Respondents Brief — Carvin L. Thomas, et al., Petitioners v. Roberta Kustoff, Chairman, Tennessee Board of Parole, et al.
Supreme Court briefMar 9, 2026
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No. 25-746
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
CARVIN L. THOMAS, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
ROBERTA NEVIL KUSTOFF, ET AL.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General
J. MATTHEW RICE
Solicitor General
MADELINE W. CLARK
Principal Deputy
Solicitor General
JOSHUA DANIEL MINCHIN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
OFFICE OF TENNESSEE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 20207
Nashville, TN 37202
(615) 837-5069
Joshua.Minchin@ag.tn.gov
Counsel for Respondents
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Do Tennessee inmates have a statutorily created
liberty interest in parole where the statutes make parole discretionary?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Petitioners (plaintiff-appellants below) are Carvin
Thomas and Terrell Lawrence.
Respondents (defendants-appellees below) are
Roberta Nevil Kustoff, Zane Duncan, Gary Faulcon,
Tim Gobble, Mae Beavers, Barrett Rich, and Robert
Waggoner—all sued in their official capacities as the
Chair and Members of the Tennessee Board of Parole.
The petition substituted Roberta Nevil Kustoff as
the lead party because she replaced Richard Montgomery as Chair of the Tennessee Board of Parole during the litigation.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 3
A. Legal Background........................................ 3
B. Tennessee’s Parole Statutes ....................... 8
C. Factual and Procedural Background ........ 13
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION .......... 15
I.
The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Does Not
Conflict With This Court’s Precedent. ........... 16
A. Tennessee’s parole statutes do not create
a liberty interest under Greenholtz. ......... 16
B. Tennessee’s parole statutes do not create
a liberty interest under Allen.................... 21
II.
The Sixth Circuit’s Approach Accords With
All Other Federal and State Courts. .............. 24
III.
This Court Has Oft-Denied Similar Petitions
for Decades. ..................................................... 25
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 26
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Baker v. Comm’r of Corr.,
914 A.2d 1034 (Conn. 2007) ................................... 24
Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972) .................................................. 3
Bermudez v. Duenas,
936 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1991) ................................ 24
Bd. of Pardons v. Allen,
482 U.S. 369 (1987) .............. 1, 2, 3, 6, 17, 19, 21, 23
Bomgaars v. State,
967 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2021) .................................... 24
Bosworth v. Whitley,
627 So.2d 629 (La. 1993) ........................................ 25
Bussiere v. Cunningham,
571 A.2d 908 (N.H. 1990) ................................. 17, 24
Candelaria v. Griffin,
641 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1981) .................................. 7
Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,
566 U.S. 399 (2012) ................................................ 22
Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat,
452 U.S. 458 (1981) .......................................... 19, 20
v
Creel v. Keene,
928 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1210 (1991) ........................................ 24, 26
Crump v. Lafler,
657 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2011) .................................. 21
Dace v. Mickelson,
797 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1986) .................................... 7
Dock v. Latimer,
729 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1984) ................................ 7
Doyle v. Hampton,
340 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1960) ................................... 9
Erlenbaugh v. United States,
409 U.S. 239 (1972) ................................................ 20
Felce v. Fiedler,
974 F.2d 1484 (7th Cir. 1992) ................................ 24
Gale v. Moore,
763 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1985) .................................... 7
Gilmore v. Kan. Parole Bd.,
756 P.2d 410 (Kan.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 930 (1988) .......................................... 25, 26
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr.
Complex,
442 U.S. 1 (1979) ................ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 21
vi
Grennier v. Frank,
453 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2006) .................................. 24
Hanrahan v. Williams,
673 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. 1996), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 812 (1997) ................................................ 26
Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994) ................................................ 13
Hester v. Chester County,
162 F.4th 780 (6th Cir. 2025) ................................. 12
Hughes v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. and Parole,
514 S.W.3d 707 (Tenn. 2017) ............................. 8, 12
In re McCarthy,
164 P.3d 1283 (Wash. 2007) ................................... 24
Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult
Parole Auth.,
929 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1991) .................................. 24
Irving v. Thigpen,
732 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1984) .................................. 7
Jago v. Ortiz,
245 F. App’x 794 (10th Cir. 2007) .......................... 24
Jago v. Van Curen,
454 U.S. 14 (1981) .................................................. 19
Marlow v. Mont. Bd. of Pardons & Parole,
39 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 1994) ..................... 23
vii
Mayes v. Trammell,
751 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1984) .................................. 12
McQuillion v. Duncan,
306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002) .............................. 8, 24
Monroe v. Thigpen,
932 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) .............................. 25
Moor v. Palmer,
603 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
562 U.S. 1049 (2010) ........................................ 24, 26
Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole,
416 P.3d 663 (Utah 2017) ......................................... 8
Newell v. Brown,
981 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1992) .................................. 21
Parker v. Corrothers,
750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984) .................................... 7
Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972) .......................................... 18, 19
Price v. Barry,
53 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1995)................................... 24
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989) .................................................. 8
Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472 (1995) .................................................. 8
viii
Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms,
461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006) .................................. 8
Scales v. Miss. State Parole Bd.,
831 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1987) .................................. 25
Schuemann v. Colo. State Bd. of Adult Parole,
624 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) .................................. 7
Seagroves v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
86 F. App’x 45 (6th Cir. 2003) ................................ 12
Shirley v. Chestnut,
603 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979) .................................. 7
State v. Sutton,
166 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2005) ................................. 12
Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons,
