Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ross Massey, Petitioner v. Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

ORIGINAL

FILED

APR 1 5 2026

_SUpI?EEMEFC^JRt;LUSK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

'RTSS? M ASSES

— PETITIONER

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

•-UMITED.-STAJES^BnijRTTlJF-flPPEftbS^FHR'THE FIFTH CIRCUIT_____________

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROSS MASSEY

(Your Name)

2661

F.M. 2054

(Address)

TENNESSEE COLONY, TEXAS -75884

(City, State, Zip Code)

(903) 928-2211

(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AFTER PETITIONER PRESENTED "NEWLY AVAILABLE

EVIDENCE" THAT PETITIONER'S SENTENCE HAD BEEN LAWFULLY DISCHARGED IN MAY OF

2011.

LIST OF PARTIES

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[X] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of

all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this

petition is as follows:

ROSS MASSEY-- Petitioner

2661 F.M. 2054

TENNESSEE COLONY, TEXAS 75884

ERIC GUERRERO, DIRECTOR - Respondent

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE-INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION

JUSTINE ISABELLE CAEDO TAN - Attorney for Respondent

Assistant Attorney General

P.O. Box 12548-Capitol Station

Austin, Texas 78711-2248

RELATED CASES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW........................................................................................................ 1

JURISDICTION........ .......................................................................................................... 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED................................ 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................................................................................4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT......................................................................... 6

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................... 12

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A : Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

APPENDIX B :

Notice of Extraordinary Circumstances

APPENDIX C

Denial for Rehearing

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX F

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE NUMBER

CASES

Miller-El v. Cockrell

123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003)

6

Preiser v. Rpdriguez

93 S.Ct. 1827 (19'73)

6

Slack v. McDaniel

120 S.Ct. 1595 (2000)

6

Teague V. Quarterman

482 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 2007)

7

Wolff v. McDonnell

94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974)

7

STATUTES AND RULES

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 42.18§16

8,9,10,11

Texas Government Code §311.025

10

Texas Government Code §311.031

10

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 42.18§15

8

Texs-nCiv. Stat. Ann. Art. 6181-1§4

8,9

28 USC §2253

6

Texas Government Code §508.023

10

OTHER

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Administrative Directive 4.80

8

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix —A— to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

Ex] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears at Appendix —B— to

the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[x] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the merits appears at

Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

E ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

appears at Appendix

:_______________ _________________ court

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

1.

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was See Appendix B

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[X] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: January 20, 2026, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix C

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including(date) on(date)

in Application No. ___ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was------------------A copy of that decision appears at Appendix----------

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including(date) on----------------- (date) in

Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

2.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

XIV Amendment, US Constitution

Provides that: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and

subject to the juridsdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States

and of the State wherein they reside.

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; Nor shall any state deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor

deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner is challenging the statement from the Texas Department of Z

Criminal Justice, that petitioner recieved the correct amount of good time

credits from 8-31-2013 through 9-22-2022.

Petitioner is alleging that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and

the Texas Board of ^.Pardons and Paroles are extending his sentence by applying

sections of statutes that are not applicable to petitioner after his sentence

was discharged, according to statutorily enacted, laws.',,and: tha.t"the .statute

enacted in 1977 was either amended or implicitly repealed by the enactment

of the later enacted statute.

Petitioner is also challenging the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s

authority to forfeit over 36 years of good time credits, years after petitioner’s

sentence had been lawfully discharged.

According to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Board

of Pardons and Paroles, petitioner was released on Mandatory Supervision on

May 13, 2011. Petitioner was arrested in Arkansas,’on unrelated charges, and

completed that sentence there on 3-24-2022. On 3-25-2022, petitioner was

transfered from Arkansas to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, where

petitioner has been since that day.

On 8-13-2023, petitioner filed a state application for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus. In that application, petitioner claimed that the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice had extended petitioner's sentence, and that the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice did not have the authority to deprive petitioner

of over 36 years of earned good time, while in the Department of Criminal

Justice.=

The state habeas court recommended denying the application," concluding

claims involving good time credits were not cognizable in habeas. The habeas

court also issued findings of fact and conclusions of law that petitioner

4.

must prove his actual innocence to receive habeas relief. On 10-11-2023, The

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied petitioner’s state habeas application

without written order on the findings of the trial court and on the court's

independent review of the record. Ex Parte Massey, No. WR-22, 085-03

Petitioner executed his federal petition for habeas corpus relief on 21-2024. The court initially time barred petitioner, however, petitioner moved

for reconsideration and the Court granted petitioner's motion, vacated its

prior decision, and reopened the case. On 3-13-2025, the court denied all

of petitioner's claims. Massey v. Guerrero, 2025 U.S. Dist. Lexis 53626. In

addition, the court ordered that a certificate of appealability shall not

issue in this case.

