Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michael Ladre Dunbar, Petitioner v. United States

FILED

MAR 02 2026

IN THE

OFFICE OFCOURT

THE CLERK

SUPREME

H «K

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MTC.HART. T.ADRR DUNBAR

(Your Name)

— PETITIONER

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

U.S. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MICHAEL L. DUNBAR'

(Your Name)

FCI PHOENIX

37910 N. 45hth

Ave

(Address)

Phoenix Az 85086

(City, State, Zip Code)

(619) 755-4650 [jPower of Attorney Father Greg Ruffin]] J.

(Phone Number)

I

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

FIRST:

Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se under

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), extends to a first appeal

(direct appeal) as of right.

SECOND:

Can the Ninth Circuit apply lat^r enacted statutory formulation to

ap^ellant/petitioner (Mr.Dunbar's) trial rights and outcome thereby

depriving him of a defense that was available under governing law

at the time of tfial and creating a retroactive change in the

legal consequences of his conduct in violation of the Ex Post

Facto clause?

THIRD:

In a 1591 prosecution, when a defendant is explicitly notified he

need not defend against force, fraud, or coercion, does the

government have to prove the only one fact that triggers a

10 year mandatory minimum sentence and all punitive enhancers

recieved at the punishment stage?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPIONION BELOW

(APPENDIX A)

PARTIES INVOLVED, RELATED CASES, JURISDICTION PAGE.l

CONSTITUTIONAL and STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

PAGE.2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

PAGE.3

DECLARATION BY PETITIONER

PAGE.4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

PAGE.

5-|3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. Whether Faretta's right to self­

representation extends to direct appeal

B. The Ninth Circuits decision violates the

EX-POST FACTO Clause

C. Was Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right

to jury violated by the lower courts

affirmation of substantial sentence not

applying Supreme Court Precedents

CONCLUSION

PROOF OF SERVBCE

PAGE.lH-l^

PAGE.2.0-22.

PAGE.23'23

PAGE.30

PAGE. 31

INDEX TO APPENDICES

9th Ci' 0RDER 12/16/25; 9th Cir MANDATE 12/30/25

O^ERDenying Pro_.Se 10/11/23; En Bane Pro Se; 9th Clr ORDER

6/3/24

A?PCENTrXi?i°v^t Form; Sent.Summary Chart; related case #22-55848

dkt*entry 14 MEMO; Witness Prep 8/8/22[Val];Plea Offer[

ran

APPlEelel\icS’T^leria Maldonado] May 7, 2020 Statement Audio Recorded

to law enforcement

APPENDIX E @2

Allege Victim's Mother (Noriama Maldonado) statements on May 7, 2020

to Law enforcement Detective Adam Wells

prlof/of Intent/ Declarations; Petitioners Human Trafficking

Expert Report; Stand by Counsel Scott FactorEmails

.

APPENDIX T

OtoM) "to be be#fd

PicecH-

LIST OF PARTIES

PETITIONER:

Michael Ladre Dunbar

^RESPONDENTS:

United States Of America

LAST COURT THAT RULED ON MERITS: U.S. Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals

TRIAL/ DISTRICT COURT (D.C.): Southern District Of California

RELATED CASES

Civilx D.C. No.:21-cv-O2OOl-TWR-(KSC); 9th Cir. No.:22-55939

Habeaus Corpus: D.C. No.:22-cv-00875-TWR-(BGS); 9th Cir. No.:22-55848

[relevant 9th Cir. MEMO dkt.Entry#14, see APPENDIX C at 5 (forced

appointed appellate counsels ignored, ’’Dunbar is not precluded

from raising 28 U.S.C. unlawful detention 4th Amendment arguments

on direct appeal)]

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a

memorandum in petitioner’s case on?May 9, 2025 (APPENDIX A at 2).

Petitioner timely filed three notifications to the Circuit for a

rehearing and suggustion for en banc; petitioner’s counsel filed to

be relieved at this time. The Ninth Circuit granted her relieving and

petitioner had to submit petition limited to counsel's raised issued.

Petition for rehearing/ Suggustion for En banc was denied on

December 16, 2025 (APPENDIX A at. 3). A mandate was issued on

December 30, 2025 (APPENDIX A at. 4)

This court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

AMENDMENT V:

No person shall be held to answer for a infamous crime unless

on indictment of a grand jury, nor shall a person be deprived

liberty without ’due process’ of law.

AMENDMENT VI: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

to trial by an impartial jury of the district wherein the crime

shall have been committed, and be informed of the NATURE and the

CAUSE of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses

in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel for his

defense.

AMENDMENT XIV: No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law, nore deprive any person the equal

protection of the laws.

OTHER PROVISIONS

(2023) USSC Amendment 821 "Status PopLnts" 4Al.l(e):

Decreases the number of status points recieved by individuals who

committed their offense while under a criminal justice sentence.

USSG 2G1.3 cmt.n.3(B)(2014):

Advises courts to closely look to the facts in finding if the minors

voluntariness was compromised.

Intervening Arrest Ninth Circuit Precedent:

In United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)(En Banc)

(an arrest is commonly used as it is defined: "imprisonment”)

CASE LAWS:

•

FARETTA v. CALIFORNIA, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)(Right to Counsel/ Waiver)

z,

H

iQ

DOUGLAS v. CALIFORNIA, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)(First Appeal as of Right)

MCKASKLE v. WIGGINS, 465 U.S. 168 (1984)(stand by Counsel /Sixth Amendment

CALDER v. BULL, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798)(Ex Post Facto Principles)

RISE V. OREGON, 59 F.3d 1556,1562 (9th Cir. 1995)(later-Amended Law depriving defense)

ROUIE v. CITY OF COLUMBIA, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)(Judicial Expansion statutes/ Due Process)

20

APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466,120 S.Ct. 2348,147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)(Max. Sent)

ALLEYNE v. UNITED STATES, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.CT. 2151,186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013)(mandatory Min

ERLINGER v. UNITED STATES, 602 U.S. 821, 144 S.Ct. 1840, 219 L. Ed. 2d 451 (2024) (newest law)

£

^3

.

DECLARATION BY PETITIONER

Under Penalty of Perjury I declare on this 2nd day of March 2026 the following

and believe the following to be true:

1. It's well established an invalid indictment cannot be saved by a bill of

particulars (or oral theories), see Russell v. United States, 369 US 749,82

S.Ct 1038, 8 L.Ed.ed 240 (1962); also see United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d

462, 464 (9th Cir. 1979). If allowed in my case the role of the grand jury as

an intervenor will be circumvented. The prosection, through the court in my

case was allowed to second guess what actually happened within the grand

jury; with the help of the court filled in the gaps with assumed transpired

theories:

“The CovH" made suggustions to what the governments theory under COUNT 2

could be. "Wouldnt it be indicative —" or suggusted that there was

alleged pornography and that the purpose of travel was to create

videos... The prosecution agreed.

see In Limines August 16, 2022 (D.C. ECF. 312 at 59-61)

Thus, this is why there should have been a 'Statement of Facts'^Hnched

to the grand jury indictment informing me (petitioner) of the nature and

cause under my Sixth Amendment, see Hamling v. United States, US 418, 87,

117-18, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 41 L. Ed.2d 590 (1974).

