Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David Kelsey Sparre, Petitioner v. Florida

No.

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Davln KnIsny SPARRE,

Petitioner,

V

SrarE OT,FIORIDA,

Respondent

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Florida

PETITIONER'S APPENDD(

THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE

KARIN L. MOORE

Counsel of Record

NICOLE JAMIESON

Capital Collateral Regional Counsel Northern Region

1004 DeSoto Park Drive

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(850) 487-0922

Karin. Moore@ccrc- north. or g

Nicole.Jamieson@ccrc-north.org

INDEX TO APPENDD(

Florida Supreme Court opinion below (December 4,2O25)

.A1

Florida Supreme Court order denying rehearing (January 27,2026).

.42

The circuit court order denying successive postconviction motion

(March 28,2023).

....,...A3

APPENDD(A1

Supromo @ourt of f[orfDu

No. SC2024-1512

DAVID KELSEY SPARRE,

Appellant,

VS

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

Decemb er 4, 2025

GROSSHANS, J.

David Kelsey Sparre, a prisoner under sentence of death,

appeals the circuit court's order summarily denying his second

successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under rule 3.851 of

the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.l For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

I

In 2010, law enforcement found Tiara Pool dead in her

apartment in Jacksonville, Florida. She had been stabbed roughly

1

. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, S 3 (b)( 1), Fla. Const.

ninety times. Based on evidence found in the apartment, law

enforcement investigated and interviewed Sparre. After initially

denying involvement, Sparre admitted to stabbing Pool to death

with a knife he found in her apartment. He also confessed to taking

various items from her apartment, including a gaming system

Ultimately, the State charged Sparre with first-degree murder

in connection with Pool's killing. And after hearing overwhelming

incriminating evidence, a Duval County jury found Sparre guilty as

charged

At the penalty-phase hearing, the State introduced evidence in

support of two aggravating circumstances-that the murder was

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC aggravator) and was

committed in the course of a burglary Purgltry aggravator).

Sparre, for his part, elected not to present mitigating evidence.

Despite this choice, defense counsel still argued that the mitigating

evidence already in the record weighed in favor of a life sentence.

Following deliberations, the jury recommended a sentence of death,

doing so by a unanimous verdict.

2

After holding a SpenceP hearing, the trial court sentenced

Sparre to death, finding that the State had proven the HAC and

burglary aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt. These two

aggravators, the court determined, outweighed the fourteen

mitigators discernable from the record.3

We affirmed Sparre's conviction and sentence on direct appeal.

Sparre u. State (Sparre 4, L64 So. 3d 1183, l2O2 (Fla. 2015).

Sparre then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to issue a writ of

certiorari and review our decision. It declined to do so. Sparre u.

Florida, 577 U.S . 961 (2015).

In the ten years since, Sparre has mounted several challenges

to his conviction and death sentence. See Spaffe u. State (Sparre II),

289 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 2OL9l (initial postconviction motion and

petition for habeas corpus), cert. denied, Sparre u. Florida, 141 S.

Ct.672 (2O2Ol; Sparre u. State (Sparre 114,391 So. 3d 404 (Fla

20241 (first successive postconviction motion); Sparre u. Sec'y, Dep't

2. Spencer u. State,615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993)

3. Under our precedent, even in cases of a mitigation waiver,

the circuit court maintains the "responsibility to consider mitigating

evidence in the record." Bell u. State,336 So. 3d 2II, 217 (Fla.

20221 (citing Sparre u. State, 164 So. 3d 1183, lL96 (Fla. 2015)).

-3

of Corr., No. 3:20-cv-216-TJC-JBT (M.D. Fla.) , petitionfor habeas

corpus filed (Mar. 4, 2O2Ol.

While his first successive postconviction motion was pending,

Sparre filed a second one-the denial of which is at issue in this

appeal. In it, Sparre raised three constitutional claims under the

Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I

of the Florida Constitution. To support these claims-which all

focus on the representativeness of his jury-Sparre relies on an

unpublished report (the "Gau Study"),+ which he argues is newly

discovered evidence of the jury-related constitutional violations.

Specifically, according to Sparre, the Gau Study shows that his jury

was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, thereby

violating the constitutional provisions alluded to above.

The circuit court summarily denied Sparre's claims, finding

them to be untimely and meritless. Sparre now appeals.

4. Jacinta M. Gau, Racialized Impacts of Death

Disqualification in Duual Countg, Florida (2021) (considering data

from 12 capital cases in Duval County from 2OLO to 2018, including

Sparre's case).

-4-

II

Sparre argues that the circuit court erred in summarily

denying his second successive postconviction motion. s We

disagree

As our cases make clear, we affirm summary denials of

successive motions if the claims raised are "legally insufficient,"

"procedurally barred," or "conclusively refuted by the record."

