Amicus Curiae Brief — Carter Page, Petitioner v. James B. Comey, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 20, 2026
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No. 25-705
IN THE
___________
CARTER PAGE,
Petitioner,
V.
JAMES COMEY, ET AL.,
Respondents.
___________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
__________
Brief of the Liberty Justice Center as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
__________
January 20, 2026
Jeffrey Schwab
Counsel of Record
Reilly Stephens
Jessica Craine
LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER
7500 Rialto Blvd.
Suite 1-250
Austin, Texas 78735
512-481-4400
jschwab@ljc.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
i
Question Presented
If the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
abuses its authority under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) to secretly surveil an
American, when must he bring a case to vindicate his
rights?
ii
Table of Contents
Question Presented ....................................................... i
Table of Contents .......................................................... ii
Table of Authorities ..................................................... iii
Interest of the Amicus Curiae ..................................... 1
Summary of Argument ................................................. 1
Argument ....................................................................... 3
I. This Court should grant the petition to uphold
the Fourth Amendment and ensure FBI FISA
abuse cannot continue without consequences. ....... 3
A.
The government has repeatedly abused
the FISA program to violate Americans’ Fourth
Amendment rights. ............................................... 4
B.
The constitutionality of the current FISA
program relies on the government providing the
FISC with accurate information. ......................... 5
C.
The FBI has not provided the FISC with
accurate information. ............................................ 7
D.
The FISC cannot prevent FISA abuse if
the FBI continues to withhold material
information. ........................................................... 9
E.
Without judicial review of FISA abuse
after it occurs, the FBI can violate Americans’
constitutional rights without consequences...... 10
Conclusion ................................................................... 12
iii
Table of Authorities
Cases
Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust
Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,
522 U. S. 192 (1997).................................................... 11
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007)..................................................... 11
Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Rsrv.
Sys.,
603 U.S. 799 (2024)..................................................... 11
In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters
Submitted to FISC,
411 F. Supp. 3d 333 (F.I.S.C. 2019) ............................ 6
In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters
Submitted to the FISC,
No. Misc. 19-02, Corrected Op. and Order (F.I.S.C.
Mar. 5, 2020). .............................................. 6, 8, 9, 10
In re Certified Question of L.,
858 F.3d 591 (F.I.S.C.R. 2016) (per curiam) .............. 5
In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
551 F.3d 1004 (F.I.S.C.R. 2008). ................................. 5
In re DNI/AG 702(h) Certifications 2018-A, 2018-B,
and 2018-C, and Predecessor Certifications,
Nos. 702(j)-18-01, 702(j)-18-02, 702(j)-18-03, and
predecessor dockets, Mem. Op. and Order (F.I.S.C.
Oct. 18, 2018)............................................................. 4
In re DNI/AG 702(h) Certifications 2020-A, 2020-B,
and 2020-C, and Predecessor Certifications et al.,
iv
Nos. 702(j)-20-01, 702(j)-20-02, 702(j)-20-03, and
predecessor dockets, Order in Resp. to Querying
Violations (F.I.S.C. Sept. 2, 2021). .......................... 5
Page v. Comey,
137 F.4th 806 (D.C. Cir. 2025)................................... 11
Page v. Comey,
628 F. Supp. 3d 103 (D.D.C. 2022) ............................ 11
Redacted,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157706, Mem. Op. (F.I.S.C.
Oct. 3, 2011) ............................................................... 4
Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295 (1999)....................................................... 5
Other Authorities
DOJ OIG, AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION’S EXECUTION OF ITS WOODS
PROCEDURES FOR APPLICATIONS FILED WITH THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
RELATING TO U.S. PERSONS, at i (Sep. 2021). .......... 8
DOJ OIG, OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW DIVISION 20-012,
REVIEW OF FOUR FISA APPLICATIONS AND OTHER
ASPECTS OF THE FBI’S CROSSFIRE HURRICANE
INVESTIGATION (Dec. 2019, Revised) ................... 7, 8
1
Interest of the Amicus Curiae
Liberty Justice Center (LJC) is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan public-interest litigation firm that
pursues strategic, precedent-setting litigation aimed
at
revitalizing
constitutional
restraints
on
government power and protecting individual rights.1
LJC is interested in this case because it frequently
litigates important cases against government
overreach and violations of Americans Fourth
Amendment rights. For example, in Scholl v. Ill. State
Police, 776 F. Supp. 3d 701 (N.D. Ill. 2025), LJC has
argued that warrantless dragnet surveillance of every
citizen that drives by automated license plate readers
(ALPRs) constitutes an unreasonable search.
LJC also files amicus briefs on similar issues, such
as its brief in Greater Las Vegas Short Term Rental
Ass’n v. Clark Cty., 555 P.3d 265 (Nev. 2024), which
argued that forcing property-owners to consent to
warrantless searches of short-term rental properties
was an unconstitutional condition.
