Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Joshua I. Martinez, Petitioner v. Richard Comerford, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

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USCA11 Case: 24-12000

JILL

Document: 62-1

Date Filed: 03/31/2026

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Page: 1 of 6

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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(Circuit

No. 24-12000

Non-Argument Calendar

JOSHUA I. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MAYO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Defendant,

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF

Before Jill Pryor, Branch, andTjOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

USCA11 Case: 24-12000

Document: 62-1

Date Filed: 03/31/2026

Opinion of the Court

2

Page: 2 of 6

24-12000

Joshua Martinez, a prisoner at Mayo Correctional Institute

(“MCI”), appeals the District Court's dismissal of his complaint al­

leging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Reviewing the District Court's order dismissing the com­

plaint de novo, we find that Martinez failed to plead factual allega­

tions sufficient to sustain a claim that is plausible on its face. Ac­

cordingly, we affirm.

I.

On December 10, 2013, Martinez was found guilty of sexual

battery on a person less than 12 years of age and sentenced to 78

months' imprisonment followed by 20 years of sex offender proba­

tion. While serving his initial sentence, Martinez was found guilty

of “preventing or obstructing extinguishment of fire” in violation

of Fla. Stat. § 806.10(1) and damaging a sexually violent predator

detention or commitment facility in violation of Fla. Stat.

§ 806.13(5). For these offenses, Martinez was sentenced to an addi­

tional 8 years’ imprisonment, with a tentative release date of July

6, 2029.

On January 23, 2024, Martinez filed an informal grievance

with the MCI mental health division. In his informal grievance,

Martinez stated that he was informed that he could not attend sex­

offender therapy until he was within twelve months of release. He

was especially concerned that his failure to participate in sex of­

fender treatment would negatively affect his chance of early re­

lease.

USCA11 Case: 24-12000

Document: 62-1

24-12000

Date Filed: 03/31/2026

Opinion of the Court

Page: 3 of 6

3

In response, an MCI official informed Martinez that because

he had approximately five years left on his sentence, he was not

within the time period for the program, and therefore ineligible to

participate. However, the official assured him that not participating

in the program would not reflect negatively on him since he was

not eligible to participate.

Martinez brought this action in the Northern District of

Florida seeking a declaration that, among other things, the prison’s

policy to delay sex-offender treatment until twelve months from

release is invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The District Court dis­

missed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

Martinez now timely appeals the District Court’s order. He

argues that the District Court erred in dismissing his complaint be­

cause the policy he challenges is not rationally related to the state’s

penological interests.

IL

We apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) stand­

ards when reviewing sua sponte dismissals under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir.

2019) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.

1997)). We review such dismissals de novo, construing the allega­

tions in the complaint as true. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159—

60 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490).

Aff-4

USCA11 Case: 24-12000

Document: 62-1

Date Filed: 03/31/2026

Opinion of the Court

4

Page: 4 of 6

24-12000

Pro se pleadings are “held to a less stringent standard and

should be liberally construed.” Taveras v. Bank ofAm., N.A., 89 F.4th

1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation modified). However, "this le­

niency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for

a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

sustain an action.” Campbell v. AirJamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,116869 (11th Cir. 2014).

,

III.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

prohibits states from denying “any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. To pre­

vail on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he

is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favora­

ble treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination

against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other

constitutionally protected basis.” Sumrail v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr.,

154 F.4th 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t

of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006)).

Pleadings must contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). The Supreme Court clarified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal that to sur­

vive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient fac­

tual allegations to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1960

USCA11 Case: 24-12000

24-12000

Document: 62-1

Date Filed: 03/31/2026

Opinion of the Court

Page: 5 of 6

5

(2007)). Legal conclusions are not “entitled to the assumption of

truth/’ and must be “supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679.

