Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alvin Beasley, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefMay 14, 2026
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Case: 23-2489
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Filed: 12/19/2025
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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2489
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALVIN BEASLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois
No. 20-cr-20009 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2025 — DECIDED DECEMBER 19, 2025
____________________
Before ST. EVE, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and MALDONADO,
Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Alvin Beasley under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) of possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon after he shot a gun at his ex-girlfriend’s house while on
parole for a felony conviction. The district court, finding
Beasley had three prior convictions for violent crimes, sentenced Beasley under the Armed Career Criminal Act
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(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which imposes a fifteen-year
mandatory minimum.
Beasley argues his sentence violates his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights because a jury rather than a judge should
have made the fact-intensive determination of whether his
prior convictions occurred on “different occasions” under
ACCA. While Beasley’s appeal was pending, the Supreme
Court held in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 835 (2024),
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury to decide
whether previous offenses occurred on occasions different
from one another under ACCA. We agree with Beasley that
the sentencing court erred under Erlinger by declining to send
the different-occasions question to the jury but nevertheless
affirm because the error was harmless.
I. Background
On May 23, 2019, police responded to a “shots fired” call
at the home of Alvin Beasley’s ex-girlfriend in Danville, Illinois. At the scene, police observed two bullet holes on the outside of the ex-girlfriend’s home and learned that a witness
saw a red Chevrolet Impala driving away immediately after
the gunshots sounded. As the police tracked down and tailed
the Impala, they saw someone toss a firearm out of its passenger side. The officers conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle
and found Beasley sitting in the driver’s seat. Beasley, a convicted felon, could not lawfully possess a firearm.
A grand jury indicted Beasley, charging him with being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1). The
case went to trial in September 2021, and the jury returned a
verdict of guilty on the sole count of the indictment.
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In preparation for Beasley’s sentencing, probation prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) highlighting
three of Beasley’s prior felony convictions: an armed robbery
committed on March 21, 2004; an aggravated battery on June
11, 2005; and a second-degree murder on December 23, 2011.
Based on the PSR, probation determined Beasley qualified as
an armed career criminal and faced a mandatory minimum
term of fifteen years and up to life in prison under ACCA,
§ 924(e). The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence
between 262 and 327 months in prison.
In a presentencing memorandum, Beasley acknowledged
the prior convictions and conceded two of the offenses occurred over a year apart, on March 21, 2004, and June 11, 2005.
During a colloquy at his sentencing hearing, Beasley confirmed the 2004 and 2005 offense dates and further conceded
that the third offense occurred on December 23, 2011. Still,
Beasley objected to probation’s recommended mandatory
minimum sentence under ACCA. He argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360
(2022), requires extensive factfinding regarding whether prior
convictions occurred on occasions different from one another
and, pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),
and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), it falls within
the province of the jury, not the court, to determine whether
his prior convictions trigger ACCA’s longer prison terms. The
district court overruled Beasley’s objection at sentencing
based on our court’s then-controlling precedent in United
States v. Hatley, 61 F.4th 536 (7th Cir. 2023), explaining “separate occasions of prior offenses do not need to be alleged in
the indictment and found beyond a reasonable doubt by the
jury.” The judge determined the three predicate offenses
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occurred on different occasions and sentenced Beasley to 300
months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.
Beasley appealed his sentence. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Erlinger,
which held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require
ACCA’s different-occasions element to be submitted to the
jury. 602 U.S. at 835.
II. Discussion
ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen
years’ imprisonment for a defendant convicted under
§ 922(g)(1) who also has three previous convictions for violent
felonies “committed on occasions different from one another.” § 924(e)(1). This sentence enhancement also increases
the maximum statutory sentence from ten years under
§ 922(g) to life in prison under the enhancement.
