Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Moses Martin, Petitioner v. Florida

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MOSES MARTIN, PETITIONER,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

_____________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

_____________

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DANIEL EISINGER

Public Defender

Benjamin Nathaniel Paley

Assistant Public Defender

Counsel of Record

Office of the Public Defender

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida

421 Third Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

(561) 355–7600

Bpaley@pd15.org

Lmattocks@pd15.org

Appeals@pd15.org

1

APPENDIX A

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

MOSES MARTIN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D2024-0053

[December 11, 2025]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County; Frank Ledee, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 10-17452CF10A, 111247CF10A, 11-4711CF10A, 11-5722CF10A, 12-4613CF10A, 14243CF10A, 14-1340CF10A, and 21-9575CF10A.

Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Benjamin Nathaniel Paley,

Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, LEVINE and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

*

*

*

Not final until disposition of timely-filed motion for rehearing.

APPENDIX B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT, 110 SOUTH TAMARIND AVENUE, WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33401

January 9, 2026

MOSES MARTIN,

Appellant(s)

v.

CASE NO. - 4D2024-0053

L.T. No. - 10-17452CF10A;

1247CF10A; 11-4711CF10A

11-

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee(s)

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

ORDERED that Appellant's December 11, 2025 motion for written opinion is denied.

Served:

Crim App WPB Attorney General

Rachael Kaiman

Benjamin Paley

Palm Beach Public Defender

KTH

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the court’s order.

4D2024-0053 January 9, 2026

LONN WEISSBLUM, Clerk

Fourth District Court of Appeal

4D2024-0053 January 9, 2026

APPENDIX C

II. SECTION 790.23 VIOLATES MR. MARTIN’S RIGHT TO

BEAR

ARMS

UNDER

THE

UNITED

STATES

CONSTITUTION.

a. The standard of review is de novo.

“The constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law subject to de novo review.” City of Fort Lauderdale v. Dhar, 185 So. 3d

1232, 1234 (Fla. 2016).

b. This issue did not need to be preserved, because a facial

challenge to a statute’s constitutionality can be raised for

the first time on appeal.

Mr. Martin is challenging the facial constitutionality of section

790.23. Although he admits that he did not raise this issue below, a

facial challenge to a statute’s constitutionality does not need to be

preserved for appeal, because it can be raised for the first time on

appeal. N.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 183 So. 3d 1186, 1187

(Fla. 3d DCA 2016); see also Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v.

Mendez, 98 So. 3d 604, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“Unlike facial

challenges to a statute, as-applied challenges are subject to the rules

of preservation.”). Thus, this issue did not need to be preserved for

appeal.

11

APPENDIX C

c. The words of the United States Constitution must be

interpreted based on their plain and ordinary meaning.

The Constitution “was written to be understood by the voters.”

United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931). Its “[w]ords are

to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the

context indicates that they bear a technical sense.” Antonin Scalia &

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 6,

at 69 (2012). Thus, “where the intention [is] clear,” “there is no room

for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.”

Sprague, 282 U.S. at 731.

An appellate court’s review of a facial challenge to a statute is

limited. Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014). “[A]

determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that

no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be

valid.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So. 2d 250,

256 (Fla. 2005). To make that determination, this Court will “consider

only the text of the statute, not its specific application to a particular

set of circumstances.” Abdool, 141 So. 3d at 538. Crucially, “[i]t is a

fundamental principle of federal constitutional law that no state

court is authorized to interpret any provision of the United States

12

APPENDIX C

Constitution . . . in a manner [that] is contrary to United States

Supreme Court decisions interpreting the same provision of the

United States Constitution.” Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Ane, 423 So.

2d 376, 384–85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

“As in all constitutional challenges, [a] statute comes to [this]

Court clothed with the presumption of correctness and all reasonable

doubts about [a] statute’s validity must be resolved in favor of

constitutionality.” Dhar, 185 So. 3d at 1234. “[T]o overcome the

presumption of constitutionality, ‘the invalidity must appear beyond

reasonable doubt.’” Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. State,

384 So. 3d 67, 77 (Fla. 2024) (quoting Franklin v. State, 887 So. 2d

1063, 1073 (Fla. 2004)).

d. The Bruen test has two steps, both of which must be met

for a firearm regulation to meet constitutional muster.

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia,

being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people

to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Amend. II, U.S. Const.

Because the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear

arms, “the government may not simply posit that [a firearm]

regulation promotes an important interest.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol

13

APPENDIX C

Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). “Rather, the government must

demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.

The Supreme Court has articulated a two-step analysis “when

passing on the constitutionality of a firearm [regulation].” Edenfield

v. State, 379 So. 3d 5, 7 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023). “First, courts must

determine whether ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an

individual’s conduct[.]’” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24). “If so,

then the ‘Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,’ and

therefore, the Government ‘must then justify its regulation by

demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation.’” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24).

“Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls

outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’” Bruen,

597 U.S. at 24 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36,

50 n.10 (1961)). “To carry its burden, the state or federal government

must point to ‘“historical precedent” from before, during, and even

after the founding [that] evinces a comparable tradition of

regulation.’” Edenfield, 379 So. 3d at 7–8 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at

27).