Sparre III, 391 So. 3d at 405. Similarly, we also affirm when the

defendant fails to raise a claim within rule 3.851's one-year time

limit and does not establish one of the rule's timeliness exceptions.

Hutchinsonu. State,4O8 So. 3d752,754 (Fla.) , cert. denied, 145 S.

Ct. 1980 (2025). We now apply these principles to Sparre's claims.6

5. We review summary denials of successive postconviction

claims de novo . See Owen u. State,364 So. 3d 1Ol7 , LO22-23 (Fla.

2023).

6. At the outset, we briefly address two issues. First, Sparre

argues that the circuit court failed to hold a preliminary hearing as

required by rule 3.851, which provides: "Within 30 days after the

state files its answer to a successive motion for postconviction relief,

the trial court must hold a case management conference. At the

case management conference, the trial court also must determine

whether an evidentiary hearing should be held and hear argument

on any purely legal claims not based on disputed facts." Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.851(0(5)(B) (emphasis added). This text's meaning is

clear. Thus, it was error for the circuit court (at the urging of the

5-

A

We begin with the timeliness of Sparre's claims. Sparre filed

his second successive motion well beyond rule 3.851's one-year

time limit. Thus, Sparre needs to demonstrate an applicable

exception or his claims are barred. Recognizing this issue, Sparre

argues that the Gau Study is newly discovered evidence under rule

3.851(d)(2)(A), which excuses untimeliness if the claim is predicated

on facts which "were unknown to the movant or the movant's

attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence." Our cases, though, are inconsistent with Sparre's

argument.

We have repeatedly held that new reports or studies, based on

previously available information, do not meet the timeliness

State's attorney) to sidestep this requirement. However, based on

our thorough review of the record, we find that any error was

harmless. See Taylor u. State,260 So. 3d 151, 157-58 (Fla. 2018).

Second, Sparre argues that the circuit court failed to make

sufficient findings and conclusions for two of his claims. To the

extent that there was error, we conclude that it was not sufficiently

preserved, see Bryantu. State,901 So. 2d 8IO,822 (Fla. 2OO5), or

properly briefed, see Doorbalu. State,983 So. 2d 464, 482 (FIa.

2008). Moreover, even if this issue had been preserved and

properly briefed, we would find any error harmless in light of our

analysis below.

-6-

exception for newly discovered evidence. See Hutchinson, 408 So

3d at 754; Dillbecku. State,357 So. 3d94,99 (Fla. 20231; Sliney u.

State,362 So.3d 186, 189 (Fla. 2023); Meltonu. State,367 So.3d

It75, tr77 (Fla. 2023).

The Gau Study purports to be drawn from data collected from

Duval County capital trials spanning from 2OIO-2018-with the

majority of them occurring before 2015. At the very least, the

underlying factual basis for the study was available several years

before Sparre filed the current motion. See Sparre III,391 So. 3d at

406 & n.4 (discussing due-diligence requirement). Accordingly, we

conclude that the Gau Study does not excuse the late filing of

Sparre's motion and the three claims it raises.T For this reason,

Sparre's claims are untimely and, thus, cannot support the

postconviction relief that he seeks. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2)

(barring consideration of untimely successive claims).

7

. Sparre also alleges Professor Michael Radelet's report

confirms the work and conclusions of the Gau Study. To the extent

Sparre independently relies on Professor Radelet's opinion to argue

a timeliness exception, that reliance is misplaced for the reasons

given above.

7

B

Sparre's claims are also procedurally barred. We have long

held that a death-sentenced defendant is barred from asserting

claims that could have been raised on direct appeal or in earlier

postconviction proceedings. See Doty u. State,4O3 So. 3d2O9,214

(Fla. 2025); Gudinas u. State,4l2 So. 3d7OI,7la (Fla.) , cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct 2833 (2025). Jury-related claims like those

brought by Sparre are no exception. See Melton u. State, 949 So. 2d

994, IOL4 (Fla. 2006) ("Claims alleging that a defendant's jury was

not a fair cross-section of the community should be raised on direct

appeal."); Bates u. State,3 So. 3d 1091, IIO4 (Fla. 2OO9)

(discriminatory-jury-selection claim barred in postconviction

proceedirg); Truehill u. State,358 So. 3d 1 167, 1186 (Fla. 20221

(fair cross-section claim barred in postconviction proceeding).