Petitioner then filed an application for certificate of appealability to

the Fifth>Circuit Court of Appeals. On 11-3-2025, the FifthjCircuit denied

petitioner's request, stating that Massey hassfailed to make a "substantial

showing" of the denial of a constitutional right. Massey v. Guerrero, 2025

U.S. App. Levis 28746.

Petitioner then filed a motion for rehearing or reconsideration. The Fifth

Circuit denied that request on 1-20-2026. Massey v. Guerrero, 2026 U.S. App.

Lexis 1376

5.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A habeas petitioner may not appeal the denial of his habeas petition,

unless the District Court or Court of Appeals issues a Certificate of Appeal­

ability. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(l)

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),

a COA "may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of

a denial of a constitutional right." §2253(c)(2) To make that showing, a habeas

petitioner must demonstrate "that a reasonable jurist could debate whether...

the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or the issues

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed. 2d 542(2000)

AEDPA does not "require petitioner to prove, before the issuance of a COA,

that some jurists would grant the petition for habeas corpus'.' Miller-El v.

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed. 2d 931(2003) Rather,

at the COA stage, the only question is whether the "claim is reasonably

debateable."

The issue confronting the Fifth Circuit, was whether reasonable jurists

could debate the District Court’s disposition of the petitioner's habeas

petition. That question, in turn, depends on whether reasonablr jurists could

argue that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision contravened or

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, or that the decision

was an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceeding. They certainly could..

This court's decision in Preiser v. Roriguez, 411 U.S 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827,

36 L.Ed. 2d 439(1973), established that when a prisoner "is challenging the

very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks

is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or speedier

release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas

6.

corpus'.' Id. at 500 See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, at *557

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear in Teague v. Quarterman,

482 F.3d 769, 776-77 (5thCir.2OO7) that a prisoner in the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice is entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause

of the 14th Amendment, that involved good time or mandatory release.

The habeas court (trial court), in its brief at Answer for Prayer for Relief,

and Findinds of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (ECF No. 8-5 at 7-17) (#9) stated,

"Claims involving good time credits are not cognizable in an application of

habeas corpus." That is false, see Preiser supra. The habeas court also stated

in several points in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, that petitioner

must prove his innocence to receive habeas relief, even though petitioner's

habeas only involved good time credit issue that had nothing to do with guilt

or innocence at trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did nothing to

correct any of these false statements in Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, therefore accepting them all as true. Once the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals accepted that petitioner's habeas was not cognizable in a hebeas corpus,

then their decision was based on false "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law.',' Thereby, contrary to prior decisions by this court. Preiser, supra.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied petitioner's habeas corpus

without written opinion. Since the only evidence in the records was petitioner's

claims and the trial court's brief.",: The Texas Court of Appeals' decision was

based on the trial court recommending denial of my habeas, because good time

claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus. (ECF No. 8-5 at 7-17); also Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law (#9)

A State's refusal to comply with its own law can amount to a federal Due

Process violation. Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S.Ct.2963(1974)

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision is CLEARLY an unreasonable

determination of CLEARLY established federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of The United States according to Preiser, Wolff, and the Fifth Circuit's

7.

Teague, supra.

The Federal District Court in its opinion at (order), said, "To the extent

that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Paenalty Act (AEDPA) applies,

Petitioner has failed to show that the state habeas corpus rejection of his

claims was objectively unreasonable. In addition, the court concludes all*,

of petitioner’s claims fail on the merits."

The Federal Court allowed the attorney for the state (The Attorney General)

to introduce into the records, numerous statutes that are ex post facto, when

applied to petitioner. For^example, Texas Department of Criminal Justice

Administartive Directive 4.8O(IV)(B), that contains false information when

applied to petitioner; and the court introduced evidence into the record

itself, that contains ex post facto statutes, and the statutes that are not

applicable to petitioner's sentence at that time; such as the (T.D.C.J. Offender

Handbook) The court acknowledged the ex post facto statutes, but did nothing

to correct the falsehood, even going further to apply them while citing from

the "Handbook". In addition, after acknowledging the ex post facto issues,

the court turns around and cites statutes that were no longer applicable to

petitioner's sentence. The court denied petitioner's extended sentence claim,

citing Article 42.18, section 15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner does^disagree with what 42.18§15 says, only when this section of

statute is applicable; 42.18§15 becomes moot once a prisoner has discharged

their sentence. Therefore, once petitioner had discharged his sentence, according

to 42.18§16, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as of May 2011, 42.18§15 was

no longer applicable.

The court denied petitioner's Good Time Credits from 1987-2011, by citing aft.

6181-1§4 of the Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann.; which provides, in part, "Good conduct

time applies only to eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision release

as provided in Section 15, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, I". 1965,

as amended shall not otherwise affect the inmate's term..."

8.

