Petition for Writ of Certiorari — James Daryl West, Petitioner v. Sabrina Schultz, et al.

No. ______

_________________________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_________________________

JAMES DARYL WEST,

Petitioner,

v.

SABRINA SCHULTZ, ET AL.,

Respondent.

_________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

_________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_________________________

Erica J. Hashimoto

Counsel of Record

John H. Peng

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW

CENTER

APPELLATE LITIGATION PROGRAM

111 F St. NW, Ste. 306

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-9555

eh502@georgetown.edu

Mar. 9, 2026

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides broad redress to compensate for

violations of individuals’ constitutional rights. This Court, in Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), indicated that Section

1983

suits

against

municipalities

are

actionable

only

against

unconstitutional polices or customs. It has never extended that holding

to private corporations that contract with state or municipal entities to

provide governmental services.

The question presented is: Whether

private prison medical providers are shielded from respondeat superior

suits under Section 1983.

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

James Daryl West – Petitioner,

Sabrina Schultz – Respondent,

Diann Spratt – Respondent, and

Wexford Health Sources, Inc. – Respondent.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

West v. Schultz, et al., No. 22-11541 (CA11 Nov. 7, 2025);

West v. Schultz et al., No. 2:16-cv-694-SPC-NPM (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2022);

and

West v. Hemphill, et al., No. 2:16-cv-694-FtM-38NPM (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28,

2021).

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS ........................................................ ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ..................................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..........................................................................iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... iv

OPINIONS BELOW .................................................................................. 1

JURISDICTION ........................................................................................ 1

PROVISIONS INVOLVED ....................................................................... 2

STATEMENT ............................................................................................ 2

A.

SUITS AGAINST PRIVATE PRISON MEDICAL PROVIDERS UNDER

SECTION 1983 ............................................................................... 2

B.

MR. WEST’S CHRONIC OSTEOARTHRITIS AND TREATMENT AT

THE CHARLOTTE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION ............................... 5

C.

WEXFORD’S CORPORATE POLICIES AND PATTERNS OF

CONDUCT ...................................................................................... 7

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO

WEXFORD ...................................................................................... 9

E.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DENIAL OF MR. WEST’S APPEAL ........... 9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .............................................. 11

THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS WHETHER PRIVATE PRISON

MEDICAL PROVIDERS ARE SHIELDED FROM RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

LIABILITY. ............................................................................................ 12

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 21

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144 (1970) ....................................................................... 11, 14

Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc.,

769 F.2d 700 (CA11 1985) .................................................................. 19

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397 (1997) ............................................................................. 18

Brennan v. Headley,

807 F. App’x 927 (CA11 2020) .............................................................. 9

City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,

471 U.S. 808 (1985) ............................................................................. 18

Craig v. Floyd Cnty.,

643 F.3d 1306 (CA11 2011) ................................................................ 19

Dennis v. Higgins,

498 U.S. 439 (1991) ............................................................................... 3

DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.,

844 F.2d 714 (CA10 1988) .................................................................. 12

Farrow v. West,

320 F.3d 1235 (CA11 2003) ................................................................ 15

Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr.,

849 F.3d 372 (CA7 2017) .................................................................... 11

Hall v. Funk,

No. 14-cv-6308, 2019 WL 1239707 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2019) ............... 9

Hall v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,

No. 19-1692, 2020 WL 6156604 (CA7 Feb. 24, 2020)........................... 9

iv

Harvey v. Harvey,

949 F.2d 1127 (CA11 1992) ................................................................ 12

Iskander v. Vill. of Forest Park,

690 F.2d 126 (CA7 1982) .................................................................... 12

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.,

457 U.S. 922 (1982) ....................................................................... 11, 14

Lux v. Hansen,

886 F.2d 1064 (CA8 1989) .................................................................. 12

Lyons v. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. (of Del.),

30 F.3d 240 (CA1 1994) ...................................................................... 12

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978) .............................................. i, 4, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20

Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility,

318 F.3d 575 (CA3 2003) .................................................................... 12

Newport v. Fact Concerts,

453 U.S. 247 (1981) ......................................................................... 3, 18

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469 (1986) ............................................................................... 4

Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co.,

678 F.2d 504 (CA4 1982) ........................................................ 12, 13, 18

Richardson v. McKnight,

521 U.S. 399 (1997) ......................................................................... 3, 20

Robertson v. Wegmann,

436 U.S. 584 (1978) ......................................................................... 3, 20

Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc.,

924 F.2d 406 (CA2 1990) .................................................................... 12

v

Roy v. Ivy,

53 F.4th 1338 (CA11 2022) ................................................................. 10

Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,

746 F.3d 782 (CA7 2014) .............................5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19

Smith v. Wade,

461 U.S. 30 (1983) ................................................................................. 2

Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,

102 F.3d 810 (CA6 1996) .................................................................... 12

Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc.,

698 F.3d 1128 (CA9 2012) .................................................................. 12

Wyatt v. Cole,

504 U.S. 158 (1992) ............................................................................... 3

Statutes

28 U.S.C. §1254(1) ..................................................................................... 2

42 U.S.C. §1983 .................................................. i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 18, 20

Other Authorities

Barbara Kritchevsky,

Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities,

26 Cardozo L. Rev. 35 (2004) .............................................................. 19

Jack M. Beermann,

Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section 1983?,

26 Cardozo L. Rev. 9 (2004) ................................................................ 19

Richard Frankel,

Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983,

76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449 (2009) ............................................................ 18

vi

James Daryl West respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The final decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit is unreported but available at 2025 WL 3123674. It is

reproduced at Pet. App. 1a–50a.

The decision of the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division,

granting defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is unreported but

available at 2022 WL 1462755. It is reproduced at Pet. App. 51a–68a. A

prior decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Florida, Fort Myers Division, granting several defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is unreported but available at 2021 WL 289065. It is reproduced

at 69a–92a.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on November 7,

2025. Pet. App. 1a. This Court granted an extension of Petitioner’s time

to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, extending Petitioner’s time to

1

file a petition by March 9, 2026. See West v. Schultz, et al., No. 25A856

(Feb. 2, 2026). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Title 42 U.S.C. §1983, titled “Civil Action for Deprivation of

Rights,” provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any

action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission

taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or

declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this

section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the

District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the

District of Columbia.

STATEMENT

A.

SUITS AGAINST PRIVATE PRISON MEDICAL PROVIDERS UNDER

SECTION 1983

1.

Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 “derived from” Section 1 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1971. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983). It provides a

cause of action against persons who violate the constitutional rights of

another while acting under the color of state law. Congress had two

2

purposes in mind when it enacted Section 1983: deterrence and

compensation. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403

(1997) (recognizing that Section 1983 “seeks ‘to deter state actors from

using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally

guaranteed rights’ and to provide related relief”) (quoting Wyatt v. Cole,

504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590–91

(1978) (explaining that “[t]he policies underlying § 1983 include

compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and

abuses of power by those acting under color of state law”).

Based on its “remedial” nature, this Court has construed Section

1983 “broadly.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 444 (1991). It has also

consulted common law tort rules in existence in 1971, when the statute

was enacted, to understand the statute’s scope. See Newport v. Fact

Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) (“One important assumption

underlying the Court’s decisions in this area is that members of the 42d

Congress were familiar with common-law principles * * * and that they

likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific

provisions to the contrary.”).

3

Section 1983 permits suits against “[l]ocal governing bodies * * * for

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. The

“touchstone[s]” of such actions are “allegation[s] that” the government

body’s “official policy” or “custom” is “responsible for a deprivation of

rights protected by the Constitution.” Ibid. at 690–91. This Court has

held, however, that “Congress did not intend” for local governing bodies

to be “held liable solely because [they] employ[] a tortfeasor—or, in other

words * * * on a respondeat superior theory.” Ibid. at 691 (emphasis in

original).

The Monell Court pointed, in part, to Section 1983’s causal

language to explain that liability may be imposed “on a government” only

if “some official policy” “‘causes’ an employee to violate another’s

constitutional rights.”

Ibid. at 692 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §1983).

The

statutory language “cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously

on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employeremployee relationship with a tortfeasor.” Ibid. This Court buttressed its

conclusion by reviewing Section 1983’s legislative history. See Pembaur

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). That history “disclosed

that, while Congress never questioned its power to impose civil liability

4

on municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt its

constitutional power to impose such liability in order to oblige

municipalities to control the conduct of others.”

original).

Ibid. (emphasis in

This Court has not squarely addressed whether private

corporations contracted to perform local governing duties should

similarly enjoy Monell’s protections against respondeat superior suits.

See, e.g., Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 793 (CA7 2014)

(“Monell itself said nothing about whether its new ‘policy or custom’

standard would apply to private companies sued under § 1983.”).

B.

