Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ryan Mendoza, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefMay 2, 2026

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; IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RYAN MENDOZA,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Ryan R. Smith, Esquire

Counsel of Record

Ryan R. Smith Law Offices

310 Grant Street, Suite 820

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

rrs@ryanrsmithlaw.com

412-235-7080

412-863-7803 (Fax)

QUESTION PRESENTED

This case presents an acknowledged circuit split on an important and recurring question

of Fourth Amendment law. Specifically, whether a hotel guest maintains an objectively

reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in a room for which they

have paid for a 24-hour block of time, where the guest has not affirmatively checked out,

personal belongings remain in the room, and both hotel management and law

enforcement express subjective uncertainty as to whether the guest has vacated the

premises.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Ryan Mendoza, who was the Defendant-Appellant in the court below.

Respondent is the United States of America, which was the Plaintiff-Appellee in the

court below. There is no party with an interest to disclose pursuant to Rule 29(6).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

CONCLUSION

Page

Cases

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Page

11-12

20, 23

People v. Hardy, 77 A.D.3d 133, 907 N.Y.S.2d 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) 14

Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)

United States v.

Akin, 562 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1977)

Allen, 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1997)

Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)

Gill, 16 F. App'x 850 (10th Cir. 2001)

Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29 (4th Cir. 1997)

Lanier, 636 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2011)

Mendoza, No. 25-1154 (8d Cir. Jan. 8, 2026)

Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986)

Parizo, 514 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1975)

Ross, 964 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2020)

Washington, 573 F.3d 279 (6th Cir. 2009)

Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258 (E.D. Va. 1992)

Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. Const. amend. IV

Statutes:

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

11, 17, 22

13, 15-17

10, 18, 17-18

10, 18-14, 19-21

10, 16, 21-23

13-14

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)

Other Authorities:

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Society, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/society

Supreme Court Rule 29(6)

OPINIONS BELOW

1. United States v. Ryan Mendoza, No. 25-1154 (8d Cir. Jan. 8, 2026)

2. United States v. Ryan Mendoza, No. CR 2:21-cr-00503. (W.D. Pa.

June 2, 2024).

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, entered on

January 8, 2026, with an Order affirming the District Court’s decision on Appellant’s

Motion to Suppress. (Appendix, pages 10). The Memorandum Opinion and Order of

the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, entered on

June 2, 2024 (Appendix, Pages 12-31) denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §1254(1), which grants the

United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari all final

judgments of the courts of appeals. Jurisdiction is also conferred upon this Court by 28

U.S.C. §1651(a), which grants the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction to issue all

writs necessary or appropriate in aid of respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the

usages and principles of law.

The time for filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari began to run on January 8,

2026, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the

District Court's Opinion. On March 23, 2026, Justice Alito granted petitioner’s motion

for an extension of time to file the within petition. The time for filing a Petition for Writ

of Certiorari expires after May 8, 2026.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularity

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Ryan Mendoza checked into the Doubletree Hotel in Pittsburgh shortly before 1:00

a.m. on February 24, 2021, paying for a two-day stay. Approximately 37 hours later, well

before the expiration of that paid period, the hotel manager entered his room under the

guise of determining whether it had been vacated. The room plainly appeared occupied:

personal belongings remained, including clothing, food, a phone charger, and a backpack

in the closet. Rather than follow hotel policy requiring staff to secure and attempt to

return guest property, the manager opened the backpack and its contents, discovering

suspected narcotics. He later admitted this was a “very bad decision” and contrary to

policy, which required holding the items and contacting the guest.

Critically, the manager acknowledged that guests commonly believe they rent

rooms in 24-hour blocks and that Mr. Mendoza, who paid for two such periods, would

reasonably think he retained possession of the room until the early morning of February

26. He expressly agreed that Mr. Mendoza may have believed he still had the room at

the time of the entry and search. Despite this, police were summoned hours later. When

officers arrived, they questioned whether Mr. Mendoza had checked out and whether he

had retained an expectation of privacy in his room. While already inside the room and

actively searching, officers asked the manager if the guest had checked out; his response,

“T think so”, was equivocal, and he confirmed that Mr. Mendoza had not physically

checked out.

