Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Malik Reynolds, Petitioner v. United States

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MALIK REYNOLDS,

PETITIONER,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michelle L. Monahan

Assistant Federal Public Defender

1010 Market, Suite 200

St. Louis, MO. 63101

(314) 241-1255

Michelle_Monahan@fd.org

Attorney for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violate the Second Amendment on its face?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner (appellant below) is Malik Reynolds.

Respondent (appellee below) is the United States of America.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States v. Reynolds, No. 24-2862 (8th Cir. Dec. 24, 2026)

United States v. Reynolds, No. 4:22-cr-00724-JAR (E.D. Mo. Sept. 3, 2024)

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page:

Question Presented ............................................................................................................ i

Parties to the Proceedings ................................................................................................. ii

Related Proceedings ......................................................................................................... ii

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ iii

Table Of Authorities ......................................................................................................... 4

Opinion Below ................................................................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................................................... 1

Relevant Provisions .......................................................................................................... 1

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 2

Statement of the Case ....................................................................................................... 3

I.

Legal Background ....................................................................................... 3

II.

Factual and Procedural History ................................................................... 7

Reasons for Granting the Writ .......................................................................................... 9

I.

Debate continues over the extent of our right to bear arms. .......................... 9

II.

The decision below was wrong. ................................................................. 11

III.

This case is a suitable vehicle to resolve the confusion surrounding 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). .................................................................................... 13

IV.

If this case is not a suitable vehicle, the Court should hold the petition

pending its decision in another case presenting a similar challenge. ............ 14

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 1

Appendix A, Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,

United States v. Reynolds, No. 24-2862 (8th Cir. Dec. 24, 2025)……………………………...1a

Appendix B, Judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,

United States v. Reynolds, 4:22-cr-00724-JAR (E.D. Mo. Sept. 3, 2024) .................................4a

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. amend. II ....................................................................................................1, 3

Cases

Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976) ........................................................................ 4

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ..................................................... 2, 3, 4, 5

Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019).....................................................................3, 5

Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980)............................................................................ 4

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) ........................................................................ 11

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) ...................... 2, 5, 12

Range v. Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) ..................................................... 10

Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) ....................................................................... 11

United States v. Clemons, 155 F.4th 978 (8th Cir. 2025) ........................................................ 8

United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) ........................................................ 9, 10

United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) .......................................................... 9

United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) ........................................................ 9

United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) ............................................................. 9

United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024) .............................................. 6, 9, 12

United States v. Jackson, 121 F.4th 656 (8th Cir. 2024) ....................................................... 12

United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir 2023) ............................................................ 6

United States v. Langston, 110 F.4th 408 (1st Cir. 2024) ........................................................ 9

United States v. Mull, 113 F.4th 864 (8th Cir. 2024) ........................................................... 13

United States v. Neal, 715 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (N.D. Ill. 2024) ............................................... 10

United States v. Prince, 700 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2023)............................................... 11

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) .............................................................. 2, 5, 12

iv

United States v. Sharkey, 131 F.4th 621 (8th Cir. 2025) ....................................................... 13

United States v. Taylor, No. 4:23-CR-40001, 2024 WL 245557 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2024) ....... 11

United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906 (8th Cir. 2024) ........................................................... 7

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) ................................................ 10, 12

Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025) ................................................................ 9

Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025) ....................................................................... 9

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ............................................................................................. 1-3, 6-14

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) .....................................................................................................2, 5

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) ........................................................................................................ 1

18 U.S.C. § 925(c) .......................................................................................................... 12

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .............................................................................................................. 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 .............................................................................................................. 1

Rules

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 ................................................................................................................ 1

Sup. Ct. R. 13.3 ................................................................................................................ 1

Session Laws

An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961) .... 4

Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) ......................................3, 4

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 ..... 4

Other Authorities

Federal Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of

the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 41 (1965) (statement of Attorney General

Katzenbach)…………………………………………………………………………………….4

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) Firearms Offenses (May 2025) .............. 11

v

Malik Reynolds respectfully petitions the Court for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

OPINION BELOW

The panel opinion of the court of appeals was unpublished. It is available on Westlaw

at 2025 WL 3724592 and is reprinted in the Appendix to the Petition (“Pet. App.”) at 1a-3a.