Summary of Argument
This Court has held that cases cannot be brought
based on pure speculation—there must be a known
factual basis to support a claim. Petitioner brought his
case after a government report declassified
information that proved the FBI violated his rights.
1 Rule 37 statement: No counsel for any party authored any part
of this brief, and no person or entity other than Amicus funded
its preparation or submission. All parties received timely notice
of Amicus’s intent to file this brief.
2
But the court below held that anonymously sourced
news articles years earlier had started the clock to
bring his case, so his claims were untimely. If the
court below is correct, every claim for FISA abuse is a
sort of Schrödinger’s case—both too early and too late
at the same time.
If courts cannot hear these cases, the FBI will
continue to abuse the FISA program to violate the
Fourth Amendment rights of Americans. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) found the FBI
abused their power because the Department of Justice
(DOJ) admitted that it abused its power in this very
case. And the FISC has expressed concern that future
abuses cannot be prevented by court oversight. The
only remedy is to bring cases after abuse occurs to
vindicate Americans’ rights. But if cases like this can
be time barred by anonymous, unconfirmed media
speculation, the FBI will continue to violate
Americans’ rights with no consequences.
This Court should grant review to clarify that a
limitations period does not begin to run based on
unconfirmed rumors, and make clear that the FBI
cannot evade judicial review of its abuse of the FISA
program and violate the Fourth Amendment rights of
Americans with impunity.
3
Argument
I.
This Court should grant the petition to
uphold the Fourth Amendment and
ensure FBI FISA abuse cannot continue
without consequences.
If courts cannot address abuses of the FISA
program after they occur, the FBI can violate
Americans’ rights with impunity. Under the decision
below, it is almost impossible to bring a case
challenging illegal FISA surveillance. This Court has
held that citizens who believe themselves to be victims
of illegal FISA surveillance do not have standing to
challenge that surveillance based on rumor and
speculation that such has occurred without concrete
evidence. See Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
568 U.S. 398 (2013). But in this case, the court below
held that Petitioner was required to file his case based
on exactly that sort of speculation and once that
speculation was public, the limitations period to file
that case began to run.
This Court should grant review and clarify cases
can be brought after proof of government overreach is
released to ensure FBI abuse of the FISA program
receives judicial review and those responsible face
consequences for violating the constitutional rights of
Americans.
4
A.
The government has repeatedly
abused the FISA program to violate
Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights.
The federal government, including the FBI, has
repeatedly abused the FISA program and violated the
Fourth Amendment rights of Americans.
For example, in 2011 the FISC found that the FISA
program was used to collect “thousands of wholly
domestic communications” by United States persons
that were “retained by [the National Security Agency]
for at least five years, despite the fact” that they were
“unlikely to contain foreign intelligence information.”
Redacted, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157706, Mem. Op.,
at 60–61 (F.I.S.C. Oct. 3, 2011). Because of this, the
FISC found aspects of the FISA program violated the
law and the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 29.
In 2018, the FISC found the FBI’s “repeated noncompliant queries” of information collected under
section 702 of the FISA program violated the law and
the Fourth Amendment. In re DNI/AG 702(h)
Certifications 2018-A, 2018-B, and 2018-C, and
Predecessor Certifications, Nos. 702(j)-18-01, 702(j)18-02, 702(j)-18-03, and predecessor dockets, Mem.
Op. and Order, at 62 (F.I.S.C. Oct. 18, 2018). Despite
these findings, the FBI continued to have “substantial
and persistent” compliance issues three years later
that would “call into question” whether aspects of the
FISA program were “consistent with statutory and
Fourth Amendment requirements.” In re DNI/AG
702(h) Certifications 2020-A, 2020-B, and 2020-C, and
Predecessor Certifications, Nos. 702(j)-20-01, 702(j)20-02, 702(j)-20-03, and predecessor dockets, Order in
5
Resp. to Querying Violations, at 13 (F.I.S.C. Sept. 2,
2021).
The repeated abuse of FISA authorities by the
federal government, including the FBI, demonstrates
the grave risks the program can pose to the rights of
Americans.
B.
The constitutionality of the current
FISA program relies on the
government providing the FISC with
accurate information.
The government’s engagement in surveillance
pursuant to FISA is subject to the Fourth
Amendment. “The touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness.” In re Certified
Question of L., 858 F.3d 591, 604 (F.I.S.C.R. 2016) (per
curiam) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
300 (1999)). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR) has explained its process for
assessing the reasonableness of the FISA program: it
must consider both “the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.” Id. at 604–05 (quoting
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300). This is a “totality of the
circumstances” balancing process. In re Directives
Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (F.I.S.C.R.