582 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
559 U.S. 991 (2010) ...................................... 8, 24, 26
Sultenfuss v. Snow,
35 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1191 (1995) ........................................ 17, 26
Swarthout v. Cooke,
562 U.S. 216 (2011) .............................................. 1, 3
Wagner v. Gilligan,
609 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1979) .................................... 7
ix
Wilkinson v. Austin,
545 U.S. 209 (2005) .................................................. 3
Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74 (2005) .................................................. 13
Williams v. Briscoe,
641 F.2d 274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 854 (1981) .................................................. 7
Wortman v. Bd. of Parole,
No. 20-5718, 2021 WL 9528123 (6th Cir. Sept. 23,
2021) ........................................................................ 12
Wright v. Trammell,
810 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1987) .................................. 12
York v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole,
502 S.W.3d 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) ..................... 9
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ........................................................ 13
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201 ...................................... 6
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114(1) ................................. 5, 17
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-101 ...................................... 8
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-101(a) ................ 9, 10, 22, 23
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-103(a) .................................. 8
x
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-105(d)(2) ............................. 9
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-115(a) .................................. 9
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-115(b)(1) ............................. 9
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a)(1) .. 2, 9-11, 17, 20, 22
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-118(c) .................................. 9
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-610 ...................................... 8
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501 ...................................... 8
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503 ...................................... 9
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b) ........ 10, 11, 16, 17, 20
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(c) ................................ 11
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(g)(1) ........................... 11
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(g)(2) ........................... 11
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(h)................................ 10
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(i) ................................. 10
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(j) ............................. 9, 18
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-506 ...................................... 8
xi
Regulations and Rules
Sup. Ct. R. 10 ......................................................... 1, 15
Tenn. Bd. of Parole Rule 1100-1-1-.06 ...................... 12
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.08(1)................. 9
Other Authorities
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sultenfuss v. Snow,
513 U.S. 1191 (1995) (No. 94-1178), 1995 WL
17048530 ................................................................ 26
Historical Timeline, Tennessee Board of Parole,
https://tinyurl.com/2jdbvdun (last visited Feb. 4,
2026) ......................................................................... 8
INTRODUCTION
This case is not certworthy. Petitioners are two
Tennessee inmates who were denied parole. Upset by
their denials, the inmates sued the individual members of the Tennessee Board of Parole under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, arguing
that they have a liberty interest in parole. But, as the
Sixth Circuit held, there is no federal constitutional
right to parole, see Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216,
220 (2011) (per curiam), and Tennessee has not created a liberty interest in parole, either.
Petitioners disagree. They argue that Tennessee’s
parole statutes are “similar to” the parole statutes at
issue in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Board of
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987), where this
Court found a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Pet. 1. And they argue that this similarity dictated a different result here.
This request for error correction does not warrant
the Court’s review. Petitioners identify no conflicts or
unresolved issues of federal law. Instead, they contend only that the Sixth Circuit got it wrong. But “[a]
petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of … the misapplication of
a properly stated rule of law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. And, in
all events, the Sixth Circuit did not err.
The unanimous Sixth Circuit panel faithfully applied Greenholtz and Allen. In those decisions, this
Court found a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole because the statutes at issue “use[d] man-
2
datory language (‘shall’),” which “created an ‘expectancy of release.’” Allen, 482 U.S. at 371, 377-78 (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12). Here, by contrast,
Tennessee’s parole statutes provide that if an inmate
satisfies all relevant parole release criteria, then the
inmate “may be paroled.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28117(a)(1) (emphasis added). Under the Greenholtz and
Allen “mandatory language” framework, Allen, 482
U.S. at 377-78, “statutes … that provide that a parole
board ‘may’ release an inmate on parole do not give
rise to a protected liberty interest,” id. at 378 n.10 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit thus held that Tennessee has not created a liberty interest in parole.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision is correct. It follows
from this Court’s explicit holding in Allen that discretionary “may” language does not give rise to a liberty
interest in parole. Id. And it reaches the same result
as every other federal and state court decision addressing similarly worded parole statutes. Not surprisingly, then, this Court has routinely denied certiorari in similar cases where courts have held that
state parole statutes providing that an inmate “may”
be paroled do not create a liberty interest.
This Court answered Petitioners’ question nearly
40 years ago in Allen. It doesn’t need to answer it
again.
The Court should deny the petition.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Legal Background
Petitioners’ claim arises under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. That “[c]lause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or
property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural
protection must establish that one of these interests is
at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221
(2005).
Due Process protections only apply to “protectible
right[s].” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. A right is not protectible if a person merely has “an abstract need or desire” or “a unilateral expectation of it.” Id. (quoting
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). But
a right is protectible if a person has “a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it.” Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at
577).
“There is no constitutional or inherent right” to parole. Id.; Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220. And “States are
under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.”
Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 220; Allen, 482 U.S. at 377 n.8.
