 16. Torrecillas agreed, and Garza paid the money and posted

the package to be delivered to 1000 La Fonda Drive, Apartment H, Las Cruces, New Mexico. Id.

Later that night, at 9:18 p.m., Torrecillas spoke to the recipient of the package and informed

him, “I sent you that shit already,” and told him that he would have to sign for the package when it

was delivered because Garza had accidentally included the signature requirement when she mailed it.

Doc. 188 at 16). The recipient told Torrecillo that he was opening a bank account and would send

Torrecillo a debit card, so Torrecillo could withdraw the money, which would constitute payment, Id.

The next afternoon, on Friday, January 28, 2022, at 4:02 p.m., Torrecillo called Garza and

asked her to “check the tracking on the shit.” (Doc. 188 at 17) Garza responded, “check what?” Id,

Torrecillo replied, “the tracking on the shit we sent.” GARZA agreed to do so, but then she forgot to

do it. A little while later, at 4:33 p.m. the recipient of the package texted Torrecillo and asked when

the package would arrive. Id. Torrecillo informed him that it would arrive cither that same day or the

day afler. Id. Torrecillo said he’d check the tracking info and get back to him. Id. At7 p.m., Torrecillo

contacted Garza and again asked her to check the tracking information because “they were asking.” Id.

Garza reported that she had forgotten to do it earlier because she was busy. Id. Garza confirmed the

package would arrive the next day, Saturday. Id. At 7:50 p.m., Torrecillo reported to the recipient that

the package would arrive on Saturday, which was January 29, 2022. Id.

During this time on January 27, 2022, agents confirmed that the package was sent from the

Hughes Avenue post office, located in Fresno, that it weighed five pounds, three ounces and it was due

to be delivered to an address in El Paso, Texas on January 29, 2022. (Doc. 188 at 17) On Friday,

January 28, 2022, at the request of investigating officer, HIS Special Agent Andres Varela, Postal

Inspectors in LE Paso re-routed the package back to Fresno, and it was scheduled to arrive, and did

arrive, on January 29, 2002. Id.; (Doc. 188 at 27)

Varela asserts that he asked that the package be returned to Fresno because the process would

be done quickly in Fresno “because a prosecutor familiar with the investigation, AUSA Justin Gilio,

was available and ready to review the warrant and would submit it to a Magistrate Judge in the Eastern

District of California over the weekend. I also knew that myself and other agents were ready and

available to open the parcel when the judge signed the warrant. And | knew that if narcotics were

5 1-ER-75

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