Martinez’s Statement of Claims section of his complaint is a

mere 1.5 pages with only a single paragraph dedicated to his invid­

ious discrimination claim. In that paragraph, Martinez vaguely ref­

erences the fact that he was discriminated against due to the “na­

ture Of his violation,” but does not make any factual allegations that

he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated prisoner or

that the state engaged in discrimination against him on a constitu­

tionally protected basis.

Likewise, in the Statement of Facts section, Martinez de­

votes a single paragraph to describing the conduct that gave rise to

the present action. He asserts that a mental health counselor told

him that since he was currently ineligible for treatment, he would

have to wait until another prisoner who was eligible began treat­

ment, in which case he could join that prisoner’s group.

Neither of these paragraphs contains a single factual allega­

tion relevant to Martinez’s invidious discrimination claim. At best,

they contain vague legal conclusions and his opinion on MCI’s

mental health treatment policies. In order to survive dismissal,

Martinez would have had to allege facts that support the elements

of his claim that similarly situated prisoners were treated more fa­

vorably than him and that the state invidiously discriminated

against him on a constitutionally protected basis.

IV.

USCA11 Case: 24-12000

Document: 62-1

Date Filed: 03/31/2026

Opinion of the Court

6

Page: 6 of 6

24-12000

Because Martinez failed to present any factual allegations

that suggest that prison officials invidiously discriminated against

him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, the District Court did not err in dismissing Martinez's

complaint.

AFFIRMED.

/wm j5

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 15 Filed 05/28/24 Page lot 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

JOSHUA I. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No.: l:24cv21-MW/MAF

RICKY DIXON,

Defendant.

_________________________ I

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This Court has considered, without hearing, the Magistrate Judge's Second

Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 13, and has also reviewed de novo Plaintiffs

objections, ECF No. 14. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs disagreement with the Second

Report and Recommendation, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

The second report and recommendation, ECF No. 13, is accepted and

adopted, over the Plaintiffs objections, as this Court’s opinion. Plaintiffs second

amended complaint, ECF No. 11, is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Clerk shall

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 15 Filed 05/28/24 Page 2 of 2

enter judgment stating, “Plaintiffs second amended complaint is DISMISSED for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2).” The Clerk shall note on the docket that this cause was dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and close the file.

SO ORDERED on May 28, 2024.

s/Mark E. Walker__________

Chief United States District Judge

2

4^ W

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13

Filed 05/02/24 Page 1 of 9

Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

JOSHUA I. MARTINEZ,

D.O.C. #V44831,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

vs.

RICKY DIXON,

Defendant.

____________ ;____________ I

SECOND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1

Plaintiff, an inmate proceeding pro se and with in forma pauperis, has

filed a second amended complaint [hereinafter “complaint”], ECF No. 11,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint has been reviewed as

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to determine if it is sufficient for service.

1 In March 2024, Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint by March 4,

2024. ECF No. 7. When nothing was received from Plaintiff, a Report and

Recommendation was entered on April 15, 2024. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff then filed an

objection, ECF No. 10, stating he did not receive the prior Order, even though it was

never returned to this Court as undeliverable. He also filed an amended complaint,

ECF No. 11, and based on his belated compliance, the first Report and

Recommendation was rejected. ECF No. 12.

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 2 of 9

Page 2 of 9

Plaintiff alleges that after his conviction in 2013, he was sentenced to

78 months in prison to be followed by 20 years of sex offender probation.

ECF No. 11 at 5. Pursuant to his plea agreement, he was subject to civil

commitment proceedings and was ultimately transferred from D.O.C.

custody to the Florida Civil Commitment Center in 2019. Id.

While there, he was able to participate in sex offender group therapy,

but refused to do so because he did not want to “disclose his offending

history to other group members.” Id. at 6. Instead, he sought “one on one”

counseling and he advises that he “took advantage of it until” April of 2023

when he had another criminal trial. Id. He was found guilty of preventing

or obstructing a fire extinguisher and damaging the Ryce Detention Facility,

and returned to the Department of Corrections to serve an 8-year

sentence. Id. at 7.

