Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ronald Damone Jenkins, Jr. and Japree Lortez Brooks, Petitioners v. United States

Supreme Court briefApr 29, 2026

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No. 25In the

Supreme Court of the United States

RONALD DAMONE JENKINS, JR.,

AND JAPREE LORTEZ BROOKS,

Petitioners,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND MALIK TREVONTE NEWSOME,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Sicilia C. Englert

Law Office of

Sicilia C. Englert, LLC

1800 Diagonal Road,

Suite 600

Alexandria, VA 22314

Counsel for

Japree Lortez Brooks

Paul G. Beers

Counsel of Record

Glenn, Feldmann,

Darby & Goodlatte

111 Franklin Road, S.E.,

Suite 200

P. O. Box 2887

Roanoke, VA 24001

(540) 224-8000

pbeers@glennfeldmann.com

Counsel for

Ronald Damone Jenkins, Jr.

392377

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether The Court Of Appeals Erred By Holding The United States Met Its Burden

To Prove Petitioners Participated In An “Enterprise” Within The Meaning Of 18

U.S.C. § 1959(a) During The Relevant Periods Charged In Counts One And Four Of

The Second Superseding Indictment?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The Petitioners are Ronald Damone Jenkins, Jr., and Japree Lortez Brooks.

The Respondents are the United States of America and Malik Trevonte

Newsome.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

United States v. Jenkins, et al., No. 2:22-cr-00101, U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia. Judgment entered April 16, 2024, and April 18, 2024.

United States v. Jenkins, et al., Nos. 24-4220, No. 24-4221, No. 24-4236, U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered March 10, 2026.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented for Review ...................................................................................... i

Parties to the Proceeding .............................................................................................. ii

Statement of Related Cases ......................................................................................... iii

Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... iv

Table of Appendices ...................................................................................................... vi

Table of Authorities ..................................................................................................... vii

Citation to Opinion Below ............................................................................................. 1

Jurisdictional Statement ............................................................................................... 1

Statutory Provision ........................................................................................................ 2

Statement of the Case ................................................................................................... 2

Statement of Relevant Facts .............................................................................. 4

Brandon’s Murder in December 2017 ................................................................ 5

The December 17-19, 2017, Shootings in Franklin ........................................... 6

The December 18, 2017, Shooting of Cynthia Barnes’s House ......................... 6

The Shooting of Shuntrel McNear on February 8, 2019 ................................... 8

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals .................................................................. 9

Argument ..................................................................................................................... 10

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THE UNITED STATES

MET ITS BURDEN TO PROVE PETITIONERS PARTICIPATED IN AN

“ENTERPRISE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) DURING

THE RELEVANT PERIODS CHARGED IN COUNTS ONE AND FOUR OF

THE SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT ....................................................... 10

Introduction ....................................................................................................... 10

Insufficient Evidence Supports The Convictions Of Jenkins And

Brooks On Count One For VICAR Conspiracy To Commit Murder

Between December 17 and December 19, 2017 .................................... 10

Brandon’s advance of funds to facilitate his brothers’ drug

dealing did not establish a VICAR enterprise ............................ 19

Defendants’ purchase of drugs from the same supplier was

not evidence of enterprise ........................................................... 20

Petitioners and others did not share and jointly store at the

Railroad firearms used to protect their distributive

ventures ....................................................................................... 20

Brandon’s coercive control and extraction of tithes from 00

Gang members did not support the Court of Appeals’s

conclusion that Brandon’s crew was an enterprise ................... 21

Insufficient Evidence Supports Jenkins’s Conviction On Count

Four ......................................................................................................... 23

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 25

Appendix

Amended Opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals

For The Fourth Circuit

filed March 12, 2026 ............................................................................... 1a

Transcript of the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

Norfolk Division,

dated December 6, 2023 ....................................................................... 35a

Judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals

For The Fourth Circuit

filed March 10, 2026 ............................................................................. 58a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Boyle v. United States,

556 U.S. 938 (2009) ........................................................10, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22

United States v. Devine,

40 F.4th 139 (4th Cir. 2022) ....................................................................... 12, 13

United States v. Fiel,

35 F.3d 997 (4th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................... 11, 12

United States v. Jenkins,

169 F.4th 497 (4th Cir. 2026) ............................................................................. 1

United States v. Mathis,

932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................. 12

United States v. Pinson,

860 F.3d 152 (4th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................. 22

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ...................................................................................................... 3

18 U.S.C. § 924 ............................................................................................................... 3

18 U.S.C. § 1512 ............................................................................................................. 3

18 U.S.C. § 1959 ............................................................2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, 25

18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) ...................................................................................................... 12

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ............................................................................................................. 1

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ............................................................................................................. 2

vii

Rules and Regulations

Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .................................................. 11

viii

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

Filed with this Petition is the published Opinion of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dated March 10, 2026, as amended March 12, 2026

(“Opinion”). (Pet. App., 1a-34a), United States v. Jenkins, et al., No. 24-4220, No. 244221, No. 24-4236, 169 F.4th 497 (4th Cir. 2026). The District Court’s unreported

bench ruling on Defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the

Government’s case-in-chief at trial on December 6, 2023. (Pet. App. 35a-57a.)

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia assumed

subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The district court entered

a final Judgment on April 16, 2024 (C.A.J.A.1881-1887), sentencing Petitioner Ronald

Damone Jenkins, Jr. (“Jenkins”) to 300 months in prison followed by three years of

supervised release. The district court then entered a final judgment on April 18, 2024,

sentencing Petitioner Japree Lortez Brooks (“Brooks”) to 420 months in prison

followed by five years of supervised release. (C.A.J.A.2022-2028.)

Jenkins filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit (C.A.J.A.1797), as did Brooks. (C.A.J.A.2029-2030.)

The

appellate court had jurisdiction to hear these consolidated appeals pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

On March 10, 2026, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

issued its Opinion, as amended on March 12, 2026, affirming Jenkins’s several counts

of conviction, including Counts One and Four. The Court of Appeals vacated Brooks’s

convictions on two counts, but affirmed his conspiracy conviction on Count One.

The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION

18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5)

(a) Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a

promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an

enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining

entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise

engaged in racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults

with a dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily

injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against any

individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, or

attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished—

(5) for attempting or conspiring to commit murder or

kidnapping, by imprisonment for not more than ten years

or a fine under this title, or both; . . . .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners were tried together by a jury in the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia (Norfolk), having been named in a multidefendant Second Superseding Indictment dated September 27, 2023. (C.A.J.A.8199.) The grand jury alleged that the two men, along with others, participated in a

racketeering “enterprise” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (“VICAR”). The enterprise

planned to kill members of the “00 Gang,” a Tidewater, Virginia set of the Crips, the

grand jury charged.

Count One of the Second Superseding Indictment charged Jenkins, Brooks,

and others with VICAR conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering during

the closed period between December 17 and 19, 2017 in violation of (18 U.S.C. §

1959(a)(5). In Count Two, Brooks was charged with VICAR attempted murder in aid

of racketeering on December 18, 2017 (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5)). In Count Three, the

grand jury charged Brooks with discharging a firearm during a crime of violence on

December 18, 2017. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

Counts Four, Five, and Six were interconnected charges directed at Jenkins.

In Count Four the grand jury charged Jenkins with attempted murder in aid of

racketeering of Shuntrel McNear on February 8, 2019, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1959(a)(5).

In Count Five Jenkins was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with

discharging a firearm during that violent crime on February 8, 2019, while Count Six

charged him with unlawful possession of ammunition on the same date as a

previously convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2).

Counts Seven and Eight were obstruction of justice charges against Brooks and

another defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Count Seven charged Brooks with

witness tampering and obstruction of an official proceeding on May 18, 2023. Count

Eight charged Brooks with witness tampering and obstruction of an official

proceeding on September 12, 2023.

Following a jury trial, Jenkins was convicted on Counts One, Four and Six and

acquitted of the Section 924(c) charge in Count Five. Brooks was convicted on Counts

One, Two, Three, Seven and Eight. (C.A.J.A.1791-1793; C.A.J.A.1794-1795.) Jenkins

was sentenced to 300 months in prison and Brooks to 420 months. (C.A.J.A.1882;

C.A.J.A.2023.)

In this Petition, Jenkins and Brooks challenge their Count One VICAR

conspiracy convictions. Jenkins also takes issue here with his Count Four conviction

for attempted VICAR murder.

Statement of Relevant Facts1

Brandon Leonard (“Brandon”) led a local gang known as the “Low Lives” in the

small City of Franklin in eastern Virginia. The Low Lives was not affiliated with any

national gang such as the east coast United Bloods Nation (“UBN” or “the Bloods”) or

the Bloods’ traditional rival, the Los Angeles-based Crips. (C.A.J.A.1153.)

The Low Lives earned money by distributing drugs in and around Franklin

until Brandon went to state prison in 2015. While he was incarcerated, Brandon

became a Blood, eventually earning the relatively exalted rank of “Big Homie.” The

1 In keeping with controlling legal standards, the facts here are summarized in the

light most favorable to the United States as the prevailing party at trial and on

appeal.

Low Lives, meanwhile, faded to the vanishing point in Brandon’s absence.

(C.A.J.A.1160.)

Upon his release from incarceration, Brandon promptly returned to Franklin

and resumed his vocation as a retail-level distributor of controlled substances.

(C.A.J.A.1167-1168.) He recruited several relatives and friends to join a set of the

Bloods known as “the Brim.”

Brandon and his brother Edward Leonard (“Edward” or “EJ”) lived in a rented

Franklin residence on Railroad Avenue commonly called the “Railroad.” Jenkins,

Brooks, and other defendants frequently visited the Leonard brothers at the Railroad.

(C.A.J.A.1162.)

