Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Timothy Peoples, Jr., Petitioner v. Raul Machuca, Jr., et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 30, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

u/r\iu.iiuy.

vaoc.

iu. i , r aye i ui

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

OCT 30 2025

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

TIMOTHY PEOPLES, Jr.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

RAUL MACHUCA, Jr.; et al.,

No. 25-4823

D.C.No.

1:19-cv-05468-RMI

Northern District of California,

San Francisco

ORDER

Defendants - Appellees.

Appellant has not paid $605 to the district court in fees for this appeal and

filed proof of payment with this court, as ordered by this court on September 30,

2025.

The court’s September 30, 2025 order stated that no motions for

reconsideration, clarification, or modification of the denial of appellant’s in forma

pauperis status will be entertained. Therefore, the court will take no action on

appellant’s motion at Docket Entry No. 12.

This appeal is therefore dismissed. See 9th Cir. R. 42-1.

This order becomes the mandate of the court in 21 days.

FOR THE COURT:

MOLLY C. DWYER

CLERK OF COURT

Case l:19-cv-05468-RMI

Document 171

Filed 07/10/25

Page 1 of 7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY PEOPLES,

Plaintiff,

RAUL MACHUCA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05468-RMI

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. No. 158

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

argued that Defendants used excessive force, were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs, and retaliated against him. Now pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings (dkt. 158), which seeks to dismiss the complaint because the action is

barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed an opposition (dkt. 163) and Defendants filed a

reply (dkt. 164). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On March 14, 2012, Plaintiff filed a case against the same Defendants with the same

claims. See Peoples v. Mack, Case No. 3:12-cv-1281-CRB (“Peoples T'). On February 2, 2015,

the court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiffs failure to

exhaust administrative remedies. (Peoples I, dkt. 110). The claims against these Defendants were

dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff could refile if he exhausted administrative remedies. Id.

at 15.

After summary judgment was granted in Peoples I, Plaintiff attempted to exhaust

administrative remedies at the prison. (Dkt. 1 in the instant action, pp. 18-19,27-30.). The

administrative appeal was denied as untimely by prison officials, (id. at 28, 33, 42-43). Plaintiff

mailed this instant action to the court on August 14, 2019. (Dkt. 1, p. 4). Defendants filed a

Case l:19-cv-05468-RMI

United States District Court

Filed 07/10/25

Page 2 of 7

motion for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to properly exhaust administrative

remedies. (Dkt. 65). The motion was denied on January 13, 2022. (Dkt. 86).

Counsel was later appointed for Plaintiff and the case was proceeding towards trial.

Counsel for Plaintiff withdrew on April 3, 2024, and Plaintiff again continued pro se. Based on

the parties’ joint stipulation with several discovery and disclosure deadlines, and due to new

discovery obtained, Defendants were allowed to file an additional dispositive motion. (Dkt. 140).

After this motion was fully briefed, the case was referred for settlement, but did not settle.

Therefore, the court will look .to the merits of the motion.

Northern District of California

Document 171

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(c), a party may move for “judgment on the pleadings” after the pleadings

are closed. The difference between a motion under Rule 12(c) and motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is

the time of filing; otherwise, they are functionally identical. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,

867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). To obtain judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must

clearly establish that the pleadings cannot raise a triable issue of fact, and that judgment as a

matter of law should be entered. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d

1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). In evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all material

allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. See Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. Instead, courts in § 1983 actions

apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471

U.S. 261, 276 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley

& Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 377-78 (2004); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).

In California, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the two-year period set forth in

California Civil Procedure Code § 335.1. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir.

2004). Section 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations

when a person is “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a

criminal court for a term of less than for life.” Id. § 352.1(a). However, the disability of

imprisonment only delays the accrual of the cause of action for a maximum of two years. See id.

Case l:19-cv-05468-RMI

Filed 07/10/25

Page 3 of 7

It is federal law that determines when a cause of action accrues, and thus, when the statute

of limitations begins to run in a § 1983 action. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under

federal law, a claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of the action. See TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991-92.

