Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ming Hong Zheng, Petitioner v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.

FILED

I MAY 13 2026

25^24 2 4

IN THE

—

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MING HONG ZHENG,

Petitioner,

v.

HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Ming Hong Zheng

Pro Se Petitioner

421 8th Avenue #7118

New York, NY 10001

636-667-8876

minghzheng@alumni.psu.edu

May 2026

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. When a transferor circuit and a transferee circuit each disclaim jurisdiction over a 28 U.S.C. §

1406(a) inter-circuit transfer order, which court — if either — bears the obligation to provide

appellate review, and by what authority?

2. Whether, and by what mechanism, an inter-circuit transfer order under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)

may be reviewed when the transferor circuit deems itself without jurisdiction after transfer and

the transferee circuit has not provided a practical avenue for review — and whether this Court’s

supervisory authority over the federal appellate system requires designation of a responsible

forum?

3. Whether a court of appeals may permissibly disclaim jurisdiction over a § 1406(a) transfer

order when, to Petitioner’s knowledge, no other appellate court has reviewed that order, and

Petitioner has pursued every procedural avenue identified by the courts below?

i

LIST OF PARTIES

Petitioner Ming Hong Zheng, pro se, was the Plaintiff-Appellant in all proceedings

below.

Ming Hong Zheng

Pro Se Petitioner

421 8th Avenue #7118

New York, NY 10001

Mobile: 636-667-8876

E-mail: minghzheng@alumni.psu.edu

Respondent Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. was the Defendant-Appellee in all

proceedings below, represented by Vinson & Elkins LLP (Marisa Antonelli — New York; Peter

J. Goetschel — pro hac vice in Wyoming) and Keith R. Nachbar, P.C. (Keith R. Nachbar —

Wyoming).

Counsel on Record:

Marisa F. Antonelli

Vinson & Elkins LLP

1114 Avenue of the Americas, 32nd Floor

New York, NY 10036

Work: 212-237-0151

E-mail: mantonelli@velaw.com

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented

i

List of Parties

ii

Table of Contents

iii

Appendix

1V

Table of Authorities

v

Opinions Below

1

Jurisdiction

1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

2

Statement of the Case

,

4

A. Background and Transfer Order

4

B. Denial of § 1292(b) Certification

5

C. First Second Circuit Dismissal (Case No. 23-849)

5

D. Tenth Circuit Dismissal (Case No. 23-8074)

5

E. Wyoming Proceedings and Dismissal

6

F. Second Second Circuit Dismissal (Case No. 25-2393)

6

G. No Court Has Reviewed the Transfer Order

6

Reasons for Granting the Writ

7

I. The Jurisdictional Loop Is a Structural Defect in Federal Appellate Law That Only This

Court Can Solve

7

II. The Interaction of § 1406(a), § 1292(b), and Transfer-Finality Doctrine Creates an

Irreconcilable Gap

9

III. This Court’s Supervisory Authority Over the Federal Courts Supports the Need for

Certiorari

10

IV. Due Process Principles Reinforce the Case for Resolution

11

V. The Question Is Important, Recurring, and Unresolved

13

VI. This Case Is a Clean Vehicle for Resolution

Conclusion

iii

14

15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49 (2013)

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367 (2004)

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962)

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)

Hormelv. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941)

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)

Michael v. I.N.S., 48 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 1995)

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)

Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955)

Am. Plan Admin, v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 39 F.4th 59 (2d Cir. 2022)

9, 13

16

12, 13

7

12, 14

11

12, 14, 16

9

11

12, 13

8

13, 14

4

13

9

4

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

passim

U.S. Const, amend. V

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act)

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Americans with Disabilities Act)

9 U.S.C. § 3 (Federal Arbitration Act)

1

passim

passim

11,16

3

5

RULES

Sup. Ct. R. 10

15

v

Sup. Ct. R. 13

Sup. Ct. R. 14

Sup. Ct. R. 33.2

Sup. Ct. R. 39

1

1

1

1

vi

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissing

Petitioner’s second appeal (Case No. 25-2393), dated February 12, 2026, is unreported and

reproduced in the Appendix at Appendix A. The order of the Second Circuit dismissing

Petitioner’s first appeal (Case No. 23-849) sua sponte on September 27, 2023, is unreported and

reproduced at Appendix B. The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

dismissing Petitioner’s appeal (Case No. 23-8074) for lack of jurisdiction, dated February 21,

2024, is unreported and reproduced at Appendix C. The Memorandum-Decision and Order of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Chief Judge Sannes)

transferring this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), dated May 12, 2023 (Dkt. No. 19 in Case No.

