Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Taaj Qaadir Blan, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania

J-A23037-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

No. 62 MDA 2024

V.

TAAJ QAADIR BLAN

Appellant

•

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Criminal Division at No: CP-35-CR-0002467-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J,:

FILED: MARCH 31, 2025

Appellant, Taaj Qaadir Blan, seeks review of the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court). In

2023, Appellant Was found guilty following a jury trial of third-degree murder,

and the trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 18 to 40 years.

We

affirm.

The charges against Appellant stemmed from a shooting in 2022. On

the night in question, Appellant: drove with the son of his father's girlfriend

(Ryan Haynes) to the apartment complex where the victim lived. The victim,

Pernell Simmons, had been in a dispute with: Haynes, and Appellant planned

to discuss the quarrel: with him.

As they arrived at the parking lot of the complex. Appellant beeped his

car horn. Simmons stepped out of his apartment and walked to the parking

lot. Appellant remained in his vehicle as he and Simmons began arguing, and

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while still seated in his vehicle. Appellant drew his firearm and opened fire at

Simmons. Seven shots were discharged, arid Simmons was struck four times,

causing fatal injuries.

Appellant stepped out of his vehicle to pick up the

.casings.that had- been discharged' from his gun. He and Haynes then drove

away. V;

.

Later that night, police obtained video surveillance footage of the

incident, and they used that recording to identify Appellant as the shooter.

The next morning, officers observed Appellant's home, where they saw

individuals handling items that could potentially be used as evidence against

Appellant.

Angelo Smith, Appellant's father, was seen removing an object

from- Appellant's car. Erica Searcy was seen'with the clothing Appellant had

worn at the time of shooting, as well as the firearm' he had used. Margaret

Delcastillo, Appellant's mother, was also seen taking Appellant's clothing out

of his home.

;

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Appellant, Smith, Searcy, arid Delcastillo all drove from Appellant's

home to an unknown destination. Delcastillo drove Appellant's car, a silver

Scion, while Appellant, Smith;,: and Searcy drove away in a white Chrysler.

Before they could complete their trip, they were simultaneously apprehended

by police during a traffic stop, ■

' ’•

The police obtained search warrants for both vehicles. A search of the

vehicles yielded the firearm Used to kill the victim, as well as the clothing

Appellant, had

worn

the

previous

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evening,

'Soon

thereafter,

the

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Commonwealth charged Appellant with first-degree murder and third-degree

murder.

Smith, Searcy, and Delcastillo were Appellant's co-defendants, as each

of them were implicated in the concealment of the evidence discussed above.

They were charged with the misdemeanor offenses of hindering apprehension;

tampering with evidence; and obstructing the administration of law.

The

cases of these co-defendants were consolidated for trial purposes, and they

were accordingly tried together during the same proceedings.

At trial, Appellant and Haynes both testified that the shooting was a

justified act of self-defense because. Simmons had made threatening

comments to them, namely, that the; was going to "air out" Appellant's car.

Appellant further attempted to justify his use of force by testifying about the

recent killing of his cousin in Philadelphia.

He intended to testify that his

cousin had been murdered moments after being told by the killer that he was

going to "air him out," the same phrase Simmons had used. See N.T. Trial,

8/3/2023 (a.m.), at 49-54.

The Commonwealth objected to such testimony on the ground that the

language used by the killer of Appellant's cousin was: irrelevant and

inadmissible hearsay. The objection was sustained in part by the trial court,

as Appellant was allowed to testify about the circumstances of his cousin's

shooting and the effect it had on his state of mind. Appellant went on to

testify that his cousin's death had been going through his ■mind at the time he

shot Simmons. See id., at 54-55. After he did so, no further questions on

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that subject were asked of Appellant by defense counsel. See id., at 55. In

closing, defense counsel summarized Appellant's testimony about his state of

mind, including the fact that his cousin had been fatally shot three weeks

•

beforeSimmons was killed.

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'

Prior to deliberations, the jury was verbally given a seif-defense

instruction by the trial court, explaining the lawful, use of dead ly force and the

duty to retreat.

While deliberating, the jury sent out questions to the triaI

court asking for a description of the charges and the definition of "malice,"

which was the intent element of the murder charges.

1'

• The trial judge Sent the: jury written instructions describing the charges

and the definition of malice but initialiy denied defense counsel's request for

the written self-defense instruction to go to the jury. The jury later again

asked for further clarification on the duty to retreat. The trial court responded:

by sending back the entire written instruction on self-defense, which

addressed the topic raised in the jury's second request. See N1t. Trial (p.m.),

8/4/2023, at 9-10.