JURISDICTION

Petitioner invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

The Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. It entered its opinion and

judgment on December 24, 2025, and Petitioner did not seek rehearing or en banc review.

Therefore, this petition is timely under Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 and 13.3.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS

The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the

security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

U.S. Const. amend. II.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) states: “It shall be unlawful for any person— (1) who has been

convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting

commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has

been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) states: “Whoever knowingly violates subsections (d) or (g) of

section 922 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both.”

1

INTRODUCTION1

This Court’s landmark decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008),

held that the Second Amendment codified an individual right to keep and bear arms. Fourteen

years later, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), adopted a

two-part framework for evaluating Second Amendment challenges. Under Bruen, courts must

first consider whether the plain text of the Second Amendment encompasses the conduct that

the challenged law proscribes. If it does, then the government must prove a Founding-era

legal tradition that is relevantly similar to the challenged law.

This Court first used the Bruen test to evaluate the constitutionality of a federal criminal

statute in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Rahimi held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8),

which bars firearm possession by those under certain restraining orders, was not facially

unconstitutional. It found that two Founding-era legal regimes were relevantly similar to

§ 922(g)(8): “going armed” laws and surety bonds. Like § 922(g)(8), these laws typically

applied based on individualized findings involving specific, serious misconduct with a gun.

In addition, the disarmament they permitted was temporary and subject to exceptions.

Bruen and Rahimi prompted litigation challenging several status-based prohibitions on

firearm possession. Section 922(g)(1), the federal ban on firearm possession by those with a

felony record, sits at the center of that litigation storm. To date, challenges have wrought

disparate outcomes and significant confusion.

Petitioner’s case is a suitable vehicle by which to quell that confusion.

This petition was adapted, with permission, from the petitions filed in United States v. Dawon Hennings,

No. 24-7260, cert. denied, 145. S. Ct. 2829 (U.S. June 23, 2025) and United States v. Tracy Jenkins, No.

25-5925, cert. denied, 223 L. Ed. 2d 249 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2025).

1

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Legal Background

The Second Amendment protects a pre-existing right to keep and bear arms. Heller,

554 U.S. at 592. In fact, a direct predecessor to the Second Amendment can be found in the

English Declaration of Rights—which secured, for certain members of the English

population, an individual right to “have Arms for their Defence[.]” Id. at 593 (quoting 1 W.

& M., ch. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441). Following the Glorious Revolution, the right

to keep and bear arms became “fundamental” for all English subjects; so, by the 1760’s and

1770’s, the Crown’s attempt to disarm inhabitants of the most rebellious colonies provoked

“polemical reactions by Americans[.]” Id. at 593-94.

After the Revolution, Americans sought more enduring protections for their rights; to

that end, the federal Constitution was amended in 1791 to provide that “the right of the people

to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.

With the Second Amendment in place, Founding-era legislatures avoided broad, classbased restrictions on arms. That was true even for those who had a criminal record:

“Founding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right to bear arms simply because of their

status as felons.” Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).

However, Congress abruptly switched course during the New Deal era. In 1938, our

legislature criminalized the receipt of firearms by individuals with certain criminal

convictions. See Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. 75-785, ch. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251

(1938). That law—the Federal Firearms Act—was narrower than the modern-day

disarmament provision in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); it only applied to those who received a

firearm or ammunition after having been convicted of a “crime of violence,” including

3

“murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnaping, burglary, housebreaking,” or certain

kinds of aggravated assault. Id. at § 1(6).