Yet States can create a protectable liberty interest in
parole under the Due Process Clause through statutes
or regulations.1 See Allen, 482 U.S. at 378 n.9.
This Court has twice examined whether state statutes created a liberty interest in parole. See Allen, 482
U.S. at 373-81; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-16; see also
Pet. App. 16a-18a. The Court first confronted the
1 Petitioners have not alleged that Tennessee’s parole regulations
created a liberty interest in parole. The focus is on Tennessee’s
parole statutes.
4
question in Greenholtz, which established the framework for determining whether a State has created a
liberty interest in parole. There, Nebraska inmates
alleged that the Nebraska Board of Parole had unconstitutionally denied them parole. Greenholtz, 442 U.S.
at 3-4. The inmates argued that they had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole because (1)
“a reasonable entitlement” to parole “is created whenever a state provides for the possibility of parole,” and
(2) Nebraska statutorily “create[d] a legitimate expectation of parole, invoking due process protections.” Id.
at 8-9.
Under the first argument, the inmates contended
that parole release decisions “should be accorded the
same constitutional protection” as parole revocation
decisions because “the ultimate interest at stake” in
both “is conditional liberty.” Id. at 9. This Court rejected that argument because of the “crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has … and
being denied a conditional liberty that one desires.”
Id. Thus, this Court held that “the possibility of parole
provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit
will be obtained.” Id. at 11. And that “hope … is not
protected by due process.” Id.
But this Court agreed with the inmates’ second argument, holding “that the Nebraska statutory language itself create[d]” a liberty interest in parole. Id.
The relevant language provided:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers
the release of a committed offender who
is eligible for release on parole, it shall
order his release unless it is of the opinion
5
that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will
not conform to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment,
medical care, or vocational or other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding
life when released at a later date.
Id. (quoting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,114(1) (1976)) (emphasis added). The Court noted “that the structure of
the provision together with the use of the word ‘shall’”
created “a legitimate expectation of release” that “entitled” the inmates “to some measure of constitutional
protection.” Id. at 11-12.
Though the statute created a liberty interest in parole, the Court ultimately held that Nebraska’s parole
procedures provided all “the process that [was] due.”
Id. at 16. The parole board afforded inmates with “an
opportunity to be heard” and informed those denied
parole “what respects [they fell] short of qualifying for
parole.” Id. “The Constitution,” this Court held, “does
not require more.” Id.
Eight years later, this Court decided Allen. There,
a class of Montana inmates sued the Montana Board
6
of Pardons, alleging that Montana had statutorily created a liberty interest in parole. Allen, 482 U.S. at
371. The relevant Montana statute provided:
(1) Subject to the following restrictions,
the board shall release on parole ... any
person confined in the Montana state
prison or the women’s correction center
... when in its opinion there is reasonable
probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner
or to the community[.]
(2) A parole shall be ordered only for the
best interests of society and not as an
award of clemency or a reduction of sentence or pardon. A prisoner shall be
placed on parole only when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill
the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.
Id. at 376-77 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201
(1985)).
After scrutinizing the Montana statute “under the
standards set forth in Greenholtz,” the Court held that
the statute created “a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.” Id. at 373, 381.
The Court found it particularly “[s]ignificant[]”
that “the Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute,
uses mandatory language (‘shall’) to ‘creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted’ when the
designated findings are made.” Id. at 377-78 (quoting
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12). The Court also noted that
“[t]he discretion” to grant parole “is equivalent in
Montana and Nebraska,” id. at 380, and that whereas
7
the parole board had previously enjoyed absolute discretion, a statutory amendment in 1955 “place[d] significant limits on the discretion of the Board,” id. at
380-81.
Significantly, the Court distinguished between parole statutes that mandate parole—and thus create a
liberty interest—and those that do not. Although
“statutes or regulatory provisions … phrased in mandatory terms” create “a liberty interest,” id. at 378
n.10, “statutes or regulations that provide that a parole board ‘may’ release an inmate on parole do not
give rise to a protected liberty interest,” id. (citing
Dace v. Mickelson, 797 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir.
1986) (South Dakota statute); Parker v. Corrothers,
750 F.2d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arkansas statute); Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir.
1985) (amended Missouri statute); Dock v. Latimer, 729 F.2d 1287, 1288 (10th Cir. 1984) (Utah statute); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir.
1984) (Mississippi statute); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641
F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (New Mexico statute); Williams v. Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.)
(Texas statute), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854
(1981); Schuemann v. Colo. State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172, 174 (10th Cir. 1980) (Colorado statute); Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805, 806-07 (10th
Cir. 1979) (Oklahoma statute); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1979) (Ohio statute)).
In short, Greenholtz and Allen looked to whether a
state statute describes the parole board’s authority to
release inmates on parole in mandatory or discretionary terms. If a statute uses mandatory language (e.g.,
“shall”), then it has created a liberty interest in parole
8
that is entitled to protection under the Due Process
Clause. Id. If a statute uses discretionary language
(e.g., “may”), then it has not created a liberty interest.
Id.2
B. Tennessee’s Parole Statutes
As “a matter of legislative grace,” Hughes v. Tenn.
Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 514 S.W.3d 707, 720 (Tenn.