,

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■,.■■■

At the conclusion of the trial, Blan was found guilty and sentenced as

outlined above.

He filed post-trial motions, which were denied.

Appellant

timely appealed, and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 3/11/2024, at 7-12 (giving the reasons why

the judgment of sentence should be affirmed). In his brief, Appellant raises

three issues for our consideration:

J-A23037-24

I. Whether the trial court: erred and abused its discretion by not

severing the trial of [Appellant] from that of his co-defendants

where [Appellant] was charged with homicide and the codefendants were charged with significantly less serious offenses[.]

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II. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by not

allowing [Appellant] to testify regarding the homicide death of his

cousin in the weeks leading up to the death in this case where

such testimony would have helped the jury to understand

[Appellant's] state of mind and actions on the date in question[.]

III. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by not

sending out a printed Copy of the justification/self-defense

instruction along with the Charges when the jury requested a

written description of the counts against [Appellant] and a

definition of malice[.]

Appellant's Brief, at 5-6 (numbering added, suggested answers omitted).

Appellant first claims that he is entitled to relief because the trial court

should have severed his case from that of his three co-defendants. This claim

was waived.

"Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal." Pa^R.A.P. 302(a). "Appellate courts in

Pennsylvania routinely decline to entertain issues raised on appeal for the first

time." Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 836 (Pa. 2005). "A party

cannot rectify the failure to preserve an issue by proffering it in response to a

Rule 1925(b) order.'1 Commonwealth v. Monjaras-Amaya, 163 A.3d 466,

469: (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).

Here, Appellant did not file a pre-trial motion asking for his case to be

severed from: that of his co-defendants. The trial court was therefore never

given the opportunity to determine whether a severance of the cases was

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J-A23037-24

warranted. It was not until appellate proceedings began that Appellant raised

this issue for the first time.

The failure to include within a pre-trial omnibus motion a request for

severance results in a waiver of that request. Sfee Pa.R.Crim.P. 578 (requiring

that all pretrial requests for relief, including severance, must: be made in one

omnibus motion); Pa.R.Crim.P. 579 (omnibus motions must be filed within 30

days after the date of a defendant's arraignment); and Pa.R.Crim.P. 583, cmt.

(any request for severance must ordinarily be made in an omnibus motion or

it is waived). Thus, due to this waiver, Appellant cannot prevail on his

severance claim.

.Even if the claim had been preserved, we would find that it lacks merit.

Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(2), co-defendants may be tried together "if they

are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same

series' of acts or transactions constituting; an offense or offenses." Further,

"[t]his rule of joinder parallels the case law which recognized that joint trials

of co-defendants [are] advisable when the crimes charged grew out of the

same acts and much of the same evidence is necessary or applicable to both

defendants." Commonwealth v. Morales, 494 A.2d 367, 372 (Pa, 1985)

(citations omitted).

A court may sever the cases of co-defendants where "it appears that;

any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together."

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. The defendant has the burden of demonstrating prejudice.

See Common wealth v, Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 541 (Pa. 2022).

There is no question in the present matter that the: cases of Appellant

and his co-defendants were properly joined: for triaI. Appellant was charged

with offenses related to the shooting death of Simmons, and his co-defendants

were all charged with offenses stemming from their efforts to dispose of

evidence of those crimes the morning

after they were committed.

Accordingly, it was alleged that these individuals participated in the same acts,

transactions, or series of acts or transactions which constituted the charges

against Appellant. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(2).

Appellant's attempt to dispose of the evidence helped the prosecution

prove his consciousness of guilt. By the same token, the culpability of the Co­

defendants hinged in part on the fact that the physical: evidence found in their

custody (the murder weapon and the clothes Appellant wore during the

shooting) could be used as evidence against Appellant. Thus, much of the

evidence presented at the joint trial Was necessary or applicable as to all the

defendants, making joinder proper.

Even had Appellant timely moved to sever his case, the record does not

indicate how prejudice could have been shown. In his brief, Appellant argues

that he was prejudiced by the joinder of the cases: because the prosecution

introduced evidence that his father was standing outside his home the

morning after the shooting in manner that appeared suspicious to an arresting

J-A23037-24

officer; the prosecution also introduced evidence that his mother washed his

clothes the night of the shooting, suggesting that Appellant was involved in a

conspiracy to destroy evidence.

Appellant asserts that this evidence,

pertaining to the conduct of his parents, allowed the jury to improperly infer

Appellant's guilt.