Consistent with what we have said above, we see no reason

why Sparre could not have raised his jury-composition claims on

direct appeal or in his prior postconviction motions. Consequently,

his claims are now barred

III

We have concluded that Sparre's claims are both untimely and

-8

procedurally barred. However, even if those bars were inapplicable,

we would still affirm the summary denial for the reasons we give

below

A

We first consider Sparre's Sixth Amendment claim. Sparre

alleges that Duval County's death-qualification process and the

State's use of peremptory strikes infringed on his Sixth Amendment

right to have a jury selected from a fanr cross-section of the

community. A major premise of Sparre's argument is that his

actualjuryi-the twelve-member body that found him guilty and

recommended his death-was required to represent a fair crosssection of the community. He is wrong.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees "the right to a speedy and

public trial, by an impartial jury." Amend. VI, U.S. Const. The U.S

Supreme Court has long recognized that this right includes an

entitlement to be tried by a jury chosen from a fair cross-section of

the community. Taylor u. Louisiana,419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975)

(discussing early case law on the subject). However, as the

Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, this right does not

guarantee that the jury actually selected-the petit jury-will

9-

always mirror the relevant community. See id. at 538; Duren u.

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , 364 n.2O (19791; Lockhart u. McCree, 476

U.S. 162, 173 (1986); Holland u. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 482-83

(1990). The federal circuit courts have stressed this same point

See United States u. O'Lear,90 F.4th 519, 525 (6th Cir.2O24) ("To

be clear, the Sixth Amendment does not require that the assembled

jury itself (often referred to as the 'petit' jury) represent a fair cross

section of the community. . . . So, unlike the Fourteenth

Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Sixth Amendment does

not limit a prosecutor's use of [peremptory] challenges to excuse

specific jurors." (citing Holland, 493 U.S. at 478-84)); see also

United States u. Fernetus, 838 F. Appk 426,434 (1 1th Cir.2O2Ol;

United States u. Brickson,999 F.3d 622,628 (8th Cir. 2O2I); United

States u. Colon, 64 F.4th 589, 591 (4th Cir. 2O23).

Put simply, this uniform body of case law is incompatible with

Sparre's Sixth Amendment claim, which focuses on the composition

and representativeness of the actual jury that tried him-not the

pool from which that jury was chosen. Indeed, nowhere in Sparre's

motion does he allege that his jury pool was not representative of

the relevant community. That being the case, Sparre's Sixth

- 10 -

Amendment claim is without merit as a matter of law

B

Sparre's Eighth Amendment claim fares no better. For this

claim, Sparre largely repeats the same factual premises underlying

his Sixth Amendment claim. He then argues some general Eighth

Amendment principles. For example, he reminds us that the

Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to forbid arbitrary

sentences and to require that the sentencer consider a defendant's

mitigating evidence. However, Sparre cites no cases where the

Eighth Amendment has been applied in the jury-representativeness

context. And we are aware of none. In light of this absence, and

based on our own understanding of the constitutional provisions at

issue, we think the Fifth Circuit was correct in saying that

"empaneling an impartial jury is grounded in the Sixth Amendment

and not the Eighth Amendment." United States u. Sanders, 133

F.4th 34I,376 (sth Cir. 2025) (relying on Wainwright u. Witt, 469

U.S. 4L2,423 (1985)); cf. United States u. Brown,44I F.3d 1330,

1354 (1lth Cir. 2006) ("Brown provides no rationale for why the

identical argument would be any more persuasive if considered

- 11-

under the rubric of the Eighth Amendment, and he offers no case

law in support of his position.").8

C

For his final claim, Sparre alleges that four provisions ot'

Article I of the Florida Constitution prohibit Duval County's

"discriminatory" death-qualification process and the prosecutor's

peremptory strikes. Sparre mainly asserts that sections L6 and 22

of Article I jointly provide an "inviolate" right to an impartial jury,

which encompasses the right to a petit jury that mirrors the

relevant community. But as with the two prior claims, Sparre fails

to identi$r any supporting precedent. Moreover, we are unaware of

any cases relying on the four cited state-law provisions as authority

for any petit-jury-representativeness requirement. In stlm, Sparre

has not persuaded us that these state-constitutional provisions

support the right he seeks.

8. To the extent Sparre's arguments could be seen as an

implicit invitation for us to recognize a new Eighth Amendment

right, we must decline. See Ford u. State,402 So. 3d 973,978-79

(Fla.) , cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1L6l (2025).

-L2-

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's

summary denial of Sparre's second successive motion for

postconviction relief.

It is so ordered.

MUNIZ, C.J., ANd CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, FRANCIS, ANd

SASSO, JJ., concur.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,

Jonathan David Sacks, Judge

Case No. 1 620 I0CF008 424AXXXMA

Dawn B. Macready, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Chelsea

Shirley, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Nida

Imtiaz, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern

Region, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,

for Appellee

-13-

APPBNDD( A2

Suprwnt @ourt of fLorf[u

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2026

David Kelsey Sparre,

Appellant(s)

sc2o24-L512

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

1620 1OCFOO8424AXXXMA

V.