Brandon’s Murder in December 2017

In December 2017 Brandon, known around Franklin as “Lil B,” got into an

altercation over a firearm sale in a “shot house” (an after-hours drinking

establishment) with a member of the 00 Gang. This dispute climaxed with Brandon

drawing and brandishing a pistol directly at the 00 Gang member, whose street name

is “Tooth.” The standoff ended abruptly with no shots fired by Brandon or Tooth.

Within 48 hours of his shot house run-in with Tooth, Brandon was dead. A

search party found Brandon’s bullet-riddled body in a secluded ditch on December 18,

2017. Edward and others close to the deceased “Big Homie” quickly surmised Tooth

and his fellow 00 Gang members killed Brandon. (C.A.J.A.1189.)

The December 17-19, 2017, Shootings in Franklin

Immediately after the discovery of Brandon’s body, Edward, Jenkins, and

others close to the decedent planned to avenge his death. On December 18 and again

on December 19, 2017, Edward and Brooks carried out drive-by shootings in

Franklin.

Their targets were residences of 00 Gang members and their family

members. (C.A.J.A.1192-1994.) The government argued at trial that these shootings

were more than property crimes. According to the government, the shootings by

Brandon’s family and friends on December 18 and 19, 2017, were manifestations of a

premediated and malicious plan to murder members of the 00 Gang in reprisal for

Brandon’s death. (C.A.J.A.1621-1622.)

The December 18, 2017 Shooting of Cynthia Barnes’s House

Edward testified that after Brandon was found dead, people gathered at the

Railroad and talked about his murder. A consensus congealed that “Tooth” and

“Trell” killed Brandon. Mourners talked about how best to retaliate. (C.A.J.A.1189.)

Edward testified in general terms about his belief that murder was on everybody’s

mind, but he did not specify any statements made by anyone present. (C.A.J.A.1190.)

The decedent’s friends left Railroad to search for Tooth and Trell, but could not

find them. (C.A.J.A.1190.) They then stopped at Monta’s house. Edward was in a

car with his cousin “Sweets.” Brooks was in the driveway. Edward recalled that

Brooks carried a .45 pistol. An AR-15 rifle rested in the passenger’s seat of Brooks’s

car.

(C.A.J.A.1190-1991; C.A.J.A.1315-1316.)

After talking to Monta for

approximately five minutes, they left to continue their search. (C.A.J.A.1191.) At

that time, Edward also had an AR-15. (C.A.J.A.1192.)

Edward again drove in the same car with Sweets, while Brooks drove alone

directly behind them. (C.A.J.A.1192.) Not long after leaving Monta’s house, Edward

heard three to four rifle shots. (C.A.J.A.1193.) Edward looked back and saw gunfire.

(C.A.J.A.1193.)2

According to Edward, it was well-known that Tooth’s mother, Cynthia Barnes,

lived five or six houses from Monta’s house. (C.A.J.A.1193.) Tooth and his brother

had stayed at that house at some point, but Edward did not specify when they last

stayed there. (C.A.J.A.1194.) After the shots, they kept driving and later returned to

Railroad. (C.A.J.A.1194.) Edward asked Brooks, “Hey, you shot that jank up?” and

Brooks said, “Yeah, I shot that jank up.” (C.A.J.A.1194.)

Cynthia Barnes lived alone in the single family house at 2200 South Street, in

Franklin Virginia. (C.A.J.A.569.) She testified that on December 18, 2017, she was

2 On cross examination, Edward admitted that his statements to law enforcement

officers were inconsistent regarding the South Street shooting. At first, Edward said

he did not know who shot up Tooth’s mother’s house. (C.A.J.A.1272.) In November

2020, Edward claimed that Brooks said he shot into the house, but Edward did not

mention himself seeing gunfire. (C.A.J.A.1258.) Edward also said that he did not see

Brooks with a rifle on the night the house was shot up. (C.A.J.A.1261.) Subsequently,

Edward changed his statement to say that he saw a rifle in Brooks’ car and saw

Brooks shoot into the house. (C.A.J.A.1258-1259, C.A.J.A.1261.)

in bed asleep when, at approximately 3:00 a.m., she woke to the sound of gunshots.

(C.A.J.A.569-570.) One bullet hit her house above the front door; a second came into

her house above her bedroom window, hit the ceiling fan, and ricocheted off the wall

(C.A.J.A.570); and a third hit over her attic.

(C.A.J.A.570.) Subsequently, law

enforcement officers recovered three 5.56 cartridge casings near the house—two from

the sidewalk across the street from the residence, and one approximately 50 yards

away (C.A.J.A.553; C.A.J.A.565.)

The Shooting of Shuntrel McNear on February 8, 2019

On February 8, 2019 (Brandon’s birthday), Fourteen months after the shooting

into Cynthia Barnes’s house described above, 00 Gang member Shuntrel McNear

(“McNear”) posted on his Instagram account a sarcastic video singing “Happy

Birthday” to Brandon. McNear also posted on Instagram a photo of a scoreboard

which indicated a score of “0-1,” along with a message “Ain’t nobody from 00 got hit .

. . but lil b did[.] . . . Check the scoreboard 0-1.” (C.A.J.A.1214-1215.) These internet

taunts prompted Edward and Jenkins to attack McNear later in the evening on that

date, February 8, 2019.

Edward and Jenkins were at a store together in Franklin on the night of

February 8, 2019, when they spotted McNear across the street. After retrieving

firearms, they drove to Franklin’s Wilson Street in Jenkins’ car. After parking,

Jenkins and Edward discharged multiple rounds into another parked car occupied by

McNear and a companion. McNear, struck by at least two bullets, survived after

undergoing surgeries. (C.A.J.A.1476.)

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Jenkins and

Brooks challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions on

Count One for VICAR conspiracy to commit murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5).

Specifically, Petitioners posited that the “Franklin Enterprise” alleged in the Second

Superseding Indictment, which prosecutors renamed “Brandon’s Crew” at trial, did

not meet the statutory requirements for a qualifying “enterprise” within the meaning

of the VICAR statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). Jenkins also assailed his conviction on

Count Four for attempted VICAR murder in violation of the same statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1959(a)(5).

A three-judge panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit affirmed Petitioners’ VICAR conspiracy conviction on Count One as well as

Jenkins’s VICAR attempted murder conviction on Count Four. (Pet. 16a, 20a.)

ARGUMENT

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THE UNITED STATES

MET ITS BURDEN TO PROVE PETITIONERS PARTICIPATED IN AN

“ENTERPRISE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) DURING

THE RELEVANT PERIODS CHARGED IN COUNTS ONE AND FOUR OF

THE SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT.

Introduction

The United States Supreme Court should grant this Petition because the

Opinion misapplies the “enterprise” element of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) and deviates

markedly from the controlling decision on enterprise liability in the VICAR context,

Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009).

Insufficient Evidence Supports The Convictions Of Jenkins And Brooks

On Count One For VICAR Conspiracy To Commit Murder Between

December 17 and December 19, 2017.

Count One of the Second Superseding Indictment charged Jenkins, Brooks,

and others under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) with participating in a VICAR conspiracy

over the three-day period between December 17 and 19, 2017, in Franklin, Virginia.

(C.A.J.A.81-85.) According to the grand jury, defendants were “. . . members and

associates of the Franklin Enterprise.” (C.A.J.A.82.) While the Franklin Enterprise

was not affiliated or associated with the UBN, it followed or copied many of the

Bloods’ practices and “rules,” the grand jury charged in paragraph 3 of the Second

Superseding Indictment. (C.A.J.A.82.)

The spoke of the VICAR conspiracy alleged in Count One was Brandon, a

Bloods “Big Homie,” who resided in Franklin with his brother, Edward, a fellow Blood

turned star prosecution witness.

The Leonard brothers lived in a residence on

Railroad Avenue commonly called simply the “Railroad.”

Using the Railroad as a base of operations, “Enterprise members and

associates distributed narcotics in Franklin, Virginia with [Brandon’s] permission,”

the grand jury alleged in paragraph 6 of the Second Superseding Indictment.

(C.A.J.A.83.)

In the immediate aftermath of Brandon’s death by gunshot in

December 2017, Jenkins and other members of the Franklin Enterprise, or

“Brandon’s crew,” purportedly conspired to murder members of the 00 Gang.

Brandon’s family believed 00 Gang had murdered him. (C.A.J.A.85.)

To withstand Petitioners’ Rule 29 motion at trial on Count One, the

government had to present evidence sufficient for rational jurors to find beyond any

reasonable doubt that (1) an “enterprise” existed within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §

1959(a); (2) the qualifying enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity; (3)

Jenkins and Brooks had a “position” in the alleged enterprise; (4) Jenkins and Brooks

conspired with the enterprise to murder members or associates of the Crips-affiliated

00 Gang; and (5) each Petitioners’ “general purpose in doing so was to maintain or

increase his position in the enterprise.” See United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1003

(4th Cir. 1994).

Insufficient evidence exists that the “Franklin Enterprise” alleged in the

Second Superseding Indictment, renamed “Brandon’s crew” at trial, met the

requirements for an “enterprise” within the meaning of the VICAR statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1959(a). An “enterprise” for VICAR purposes means the same in the RICO context.

Compare, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2) (VICAR) with 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) (RICO); Fiel, 35 F.3d

at 1003 (“The legislative history of the [VICAR] statute indicates that enterprise in

this section and in RICO are intended to have the same scope”) [internal citations

omitted].

An association-in-fact or other informal entity may qualify as an

“enterprise” under both RICO and VICAR, provided it has four characteristics:

continuity, unity, shared purpose, and identifiable structure.

United States v.

Devine, 40 F.4th 139, 149 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The ‘hallmark concepts’ that identify RICO

enterprises are ‘continuity, unity, shared purpose and identifiable structure.’”)

(quoting Fiel, 35 F.3d at 1003).