1:22-cv-00814-BKS-ATB), is reproduced at Appendix D. The Text Order of Chief Judge Sannes

declining to certify the transfer order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), dated June 1, 2023 (Dkt. No.

21), is reproduced at Appendix E. The Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Action of the United States

District Court for the District of Wyoming (Judge Johnson), dated September 2, 2025 (Dkt. No.

50 in Case No. 2:23-cv-00098-ABJ), is reproduced at Appendix F.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Case No.

25-2393) was entered on February 12, 2026. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1). Petitioner is proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 39, and a

separate Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is filed concurrently. This petition is timely filed

within 90 days of entry ofjudgment, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) and Sup. Ct. R. 13.

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution:

“No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law....”

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) — Cure or Waiver of Defects:

“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong

division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest ofjustice, transfer such

case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) — Interlocutory Decisions (relevant portion):

“When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise

appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference

of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance

the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.

The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action

may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order ...

28 U.S.C. § 1631 — Transfer to Cure Want of Jurisdiction:

“Whenever a civil action is filed in a court. . . and that court finds that there is a

want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such

action ... to any other such court in which the action ... could have been brought

at the time it was filed ....”

28 U.S.C. § 1651 — All Writs Act:

“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all

writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable

to the usages and principles of law.”

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) — Americans with Disabilities Act, Purpose (relevant portion):

“It is the purpose of this chapter — (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive

2

national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with

disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing

discrimination against individuals with disabilities ...

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background and Transfer Order

Petitioner Ming Hong Zheng, a former MWD Engineer employed by Halliburton Energy

Services, Inc. in a traveling position, sustained on-the-job injuries in May 2019 at a rig site in

North Dakota that resulted in permanent physical restrictions. Following a period of medical

leave during which Halliburton did not engage in an interactive accommodation process or offer

a modified position, Petitioner was terminated by automatic email on July 1, 2022. Petitioner

filed an EEOC charge (No. 460-2022-02344) and received a Notice of Right to Sue. On July 29,

2022, Petitioner filed a pro se complaint in forma pauperis in the United States District Court for

the Northern District of New York (Case No. l:22-cv-00814-BKS-ATB), asserting claims under

the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., for wrongful termination, failure

to accommodate, and retaliation, seeking $243,728.64 in back pay plus compensatory and

punitive damages. IFP status was granted on August 24, 2022.

On October 25, 2022, Halliburton moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and

to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. On May 12, 2023, Chief Judge Brenda K. Sannes

granted the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and transferred the action to the

United States District Court for the District of Wyoming pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (Dkt.

No. 19). The transfer was ordered under § 1406(a), which courts have applied to both venue and

personal jurisdiction defects, though 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides a separate transfer mechanism

specifically addressing want of jurisdiction. Whether § 1406(a) was the appropriate vehicle here

is a question the transfer order itself did not address — and one that appellate review could have

resolved. The case was docketed in Wyoming as Case No. 2:23-cv-00098-ABJ before Judge

4

Alan B. Johnson, approximately 1,800 miles from Petitioner’s residence.

B. Denial of § 1292(b) Certification

On May 26, 2023, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a motion requesting an

extension of time to appeal the transfer order. On June 1, 2023, Chief Judge Sannes declined to

certify the transfer order for interlocutoiy review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), citing Michael v.

I.N.S., 48 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 1995), and Am. Plan Admin, v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 39 F.4th 59

(2d Cir. 2022). The court offered no alternative path to appellate review. The transfer took effect

the same day.