2017), Tennessee has maintained a system of parole
for nearly a century, see Historical Timeline, Tennessee Board of Parole, https://tinyurl.com/2jdbvdun (last
visited Feb. 4, 2026) (Tennessee’s first parole system
was established in 1929).
Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 40-28-101 to -610
and §§ 40-35-501 to -506 provide the statutory framework for probation and parole in Tennessee. Under
this framework, Tennessee’s parole system is governed by a seven-member Board of Parole. Pet. App.
7a (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-103(a)). The Board
evaluates “inmates’ fitness for parole.” Pet. App. 8a
2 In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), this “Court retreated
somewhat from the view that statutory and regulatory entitlements are necessary or sufficient to create protected liberty interests.” Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 416 P.3d 663,
675 (Utah 2017). Yet “Sandin was decided only in the context of
prison conditions, not parole eligibility,” Straley v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2009); Sass v. Cal. Bd.
of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006), and it
did not overrule Greenholtz or Allen, see Neese, 416 P.3d at 67576 (citing McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.
2002)). So Greenholtz and Allen—and the mandatory versus discretionary language framework they created—still “directly control[]” this case. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
9
(citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-118(c)). Inmates become eligible for parole by serving “half of their prison
sentence (for determinate sentences)” or by serving
“their minimum sentence (for indeterminate sentences involving a range).” Pet. App. 8a (citing Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-28-115(a), (b)(1)).
Once an inmate becomes parole-eligible, the “Department of Correction notifies the Board … and the
Board compiles and distributes a list of inmates who
shall have a hearing.” Pet. App. 8a (citing Tenn.
Comp. R. & Regs. 1100-01-01-.08(1)). Hearing officers
then “conduct hearings, take testimony and make proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the
board regarding a grant [or] denial … of parole.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-105(d)(2). The Parole Board
will then “adopt, modify or reject” the hearing officer’s
recommendation. Id. If the inmate is not paroled, he
is provided with the reason(s) why he did not qualify
for parole. Id. § 40-35-503(j). The discretion to grant
or deny parole is “vested exclusively in the Board.”
York v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole, 502 S.W.3d 783, 788
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Doyle v. Hampton, 340
S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tenn. 1960)).
The three relevant statutes for evaluating whether
Tennessee has created a liberty interest in parole are
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-28-101(a), 40-28-117(a)(1), and
40-35-503. See Pet. 3-5.
Section 40-28-101(a) broadly describes the purpose
of the Tennessee Code pertaining to the State’s “system of probation and paroles.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4028-101(a). It provides that probation and parole decisions “shall take into consideration … individual characteristics, circumstances, needs and potentialities,”
10
and persons who are released on probation or parole
“shall be dealt with in the community by a uniformly
organized system of constructive rehabilitation under
probation supervision … or under parole supervision.”
Id.
Section 40-35-503(b), in turn, creates a presumption against parole, with few exceptions.3 The statute
provides that “[r]elease on parole is a privilege and not
a right,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b); see also id.
§ 40-28-117(a)(1), and then establishes that:
no inmate … shall be granted parole if
the board finds that:
(1) There is a substantial risk that the incarcerated individual will not conform to
the conditions of the release program;
(2)(A) The release from custody at the
time would depreciate the seriousness of
the crime of which the incarcerated individual stands convicted or promote disrespect for the law …;
(3) The release from custody at the time
would have a substantially adverse effect
on institutional discipline; or
(4) The incarcerated individual’s continued correctional treatment, medical care
or vocational or other training in the institution will substantially enhance the
3 The presumption against parole does not apply in several nar-
row contexts. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(h)-(i). But
Petitioners have not alleged that any of those contexts apply to
them.
11
incarcerated individual’s capacity to lead
a law-abiding life when given release status at a later time.
Id. § 40-35-503(b). The Board also considers other factors, such as whether “the inmate has attempted to
improve” his “educational, vocational, or employment
skills” while incarcerated; whether, if the inmate was
convicted of a sex crime, a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist has “certified that … the inmate does not
pose the likelihood of committing sexual assaults upon
release from confinement”; and whether, if the inmate
“was convicted of a homicide, … the offender obstructed or continues to obstruct the ability of law enforcement to recover the remains of the victim.” Id. §
40-35-503(c), (g)(1)-(2).
Even if a parole-eligible inmate checks all the right
boxes, § 40-28-117(a)(1) provides that the Board retains unfettered discretion to deny the inmate parole:
Parole being a privilege and not a right,
no prisoner shall be released on parole
merely as a reward for good conduct or
efficient performance of duties assigned
in prison, but only if the board is of the
opinion that there is reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, will live
and remain at liberty without violating
the law, and that the prisoner’s release is
not incompatible with the welfare of society. If the board so determines, the prisoner may be paroled ….
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a)(1) (emphasis added).