2. My indictment charged 18 U.S.C 1591(a) [not subsection (b)(1),(b)(2), or

(c). No phrases of force, fraud, or coercion was included. Likewise, the

AUSA explicitly confirmed:

M5A-.MS MCGRATH: "YdurvHonor, just to clarify my comments, we are not attempting

to assert that this is ’ANY TYPE' of coercion because we have

not charged force, fraud, or coercion in Count 1.

see In Limines August 16, 2022 (D.C. ECF. 312 at 62)

The indictment also did not mention ' Adver-tiserneiTh' •

3. See (APPENDIX G at 3 Advertising Offense/Conduct), specified that in a

case of advertising, it is a defense as to the defendants knowledge of the

persons age.

4. In a case of no force, fraud, or coercion [the only conduct that triggers

1591 punishment listed under subsection 1591(b)(1) 15 year mandatory min;

"if the offense was not so affected by force, fraud, or coercion"(2020)

1591(b)(2) 10 year mandatory minimum. See (APPENDIX G at 12), because the

age of the person triggers the 10 mandatory minimum, such fact(knowledgemens rea) needs to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.

5. The Court conf irmed (Six daysjbefore trial Count 1:1591 carries a mens rea.

See (D.C. ECF.312 at 24); the AUSA confirmed explicitly their intent

provfl, under Count 1, that AS/ to prove in the dysjunctive knowledge or

disregard of the fact. See (D.C. ECF. 312 at 96).

6. My verdict form (APPENDIX C at 2) has no Special findings as to enhancers.

The enhancments all involve the nature: "Prohibited Sexual Conduct",

defined under USSG 2A3.1 Criminal Sexual Abuse, see 2241; also see 18 USC

2246 deinitions for sexual act, in relvant part: dealing with minors under

16 years of age. See 18 USC 3559(e) 'minor' to mean a person under 17.Lastly,

under USSG 2G1.3cmt.n.l the definitions are all under USSG2A3.1, which is

’plainly carrying a different set of elements verses 'commercial sex act' as

defined under 1591(e)(2020). I had a sixth amendment right to prepare a

defense against such accusation before imposition of sentence; I had a right

to jury findings. The enhancers don't apply and substantial punishment

is not justified toy fa^te -found toy Jury beyond a.

douvta

T miomel l-OVNS'iP- DECifiee THC fWWAJt? 12> Ef W

OF peTJTlw/xJ orJ THIS 2^ &AY1 of MAFOH

fage- 5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Warrantless Arrest:

Petitioner, Michael Ladre Dunbar, was arrested by San Diego Police

Department on May 7, 2020 at 1:15pm without a declaration of facts, a

complaint being filed, or a magistrates permission. No crime took place.

There was suspicion of human trafficking a minor. Mr.Dunbar was booked into

San Diego county jail after the investigation in reckless disregard of the

following facts discovered by San Diego District attorney investigator

Luis Pena; through the investigation (i.e. interviews of allege victim

[APPENDIX D] and her mother Noriama Maldonado [APPENDIX E]); there was

no evidence to support a prosecution, see Federal Complaint declarant's

(Luis Pena's) explicit statement in (APPENDIX F at 6):

"I looked at everything on his phone—all your guy's

conversations and kind of everything in that. And-I couldn't book him and keep him in state custody..."

r

■

(App F at 6)

Luis Pena factually did book petitioner in state custody without a

complaint being filed. No attorney was provided. No prompt proceeding was

provided, see San Diego County Jail Booking information (App F at 2), the

arresting agency was not the government but the state. There was no

government interes t\

a state employee, obtained a search warrant

with the sole purpose to, "examine" petitioner's phone to confirm or

disprove his involvement in the California penal code violations (not

governmnent statutes), see (App F at 4 of state search warrant). The

warrant purpose was a fishing expedition and once Mr.Pena disprove petitioner's

involvement (because he couldn't book him in state custody), petitioner

should have been set free. Instead the initial warrantless arrest on

May 7, 2020, that provided petitioner with no attorney, no proceedings, was

circumvented through a federal prosecution by the same prosecuting person

San Diego District Attorney personel,(Luis Pena) by filing of federal

complaint (D.C. ECFJ. , on May 11, 2020) in reckless disregard of the following;

Luis fena is a San Oi^0o County

As recorded An Append*'* F dt-Z.

is

to

During the investigation (on May 7, 2020), Ml explained to Luis Pena

how petitioner 'Michael' was in the picture, that is, that she had just

recently met him, lied to him claiming to be 21 years old, they met at her

job while she was working the drive through window at BurgerKing. see

(APPENDIX D at 2-3).

In talking about the advertisements, she explained it was her who

posted the ads. (App D at 4). "Michael had nothing to do with it"; she

explained she always saw it on social medias and knows girls who do it.

(App D at 7). Furthermore she showed law enforcement that she understood

that the perception of advertising can be percieved as prostitution, but

thats not what she does on ads (going on dates). (App D at 5).

She calls

what she does "escorting", see (Appendix D at 13).

In the stages of petitioners findings of a warrant sufficiency by a

magistrate judge, no judge considered the true facts known to Luis Pena.

Pena was focused on petitioners criminal history, see (APPENDIX D at 30).

When

continued to explain how much she was in her own control, the more

law enforcement disregarded the truths.

She explained how she had knowledge

of Mr.Dunbar trying to retrieve a job in the month of May. Pena would

interject petitioner doesn't work. (App D at 31). She explained her

knowledge that Mr.Dunbar had alot of good things going for himself. Mr.Pena

began bringing up petitioner's past history of arrest (without conviction­

proving ill-will). Finally,

explained she did not care about the past

or Mr.Dunbar's business but only her's. She asserted, he did not benefit off

her earnings or her situation. (App D at 33).

She not only explained petitioner did not benefit, but she stated

how much money she makes, how she set's her prices by the 'time'. She again

re-interated she looks at other girls ads (websites); she disagree's with

their prices and set's her own. She explained how people fly her out. This

information provided that she was experienced, see (App D at 34-35),

.

Mtwix O

54-35 shows. taw enforce nnerrt-’. MF

bdn« UW «hni+'J MF 5W

hstal on heH

-

Page •I'

Luis Pena recieved information that provided

was engaged in acts

of commercial sex (possibly) in her own control and before she met

Mr

Mr.Dunbar. He refused to release petitioner so he suggusted to * that he,*8

being nice to heT so that he can manipulate her. 4^ asserted petitioner,

did not manipulate her; in fact she

was the manipulator. (App D at 42);

she asserted no one has a stronghold over her (App,0 at 40). She even

explained how she was on a date with a guy and the guy tried to provide

her with drugs ("lines of coke/meth" [APPENDIX D at 45]), She told him ,"I

don't do that". Luis Pena put in his federal complaint an appearance that

petitioner provided drugs to

. 05 M to* Nd- 20-CpHOOT^ 6CF. I

about her prices and time stating,

Detective Jennifer questioned

"damn, girl you aint cheap",

see (App D at 46). Again

|

responded (confidently) "no I'm not",

explained and started clapping! !

on how she

can retrieve money from men without sexual exch^tyge. She states, she

understands why the men come to her and their reasons, but that s not her

reason, "I'm just here to get your money and to use you so you can leave."

see (APPENDIX D at 47)

To corrborate WBBt acts, detective Jennifer and Luis Pena also

interview Noriama Maldonado and Juan Diaz

• parents) in a seperate room.

see (APPENDIX E). :

ThC mother (Noriamaf(a government trial witness) provided on May 7,

2020 to law enforcement she maintained screenshot (brady exculpatory evid)

messages of ^|||^ arranging dates with adult men to meet with her at motel

rooms; this was in February 2020 (outside petitioner's indictment by grand

jury dates), see (APPENDIX E at 13-15). Noriama also confirmed her daughter

had moved out around this time, proving she was no runaway but had been

living on her own for months. Luis Pena mislead the magistrates as he had

corroborating information♦

_

—

tnadx -for

in arectos

disreaa rdbe. informed

rian¥

fmais+rzde^-fo

provvted on 5|1|20(/showed

expUdUj stah'ng twBAfi did not <give her advice. on 'The

fyje-8

Ms . Maldonado explained how in February she practica

was telling other

phone and came across her conduct. (App E at 2adult men that she was 21 years old. She explained that

stopped working

to her mother she uses

at ihop, and wanted to move out

websites” to 'promote and advancethats were she was getting money from.