C. First Second Circuit Dismissal (Case No. 23-849)

Petitioner’s notice of appeal was transmitted to the Second Circuit and docketed as Case

No. 23-849. On September 27, 2023, a panel consisting of Judges Parker, Bianco, and Rakoff

dismissed the appeal sua sponte. The mandate issued October 18, 2023. The panel did not review

the transfer order on the merits and did not identify any forum in which the order could be

reviewed.

D. Tenth Circuit Dismissal (Case No. 23-8074)

On November 13, 2023, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the District of Wyoming

(Dkt. No. 40), which the Tenth Circuit docketed as Case No. 23-8074. On November 14, 2023,

the Tenth Circuit immediately questioned its own jurisdiction and suspended merits briefing.

Petitioner submitted a memorandum brief on January 31, 2024. On February 21, 2024, a panel

consisting of Judges Bacharach, Moritz, and Federico issued an unsigned, unpublished order

dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit’s dismissal was on the ground that the

5

orders appealed — including the arbitration/stay order — were interlocutory and not within its

appellate jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). The Tenth Circuit did not address the merits of

the transfer order, and it did not identify any forum in which the transfer order could be

reviewed.

E. Wyoming Proceedings and Dismissal

After transfer, Halliburton moved to compel arbitration (Dkt. No. 27), which Judge

Johnson granted on October 30, 2023, staying the action pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Dkt. No. 39).

The action remained stayed for nearly two years. During the stay period, Petitioner’s capacity to

participate was substantially diminished by the confluence of her underlying workplace injury,

the financial and logistical burden of pro se litigation 1,800 miles from home, the death of her

grandmother in the summer of 2023, and the inability to find counsel licensed or willing to

appear in Wyoming. Following status reports in December 2024, Judge Johnson dismissed the

action without prejudice on September 2, 2025 (Dkt. Nos. 50-51).

F. Second Second Circuit Dismissal (Case No. 25-2393)

Following the Wyoming dismissal, Petitioner filed a second notice of appeal to the

Second Circuit on September 29, 2025, challenging the May 12, 2023 transfer order. On

February 12, 2026, a panel consisting of Judges Jacobs, Calabresi, and Nathan dismissed,

holding that following a § 1406(a) transfer, jurisdiction over the transferor district court’s orders

vests in the transferee circuit. The mandate issued March 6, 2026.

G. No Court Has Reviewed the Transfer Order

The May 12,2023 transfer order has never been reviewed on the merits by any appellate

6

court. The Second Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s appeals on jurisdictional grounds twice.

The Tenth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s appeal in February 2024 on the ground that the orders

appealed were interlocutory, without addressing the transfer order on the merits or identifying a

forum for its review. Critically, that Tenth Circuit dismissal came two years before the Second

Circuit’s February 2026 ruling directing Petitioner to the Tenth Circuit. The Second Circuit thus

pointed to a forum that had already declined jurisdiction. Neither court reviewed the transfer

order; neither identified a remaining avenue for review. The result is a practical review gap: a

federal court order that determined the forum for Petitioner’s ADA claims was entered,

implemented, and effectuated without any appellate scrutiny of its legality. Petitioner has

identified no controlling authority designating which court, if any, bears residual jurisdiction to

fill that gap.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE JURISDICTIONAL LOOP IS A STRUCTURAL DEFECT IN FEDERAL

APPELLATE LAW THAT ONLY THIS COURT CAN RESOLVE

The core problem in this case can be stated in four sentences. The Second Circuit held

that the Tenth Circuit must review the transfer order. The Tenth Circuit had already disclaimed

jurisdiction two years earlier. Neither court identified any remaining forum. The transfer order

has never been reviewed on the merits.

That sequence is not the result of Petitioner’s litigation errors. Petitioner filed two appeals

in the Second Circuit and one in the Tenth Circuit, filed motions to stay, and submitted a

memorandum brief before the Tenth Circuit dismissed. Every door was closed on jurisdictional

grounds. The resulting review gap — the Second Circuit directing Petitioner to the Tenth Circuit

7

after the Tenth Circuit had already dismissed, with neither court reaching the merits of the

transfer order — is a structural problem in federal appellate law that this Court is uniquely

positioned to resolve.