MR. WEST’S CHRONIC OSTEOARTHRITIS AND TREATMENT AT THE

CHARLOTTE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION

Petitioner

James

Daryl

West

suffers

from

diagnosed

“osteoarthritis, degenerative joint disease, and chronic pain.” Pet. App.

4a (internal quotation marks omitted).

His conditions cause him

constant pain in his back, right knee, and right foot. Ibid. In 2014–15,

Mr. West was incarcerated at the Charlotte Correctional Institution,

within the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDC”) network. Ibid.

Respondent Wexford Health Sources, Inc., was the medical provider at

the prison. Ibid. Wexford employed the doctors and nurses who attended

to Mr. West during his time at Charlotte Correctional. Ibid.

5

Mr. West met with three doctors and two nurses during the summer

and fall of 2015. Pet. App. 4a–6a. One doctor ordered x-rays on Mr.

West’s knee, gave him prescription ibuprofen, analgesic balm, a cane, and

temporary medical passes for restricted physical activity. Pet. App. 4a.

That doctor also formally diagnosed Mr. West with osteoarthritis,

degenerative joint disease, and chronic pain. Ibid.

While at Charlotte Correctional, Mr. West was—“[d]espite his

diagnosis and medical passes”—required to work in food service. Pet.

App. 4a. Mr. West’s two supervisors “were aware that [Mr. West] had

medical passes limiting his ability to bend over and lift heavy objects,”

but “they made [Mr.] West sit on an upside-down trashcan to cut

vegetables” and “lift bags of vegetables weighing over fifteen pounds.”

Pet. App. 4a–5a. These daily activities caused Mr. West “obvious pain.”

Pet. App. 47a (Abudu, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Mr. West fell while

working in food service on June 27, 2015, after he was ordered and tried

to carry a “seventy-five pound bag of vegetables.” Pet. App. 5a.

Both before and after his fall, Mr. West experienced chronic pain

that spiked at various times while he was at Charlotte Correctional. Pet.

6

App. 4a–6a. He asked his medical providers several times for “additional

diagnostic testing.” Pet. App. 4a. Three separate doctors told Mr. West

that “Wexford had a policy restricting necessary medical care.” Pet. App.

4a; see also Pet. App. 6a. The doctors generally gave Mr. West pain

management medication and provided Mr. West in-prison services. Pet.

App. 4a–6a.

C.

WEXFORD’S CORPORATE POLICIES AND PATTERNS OF CONDUCT

Wexford’s policy, as Mr. West alleged and supported with

“extensive materials,” consisted of “cost-based medical decisions” that

resulted in “failures throughout Florida’s correctional system.” Pet. App.

40a (Abudu, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Reports

produced by the FDC and the Florida legislature “detail[ed] longstanding

deficiencies in Wexford’s performance dating back to 2000, including

repeated contract terminations for ‘serious performance issues.’” Ibid.

Florida’s “transition to privatized prison health care ‘was difficult.’” Ibid.

“To meet contractual savings targets, vendors—including Wexford—

‘initially reduced spending by maintaining lower health care staffing

levels,’ which, according to FDC staff, ‘led to serious performance issues

in both contracts.’” Pet. App. 40a–41a (internal citation omitted). Mr.

7

West alleged that “Wexford’s cost-driven policies limited clinicians from

providing timely follow-up care or an examination after his fall.” Pet.

App. 41a.

The Florida Legislature’s Office of Program Policy Analysis and

Government Accountability also documented Wexford’s troubles. Ibid.

The office’s 2004 and 2009 reports “maintained that the ‘quality of

Wexford’s health care had been problematic” and plagued by “‘repeated

deficiencies.’” Ibid. (internal citation omitted). During inspections at

various FDC facilities, state auditors often observed “‘repeated

deficiencies and a deteriorated level of service to the extent that the

clinical quality of care required immediate correction.’” Ibid. Inspectors

also documented “‘inadequate medical record keeping, insufficient

staffing, and postponement of specialty clinical visits.’” Ibid.

A 2015 article Mr. West submitted to the district court stated that

Wexford “had ‘1,092 malpractice claims * * * from aggrieved inmates

from Jan. 1, 2008, through 2012.’”

Pet. App. 42a.

Mr. West also

“submitted an article about a case against Wexford in Illinois,” where an

Illinois jury ultimately “found that Wexford had a policy of denying

elective surgeries in its provision of services to those incarcerated in [an]

8

Illinois Department of Corrections” facility. Pet. App. 41a n.5 (citing Hall

v. Funk, No. 14-cv-6308, 2019 WL 1239707, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2019),

appeal dismissed, Hall v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 19-1692, 2020

WL 6156604 (CA7 Feb. 24, 2020)).