Under Apprendi and Alleyne, the government must prove
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt any sentencing factor—
other than the fact of a prior conviction—that increases a defendant’s maximum or minimum penalty. Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 490; Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 111–13. ACCA’s different-occasions
factor increases both the minimum and maximum penalties
facing defendants sentenced under that statute. And because
the different-occasions determination is an “intensely factual”
question requiring “examination of a ‘range’ of facts,” the inquiry goes beyond finding the fact of a prior conviction. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 828 (citing Wooden, 595 U.S. at 369). Thus,
building on Wooden in the context of Apprendi and Alleyne, the
Court in Erlinger held the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury—not a court—to resolve the differentoccasions question beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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The government concedes that the district court erred under Erlinger. We agree. The sentencing court, not the jury,
found that Beasley committed the three prior violent crimes
on different occasions. The different-occasions question was
neither charged in the indictment nor submitted to the jury.
And the different-occasions finding increased both the minimum and maximum penalties beyond what the jury’s verdict
authorized. The firmly entrenched principles from Apprendi
and Alleyne, plus the newly articulated standard from Erlinger, expressly prohibit this. No one disputes an error occurred, nor could they.
At issue, then, is (1) whether we review the district court’s
error as a harmless error or a structural error and (2) if harmless error review applies, whether the error was harmless in
this case.
A. Standard of Review for Erlinger Errors
A preserved trial error is subject to harmless error analysis
unless it is a structural error necessitating automatic reversal.
Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–19 (2006). We reject
Beasley’s suggestion that his Erlinger error is structural. Instead, we review the error for harmlessness, as every federal
circuit to address the issue has done.
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized that the
commission of a constitutional error at trial alone does not entitle a defendant to automatic reversal.” Recuenco, 548 U.S. at
218; Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); see also Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991); Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). Rather, “most constitutional errors can
be harmless.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Fulminante, 499
U.S. at 306). “[I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by
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an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that
any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are
subject to harmless-error analysis.” Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark,
478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)).
Structural errors are “not subject to harmless-error analysis because [they] ‘vitiate[] all the jury’s findings.’” Neder, 527
U.S. at 11 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281
(1993)). Only in a “very limited class of cases” has the Court
found structural errors requiring automatic reversal. Johnson
v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (complete denial of counsel); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (biased trial judge); Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination in selection
of grand jury); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (denial
of self-representation at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39
(1984) (denial of public trial); Sullivan, 508 U.S. 275 (defective
reasonable-doubt instruction in death penalty case)).
In contrast, “[e]rrors that ‘infringe upon the jury’s factfinding role’ are ‘subject to harmless-error analysis.’” United States
v. Johnson, 114 F.4th 913, 917 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Neder,
527 U.S. at 18). Specifically, a district court’s “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury . . . is not structural error”
and a court should review it for harmlessness. Recuenco, 548
U.S. at 222. Unlike the structural errors identified above, the
failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury does not “vitiate” the jury’s entire verdict; it impacts only the jury’s ability
to make a finding on one discrete issue, leaving the jury’s verdict on the defendant’s substantive offenses entirely intact.
Neder, 527 U.S. at 11. Our court has consistently followed
Recuenco’s precedent, applying harmless error review where
the district court failed to submit a sentencing factor to the
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jury. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 493 F.3d 763, 765 (7th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d 795, 806 (7th
Cir. 2007).
Beasley’s case is nearly indistinguishable from Recuenco,
and the same result follows. Here, as there, the district court
imposed a sentence enhancement based on factual findings
not submitted to the jury. Under Recuenco’s clear holding, the
district court’s failure to submit the ACCA different-occasions
sentencing factor to the jury does not vitiate the jury’s entire
holding and accordingly is subject to harmless error review.