This petition presents a question of substantial importance to the administration of the

federal courts: when a transferor circuit and a transferee circuit each disclaim jurisdiction over a

§ 1406(a) inter-circuit transfer order, which court — if either — is obligated to provide review,

and by what authority? That question is unresolved by this Court, produced three jurisdictional

dismissals across two circuits, and will recur whenever the conditions present here are replicated.

The structural problem is this. Under existing doctrine, review of a § 1406(a) transfer

order proceeds by one of two paths: (1) interlocutory certification by the district court under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b); or (2) review by the transferee circuit following final judgment. Neither path

was available here. Section 1292(b) certification depends entirely on the district court’s

unreviewable discretion. When the district court refuses — as Chief Judge Sannes did — the

transferor circuit has no basis for interlocutory jurisdiction. In the ordinary course, the transferee

circuit’s jurisdiction to review a transfer order depends on a final, appealable judgment in the

transferee district. Here, the case was stayed for arbitration and then dismissed without prejudice

— a dismissal that, while potentially appealable in other contexts, did not produce a merits

judgment that the Tenth Circuit treated as a basis for reviewing the antecedent transfer order.

When Petitioner returned to the Second Circuit, the panel held that jurisdiction had vested in the

Tenth Circuit — the circuit that had already disclaimed jurisdiction a year before that ruling.

Petitioner has identified no controlling statute, circuit precedent, or prior ruling of this

Court that designates which forum bears residual appellate jurisdiction in this circumstance.

8

Only this Court can supply that designation.

As Chief Justice Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163

(1803), a legal system that recognizes a right but provides no remedy for its violation cannot

properly be called a system of law. That defect materialized here.

II. THE INTERACTION OF § 1406(a), § 1292(b), AND TRANSFER-FINALITY

DOCTRINE CREATES AN IRRECONCILABLE GAP

The review gap is the predictable consequence of three procedural rules that, in their

interaction, can leave a litigant without any practical avenue for appellate review of an

inter-circuit transfer order. The three rules are: (1) § 1292(b) provides one mechanism for

interlocutory review of a non-final transfer order, and its availability depends entirely on the

district court’s unreviewable discretion; (2) once transfer occurs, the transferor circuit treats

jurisdiction over the transferor district court’s interlocutory orders as having passed to the

transferee circuit; and (3) the transferee circuit’s jurisdiction requires a reviewable final judgment

from the transferee district.

Each rule has defensible justification. Rule (1) avoids piecemeal appeals. Rule (2)

respects the principle that the transferee circuit is better situated to administer the transferred

case. Rule (3) preserves the final judgment rule. But their interaction is irreconcilable when the

transferee case terminates without a merits judgment before the transferee circuit exercises

review. In that scenario, Rule (2) blocks the transferor circuit; Rule (3) forecloses the transferee

circuit; and Rule (1) was never satisfied. No court has jurisdiction — yet the transfer order

stands. Procedural rules may not operate as a trap foreclosing all review of a substantive ruling.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).

9

This Court has addressed transfer orders in contexts presupposing the existence of a

reviewing court. See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 57 (2013)

(treating mandamus as a vehicle for review of improper transfer orders); Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). None of

those decisions addressed what happens when both circuits disclaim jurisdiction; they thus do

not resolve the gap presented here, but they do confirm that appellate oversight of transfer orders

is part of the ordinary federal appellate architecture.

There is also an independent statutory dimension. The transfer here was ordered under §

1406(a), which courts have applied to both venue and personal jurisdiction defects, though 28

U.S.C. § 1631 provides a separate transfer mechanism specifically addressing want of

jurisdiction. Whether § 1406(a) was the appropriate vehicle here is a question that appellate

review could have resolved. Either way, the same practical review gap arises when both circuits

disclaim jurisdiction. This Court’s resolution can address both statutes, or clarify that the

jurisdictional analysis is identical under either, providing comprehensive guidance to the lower

courts.