In RICO and VICAR prosecutions targeting notorious gangs such as the Bloods

and Crips, the Department of Justice typically establishes the threshold “enterprise”

element by proving the racketeering organization operated in accordance with a set

of rules and standardized practices with respect to initiation rites, participation

expectations, and discipline.

These prototypical features of gangs, while not

necessary in every case, often amount to sufficient “. . . evidence of a functioning

‘enterprise.’” United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 259 (4th Cir. 2019). In Devine,

40 F.4th Cir. at 149, for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit held that evidence of gang rules and rites of passage proved an outlaw

association-in-fact, known “as the Gangstas,” had sufficient unity, shared purpose

and structure to constitute a RICO enterprise.

The government properly introduced evidence to prove this “enterprise”

element. Testimony on the “beat in” initiations, gang rules, gang

meetings, gang discipline, collection of dues, acts of violence carried out

at the direction of gang superiors, and gang promotion for “putting in

work” all support the jury’s conclusion that the Gangstas constituted a

RICO enterprise.

Devine, 40 F.3d at 149.

The government presented no such evidence with respect to “Brandon’s crew.”

Although the grand jury in the Second Superseding Indictment alleged this supposed

enterprise copied Bloods “rules,” the government’s witnesses at trial made clear this

was not so.

For instance, Tony Sledge (“Sledge”), called to the stand by the

government, testified neither Jenkins nor any other drug dealers who frequented the

Railroad paid dues, or “tithes,” to Brandon or his “crew.” (C.A.J.A.816.) Sledge also

testified that the Bloods’ initiation rites were not replicated by Brandon or anyone

else at the Railroad. (C.A.J.A.818.) Sledge was unequivocal that the men who

congregated at the Railroad did not interact or function as members of the Bloods,

Low Lives, or any other “gang” under Brandon’s control.

So when you talked about how people just hung out at Railroad,

everybody that hung out at the Railroad house with the Leonards,

they weren’t Bloods, were they?

No.

Nobody sat around and answered to Brandon Leonard, did they?

No.

Brandon Leonard didn’t tell people what to do and tell people to

go out in the street, did he?

No.

Was everybody that hung out at that house in a gang together?

No.

(C.A.J.A.818-19.).

Sledge further testified that Brooks visited Railroad “once a month maybe” to

play “[g]ames and chill.” (C.A.J.A.760). Sledge denied any knowledge of Brooks selling

drugs. (C.A.J.A.760).

In finding the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of the essential

enterprise element within the broad confines of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2), the Court of

Appeals relied heavily upon Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009).

Petitioners agree Boyle controls on the elements of a RICO or VICAR enterprise. The

Boyle Court confirmed that an enterprise in the RICO arena need not have a “. . .

hierarchical structure or a chain of command.” Id. at 948. But Boyle also confirmed

that an “identifiable structure,” unity, and joint purpose are the sine qua non of any

RICO or VICAR enterprise.

It is easy to envision situations in which proof that individuals engaged

in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish the existence of

an enterprise.

For example, suppose that several individuals,

independently and without coordination, engaged in a pattern of crimes

listed as RICO predicates--for example, bribery or extortion. Proof of

these patterns would not be enough to show that the individuals were

members of an enterprise.

Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 and note 4.

Similarly, here the several individuals the Court of Appeals decided operated

a cohesive, association-in-fact enterprise, actually were sole proprietors. They were

not joint venturers. Each operated his own drug distribution venture.

The government’s theory below was that Jenkins, Brooks, and others who

frequented the Railroad formed a racketeering enterprise led by Brandon, even if they

never were members of the moribund Low Lives or resurgent Bloods.3 Brandon’s

crew was an enterprise distinct from the various Bloods sets and other recognized

gangs in Franklin, including the defunct Low Lives, prosecutors insisted.

The

purpose of Brandon’s eponymous enterprise was to distribute controlled substances,

thundered the prosecution in closing arguments.

The enterprise in this case is the group of guys that you have heard

about for the last week. It’s Brandon’s crew.

(C.A.J.A.1614.)

3 Significantly, at no point did Jenkins belong to either the Low Lives or the Bloods.

(C.A.J.A.1616.)

In the government’s creative retelling of the trial evidence, this asserted

enterprise engaged in interstate racketeering by selling controlled substances

throughout the Franklin community. “Brandon’s crew” purchased narcotics from a

North Carolina-based seller whose moniker was “Weezy,” prosecutors reminded

jurors in closing.

. . . The racketeering activity in this case is drug dealing. It’s very simple.

. . . Brandon’s crew, this group, this enterprise, all got their drugs from

Weezy, and Weezy lived in North Carolina, and we’re talking about

Franklin, Virginia.

(C.A.J.A.1615.)

Reduced to its essentials, then, the government’s argument that “Brandon’s

crew” was a VICAR “enterprise” hinges on the notion that this group of men, led by

Brandon, jointly engaged in the racketeering predicate of drug distribution in and

around Franklin.

This enterprise theory collapses at the threshold. Government witnesses made

clear Jenkins and others in Franklin who sold drugs supplied by Weezy did so as

autonomous distributors rather than as constituents of a cohesive unit or joint

venture.

Testimony of the government’s central witness, Edward, thoroughly drowned

out the government’s refrain that Jenkins and others sold drugs as members of an

integrated - or even loosely structured - enterprise directed by his late brother,

Brandon. Edward testified that Brandon did not front or redistribute at wholesale

prices Weezy’s products to Jenkins and others for street-level transactions with

addicts. Instead, Jenkins and other putative members of “Brandon’s crew” bought

directly from Weezy using their own funds, just as Brandon bought from that supplier

with his funds. Weezy’s customers in Franklin did not pool resources, share profits,

or contribute to a common fund overseen by Brandon.

Far from a joint venture, this was a collection of entrepreneurs. Edward’s

testimony makes clear the several dealers’ parallel criminal conduct did not create a

unitary or functionally integrated racketeering enterprise.

Did Brandon buy all the drugs from Weezy and hand them out to

other people?

No, I don’t think so.

You never saw this?

No.

As far as you know, everybody bought drugs from Weezy and sold

them on their own?

Yes.

Including G?4

Yes.

You never saw G get drugs from Brandon to sell, did you?

No.

4 Jenkins’s nickname is “G.”

As far as you know, G got his own supply, and he handled his own

business?

Yes.

And you did the same, right?

Yes.

In fact, you guys didn’t even sell the same products?

No.

(C.A.J.A.1288-1289.)

Other prosecution witnesses corroborated Edward’s testimony that “Brandon’s

crew” was comprised of independent distributors rather than subordinate agents of

Brandon working in a joint venture with an identifiable structure. See testimony of

T. Sledge C.A.J.A.816-817, and T. Griffin, C.A.J.A.535.

Under the Supreme Court’s in depth analysis of RICO requirements in Boyle,

“Brandon’s crew” was not an “enterprise.” Justice Alito, author of the majority

opinion in Boyle, envisaged a set of facts closely akin to the set presented here.

It is easy to envision situations in which proof that individuals engaged

in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish the existence of

an enterprise.

For example, suppose that several individuals,

independently and without coordination, engaged in a pattern of crimes

listed as RICO predicates--for example, bribery or extortion. Proof of

these patterns would not be enough to show that the individuals were

members of an enterprise.

Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 and note 4.

Misapplying Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 and note 4, the Court of Appeals held

“Brandon’s Crew” qualified as a VICAR enterprise engaged in drug distribution.

According to the Court of Appeals, the following purported facts and circumstances

provided a rational basis for the jury’s finding that “Brandon’s Crew” was an

“enterprise” as the Boyle Court defined that statutory element:

“Brandon fronted money to [Edward] to purchase drugs

that would later be sold.” (Pet. 12a.)

“Brooks introduced the crew to a Blood Member (Weezy)

who became a primary drug supplier for many members of the crew.”

(Id.)

“Brandon’s crew shared firearms stored at the Railroad,

which they could use during their drug transactions.” (Pet. 12a-13a.)

“Members of Brandon’s crew were permitted to sell drugs

freely throughout Franklin” while the 00s did so “only with Brandon’s

permission and by paying him tithes.” (Pet. 13a.)

Considered individually or collectively, these four supposedly inculpatory

circumstances were insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that

Brandon’s crew operated as an association-in-fact enterprise for VICAR purposes.

Brandon’s advance of funds to facilitate his brothers’ drug dealing

did not establish a VICAR enterprise.

The only evidence of Brandon fronting funds to other members of his putative

enterprise came from Edward in the testimony quoted below.

He [Brandon] came home from prison. He came home with some money

from prison, and he gave me money to go buy drugs, and that’s how I

start [sic] back full time selling drugs.

(C.A.J.A.1168) [emphasis added].

Edward’s testimony about an advance from his brother does not bolster the

Court of Appeals’ enterprise theory. Edward testified his brother gave him money “to

go buy drugs.” Neither Edward nor anyone else testified Edward, in turn, advanced

capital to Jenkins, Brooks, or any other purported member of “Brandon’s crew.”

Defendants’ purchase of drugs from the same supplier was not

evidence of enterprise.

The Court of Appeals pointed to defendants’ wholesale purchases of drugs from

the same source, a Bloods member in North Carolina named Weezy, as evidence of

enterprise. Again, the record belies the Court of Appeals’ VICAR analysis.

In distributing narcotics they bought from Weezy in North Carolina, Jenkins,

Brooks, and other alleged members of Brandon’s crew did not operate as partners.

They did not share their illicit profits and losses. (C.A.J.A.818-819; 1288-1289.) Each

was an independent retailer. At most, Brandon’s crew comprised a set of parallel,

unlawful enterprises. The Boyle Court made clear independent ventures such as

these do not comprise a sufficiently unified entity to trigger enterprise liability under

RICO. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 and note 4.

Petitioners and others did not share and jointly store at the

Railroad firearms used to protect their distributive ventures.

Evidence addressed at trial does not support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion

that members of Brandon’s crew jointly stored and shared weapons at the Railroad.