What the Federal District Court has done, is to pick one specific statute

from 1977 (6181-1§4) and apply that statute to petitioner, even though the

Texas legislature enacted 42.18$16, "THE TEXAS BAROLE AND MANDATORY SUPERVISION

LAW" in 1985, which applies to this sentence, that began on 8-18-1987. The

court has mistakenly applied

(section of statute, that is only applicable

if a prisoner’s sentence has not been lawfully discharged.

While T.D.C.J. has told the court I was released to Mandatory Supervision,

according to 6181-1§4, my sentence was actually discharged under the later

enacted statute 42.18§16, that does

o': stipulate for me to recieve a Final

Certificate of Discharge, "is Subject to the amount of good time petitioner

earned while in the Department of Corrections."

Petitioner presented 42.18§16, to the Fifth Circuit in his request for

a COA. Petitioner would argue that this "Newly available statute" the federal

district court's decision, is clearly debateable, and that the Fifth Circuit's

decision to deny petitioner a COA was in error.

Petitioner would ask this court to consider a scenario/question. Does

petitioner have to personally know what every section of statute in the Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure says before it applies to him? Or/does, as petitioner

believes, that once a section of statuteS'ebiigatidnSoare completed for his

sentence to be discharged, then the sentence is discharged. Otherwise, T.D.C.J.

could simply imprison a person forever because they are poor and cannot afford

an attorney, ot ignorant of the law. However, that HAS happened in petitioner's

case. I ask this court to correct this miscarraige of justice.

Petitioner is not contesting the legality of his conviction.or the validity

of his initial sentence. Rather, petitioner is contesting the manner in which

his sentence is being executed by the Texas Department of Criminal JusticeInstitutional Division, and the Pardons and Paroles division.

Petitioner is contesting which sections of statute are applicable to

petitioner as of May 2011. According to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,

42.18§16, effective date 1985, petitioner's sentence was discharged in May

2011.

The Federal District Court cited 42.18§15 to deny petitioner's extended s

sentence claim. That section of statute is only applicable to a prisoner until

his sentence has been lawfully discharged. In his affidavit, Charley Valdez,

(T.D.C.J. official) states that based on Texas Gov't

Code §508.023(b), I

do not recieve street time. However, according to Tex.Gov't. Code §311.025

(a)(b), the later enacted statute prevails. Also according to §311.031(d),

if a code conflicts with a statute, the statute controls.

Petitioner would ask this court to consider that no state or federal court

has ever ruled as to the applicability of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 42.18§16. I would also ask this court to consider that ho state or

federal has ruled that this statute does not apply to petitioner. Nor, has

any state or federal court held that petitioner's sentence was not discharged

according to 42.18§16

Petitioner would also ask this court to consider that if they do not rule

on the the applicability of 42.18§16, not only will petitioner never know

if his sentence was lawfully discharged as of May 2011, he will remain falsely

imprisoned according to the statutes that are applicable to petitioner.TThis

court should also realize that any other prisoner, that was sentenced from

the effective date of 42.18§16, until 9-1-1987, that completed the obligations

required to recieve a finalecertificatef of.idischarge, that has been returfcned

to prison, are, or have bee^falsely imptisoned.

I would also point out to this court that 42.18§16, DOES NOT Idave any

discretion to the parole board on when to issue a final certificate of dis­

charge. It is a command. The only purpose for the parole board regarding

42.18§16, is adding 3 sets of numbers; the amount of time spent in prison

prior to release, the amount of good time credits earned,while in the Departs

ment, prior to release, and to any days required wljile on parole.

No decisions, Administrative only.

10.

Petitioner would also ask this court to consider that the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals, the Federal District Courts in Texas, and the Fifth Circuit

have had the opportunity for almost (40) forty years to correct this miscarraige

of justice, involving poor and ignorant prisoners being falsely imprisoned

in the Texas Departmenttof Criminal Justice.

Because of the scope and far reaching consequences of the failure of lower

courts to address the applicability of 42.18§16, petitioner would ask this

court to do so. The issue is debateable in the District Court and, petitioner

believes, the Fifth Circuit's denial of a COA was in error.

Petitioner would also ask this court to take into consideration three

statements from prior Justices of the Supreme Court. Honorable Justice Douglas

said: "The lesson to be learned is that courts cannot blithley defer to the

supposed expertise of prison officials when it comes to the constitutional

rights of inmates:." Wolff at 599 .

Honorable Justice White stated: "We granted the petition for writ of see

certiorari in this case because it raises important questions concerning the

administration of a state prison." Wolff at 542. Also by the court in Wdlff

at Headnotes[l]: The united States Supreme Court will grant certiorari to

consider important questions concerning the administration of a state prison.

I believe this statement to be a promise to those of us who are poor and i

ignorant of the law. I ask this court, this day, to fulfill this promise made

over (50) fifty years ago and grant certiorari.

11.

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re-hhon/er pwyt,

CONCLUSION

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The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Ross Massey #00468822

Date: March 30, 2026

12.

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