HL THIS COURT’S SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OVER THE FEDERAL COURTS

SUPPORTS THE NEED FOR CERTIORARI

Even if this Court were to conclude that the question does not rise to a constitutional

violation, the orderly administration of the federal courts supports the need for certiorari. This

Court has exercised its supervisory authority over the lower federal courts to resolve structural

gaps in appellate procedure — not because a constitutional right was necessarily violated, but

because the federal court system requires a clear rule to operate consistently and predictably.

10

The problem presented here is precisely the type that supervisory authority exists to

address. Petitioner has identified no court ruling, statute, or circuit precedent that designates

which forum bears responsibility when both the transferor and transferee circuits disclaim

jurisdiction over a § 1406(a) transfer order. The gap has produced three jurisdictional dismissals

across two circuits in a single case. Left unresolved, it will produce inconsistent and

unpredictable outcomes in every future case presenting the same pattern.

Resolution requires this Court to identify a doctrinal principle allocating appellate .

jurisdiction when both circuits disclaim. Candidates include: (a) the transferee circuit’s

jurisdiction over the transfer order is a mandatory and non-waivable incident of its jurisdiction

over the transferred case, regardless of how the case terminates — the cleanest institutional rule

and the one most directly closing the gap; (b) the transferor circuit retains residual jurisdiction

over the transfer order it entered; (c) the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which aids but does

not independently create jurisdiction, could nonetheless support an appropriate writ in a circuit

that retains some residual connection to the case; or (d) § 1292(b) certification must be granted

when a litigant demonstrates that review will otherwise be unavailable. This Court should grant

certiorari to resolve which rule applies.

IV. DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES REINFORCE THE CASE FOR RESOLUTION

The structural problem identified above also raises due process concerns that reinforce

the case for supervisory resolution. While there is no freestanding constitutional right to

appellate review of a transfer order, this Court has held that once Congress creates a system of

appellate review, procedural rules governing access to that system must be administered

11

consistently with due process. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985); Griffin v. Illinois, 351

U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956). Those principles, read in light ofMathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

(1976), counsel against a framework that can leave a litigant without any practical reviewing

forum based solely on the fortuity of the district court’s certification decision. Access to courts

must be meaningful in practice, not merely nominal. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977);

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S.

306, 314 (1950). The procedures governing access must satisfy Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319,335(1976).

Applying Mathews: the private interest is substantial. A § 1406(a) transfer determines the

forum in which federal statutory claims are litigated, affecting access to witnesses, cost of

participation, and practical ability to prosecute the case. Here, transfer to Wyoming —-

approximately 1,800 miles from Petitioner’s residence — was followed immediately by a motion

to compel arbitration, a two-year stay, and dismissal without prejudice. Petitioner’s ADA claims,

including $243,728.64 in back pay and significant additional damages, were extinguished

without ever reaching the merits.

The risk of erroneous deprivation is significant. A § 1406(a) transfer requires the district

court to determine that venue is improper and that transfer — rather than dismissal — serves the

interest of justice. Both determinations are subject to legal and factual error. Without any

appellate review, those errors stand permanently uncorrected.

The government’s interest in procedural efficiency does not justify a categorical absence

of review. The question is not whether transfer orders should receive deferential review — they

plainly should. The question is whether the existing framework may, in its practical operation,

12

categorically fail to provide any reviewing court for an identifiable class of litigants. Petitioner

contends that it may not, and that this Court’s supervisory authority provides an independent

basis to resolve the gap without the need to reach a constitutional holding.

The framework also produces an arbitrary disparity. A litigant whose district court

certifies under § 1292(b) receives appellate review. A litigant whose district court refuses —

even on an identical legal question — may receive none. That asymmetry compounds the due

process problem: the risk of erroneous deprivation falls entirely on the litigant who happens to

draw a district judge unwilling to certify, with no procedural safeguard. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347

U. S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 17.

Nor does mandamus supply an adequate safeguard. To obtain mandamus, a petitioner

must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to relief and the absence of adequate alternative

remedies. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004). Courts routinely deny

mandamus for transfer orders, and neither appellate court here identified mandamus as available

or adequate. A demanding, discretionary writ cannot reliably substitute for the practical avenue

for review that due process principles counsel should exist.

