Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jennie V. Wright, et al., Petitioners v. Louisville Metro Government, et al.

No. _______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

––––––––––––––––

JENNIE V. WRIGHT AND SAUL WRIGHT,

Petitioners,

v.

LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, ET AL.,

––––––––––––––––

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

––––––––––––––––

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

––––––––––––––––

Cecillia D. Wang

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

425 California St. Ste. 700

San Francisco, CA 94104

Corey M. Shapiro

William E. Sharp

Bethany N. Baxter

ACLU OF KENTUCKY

FOUNDATION

325 W. Main Street

Suite 2200

Louisville, KY 40202

Lauren Willard Zehmer

Counsel of Record

Sameer Aggarwal

Emma Keteltas Graham

Ryan S. Sandler

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

850 Tenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-6000

lzehmer@cov.com

Counsel for Petitioners

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Although Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to

hold state actors accountable for violating federal civil

rights, the application of inconsistent and unreasonably short state statutes of limitations has impeded

access to this important federal remedy. This petition

presents the Court an opportunity to revisit the current fifty-state borrowing framework in light of

Congress’s enactment of a federal catchall statute of

limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Section 1658(a)

now provides a “suitable” federal rule of decision that

did not exist when this Court last addressed the appropriate limitations period for Section 1983 claims.

This petition also enables the Court to decide the

question it expressly reserved in Owens v. Okure, 488

U.S. 235 (1989): whether a one-year state limitations

period is inconsistent with the federal interests underlying Section 1983.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a)’s uniform residual

limitations period provides a “suitable” federal rule to

govern federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

2. Whether Kentucky’s one-year residual personal

injury statute of limitations is too short to be consistent with the federal interests underpinning

Section 1983.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners (plaintiffs-appellants

Jennie V. Wright and Saul Wright.

below)

are

Respondents (defendants-appellees below) are the

Louisville Metro Government, Eric Stafford, Timothy

Huber, Timothy Liksey, David Eades, Kyle Seng, and

Steven Macatee.

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

•

Wright, et al. v. Louisville Metro Government, et

al., No. 24-5965 (6th Cir. July 16, 2025) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss) *

•

Wright, et al. v. Louisville Metro Government, et

al., No. 21-cv-308 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2024)

(granting motion to dismiss) **

There are no other proceedings in state or federal

trial or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to this case within the meaning of this Court’s

Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

* On the suggestion from the Sixth Circuit in the opinion below,

Petitioners’ co-plaintiffs, Brendon Burnett and Jawand Lyle

moved to alter the district court’s judgment under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b) as applied to them, and the district court

granted that motion. Mr. Burnett and Mr. Lyle will file an

amended complaint by January 15, 2026. The district court’s

prior judgment remains in effect with respect to Petitioners.

They were not parties to the motion to alter nor will they be parties to the forthcoming amended complaint.

** The district court action has been reopened only with respect

to Mr. Burnett and Mr. Lyle.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS........................ ii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS...... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................... vi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ............1

OPINIONS BELOW ...................................................1

JURISDICTION .........................................................1

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ................1

INTRODUCTION .......................................................2

STATEMENT .............................................................4

A.

Legal and Statutory Background ........ 4

B.

Factual Background............................. 8

C.

Procedural Background ....................... 9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......12

I.

The Court Should Grant Certiorari to

Recognize that Section 1658(a) Provides

a “Suitable” and Uniform Federal

Limitations Period to Govern Section

1983 Claims. .............................................12

II.

The Court Can Also Grant Certiorari to

Decide the Question It Left Open in

Owens: Whether a One-Year State

Limitations Period Is Inconsistent with

the Federal Interests of Section 1983......21

v

III.

The Application of Fifty Different State

Limitations Periods Creates Unequal

Access to Federal Civil Rights Claims. ...30

IV.