State of Florida,

Appellee(s)

Appellant's Motion for Rehearing is hereby denied.

MUNIZ, C.J., ANd LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,

and SASSO, JJ., concur.

TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.

A True Copy

Test:

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A. Tomasino

Clerk. Suprcft.eCoufi

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sC2024- 151'2 I I 27 I 2t)').{}

KC

Served:

CHARMAINE MILLSAPS

CHELSEA RAE SHIRLEY

KARIN LEE MOORE

DAWN BRANDI MACREADY

DUVAL CLERK

HON. LANCE MANNING DAY

NIDA IMTIAZ

STEPHANIE NICOLE JAMIESON

HON. JONATHAN DAVID SACKS

BERNARDO ENRIQUE DE LA RIONDA

CAPAPPEALS TLH ATTORNEY GENERAL

APPENDD(A3

Filing # 169820618 E-Filed0312812023 02:44:31 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, FOURTH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR

DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO.: l6-2010-CF-008424-AXXX

DIVISION: CR-G

STATE OF FLORIDA

v

DAVID SPARRE,

Defendant.

OBDER DENYING SUCCESSTVE MOTION F'OR POSTCONVTCTION RBLTEF'

This cause came before this Court on Defendant's successive motion for postconviction

relief filed on February 16,2023. tn his motion, Defendant alleges death qualification in Duval

County results in a skerved cross-section of the community that excludes "Black jurors and other

jurors of coloC' at a disproportionate rate. In support of this argument, he relies on a study by

Jacinta Gau, an associate professor with the University of Central Florida.

At the outset, Defendant's argument fails because the Constitution does not prohibit the

State from death-qualiffing a jury

"Death qualification," unlike the rvholesale exclusion of blacks, women, or

Mexican-Americans from jury service, is carefully designed to serve the State's

concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and

impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing

phases ofa capital trial.There is very little danger, therefore, . . . that "death

qualification" tvas instituted as a means for the State to arbitrarily skerv the

composition of capital-case juries.

Lockhart v. McCree.476 U.S. 162,175-76 (1986). Seemingly aware of this, Defendant argues that

death qualification is nonetheless unconstitutional because distinctive groups have different viervs

on the death penalty. Flowever, the Court in Lockhart also rejected this reasoning: "ln our vierv,

CCEPTED: DUVAL COLINTY, JODY PHILLPS, CLERK, 0312912023 O4:47:26PM

groups defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or substantially impair

members of the group from performing one of their duties as jurors . . . are not 'distinctive groups'

for fair-cross-section purposes." Id. at 174. When the link between stricken jurors is their inability

to impartially sit on a capitaljury, not their membership in a "distinctive group," then the State

may excuse them for cause. Put plainly, a juror who cannot impose the death penalty cannot serve

on a capital jury. Eg, Franqui v. Statg. 804 So. 2d I185, I192 (Fla. 2001).

Further, Defendant has already been convicted and is cunently sentenced to death. Unlike

a defendant in a pre-trial posture, the composition of Defendant's jury is not unknorvn. Thus, he

must demonstrate that his conviction and sentence lvas the result of actual bias. See Carratelli v.

State.96l So. 2d312,324 (Fla.2007); Martin v. State,322 So. 3d25,37-38 (Fla.202l). Defendant

makes no attempt at such a showing, only arguing that the process of death qualification implicitly

creates ajury that is actually biased against him. Accordingly, his Motion is DENIED.I

DONE

in Jacksonville, Duval

.4a* -a

County, Florida, on this

z-{ou, of

,2023.

\

A.

Circuit Court Judge

I Bccause the claims raised in lhe instant molion are not similar to claims raised in the motion cunently pending before

the Florida Supreme Court, Defendant's Motion for Stay is DENIED. See Tompkins v. State. 984 So. 2d 857, 859

(Fla.2005) ("[T]he circuit court did not have jurisdiction to considerTompkins' motions rvhile the appeal of the denial

of his previous motions, vhich raised similar claints, rvas pending in this Court."); see also Tompkins v. State.994

So. 2d 1072, 1084-88 (Fla. 2008) (affirming summary denial of fifth successive motion for postconviction reliei,

entered rvhile appeal of fourth successive motion rvas pending).

')

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certiS that a copy of the foregoing has been furnished to all legal counsel for both parties

day of

via address listed above and/or Defendant by U.S. Mail this

2023.

&^-I-,

Deputy Clerk

Case No.: I 6-20 I 0-CF-008424-NOO(

3