The only witness to testify about placement of firearms was Edward, who related that

he kept his own firearms at the Railroad. Particularly since he resided at the

Railroad, Edward’s testimony that he kept guns there hardly constitutes evidence of

a VICAR enterprise. When other drug dealers visited, they frequently deposited their

guns on the kitchen counter and retrieved the weapons when they departed. They did

not share or store their guns at the Railroad.

Did they [Brandon’s Crew] bring guns to Railroad?

Edward.

Yes.

How do you know that?

Edward.

Because I seen them.

And where did you see the guns in Railroad?

Edward.

I mean, on either on your hip, you take it out, put it on the

counter, or wherever.

Why would members of the crew take their guns and put

them on the counter at Railroad?

Edward.

I mean, because you feel like you just relax at my house at

the time.

(C.A.J.A.1176.)

Brandon’s coercive control and extraction of tithes from 00 Gang

members did not support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

Brandon’s crew was an enterprise.

Similarly misguided is the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Brandon’s

leadership and control over Franklin defined or generated a VICAR enterprise. The

Court of Appeals points to “tithes” Brandon imposed upon members of the 00 Gang.

In exchange for these payments, Brandon permitted the Crips affiliate to sell drugs

in parts of Franklin. Brandon’s taxation of his Cripps rivals means he oversaw a

VICAR enterprise, the Court of Appeals maintained. (Pet. 5a.)

Brandon’s collection of tithes from 00 Gang members was not substantial

evidence that he and his allies formed an “enterprise.” Brandon did not share these

proceeds with Jenkins or Brooks and other dealers aligned with him, or expend the

funds for their collective benefit.

Instead, Brandon enriched himself by pocketing

the dues payments. (C.A.J.A.516-17.) As discussed supra, a VICAR enterprise exists

only when its participants have at least a minimally coherent structure and a unitary

venture which provides shared gains. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948 and note 4; United States

v. Pinson, 860 F.3d 152, 162 (4th Cir. 2017). Brandon’s enrichment at the expense

of the 00 Gang does not prove he and his friends operated a VICAR enterprise.

In short, Petitioners’ convictions on Count One for VICAR conspiracy should

be reversed by the United States Supreme Court because the government failed to

prove the existence of the association-in-fact enterprise alleged in the Second

Superseding Indictment.

The Court of Appeals Opinion misapplied 18 U.S.C. §

1959(a) and Boyle, 556 U.S. at 938.

Insufficient Evidence Supports Jenkins’s Conviction On Count Four.

The United States Supreme Court also should review and reverse Jenkins’s

conviction on Count Four for attempted VICAR murder because no evidence exists of

an ongoing enterprise in February 2019 within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5).

Even assuming, arguendo, “Brandon’s crew” qualified as an “enterprise” under

Section 1959(a)(5) during the closed period charged in Count One (December 17-19,

2017), this “enterprise” plainly no longer functioned 14 months later when Jenkins

allegedly attempted to commit VICAR murder. Counts One and Four are temporally

distinct from one another. The three-day period encompassed by the VICAR

conspiracy charged in Count One transpired in the immediate aftermath of Brandon’s

murder. Count Four, in contrast, concerns a different substantive offense (VICAR

attempted murder) 14 months after the “Big Homie’s” downfall. The constellation of

circumstances which the government insists proved “Brandon’s crew” a VICAR

enterprise in December 2017 prevailed no longer in February 2019.

The Court of Appeals’ conclusory holding that the “Brandon’s crew” enterprise

continued to exist in February 2019 elides the substantially altered circumstances

wrought by Brandon’s murder in the Franklin drug world.

Brandon’s death transformed his former Franklin turf in ways that taken

together eviscerate the government’s claim that his enterprise survived until 2019.

First, when Brandon died, the tithes he imposed upon the 00 Gang ceased. The Court

of Appeals pointed to these tithes as evidence that Brandon operated an enterprise,

as just discussed. Assuming arguendo that the tithing system Brandon enforced is

probative of an enterprise at work, the prompt dismantling of that extortionate

scheme upon his death is compelling evidence the enterprise ended well before

February 8, 2019, when Jenkins allegedly attempted to commit VICAR murder as

charged in Count Four.

Second, in the wake of Brandon’s murder his alleged subordinates dispersed.

Nobody took Brandon’s place as leader. Members of “Brandon’s crew” no longer

congregated at the Railroad after the outburst of reprisal gunfire between December

17 and 19, 2017. Central to the government’s enterprise theory both at trial and on

appeal was the misguided notion that the Railroad served as the enterprise’s

headquarters and weapons arsenal. Again assuming for the sake of argument that

these claims by the government were supported by the record, the departure of

Edward and others from the Railroad following Brandon’s demise demolishes the

government’s enterprise architecture. (C.A.J.A.1212.)

The Court of Appeals acknowledged in passing that in Brandon’s wake Edward

moved out of the Railroad and many of the drug distributors prosecutors consigned

to “Brandon’s crew” left the decedent’s former “territory.” (Pet 18a.) The Court of

Appeals nonetheless implied that reasonable jurors could have found that despite the

passage of 14 months since the “Big Homie’s” final apotheosis, Edward and Jenkins

carried out shootings in February 2019 on behalf of the remnant enterprise.

(Pet.

18a.) This theory that Jenkins and Edward acted as agents of a suddenly revived

enterprise in February 2019 is unmoored to the trial evidence. Edward and Jenkins

certainly acted out of anger on Bruce Street in response to the 00 Gang’s taunting

“Happy Birthday” video on February 8, 2019.

But Edward was Brandon’s brother

and Jenkins his close friend. Their vengeful response to the provocative “Happy

Birthday” message does not mean they reacted violently on behalf of “Brandon’s

crew,” which had not operated since December 2017. The Supreme Court therefore

should reverse Jenkins’s conviction on Count Four for VICAR attempted murder in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the United States Supreme Court should issue a

writ of certiorari and review and reverse Petitioners’ convictions on Counts One and

Four of the Second Superseding Indictment.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Paul G. Beers

Paul G. Beers

Counsel of Record

Glenn, Feldmann, Darby & Goodlatte

111 Franklin Road, S.E., Suite 200

P. O. Box 2887

Roanoke, Virginia 24001-2887

Telephone: (540) 224-8000

Email: pbeers@glennfeldmann.com

Counsel for Ronald Damone Jenkins, Jr.

Sicilia C. Englert

Law Office of Sicilia C. Englert, LLC

1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 600

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Counsel for Japree Lortez Brooks

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A — AMENDED OPINION OF THE UNITED

S TAT E S C O U RT O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E F O U RT H

CIRCUIT, FILED MARCH 12, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — TRANSCRIPT OF THE UNITED

S TAT E S D I S T R I C T C O U RT F O R T H E E A S T E R N

DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, NORFOLK DIVISION,

DATED DECEMBER 6, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35a

APPENDIX C — JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,

FILED MARCH 10, 2026 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58a

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4220

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

RONALD DAMONE JENKINS, JR., a/k/a G, a/k/a GG, a/k/a Gee, a/k/a Gee Gee,

Defendant – Appellant.

No: 24-4221

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

JAPREE LORTEZ BROOKS, a/k/a Choppa, a/k/a Khoppa, a/k/a Primo,

Defendant – Appellant.

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No: 24-4236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

MALIK TREVONTE NEWSOME, a/k/a Red, a/k/a Redd, a/k/a Hitman Redd,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at Norfolk.

Jamar Kentrell Walker, District Judge. (2:22-cr-00101-JKW-DEM-1)

Argued:

September 12, 2025

Amended: March 12, 2026

Decided: March 10, 2026

Before AGEE, RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and reversed, vacated, and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge

Agee wrote the opinion in which Judge Richardson and Judge Berner join.

ARGUED: Paul Graham Beers, GLENN, FELDMAN, DARBY & GOODLATTE,

Roanoke, Virginia; Sicilia Englert, LAW OFFICE OF SICILIA C. ENGLERT, LLC,

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellants. Kristen Shannon Taylor, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mark Diamond,

Pound Ridge, New York, for Appellant Malik Trevonte Newsome. Jessica D. Aber, United

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellee.

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AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Ronald Damione Jenkins, Japree Lortez Brooks, and Malik Trevonte Newsome

appeal different components of their convictions and sentences arising from a conspiracy

to commit and the commission of various violent crimes in retaliation for a rival gang

killing Brandon Leonard. For the reasons set forth below, we largely reject the arguments

on appeal and affirm the Defendants’ convictions and sentences with one exception.

Because the Government did not come forward with sufficient evidence to support Brooks’

conviction for violent crime in aid of racketeering activity (VICAR) based on attempted

murder and a related firearms conviction, we reverse the district court’s denial of judgment

of acquittal as to those convictions, vacate Brooks’ sentence, and remand for resentencing.

This appeal arises from the activities of a group labeled at trial as “Brandon’s crew,”

so denominated in reference to the group’s leader, Brandon Leonard. The underlying

events, tailored to discuss evidence relevant to the issues on appeal, are recounted from the

trial record in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. Darosa, 102

F.4th 228, 237 (4th Cir. 2024) (“In reviewing [a conviction after a jury trial], we construe

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, assuming its credibility, and

drawing all favorable inferences from it.” (cleaned up)).

In the early 2000s, Brandon was a leader of a street gang in Franklin, Virginia,

known as the “Low Lives.” This gang consisted of Brandon’s brother, Edward Leonard

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(“EJ”); Derrick Griffin; and others who committed various criminal acts together. While

serving time for state drug offenses, Brandon joined the Brim Bloods, a subset of the

nationwide Bloods gang.

Upon his release from prison, Brandon lived with EJ and another individual in a

house on Railroad Avenue known as the “Railroad.” Around this time, Brandon gave EJ

money to resume selling drugs in Franklin and EJ soon made enough money from selling

drugs that it became his primary revenue source. Jenkins also sometimes lived at the

Railroad and he too sold drugs regularly enough that it was his primary source of income.