'

These arguments are unavailing.

Significantly, Appellant was

apprehended by police during a traffic stop along with his co-defendants while

all of them: were in possession of the murder weapon and the clothing

Appellant wore when he shot Simmons: "It is . . . undisputed that attempts

by a defendant to suppress evidence are admissible to demonstrate his or her

consciousness of guilt." Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A. 2d 294, 319 (Pa,

2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 668 A.2d 97, 106 (Pa. 1995)). A

defendant's uncharged, prior bad act may be admissible as proof of his

consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251 (Pa.

Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 320 A.3d 140, 146-47

(Pa. Super. 2024) (same).

Appellant could not have suffered undue prejudice from having the jury

consider evidence of the co-defendants' attempts to dispose of evidence

linking Appellant to the shooting.

The allegations against all of the co­

defendants were interrelated with Appellant's case. While not charged with

conspiring to dispose of evidence, Appellant's participation in the co­

defendants' crimes was nevertheless admissible, as it evidenced his

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J-A23037-24

consciousness of guilt. The jury was therefore free to consider the conduct of

Appellant's co-defendants when determining if Appellant was guilty of the

charges against him. Thus, no relief is due on this first claim.

Appellants second claim is that the trial court abused its discretion by

not allowing him to testify about certain aspects of his cousin's murder, which

took, place about three weeks prior to the death of Simmons. According to

Appellant, the trial court barred him from testifying that his cousin's murderer

had threatened to "air out" his cousin moments before he was shot, and such

testimony would have been relevant to Appellant's state of mind when he shot

Simmons, who had uttered the same phrase: moments before: he was killed.

"It is well settled that evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion

of trial courts." Commonwealth v. Distefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297 (Pa.

2021). "Accordingly, when a party adverse to a trial court's evidentiary ruling

seeks appellate review of that determination, that party carries a heavy

burden to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion." Id. (citing

Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 120 (Pa. 2019)). "An appellant

cannot simply meet this burden by simply persuading an appellate court that

it may have reached a different conclusion than reached by the trial court;

rather, to overcome this heavy burden, the appellant must demonstrate that

the trial court actually abused its: discretionary power." Id.

Here, the trial court did not err in ruling on the admissibility of

Appellant s testimony about his cousin's death because the record shows that

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he was in fact permitted by the trial court to testify about that event. The

jury heard Appellant's testimony that, at the time he shot Simmons, he was

thinking about his cousin's murder. The trial court did hot bar defense counsel

from eliciting Appellant s testimony about what his cousin's murderer had

stated, or how Appellant's state of mind was influenced by the fact that

Simmons had threatened to "air him out," uttering the same phrase that the

murderer of Appellant's cousin had spoken.

■

•

■ Rather,, the transcripts of Appellant's trial testimony show that defense

counsel asked Appellant whether he was thinking of his cousin's murder during

his encounter with Simmons. Appellant responded affirmatively, and defense

counsel did not ask further questions about that topic. The" record does not

show that the trial court directed defense counsel to cease questioning

Appellant about his cousin's murder, or specifically, from asking Appellant

about how his state .of mind was affected by the fact that Simmons had

threatened him by using a phrase similar to the one spoken to his deceased

cousin. See N.T. Trial, 8/3/2023 (a.m.), at 54-55. Thus, there is no merit to

Appellants second claim that his state-of-mind testimony was erroneously

excluded.

..

r

•_

Appellant's third and final claim is that the-trial court abused its

discretion in not sending the jury a printed copy of the justification defense

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instruction1 in response to the jury's request for a written description of the

charges, as well as a definition of "malice.”2 We find no merit in this claim, as

the record shows that the trial court in fact supplied the jury with all the

written materials it requested.

Under Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(B), "[t]he trial judge may permit members of

the jury to have for use during deliberations written copies of the portion of

the judge s charge on the elements of the offenses, lesser included offenses,

and any defense upon which the jury has been instructed." Whether written

documents should be allowed to go out with the jury during its deliberation is

Within the trial court's discretion. See Common wealth v. Barnett, 50 A.3d

176, 194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Merbah, 411 A.2d

244, 247 (Pa. Super. 1979)). The comment to Rule 646 provides that "once

1 A defendant may prevail on a justification defense to a murder charge where

it is shown that the defendant (a) reasonably believed deadly force against

the victim was necessary to avoid imminent danger of death or serious bodily

injury; (b) that the defendant did not provoke the incident leading to the

victim's death; and (c) the defendant did hot violate a duty to retreat. See

Commonwealth v, Burns, 416 A.2d 506, 507 (Pa. 1980),

2 "Malice” is the state of mind necessary to establish the offense of first and

third degree murder. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592,

597 (Pa. Super. 2012) (e/7 banc) ("Third degree murder occurs when a person

commits a killing which is neither intentional nor committed during the

perpetration of a felony, but contains the requisite malice.”); see also 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2502. Malice consists of either an express intent to kill or inflict

great bodily harm, or "hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of

consequences of a mind regardless of social duty indicating an unjustified

disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm and an extreme

indifference to human life.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 337 A.2d 545 (Pa.