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Document 171

DISCUSSION

Statute of Limitations

The events giving rise to this case occurred in May 2011. (Dkt. 1, pp. 7-8, 13; dkt. 26, pp.

5-6). Because Plaintiff was imprisoned, he had.four years to commence the instant case: two

years under California Civil Procedure Code § 335.1, and two more years under California Civil

Procedure Code § 352.1 because he was imprisoned. Therefore, the statute of limitations expired

in May 2015. Because this case was filed on August 14, 2019, it is untimely by several years.

Plaintiff s opposition only briefly discusses the statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends

that he exhausted administrative remedies and timely filed the prior case. Plaintiff does not

address any of Defendants’ specific contentions, nor does he present any arguments for statutory

or equitable tolling.

A review of the record indicates that the two main issues regarding the statute of

limitations are the effects of Peoples I and if any tolling is appropriate. Defendants argue that

limitations period was not tolled during the pendency of Peoples I. Their argument is well taken.

Generally, an action that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statute of limitations:

The filing of a suit stops the running of the statute of limitations,

though only contingently. . . . [I]f the suit is dismissed without

prejudice, meaning that it can be refiled, then the tolling effect of the

filing of the suit is wiped out and the statute of limitations is deemed

to have continued running from whenever the cause of action accrued,

without interruption by that filing.... In other words, a suit dismissed

without prejudice is treated for statute of limitations purposes as if it

had never been filed.

Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1011 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Cirlasky v. CIA, 355 F.3d

661, 672 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit and other courts in California

have reached the same conclusion. See O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.

2006); Wood v. Eiling Corp., 512 P.3d 755, 758 (1977) (“In the absence of a statute, a party

Case l:19-cv-05468-RMI

Filed 07/10/25

Page 4 of 7

cannot deduct from the period of the statute of limitations applicable to his case the time

consumed by the pendency of an action in which he sought to have the matter adjudicated, but

which was dismissed without prejudice to him.”); Gibbs v. Wood, 2017 WL 1407727, at *3-4

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2017); Sandoval v. Barneburg, 2013 WL 5961087, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6,

■ 5

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Document 171

2013) (finding pro se prisoner not entitled to equitable tolling during pendency of his prior federal

lawsuit, the dismissal of which was affirmed on appeal).

In this case, Plaintiff pursued Peoples 1, but he failed to complete the administrative

exhaustion process, so the claims and Defendants were dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly,

the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims continued running from the date those claims

accrued. Because the statute of limitations expired in May 2015, this case is untimely absent any

additional tolling. See Epps v. Deleon, 2019 WL 2339430, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. June 3, 2019)

.12

(second case was untimely because the prior case was dismissed without prejudice and did not toll

the limitations period), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 772 (9th Cir. 2020).

Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations is tolled for the period in which a prisoner administratively

exhausted his underlying grievances pursuant to the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”). See Soto v. Unknown Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that a

prisoner “is entitled to tolling [of the applicable statute of limitations] while he was actively

exhausting his remedies” under the PLRA); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“the applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory

exhaustion process”).

The court in Peoples I found that Plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies

related to these claims. There is no clear consensus among district courts in the Ninth Circuit as to

whether a plaintiff is entitled to tolling for grievances that were rejected under prison regulations

and therefore would not properly exhaust a claim for purposes of the PLRA. Compare Baker v.

German, 2018 WL 276762, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018) (finding that the plaintiff was “not

entitled to exhaustion-based tolling because his appeal was cancelled as untimely” but noting that,

even with such tolling, “the instant action would still be time barred”) with Jackson v. Harrison,

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case l:19-cv-05468-RMI

Document 171

Filed 07/10/25

Page 5 of 7

2010 WL 3895478, at *12, *18 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 3895468 (C.D. Cal.

Sept. 28, 2010) (finding prison officials “were justified in screening out the” grievance “as

untimely, since more than fifteen days had elapsed since the” incident, but the plaintiff was

“entitled to equitable tolling while he completed, or at least attempted to complete^] the

mandatory exhaustion processf;]” ultimately finding that this tolling did not render the claim

timely).