It wasn’t until 1961 that Congress passed a law prohibiting the receipt of firearms by

anyone who had been convicted of a crime “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year.” See An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87-342, § 2, 75

Stat. 757, 757 (1961). Lawmakers of the Great Society era held the widespread but erroneous

view that “the right to bear arms . . . relates only to the maintenance of the militia.” Federal

Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the

Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 41 (1965) (statement of Attorney General

Katzenbach). As a result, they took an “expansive legislative approach” in order to keep arms

from “potentially irresponsible persons, including convicted felons.” Lewis v. United States, 445

U.S. 55, 61 (1980); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 220 (1976). By the late 1960’s, our

legislature had expanded the Federal Firearms Act to criminalize the possession of firearms

and ammunition by anyone with a felony conviction. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe

Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202(a)(1), 82 Stat. 197, 236.

Heller debunked the prevailing myth that the Second Amendment only guaranteed a

collective, militia-based right to bear arms. See 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt,

on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual

right to keep and bear arms.”). However, the Heller Court also emphasized, in dicta, that,

nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws

forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and

government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the

commercial sale of arms.

4

Id. at 626-27. Calling these prohibitions “presumptively lawful,” id. at 627 n.26, Heller assured

readers that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the

exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.” Id. at 635.

Following Heller, most courts of appeal adopted a balancing test which assessed “‘how

close [a challenged] law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity

of the law’s burden on that right.’” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 18 (quoting Kanter, 919 F.3d at 441).

Bruen rejected that judicially-crafted balancing test: It held that “when the Second

Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively

protects that conduct.” Id. at 17. And, if a law restricts protected conduct, the government

“must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of

firearm regulation.” Id. If the government cannot establish “relevantly similar” historical

analogue, the challenged regulation is unconstitutional. Id. at 29.

The Court provided additional Second Amendment guidance in Rahimi. That case

addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which disarms individuals who are

subject to a restraining order issued following a court’s determination that the restrainee

presents a “credible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner or child.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(8). Ultimately, the Rahimi Court found that § 922(g)(8) was constitutional, noting

that there is a historical tradition of temporarily disarming persons after making an

individualized finding that they present a credible threat of violence. 602 U.S. 680 at 695-98.

Referencing Heller’s dicta on presumptive lawfulness, the majority opinion in Rahimi

emphasized that it did not suggest that the Second Amendment “prohibits the enactment of

laws banning the possession of guns by categories of persons thought by a legislature to

present a special danger of misuse[.]” Id. at 699. Again, however, it did not address the

5

propriety of laws which were not before the Court. See id. at 702 (“In Heller, McDonald, and

Bruen, this Court did not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of

the Second Amendment. Nor do we do so today.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

The Eighth Circuit, which includes the District where Petitioner committed his

offenses, first applied Bruen to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir

2023), vacated by 2024 WL 3768055 (8th Cir. Aug. 8, 2024). That decision did not survive

Rahimi. See Jackson v. United States, No. 23-6170, 144 S. Ct. 2710 (U.S. July 2, 2024) (granting

certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remanding for further consideration in light of Rahimi).

After receiving this Court’s remand of Jackson I, the Eighth Circuit issued a new

opinion (Jackson II) just three days later. 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 246517, 145. S. Ct. 2708 (U.S. May 19, 2025). After making minimal changes to its opinion in

Jackson I, the panel concluded that there was “no need for felony-by-felony litigation regarding

the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).” Id. at 1125. Indeed, Jackson II reasoned that because

legislatures “traditionally employed status-based restrictions to disqualify categories of

persons from possessing firearms . . . Congress acted within the historical tradition when it

enacted § 922(g)(1) and the prohibition on possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 1129.

Jackson II relied heavily on Heller’s dicta about the presumptive lawfulness of felon-inpossession laws. See id. at 1125, 1128-29. The Eighth Circuit subsequently cited that dicta as

its basis for distinguishing § 922(g)(1) from statutes which it believes are amenable to asapplied constitutional challenges. See United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 909 n.2 (8th Cir.