1975) (internal quotations excluded).

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the judge permits the use of the Written elements [of the charged offenses],

the elements of all the offenses, lesser included offenses, and defenses upon

which the jury was; charged must be provided to the jury in writing."

■ Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(B), emt.

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In the present case, at the close of the evidence. Appellant requested a

Charge of voluhtafyimandlaughter (supported by a theory of imperfect self-

defense), as a lesser offense of the murder counts. The request was granted,

arid the jury was read instructions oh that lesser offense, as well as a charge

regarding imperfect self-defense.

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During deliberations, the jury twice requested for the trial court to send

it written materials.

The first request from the jury was for a written

description of each of the charges, as well as the definition of "malice." NT.

Trial, 8/4/2023 (a.rm), at 3, After hearing oral argument from counsel on

that issue, the trial court sent back written, comprehensive instructions on the

subject of homicide, which included the definition of "malice." See M, at 4.

Defense counsel had objected that the jury should also be sent a written

instruction on the theory of self-defense, but the trial court rejected counsel's

request at that time.

, ■

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A few hours later, the jury sent a second note to the trial court while it

was still deliberating^ this time asking about the duty to retreat: "Does that

duty need to be safe retreat in that moment? Can we have the three different

mental' states that the law regards as being bad enough to make a killing;

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murder regarding the term malice." See id., at 7-8. The trial court responded

to the note by sending back a written instruction on the use of force/deadly

force in self-defense, which contained the instruction on the duty to retreat

(the specific instruction which defense counsel had earlier requested). See

id., at 9, 14.

The jury in this case ultimately received all the written materials it

sought during deliberations, including the written instruction on self-defense.

Appellant has not identified any evidence in the record, or controlling

authorities, which suggest that he was prejudiced by the trial court's delay in

providing those requested instructions. It is entirely speculative whether the

timing of the trial court's response to the jury's questions, somehow affected

the verdict.3 Thus, no relief is due on this claim, and the order on review must

stand.

3 The Comment to Rule 646 provides that if written copies of a crime's

elements are given to the jury, the court must further supply the jury with

written copies of any viable defenses. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 646, cmt. To the

extent that the trial court did not fully comport with the comment to Rule 646,

it would not be availing to Appellant because comments to rules are not

controlling authority. See Commonwealth v. Lockridge, 810 A.2d 1191,:

1196 (Pa. 2002) (rule comments are not part of the rules themselves, and

may only be used by courts to construe and apply the rules). Further,

Appellant still would have had to show that prejudice would have resulted from

such an error. He has not done so.

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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2025

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COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:: IN: THE' COURT OF

: COMMON PLEAS OF

t OFLACKAWANNFAO^Tg

t

CRIMINAL DIVlg|| g

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:

<’^o' Z:

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cor,

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vs.

TAAJ QAADIRBLAN

ssfe -u ; <_

: No. 2022 CR2467 ~||2

OPINION PURSUANT TO P&JR.A.P. 1925(a)

I.

fg

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 9,2022, Taaj Quaadir Blan, (hereinafter “defendant”) was arrested and

charged with 4 counts; count I Murder, of the First Degree pursuant to 18 P.S.A.

§2502('a); count K Murder of the Third Degree pursuant to 18 P.S.A. §2502(c); count

ITT Aggravated Assault pursuant to 18 P.S.A. 82702(a)(4); and count IV Simple

Assault pursuant to 18 P.S, A. 2701(a)(1). ’The Commonwealth joined three

codefendants for trial; Angelo Smith (hereinafter “Smith”), Margaret Del Castillo,

(hereinafter ‘‘Del Castillo”) and Erica Searcy (hereinafter “Searcy”). The

codefendants are the defendant’s father, mother and father’s girlftiend respectively.