(App E at 9). Noriama explained she had access to

money transactions

and saw amounts from $60.00 to $150.00 coming in. Also see (App E at 19-21)

Noriama explains she has access to transactions and can turn over this

evidence of accumalations of monies on W own accord (Brady evidence).

Juan Diaz (Noriama's boyfriend) was present during the interviews. He

confirmed WB username account looked up by detective Adam Wells called

"RicanDoll”. (App E at 18); he also confirmed WbSSB fake user social media

accounts. Mr.Diaz explained in observation of

accounts he observed her

engaged in 'promisicious activities' and provocative dancing. (App E at 16).

Nonetheless, detective Adam Wells asserted he would obtain this brady

evidence (i.e. screenshots of arranged dates, money transactions, user

accounts) as Noriama Maldonado

(App E at

MF

mother) confirmed, she has everything.

14-15) .

corroborated that in Febraury 2020 she was factually confronted

by her mother Noriama about prostitution. (APPENDIX D at 24-26). No monies

was found on Mr .Dunbar; and

explained all her monies was in a shoebox at

her residence. (App D at 27); she explained she used her money for her rent,

her child, clothes. In sum,

parents explained in February she

admitted her conducted; at the time of warrantless arrest of Mr.Dunbar, she

not only admitted her conduct but explained to law enforcement that she can't

be manipulated because she's a manipulator and manipulates men for their

money, see (APPENDIX D at 42). None of these facts known to Luis Pena went to

a magistrates judge for a independent decision for finding of probable cause.

A

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2. Federal Pretrial

The PSR #75 asserts petitioner was released; petitioner's liberty

was seized on May 7, 2020 and he has never been released back to his liberty

since. On May 11, 2020, Luis Pena filed a federal complaint after seeing he

could not prosecute petitioner for the initial decision to make a warrantless

arrest on May 7th. The federal complaint was in reckless disregard of the

true facts known to the arresting officer, misleading, and omitted relevant

information.

c FCF . 167.

seekD.C.

iu/, 168,, and 183 Requesting

J Evidentiary Hearings,

Petitioner had not recieved a counsel to represent him until

coming to federal

authorites MCC Sad Diego holding.. He did not waive the

indictment process as he sought a preliminary hearing. However, the record

shows appointed counsel Carlos Ruan attempted to waive petitioners grand jury

proceeding without his consent. The government filed an information, see

(D.C. ECF.14 filed June 5, 2020). Petitioner was suppose to have a

i

x

preliminary hearing set for May 19, 2020, but on the court's own motion, he

was precluded from making a record through such proceeding.

The court used Chief Judge order No.27 to stop proceeding due to COVID-19.

However, such order held no weight when Carlos Ruan attempted to waive the

preliminary hearing. The court set a immediate proceeding.

Carlos Ruan did

not appear on June 9, 2020 and petitioner relieve him after that proceeding.

Mr.Dunbar wanted motions filed to dismiss the case based on the true

facts as he known them to be. No attorney would in a compulsory process go

and obtain favorable witness (D.C. ECF. 191 Paloma Bringas), Burger King video

of drive thru where petitioner met WK (see Subpoena duces tecums filed by

petitioner D.C. ECF. 192). Eventually Mr.Dunbar proceeded pro se after seeing

no attorney would get private investigator, experts. He explained to the court

he felt force to proceed pro se. see June 23, 2022 proceed (D.C. ECF. 328 at.”/ B)e

civ

before trial petitioner furthermore explained he felt forced

to proceed pro se. see(D.C. ECF.312 at 84-85)

ftye.

The Faretta inquiry was held in July 2021 when allowing petitioner to

proceed pro se. Petitioner relinqished his pro se status and allow counsel

Carolyn Oliver to presume the role of lead couseion October 1, 2021 (D.C.

ECF.145). However shortly afterjpetitioner wrote a letter to Judge Sammartino

requesting to relieve Carolyn Oliver (D.C. ECF. 152) on November 29, 2021.

On December 10, 2021 Ms Oliver was relieved , Dunbar proceeded pro se without

another Faretta inquiry, and: stand by counsel Scott Pactor was appointed.

Before trial petitioner enagaged in plea negotiations. The government

expressly offered and represented, under Justice MunUll KufeSftf

an ImpftonmeH-

result in "no more than 78 months BOP imprisonment*1. The 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)

factors and case facts was considered by the prosecution and it’s supervisor's,

see (APPENDIX C at.8-12 PLEA). Stand by counsel informed Mr.Dunbar to stop

pleading and proceed to trial with assurance that petitioner would have his

experts on his defense presentation team, see (APPENDIX H at 15-Emails); also

see (D.C. ECF. 284-5 PageID:2728, filed September 1, 2022), there Mr.Dunbar

requested prior counsel, Sammer A. Zakhour, for clarity on facts justifying

under a 10 year mandatory minimum sentence.

V*'"'

Petitioner proceeded to trial for jury findings of facts to exactly

what's alleged in his indictment [hence, indictment doesn't contain a

declaration of facts], see (D.C. ECF. 221 PageID:2040 [point XViP, filed

July 14, 2022 "Ensure the Government Proves All Allegations In Indictment").

Petitioner specifically pointed out the grc^tL jury found a mens rea element as

to age of the person being trafficked, that is, that Mr.Dunbar had knowledge

and reckless disregarded the fact as to her age status, see Count 1 of the

indictment (D.C. ECF. 17). Under Count 2, the indictment alleged 'prostitution'

and "any" sexual activity (covering all [including illicit phrase]). The trial

court granted petitioner's request at in limines (D.C. ECF.312 at*?/

).

(1) ECF.221 PageID:2040 requested in the alternative to turn over grand

jury transcripts to see what the grand jury actually

heard.

In proceeding pro se to trial with the right to control the organization

of defense trial strategy and preparation, the district court exercise it s

supervisory powers and had stand by counel re-facilitate the avaliabilty of

defense experts, see June 23, 2022 proceeding (D.C. ECF.328 at 4). Dunbar

informed the court he and stand by had already arranged the avaliabilty of

experts for the August 8, 2022 trial set date with Judge Sammartino.

(D.C. ECF. 328 at 3).