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO WEXFORD

The district court granted summary judgment to Wexford by

finding that Mr. West did not produce sufficient evidence showing

genuine disputes of material fact regarding an unconstitutional custom

or policy.

Pet. App. 54a.

The court followed the Eleventh Circuit’s

precedent in assessing that “Wexford can only be liable if ‘the alleged

constitutional harm is the result of a custom or policy.’” Ibid. (quoting

Brennan v. Headley, 807 F. App’x 927, 937 (CA11 2020)). It concluded

that Wexford did not have a “policy or custom restricting non-emergency

care” and that Mr. West did not receive altered or reduced treatment

because of a Wexford policy or custom. Ibid.

E.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DENIAL OF MR. WEST’S APPEAL

The Eleventh Circuit denied Mr. West’s appeal by a per curiam

opinion on November 7, 2025. Pet. App. 1a. The Honorable Nancy G.

Abudu filed a separate opinion concurring and dissenting in part. Pet.

9

App. 33a–50a. The majority affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary

judgment for Wexford. Pet. App. 22a. It agreed that Mr. West had not

“provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that

Wexford had a policy or custom that was deliberately indifferent to his

necessary medical care.” Pet. App. 22a. In so holding, the court applied

its past precedent that “[a] private entity, like Wexford, that contracts to

provide medical services to inmates performs traditional state functions

and, therefore, is treated as a municipality for purposes” of Section 1983.

Ibid. (quoting Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1347 (CA11 2022)). The court

therefore did not consider whether Wexford could be vicariously liable for

its employees’ constitutional violations.

Judge Abudu dissented regarding Mr. West’s claim against

Wexford. Pet. App. 39a–45a. She applied the same Monell test as the

majority.

Pet. App. 39a (assessing whether Mr. West had provided

sufficient evidence of an unconstitutional Wexford policy or custom). But

she concluded that Mr. West had raised genuine disputes of material

facts over both Wexford’s “cost-containment and staffing practices” and

those practices’ effect “compromis[ing] patient care.”

Pet. App. 44a.

Pointing to the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t

10

of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 376–80 (CA7 2017), which recognized corporate

policies’ tendency to “constrain[] providers from making fully informed,

patient-specific decisions,” Judge Abudu assessed that “Wexford’s polices

may have impermissibly limited staff from exercising independent

judgment to treat [Mr.] West’s serious medical needs.” Pet. App. 45a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should issue a writ of certiorari to address whether

lower courts have rightly expanded Monell to private corporations and

improperly shielded them from respondeat superior liability. This Court

has not squarely addressed this issue. The considerations this Court

reviewed in Monell and subsequent cases do not compel similar

protection for private corporations. And this Court has precedents—

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), and Lugar v.

Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), among them—that suggest

private corporations should be held accountable for the unconstitutional

tortious actions of their employees. This Court should grant this petition

to correct the lower courts’ misunderstanding.

11

THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS WHETHER PRIVATE PRISON MEDICAL

PROVIDERS ARE SHIELDED FROM RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY.

1.

The circuit courts have uniformly extended Monell protection

to private corporations providing local governmental services.1 But this

Court has not indicated that Monell should be extended in this way. This

Court’s past decisions suggest that Monell ought not be so extended. The

courts of appeals’ contrary determinations merit review and revisal.

a.

The courts of appeals’ extension of Monell to private

corporations largely “trace back to [a] terse Fourth Circuit opinion”

which first made the extension. Shields, 746 F.3d at 794 (citing

Powell, 678 F.2d at 506). The Powell Court offered merely:

In Monell * * * the Supreme Court held that a municipal

corporation cannot be saddled with section 1983 liability

via respondeat superior alone. We see this holding as

equally applicable to the liability of private

corporations.

Two aspects of Monell exact this

conclusion. The Court found section 1983 evincing a

See Lyons v. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. (of Del.), 30 F.3d 240, 246

(CA1 1994); Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408–09

(CA2 1990); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583

(CA3 2003); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (CA4 1982);

Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (CA6 1996); Iskander v.

Vill. of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (CA7 1982); Lux v. Hansen, 886

F.2d 1064, 1067 (CA8 1989); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128,

1139 (CA9 2012); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844

F.2d 714, 723 (CA10 1988); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129–30

(CA11 1992).