On that same date., all three codefendants were each charged with one count of Hinder

Apprehension or Prosecution Conceal or Destroy Evidence pursuant to 1? Pa. C-SA

85105(a)(3). one count of Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence pursuant

■to 18 Pa. C.S.A. §4910(1). and one count of Obstructing Administration of Law or

Other CTnvp.mment Fnnctinn pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S A. §5101. 1

1 The codefendants cases are docketed to 2.022 CR. 2444,2022 CR 2445, and 2022 CR 2446

respectively.

1

Initially, the defendant wasreprescuted bycourt-appointed attorneys William

Thompson, Esq. and C.J, Rotteveel, Esq. Attorney Rotteveel filed a Motion for Writ

of Habeas Corpus on May 15,2023.'Codefendant AngeloSmithfiled aMotion for ■

Severance and a Motion for Writ of Habeas Coppus, Thetwo remaining codefendants

orally joined in Smith’s motion for severance. The hearing on all motions was held on

May' 15,2023, OnMay 17,2023, this court denied all motions.

.y

On June 6,2023, Robert Saurman, Esq. entered his appearance on behalf of the

defendant. Attorney Saurman was privately retained. On June 8,2023, this court held

a status conference with Attorney Saurman and counsel for the codefendants to -

address Attorney Saurman’s 'ability to' access the file and discovery, as well as the '

current trial schedule,

Notes ofTestimonv June 6,2023 .

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All four defendants’ cases proceeded to a jury trial on July 31,2023. The

Commonwealth filed an amended information in Defendant Blan’s case charging ■

murder in the first and third degrees only. A verdict was returned on August 4, 2023,

wherein the defendant was found guilty of murder in the third degree. The three

codefendants were acquitted. On November 1,2023, the defendant was sentenced to

serve, eighteen (18) to forty (40) years in a state correctional institution. OnNovember

13,2023, the defendant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of sentence.

Following a hearing, this court denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of

sentence on December 12,2023.,

2

H.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At trial the Commonwealth presented several witnesses and exhibits that

established the foliowing facts: On the evening of August 8,2022, defendant was at

his home which he shared with the three codefendants, his brother, and his Searcy’s

son Ryan Haynes (hereinafter “Haynes”): (N.T. 8/3/2023 a.m. session pp. 32,. 34).

The defendant thought of Haynes as a “stepbrother.” (N.T. 8/3/2023 a.m. session p.

35). Haynes arranged to purchase a smell amount of marijuana from Pemell

Simmons, the victim (hereinafter “the victim”). (N-T- 8/2Z2O23 p.m. session p. 11).

Haynes was unable to find a ride, so he attempted to cancel the transaction. (N.T

8/2/2023 pm. session p. 14). A series of threatening voicemails and voice memos

•from the victim ensued. (N.T. 8/2/2023 pm. session p. 12). Haynes was hysterical

(N.T, 8/3/2023 am session p. 41). Haynes told the defendant he was afraid of the

vinriTn. and he would have to see him .the next day because they work together. (N.T.

8/3/2023 fl m. session pp. 41-42). In the threatening messages the victim said he had

“12 bodies” and he was a gang member. (N.T. 8/3/2023 am. session p. 42). The

zWendanr agreed to try to speak to the victim to smooth things over. (N.T. 8/3/2023

am. session p. 42). The defendant and Haynes drove over to the housing complex

where the victim lived. (N.T. 8/3/2023 am. session p. 43). The defendant beeped the

horn, and the victim exited, his apartment (N.T. 8/3(2023 pm. session p. 44). The

victim was very agitated and was wearing a red bandana. (N.T. 8/3/2023 p.m. session

p. 44). The victim was yelling, waving his hands, and lifting his shirt. (N.T. 8/3/2023

pm session p. 46). The defendant and Haynes remained in the car.-The defendant

drove his car forward on a number of occasions, but the victim continued to approach

3

the car. (N.T. 8/2/2023 a.m. session p. 31). The victim told the defendant that he was

going tn “air out the car.” (N.T. 8/3/2023 p.m. sessionp. 48). The defendant testified:

I thought he had a gun because that is what he said. And

■•thenhecamebacktothecarso.Ithoughthe'wasgomg:

toshdbtme;

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,

(N.T. 8/3/2023 p.m. session p. 48).

The defendant further testified he could hot just drive away because he was

afraid that he would be shot. (N.T.8/3/2023 p.m. session p. 55). The defendant

testified he “just pointed the gun and-and - and I shot.” (N.T. 8/3/2023 p.m. session

p. 57). When asked why he fired the shots the defendant testified, “I fired the shots

because I was scared for my life and he said he was going to shoot me,”: (N.T.'' .