12
In 1984, the Sixth Circuit evaluated Tennessee’s
parole statutory and regulatory scheme and held that
while Tennessee’s parole statutes did not confer a liberty interest in parole, a parole board rule had created
a liberty interest. See Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F.2d
175, 178 (6th Cir. 1984). The pertinent rule provided:
“The Board operates under the presumption that each
resident who is eligible for parole is a worthy candidate and thus the Board presumes that he will be released on parole when he is first eligible.” Id. (quoting
Tenn. Bd. of Parole Rule 1100-1-1-.06). Tennessee
amended the rule the following year to instead provide, in relevant part: “Before granting or denying parole, the Board shall apply the following factors to
each eligible resident to assist it in determining
whether such resident will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law or the conditions of his parole.” Wright v. Trammell, 810 F.2d 589, 590-91 (6th
Cir. 1987) (quoting Tenn. Bd. of Parole Rule 1100-1-1.06). And the Sixth Circuit found no liberty interest
conferred by that revised rule. Id. at 591.
Since Wright, state and federal courts have unanimously held that Tennessee has not conferred a liberty
interest in parole. See, e.g., Pet. App. 7a-26a; Hester
v. Chester County, 162 F.4th 780, 785 (6th Cir. 2025)
(“[T]here is no liberty interest in parole under Tennessee law.”); Wortman v. Bd. of Parole, No. 20-5718, 2021
WL 9528123, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 2021) (same);
Hughes, 514 S.W.3d at 719-20 (same); State v. Sutton,
166 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005) (same); Seagroves v.
Tenn. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 86 F. App’x 45, 48
(6th Cir. 2003) (same).
13
C. Factual and Procedural Background
The facts underlying this case are simple. Thomas
and Lawrence are Tennessee inmates. Pet. App. 10a.
Upon reaching their parole eligibility dates, both inmates received a parole hearing. Pet. App. 11a-12a.
Following their hearings, the Board denied them both
parole. Pet. App. 12a.
The inmates took umbrage with the denials—particularly the officers’ reliance, at least in part, on a risk
assessment computer program that allegedly “has produced inaccurate results” in the past. Pet. App. 9a; see
also Pet. App. 50a-53a. They sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging the denial of procedural due process
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. D. Ct.
Doc. 1 ¶ 77; id., Prayer for Relief. The Parole Board
filed a motion to dismiss, see D. Ct. Doc. 11; D. Ct. Doc.
11-1, and the inmates filed an Amended Complaint revising their request for injunctive relief, see Pet. App.
41a-69a. The inmates had originally asked for “release … on parole,” but they amended that request to
instead seek “a new and prompt parole hearing.”
Compare D. Ct. Doc. 1, Prayer for Relief with Pet. App.
67a. The Board filed a renewed motion to dismiss. D.
Ct. Doc. 14; D. Ct. Doc. 14-1.
The district court granted the Board’s renewed motion to dismiss. Pet. App. 33a-39a. First, the district
court held that under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994), and Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005),
the inmates’ demand for a declaration “based on past
parole decisions” was not “a cognizable Section 1983
remedy.” Pet. App. 36a-37a. And while their requested injunctive relief was cognizable under Heck
and Wilkinson, it failed on the merits because “[t]here
14
is no constitutional right to parole,” Tennessee has not
created a right to parole, and “Tennessee inmates do
not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in parole.” Pet. App. 37a.
Regardless, because the inmates both participated
in a parole hearing and were informed of the basis for
the parole denial, the district court held that the minimal “due process requirements afforded to parole
hearings were followed.” Pet. App. 38a.
The court also held that the inmates were not without remedy because Tennessee law allows for inmates
“to seek review of decisions made by parole boards.”
Pet. App. 38a. Both inmates, in fact, “availed themselves of that review process” by filing suit in state
court. Pet. App. 39a (citing Ch. Ct. Filings, D. Ct. Doc.
23). This left the inmates without a claim for relief
under federal law, and the court dismissed the case.
Order, D. Ct. Doc. 27 at 238.
A unanimous Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in an
opinion by Judge Cole. Relying on the framework established in Greenholtz and Allen, the Sixth Circuit
held that Tennessee had not created a liberty interest
in parole. Pet. App. 16a-18a, 23a.
The court explained that by using discretionary
language—“may” instead of “shall”—Tennessee’s statutory scheme did not constrain the Board’s discretion
to deny parole to the extent necessary to provide inmates with “a constitutionally recognized expectation
of receiving parole.” Pet. App. 16a, 23a. And although
Tennessee’s law uses the same considerations to disqualify inmates seeking release as the law at issue in
Greenholtz, Tennessee’s law uses those considerations
15
as “grounds for mandatory denial of parole, not the
mandatory grant of parole.” Pet. App. at 23a-24a (emphasis added).
Petitioners sought rehearing en banc, which the
Sixth Circuit denied. Pet. App. 29a-30a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
Petitioners never suggest that the decision below
“conflict[s] with the decision of another United States
court of appeals on the same important matter” or
“conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. Nor do they argue that the court
below “decided an important question of federal law
that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court.” Id.
Petitioners instead contend that the Sixth Circuit
misapplied governing law. Pet. 9-15. But “[a] petition
for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of … the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. And regardless, the Sixth Circuit did not err. It faithfully
applied this Court’s precedent, and other federal and
state courts addressing similarly worded parole statutes have applied the same approach as the Sixth Circuit below.
This Court has denied at least a half dozen petitions involving analogous state parole statutes. This
Court should follow suit here and deny the petition.
16
I.
The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Does Not Conflict With This Court’s Precedent.