Stand by counsels role was exceeded outside Mr.Dunbar's request.Addition­

ally

the district court ordered

Mr.Factor to facilitate petitioner's

Rule 17-Subpoena Duces Tecums materials, see August 19, 2022 (three days

before trial) proceeding (D.C. ECF. 3'13 at 10 granting material; (at 15) ordered

stand by to facilitate). Due to the lack of prior counsels disclosure of dis­

covery and the court's lack of order to compel the government to turn over

discovery (D.C. ECF. 24 never answered), Mr.Dunbar filed multiple discovery

motions. (APPENDIX H at 16-17) stand by counsel instructed

petitioner on filing

subpoena duces tecums; the court waited three days before trial to grant materials

Mr.Dunbar at trial did not recieve none of his planned rule 17 materials

or non of his defense experts appeared through the court's request of stand by

counsel to facilitate such aspects of defense. The materials and experts was

to be used by the defense to rebut the governments case and provide the jury

with evidence to consider during deliberations.

The trial court precluded petitioners defenses from going to the jury.

In 2020, 18 U.S.C. 2423(g) provided an affirmative defense to a defendant to

show he reasonably believed a person to have reached the age of 18; Mr.Dunbar

requested to show the jury he believed the person to have been 21 years of age.

see (APPENDIX

G at 11 2020 2423(g)). At the in limines the court (six days

before trial confirmed) count 1:18 U.S.C 1591(a) carried a mens rea as to age.

see (D.C. ECF. 312 at 24-25). The court explained this when precluding defense

under 'reasonable belief (D.C. ECF.209) and 18 U.S.C. 2423(g)(2020).

The grand jury presenter (AUSA KAtherine E.A. McGrath) affirmed intent

to prove at trial, therefore petitioner had a right to depend on this

explicit notification, see (D.C. ECF. 312 at 96)

■ 12.

the trial, the court exclude Mr.Dunbar from showing the jury

then trial exhibit Q (D.C. ECF. 299 at 215, Trial Day 2 cross-exam of^B).

The evidence excluded was

and Noriamas May 7, 2020 audio recorded

and corroborated admissions. At:in limines, petitioner made it clear to

the court he wanted stand by counsel to cross-exam the allege victim. This

was to ensure no prejudice and to ensure the entry of the evidence.

However, in an ambushing method', stand by counsel said Mr.Dunbar had to be

the one to cross-exam the allege victim and limited his role (duties) if

petitioner did not cross her and made him do it.

Nonetheless, the jury was instructed to not have to consider Mr.Dunbar

knowledge or recklessness as to her age charging 18 U.S.C. 1591(c).

On Trial Day 3 (at-the beginning), it was clear Mr.Dunbar did not review

any jury instructions. Stand by counsel was suppose to review the electronic

filed instructions with Mr.Dunbar the evening of trial Day 2. There was

ex-parte email communications between all parties but petitioner on the

change to the one fact that trigger's the 10 year mandatory minimum,

[the persons age], see (APPENDIX G at 12, San Diego Federal Defenders

t'2016] ifor Defenses in Sex Trafficking Cases).

In the In Limines proceeding the prosecution explicitly verified

there was no "jencks material". (D.C. ECF.312 at 76). The prosecution

[ASUA Katherine E.A. Mcgrathjwas the only witness to the grand jury? She

explicitly confirmed: (1) this case has no force, fraud, or coercion, see

(D.C. ECF.312 at 62). The ;indictment in this case did not charge 1591(b)(1)

or;(2). Petitioner did not need to defend against the conduct listed under

those subsection; likewise there was no planning to defending against the

base of fense 0iven at

see USSG 2G1.3(a) (2) (2021 Guidelines Manual)

/a pursuant to Rosales-Mireles v. United States 585 U.S. 138 S.Ct. 201 L.

'’Ed. 2d. 376, 2018 US LEXIS 3690 (2018) "Lower court erred not remanding

for resentencing due to miscalculation of federal sentencing Guideline;

ranges. Mr.Dunbar's substantial rights are affected undercthe plain error;

ft) see (APP0JDIX £ a.i 5)

The court explained petitioner can tell the jury,"in closing arguments

you could certainly tell jurors,, not only did you hear from the witness stand,

but there is also this piece of evidence that confirms and corroborates that

testimony." see (D.C. ECF.312 at 90). With this, petitioner offered himself

as a witness; he entered the witness stand in front of the jury. However,Wl+h“

Obct* petitioner’s request, stand by counsel interupted and requested a recess.

During the recess he persuaded Mr.Dunbar not to testify by asserting his trial

was doomed and again limited his role as stand by.counsel by stating what he's

not going to help with closing . Petitioner returned from the recess and did not

testify.

Petitioner wanted to enter to the jury the May 7, 2020 audio recorded

prior statements that in sum showed WB clapping about how she manipulates

men for money without sexual exchange, sets her own prices, and confirmed she

is a manipulator who can't be manipulated. It was unreasonable that stand by

counsel (a license attorney) would stop a pro se decision from testifying

when counsel knew petitioner trial

was to use the May 7 , 2020 party

admissions to persuade the jury in good faith.

Petitioner was found guilty from the prosecutions presentation of an

advertisement, exlusions of defense evidence, exlusion of defense theory^and

affirmative defense.

©cpttSSed 'a desire not to particpate in the trialj she

asserted she didn't remember what happened and that she lied about her age.

see (APPENDIX C at 6-7). 4^ still appeared three weeks later and testified

that Mr.Dunbar sold her a dream. However on cross-examination of the AUSA's

Human Trafficking Expert Chase Chiappino, it was discovered before the

proceeding he was provided a Article on 'Ending the Game', which created the

phrase selling the dream. He did not know where the phrase came from as ain

expert. seeCTnal Day 3 , ECf. 3X>

Petitioner was denied sentencing counsel (D.C. ECF. 361). The court

answered all post trial motions on sentencing day and imposed three enhancers.

On his first appeal he was prohibited from proceeding pro se to raise issues^

I s>ec Th'al Day <2

act.

ecf.

521-2^-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A. THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER FARETTA*S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION

EXTENDS TO DIRECT APPEAL:

1. Legal Relevant Background’*

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 818-834 (1975), established that

the Sixth Amendment includes a constitutional right to a criminal defendant

to proceed prose at trial. Grounded in the Sixth Amendment is one’s right

to make fundamental choices about one's defense. With intent to protect,

stand by counsel is provided to the pro se defendant. The Supreme Court

addressed the permissible role of stand by counsel and is instructive about

how court's can protect" appellate process while respecting a defendant's

choice to self-representation. see Mckaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).

Before Faretta, in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), it was

recognized that the Sixth Amendment guarantees assistance of counsel and the

Supreme Court understood a need for special protections for'first appeals'

as of right under the Sixth Amendment. This meant conclusion that a 'first'

appeal (direct/ interloctory) review appeal is an important stage, in the

criminal process for which [meaningful/ effective] counsel is necessary to

protect (Mr.Dunbar's) rights to a meaningful appeal.

The Douglas case did not squarely address if under the Sixth Amendment

'right to counsel', could an appellant waive counsel and proceed pro se

under faretta. The court did not address if a defendant has already proceeded

pro se could he continue on review (first appeal).

2. Practical Concerns By Appellant Could Have Been Addressed Without Out

Right Denying Appellant a Constitutional Right To Be Heard;

More recent Supreme Court rulings favor petitioner's standing, that is:

a defendant who proceeds pro se at trial should be allowed to proceed pro se

on his/her direct appeal; Faretta should continue, otherwise the lower court

violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Faretta proper

inquiry.

: Si!