1

12

Congressional intention to exclude the imposition of

vicarious answerability. For a third party to be liable

the statute demands of the plaintiff proof that the

former “caused” the deprivation of his Federal rights.

436 U.S. at 691–92. Continuing, the Court observed

that the policy considerations underpinning the doctrine

of respondeat superior insufficient to warrant

integration of that doctrine into the statute. Id. at 694.

No element of the Court's ratio decidendi lends support

for distinguishing the case of a private corporation.

678 F.2d at 506.

The courts of appeals have recognized that this Court has not

directly answered this question. See, e.g., Shields, 746 F.3d at 793.

b.

The Seventh Circuit has recognized that Monell does not

cleanly extend to private corporations contracting with state and

municipal entities. In Shields, the Honorable David F. Hamilton

(joined by the Honorable Richard A. Posner) laid out the differences

between municipalities and private contractors. See 746 F.3d at

795. It observed that because private prison medical providers have

“reduc[ed] * * * incentives to prevent their employees from violating

inmates’ constitutional rights,” “a new approach may be needed for

whether corporations should be insulated from respondeat superior

liability.” Ibid. The context of “prison medical services [being]

increasingly * * * contracted out to private parties”—and its

13

attendant “important policy considerations”—exceed “[this Court’s]

jurisprudence” on respondeat superior liability. Ibid.

The Shields Court further noted that “Monell itself said

nothing about whether [the] ‘policy or custom’ standard would

apply to private companies sued” under Section 1983. Ibid. at 793.

And Monell did not engage with this Court’s “reflexive application

of respondeat superior liability to a private company” under Section

1983 in Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150. Ibid. Adickes “remains good law.”

Ibid.; see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 930–31 (quoting and citing

approvingly to Adickes).

The Seventh Circuit explained that

because this Court “has never held that a private corporation may

take advantage of the Monell standard that applies to local

governments,” courts should instead “treat a private corporation

like any other ‘person’ who causes a constitutional violation.” Ibid.

“[R]espondeat superior liability should” therefore “apply.” Ibid.

The

Seventh

Circuit

further

reviewed

the

policy

considerations for not insulating private prison medical providers

from liability.

“Private prison employees and prison medical

providers have frequent opportunities, through their positions, to

14

violate inmates’ constitutional rights.”

Ibid. at 794.

Unlike

municipalities, they further have a financial incentive for cutting

corners because it is “generally cheaper to provide substandard care

than it is to provide adequate care.” Ibid. Private “prison medical

providers are subject to market pressures” and their employees

“have financial incentives to save money at the expense of inmates

‘well-being and constitutional rights.”

Ibid.

Shielding “private

corporations from respondeat superior liability significantly

reduces” those companies’ “incentives to control their employees’

tortious behavior and to ensure respect for prisoners’ rights.” Ibid.

c.

Judge Abudu provided a similar assessment in her

partial dissent below. The core question, she explained, “is whether

Wexford’s policies of limiting medical treatment were the

motivating factor for why the medical providers denied” Mr. West

“medical treatment for his ‘serious medical need.’” Pet. App. 44a

(quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (CA11 2003)). Mr.

West’s evidence suggested that “Wexford’s policies may have

limited staff from exercising independent judgment to treat [Mr.]

West’s serious medical needs.” Pet. App. 45a.

15

That evidence included “independent, state-generated reports

and public records documenting a pattern of Wexford’s cost-based

medical decisions and failures throughout Florida’s correctional

system.”

Pet. App. 40a.

Those reports concluded that private

vendors “including Wexford * * * reduced spending by maintaining

lower health care staffing levels” in order to “meet contractual

savings targets.”

Ibid. (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). Wexford’s reduction of staffing levels led FDC staff to

document “serious performance issues,” Pet. App. 40a–41a

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted), including

“inadequate medical record keeping, insufficient staffing, and

postponement of specialty clinical visits,” Pet. App 41a (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted). Judge Abudu noted that the

documentary evidence “parallels [Mr.] West’s allegation that

Wexford’s cost-driven policies limited clinicians from providing

timely follow-up care or an examination after his fall,” and

“mirror[s]” Mr. West’s allegations of “repeated postponements of

follow-up evaluations [and] perfunctory examinations.” Pet. App.

41a.

16

2.