Notwithstanding these unresolved doubts, and despite clear indicia that the room

remained occupied and under the guest’s control, officers proceeded with a warrantless

search. Mr. Mendoza later returned to the hotel that evening with his room key and

receipt in his possession, further confirming his ongoing expectation of privacy. This case

squarely presents the question whether a hotel guest’s Fourth Amendment rights may

be extinguished based on a bright line check out status, despite prepaid occupancy,

retained belongings, and acknowledgement that some guests believe they rent rooms in

24-hour increments.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Court Should Resolve a Mature and Acknowledged Circuit Split

Regarding the "Pattern or Practice" Exception to Hotel Checkout Times.

The United States Courts of Appeals are irreconcilably divided on a recurring

question of Fourth Amendment law: whether a hotel guest’s objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy terminates strictly at the posted checkout time, or whether that

expectation may persist based on the "patterns and practices" of the hotel.

The "Pattern or Practice" Jurisdictions

The Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold that a guest may retain a

legitimate expectation of privacy after the formal checkout time if the hotel’s policies or

actions make such an expectation reasonable.

United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1997).

United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2011).

United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001).

United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986).

The “Bright-Line” Jurisdictions

Conversely, the Eleventh Circuit has expressly rejected this exception, favoring a

rigid rule that privacy interests expire the moment checkout passes. United States v.

Ross, 964 F.3d 1034, 1043 n.6 (11th Cir. 2020). By affirming the conviction here, the

Third Circuit has joined this "bright-line" camp, ignoring the specific facts of the hotel's

conduct.

This Case is an Ideal Vehicle to Resolve a Circuit Split on important

Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights.

The facts of this case provide a "textbook" example of why the circuit split matters.

Had this search occurred in the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, or Tenth Circuit, the manager’s

equivocal "I think so" and the officers' recorded hesitation regarding the "24-hour block"

rule and the manager’s admission that some guests believe they rent a room in 24-hour

blocks, would likely have resulted in suppression. In the Third Circuit, however, these

facts were rendered irrelevant by a rigid adherence to the clock. This Court should grant

certiorari to ensure that the Fourth Amendment does not provide varying levels of

protection based solely on geography.

The Patterns and Practices Jurisdictions

Under the Fourth Amendment, a hotel guest’s privacy interest in a hotel room is

the same as that of a tenant in a rented house. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490

(1964). But that interest dissipates once a guest has paid his bill and vacates the room.

The hotel then has the exclusive right to its possession. Abel v. United States, 362 U-S.

217, 241 (1960) emphasis added. Although, the Stoner and Abel, opinions set forth a

seemingly simple standard to apply, the Circuits have not consistently applied that

standard. Reading the two cases together, a hotel guest’s privacy terminates only when

he pays his bill, and then vacates the room. The fact that a hotel guest must pay his bill

and then vacate the room implies an affirmative act by the hotel guest in relinquishing

his privacy in the hotel room. That is exactly what happened in Abel. In holding that

items found by an FBI agent immediately after the petitioner paid his bill and vacated

his room this Court held that no warrant was required for the search of petitioner’s hotel

room because at that moment the hotel had exclusive right to its possession. Id. at 241.

The Circuits do not uniformly apply this standard.

The Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold that a guest may retain a

legitimate expectation of privacy after the formal checkout time if the hotel’s policies or

actions make such an expectation reasonable.

The Fourth Circuit has stated that a guest may have a legitimate expectation for

privacy even after his rental has terminated, if there is a pattern or practice which

would make that expectation reasonable. See United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31

(4th Cir. 1997), citing United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 263 (E.D. Va.

1992) (legitimate expectation of privacy since guest had continually paid his bill several

hours after the check-out time);and United States v. Qwens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10th

Cir. 1986) (legitimate expectation of privacy in a motel room after check-out time since

the guest continued to occupy the room and had paid for the room late on several

occasions).

The Sixth Circuit has held that a hotel's practices and communications with the guest

may modify the general rule. In United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 232 (6 Circuit

2011), the Court noted that "[T]he policies and practices of a hotel may result in the

extension past checkout time of a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.”

citing, United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United

States v. Gill, 16 F. App'x 850, 854 (10th Cir._2001); United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d

29, 31-32 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 149-50 (10th Cir.

1986); Larson, 760 F.2d at_855; United States v. Watson, 783 F. Supp. 258, 263 (B.D. Va.