8/3/2023p.m. sessionp.63).

'• '•

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The incident was captured on video surveillance. (N.T. 8/1/2023 a.m. session

p. 84). The video clearly showed the defendant driving a Toyota Scion, registered to

Nim, in the parking lot of the scene at the time of the shooting. The police were able

to identify the defendant as the shooter in the early morning hours ofAugust 9,2022(N.T. 8/1/2023 am session p. 101) . Police surveillance was established outside of the

defendant’s residence. (N.T. 8/2/2023 am. session p. 104). Initially, a marked patrol

car was parked on the defendant’s street. (N.T. 8/2/2023 p.m. session p. 87). The

; defendant’s father, Srmth, was observed raking leaves in the front yard shortly before

• 7:00 a m. (N.T. 8/2/2023 p.m. session pp; 87-88). An unmarked patrol car parked on

the street and the marked police car pulled away. (N.T‘ 8/2/2023 p.m. session pp. 87-

88). As soon as tire marked car pulled away, Smith went inside and then returned a

few moments later and retrieved something from a Chrysler vehicle parked in front of

'•

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A26

the house. (N.T 8/2/2023 p.m. session pp. 90-91). Smith then re-entered the house,

exiting a few minutes later with the defendant. (N.T. 8/2/2023 p.m. session p. 91).

Smith re-entered the house, and the defendant sat in the front passenger seat of the

Chrysler. (N.T. 8/2/2023 pm-session p. 91). Del Castillo then exited the house

parrying a bag of clothing, later determined to be the clothes the defendant wore at the

time of the shooting- (N.T. 8/2/2023 pan. session p. 117). She entered the house

again. (N.T. 8/2/2023 pm. session p. 92). Searcy next exited the house carrying a

backpack, later determined to be carrying the gun used in the shooting. (N.T.

8/2/2023 p.m. session p. 93). Searcy got into the Chrysler with the defendant and

drove off. (N.T. 8/2/2Q23 pm. session p. 93). Then Del Castillo exited the house

again, got into the Scion and drove away in the opposite direction. (N.T. 8/1/2023

pm. session p. 94). Searcy’s vehicle was stopped- and the defendant was taken into

custody at 7:40 am. (N.T. 8/2/2023 pm. session p. 95). Del Castillo pulled up to the

traffic stop of Searcy’s car and began filming. The police recovered the defendant’s

clothing from DelCastilios’ car and the gun from Searcy’s car. (N.T. 8/1/2023 am.

session pp. 109,117).

Charles Siebert, M.D. was called to testify at trial. He is a forensic pathologist

and pertrym-prl the autopsy. (N.T. 8/2/2023 pm. session p. 123). Dr. Siebert testified

the victim sustained two gunshot wounds to the chest and one gunshot wound to his

arm.. (N.T. 8/2/2023 pm. session p., 130). He further testified the victim sustained

“multiple wounds because of the-uniqueness: of this bullet.” (N.T. 8/1/2023 p m.

session p. 131). He testified:

5

[H]e had - - this is an interesting type of a gunshotwound

because of the projectiles, which we’ll get to in

. mere de.faiT, as far as what the wounds look like.

Typically when you get injuries or gunshot wounds from

a typical projectile, a bullet, as you say, you have an

entrance and you have an exit, and you have a pathway

that you could follow and find the injuries and see what

.... it did to the body. The projectiles that we (ric) used in.

■ this particular case are a unique kind that come apart into

different pieces, and they’re called trocars. And in this

: type of bullet, thereare eight of those per bullet.

-

So in the case of Mr. Perhell Simmons, we have.:

mTiltiph wounds on the body - - come from different

entrances andexirsfromthe gunshot wounds. So there’s

more wounds that I’m going to describe as opposed to

ho w many shots; there actually were. So there were three

' gi m tihot wounds that I could tell he sustained. There were

two to his chest, and there was' one to hls arm. However,

there, are multiple wounds because bf . this -: the

uniqueness of this bullet.

(N.T. 8/2/2.023 p.m, session pp. 130-131).

The cause of death is homicide, multiple gun shots tc. the chest (N.T.

8/2/2023, pan. session p. 142). Two bullets and fifteen fragments were removed from

the victim’s body. (N.T. 8/2/2023 pun. session p. 116). The investigation revealed the

defendant used a semi-automatic firearm, requiring the trigger to be pulled to

discharge a bullet (N.T. 8/2/2023 pm. session p. 78). The investigation further

revealed the defendant fired 7shots. (N.T. 8/2/2023 a.m session p. 33).

m.