Beasley fails to engage with the substantial precedent
holding harmless-error review applies to Apprendi-like errors,
seeming to suggest Erlinger errors are distinguishable. But
that the error here arose under Erlinger rather than Apprendi
or Alleyne makes no difference to our analysis. Erlinger, by its
own description, is a straightforward application of the rule
from Apprendi and Alleyne that a jury must find all facts that
increase a defendant’s statutory penalties. 602 U.S. at 835
(“[Erlinger] is as nearly on all fours with Apprendi and Alleyne
as any [case] we might imagine.”). As such, we review Erlinger errors, like other sentencing-factor errors, for harmless
error. See Johnson, 114 F.4th at 917 (applying harmless error
analysis to Erlinger error); United States v. Santana, 141 F.4th
847 (7th Cir. 2025) (reviewing unpreserved Erlinger error for
harmlessness within plain error review). 1
1 Each of our sister circuits to consider an Erlinger error has uniformly
reviewed for harmlessness, too. See United States v. Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 95
(4th Cir. 2025); United States v. Butler, 122 F.4th 584, 589 (5th Cir. 2024);
United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 631 (6th Cir. 2024); United States v.
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Nor does our analysis change because the court failed to
charge the ACCA-related sentencing factor in the indictment.
It is “well established in this circuit that Apprendi errors in
both the indictment and the charge to the jury are subject to
harmless error analysis.” United States v. Adkins, 274 F.3d 444,
454 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820,
825 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding Apprendi error not structural because an incomplete indictment is analogous to a jury instruction error, which the Court in Neder held we review for harmless error).
Beasley urges that his error rises to the level of a constructive amendment to the indictment, which “is per se reversible
error.” United States v. Muresanu, 951 F.3d 833, 839 (7th Cir.
2020) (quoting United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 311 (7th
Cir. 1984)). Beasley relies on two cases, Stirone and Muresanu,
in which the trial court constructively altered the indictment
by convicting the defendant of an offense not charged in the
indictment, which was structural error because it violated the
substantial right to be tried only on charges in the grand jury’s
indictment. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960);
Muresanu, 951 F.3d at 839. Both cases, however, involved the
subsequent addition of an entire offense not charged in the indictment—in Stirone the erroneous jury instructions allowed
conviction for a separate Hobbs Act violation not charged in
the indictment, 361 U.S. at 214, and in Muresanu, the indictment charged the defendant with an attempted crime but the
jury convicted him for the completed crime because the judge
Xavior-Smith, 136 F.4th 1136, 1137 (8th Cir. 2025); United States v. Rivers,
134 F.4th 1292, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2025); United States v. Saunders, No. 236735-cr, 2024 WL 4533359, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2024).
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omitted the word “attempt” from the jury instructions, 951
F.3d at 834–835. Here, by contrast, the indictment “fail[ed] to
allege . . . but one element of the ACCA sentencing enhancement to be decided by the jury.” Brown, 136 F.4th at 96. Cases
involving the addition of new offenses to the indictment,
therefore, are not instructive here.
Accordingly, our court has never extended the principles
from Stirone to cases concerning the failure to charge a
sentencing factor, instead consistently reviewing for
harmlessness. See, e.g., Santana, 141 F.4th at 852 (applying
harmless-error review to Erlinger error where differentoccasions question was neither charged in the indictment nor
submitted to the jury); United States v. Gamez, 77 F.4th 594, 598
(7th Cir. 2023) (same); United States v. Mansoori, 480 F.3d 514,
518, 523 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying harmless error review where
indictment failed to charge factor that ultimately mandated a
life sentence). Other circuits to consider the issue agree.
Brown, 136 F.4th 87, 95 (noting, in Erlinger context, that
“failure to charge” error is not structural error and rejecting
argument that sentencing under ACCA without charging
ACCA violation constituted constructive amendment of the
indictment); United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 286 (5th
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he absence of an indictment on the aggravating
factors used to justify a death sentence is not structural error
and is susceptible to harmless error review.”).