2008). If “the protections that are in place for
individual privacy interests are . . . insufficient to
alleviate the risks of government error and abuse, the
scales will tip toward a finding of unconstitutionally.”
Id. at 1015.
6
Fourth Amendment rights of Americans in
relation to FISA are protected by the program’s “presurveillance
judicial
warrant
procedure,”
“particularly the judge’s probable cause findings.” In
re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters
Submitted to FISC, 411 F. Supp. 3d 333, 336 (F.I.S.C.
2019) (quoting previous orders and opinions from the
FISC).
The FISC has warned, though, that its
“assessment of probable cause can serve those
purposes effectively only if the applicant agency fully
and accurately provides information in its possession
that is material to whether probable cause exists.” Id.
at 336–37. Without such information the FISC
“cannot properly ensure the government” is using its
FISA authorities “only when there is a sufficient
factual basis.” Id. at 337. So “only when the
government fully and accurately provides all
information in its possession that is material to
whether probable cause exists can the Court's review
effectively serve as a check on Executive Branch
decisions to conduct surveillance.” In re Accuracy
Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the
FISC, No. Misc. 19-02, Corrected Op. and Order, at 8
(F.I.S.C. Mar. 5, 2020).
The FISC makes its decisions about the FISA
program based on the procedures in place to protect
Americans’ privacy interests and the information the
government provides about probable cause. If that
information is incomplete or incorrect, the court’s
decisions will often be flawed as well. The FISC may
not have a full or accurate understanding of the
“totality of the circumstances.” This can result in their
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analyses being
7
flawed, and the constitutional rights of Americans
being violated, like they were in this case.
C.
The FBI has not provided the FISC
with accurate information.
The FISC cannot ensure the FISA program stays
within Fourth Amendment boundaries unless the FBI
provides it with accurate information. But the DOJ
has admitted it failed to do so in this case, and the
FISC agrees.
The DOJ itself has admitted the FBI has not
provided the FISC with the information needed to
ensure Americans’ constitutional rights are respected.
In reviewing the actions of the FBI in this specific
case, the DOJ Office of Inspector General (OIG) found
“at least 17 significant errors or omissions,” which
“taken together resulted in FISA applications that
made it appear that the information supporting
probable cause was stronger than was actually the
case.” DOJ OIG, OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW DIVISION 20012, REVIEW OF FOUR FISA APPLICATIONS AND OTHER
ASPECTS OF THE FBI’S CROSSFIRE HURRICANE
INVESTIGATION, at xiv and vii (Dec. 2019, Revised).
These “extensive compliance errors” occurred even
though the FBI’s work “received more attention and
scrutiny than a typical FISA application in terms of
the additional layers of review and number of highlevel officials who read the application before it was
signed.” Id. at xiv and vii. The DOJ OIG expressed
major concerns because “so many basic and
fundamental errors were made by three separate,
hand-picked teams on one of the most sensitive FBI
investigations that was briefed to the highest levels
8
within the FBI, and that FBI officials expected would
eventually be subjected to close scrutiny.” Id. at xiv.
The FISC agreed that the FBI abused its power in
this case. “There is thus little doubt that the
government breached its duty of candor to the
Court . . .” In re Accuracy Concerns, Corrected Op. and
Order, at 1. “[T]he most prevalent and among the
most serious problems” in this case were “[o]missions
of material fact.” Id. at 4.
The FISC expressed further concern that the FBI
may be abusing its power in the FISA program to
violate the rights of other Americans. “The frequency
and seriousness of these errors in a case that, given
its sensitive nature, had an unusually high level of
review at both DOJ and the [FBI] have called into
question the reliability of the information proffered in
other FBI [FISA] applications.” Id. at 1.
This concern seems justified, given that over a year
later the OIG within the DOJ stated it believed
“additional action [was] necessary to ensure rigorous
supervisory review and to further strengthen
[internal] oversight to reduce the risk of erroneous
information being included in FISA applications,
which can lead to faulty probable cause
determinations and infringement of U.S. persons’ civil
liberties.” DOJ OIG, AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION’S EXECUTION OF ITS WOODS
PROCEDURES FOR APPLICATIONS FILED WITH THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT
RELATING TO U.S. PERSONS, at i (Sep. 2021).
The procedures in place in the FISA program have
not protected Americans’ privacy interests. And the
information provided by the FBI purporting to
9
demonstrate probable cause has also been inaccurate.
This information led the FISC to approve FISA
warrant applications when it shouldn’t have. Which
in turn has allowed the FBI to violate Americans’
constitutional rights.