Brooks introduced EJ, Jenkins, and other individuals to a drug supplier in North Carolina,

a member of the same Bloods set to which Brooks belonged. The Railroad became a

“headquarters” of sorts, attracting members of the Low Lives (including Brandon and EJ),

individuals belonging to different sets of Bloods (including Brooks and Newsome), as well

as individuals who did not formally identify with any gang. J.A. 506.1 From this location,

individuals could relax, play dice and engage in other social activities, distribute drugs

(including crack, heroin, and powder cocaine), and store or borrow an array of firearms

that were “always around” for use. J.A. 517.2

Brandon’s crew was not itself a Bloods set, though it may be described as having

a Bloods-leaning loyalty since many of its members were also members of several Bloods

sets.

EJ testified that he held firearms for and sold firearms to members of the crew. He

also stored ammunition and other firearm accessories at the Railroad for use by others,

using money earned from his drug transactions to purchase them.

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During this time, Brandon developed a reputation as “the respected head Blood

member,” J.A. 1174, who “you don’t cross,” J.A. 498. Around the same time, a competing

gang associated with the Crips, known as the 00s (“double 0s”), also operated in Franklin.

Among the 00s’ members were Shuntrel McNear, Loron Barnes, and Larry Parrish. While

the Bloods and the Crips are nationwide rival gangs, for a period of time Brandon’s crew

(and its individual Bloods members) and the 00s coexisted without open hostility given

their common upbringings and Brandon’s exercise of authority. For example, Brandon

charged members of the 00s “tithes” so that they too could distribute drugs in Franklin.

J.A. 516–17.

That symbiotic existence ended in December 2017. The evening of December 16th,

Barnes confronted Brooks for allegedly selling him a “broken gun.” J.A. 1183. Brandon

intervened and pulled a firearm on Barnes, leading Brooks and McNear to also pull their

guns. The incident ended with Barnes telling Brandon that if he didn’t use the firearm

“now, then I’ll be back.” J.A. 519.

The next day, Brandon went missing. Friends and family spread word to look for

him, and members of Brandon’s crew gathered at the Railroad that afternoon and evening

to discuss and coordinate a search. According to witnesses in attendance, “[t]he atmosphere

[was] tense, a lot of anger, people upset, a lot of adrenaline running,” “a lot of rage going

on at this moment” as people discussed “revenge” and “[r]etaliation” and “shoot[ing]

somebody up.” J.A. 520 (first two quotes), 522 (last three quotes). By evening, Brandon’s

body had been discovered in a ditch near the Railroad.

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Within a short time of learning of Brandon’s death, EJ, Brooks, and others from the

Railroad ended up reconvening at Newsome’s brother’s house on South Street to mourn

and plot revenge against Barnes and McNear, the two 00s members that they believed were

responsible for Brandon’s death. Around 3:00 a.m., they left in search of Barnes and

McNear. EJ and Brooks were in separate vehicles, and “[n]ot long” after departing, EJ

heard “three or four” shots being fired from the other vehicle as they drove by the home of

McNear’s mother. J.A. 1193.3 Shortly thereafter, EJ confirmed with Brooks that he’d fired

the shots. A later police investigation revealed that three bullets had entered the residence

above the front door, above a bedroom window, and into the attic.

Barnes and McNear were not located on the evening of December 18, but they were

seen the next evening. After learning that Barnes and other 00s were on Madison Street,

EJ, Newsome, and others “plotted and planned to do a shooting over there.” J.A. 407.

Newsome and others took one of EJ’s firearms to execute their plan, leading to Barnes and

another 00s member being shot. Their wounds were not fatal.

After the Madison Street shooting, things calmed for many months and some

members of Brandon’s crew left town or were incarcerated. But in February 2019, on what

would have been Brandon’s birthday, 00s began posting and circulating an image of a blue

hat (Crips imagery) and a scoreboard of “0 to 1” on social media with the text “[a]in’t

nobody from Double 0 get his but Lil B [i.e., Brandon] did.” J.A. 1214–15. In addition,

McNear posted a video recorded “happy birthday” message that EJ interpreted as

McNear’s mother lived a few houses down from Newsome’s brother.

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“taunt[ing], like he killed my brother.” J.A. 1217. “[F]urious,” EJ “sent [the social media

posts] all over,” ultimately reconvening with Jenkins to exact revenge. J.A. 1217–18. They

determined McNear’s location and “shot him up” by firing multiple rounds at him and

another individual as they were in a vehicle. J.A. 1221. McNear survived, with extensive

injuries.

After their arrests, Jenkins, Brooks, and Newsome were detained pending trial. In

July 2023, Newsome used another inmates’ identification number to call his friend

Quenacia Bynum. During the call—which was recorded—Newsome asked Bynum to say

that the two had been together in North Carolina from December 18 to 19, 2017. Bynum

responded that she would not do that and hung up the phone. She then ignored several more

phone calls and ripped up a letter Newsome later sent her.

That was not Newsome’s only attempt to secure an alibi; in August 2023, he

contacted his child’s mother, Akeiba Goodwyn, to ask her to say that they were together in

December 2017. Goodwyn testified she could not recall if they were together.

Defendants exercised their right to a jury trial, and a jury convicted them of the

following offenses that are challenged on appeal:

• Count I (all defendants): conspiracy to commit VICAR murder, namely, the

December 17–19, 2017 conspiracy to murder 00s after Brandon’s death, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5);

• Count II (Brooks): VICAR attempted murder arising from the December 18,

2017 shooting at the South Street residence of McNear’s mother, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(5) and (2);

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• Count III (Brooks): discharge and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of

violence, namely, the VICAR attempted murder described in Count II, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(5) and (2);

• Count IV (Jenkins): VICAR attempted murder arising from the February 8,

2019 shooting of 00s gang member McNear, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1959(a)(5) and (2); and

• Count IX (Newsome): witness tampering for attempting to influence one or

more persons to give false testimony at trial, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(b)(1).4

Defendants’ motions for a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal were denied. In separate

sentencing hearings, the district court sentenced Jenkins to 300 months’ imprisonment,

Brooks to 420 months’ imprisonment, and Newsome to 273 months’ imprisonment.

Defendants noted timely appeals, and the Court consolidated them for briefing and

oral argument. The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

II.

“[W]e review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of

acquittal.” United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 501–02 (4th Cir. 2015).

Most of the arguments on appeal challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict. Such arguments “must overcome a heavy burden” to prevail, United States v.

Robinson, 855 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 2017), and we will reverse only when “the

prosecution’s failure is clear,” Fuertes, 805 F.3d at 502 (cleaned up). When reviewing the

Three convictions are not at issue on appeal. Jenkins’ one count of being a felon

in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count

VI); and Brooks’ two counts of witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1)

(Counts VII and VIII). In addition, the jury found Jenkins not guilty of one firearms offense

(Count V).

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sufficiency of the evidence, the Court “does not decide for itself whether the evidence

establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 386 (2025).

“Instead, it construes all evidence and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the

prosecution, and asks whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). And the Court may not “overturn a substantially supported verdict”

simply because it deems “the verdict unpalatable” or concludes that “another, reasonable

verdict would be preferable.” Robinson, 855 F.3d at 268 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

A. VICAR-related Convictions

The federal “VICAR statute complements the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 through 1968, by addressing the particular

danger posed by those who are willing to commit violent crimes in order to bolster their

positions within [racketeering] enterprises.” United States v. Keene, 955 F.3d 391, 394 (4th

Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).5 To establish that Defendants violated the VICAR statute, the

Government had to prove:

(1) the existence of a RICO enterprise;

(2) that the enterprise was engaged in racketeering activity;

(3) that the defendant had a position in the enterprise;

“The legislative history of the [VICAR] statute indicates that ‘enterprise’ in this

section and in RICO are intended to ‘have the same scope[,]’” so cases regularly rely on

discussions of one when analyzing the other. United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1003 (4th

Cir. 1994).

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(4) that the defendant committed one of the crimes specified in the VICAR

statute[, which includes both conspiracy to murder and attempted murder,

§ 1959(a)(5); and]

(5) that the defendant’s purpose was to maintain or increase his position in

the enterprise.

Id. (cleaned up and formatting added).

Thus, one common element for the conspiracy and other VICAR offenses is the

existence of an “enterprise,” which exists when a group of individuals “associate[] together

for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” United States v. Turkette, 452

U.S. 576, 583 (1981). An enterprise is “proved by evidence of [(1)] an ongoing

organization, formal or informal, and [(2)] by evidence that the various associates

function[ed] as a continuing unit.” Id.

Further, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2) defines an “enterprise” to “include[] any . . . group

of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” In interpreting what this

language means, the Supreme Court has held that “an association-in-fact enterprise must

have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with

the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s

purpose.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009). That said, the Supreme Court

has reiterated that this language is “obviously broad” and “expansive,” with the term “any”

to describe the relevant “group” “ensur[ing] that the definition has a wide reach.” Id. at

944; accord United States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 249 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that the

Supreme Court has “cautioned . . . against reading the term ‘enterprise’ too narrowly”).

10a

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1. Conspiracy to Commit Murder in Aid of Racketeering (Count I)

Defendants were each convicted of Count I, which charged a conspiracy to commit

murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), based on the events

of December 17–19, 2017—their endeavor to murder individuals they suspected of killing

Brandon. Defendants all challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the existence

of an “enterprise.” In addition, Brooks and Newsome raise additional arguments

challenging other elements of the offense. We address each argument in turn.

a. Existence of an Enterprise

Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the group the

Government termed “Brandon’s crew” constituted an association-in-fact enterprise for

purposes of the VICAR statute. In other words, they argue there’s insufficient evidence of

structure, unity, and common purpose. They point out that the record does not show the

hallmarks of a traditional gang, such as a hierarchy between individuals, that dues were

paid, or that there were initiation rites or rules for this group of individuals. In addition,

they assert that the Railroad was simply a social hub for hanging out and playing dice, not

for coordinating criminal activity. And they argue that, although the record shows that

several members of the group may have sold drugs, it does not show synchronized or

coordinated criminal activity, but separate entrepreneurship. Based on the foregoing, they

argue the record fails to show the requisite characteristics of an enterprise.