Finally, Beasley argues that harmless error review cannot
apply because, absent a jury verdict on the different-occasions
question, we have no point of comparison for what a properly
instructed jury could have found. He bases this argument on
language from Sullivan stating that without a “jury verdict of
guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the
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same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would
have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly
meaningless.” 508 U.S. at 280. But while “this strand of the
reasoning in Sullivan does provide support for [Beasley’s] position, it cannot be squared with [the Supreme Court’s] harmless-error cases.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 11; see, e.g., Pope v. Illinois,
481 U.S. 497, 499–501 (1987). The Supreme Court rejected the
same argument in Neder and Recuenco, both cases in which the
jury failed to return a verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonabledoubt on the issue in question (an element of the offense in
Neder; a sentencing factor in Recuenco). The Supreme Court’s
repeated rejection of Beasley’s proposed application of the
language from Sullivan “compels our rejection of this argument here.” Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222 n.4. Further, we have applied harmless error to Apprendi and Erlinger errors even
when the defendant pleaded guilty and there was no trial or
jury verdict at all. See Johnson, 114 F.4th at 917 (reviewing Erlinger error for harmlessness after guilty plea).
Beasley attempts to deflect this precedent by again casting
his error as a charging error, noting Recuenco did not involve
analysis of a charging error. But the issue highlighted—that
there was no guilty verdict to use as a comparison for
harmless-error review—exists whether the sentencing factor
was omitted from the indictment, the jury instructions, or
both. We are not convinced Beasley has identified a
meaningful distinction, so we follow our precedent.
B. Harmless Error Analysis
A district court’s “failure to submit a sentencing factor to
a jury is harmless only if it is ‘clear beyond a reasonable
doubt’ that a properly instructed jury would have found the
same facts as the court.” Johnson, 114 F.4th at 917 (quoting
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Hollingsworth, 495 F.3d at 806); see also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
Here, “[a] properly instructed jury would have considered ‘a
range of circumstances,’ including timing, proximity of location, and the character and relationship of the offenses.” Id.
(citing Wooden, 595 U.S. at 369).
Beasley argues as a threshold matter that the government
cannot meet its burden of showing the error in this case was
harmless because we may not rely on Shepard documents,
without which the record contains no evidence regarding the
three predicate convictions’ timing, location, or relatedness.2
Here, we need not turn to Shepard documents because Beasley
conceded in his sentencing memorandum that two of the offenses occurred over a year apart, and during the sentencing
hearing confirmed that the three past convictions at issue
were “an armed robbery on March 21st, 2004; an aggravated
battery on June 11th of [2005]; and [] a homicide on December
23rd of 2011.” These concessions alone are sufficient to support our harmlessness analysis. See United States v. Robinson,
964 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding no plain error where
court based sentence on defendant’s admission to drug quantity without submitting that fact to the jury because “[a]n admission is even better than a jury’s finding” (quoting United
States v. Warneke, 310 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2002))).
2 Beasley raised an even broader challenge at oral argument, arguing
that we may not rely on anything outside the trial record that was before
the jury when we conduct harmless error review. Beasley did not make
this argument prior to oral argument, however, and arguments raised for
the first time at oral argument are waived. Marvin v. Holcomb, 72 F.4th 828,
833 (7th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 557 (2024) (citing Harden v. Marion
Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 799 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 2015)).
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With Beasley’s concessions in mind, we consider the
Wooden factors: “timing, proximity of location, and the character and relationship of the offenses.” Id. (citing Wooden, 595
U.S. at 369). Often, “a single factor—especially of time or
place—can decisively differentiate occasions.” Wooden, 595
U.S. at 370. “When the crimes are separated by a day or more,
for example, they will ‘nearly always’ be treated as different
occasions.” Santana, 141 F.4th at 853 (quoting Wooden, 595 U.S.
at 370). And we have said following Wooden that “no colorable
argument” could support treating two robberies as having
been committed on the same occasion when they were separated by thirty-six hours. United States v. Richardson, 60 F.4th
397, 399 (7th Cir. 2023).