ISSUES ON APEAI.

On January 10,2024, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior

Court. On February 1,2024, the defendant filed a timely concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal. In his concise statement the defendant asserts the following:

6

A38

1.

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by

not severing the trial: Of Blan from that of his co­

defendants where Blan was charged with homicide and

the co-defendants were charged with significantly less

seriousoffenses.

1. ' The trial court erred and abused its discretion by

not severing the trial of Blan from that of his co­

defendants, which, allowed the Commonwealth to enter

evidence it might not otherwise have been able to at trial

and, because of Bruton standards, prevented Blan from

using certain evidence his (sic) might otherwise have had

available to him. . .

.

-

3. ... The trial; court erred and abused its discretion by

not allowing Blan to testify regarding the homicide death

of his cousin in the weeks leading up to the death in this

case where such testimony would have helped the jury to

understand Bias’s state of mind and actions on the date

in question.:. . . .. ■

.

4.

The trial, court erred and -abused its discretion by

not sending: out a printed copy of the justification/self

defense instruction along with the charges; when the jury

requested a written description ofthe counts against Blan

and a definition of malice.

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal docketed to 2/1/2024.

IV.

DISCUSSION

1. Severance

In his first two matters, defendant asserts the court erred by not severing his

trial from his codefendants. As such, we will address these two issues in tandem.,The

defendant asserts the court erred by not granting the motion to sever made by his

three codefendants. A review of the record reveals the defendant did not join in the

motion, nor did he file a separate motion to sever, as such the issue is waived.

7

Pur<niPTittn Pennsylvania law, issues must be raised at the trial court level in

order to preserve the issue for appeal. Commonwealth v.Phillips. 141 A.3d 512, 522

(Pa. Super. 701 6). Additionally. Pennsylvania Rule of AppellatePrOcedme 3Q2fa) ;

■states “issues not raised in. the trial court are waived and cannot bc raised for the first

time on appeal.” Pa,R A.P. 302tal. ‘‘This requirement bars an appellant from raising

‘a hmv and different theory of relief for the first time on appeM” PWEs at 522, :

m-irjtizig Commonwealth v. York,.465 A.2d 1028,1032 (Pa. Super, 1983).

More specifically, in matter number 2, the defendant asserts, he was prevented

from introducing evidence at his trial because of issues relating to Bruton v. United

States 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). the defendant also asserts he was

prejudiced by the admission of evidence in the codefendants’ case, that would not •

have been otherwise admissible in his case. This court is unable,to address these two

(2) claims because the issues were never raised and/or developed prior to or during

trial. The Permsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require an issue to be raised at

trial or it is waived,..PaR.C.P.302. As such, the defendant’s appeal should be

DENIED.

"

' ,

•

. ,

- ■

2. State of Mind

In his third matter, defendant assarts this court erred in limiting the testimony

from the defendant about his cousin’s death a few weeks prior to the incident that led

to the defendant’s arrest The defendant testified in his own defense. (N.T. 8/3/2023'

Lm-' session pp. 31-89). On direct examination, his attorney sought to elicit testimony

: about the defendant’s: cousin who was a victim of gun violence. (N.T. 8/3/2023 am.

8

session p. 49). An objection was raised by the Commonwealth, and a sidebar

conversation ensued. (N.T. 8/3/2023 am. session pp. 49-54). More specifically, the

(defendant wanted to testify that his cousin’s killer used the phrase “air it out” shortly

before shooting his cousin. (N.T. 8/3/2023 am. session p. 50). The defendant asserts

when the victim in this case said he was going to “air it out,” he was afraid he was

going to be shot. (N.T. 8/3/20'23 a.m. session pp. 49-54). At the conclusion of the side

bar conference, this court ruled the; defendant could offer limited testimony on the

subject (N.T. 8/3/2023 am. sessionpp. 53-54). The following exchange then took

place between the defendant and his attorney:

BY MR. S AURMANt .

...

.

Q. Taaj, you had mentioned that your cousin was - - you

would have been to a funeral just briefly before this?

A. Yes. Three weeks before this incident.

■■ Q. And was your thoughts of that homicide going

through your mind while you were there that evening?

A. Yes. Because - -

.

THE COURT: Hold on. There’s not a question pending.

The question was: Were thoughts of that homicide going

through your mind that night?

MR. BLAN: Yes.

THE COURT: The question is answered. Next question.