V. THE QUESTION IS IMPORTANT, RECURRING, AND UNRESOLVED

Supreme Court Rule 10 identifies as particularly compelling for certiorari a question of

federal law that has not been settled by this Court and that, left unresolved, will continue to

generate inconsistent outcomes. This petition satisfies that standard.

The question is important. Inter-circuit transfers under § 1406(a) occur regularly across

the federal system. The question of which circuit must review a transfer order when the ordinary

13

paths have been foreclosed is a recurring feature of federal litigation, not a one-time anomaly.

The question is unresolved. This Court has not addressed which court bears residual

appellate jurisdiction over a § 1406(a) transfer order when both the transferor and transferee

circuits disclaim. The absence of controlling authority means courts facing this pattern will reach

inconsistent results, and litigants will be unable to predict whether any court will review a

transfer order that determines their forum.

The question is recurring. The conditions that produced the vacuum here — declined §

1292(b) certification, inter-circuit transfer, and case termination without a merits judgment —

arise in any case where arbitration is compelled following transfer, where a case is voluntarily

dismissed before merits adjudication, or where the transferee court dismisses on threshold

grounds. In all such cases, if both circuits disclaim jurisdiction, no review occurs.

A question that has produced three jurisdictional dismissals across two circuits in a single

case, leaving a federal court order permanently unreviewed, falls squarely within this Court’s

supervisory authority. No other institution can supply the clear rule that the federal court system

requires.

VI. THIS CASE IS A CLEAN VEHICLE FOR RESOLUTION

This case presents a clean vehicle for resolving the question presented. The jurisdictional

issue was squarely raised in every proceeding below and preserved at each stage. Three

dismissals on jurisdictional or procedural grounds — twice in the Second Circuit and once in the

Tenth Circuit — resulted in no appellate court reaching the merits of the transfer order. The

record fully documents the procedural sequence that produced the review gap.

14

There are no factual disputes that complicate the jurisdictional question. The transfer

order was entered, the § 1292(b) certification was declined, both circuits disclaimed jurisdiction,

and no merits review occurred. The legal question — which court must provide appellate review

of a § 1406(a) transfer order when both the transferor and transferee circuits disclaim jurisdiction

— is presented cleanly on this record without any factual overlay that would limit the Court’s

ability to address it broadly.

Petitioner is a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis who litigated across multiple

forums over several years against experienced counsel from a major national law firm. The

absence of appellate review of the transfer order that determined her forum — and thus the

practical trajectory of her ADA claims — is not the product of neglect or procedural default. It is

the product of a structural gap in federal appellate jurisdiction doctrine that this Court is uniquely

positioned to resolve.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant the

petition for a writ of certiorari to review the February 12, 2026 judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Case No. 25-2393.

The questions presented are of substantial importance to the administration of the federal

courts and remain unresolved by this Court. The combined operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b), and the rules governing post-transfer appellate jurisdiction created apractical

review gap in which, to Petitioner’s knowledge, no appellate court reviewed the merits of the

May 12, 2023 transfer order. The Second Circuit and the Tenth Circuit each disclaimed

jurisdiction — the Second Circuit pointing to a forum that had already disclaimed — without

15

either providing review or identifying an alternative forum.

This Court should grant certiorari to designate which court must provide appellate review

of a § 1406(a) inter-circuit transfer order when both the transferor and transferee circuits

disclaim jurisdiction, and to clarify the doctrinal basis — whether grounded in this Court’s

supervisory authority, the All Writs Act, mandatory transferee jurisdiction, or constitutional due

process — for that obligation.

Respectfully submitted,

Ming Hong Zheng

Pro Se Petitioner

421 8th Avenue #7118

New York, NY 10001

May 13,2026

This petition contains 4,066 words, exclusive of the parts exempted by Supreme Court

Rule 33.1(d).

16