In Johnson, we held the Erlinger error at issue was not
harmless because the offenses occurred “within minutes” and
less than a mile of each other. 114 F.4th at 917. Similarly, in
Santana, we held the jury could have reasonable doubt the
crimes were committed on different occasions where the defendant committed them four miles and ten minutes apart. In
contrast, courts have found Erlinger errors harmless where
substantial gaps in time and distance separated the offenses
and the nature of the crimes differed. See, e.g., Brown, 136 F.4th
at 98–99 (robberies separated by two months); Butler, 122
F.4th at 590 (four drug crimes committed months to years
apart involving different buyers and different drugs); Campbell, 122 F.4th at 632 (three drug crimes committed months
and hundreds of miles apart, involving different drugs).
This is the kind of case where the “single factor . . . of time
. . . decisively differentiate[s] occasions.” Wooden, 595 U.S. at
370. The record shows Beasley committed each offense over a
year apart (in 2004, 2005, and 2011), far beyond the thirty-six-
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hour limit we described in Richardson. 60 F.4th at 399. We can
think of “no colorable argument” for treating offenses separated by over a year as having been committed on the same
occasion. Id. Further, the offenses differed in nature: an armed
robbery, an aggravated battery, and a homicide. It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury
would have found that Beasley committed the three offenses
on different occasions.
One final note. Beasley argues the district court’s error
cannot be harmless because remanding to the district court to
allow the government to properly charge and prove the
ACCA enhancement would violate double jeopardy principles. Regardless of whether Beasley is correct that double
jeopardy would bar subsequent proceedings on the differentoccasions question, his argument does not show the district
court’s error was harmful. It has nothing to do with our inquiry, which is whether it is clear a properly instructed jury
would have found beyond a reasonable doubt the offenses occurred on separate occasions. In any event, we are not remanding in this case because the district court’s Erlinger error
was harmless, so our decision does not implicate Beasley’s
double jeopardy concerns.
*
*
*
We review for harmless error a district court’s failure to
charge ACCA’s different-occasions factor in the indictment or
submit it to the jury. The error here was harmless.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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Appendix B
USA v. ALVIN BEASLEY, No. 20-20009 -- Sentencing Hearing (07/21/2023)
1
8
Now, let's get to the other two objections
2
that you raised, Mr. Adams, in the sentencing
3
memorandums, et cetera.
4
So as I, as I ....
5
All right.
So when I read your objection and
6
then I read the government's resp-- your objection in
7
the sentencing memorandum that you filed on
8
December 12th and then I read the government's
9
response, I saw that you had -- I thought very
10
wisely -- cited Ramirez v. United States, talking about
11
how it's a good idea if you, if you, if you can -- I
12
think the language used is sufficiently foreshadow, is
13
the language you talked about, --
14
MR. ADAMS:
Yeah.
15
THE COURT:
-- a possible change in the law.
16
So on the one hand, we've got the Hatley case,
17
61 F.4th 536 -- that's a Seventh Circuit case from this
18
year -- that sort of forecloses your argument right now
19
in the Seventh Circuit.
20
I take it by that footnote you're not arguing
21
with that; but if they change the law, you want to
22
preserve this objection for appeal.
23
Is that accurate?
24
MR. ADAMS:
That's accurate, Judge.
25
THE COURT:
Okay.
All right.
So I'm going to
LISA KNIGHT COSIMINI, RMR-CRR
Official Court Reporter -- U.S. District Court
lisa_cosimini@ilcd.uscourts.gov
App. 1a
Yes.
Appendix C
USA v. ALVIN BEASLEY, No. 20-20009 -- Sentencing Hearing (07/21/2023)
9
1
overrule the objection based on Hatley and find that
2
the, the arguments being raised about -- well, first
3
off, the fact that the armed robbery conviction in
4
Illinois can be a predicate offense for the, for the
5
Armed Career Criminal Act -- that's Klikno,
6
K-l-i-k-n-o, v. United States, 928 F.3d 539, a Seventh
7
Circuit case from 2019 -- that disposes of that part of
8
the, portion of the argument.