•

-

MR. SAURMAN: Okay. .

(N.T. 8/3/2023 am. session pp. 54-55)..

Attorney Saurman did not ask any more questions on. the topic. (N.T. 8/3/2023,

am. session p. 55). The defendant was permitted to offer limited testimony regarding:

9

the effect hi<; cnnsin’s murder had on his state ofmind. (N.T. 8/3/2023 a.m. scssionp.

;'

54-55).

j

Admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Laich. 777 A.2d 1057,1060 (Pa. 2001), erring Commonwealth w

Chimel. 738 A.2d 406,414 (Pa. 19,99). The standard of review for anewdentiary ■

ruling on appeal is “abuse of discretion.” Id. This court permitted the defendant to • s

. offer limited testimony regarding his cousin’s murder to. establish his state of mind.

(N.T. 8/3/2023

session pp. 54-55). Defendant asserts this court erred by limiting

the proffered testimony.Itis clear from the record the defendant was able to testify

about his state of mmd at the time of the shooting. Haynes .also testifred about the fear

both he and the defendant felt at the time pf the shooting. (NX 8/2/2023p.m. session

p. 34). Additionally, the defendant was able to further develop his defense through

■direct and cross examination of tire witnesses, through the presentation of the ,

threatening voice mails and. voicememos, through the video surveillance which

dieted fl* *ngty and visibly agitated victim, the autopsy which revealed the victim

had a BAC of0.205. (N.T. 8/2/2023 p.m. session p. 143). In his closing argument, •.

Attorney Saurman. was able to explain to the jurors the evidence supported his client’s

testimony regarding his state of mind. (N.T. 8/3/2023 p.m. session pp. 44-46).

Attorney' SanrmAn in closing, mentioned the cousin1 s death stating, e~[t]hree weeks

earlier he had been to his cousin’s funeral who had been shot in Philly-” (N.X

8/3/2023 p.m. session p. 60).

If, however, it is determined that this court erred in limiting the proffered'

I restiTnony then the appeal shomd be denied because “the properly admitted and

10

uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of

error was so significant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the

verdict” Laich at 1062-1063,citing Commonwealth v, Ardestani. 736 A-2d 552,556

(Pa. 1999). In light of all of the facts established in this case, it is clear, the evidence

of guilt was overwhelming.

-3.- Jury Instructions

Finally, the defendant ‘alleges this court erred by not sending, but a printed

copy of the Use of ForceZDeadlyForcein Self-Defense (Castle Doctrine) jury

instruction along with the jury instruction of the charges. Pa. SSJI fCrim.) §9.501A.

After a lengthy charging conference this court granted the defendant’s request and

added a count Of voluntary manslaughter to the verdict slip. (N.T. 8/3/2023 a.m.

session pp. 98-138, p.m. session p. 3-9).The court read the standard jury instruction,

for voluntary' manslaughter. (N.T. 8/3/2023 p.m. sessionpp. 119-125). The court also

instructed the jury on self-defense. (N.T. 8/3/2023 p.m. session pp. 125-129).

During the: deliberations, the jury sent a note, to the court malting the following

request “can we have a written description on each of the Taaj counts? Can we have

a definition of malice.” See Court Exhibit Number 1. (N.T. 8/4/2023 p. 3). The court,

entertained oral argument on the request (N.T. 8/4/2023 pp. 4-7). This court, over

Attorney Saurman’a Objection sent out. all of the: instructions for homicide,: which

included the definition of malice. See Court Exhibit Number 2 (N.T. 8/4/2023 p. 7).

Later, a second note Was sent out, it said:

" "

Does that duty need to be safe retreat in that moment? ..

Can we have thethree different mental states that the

11

A31

law regards as being.bad enough to make a killing a . .

murder regarding the term malice?.

See Court Exhibit Number 3. See also ^’.T. 8/4/2023 pp. 7-8).

The court responded to the request by sending out the instruction for Use of

Force/ Deadly Force in Self-Defense (Castle Doctrine). Pa. SSJI (Cnm)59.50IA. She

Court Exhibit 4- (N.T.. 8/4/2023 p. 9). The defendant’s issue is moot, as the

instructions were both read and sent out to the jury. As such, the defendant’s appeal

should be DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

J.

' Honorable Margaret Bisignani Moyle

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

:

Respondent

;;

v.

TAAJ QAADIR BLAN,

Petitioner

No. 220 MAL 2025

:

: Petition for Allowance of Appeal

: from the Order of the Superior Court

;

:

:

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of September, 2025, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.