With no split or important question of federal law
to point to, Petitioners hang their hat on the characterization that the decision below “wrongly disregarded” this Court’s precedent in Greenholtz and Allen. Pet. 9-15. The Sixth Circuit did no such thing.
A. Tennessee’s parole statutes do not create
a liberty interest under Greenholtz.
Petitioners argue that Tennessee’s parole laws
“[r]esembl[e]” the law in Greenholtz, which this Court
held created a protected liberty interest. Pet. 9. But
the statutes are dispositively dissimilar.
Petitioners’ argument centers on the four factors
the Greenholtz statute required the Nebraska Board
of Parole to consider. There, the statute required the
Board of Parole to release an offender eligible for parole unless any of the following required deferral of release: “(1) Likelihood of violating parole, (2) Depreciating the seriousness of the offense, (3) Prison disciplinary problems, or (4) Need for further treatment or
training in prison.” Pet. 9-10 (citing Greenholtz, 442
U.S. at 11). Petitioners argue that because “Tennessee law lays out the same four disqualifiers,” it also
“compels[] a finding of a liberty interest.” Pet. 10 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b)). But Petitioners
fail to appreciate the key differences between the statute in Greenholtz and § 40-35-503(b).
Start with the statutory baseline. In Greenholtz,
the statute specified that the parole board “shall order
[an inmate’s] release unless” one of the four disqualifiers were met. 442 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). Here,
17
instead of a presumption that parole “shall” be
granted “unless” an inmate is disqualified for one of
the four listed reasons, id., the statute provides that
“no inmate convicted shall be granted parole if the
board finds that” one of the four disqualifiers are satisfied, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b). This means
that an inmate must satisfy certain conditions before
they can be released on parole—but “[i]t does not mean
that release is required once” those “necessary condition[s are] met.” Bussiere v. Cunningham, 571 A.2d
908, 911-12 (N.H. 1990) (collecting cases). And that
distinction is the difference between a presumption in
favor of parole that can create a liberty interest, à la
Greenholtz and Allen, and “a presumption against parole,” which doesn’t. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494,
1502 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
On top of the differing presumptions, in Tennessee,
even if an inmate satisfies all the necessary criteria
for parole release, the inmate only “may be paroled.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a)(1) (emphasis added).
That sharply contrasts with the Nebraska statute in
Greenholtz, which provided that the board “shall order” an inmate’s release unless one of four disqualifiers were satisfied. 442 U.S. at 11 (quoting Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 83-1,114(1)). That textual distinction makes
all the difference. In short, the use of the discretionary
“may,” along with the structure of Tennessee’s parole
statutes, “compels” a finding that Tennessee has not
created a liberty interest. Pet. 10; see Allen, 482 U.S.
at 378 n.10.
Petitioners next argue that because the Board
must “list a reason in writing before denying parole,”
it has “create[d] a presumption of parole.” Pet. 10. To
18
start, that’s procedurally incorrect. The “state in writing” requirement only kicks in after the board has
“declin[ed] to grant parole” to an inmate. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-503(j). So it does not—and cannot—play
a role in whether the initial parole decision is mandatory in certain situations or not.
But even if Petitioners were correct that the Board
must “list a reason in writing before denying parole,”
how does that create a presumption of parole? Pet. 10.
Petitioners never say. The requirement that the
Board list a reason merely provides inmates with information they can use to better their chances of being
paroled in the future. See Pet. App. 22a. It says nothing about whether parole itself is mandatory or not;
after all, the requirement does not limit the reasons
why parole could be denied or mandate that parole
must be granted for any reason. This argument gets
Petitioners nowhere.
Petitioners also argue, relying on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972), that the Parole Board
has an “informal custom” of only denying parole if one
of the four Greenholtz factors is met. Pet. 10-11. So,
the argument goes, because the Board only denies parole based on the four Greenholtz factors, then it has
created a liberty interest “by custom” of granting parole otherwise. Pet. 10-11. That argument fails for
two reasons.
First, it seemingly relies, at least in part, on the
proposition that “the Tennessee statutes imply that
the four Greenholtz disqualifiers are indeed the only
reasons that may justify denying parole.” Pet. 10. But
that’s wrong on its face. Tennessee’s parole statutes
explicitly provide several justifications, apart from the
19
specific Greenholtz factors, that may serve as grounds
for denying parole. Supra 11.
Second, even if Petitioners were right that the
Board had an “informal custom” of denying parole
based solely on the Greenholtz factors, this Court established over four decades ago that “custom” cannot
create a liberty interest in parole. Pet. 11. In Jago v.
Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981), this court distinguished the property interests at issue in Perry
with the liberty interest at issue in parole cases. Perry
involved “[a] written contract,” which was used as evidence to support a teacher’s property interest in “continued employment” absent good cause to fire him.
408 U.S. at 601. But this Court held in Jago that the
property interest principle from Perry does not “so
readily lend [itself] to determining the existence of
constitutionally protected liberty interests in the setting of prisoner parole.” Jago, 454 U.S. at 18. Trying
to map the property interest framework onto the liberty interest context for parole “would severely restrict
the necessary flexibility of … parole authorities” who
must make “myriad decisions with respect to individual inmates ….” Id. at 19. So the Court expressly rejected Perry’s application to parole cases and “limited”
its application to the property interest context. Id. at
17.