9
The other part, based on the Supreme Court's
10
decision in Wooden, that harkens me back to two earlier
11
situations involving the Supreme Court.
12
Booker situation where -- I don't know about you,
13
Mr. Adams, but I know Mr. Freres and I were all
14
thinking there is no way the Supreme Court is going to
15
get rid of the sentencing guidelines.
16
suddenly they're gone.
17
We had the
And then
MR. ADAMS:
I was a clerk at the time, so I
19
THE COURT:
Oh.
20
MR. ADAMS:
Yeah.
21
THE COURT:
Really?
22
MR. ADAMS:
Yes.
23
THE COURT:
That threw us all off.
24
MR. ADAMS:
Yeah.
25
THE COURT:
And that was immediate cha-- I
18
was --
LISA KNIGHT COSIMINI, RMR-CRR
Official Court Reporter -- U.S. District Court
lisa_cosimini@ilcd.uscourts.gov
App. 1a
Appendix C
USA v. ALVIN BEASLEY, No. 20-20009 -- Sentencing Hearing (07/21/2023)
1
10
mean, nobody would have predicted that.
2
And then Almendarez-Torres came out, the same
3
kind of thing.
4
then --
We're all thinking one direction, and
5
MR. ADAMS:
Totally opposite.
6
THE COURT:
-- it's a totally different thing.
7
And I -- there was a third case that kind of
8
threw all of us off.
9
MR. FRERES:
Alleyne.
10
THE COURT:
Or Apprendi.
11
MR. FRERES:
Yeah, Apprendi.
12
THE COURT:
Apprendi kind of threw us all off,
13
14
Help me out here.
so ....
I don't -- I mean, I read Wooden, and I think
15
they're going one direction.
But if they go a
16
different direction, I think you need to preserve that
17
for appeal.
So I understand.
18
As far as it stands right now, I'm going to
19
base my decision on the Hatley case; and in doing so,
20
I'm going to find that the current state of the law in
21
the Seventh Circuit is that separate occasions of prior
22
offenses do not need to be alleged in the indictment
23
and found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury as it
24
stands right now.
25
You, you agree that's where it stands -- it is
LISA KNIGHT COSIMINI, RMR-CRR
Official Court Reporter -- U.S. District Court
lisa_cosimini@ilcd.uscourts.gov
App. 1a
Appendix C
USA v. ALVIN BEASLEY, No. 20-20009 -- Sentencing Hearing (07/21/2023)
11
1
right now, correct?
2
MR. ADAMS:
3
But I have a second, second part to that.
4
THE COURT:
You want to talk about the DOJ --
5
MR. ADAMS:
Yes, Your Honor.
6
THE COURT:
I don't know what the Northern
7
District of Indiana is doing.
8
MR. FRERES:
Well, --
9
THE COURT:
Go ahead.
10
MR. FRERES:
-- I can short-circuit this.
11
DOJ took that position in Hatley actually.
Judge, yes.
So
12
the Hatley decision already baked that in the analysis.
13
DOJ said in Hatley, basically, that we need to do it
14
this way, and the Seventh Circuit rejected it.
15
there's -- it's already been kind of decided.
So
16
THE COURT:
Okay.
17
MR. ADAMS:
Well, I would object to that as
18
decided in the sense that DOJ is certainly not
19
enforcing any ACCA enhancement on 922(g) cases like
20
Mr. Beasley.
21
So my concern is we're going to have separate
22
sentences for similarly situated people, which the
23
sentencing guidelines were designed to prohibit.
24
THE COURT:
I, I -- okay.
25
go with what Hatley says now.