1992); People v. Hardy, 77 A.D.3d 133, 907 N.Y.S.2d 244, 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). As

relevant here, these practices often take two forms: giving a guest permission to stay

until a later check-out time or generally acquiescing when a guest stays until a later

check-out time.

The Ninth Circuit has held that, as a general rule; (emphasis added) a hotel

guest's expectation of privacy expires at checkout time. See United States v. Dorais, 241

F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001). “However, the policies and practices of a hotel may result in

the extension past checkout time of defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The

existence and duration of that expectation period depend on the facts and circumstances

in each case”. Id.

The Tenth Circuit also examines a hotel guest’s privacy interest in his hotel room

based on his subjective understanding of the amount of time for which he believes he has

rented his room. In United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10 Cir. 1986), stating

that “All hotel guests cannot be expected to be familiar with the detailed internal policies

and bookkeeping procedures of the inns where they lodge. Even assuming that Owens

was renting on a day-to-day basis, his reasonable expectation of privacy extended past

check out time for at least the short period in question here”. Id.

The “Bright-Line” Jurisdictions

The Eleventh Circuit holds that at checkout time a hotel guest automatically loses

his Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in his hotel room. United States v. Ross,

964 F.3d 1034 (11 Cir. 2020). In Ross, the court reasoned, “At checkout time,

everything changes. At that point the housekeeping crew will need to—and has the

authority to—access the room to clean and prepare it for the next registered guest, often

on a very tight turnaround. A guest's doorhanger no longer bars entry. Accordingly, as

the Second Circuit has held, after checkout time, even if a guest "ha[s] not completely

vacated [his] room, the motel manager ha[s] the right to enter and examine the room as

if it had been relinquished," because the guest no longer has "sufficient control over the

premises to establish a right to privacy therein." (citations omitted); (holding that

[s]ince the record supports the district court's conclusion that the rental period ended at

the 1:00 [p.m.] check-out time rather than at 6:00 [p.m.] when an individual would be

billed for an additional day, the authorized representative of the hotel had the authority

to consent to the search of the room" after 1:00 p.m.). We hold, therefore, that a hotel

guest loses his reasonable expectation of privacy in his room following checkout time,

and that hotel management can validly consent to a search of the room at that point”.

Id. at 10438.

ARGUMENT

In Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84S. Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed. 2d 856 (1964), this

Court held that a guest in a hotel room enjoys the same expectation of privacy in his

hotel room as he does in his own house, stating, “No less than a tenant of a house, or the

occupant of a room in a boarding house, (citation omitted) a guest in a hotel room is

entitled constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id at 489.

Justice Stewart continued, “[t]hat protection would disappear if it were left to depend on

the unfettered discretion of an employee of the hotel”. Jd. However, the Court in Stoner

left open the question of exactly when a hotel guest’s expectation of privacy in his room

expires. That ambiguity has led to a long-standing split in the Circuit Courts. The

Eleventh Circuit has held that privacy interests in hotel rooms expire the moment

checkout passes. United States v. Ross, 964 F.3d 1034, 1043 n.6 (11th Cir. 2020).

Conversely, the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold that a guest may retain a

legitimate expectation of privacy after the formal checkout time if the hotel’s policies or

actions make such an expectation reasonable. United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 32

(4th Cir. 1997), United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2011), United States

v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001), United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150

(10th Cir. 1986).

In Kitchens supra, the 4** Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that a guest may

have a legitimate expectation of privacy even after his rental period has terminated, if

there is a pattern or practice which would make that expectation reasonable. Id. at 32.

Finding that there was no evidence of such a pattern or practice, specifically, that there

was no evidence in the record that the motel had a pattern or practice of allowing the

Kitchens family to stay past check out time, and that the manager testified that the

motel had a strict policy regarding check out, the Kitchens had no expectation of privacy

in the hotel room when the police entered it. Jd. In Ryan Mendoza’s case, the manager

was equivocal, at best, regarding whether the hotel had a strict policy regarding checkout time. In fact, the manager acknowledged that some people believe they rent a room

in twenty-four-hour blocks of time. Importantly, the police seemed troubled before

entering the room questioning the manager several times as to whether Mr. Mendoza

still occupied the room. The Police entered the room without a warrant, despite there

being an approximate five-hour delay between the manager’s entrance into Mr.