14

APPENDIX C

e. Section 790.23 fails to meet either step of the Bruen test

and fails to meet constitutional muster.

The first step in the Bruen analysis is whether Mr. Martin is

protected by the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment’s text

makes it clear that it applies to “the people.” See amend. II, U.S.

Const. “[T]he people . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a

national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient

connection with this country to be considered part of that

community.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008)

(quoting United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265

(1990)). As can be seen, there is no felon/non-felon distinction within

the term “the people” in the Second Amendment. See also United

States v. Jimenez-Shilon, 34 F.4th 1042, 1046 (11th Cir. 2022)

(describing felons as “indisputably part of ‘the people’” under the

Second Amendment); United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664,

671 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that a person’s criminal record is

irrelevant in determining whether the person is among “the people”

protected under the Second Amendment). Thus, Mr. Martin is

protected by the Second Amendment.

15

APPENDIX C

The second step in the Bruen analysis is whether an historical

tradition exists that supports permanently dispossessing felons of

firearms. The State bears the burden to prove so. Here, the State

cannot meet its burden, as there is more than enough historical

evidence to support the fact that nonviolent felons either were not

permanently dispossessed of firearms or were not deprived at all of

their firearms.

In Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019), the State of

Wisconsin and the United States offered three rationales for

categorical bans of felons possessing firearms. First, they claimed

that

“there

is

some

evidence

suggesting

that

founding-era

legislatures deprived felons of the right” to bear arms. Id. at 454

(Barrett, J., dissenting). “Second, they argue[d] that because the

states put felons to death at the time of the founding, no one would

have questioned their authority to take felons’ guns too.” Id. “And

third, they insist[ed] that founding-era legislatures permitted only

virtuous citizens to have guns, and felons are not virtuous citizens.”

Id.

In response, then-Judge Barrett stated that although “[t]he

historical evidence . . . support[s] . . . that [a] legislature may disarm

16

APPENDIX C

those who have demonstrated a proclivity for violence or whose

possession of guns would otherwise threaten the public safety,” that

does not support “the proposition that the legislature can

permanently deprive felons of the right to possess arms simply

because of their status as felons.” Id.

Recently, in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the

Supreme Court held, in its first post-Bruen Second Amendment case,

that a person who was subject to a domestic violence restraining

order and was found to represent a credible threat could be

temporarily circumscribed from possessing a firearm. Id. at 702. The

Court concluded that such a prohibition was facially constitutional

because the nation’s tradition of firearm regulation allows the

government to temporarily disarm individuals so long as they present

a credible threat to the physical safety of others. Id. at 692.

The key in Rahimi is that there was a finding that Mr. Rahimi

represented a credible threat. Thus, at the point in time Mr. Rahimi

no longer represents a credible threat, he will be allowed to once

again possess firearms. See id. (“[I]f laws at the founding regulated

firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong

indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for

17

APPENDIX C

similar reasons fall within a permissible category of regulations.”); id.

at 699 (“Moreover, like surety bonds of limited duration, Section

922(g)(8)’s restriction was temporary as applied to Rahimi. Section

922(g)(8) only prohibits firearm possession so long as the defendant

‘is’ subject to a restraining order. § 922(g)(8). In Rahimi’s case that is

one to two years after his release from prison, according to Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 85.025(c) (West 2019). App. 6–7.”).

Here, no set of circumstances exists under which section

790.23 could be constitutionally applied, as it permanently deprives

any felon (violent or nonviolent) of possessing firearms.4 Unlike in

Rahimi, section 790.23 permanently dispossess felons of any firearm;

it is not a one-to-two year ban; and it provides no mechanism for

getting the right to bear arms returned after a number of years have

passed or circumstances have changed. In fact, no founding-era

firearm regulation ever categorically and permanently restricted

felons from possessing firearms.

4 Mr. Martin is not saying that the State cannot prohibit a felon

from possessing firearms for the rest of that felon’s life while serving

a life sentence. In fact, the State is justified in doing so under its

authority to regulate prisons. See § 944.47(1)(a)5., Fla. Stat. (2024)

(prohibiting felons from possessing firearms or weapons of any kind

in state prisons). However, that statute is not at issue in this case.

18

APPENDIX C

Because section 790.23 is a permanent ban, it is not analogous

to any prior firearm regulation. Thus, this Court should reverse Mr.

Martin’s conviction and sentence.

III. SECTION 790.23 VIOLATES MR. MARTIN’S RIGHT TO

BEAR ARMS UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION.

a. The standard of review is de novo.

“The constitutional validity of a law is a legal issue subject to de

novo review by this [C]ourt.” Norman v. State, 159 So. 3d 205, 210

(Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

b. This issue is preserved because a facial challenge to a

statute’s constitutionality can be raised for the first time

on appeal.

Mr. Martin is challenging the facial constitutionality of section

790.23. Although he admits that he did not raise this issue below, a

facial challenge to a statute’s constitutionality does not need to be

preserved for appeal, because it can be raised for the first time on

appeal. N.B., 183 So. 3d at 1187; see also Mendez, 98 So. 3d at 608

(“Unlike facial challenges to a statute, as-applied challenges are

subject to the rules of preservation.”). Thus, this issue did not need

to be preserved for appeal.

19