Under our deferential review of jury verdicts, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that “Brandon’s crew” has the requisite

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“structure” for purposes of VICAR.6 In Boyle, the Supreme Court discussed what this term

meant: “a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity

sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” 556 U.S. at 946.

And at the outset, in undertaking our review of the record for this evidence, we are mindful

that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, drawing all

reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219–20 (4th Cir.

2018).

At trial, the jury heard testimony that showed the purpose of Brandon’s crew was to

control who trafficked drugs in Franklin, Virginia. This included evidence of drug dealing

by members of Brandon’s crew. For instance, Brandon fronted money to EJ to purchase

drugs that would later be sold. Other members benefited from Brandon’s ties to the Bloods.

And Brooks introduced the crew to a Blood member (Weezy) who became a primary drug

supplier for many members of the crew. Trial testimony also established that Brandon’s

Our deferential standard of review supports upholding the verdict. We first note

that the facts of this case could reflect that the individuals might have been charged and

convicted for a general, state-law conspiracy to commit murder rather than a federal

VICAR conspiracy. In addition, we note that our opinion should not be read to suggest that

mere associations of friends, even those involved in individual illicit activities, would, in

and of itself, satisfy the requirements of an “enterprise” for purposes of VICAR and RICO.

See e.g., Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947 n.4 (“It is easy to envision situations in which proof that

individuals engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish the existence

of an enterprise. For example, suppose that several individuals, independently and without

coordination, engaged in a pattern of crimes listed as RICO predicates . . . . Proof of these

patterns would not be enough to show that the individuals were members of an

enterprise.”); United States v. Pinson, 860 F.3d 152, 162 (4th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing

separate ventures from the common purpose required of a RICO conspiracy).

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crew shared firearms stored at the Railroad, which they could use during their drug

transactions.

Beyond the purpose of solidifying their own drug trafficking, Brandon’s crew also

operated to control the ability of non-crew members to engage in any independent

competitive criminal activity in Franklin. Jurors heard about Brandon’s reputation and how

others knew that they should not cross him or they would suffer the consequences.

Members of Brandon’s crew were permitted to sell drugs freely throughout Franklin. By

contrast, until 2017, the 00s operated in Franklin only with Brandon’s permission and by

paying him tithes, enabling them to enter an otherwise-closed drug market. Until Brandon’s

death in December 2017, the 00s were viewed as an entity operating in opposition to crew

members. The circumstances leading up to Brandon’s death, the crew’s coordinated

revenge toward the 00s immediately after his death, the 00s taunting social media posts,

and the February 2019 attempted murder of the 00s member thought to be responsible for

Brandon’s death serve as additional circumstantial evidence supporting the jury’s

determination that the crew possessed a common purpose.

Moving on to the next element, the record also contains sufficient evidence from

which the jury could find the requisite relationships between group members. Brandon’s

crew consisted of his brother and other compatriots with familial and other connections

who resided in and around Franklin and frequented the Railroad. Many of the same

individuals from Franklin who were purchasing drugs from Weezy for resale often did so

from the common location of the Railroad, and those same individuals then rallied in

defense of Brandon’s death to inflict the violent crimes that occurred in December 2017

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and, later, February 2019. See United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628, 631–32 (4th Cir.

1985); see also United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding

sufficient evidence of “relationships” existed when, inter alia, “the record demonstrate[d]

that the members of the different sets saw and interacted with one another” and socialized

together at the group’s “club”).

Finally, the record contains sufficient evidence of longevity to sustain the jury

verdict. From the time Brandon was released from prison in 2012 through at least the

February 2019 shootings, Brandon’s crew operated in Franklin. Almost immediately upon

returning to Franklin, Brandon leveraged his existing reputation to gain control of

Franklin’s drug operations and build a network of associates who used the Railroad as a

gathering place for drug deals, firearms storage and utilization, and social activities. The

record further showed that Brandon’s crew banded together with others in the wake of his

execution to exact vengeance in a multi-day shooting spree around town. A year later, after

the 00s posted a provocative scoreboard and birthday message for Brandon on social

media, two members of the crew joined forces to once again seek to avenge Brandon’s

death. All told, the jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence that Brandon’s crew

operated for a sufficient period to carry out the purpose of the charged enterprise—namely

to maintain control over and profit from drug sales within Franklin. Other cases have found

the longevity component of an association-in-fact enterprise satisfied by shorter and

comparable periods of time. E.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. WDC Hldgs. LLC, 155 F.4th 313,

326 (4th Cir. 2025) (concluding longevity component was satisfied by evidence showing

the scheme was devised in 2017 “and continued into early 2020”); United States v. Garcia,

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74 F.4th 1073, 1112 (10th Cir. 2023) (reviewing cases indicating that “longevity” is

satisfied by evidence that the enterprise operated “over a period of years” (cleaned up));

United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding longevity

requirement satisfied based on conduct spanning about seven years).

As for the components of some enterprises that this record does not contain—and

which Defendants point to as a basis for arguing the evidence is deficient—Boyle itself

made clear that “an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions

with a common purpose.” 556 U.S. at 948. It does not require formality or “much”

structure. Id. (cleaned up). To that end,

[s]uch a group need not have a hierarchical structure or a “chain of

command”; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of

methods—by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of

the group need not have fixed roles; different members may perform different

roles at different times. The group need not have a name, regular meetings,

dues, established rules or regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction

or initiation ceremonies. . . . Nor is [an enterprise] limited to groups whose

crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex or unique; for example, a group

that does nothing but engage in extortion through old-fashioned,

unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the statute’s

reach.

Id.

Given our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the evidence is legally

sufficient for the jury to have found that there was “the requisite commonality of purpose

between [individuals in the group] to give form to the associational enterprise charged.”

United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981). Put another way, the evidence

showed that Defendants “conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s

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affairs, not just their own affairs.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158,

163 (2001) (cleaned up).

We therefore reject Defendants’ argument that their conviction for VICAR

conspiracy must be vacated for lack of evidence supporting the enterprise element.

b. Other Arguments

Brooks and Newsome raise additional arguments challenging other elements of their

VICAR conspiracy convictions. None are convincing.

First, Brooks argues that even if there was sufficient evidence demonstrating the

existence of an enterprise, there’s insufficient evidence to: show he was a member of that

enterprise; demonstrate that he held a position within it; or support that he engaged in any

act to join, maintain, or increase a position within it. Rather, he maintains that the evidence

supports that he was sometimes present at the Railroad, nothing more, and that mere

presence does not make someone a member of an enterprise. Last, he argues that seeking

revenge after a friend’s death demonstrates motive, not that any of those acts were taken

for the purpose of joining, maintaining, or increasing any position within an enterprise.

We have reviewed the record and conclude that Brooks has not met his high burden

of showing that no rational factfinder could have found these elements of the charged

conspiracy. Brooks was a regular at the Railroad before the events surrounding Brandon’s

death, connected Brandon to the group’s out-of-state drug supplier, and was part of the

altercation that eventually led to Brandon’s death. He was also present at the Railroad and

other locations where members of the enterprise decided to take revenge for Brandon’s

death. Further, witness testimony connected Brooks to specific firearms and shootings that

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occurred over the relevant days. From this, we readily conclude a reasonable jury could

infer Brooks’ membership and position within the enterprise, and that he committed these

acts as part of his position within it. See, e.g., United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 927

(4th Cir. 20180) (observing that the purpose element is not a heavy burden and requires

only evidence from which a “jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his

violent crime . . . in furtherance of [his] membership,” and that this purpose need not be

his “only or primary concern” in carrying out the charged acts).

For similar reasons, we reject Newsome’s additional challenges to his conspiracy

conviction. He too contends that the record does not show that he knowingly entered into

the charged conspiracy to maintain or increase a position within an enterprise. As support,

he suggests that evidence placing him at the Railroad on the night of Brandon’s death lacks

credibility. But credibility determinations are squarely within the province of the factfinder,

and the jury was entitled to credit that testimony. E.g., United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d

143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the

evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented, and if the evidence supports

different, reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe.”).

What’s more, his arguments ignore evidence placing him at the Railroad when the

conspiracy underlying Count I formed and, later that evening, possessing a firearm whose

bullets were connected to one of the shootings. Accordingly, a rational factfinder could

find the challenged elements of the conspiracy offense, and we will not disturb that verdict.

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2. Jenkins’ Conviction for VICAR Attempted Murder (Count IV)

Next, Jenkins challenges his conviction for VICAR attempted murder, Count IV,

which is based on the February 8, 2019 attempted murder of rival gang member Shuntrel

McNear. He contends that there is insufficient evidence to support this conviction because,

for the reasons already argued, there was not an “enterprise,” and even if there ever was

one, it no longer existed by February 2019 when the acts underlying Count IV occurred.

He asserts that by then, Brandon had been deceased for some fourteen months and most of

the enterprise’s purported members had left town or were in prison and, in any event, were

out of contact. He thus argues that the attempted killing of McNear in February 2019—

which involved just two of the original members of the enterprise—was an act not

attributable to or part of any enterprise.

To the extent Jenkins’ argument rests on there never having been an “enterprise,”

that argument fails for the same reasons we rejected it earlier. See supra II.A.1.a.