Mendoza’s room and his call to 911. When the manager entered Mr. Mendoza’s room it

was filled with Mr. Mendoza’s personal items including a backpack in the closet.

In Lanier, supra, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the following analysis of

a hotel guest’s expectation of privacy.

[The starting point is that a hotel guest has a periodic

right to occupy a room, not a permanent one. "Once a hotel

guest's rental period has expired or been lawfully

terminated, the guest does not have a _ legitimate

expectation of privacy in the hotel room or in any article

therein of which the hotel lawfully takes

possession." Citing United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695,

699 (6th Cir. 1997) Gnternal quotation omitted). "[A] hotel

guest's right to a room is limited to a predetermined period

of occupancy," and it is reasonable to presume as a general

matter "that hotel guests will check out at the designated

time and their right in the premises does not automatically

continue for some indefinite period." United States uv.

Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 285 (6th Cir. 2009).

Yet a hotel's practices and communications with the guest

may modify the general rule. "[T]he policies and practices

of a hotel may result in the extension past checkout time of

a defendant's reasonable expectation of

privacy."...(citations omitied) As relevant here, these

practices often take two forms: giving a guest permission

to stay until a later check-out time or generally acquiescing

when a guest stays until a later check-out time.]

United States v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2011),

Under the test set forth in Lanier, the hotel acquiesced in not taking an

affirmative step to notify that Mr. Mendoza’s personal belongings had been left

in his hotel room. In fact, quite the opposite happened. The hotel manager

rummaged through Mr. Mendoza’s backpack, rather than calling him and notify

him his belongings were still in the room pursuant to hotel policy. Importantly,

the manager and the police were all certain that Mr. Mendoza would return the

room, which he did. His ultimate return to the hotel is indicative of his subjective

belief that he still occupied the room he rented for two nights, beginning

February 23, 2021, at approximately 1:00 a.m.

In United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit

explicitly rejected the notion that a hotel guest’s Fourth Amendment protection expires

automatically at the posted checkout time. Instead, the court held that whether a guest

retains a reasonable expectation of privacy depends on a fact-specific inquiry into the

hotel’s actual practices and its communications with the guest. Applying this framework,

the court found that while the defendant’s privacy interest extended past the noon

checkout deadline, it expired at 12:30 p.m. because: (1) the hotel had provided a 10 a.m.

reminder of the noon deadline; (2) the defendant specifically informed staff he would

vacate by 12:30 p.m.; and (3) hotel policy, while lenient, viewed "thirty minutes" as the

standard limit of such leeway. Dorais at 1131.

Because the police search in Dorais did not occur until 12:40 p.m., ten minutes

after the guest's self-imposed extension and the hotel's customary grace period had

lapsed, the court concluded the defendant lacked standing. In contrast to the rigid,

temporal cutoff applied by the court below, Dorais establishes that the "reasonableness"

of a privacy expectation is not a fixed clock, but a contextual determination based on

whether the hotel has treated the guest as a trespasser or continued to recognize their

possession of the room. Id.

The decision below cannot be reconciled with United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124

(9th Cir. 2001), which rejects any categorical rule that a hotel guest’s Fourth

Amendment protection expires at the moment of checkout. Dorais holds that the

existence and duration of a guest’s reasonable expectation of privacy turn on a factspecific inquiry into hotel practices, communications, and whether the guest has in fact

relinquished possession. Jd. at 1128-80. Applying that framework, the Ninth Circuit

recognized that a hotel’s tolerance of brief overstays and its ordinary housekeeping

procedures may extend a guest’s expectation of privacy beyond the posted checkout time.

Id. at 1129-30. The Third Circuit acknowledged that no precedent in that court

establishes a bright-line cutoff and even recognized that a “grace period” may exist

depending on hotel practices and communications. Yet it effectively adopted the very

rigidity Dorais forbids by holding that petitioner lacked any objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy five hours after checkout, without engaging in the contextual

inquiry Dorais requires.