In 2022, the Supreme Court in People v. Delgadillo 521 P.3d 360, 302

Cal. Rptr. 3d 153, (2022) explained on appellant's 'first' appeal Wende

procedures (review of the entire record) is applicable, see People v. Wende

25 Cal. 3d.436, 158 Cal. Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071. (1979); the Wende

procedure is a procedure compelled by the constitutional right to counsel

under the Fourteenth Amendment. Wendeat pp.439, 441, 158 Cal. Rptr. 839,600

P.2d 1071; see.Pennsylvannia v. Fineley 481 U.S. 551, 554-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990

95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987).

In Ander's v. California 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493

(1967)... counsel advised the court petitioner wished to file a pro se brief.

Id. at. pp. 739-740, 87 S. Ct. 1396. After petitioner's filed brief, the

court affirmed conviction; the U.S. Supremet Court reversed concluding that

the procedures was inadequate under the fourteenth Amendment, at p.741, 87

S. Ct. 1396 (ander's).

In this case [Ninth Circuit No. 23-50036], petitioner filed: Docket

Entries "Relieve Appointed Counsel;Leave to Proceed Pro Se" #23, 08/03/23;

"Request For Relief of Attorney and Time Extension" #26, 08/07/23; The motion

cited Circuit Rule 4-l(c), Ander's v. California, and U.S. v. Griffy(9th Cir.

1990). The court made petitioner (while he had an attorney) file a outline

of arguments in it's decision to allow him to proceed pro se or not. Peitioner

already carried an entire proceeding before the district court and was denied

counsel at the punishment stage as proof to proceed pro se.

see (D.C. ECF.361).

The Ninth Circuit cited Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528

U.S. 152, 163 (2000)(holding there is no constitutional right to self­

representation on appeal and explaining to ensure the "fair and effecient

administration of justice"), see (APPENDIX

at 2. );

Ito

but see United States v. Zuberi, LEXIS 26985 (9th Cir. Oct 16, 2025)

explaining under 9th Circuit Rule 4-l(d) ’’Self-Representation will not be

permitted in direct criminal appeals, except in the unusal case where the

court determines that allowing the defendant to proceed pro se is the best

interest of the defendant, and would not undermine a just orderly

resolution of the appeal”.

The Ninth Circuit recieve letters (declarations) from

appointed

counsels asserting, "I do not believe it is in his best interest for me

to continue as his counsel.” see (9th Cir. 23-50036, Dkt.Enty #33 atj3 by

Vicki Buchanan),

z

. Ninth Circuit Case No.23-50036, Dkt.Entry #54 was a declaration by

appellant asserting a right to be heard through Ander' s brief*, id at 3

(filed August 2?, 2024). The motion explained appellant's best interest on

direct appeal. Additionally, Court appointed counsel Gretchen Fusilier filed

Dkt.Entry #55 at 5 explaining that her representation "does not serve his

best interests”;-yor "interests".

Attorney Fusilier filed this September 2,

2024. The Ninth circuit request I voluntarily

dismiss my appeal if I dont

want to proceed with counsel. (Dkt.Entry #56)ORDER).

3. The Sixth Amendment Errors Below and The Core Rationales Favor In

Recognizing a Pro Se Right on Direct Appeal!

In this case, Farfetta emphasized petitioner's dignity and autonomy in

choosing the manner of defense. Mr.Dunbar filed multiple motions on

discovery for/ and in preperation of trial, see (D.C. ECF. 24"CompelODiscov-

ery; 107 Subpoenas Private CPS info; 191 "Deposition of Material Witness";

192 "Subpoena Duces Tecums-Rule 17"; 210 & 255 Request for Hearing on Rule 17

materials; 223 "Ex-Parte Request for Funds to Secure Human Trafficking Expert

82 "Motion to Dismiss (Raising-,Defenses).

This meaningful autonomy is no less valued on direct appeal (review),

t see AWNOIX I

A

where petitioner faces the lose of liberty from an adverse judgment. Put

simply, our justice system allowed Mr.Dunbar to proceed pro se and carry

criminal process proceedingsdadequately. Those proceedings comes with it

interloctory review (direct appeal), which Mr.Duhbar has proven to be able

to raise claims. It’s only fair he have his claims heard, raised, and answered

adequately, not swiped and procedurally barred through another person when

such person has declarized it was not in Mr.Dunbar's best interest for their

representation.

I

Pursuant to Douglas, petitioner's direct appeal is an important stage

of the criminal process. Counsel is constitutionally required* If counsel is

required under the sixth amendment (unless waived), the corresponding right

to waive presence of counsel and proceed prose follows from the same

reasoning that supports Faretta at trial! 'a competentddefendant's choice

to control his own defense should not be foreclosed merely because appeal

work is typically legalistic. Mr.Dunbar was competent at trial, mentally

efficient, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008)(recognizing states

may insist on representation at trial for certain defendant's lacking mental

capacity to conduct proceedings; Faretta is not absolute and that safeguards

exists (but for those mental deminished) to protect the integrity of the

process*

The district court allowed petitioner to proceed pro se without

holding another Faretta hearing [Faretta was held in July 2021; petitioner

allowed Carolyn1,Oliver to be Lead Counsel based on promises]. Immediately

petitioner observed counsel had no intent of putting him in a favorable

position, wrote a letter to Judge (D.C. ECF.IH"!') and requested a hearing to

have counsel relieved (D.C. ECF.

).

The court relieved counsel and had

petitioner proceed pro se.see (D.C. ECF. 154) j V4o fziXCHA, uJCtS

,

Stand by counsel Scott Factor was appointed. On June 23, 2022, i...

1 “The declarations by borVh~^pellabe, appointed counsels -supported

4he

Case”

of

15

Mr.Dunbar informed the district court (new trial judge-who never held a

Faretta inquiry with petitioner himself) that he felt "forced" to proceed

pro se due to prior attorney's lack of retrieving available exculpatory

(as described in the statement of facts) brady evidence, experts, and

private investigators, see (D.C. ECF. 328 at 7^8).

II

Eventhough petitioner was granted self-representation in the trial

court, that is, to control the organization of his defense, the court still

positioned stand by counsel in control of organizing

important evidence

of Mr.Dunbar's defense presentation. The court ordered stand by counsel to

facilitate petitioners experts avaliability after Mr.Dunbar explicitly

informed the court his experts were already 'facilitated' (avaliable) for

the August 8, 2022 trial date set with Judge Sammartino. see (D.C. ECF. 328

at 4). On August 19, 2022 (three days before trial), the court unreasonably

granted petitioner's Rule 17 [Subpoena Duces Tecums], eventhough petitioner

requested multiple hearings on the materials (under Nixon) long before three

days of trial. The court also had stand by counsel facilitate that material,

see (D.C. ECF.313 at 15). Under the district courts oral OfdttS to stand by

counsel (not pro se Mr.Dunbar), no experts or Rule 17 defense discovery

evidence was made avaliable for trial.

¥

4. This Cases Procedural Facts, The Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel under

Faretta, McKaskle v. Wiggins, Ander's, Delgadillo(2022), and other Conflict

Precedents Warrants Resolution?

Petitioner has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at every critical stage

of the criminal process; that should include the one (first) review interloctory stage [direct appeal]. Proceeding pro se, petitioner had a right to

have recoreded errors reviewed (i.e. Late Grant of Rule 17 material, Denial

to obtain favorable witness ECF.191 or obtain exculpatory impeachment material

ECF.107, denial of affirmative defense under (2020) 18 USC 2423(g) or ECF.209)^

[reasonable' belief 20.2^ of biinlH (Lircui-b Junj tn&hu&hoH Manv-sd 2022-3,

I dtandardls W Parting Tn*al

Vta. Hvle IT”, oee Suprme 0ovf±

:

It was Mr.Dunbar who was to control stand by counsel by requesting his

assistance. The court requested stand by counsel

to facilitate and thereby

ruin Mr.Dunbar’s trial presentation. Then the court removed stand by counsel

and denied petitioner anymore assistance, see (D.C. ECF.361).