Upon his return, Plaintiff expressed interest in the Department’s sex

offender treatment program, but was informed that he would be unable to

do so until he “was less than twelve months from release.” Id. Plaintiff

indicates that is a matter of policy. Id.

Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the policy “to delay sex-offender

treatment until twelve-months from release is invidious discrimination in

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 3 of 9

Page 3 of 9

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause.” Id. at 8.

Plaintiff contends it is “irrationally delaying treatment for those who need it

most immediately.” Id. He asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim, ECF

No. 11 at 8, as well as “liberty-interest” claim, stating he has “a

constitutionally protected liberty-interest in remaining free from restraint,”

which he appears to assert is based on the “unreasonable search and

seizure clause.” Id. at 9.

First, although Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations to

show a causal connection between his claims and the Defendant,

Department of Corrections’ Secretary Ricky Dixon, the Court acknowledges

that the Secretary is-generally responsible for created policy for the

Department. It is also acknowledged that if Plaintiff was convicted and

sentenced in April 2023, he has approximately seven years to wait until he

could participate in the sex offender treatment program.

Second, rehabilitation is a valid interest of both the Plaintiff and the

Department of Corrections. However, as Plaintiff recognizes, see ECF No.

11 at 9, he has no “constitutional right to rehabilitation.” Therefore, Plaintiff

does not have a protected liberty interest in participating in rehabilitation

programs such as a sex offender treatment program.

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 5 of 9

Page 5 of 9

(2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted

constitutional right that remain open to the inmates;

(3) whether and the extent to which accommodation of the asserted

right will have an impact on prison staff, inmates, and the allocation of

prison resources generally; and

(4) whether the regulation represents an “exaggerated response” to

orison concerns.

Pesci. 935 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Turner. 482 U.S. at 89-91, 107 S.Ct.

2254); see also Pope v. Hightower. 10f F.3d 1382, 1384 (11th Cir. 1996).

In considering these facts, the Court finds there is a “valid, rational

connection” to support the policy as the Department operates with limited

resources which, in turn, requires limiting availability to certain programs.

Plaintiff still has “alternative means” of pursuing his interest in rehabilitation

through books and continued mental health counseling which is available

to inmates in the Department’s custody. Accommodating Plaintiffs interest

would, however, create a detrimental impact on the Department’s staff,

other inmates, and the allocation of resources. As Plaintiff recognized in

his complaint, there is a “high number of individuals waiting to get into this

type of therapy,” and any accommodation must necessarily include

considerations of prioritizing needs against the limited number of program

slots. Indeed. Plaintiff acknowledges that the “ones who need” this

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 4 of 9

Page 4 of 9

Moreover, the Department has authority to create rules which may

impose limits and restrictions on the programs offered to prisoners. A

prisoner may challenge a rule that he believes violates his constitutional

rights, and the United States Supreme Court fashioned a standard for

evaluating such claims which was set forth in Turnery. Safley. 482 U.S. 78,

89-90, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987). The Court recognized that

prison walls “do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the

protections of the Constitution.” 482 U.S. at 84, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (quoted in

Pesci v. Budz. 935 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2019)).

“In an effort to vindicate both ‘the need to protect constitutional rights’

and the need for ‘judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints,’ Turner

set out the ground rules for evaluating prisoners’ constitutional claims:

When a prison regulation or policy ‘impinges on inmates’ constitutional

rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.’” Pesci. 935 F.3d at 1165-66 (quoting Turner. Id. at

85, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254). The Court identified four facts which focus the

reasonableness inquiry:

(1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between the

regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put forward to

justify it;

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 6 of 9

Page 6 of 9

treatment “most immediately . . . are those charged with violent crimes.

especially sexually deviant ones, inorder that they may benefit from the

recent lessons learned when released ” ECF No. 11 at 9. Finally, the

policy is not an “exaggerated response” to the Department’s concern with

limited availability to its programs. Those who can most benefit Jrom the

treatment because they will be released from prison within 12 months are

allowed to participate. The policy Plaintiff challenges is reasonable, and

should be upheld. In a world of limited resources, it is often necessary to

limit access to certain rehabilitation programs to those inmates nearing the

end of their sentences.