Petitioner’s custom argument also fails for another
reason. Greenholtz and Allen require “mandatory language” to create a liberty interest, see Allen, 482 U.S.
at 377, but an informal custom does not—and cannot—constitute “mandatory language,” id. The Court
made this point in Connecticut Board of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981), when it rejected
20
the argument that “unspoken understanding between
the State Board [of Pardons] and inmates” regarding
the frequency of paroled life sentences could create a
liberty interest. It held: “A constitutional entitlement
cannot be created—as if by estoppel—merely because
a wholly and expressly discretionary state privilege
has been granted generously in the past.” Id. at 465
(quotations omitted). So even if the Board did have an
informal custom as Petitioners claim, that custom
would not create a liberty interest.
In all events, the petition is a poor vehicle for evaluating Petitioners’ custom argument because, as the
Sixth Circuit determined, Petitioners did “not develop
this argument” below “or include plausible allegations
of customs that create a legitimate expectation of parole.” Pet. App. 25a.
Finally, Petitioners argue that “a close reading” of
§ 40-35-503(b) and § 40-28-117(a), considered under
“the doctrine in pari materia,” show that Tennessee
created a liberty interest in parole. Pet. 11-12. But a
close reading of those statutes supports the Board, not
Petitioners.
The principle of in pari materia instructs that laws
“pertain[ing] to the same subject … should … be construed as if they were one law.” Erlenbaugh v. United
States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972) (quotations omitted).
Here, the statutes (twice) emphasize that parole is a
privilege and not a right. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4028-117(a)(1); id. § 40-35-503(b). They then create a
presumption against parole. Id. § 40-35-503(b); supra
10. And they also specify that even if all the relevant
criteria favor parole, an inmate only “may be paroled.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a)(1) (emphasis added).
21
Construing these parole statutes as one law demonstrates that parole in Tennessee is discretionary, not
mandatory.
Under Greenholtz, Tennessee’s parole statutes do
not create a liberty interest that implicates the Due
Process Clause.
B. Tennessee’s parole statutes do not create
a liberty interest under Allen.
Allen only makes Petitioners’ position more untenable.4 In Allen, which relied on the “control[ling] …
principles established in … Greenholtz,” the Court
found a liberty interest in parole because “the Montana statute, like the Nebraska statute, uses mandatory language (‘shall’).” 482 U.S. at 371, 377. By contrast, Tennessee’s parole statutes do not. Supra 11.
But, Petitioners argue, even if Tennessee’s parole
statutes are not identical to the statute in Allen, they
“are functionally the same.” Pet. 13. That’s wrong.
Again, whether a statute mandates parole in certain
circumstances (instead of merely permitting parole),
is dispositive. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12; Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78. And again, the statute in Allen, like the one in Greenholtz, used mandatory language, whereas Tennessee’s statutes use permissive
language. Supra 11.
4 Petitioners assert that “the Sixth Circuit has never squarely ad-
dressed” the “rule of law” in Allen. Pet. 12. That’s wrong. See,
e.g., Pet. App. 16a-18a; Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 398-99
(6th Cir. 2011); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 884-85 (6th Cir.
1992).
22
Petitioners try to bolster their “functionally the
same” argument by pointing to the following portion
of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a)(1):
[N]o prisoner shall be released merely as
a reward for good conduct …, but only if
the board is of the opinion that there is
reasonable probability that the prisoner,
if released, will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law, and that the
prisoner’s release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society.
Pet. 13-14 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28117(a)(1)). But immediately following that quoted portion, the statute goes on to say: “If the board so determines, the prisoner may be paroled and if paroled
shall be allowed to go upon parole outside of prison
walls and enclosure upon the terms and conditions as
the board shall prescribe ….” Id. (emphasis added).
The full statutory context belies Petitioners’ assertion
that the statute in Allen and Tennessee’s statute “are
functionally the same”: one statute mandates parole if
certain conditions are met, and the other does not.
Pet. 13.
Petitioners next point to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-28101(a), which broadly describes the purpose of the
Tennessee code dealing with probation and parole.
Petitioners argue that the use of “shall” in that statute
means “that every worthy inmate must be released.”
Pet. 14. But that’s not what the statute says. “[C]ontext matters,” and § 40-28-101(a) never mandates that
inmates “shall” be released. Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd.
v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 414 (2012). Instead, after broadly providing that “[t]he purpose of
23
this chapter is to provide a system of probation and
paroles,” it provides that parole and probation boards
“shall take into consideration” certain personal information when making their decisions, and then, if individuals are released on parole or probation, they “shall
be dealt with” in a “uniform[]” manner. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-28-101(a). But unlike the statutes in Greenholtz and Allen, this statute never mandates parole
under any particular circumstance. While the statute
may mandate certain procedures, “none of those procedures impose any substantive restriction on the
Board’s ultimate decision.” Marlow v. Mont. Bd. of
Pardons & Parole, 39 F.3d 1187, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct.
27, 1994).