This court should resolve whether the Sixth Amendment compels a right to

proceed pro se on direct (first appeal) especially when like in petitioner's

case, trial-proven Faretta waiver's are involved. It's necessary to explain

why a defendant's constitutional recognized right can be waived, self-repres­

entation accepted at trial, but doesn't extend at least in some form to one's

direct appeal (first appeal) . [AnderiS

See.

CiT. DK+-&Ary • 23 aV 3 J)

Conclusively, petitioner ask the Supreme Court to grant certiorari; his

due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are being

overlooked in the lower courts decision. Procedural rights are guranteed to

criminal defendants with respect to representation and precedents need to be

respected and consistent. The use of discretion by a court affects not only

Mr.Dunbar, but numerours defendants nationwide. [APPENDIX.^!. eMkcfy ] clearly

provides Mr.Dunbar requesting an opportunity to be heard (at minimum) through

an Ander's brief.

[APPENDIX

Bctt-ZjS,..order denying that request is just plainly

and blatantly a disregard to not provide petitioner with an opportunity for

possible relief and seal his fate.

No;court can ignore the principle from Gideon v. Wainwright, which in a

//

*

serious case, indigent defendant charged with a serious crime requires counsel

372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799 (1963). Under the 'equal protection

clause',which conferred to appointed counsels as well, the Douglas v. California

court showed a first appeal is a critical stage; just as sentencing is a

critical stage.see Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d

336 (1967). Appointed appellate counsel ignored my notice (letters) of the

district courts denial of request for counsel at that stage. (D.C. ECF.361).

Writ of Certiorari shall be granted to petitioner.

SW/o

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

B. THE COURT BELOW AFFIRMED CONVICTION AND SENTENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE

EXrPOST FACTO CLAUSE

1. Constitutional Law

See United States Constitution Article.1 subsection 9, clause 3

'The Ex Post Facto Clause', providing that "no state shall...pass any —

ex post facto law." (section 10). Ex Post facto laws include "every law

that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment, than the

law annexed to the crime when committed." Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423

(1987)(quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386(1798); also see

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)(retroactive enlargement

of criminal statutes by judicial construction violates due process/ ex post

facto principles).

A law violates the Ex Post Fact Clause "if it crimnalizes conduct

that was not a crime when it was committed, increases the punishment for

a crime beyond what it was at the time the act was committed, or (like

here) deprives a person of a defense available at the time (18 U.S.C 2423(g)

(2020)) the act was committed." Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir.

1995) .

2. Application to This Case:

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Southern District of California's

conviction and sentence in it's May 9, 2025 memorandum. (APPENDIX A atX

Thercburt cited and reasoned the new law of 18 U.S.C. 2423 affirmative

defense (2022) only applied to specific defendants based on the new law

language under subsection (i).

Petitioner requested the trial court to allow him to take on the

burden (not the government) and prove he reasonably believe the person he

was hanging out with at her apartment for three days was 21 years old and

not a minor. He made this request based on his indictment charge under

).

Count 2: 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) [2020]. The statute 2423, in 2020 provided an

affirmative defense in which it was on the defendant to take on the

burden of proof. The statute specifically gave instructions at that

time under subsections (f)(2), explaining commercial sex act to be the

nature in which a defendant to be charged. Under (2020) definition for

commercial sex act, it was defined under 1591(e). Petitioner was charged

with the substantial offense of commercial sex act in count 1.

Also at in limines, Mr.Dunbar explained the defense came after the

United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001) precedent.

Congress created the affirmative defense in 2003, in which since no reported

case has been able to raise the defense. Petitioner had the facts in

support for the defense in good faith. Those facts were:

1. A lied to petitioner and coroborated by her mother (Noriama Maldonado)

three other adult men claiming to be 21 years old.

had an apartment (with a new born child under her care; only adults

cap get apartments).

3. W was able to enter into a 21 adult night club (that sold alcohol)

Mpsee Trial Day 2 transcripts ECF.299 at^H

4..MfiM was able to register into a hotel (Arizona,Tempe Ramada Inn), see

Trial Defense ExhibitG

cc\ - 583-8H entered 1

5. There was no parent over WML; she testified she been living on her own

since^.January 2020; Governments trial EXH^JO satelite showed petitioner

met St in Arizona and entered her number in his phone on April 28, 2020.

2.

SCC Trial

ah 347-^

The district court excluded Defense audio evidence of party

admissions of

EMay *7,

and her mother Noriama Maldonado. Both of them made

statements to law enforcement that proved

was under her own control and

has been arranging dates with men through the internet since February 2020.

see Trial Day 2 ECF. 299 at 215, 278-81. The court precluded the jury from

viewing defense evidence that would support (2020) affirmative defense.

Nonetheless, petitioner requested the reasonable belief defense in

(D.C. ECF. 209) as well; the Ninth Circuit Jury instruction Manual for 2022

offered 20.24 reasonable belief defense. The district court did not provide

any defense theory for the jury to consider and then the Ninth Circuit used

the 2022 new law affirming conviction and sentence.

recie+e

co<^$e\ unreasonably diWtaftted recihrw K bKe

Shows any retSnSSle JuroY cuovid belike * peac/)

,

>

~

C m/rwC

NdT be 4

3. The Error .Effectsand The Ex Post Facto Doctrine Protection Principles:

This case presents a clear occasion for the court to reaffirm that

courts cannot bless retroactive laws that tend to deprive defenses or

increase punishment, whether by judicial construction or statute. The Ninth

circuit failed to apply ex post facto principles. Under Wende procedures,

or even through adequate appointed counsel or seeks relief for their client,

it should not have went unmised that the 2018 guidelines manual applies to

petitioner (not 2021 which set forth exact offense levels); or that the

(2020) 18 U.S;C. 2423(g) defense should have been vehemently argued for at

least 5 minutes at oral arguements on April 10, 2025. It's the lack of

defense that created a lack of supporting record for petitioner in this

case.

Petitioner is not a licensed counsel or a counsel at all, but the

information law enforcment recieved on the day of his warrantless arrest

should of set him free then. Such information was supported by screenshot

messages maintained by allege victims mother (Noriama). A direct appeal,

can't violate the ex post facto principles just to bury all cumalitive errors

in the lower courts actions in obtaining a conviction.

The Ex Post facto doctrine is offended

when the Ninth Circuit

judicially wrote a memorandum based on new law in disregard of the actual

law (2020 18 U.S.C. 2423(g)) that he argued for as a defense. The reviewing

court jS SuppOSC

protect

against a continuing unlawful punishment.

Petitioner had a right to have the jury hear evidence he believed in good­

faith supported his release from imprionment; he had a right for that same

defense to stand against un-notified enhancements (not considered by a jury).

The doctrine protects against fair notice and finality interests that

undergird the criminal law.

The jury did not consider one defense theory.