Even if Plaintiff was entitled to additional tolling while he attempted to exhaust

administrative remedies prior to Peoples I, this case would still be untimely. The Court in Peoples

I found that Plaintiff attempted to submit 23 grievances between March 2011 to May 2012, but

that no properly filed grievances concerned the Defendants and events for the case. (Peoples I,

dkt. 110, p. 6). Even if Plaintiff did attempt to exhaust a grievance relevant to these Defendants

and claims, and even if he was provided fourteen months of tolling for exhaustion and the

additional two-year tolling for California Civil Procedure Code section 352.1, the instant case

would still be untimely by roughly three years.

The court previously held in the instant case that Plaintiff properly exhausted his claims

after the earlier dismissal in Peoples I. (Dkt. 86). However, the court found that Plaintiffs initial

inmate appeal after the dismissal in Peoples I was filed on June 1, 2017. (Dkt. 86, pp. 7-8).1

Plaintiff started the exhaustion process more than two years after the statute of limitations expired.

No amount of tolling during the exhaustion of his claims can cure the fact that the statute of

limitations had already expired.

Equitable Tolling

“Equitable tolling under California law operates independently of the literal wording of the

Code of Civil Procedure to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure

fundamental practicality and fairness.” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 73 P.3d 517, 523 (Cal. 2003)) (cleaned up). “The purpose of

To the extent Plaintiff now contends that he was also exhausting administrative remedies in the

Years Pnor to 2017, he has not provided sufficient arguments or evidence to support this assertion,

nor has he discussed how this would affect the statute of limitations.

Case l:19-cv-05468-RMI

Page 6 of 7

California’s equitable tolling doctrine ‘is to soften the harsh impact of technical rales which might

otherwise prevent a good faith litigant from having a day in court.’” Id. (citing Daviton v.

Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Filed 07/10/25

Document 171

California law recognizes tolling “in a later suit when an earlier suit was filed and where

the record shows: (1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to

the defendant in gathering evidence to defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and

reasonable conduct by the plaintiffin filing the second claim.” Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Collier v. City ofPasadena, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924 (Cal. Ct. App.

1983), and Addison v. State, 578 P.3d 941, 943—44 (Cal. 1978)) (internal quotations omitted).

However, such tolling does not apply when the two lawsuits were filed in the same forum.

Centaur Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund Ltd. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 878 F. Supp. 2d

1009, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“In Addison, however, the California Supreme Court also explained

that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies when a plaintiff has several legal remedies and

reasonably, and in good faith, pursues one. . . . California’s equitable tolling doctrine does not

apply in this case because this case and [the first] were filed in the same forum: this Court.”); see

also Jamison v. Garza, 2017 WL 3226472, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2017) (“when a plaintiff does

not pursue one remedy when several are available, but instead repeatedly pursues the same claim

in the same forum, equitable tolling does not apply”). Because Plaintiff filed both actions in the

same forum, this court, he is not entitled to this type of tolling.

In addition, under the so-called “Bollinger rule,” “a plaintiff may also argue the statute of

limitations should be tolled based on the filing of an earlier, timely action based upon general

equitable principles[.]” Carranza v. Lewis, 2017 WL 1050538, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017)

(citing Bollinger v. National Fire Ins. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 399 (1944) and Addison, 21 Cal. 3d at 318-

19 ). The Bollinger rale applies where the plaintiff shows that three factors are met:

(1) the plaintiff [has] diligently pursued his or her claim; (2) the fact

that the plaintiff is left without a judicial forum for resolution of the

claim [is] attributable to forces outside the control of the plaintiff,

[i.e., the dismissal of the first action was in error and, thus, due to

forces outside of his own control]; and (3) the defendant [is not]

prejudiced by application of the doctrine (which is normally not a

factor since the defendant will have had notice of the first action).

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.