6

2024), cert. denied, No. 24-5089, 145 S. Ct. 304 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2024) (addressing a Second

Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)).2

II.

Factual and Procedural History

Petitioner Malik Reynolds pleaded guilty to two violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Pet. App. 1a. He did not challenge the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) prior to the entry of his

guilty plea and, as part of a plea agreement, admitted that he had possessed a firearm on June

30, 2022 and ammunition on October 30, 2022. Dist. Ct. Dkt. 47 at 4-5.3 More specifically,

Petitioner admitted that a gun “fell out of [his] pants” during an arrest on June 30, 2022 and

that video showed him “shooting a pistol” from inside a convenience store on October 30,

2022. Id. Petitioner also admitted that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable

by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Id. at 5.

After accepting the guilty plea, the District Court sentenced Petitioner to 71 months

on each count, running concurrently for a total term of 71 months in federal prison. Id. at 5a.

On appeal, Petitioner argued that “18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face.” Pet.

C.A. Br. at 40 (8th Cir. Jan. 21, 2025). Although he acknowledged that his claim was

foreclosed by Jackson II, he argued that the conduct targeted by his prosecution was covered

by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 41-47. He then asserted that § 922(g)(1) has

“two unique features which make it unconstitutional on its face.” Id. at 48. “First,” he noted,

“the statute contains a lifelong ban on firearm possession—it is not time-limited or temporary

in any way.” Id. “Second, the statute is not triggered by an individual determination of

The constitutionality of § 922(g)(3) is at issue in United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234, cert. granted,

146 S. Ct. 326 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2025), argued (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026).

3

“Dist. Ct. Dkt.” refers to the docket in United States v. Reynolds, 4:22-cr-00724-JAR (E.D. Mo.).

2

7

dangerousness; it goes into effect automatically, and disarmament is triggered by any

conviction punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Id. Ultimately,

Petitioner asserted that—despite the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Jackson II—there was no

historical tradition supporting the enactment of § 922(g)(1). Id. at 48-50.

Reviewing Petitioner’s claim for plain error, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “there

was no error, plain or otherwise[.]” Pet. App. at 2a. The panel reasoned that it had “already

rejected a challenge like this one,” citing United States v. Clemons, 155 F.4th 978 (8th Cir.

2025)—which, in turn, concluded that a facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)

was precluded by Jackson II. Thus, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. Id. at 3a.

8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

Debate continues over the extent of our right to bear arms.

Courts are struggling to find a coherent way to adjudicate § 922(g)(1) challenges

following Bruen and Rahimi. Petitioner acknowledges that no Circuit has found that

§ 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional. However, there is a clear split of authority on related

matters.

The Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have foreclosed

challenges to the felon-in-possession restriction while citing Heller’s dicta. See Zherka v. Bondi,

140 F.4th 68, 73, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-269, 2026 WL 135708 (U.S. Jan.

20, 2026); United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 703-05 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 246818, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (June 2, 2025); Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1125; United States v. Duarte, 137

F.4th 743, 750-52 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc), cert. denied, No. 25-425, 2026 WL 135692 (U.S.

Jan. 20, 2026); Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 241155, 2026 WL 568283 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026); United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 890-94

(11th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6281, 2026 WL 135685 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026).4

The law is different in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. Those Circuits have left open the

possibility of as-applied challenges that would be foreclosed in the Second, Fourth, Eighth,

Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 470 n.4 (5th Cir.

2024), cert. denied, No. 24-6625, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (U.S June 23, 2025); United States v. Williams,

The First Circuit has also relied upon Heller’s dicta to deny a Second Amendment challenge

to § 922(g)(1), although that case was decided under a plain error standard. See United States

v. Langston, 110 F.4th 408, 419-20 (1st Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-5795, 145 S. Ct. 581

(U.S. Nov. 18, 2024).