The FBI’s repeated failures to provide the FISC
with the information it needs to protect Americans’
rights, by all levels of management and even when
they could expect to have their actions reviewed, show
the gravity of the risk the FISA program poses to the
constitutional rights of Americans. And yet, if the
decision of the court below stands, those responsible
will get away with it. This Court must intervene to
ensure there will be consequences for violating
Americans’ rights and the FBI will not have reason to
believe it is above the law and can continue to act with
impunity.
D.
The FISC cannot prevent FISA abuse
if the FBI continues to withhold
material information.
Without accountability, the FISC will not be able
to prevent similar FISA abuse in the future.
The FISC has indicated it does not believe
procedural or structural changes will fix the problem.
“[T]he errors . . . cannot be solved through procedures
alone. DOJ and the FBI, including all personnel
involved in the FISA process, must fully understand
and embrace the heightened duties of probity and
transparency that apply in ex parte proceedings.” In
re Accuracy Concerns, Corrected Op. and Order at 2.
“While more rigorous procedures for preparing FISA
applications should prove helpful, the Court is also
10
mindful that changes in culture will require more
than checklists.” Id. at 13.
And it is clear the FBI cannot be trusted to provide
the information needed for courts to provide the
required oversight. As the FISC noted in this case,
there were “prevalent” “[o]missions of material fact”
by the FBI. Id. at 4. And the FBI’s actions “have called
into question the reliability of the information
proffered in other FBI [FISA] applications.” Id. at 1.
And “[w]ithout facts that are both accurate and
complete, the Court is necessarily hamstrung in its
ability to balance the interests of national security
with those of personal privacy,” which is required to
determine if the Fourth Amendment’s protections are
actually being provided. Id. at 8.
Courts do not have the facts necessary to
determine whether the FISA program respects the
Fourth Amendment, there is reason to believe they
will not have that information moving forward, and
additional procedures cannot fix the problem. The
Fourth Amendment rights of Americans must receive
greater respect.
E.
Without judicial review of FISA abuse
after it occurs, the FBI can violate
Americans’ constitutional rights
without consequences.
Because the procedures and required factual
predicates intended to prevent FISA abuse have not
been working, and there is no reason to be confident
they will in the future, the only recourse is to allow
cases to be brought after FBI abuse occurs to hold
11
those responsible accountable. But given the decision
below, that option does not seem exist.
This Court has explained that claims do not accrue
“until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”
Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Rsrv.
Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 810 (2024) (quoting Bay Area
Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.
Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997)). And
suspicion is not enough to file suit. “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
But the court below found that because the
petitioner read two anonymously sourced newspaper
articles and “knew he was the subject of alleged illegal
government surveillance,” he “had sufficient
notice . . . to bring FISA claims.” Page v. Comey, 137
F.4th 806, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (emphasis added).
That petitioner “suspected that the allegations, and
the ensuing warrants, were baseless” was apparently
enough. Id. at 815 (quoting Page v. Comey, 628 F.
Supp. 3d 103, 118 (D.D.C. 2022)) (emphasis added).
If suspicion is enough to start the clock, but
speculation is not enough to file suit, there is little to
no hope of Americans being able to bring cases to
vindicate their rights. FISA warrants are classified, so
the details will almost certainly not be available to
Americans to support their suspicions. But without
those facts, the clock continues ticking until
Americans run out of time and the FBI is saved by
bell, evading review of any FISA abuse it engages in.
Without judicial review of FISA abuses after they
occur, Americans’ constitutional rights will continue
12
to be violated without any consequences for the FBI.
That cannot be. This Court should grant the petition
and hold cases can be brought after proof of
government abuse is released to ensure Americans’
constitutional rights receive protection and the FBI is
not allowed to act with impunity.
Conclusion
There is no question the FBI has abused its FISA
authority—it admittedly did so in this very case. And
there is no reason to believe it will stop in the future.
The only option is to hold it accountable after it
violates Americans’ rights.
The question is, will anyone be held responsible—
in this case or in the future—for violations of
Americans’ constitutional rights?
If the decision below is left in place, the answer is
no. It effectively prevents any judicial review of the
FBI’s abuse of FISA authorities after the fact, in
addition to the inadequate review provided before it
occurs. If a case is brought when there are suspicions
of secret abuse, it will be dismissed as too early. If it
is brought after actual evidence of abuse is released,
it will be dismissed as too late. Heads the FBI wins,
tails Americans lose.
The FBI must be not allowed to continue to run
roughshod over the Fourth Amendment rights of
Americans with no consequences. This Court should
grant the petition to make clear when a case must be
brought so judicial review of FISA abuse can occur
and the FBI can finally be held accountable.
13
January 20, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
Jeffrey Schwab
Counsel of Record
Reilly Stephens
Jessica Craine
LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER
7500 Rialto Blvd.
Suite 1-250
Austin, Texas 78735
512-481-4400
jschwab@ljc.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.