Jenkins’ remaining arguments fare no better. At the outset, he is incorrect in

suggesting that a fourteen-month gap in time between an enterprise’s criminal acts must

mean that they were not part of the same criminal enterprise’s endeavors. In Boyle, the

Supreme Court recognized that “[w]hile the group must function as a continuing unit and

remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in RICO exempts

an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of

quiescence.” 556 U.S. at 948. Boyle’s facts illustrate how this ebb and flow can operate.

There, the record showed that a core group of individuals participated in multiple thefts

over several years and then the defendant joined that group “over the [following] five

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years” to participate in “numerous attempted night-deposit-box thefts and at least two

attempted bank-vault burglaries.” Id. at 942. Over the defendant’s objections, the Court

affirmed that the periods of “quiescence” between criminal “spurts” over the course of

years did not preclude the requisite jury findings connecting the latter conduct to the same

criminal enterprise that had first acted years prior. Id. at 948. Thus, insofar as Jenkins is

arguing that, as a matter of law, the February 2019 incident could not be part of the

enterprise that last acted some fourteen months earlier, that argument fails under Boyle.

Simply put, a period of “quiescence” does not mean that an enterprise must have ceased

and a new criminal endeavor commenced.

The above understanding of what the law permits means that the only remaining

question before us is a quintessential matter for the jury to determine as the fact finder:

under the record evidence, were the requisite characteristics of an association-in-fact still

present as of February 2019 such that those acts could be deemed part of the same

enterprise’s conduct? Here, we conclude that “a rational trier of fact could” answer that

question affirmatively. Darosa, 102 F.4th at 237 (“We must sustain the jury’s verdict if

any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(cleaned up)).

As discussed above, the Government’s evidence contained enough for a jury to find

a commonality of purpose (to maintain dominance in Franklin against the 00s and avenge

Brandon’s death), relationship (EJ and Jenkins), and duration (forming and reconstituting

for members of the group to pursue that same purpose) to find that the “enterprise” labeled

as Brandon’s crew continued through February 2019. The challenged enterprise element

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of the VICAR attempted murder conviction thus satisfied, we therefore affirm Jenkins’

conviction as to Count IV.

B. Brooks’ VICAR Attempted Murder & Related Firearm Convictions

(Counts II and III)

Count II charged Brooks with VICAR attempted murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1959(a)(5) and (2), and Count III charged him with unlawful discharge of a firearm in

furtherance of a crime of violence (the VICAR attempted murder in Count II), in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (2). The underlying factual basis for these counts was a

December 2017 “attempt to murder individual occupants of the residence located in the

2200 block of South Street in Franklin, Virginia, in violation of Va. Code §§ 18.2-32, 18.226, and 18.2-18.” J.A. 86.

To convict Brooks, the Government had to prove, in addition to the enterpriserelated elements, that he attempted to “commit murder” consistent with Virginia’s offense

of attempted murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); see also United States v. Simmons, 11

F.4th 239, 271 (observing that we look to state law to determine whether the crossreferenced state-law predicate offense that is alleged in the indictment occurred). To prove

attempted murder under Virginia law, the Government had to prove that Brooks acted with

“(1) a specific intent to kill the victim and (2) some overt act in furtherance of that intent.”

United States v. Lassiter, 96 F.4th 629, 636 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Virginia cases); see,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Herring, 758 S.E.2d 225, 235 (Va. 2014). Virginia defines “specific

intent” as “the intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with.”

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Winston v. Commonwealth, 604 S.E.2d 21, 41 (Va. 2004) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

826 (8th ed. 2004)).

On appeal, Brooks challenges these convictions principally by arguing that the

record does not establish his specific intent to kill anyone when he fired three rounds into

the South Street residence. He contends there’s no evidence that Brooks believed

McNear—or anyone else, for that matter—was home in the early morning hours when the

shots were fired from the street toward the residence. He notes that the shots were fired ad

hominem at an upward trajectory toward the single-level home, entering over the front

door, above a bedroom window, and into the attic. From this, Brooks asserts that the record

does not permit a reasonable fact finder to find that he possessed the specific intent to kill

anyone, much less a specific person, by firing those shots at the house.

Having reviewed Virginia’s case law regarding the specific intent required to

commit the offense of attempted murder, and mindful of the heavy burden Brooks faces in

raising a sufficiency challenge, we agree with him that the evidence of record does not

support a finding that he had the specific intent to murder when he discharged his firearm

toward the South Street residence. At the outset, it is clear that “use of a deadly weapon,

standing alone, is not sufficient to prove the specific intent required to establish attempted

murder.” Hargrave, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (Va. 1974) (per curiam); see also Thacker v.

Commonwealth, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (Va. 1922) (“The law does not presume, because an

assault was made with a weapon likely to produce death, that it was an assault with the

intent to murder.”). More is required to convict, and that “more” requires establishing the

defendant’s specific intent to murder when employing the deadly force. After all, “[w]hen

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a statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular intent, that intent

is just as necessary to be proved as the act itself, and must be found as a matter of fact

before a conviction can be had[.]” Thacker, 114 S.E. at 505. To satisfy its burden of proving

specific intent, the government can rely on “inferences to be drawn from proven facts, so

long as they are reasonable,” showing specific intent “by circumstances, including by a

person’s conduct or by his statements.” Hancock v. Commonwealth, 407 S.E.2d 301, 306

(Va. App. 1991). And, in all events, “[i]t is permissible for the fact finder to have concluded

that a person intended the immediate, direct, and necessary consequences of his voluntary

acts.” Id.

Over a century ago, Virginia’s highest court looked to a respected treatise to

elaborate what proof is necessary to show the specific intent to murder by way of an

example that fits the facts of this case. In Thacker v. Commonwealth, the court opined:

To set fire to a house and burn a human being who is in it, but not to the

offender’s knowledge, would be murder, though the intent was to burn the

house only; but to attempt to set fire to the house under such circumstances

would be an attempt to commit arson only and not an attempt to murder. A

man actuated by general malevolence may commit murder, though there is

no actual intention to kill; to be guilty of an attempt to murder there must be

a specific intent to kill.

114 S.E. at 506 (quoting Clark’s Criminal Law, p. 111). Subsequent Virginia cases have

reaffirmed this point—sustaining attempted murder convictions challenged on the basis of

evidence supporting specific intent only when the facts directly or circumstantially permit

the conclusion that, at the moment the defendant employed deadly force, he intended to

kill someone. See, e.g., Coles v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 109, 112 (Va. 2005)

(affirming conviction for attempted murder when the defendant driver “swerved to the left

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and aimed [his vehicle] directly toward [a police] officer and the police vehicle,”

“ram[ming] the heavy police cruiser and push[ing] it toward [the officer], causing him to

‘jump back’ to avoid injury”); Hancock, 407 S.E.2d at 306 (affirming attempted murder

conviction based on evidence that the defendants (1) knew a building was occupied, (2)

“poured gasoline on a cushion, placed it in front of the only door which provided a means

of egress, and set it on fire,” and (3) then threatened the occupants “that they would be shot

if they attempted to leave”); accord Bell v. Commonwealth, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452–53 (Va.

App. 1991) (same).

Applying these principles from Thacker and its progeny to the record in this case

compels the reversal of Brooks’ VICAR attempted murder conviction. The evidence does

not permit a rational jury to find that when he discharged his firearm, he possessed the

specific intent to murder anyone at the residence. As these cases demonstrate, when

examining whether Brooks possessed the requisite specific intent, “the question . . . is not

whether [his] acts might have resulted in the murder of [an inhabitant of the residence].

Rather, the question is whether [Brooks], [when shooting at the residence], formed the

specific intent . . . for the unequivocal purpose of murdering [someone].” Haywood v.

Commonwealth, 458 S.E.2d 606, 608 (Va. App. 1995). Here, there’s no evidence that, at

the time he discharged his weapon, Brooks intended to kill McNear’s mother, any other

occupant of the house, or someone within the trajectory of his shots. Evidence of Brooks’

familiarity with the neighborhood meant that he knew that McNear’s mother resided at this

location, but it does not permit an inference that Brooks intended at that time to kill her or

any other occupant. At most, evidence that he knew whose residence it was shows why he

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decided to shoot at this residence, not that he attempted to murder an occupant.7 And

although the Government points to the early-morning hour and the fact that Brooks shot at

a residence as a basis for inferring it might be occupied at the time, that is a far cry from

sufficient evidence to permit an inference that Brooks fired his weapon with the specific

intent to murder an occupant of that residence. The record does not show that Brooks knew

or had any reason to know that anyone was inside the residence (or, for that matter,

anywhere within the trajectory of his shots). Cf. Secret v. Commonwealth, 819 S.E.2d 234,

249 (Va. 2018). (affirming attempted murder conviction based on record evidence

“establish[ing] that [the defendant] had full knowledge that [the residence] was

undoubtedly occupied by several individuals at the time he set the fire”). Last, while the

Government came forward with evidence from which a jury could infer that Brooks had

the specific intent to kill McNear on the evening of the shooting, nothing placed McNear

at that property on the evening of the shooting (or, for that matter, with any regularity in

the timeframe at issue). This disconnect is fatal to the Government’s case as to Count IV.

In sum, there’s no evidence supporting a finding that “the immediate, direct, and

necessary consequences” of Brooks’ firing at the residence would have been the murder of

one or more individuals absent intervening events. Hancock, 407 S.E.2d at 306. As Thacker

reflects, had Brooks actually killed someone when he discharged his firearm toward the

While not directly bearing on Brooks’ sufficiency argument, we note that Virginia

has a separate offense of shooting at an occupied dwelling, Va. Code § 18.2-279, which

does not contain an intent element. See Bryant v. Commonwealth, 811 S.E.2d 250 (Va.

2018); Ellis v. Commonwealth, 706 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 2011). To permit the facts here to

satisfy a charge of attempted murder would essentially turn every firearm discharge at an

occupied dwelling into an attempted murder offense.