Under the proper Dorais analysis, petitioner retained a reasonable expectation of

privacy in his room at the time of the warrantless entry. He did not affirmatively check

out; he retained his keycards and receipt; and his personal belongings, including

luggage, remained in the room. The hotel’s own practices further undermine any claim

that possession immediately reverted at noon: guests were not required to check out at

the front desk, rooms were placed on an internal “due-out” list rather than immediately

treated as abandoned, and staff entries were undertaken as part of routine housekeeping

rather than unequivocal repossession. As in Dorais, these practices demonstrate that

checkout time functioned as an administrative benchmark, not an instantaneous

termination of a guest’s possessory and privacy interests. By treating the mere passage

of time as dispositive and disregarding these surrounding circumstances, the decision

below conflicts with Dorais and the settled principle that Fourth Amendment

reasonableness turns on objective expectations grounded in real-world practices, not a

strict adherence to a hotel’s internal policies and practices, to which most hotel guests

are not privy.

In United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10* Cir. 1986) the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals held that a motel guest retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his room

after his paid occupancy expired at noon on September 12. The issue in Owens was

whether Owens had abandoned that protection by remaining in his room past the noon

check-out time on the day of the search, September 12.

The Owens Court noted that “subtle distinctions of state landlord-tenant law cannot

control the paramount constitutional question of whether Owens still had a privacy

interest in his motel room when it was searched. Citing, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.

257, 266, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725 (1960). The Court continued, “The Fourth

Amendment protects people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d

576, 88S. Ct. 507 (1967). Justice Harlan's oft quoted concurring opinion in Katz thus

explained the standard:

The rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold

requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of

privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as

‘reasonable.' Jd._at 361.”

In the Owens case the Court found that Owens testified that he believed his $100

deposit had converted his status to that of a weekly rate tenant. That coupled with his

attempts to persuade the police not to enter his room further demonstrated that he held

a subjective expectation of privacy. Id.

Moreover, the Court continued, Owens' expectation appears to have been

eminently reasonable, stating

[The record reflects that a reasonable person in Owens' situation

might well have expected a weekly rental rate in exchange for a

$128.45 advance deposit. All motel guests cannot be expected to be

familiar with the detailed internal policies and bookkeeping

procedures of the inns where they lodge. (emphasis added) Even

assuming that Owens was renting on a day-to-day basis, his

reasonable expectation of privacy continued past check-out time

for at least the short period in question here. On September 9,

Owens had remained in his room past check-out time without

consequence. Some time after noon, on the 9th, the Inn merely had

inquired politely whether he planned to stay an extra day.

Eventually, after 3:00 p.m., he had paid in advance for continued

occupancy.

Thus Owens' presence in the room after noon on September 12,

together with his prior conduct, strongly suggested that he

intended to continue his stay. It would be surprising indeed if the

motel regularly authorized police entry and search of the room of

every guest who failed to comply strictly with the noon checkout

time requirement. Such a practice would quickly solve the problem

of late checkouts, for few if any guests would ever check in to a

motel thus operated. ]

The decision below is at odds with United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.

1986), which held that a hotel guest’s Fourth Amendment protection does not

automatically expire at checkout time. Applying Katz v. United States, Owens rejected

rigid reliance on contractual deadlines and instead required a fact-specific inquiry into

whether the guest maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy. On facts materially

analogous to those here, the Tenth Circuit concluded that even a post-checkout

occupancy can remain protected where the guest’s conduct and the hotel’s practices

reasonably suggest continued possession. By contrast, the Third Circuit treated checkout

time as effectively dispositive, holding that “five hours after checkout time, any

expectation of privacy ... was not objectively reasonable,” without engaging in the

contextual considerations that Owens deemed essential. (p.2).

Owens compels the opposite result on these facts. As the record reflects, hotels

including the one here do not treat checkout time as an immediate forfeiture of

occupancy; rather, they allow a period during which guests may depart, return, or

resolve billing, and they often rely on internal practices such as delayed key deactivation

and staff follow-up before reclaiming the room. Under Owens, those practices are critical

to the objective reasonableness inquiry, because “all motel guests cannot be expected to

be familiar with the detailed internal policies” governing checkout and billing. Owens,

782 F.2d at 151. By disregarding those realities and adopting a bright-line rule keyed to

the passage of time, the decision below conflicts with Owens and deepens an

acknowledged division among the circuits on whether and for how long a hotel guest

retains Fourth Amendment protection after checkout.