4

9

113 F.4th 637, 657 (6th Cir. 2024). The Sixth Circuit has recognized that every person with a

felony conviction enjoys “a constitutionally required opportunity to show that he is not

dangerous[.]” Williams, 113 F.4th at 663. The Fifth Circuit, while not explicitly adopting a

dangerousness standard, has explicitly declined to “foreclose” as-applied challenges. Diaz,

116 F.4th at 470 n.4.

One other Circuit—the Third—has gone even further. Sitting en banc, it found

§ 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied. Range v. Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218, 232 (3d Cir.

2024) (en banc) (reasoning that the record contained “no evidence that [the plaintiff] poses a

physical danger to others” and holding that, without a showing of dangerousness, “§ 922(g)(1)

cannot constitutionally strip [the plaintiff] of his Second Amendment rights”).

To recap, six Circuits have rendered § 922(g)(1) immune to Second Amendment

challenges. Two others permit as-applied challenges, although they have not yet encountered

a meritorious one. And one has found the federal prohibition unconstitutional as applied.

This state of affairs shows that the Circuits are a long way from finding consensus, despite the

guidance of Bruen and Rahimi.

Section 922(g)(1) has not only confounded our appellate courts; it has also “deeply

divided district courts.” Supp. Br. for the Fed. Parties, Jackson v. United States, No. 23-6170, 4

(U.S. June 24, 2024). Some have held that the statue is unconstitutional in cases involving

“felons with convictions for violent crimes, such as murder, manslaughter, armed robbery,

and carjacking.” Id. (collecting cases). Notably, a few district courts have done what Petitioner

asked Eighth Circuit to do and have invalidated § 922(g)(1) on its face. See, e.g., United States

v. Neal, 715 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 2024), appeal docketed, No. 24-1219 (7th Cir. Feb

12, 2024); United States v. Taylor, No. 4:23-CR-40001, 2024 WL 245557, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Jan.

10

22, 2024), appeal docketed, 24-1244 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 2024); United States v. Prince, 700 F. Supp.

3d 663, 675-76 (N.D. Ill. 2023), appeal docketed, No. 23-3155 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 2023), argued

(7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2024).

Those decisions may not survive appellate review. However, their existence highlights

the untenable state of the law. In Petitioner’s hometown of St. Louis, the government is free

to bring § 922(g)(1) prosecutions against anyone with a felony record, regardless of the

circumstances surrounding their prior conviction. Yet just across the Mississippi River in

Illinois, several judges have concluded that the government cannot constitutionally prosecute

a § 922(g)(1) case against anyone. So, although the Second Amendment protects a

“fundamental” right, McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010), its scope now depends

on the vagaries of geography.

Confusion over § 922(g) is no minor thing, because that law is “no minor provision.”

Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225, 239 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting). The government

prosecuted nearly 7,500 cases under § 922(g) in fiscal year 2024. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Quick

Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) Firearms Offenses, 1 (May 2025). Over 90% of those convictions

occurred because the defendant had a “a prior felony conviction.” Id.

Chaos over § 922(g)(1)’s status thus affects thousands of people every year. This Court

should step in to resolve the ongoing uncertainty over a critical criminal law.

II.

The decision below was wrong.

The Eighth Circuit decided Petitioner’s appeal based on Jackson II, an opinion that is

inconsistent with the Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence.

Bruen instructed courts to ask, as part of a historical analysis, “whether modern and

historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and

11

whether that burden is comparably justified[.]” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29. In other words, courts

must ask “[w]hy and how” a challenged regulation burdens the Second Amendment right to

bear arms. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692.

Jackson II did not account for how § 922(g)(1) burdens the right to bear arms. Indeed,

the Eighth Circuit failed to reckon with the law’s defining feature: a lifetime ban on possessing

any firearm or ammunition, without exception.5 See United States v. Jackson, 121 F.4th 656, 660

(8th Cir. 2024) (Stras, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Jackson II . . .

makes no attempt to explain how the burden imposed by the felon-in-possession statute,

which lasts for a lifetime, is comparable to any of the Founding-era laws it discusses.”). Such

an extreme burden has no parallel in our tradition: as Rahimi noted, comparable disarmament

laws were temporary, not permanent. 602 U.S. at 699.