In a case that had no force, fraud or coercion (at the time of grand jury

passing)(affirmed by AUSA at in limines), the court was to ensure the govern­

ment proved I knew the persons age beyond a reasonable doubt.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

C. WHETHER THE LOWER COURTS ERRED IN VIOLATION OF A DEFENDANTS SIXTH

AMENDMENT RIGHT TO JURY BY INCREASING PUNISHMENT THROUGH JUDICIAL

FACT-FINDING AND NOT APPLYING PRINCIPLES OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS:

1. The Law of Apprendi, Alleyne, and it's Progenitor[s ]

"Any fact that raises the statutory 'maximum' must be submitted to a

jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (2000).

This rule was extented to: "any fact that increases a defendant's mandatory

'minimum' sentence must be submitted to‘a jury and found beyond a reasonable

doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. at.108 (2013).

The newest Supreme Court decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602

821, 144 S.Ct. 1840, 219 L. Ed. 2d 451 (2024) enforced the foundations

(reasoningfs]) behind Apprendi and Alleyne. The fifth and Sixth Amendments

requires an unanimous jury to make specific findings of facts [not a judge],

id at Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 835-36. Erlinger court stated, "this case is as

nearly on all FOURS with Apprendi and Alleyne as any we might imagine." see

Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 835.

In this case, petitioner faced no Force, Fraud, or Coercion conduct

that he needed to defend against by explicit notice[s]: (1) Petitioner's

indictment did not charge (like other defendant[s]) 1591(b)(1) or (2). The

AUSA explicitly stated Six Days before trial:

AUSA KATHRINE E.A. MCGRATH: Allow me to clarify my comments your honor

we are not attempting to assert any coercion

in this case, because we have not charged

force,fraud, or coercion.

motions in limines(D.C. ECF 312 at 62)

Transcripts

The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant gurantee right to defend

against punishment[s]. (APPENDIxCat

)provides the plea and "no more than

78 months imprisonment" considered under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors by the

government and it's supervisors. For multiple reasonfystemming from stand by

counsels gurantee^ of defense experts (APP |-| at

), petitioner exercised hiS

sixth amendment to jury findings of facts. The jury did not find FACTS 4t) SuppOf

lifetime

enhcmcements, or bc<Se offeose level.

2. The Three Enhancer[s] Raised Petitioner’s Statutory MINIMUM without

Jury Findings under Alleyne:

The ‘Justice Manual Rules For Prosecutors’ explains that pleas

cannot be offered without justification of facts. The plea provided the

government and it's supervisor attorney's reviewed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)

factors and facts and petitioner needed to be imprisoned "No More Than

78 Months in BOP custody", see (APPENDIX £at.^J-|2)»

Petitioner's verdict form provides the jury only found him guilty of

of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) and 18 U.S.C. 2423(a). Plain language of the USSG

reads: Base offense Level 24 under 2G1.3(a) (2018 guidelines Manual); !

however instead the district court used the 2021 guidline manual to

impose penalty which set forth multiple base offense levels, see

(APPENDIX £jat

> 2018 USSG Manual), i.

Nonetheless, using the 2021 guideline manual, because petitioner

was convicted for 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), 2G1.3(a)(3) applied, providing a

base offense level of 28, not 30 as the district court imposed asserting

petitioner was convicted of 18 U.S.C. 1591(b)(2). He was not, and the AUSA

explicit notification at in limines hearing provided Mr.Dunbar the

absolute right to not have to worry about defending against such penalty.

Petitioner's base offense level should have been 28.

Petitioner's criminal history category was scored at 4 total points.

With a CHC of 4 and OL of 28, Mr. Dunbar guidelines was 97-121 months. The

lower court excluded all requested defense theories from the jury, audio

evidence at sentencing (D.G». ECF;3(cS), sentencing counsel(D.C. ECF.361), and

all mitigation downward departure requests(i.e. voluntary programs engaged,

COVID-19 lockdowns/ waiver of hearings, 3B1.1). In sum, the guidelines did

even reach the 10 year minimumy+oe jury did no+ -Find C_°n verdlcHormQ ■foe,

4hcd -tngcjers 01

y€ar rninimvm punishmeriT. CaPF&NPIX &

‘fad’

Additionally, the United States Sentencing Commission eliminated the

two additional points the lower court added to petitioner's criminal

history for being on probation in a DUI case. The two points are

eliminated under USSC Amendment 821 'status points' 4Al.l(e). Furthermore,

the lower court counted petitioners PSR# 58 and PSR#6O as two seperate points.

The court found there was an intervening arrest. However, under Ninth Circuit

precedent United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011)(en banc)

the Ninth Circuit explained, Q' an arrest is commonly used as it is defined:

'the taking or detainment (of a person) in custody by authority of law...

imprisonment'"), id at 1041. Here, Mr. Dunbar in PSR#58,

. was ticketed as

a 'promise to appear*. He was never imprisoned. PSR#58 was added to the

Maricopa County docket sheet with case (PSR#60) almost a year later. It was

at that time petitioner was sentence, convicted all by the same judge, the

same day, for both PSR#58 and #60. There was no intervening arrest. Therefore

both criminal histories count as one total point and the two additional

point are eliminated, effectively making petitioner's CHC to equal 1 point,

category 1, with an offense level 28. His guidelines

QTC- tDOCCy

accurate with the governments plea, that is, 78-97 months imprisonment. The

Ninth Circuit erred not vacating sentence zwl KfrwndMg wifh

It's important to understand the cumalative errors calculating

petitioners offense level and criminal points before enhancer's;

it's

necessary under Booker decision, to see Mr. Dunbar's guidelines did not

"recommend" him to be imprisoned to 10 years based on facts. One major fact

is that the grand jury found no force, fraud , or coercion, verified by the

AUSA herself (the presentator) . A

CoodrhoA

1 Pditoner prayi -for relict by

and wmand ’wi-Hi

injArudions. Inactions aft ntcc^an^ udien moving papers

are not rebutted

no fadvai

2 The dfcfritfr coor4 owh+hsl -Hu. one. "fixcA- (jodifyinoj a 10 year

2.

The court imposed USSG 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)"unduly influence a minor to

engage in prohibited sexual conduct". The court adopted the PSR's recommend­

ation under

application note 3(B)"in which the participant is at least 10

years older than the minor —". The coupt did not accept none of the

May 7, 2020 admissions by Noriama and

that came with corroborating

screenshot text messeges -which showed

acted on her own accord before

meeting Mr.Dunbar, she lied to at least three other adult men (proving three

others reasonably believe her to be an adult), she was living on her own with

a child under her care (not homeless). She had a job, which is where she met

Mr.Dunbar, or the facts that she lied to Mr. Dunbar claiming to be 21 years

old, was able to rent hotel rooms in her true name. The presumption was

rebutted but not accepted.

I

Nothing in the record shows Mr.Dunbar intentionally induced fjjg'uuity DfWfo

of with alcohol^and she did dates based on these acts. She never testified that

she was under the influence going on dates. She explained she told Mr.Dunbar

she was 21 years old. They

oufat her apartment, she would be walking

around drinking a glass of"wine" (Trial Day 2 EOF. 299 a tasH). No

evidence providedihcrV she was so vulunerable than the avergae victim of

these types of cases.see

UnitelSWav. VtaschedeG Wf:3d U5Q

The court imposed another two point under USSG 2G1.3(b)(3)(B)"use of

computer... engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor" The court

adopted the PSR’s recommendation explaining that because Mr.Dunbar's phone

showed he posted an ad for her dn May 2, 2020 the enhancement applies. This

application is plainly wrong for one, because the only evidence (which was

not charged in the indictment) used to obtain conviction was 'one' ad. That

advertisement was from May 7, 2020,

double counting exist. The jury used

this evidence to convict. If you took the ad out the trial, the jury would

have no corroborating evidence.StC OftiWSUtS V- ^€,<2 f.3d %10j

• "The

Court Abused lU

<21^4- art

and

-2 To increase punishrnenT (Jornpufer

used! ,n SwRawtor

vntoUj

UM appli^.