In United States v. Ross, 964 F.3d 1034, 2020 U.S. App. 21028 (11 Cir. 2020) the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal held that a hotel guest loses his reasonable expectation

of privacy in his room following checkout time, and that hotel management can validly

consent to a search of the room at that point. Jd. at 1043. Ross involved two separate

searches of Ross’s hotel room. The first search involved a protective sweep of his hotel

room soon after arriving at the hotel to arrest Ross on several outstanding warrants. The

Ross court found this first search did not violate Ross’s Fourth Amendment expectation

of privacy for reasons not pertinent to petitioner Mendoza’s argument. However, the

second search of Ross’s room addressed the issue of whether, after checkout time, a hotel

guest may still retain an expectation of privacy in his hotel room.

The Court in Ross, held that after checkout time a hotel guest loses his

expectation of privacy in his room reasoning as follows:

[W]ith one minor caveat explained below, that a short-term hotel

guest like Ross has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his room

after checkout time, and thus no standing to object to a room search

that police conduct with the consent of hotel management after

checkout time has passed. What, one might ask, is the magic of

checkout time? After all, even before then, during a hotel guest's

tenure, hotel employees may enter the guest's room—say, to make the

bed or restock toiletries. It's about control. Those sorts of fleeting, precheckout entries don't fundamentally compromise a_ guest's

reasonable expectation of privacy in his room because as long as the

guest is lawfully in the room, he has at least a qualified right to

exclude others, including hotel staff—see, eg., the "DO NOT

DISTURB" doorhanger. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Supreme

Court has held that hotel employees may not validly consent to a

search of an occupied hotel room without the guest's permission—

during his authorized tenancy, he has a right to privacy in the space

that the hotel cannot pierce. See, e.g., Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489-90.

At checkout time, everything changes. At that point the housekeeping

crew will need to—and has the authority to—access the room to clean

and prepare it for the next registered guest, often on a very tight

turnaround. A guest's doorhanger no longer bars entry. Accordingly,

as the Second Circuit has held, after checkout time, even if a guest

"ha[s] not completely vacated [his] room, the motel manager ha[s] the

right to enter and examine the room as if it had been relinquished,"

because the guest no longer has "sufficient control over the premises

to establish a right to privacy therein." United States v. Parizo, 514

F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1975); see also United States v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459,

464 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that "[s]ince the record supports the

district court's conclusion that the rental period ended at the 1:00

[p.m.] check-out time rather than at 6:00 [p.m.] when an individual

would be billed for an additional day, . . . the authorized

representative of the hotel had the authority to consent to the search

of the room" after 1:00 p.m.).]

United States v. Ross, 964 F.3 1034 (11) Cir. 2020)

In Petitioner’s case, the Third Circuit applied a rigid, bright-line rule that a hotel

guest’s expectation of privacy expires the moment checkout time passes. That approach

foreclosed any meaningful inquiry into whether Petitioner retained either a subjective or

objective expectation of privacy in the room, including whether he had notice of the

hotel’s checkout policy or a reasonable opportunity to review it. For example, there was

no consideration of whether checkout times were clearly communicated or whether the

guest was aware of them.

This reasoning conflicts with the established Fourth Amendment framework,

which asks whether the individual exhibited “an actual (subjective) expectation of

privacy” and whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as

reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) The concept of “society” in

this context refers not to a rigid rule tied to hotel policy, but to broader social norms and

expectations regarding privacy. See Merriam-Webster, Society, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/society (last visited Apr. 28, 2026) (defining “society” as a large,

organized group of people sharing common norms, laws, and customs).

This Court’s review is warranted to resolve a growing and consequential circuit

split concerning the scope of Fourth Amendment protections in the hotel context. Some

courts have adopted a fact-specific “patterns and practices” approach, recognizing that a

guest’s reasonable expectation of privacy may extend beyond formal checkout time based.

on hotel customs, notice, and the parties’ conduct. Others, including the Third Circuit,

impose a rigid bright-line rule that extinguishes all privacy interests the moment

checkout time passes, without regard to real-world practices or the totality of the

circumstances. This divergence undermines the uniform application of the Fourth

Amendment and departs from the flexible, societal-expectations framework articulated

in Katz v. United States. Because the question presented recurs frequently and carries

significant implications for privacy rights nationwide, this Court should grant the

petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve the split and restore a consistent, principled

standard.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Ryan R. Smith

Ryan R. Smith, Esq.

Counsel for Petitioner

310 Grant Street, Suite 820

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

(412) 235-7080

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