Moreover, while Plaintiff alleges an equal protection violation, it is

also insufficient. The Equal Protection Clause does not require that all

prisoners be provided “identical treatment.” Howard v. Coonrod. 546 F.

Supp. 3d 1121, 1134 (M.D. Fla. 2021) (rejecting equal protection claim

concerning different sentences imposed). Instead, different treatment is

permissible so long as there is a “rational basis” for the difference. See

Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence. 468 U.S. 288, 295, 104 S.

Ct. 3065, 3070, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984) (rejecting equal protection claim

found to be “a time, place, or manner regulation”). The “rational basis test”

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

/fyf' W

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 7 of 9

Page 7 of 9

considers whether a challenged rule or policy furthers a legitimate

government purpose. See Joel v. City of Orlando. 232 F.3d 1353, 1358

(11th Cir. 2000). Here, the Department’s policy, as alleged by Plaintiff, is

rationally related to conserving limited resources in providing a program to

those who need it most immediately. The more distant the program is_from

an inmate’s release, the more likely it is to have a lesser impact. There is a

rational basis which supports the policy and Plaintiff’s equal protection

claim should be dismissed.

In addition, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not otherwise

demonstrated an equal protection claim based on other prisoners receiving

“more favorable treatment” because he has not alleged that the

Department “engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on

race, religion, national original, or some other constitutionally protected

basis.” Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.. 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir.

2006). Plaintiff does not present any factual allegations which suggest that

prison officials treated him differently because of “some form of invidious

discrimination tied to a constitutionally protected-interest.” Sweet. 467 F.3d

at 1319.

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 8 of 9

Page 8 of 9

No other potential constitutional claims are apparent and, thus, it

does not appear that allowing Plaintiff another opportunity to submit a third

amended complaint would be beneficial. Accordingly, it is recommended

that this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint, ECF No. 11, be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and that

the Order adopting this Report and Recommendation direct the Clerk of

Court to note on the docket that this cause was dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on May 2, 2024.

SZ

Martin A. Fitzpatrick____________

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

Case l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF Document 13 Filed 05/02/24 Page 9 of 9

Page 9 of 9

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written

objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other

parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic

docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. If a

party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or

recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this

Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on

appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

Case No. 1:24cv21-MW-MAF

24-12000

Joshua I. Martinez

#V44831

Suwannee CI - Inmate Legal Mail

5964 US HWY 90

LIVE OAK, FL 32060

USCA11 Case: 24-12000

Document: 67-1

Date Filed: 05/19/2026

Page: 1 of 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING

56 Forsyth Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

For rules and forms visit

www.cal 1.uscourts.gov

David J. Smith

Clerk of Court

May 19, 2026

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES

Appeal Number: 24-12000-CC

Case Style: Joshua Martinez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

District Court Docket No: 1:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF

The enclosed order has been entered on petition(s) for rehearing.

See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Eleventh Circuit Rule 41-1 for

information regarding issuance and stay of mandate.

Clerk's Office Phone Numbers

General Information: 404-335-6100

Case Administration: 404-335-6135

CM/ECF Help Desk: 404-335-6125

Attorney Admissions:

404-335-6122

Capital Cases:

404-335-6200

Cases Set for Oral Argument: 404-335-6141

REHG-1 Ltr Order Petition Rehearing

USCA11 Case: 24-12000

Document: 67-2

Date Filed: 05/19/2026

Page: 1 of 1

3lrt

Mmteb JBtate ©nurt nf Appcnfe

3Fnr tye Wletentlj Circuit

No. 24-12000

JOSHUA I. MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MAYO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

Defendant,

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. l:24-cv-00021-MW-MAF

Before Jill Pryor, Branch and Tjoflat, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The “Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing” construed as a Pe­

tition for Panel Rehearing filed by Appellant Joshua I. Martinez is

DENIED.

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.