Petitioners also argue that because Tennessee “invokes the same criteria from Allen—law-abiding character, and societal welfare”—it has created a liberty
interest. Pet. 14. But the presence or absence of certain evaluation criteria—on its own—is wholly irrelevant. Instead, what matters is whether a parole
board’s discretion has been “significant[ly] limit[ed].”
Allen, 482 U.S. at 380. If a board “shall” parole an inmate based on certain criteria, then the State has created a liberty interest. Id. at 377. But if, as here, the
board “may” release an inmate based on those same
criteria, then the State has not created a liberty interest. Id. at 378 n.10. Tennessee’s statutory scheme
does not limit the Board’s discretion like the statutes
in Montana and Nebraska. And whereas this Court in
Allen pointed to changes in the statute that “place[d]
significant limits on the discretion of the Board,” Petitioners have pointed to no similar changes here. Id. at
380.
24
II. The Sixth Circuit’s Approach Accords With
All Other Federal and State Courts.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision also accords with every
other state supreme court and circuit court interpreting similar, permissive parole statutes. For decades,
courts have relied on the mandatory/discretionary distinction created in Greenholtz and Allen to evaluate
whether a state statute confers a liberty interest in parole. In cases where a parole statute uses mandatory
“shall” language, courts have found a liberty interest
in parole. See, e.g., Bomgaars v. State, 967 N.W.2d 41,
46-48 (Iowa 2021) (Iowa statute); In re McCarthy, 164
P.3d 1283, 1286 (Wash. 2007) (Washington statute);
McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901-03 (California statute);
Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484, 1491-92 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Wisconsin’s mandatory release statute); Bermudez v.
Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1991) (Guam
statute).
And in cases where a parole statute uses permissive “may” language, courts have applied Greenholtz
and Allen to hold that the statute has not created a
liberty interest in parole. See, e.g., Moor v. Palmer,
603 F.3d 658, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nevada statute);
Straley, 582 F.3d at 1212-13 (Utah statute); Baker v.
Comm’r of Corr., 914 A.2d 1034, 1041-43 (Conn. 2007)
(Connecticut statute); Jago v. Ortiz, 245 F. App’x 794,
796-97 (10th Cir. 2007) (Colorado statute); Grennier v.
Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 444 (7th Cir. 2006) (Wisconsin
statute); Price v. Barry, 53 F.3d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (D.C. statute); Bussiere, 571 A.2d at 911-12
(New Hampshire statute); Inmates of Orient Corr.
Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233,
235-36 (6th Cir. 1991) (Ohio statute); Creel v. Keene,
25
928 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas statute);
Scales v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565, 565-66
(5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (Mississippi statute); cf.
Bosworth v. Whitley, 627 So.2d 629, 633 (La. 1993)
(Louisiana statute); Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d
1437, 1441 (11th Cir. 1991) (Alabama statute); Gilmore v. Kan. Parole Bd., 756 P.2d 410, 414-15 (Kan.
1988) (Kansas statute). The same is true here.
The Board is unaware of a single state or federal
court since Allen—and Petitioners certainly haven’t
provided one—that has found a liberty interest in a
state parole statutory scheme that uses discretionary
“may” language like Tennessee here. This case fits
squarely within the holdings of Greenholtz and Allen.
In short, the Sixth Circuit’s decision is simply the
latest in an unbroken line of cases dating back 40
years applying Greenholtz and Allen to find that Tennessee has not created a liberty interest in parole. Supra 12. There is no good reason to revisit that decision
given the court’s faithful adherence to Greenholtz and
Allen and the absence of any contrary approach.
III. This Court Has Oft-Denied Similar Petitions
for Decades.
Since Allen, this Court has repeatedly denied review in cases where inmates challenge discretionary
parole statutes on liberty interest grounds. Petitioners have failed to identify any changed circumstances
warranting a different outcome here.
For example, in the wake of Allen, this Court denied review in Sultenfuss, a case about Georgia’s parole system that involved virtually identical issues as
26
this case. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sultenfuss v. Snow, 513 U.S. 1191 (1995) (No. 94-1178), 1995
WL 17048530, at *21-23, *26, *30.
And Sultenfuss is no outlier: Time and time again
since Allen, this Court has denied review in cases
where state and federal courts held that discretionary
language did not create a liberty interest in parole.
See, e.g., Moor, 603 F.3d at 661-62, cert. denied, 562
U.S. 1049 (2010); Straley, 582 F.3d at 1212-13, cert.
denied, 559 U.S. 991 (2010); Hanrahan v. Williams,
673 N.E.2d 251, 275-78 (Ill. 1996), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 812 (1997); Sultenfuss, 35 F.3d at 1503, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1191 (1995); Creel, 928 F.2d at 712, cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1210 (1991); Gilmore, 756 P.2d at
414-15, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 930 (1988). Nothing has
changed. Denial is warranted here, too.
CONCLUSION
The Court should deny the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
27
Respectfully submitted,
JONATHAN SKRMETTI
Attorney General
J. MATTHEW RICE
Solicitor General
MADELINE W. CLARK
Principal Deputy
Solicitor General
JOSHUA DANIEL MINCHIN
Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
OFFICE OF TENNESSEE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. Box 20207
Nashville, TN 37202
(615) 837-5069
Joshua.Minchin@ag.tn.gov
Counsel for Respondents
MARCH 9, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.