#11

ocwi*dl

occwcaj

. &

Secondly, Prohibited Sexual Conduct is specifically defined under

2G1.3 guidelines, see Application Notes (1) explaining to the reader to see

USSG 2A3.1 Criminal Sexual Abuse guidelines. Also see "Commercial Sex Act,

defined under 18 U.S.C. 1591(e)(3). Petitioner is notified to defend against

commercial sex act, not prohibited sexual conduct. These have two different

element factors! For example

petitioners case specifically surrounds the

nature of Pimp and Prostitution, not personal sexual desires or gratifications

(as the district court strategically used these types of verbage in

applying enhancers without jury fact f indings).

3-

Third, under criminal sexual abuse and for purposes of 'Federal Law'

[ 18 USC 3559(e) "minor is person under age of 17"]; for the purpose of

USSG 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) "Sex Act" enhancement: the district court plainly erred

because under the guidelines there's specific instructions to the applicator

to review the definitions. Sex act is defined also under criminal sexual

abuse, that is, 18 USC 2246 definitions. There, 2246(d) reads the age limit to

be 16 years old, which reflects federal law under 3559(e).

Here, petitioner believed a girl to be 21 years old. At the time of

warrantless arrest (May 7, 2020) the girls mother Noriama confirmed three other

adult men also were lied to believingto be 21 years old. Peitioner met

this girl at her job while he was in the drive through as (as she testifed),

"a regular customer" (Trial Day 2 EOF. 299 at

). The AUSA explicitly

affirmed no force, fraud, or coercion in this case (2 years after the arrest).

The lifetime registration, enhancements, and sentence in totality is

unconstituional and has placed Mr.Dunbar in prison for over the 2nd degree

of a mandatory 15 year minimum; the government did not prove the one fact

that would mandate the 10 year. SEE PHOTO OF 2016 FEDERAL DEFENDERS BOOK

USSG 5A3.1 is an

8-Wes undtf subsec

below:

a Sentence ander 35^ pacers

''minor is «

"THE CONDITION OF THE VICTIM (relevant to this case based on

indictment) IMPACTS THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE, THE

GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE THE AGE OF THE VICTIM; and/or( when

indictment notice charges 1591 (b-)") WHETHER FORCE, FRAUD, OR

COERCION WAS EMPLOYED.see Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

881 (2014); Burrage v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 881 (2014).”

(APPENDIX G atj vFor Advertisement Conduct): provides "1591(c)

specifically excludes advertising offenses. This allows for the inference

that the government must prove the defendant had knowledge of the victim's

age. see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 580 (2006).

■'Section 1591 is nit a categorical crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See United

'States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485,499 (4th Cir. 2015), cert, denied sub nom., Ventura v. United States (Feb. 29,

2016) ("because § 1591(a) specifies that sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion may be committed

nonviolently-i.e., through fraudulent means-the offense does not qualify as a categorical crime of violence

under the force clause.”).

25.09.01

Sex Trafficking of Children or by Force, Fraud or Coercion (18 U.S.C. § 1591)

•“ *

Section 1591 proscribes a number of offenses, which can generally be broken down into four

categories: (1) advertising prostitution; (2) recruiting, enticing, harboring providing obtaining, maintaining,

patronizing, or soliciting prostitution; (3) benefitting from prostitution; and (4) obstructing the enforcement

of this law. The statute encompasses crimes involving minors and adults. What makes section 1591

complicated is that the offenses are based a combination of the actions of the defendant and the condition of

the victim. This means not only must the defendant (1 j advertise, (2) recruit, or (3) benefit from sex trafficking,

but must do so with a victim who is (1) under fourteen years of age, (2) between fourteen and seventeen years

old, or (3) was forced, defrauded, or coerced. Because the condition of the victim impacts the mandatory­

minimum sentence, the government must plead and prove the age of the victim and/or whether force, fraud

or coercion was employed. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Burrage v. United States,

134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). The “commission of a sex act or sexual contact” is not an element the offense. United

States v. Hornbuckle, 784 F.3d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 2015).

In^advertising cases (which the indictment omitted (variance))^ which here

_

/Il

the government presented in obtaining conviction [Gov t Trial EXH.J,

it is a defense that the defendant did not know the victim's ageJ

In sum, the lower court excluded petitioner from presenting a

defense, then the sentencing court imposed three enhancements that subjected

Mr.Dunbar to substantial harm (imprisonment and lifetime registration).

Supreme court precedents provided protections to the nation's defendants

excersizes their Sixth Amendment right to jury (not judge) on facts that can

justify punishment. Petitioner preys this court grants certiorari.

'see APPENDIX Cl otV 5

^see T«W- OW I , ecF-

H-arndan v. Rumsfeld, Sit

ah. 41'51.

Page,. 7!\

3. The Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Findings under Alleyne was not

Harmless, Invites Continuing Errors In Sentencing Schemes Among our

Nation calling for Supreme Court Retroactive Affirmation:

The three, enhancements imposed is plainly contrary to Mr.Dunbar's

Verdict Form.see (APPENDIXC! at. 2- )• The enhancer's were based on judge

found facts.

Such facts are functionally elements of a greater offense

[USSG 2A3.1 Criminal Sexual Abuse]; the Sixth Amendment requires that such

facts be properly notifed to Mr.Dunbar so he can (1) prepare and present a

defense, (2) submit special jury instructions, (3) ensure in his.trial facts

are found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155-56. Petition—,

er's guidelines substantially changes without the enhancers after correcting

his base offense level to 28 (with 2021 guidelines) or 24 (with (2018

guidelines manual); petitioners criminal history score needs to be corrected

to one point (no intervening arrest). His guideline would be without

enhancer's 78-97 months imprisonment (with 2021 Guidelines Manual). The

error is not harmless.

It's necessary to stop the inconsistent lower court disagreements

and outcomes across the nation. Some courts allow judge found facts to be

discretionary or enhancements get characterized as a sentencing discretion

rather than as elements. Justice Thomas made clear in his opinion:

"because mandatory minimum sentences increases the penalty for

a crime, ANY FACT that increases the mandatory minimum is an

Element * that must be submitted to the jury." Accordingly

HARRIS is overruled, see Alleyne (pp.111-17, 186 L.Ed.2d at 326-30)

Thus, petitioner's verdict form is silent on the enhancer's and his

guidelines substantially alter's, this case is the appropriate vehicle for

certiorari.

Cage. 30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that

this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the court

of appeals, vacate the judgment, and remand for proceedings consistent with

this court's forthcoming decision, or otherwise grant appropriate relief.

This case presents a clear occasion for the court to reaffirm that courts

cannot bless increases in punishment, whether by change in law,^statute,

or judicial construction. It's also necessary for the nation to have

understanding on i f i faretta continues on ones fijrst appeal^as of right,

especially when a defendant has proved to be competent. Lastly, It needs

clarity on the matter of a criminal defendant's defense

theory going to

the jury; in a case of no force, fraud, or coercion, a defendants defense

against the one fact should be submitted to the jury.

Petitioner preys this honorable court grant relief.