Jackson II also watered down the second part of the Bruen analysis, which looks at the

“why” behind firearm restrictions. After examining laws that targeted disfavored groups, the

opinion concluded that “legislatures traditionally employed status-based restrictions to

disqualify categories of persons from possessing firearms.” 110 F.4th at 1129. But, by

operating at such a high level of generality, Jackson II gave “deference to Congress’s blanket

determination that a group numbering in the tens of millions and ranging from murderers to

ketchup-bottle tamperers categorically ‘present[s] an unacceptable risk of danger if armed.’”

Jackson, 121 F.4th at 660 (Stras, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson II, 110 F.4th at 1128). Such

deference is a threat to our liberty, which each member of this Court acknowledged in Rahimi.

There is a statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), which allows “[a] person who is prohibited from

possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition [to] make application to

the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws[.]” However, “Congress

hasn’t funded the program in decades.” Williams, 113 F.4th at 661. And even if there were a robust

§ 925(c) program, a law preventing individuals from exercising their core constitutional rights does

not become permissible simply because the government has the discretion to allow exceptions.

5

12

See 602 U.S. at 772-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “[n]ot a single Member of the

Court adopts the Government’s theory” that it can “disarm anyone who is not ‘responsible’

and ‘law-abiding’”).

By failing to pay sufficient attention to “how” or “why,” Jackson II played fast and

loose with our fundamental rights. The opinion below, which affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction, added nothing to Jackson II and did not shore up any of its faults. For that reason,

the Court should grant this petition and set the historical record straight.

III.

This case is a suitable vehicle to resolve the confusion surrounding 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1).

This petition presents a clean question with no loose ends. While Petitioner forfeited

this issue below, he did not waive it, and the Eighth Circuit recognized as much when it

reached the merits of his appeal instead of adopting the government’s waiver argument. See

Pet. App. 2a (concluding that Petitioner could challenge the facial constitutionality of the

felon-in-possession-statute “despite his guilty plea”).

In addition, a favorable ruling would establish that the Eighth Circuit’s decision was

plain error. Currently, the Eighth Circuit resolves all Second Amendment challenges to

§ 922(g)(1) based on Jackson II, regardless of the standard of review or whether the challenge

is facial or as-applied. See, e.g., United States v. Sharkey, 131 F.4th 621, 622 (8th Cir. 2025)

(concluding that Jackson II foreclosed facial and as-applied challenges, including those

preserved in district court); United States v. Mull, 113 F.4th 864, 869-70 (8th Cir. 2024) (holding

that Jackson II foreclosed an unpreserved Second Amendment challenge). So, if the Court

settles Petitioner’s unpreserved facial claim, its holding will translate to preserved challenges,

both facial and as-applied.

13

IV.

If this case is not a suitable vehicle, the Court should hold the petition pending its

decision in another case presenting a similar challenge.

The Court has another viable option: it can hold this petition pending the disposition

of a related challenge. Similar petitions appear on a recurring basis, with at least one pending

at seemingly any time. See, e.g., Pet. for Cert., Beaird v. United States, No. 25-5343 (U.S. Aug.

1, 2025) (pending petition asking this Court to review “whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

comports with the Second Amendment”).

This approach would not only promote judicial economy—it would ensure Petitioner

receives the justice he seeks.

14

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of April, 2026,

/s/Michelle Monahan___________

Michelle L. Monahan

Assistant Federal Public Defender

1010 Market Street, Suite 200

St. Louis, Missouri 63101

Telephone: (314) 241-1255

Fax: (314) 421-3177

E-mail: Michelle_Monahan@fd.org

Attorney For Petitioner