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South Street residence, regardless of his intent, the evidence would have supported a

finding of general intent sufficient to support a murder conviction (assuming the other

elements were satisfied). 114 S.E. at 506. From these same principles, had he only injured

someone as a result of discharging his weapon, that would not be sufficient to show

attempted murder without the specific intent to kill by so doing. Accord Secret, 819 S.E.2d

at 241. (Under these facts, such an individual might be guilty of malicious or unlawful

wounding under Virginia law, but those are separate offenses, and are also distinguished

based on evidence regarding the shooter’s intent. See Va. Code § 18.2-51.) These

hypotheticals point precisely to the distinction that matters here; as a specific intent offense,

attempted murder requires proof that the defendant acted with the intent to kill when he

fired the shots.

Permitting the evidence in this case to satisfy Virginia’s specific intent requirement

for attempted murder would run afoul of well-established case law, which we are not at

liberty to do. Thus, despite the high hurdle a defendant faces to disturb a jury verdict, we

must vacate Brooks’ VICAR attempted murder conviction (Count II) for failure of proof

of specific intent to murder an occupant of the South Street residence. Given that

disposition, we also reverse the related unlawful discharge conviction (Count III), which

was predicated only on being “in furtherance of” that VICAR attempted murder offense.

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See § 924(c)(1)(A). As Brooks’ convictions for Counts II and III are vacated, we also

vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.8

C. Newsome’s Conviction for Witness Tampering (Count IX)

Newsome challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for

witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), which makes it a crime to

“knowingly use[] intimidation, threaten[], or corruptly persuade[] another person, or

attempt[] to do so, or engage[] in misleading conduct toward another person” with the

intent to influence the testimony of any person in an official proceeding. Count IX of the

operative indictment charged Newsome with committing this offense “[o]n or about July

21, 2023.” J.A. 93.

At trial, Quenacia Bynum testified that in July 2023, Newsome—with whom she

had a personal relationship—called her from prison and asked her to say that she had been

with him at his grandma’s house in North Carolina from December 18 to 19, 2017 (the

days after Brandon’s death). She testified that saying so would have been false, and that

she promptly ended the call after realizing what he wanted her to do. Thereafter, she

There are two ways the now-vacated counts impacted Brooks’ overall sentencing

proceeding. First, to calculate Brooks’ Guidelines range, the PSR grouped his convictions

for Counts I, II, VII, and VIII to calculate one offense level and separately calculated the

offense level for Count III. It then relied on the higher level, which ended up being for

Count III. From there, it determined Brooks’ Guidelines range. At sentencing, the district

court adopted the PSR Guidelines calculation over Brooks’ objections. This resulted in an

adjusted Guidelines range of 360 to 720 months’ imprisonment. Second, the district

imposed a total sentence of 420 months’ imprisonment, imposing consecutive sentences of

various lengths for Counts I, II, III, and VII, and a concurrent sentence for Count VIII.

Given the plain impact that Counts II and III had both in calculating Brooks’ Guidelines

range and in then formulating the sentence imposed, vacating and remanding for

resentencing is the proper remedy.

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ignored dozens more of his calls and ripped up a letter that he sent from prison. The

Government also introduced an audio recording of their conversation and proof that

Newsome had used another inmate’s identification to place the call.

The Government also elicited testimony from Akeiba Goodwyn, who has a child

with Newsome, that in August 2023 Newsome had called her from prison to ask her to say

that they were together during the relevant December 2017 dates, but that she could not

recall if they were actually together at that time because “he pops in and pops out . . . from

certain time frames.” J.A. 889–93.

When instructing the jury on this count, the court recited Count IX of the indictment,

quoted the relevant statutory language, and then set out the three elements of the offense.

On appeal, Newsome contends that the evidence showed that he never threatened

any witness, but rather asked them to testify truthfully to information that would exonerate

him from participating in the offenses that occurred in December 2017. He also maintains

that the jury verdict is further suspect because the jury was instructed that Newsome had

to participate in four distinct acts—intimidating, threatening, corruptly persuading, and

attempting to do the same—when there’s no evidence at all of a threat or intimidation. So,

according to Newsome, the jury could not have followed these instructions and found that

he engaged in all three acts. As a final basis for reversing his obstruction conviction,

Newsome argues that at trial the Government presented evidence based on Newsome’s

statements to two witnesses—Bynum and Goodwyn—but on appeal, the Government

relies on his statements to Bynum alone support his conviction. He concludes that because

the jury heard evidence of witness tampering as to both witnesses and was told that he had

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thereby tampered with “one or more persons,” it’s entirely possible that the guilty verdict

is based on evidence relating to Goodwyn, not Bynum. For all these reasons, he asks us to

reverse his conviction.

None of Newsome’s arguments cast doubt on his conviction for witness tampering.

The jury was entitled to credit Bynum’s testimony, recounted above, that Newsome asked

her to lie about being together on the relevant dates, and that testimony is sufficient to find

each necessary element of witness tampering. United States v. Arrington, 719 F.2d 701,

704 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[I]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s

determination, we can only inquire whether there is substantial evidence, taking the view

most favorable to the [G]overnment, from which the jury might find the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. We, of course, do not weigh the evidence or review the

credibility of witnesses[.]” (internal citations omitted)).

Nor does Newsome’s attack on the jury instructions persuade. Among other things,

this argument is based solely on the instruction that simply recounts the indictment and

ignores the remaining instructions. See J.A. 1603. It’s the totality of the instructions that

matter. United States v. Sanders, 107 F.4th 234, 259 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[W]e do not view a

single instruction in isolation; rather we consider whether taken as a whole and in the

context of the entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the controlling law.”

(cleaned up)). Collectively, the instructions accurately quote the indictment, which itself

“must allege conjunctively the disjunctive components of [the] underlying statute.” E.g.,

United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 774 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam) (emphasis

added). The instructions then correctly recited the elements of the offense, the means of

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satisfying each element, and what findings were necessary to convict. Nothing about this

approach or repetition suggests that the jury would be confused or that the verdict would

be based on anything other than what the statute requires.

To the extent Newsome’s argument relies on a lack of evidence of threats or

intimidation, he ignores that this element of this offense can also be satisfied upon proof

of corrupt persuasion of a witness. § 1519(b)(1). That “require[s] the Government to prove

a defendant’s action was done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about false or

misleading testimony with the hope or expectation of some benefit to the defendant.”

United States v. Edlind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see also id.

at 173–74 (describing how the phrase “corrupt persuasion” operates to distinguish innocent

acts from those committed by “persons conscious of wrongdoing, that is, persons acting

with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil intent” (cleaned up)); accord Arthur Andersen

LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704–06 (2005) (same). “A defendant’s directive to a

witness to lie to investigators or at trial always suffices” to satisfy corrupt persuasion.

Edlind, 887 F.3d at 174 (citation omitted). Notably, Newsome raises no argument that the

evidence is insufficient as to this means of committing the offense.9

Nor are we persuaded by Newsome’s argument that the Government has shifted

its theory from tampering with both Bynum and Goodwyn at trial and relying on Bynum

alone on appeal. Count IX charged Newsome with committing this offense “on or about

July 31, 2023,” J.A. 93, a date that directly corresponds to the evidence relating to his

prison call to Bynum. While the charge also alleged that Newsome attempted to influence

“one or more” persons, J.A. 93, proof that Newsome attempted to influence Bynum alone

patently satisfies that charge.

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For these reasons, Newsome’s sundry arguments challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence to support and the accuracy of the jury instructions concerning his obstruction

offense fail. We therefore affirm this conviction.

E. Newsome’s Sentence

Last, Newsome challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his

273-month sentence of imprisonment: 120 months’ for the RICO conspiracy (Count I) and

153 months’ for the witness tampering conviction (Count IX), consecutive to Count I.10 In

his view, the district court should have granted a downward variant sentence because the

§ 3553(a) factors favor that reduction. As support, he points to his difficult upbringing and

other personal characteristics, but he mostly points to perceived weaknesses with the

evidence supporting his witness-tampering conviction. In addition, he observes that the

district court had acknowledged that he was the “least culpable” of the three co-defendants,

yet it ultimately imposed a sentence only twenty-seven months lower than Jenkins’s 300month sentence. He argues that this isn’t a sufficient enough difference to meaningfully

account for their relative culpability.11

At sentencing, no party objected to Newsome’s Guidelines calculation. With a

total offense level of 39 and a criminal history category of V, Newsome’s Guidelines range

was 360 months’ to life, capped at 360 months’ imprisonment due to the statutory

maximum sentence. Newsome successfully moved for a downward departure of 27-months

under U.S.S.G. § 4K2.23, which the court considered when imposing its sentence. The

Government advocated for a 360-month sentence, and Newsome asked for 180 months’

total imprisonment.

In passing, Newsome asserts that “[f]or the same reasons” the district court erred

in imposing a two-level enhancement to his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for

obstructing or impeding the administration of justice. Opening Br. 50. Newsome has

(Continued)

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We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of

discretion, reviewing “the district court’s factual conclusions for clear error . . . and its legal

conclusions de novo.” United States v. Elboghdady, 117 F.4th 224, 234 (4th Cir. 2024)

(cleaned up). In undertaking this review, we must first consider the procedural

reasonableness of the sentence—such as whether the court failed to appropriately consider

the relevant sentencing factors—before turning to its substantive reasonableness,

“considering the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379

(4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

Having reviewed the district court’s thorough exchange with counsel and

explanation of the sentence imposed, we reject Newsome’s argument. In short, the district

court considered his non-frivolous arguments for a lower sentence, explained why it was

rejecting those arguments and why—in its view of the lengthy trial record—its sentence

arguably waived review of this issue for failure to develop a cogent argument about why

the enhancement was error. See United States v. Fernandez-Sanchez, 46 F.4th 211, 219

(4th Cir. 2022). But even assuming he did not, our review would be for plain error given

that he did not directly develop any Guidelines-based objection to imposing the

enhancement at sentencing. See United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2010);