Clarifying whether private corporations should be shielded

from respondeat superior liability is of great importance. Judge Abudu

rightly pointed out that “[o]ver the past decade, states have increasingly

outsourced their correctional health care systems to large, for-profit

providers.”

Pet. App. 39a (citing journal articles discussing the

proliferation of private correctional providers). Companies like Wexford

“operate across multiple states and within numerous facilities, often

under standardized contracts and uniform cost-control policies.” Ibid.

Any “patterns of failures flowing from a single provider’s customs or

practices may manifest across several institutions over several years,

rather than within the confines of one facility or finite period of time.”

Pet. App. 40a–41a. The Shields Court rightly identified: “[I]n a world of

increasingly privatized state services, the doctrine [of respondeat

superior] could help to protect people from tortious deprivations of their

constitutional rights.” 746 F.3d at 795.

The Shields Court and Judge Abudu’s concerns with extending

Monell to private corporations dovetail with several of this Court’s

justices’ questioning Monell’s foreclosure of respondeat superior liability

writ large. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430–37

17

(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.

808, 834–44 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Shields, 746 F.3d at

791 (citing scholarship outlining the disconnect between Section 1983,

common law, and respondeat superior liability). Because Section 1983 is

embedded with “common-law principles,” Newport, 453 U.S. at 258, and

“respondeat superior liability was already a well established part of the

common law in 1871, * * * Congress could reasonably have expected the

courts to apply the doctrine under § 1983,” Shields, 746 F.3d at 795.

Restoring this key common-law theory of liability to Section 1983 actions

ensures Congress’s original intent is met.

3.

The courts of appeals have been wrong to extend Monell to

private corporations.

In doing so, courts—starting with the Fourth

Circuit in Powell, 678 F.2d at 506—have “simply overlooked the Monell

Court’s special solicitude for municipalities and their budgets,” Shields,

746 F.3d at 795. Cases like Shields and Mr. West’s “are * * * excellent

example[s] of the problems generated by barring respondeat superior

liability for corporations under § 1983.” Shields, 746 F.3d at 795.2 In

See also Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government

Through § 1983, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449 (2009); Barbara Kritchevsky,

2

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Shields, “it appear[ed] that Wexford structured its affairs so that no one

person was responsible for Shields’ care, making it impossible for him to

pin responsibility on an individual.” Ibid. If respondeat superior liability

were available, “Wexford could not escape liability by diffusing

responsibility across its employees, and prisoners would be better

protected from violations of their constitutional rights.” Ibid.

Mr. West’s case highlights the same problem. Each doctor Mr. West

saw at Charlotte Correctional denied Mr. West out-of-prison diagnostic

care, telling him that “Wexford had a policy restricting necessary medical

care.” Pet. App. 4a, 6a. The denial of necessary care for “non-medical

reasons” is an Eighth Amendment violation. Ancata v. Prison Health

Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (CA11 1985). But Wexford was insulated

from its employees’ tortious actions under Monell because he could not

establish a Wexford custom or practice denying “medically necessary”

care “outside [Mr.] West’s own experience.” Pet. App. 24a (citing Craig

v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (CA11 2011) (internal quotation

Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 35 (2004);

Jack M. Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section

1983?, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 9 (2004) (each discussing the different policy

considerations at stake when a private corporation provides a local

governmental service).

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marks omitted)). Given Mr. West and other incarcerated individuals’

difficulty acquiring knowledge and evidence of other people’s experiences

with Wexford, Monell erected too high an obstacle. Monell’s shielding of

private corporations like Wexford prevented Mr. West from accessing

Section 1983’s core guarantees: that of “deter[ring] state actors from * * *

depriv[ing] individuals of their federally guaranteed rights,” Richardson,

521 U.S. at 403 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), and

providing “compensation” for injuries from the “deprivation of federal

rights,” Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591.

4.

This case presents a clean vehicle to address whether Monell

should be extended to private corporations. Virtually all of the federal

courts of appeals have analyzed and answered this question. See supra,

p.12 n.1. The panel below agreed that Monell barred Mr. West from

establishing Section 1983 respondeat superior liability against Wexford.

Pet. App. 22a, 38a–39a.

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CONCLUSION

Mr. West respectfully requests this Court grant a writ of certiorari

as to the question presented.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Erica J. Hashimoto

Erica J. Hashimoto

Counsel of Record

John H. Peng

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW

CENTER

APPELLATE LITIGATION PROGRAM

111 F. St. NW, Ste. 306

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-9555

eh502@georgetown.edu

Mar. 9, 2026

Counsel for Petitioner

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