I'm just going to
I don't know what the
LISA KNIGHT COSIMINI, RMR-CRR
Official Court Reporter -- U.S. District Court
lisa_cosimini@ilcd.uscourts.gov
App. 1a
Appendix C
USA v. ALVIN BEASLEY, No. 20-20009 -- Sentencing Hearing (07/21/2023)
1
2
12
Northern District is -- of Indiana was doing.
When I looked around, I couldn't find any
3
other District Courts in the Seventh Circuit who have
4
been presented with a similar DOJ memo from a different
5
U.S. Attorney's Office.
6
from this district.
7
MR. FRERES:
I certainly haven't seen one
Well, Judge, just to be clear,
8
that is DOJ's official position.
9
been foreclosed by the Seventh Circuit, and Your Honor
10
is bound by that foreclosure.
11
But the position has
So whatever DOJ's position is at this point --
12
especially for you as a district judge -- in the wake
13
of the Hatley decision, it just doesn't matter.
14
THE COURT:
15
All right, so -- but those issues, as far as
16
17
18
Fair point.
Okay.
I'm concerned, are preserved for appeal.
Is that sufficient for you, Mr. -- do you want
us to do anything else, or is that good enough?
19
MR. ADAMS:
That's good enough.
Along with
20
the briefs, Judge, I think --
21
THE COURT:
Okay.
22
MR. ADAMS:
-- I've sufficiently preserved it.
23
THE COURT:
And just so the record is clear,
24
I've read all the briefs; and to the extent that
25
there's any issue on appeal, I'll say that all the
LISA KNIGHT COSIMINI, RMR-CRR
Official Court Reporter -- U.S. District Court
lisa_cosimini@ilcd.uscourts.gov
App. 1a
Appendix C
USA v. ALVIN BEASLEY, No. 20-20009 -- Sentencing Hearing (07/21/2023)
1
issues raised in both those briefs are, from -- at
2
least from my point of view, not that the Seventh
3
Circuit cares anything about what I say regarding
4
preserving issues.
5
Okay.
13
But I think they're all preserved.
All right, so with that being said,
6
then, I'm going to adopt the revised -- the second
7
revised presentence report, all of its findings and
8
paragraphs contained therein.
9
So preserving, Mr. Adams, all of your
10
objections you raised for appeal, to the extent that I
11
can help you out doing that, the applicable adjusted
12
offense level is 34.
13
history category VI.
14
15
The defendant's a criminal
He faces a guideline range of 262 to
327 months;
16
Supervised release of two to five years;
17
He's not eligible for probation;
18
A fine of 35,000 to $250,000;
19
Restitution's not applicable; and
20
A $100 special assessment.
21
Is that correct?
22
MR. FRERES:
Yes, Your Honor.
23
THE COURT:
Do you agree?
24
MR. ADAMS:
Yes, Judge.
25
THE COURT:
All right.
And statutorily --
LISA KNIGHT COSIMINI, RMR-CRR
Official Court Reporter -- U.S. District Court
lisa_cosimini@ilcd.uscourts.gov
App. 1a
Appendix C
2:20-cr-20009-CSB-EIL # 1
Filed: 02/05/20
SEALED
Page 1 of 1
FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
E-FILED
Wednesday, 05 February, 2020 02:31:26 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
FEBO 5 2020
CLERK OF THE COURT
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALVIN BEASLEY,
)
Case No. 20-20009
)
)
)
)
Title 18, United States Code,
Section 922(g)(1)
)
)
· Defendant.
INDICTMENT
COUNTl
(Possession of a Firearm by a Felon)
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:
On or about May 23, 2019, in Vermilion County, in the Central District of Illinois,
AL VIN BEASLEY,
defendant herein, knowing he had been previously convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, did knowingly possess, in and affecting
commerce, a firearm, that is, a Glock 9mm handgun bearing serial number TNR082.
In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1).
A TRUE BILL.
s/Foreperson
s/John C. Milhiser
FdREPJi~
(J
0
v• '
V
Jof?N C. MILHISER
United States Attorney
BDF
App. 1a
Appendix D
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.