This Case Provides an Ideal Vehicle to

Resolve Important Questions That Will

Be Difficult to Raise in Future Cases. .....32

CONCLUSION .........................................................35

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Brown v. Pouncy,

93 F.4th 331 (5th Cir. 2024) .............. 12, 28, 32, 34

Burnett v. Grattan,

468 U.S. 42 (1984) ................. 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 17,

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 32

Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles,

321 U.S. 144 (1944) .............................................. 18

DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,

462 U.S. 151 (1983) .................................. 15, 16, 29

Hardin v. Straub,

490 U.S. 536 (1989) .............................................. 22

Holmberg v. Armbrecht,

327 U.S. 392 (1946) .............................................. 16

Johnson v. Garrison,

805 F. App’x 589 (10th Cir. 2020)........................ 23

Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency,

421 U.S. 454 (1975) .............................................. 14

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,

392 U.S. 409 (1968) .............................................. 14

McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,

357 U.S. 221 (1958) ........................................ 15, 20

vii

McDonald v. Salazar,

831 F. Supp. 2d 313 (D.D.C. 2011) ...................... 24

Mitchum v. Foster,

407 U.S. 225 (1972) .......................................... 2, 27

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978) .............................................. 28

Monroe v. Conner,

2024 WL 939735

(5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2024) ......................................... 34

N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas,

515 U.S. 29 (1995) ................................................ 20

O’Sullivan v. Felix,

233 U.S. 318 (1914) .............................................. 14

Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC,

432 U.S. 355 (1977) ........................................ 16, 31

Okure v. Owens,

816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987) ..................... 6, 7, 24, 25

Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235 (1989) ....................... 2, 5, 6, 7, 18, 19,

22, 23, 24, 29

United States v. Price,

383 U.S. 787 (1966) .............................................. 31

Wilson v. Garcia,

471 U.S. 261 (1985) ........ 2, 6, 14, 18, 19, 27, 28, 31

viii

Zakora v. Chrisman,

44 F.4th 452 (6th Cir. 2022) ................................ 26

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .......................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1658 ............................................ 1, 2, 3, 13

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................. 1, 4, 9

42 U.S.C. § 1986 .................................................. 12, 28

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ...................................... 1, 5, 6, 13, 21

Ku Klux Klan Act, Pub. L. No. 42-22,

§ 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) ............................................ 4

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140 ..................................... 1

2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423, § 4 ...................... 34

Me. Stat. tit. 14, § 752 ............................................... 30

Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805 .................................. 30

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 ........................................... 30

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298 .................................. 30

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 ...................................... 30

ix

Other Authorities

Martin S. Greenberg & R. Barry

Ruback, After the Crime: Victim

Decision Making, in 9 Perspectives in

Law & Psychology (1992) ..................................... 26

Robert M. Jarvis & Judith Anne Jarvis,

The Continuing Problem of Statutes

of Limitations in Section 1983 Cases:

Is the Answer Out at Sea?,

22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 285 (1988) ....................... 20

Nancy Leong, Katelyn Elrod & Matthew

Nilsen, Pleading Failures in Monell

Litigation,

72 Emory L.J. 801 (2024)..................................... 25

Jason Marcus, All Quiet on the Eastern

Front: Legal Malpractice, Tolling,

and the Systemic Barriers Facing

Eastern Kentuckians,

114 Ky. L.J. Online (2025) ................................... 25

Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal

“Fallback” Statute of Limitations:

Limitations by Default,

72 Neb. L. Rev. 454 (1993) ................................... 30

Kimberly Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A

Limitations Period with Real

Limitations,

69 Ind. L.J. 477 (1994) ......................................... 18

Oral Argument, Brown v. Pouncy, No.

22-30691 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023) .......................... 20

x

Teressa Ravenell, Unidentified Police

Officials,

100 Tex. L. Rev. 891 (2022) ................................. 27

Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights

Without Representation,

64 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 641 (2023) ..................... 25

Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights

Plaintiffs and John Doe Defendants:

A Study in Section 1983 Procedure,

25 Cardozo L. Rev. 793 (2003) ............................. 27

Noah Webster, An American Dictionary

of the English Language (1857) ........................... 17

Joseph E. Worcester, A Dictionary of the

English Language (1860) ..................................... 17

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Jennie and Saul Wright respectfully

petition this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Sixth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The July 16, 2025, decision of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (App. 1a–17a)

is reported at 144 F.4th 817. The district court’s September 19, 2024, memorandum ruling granting

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (App. 18a–26a) is available at 2024 WL 4242060.

JURISDICTION

The Sixth Circuit entered judgment on July 16,

2025. App. 1a. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The relevant U.S. statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1658, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, are reproduced at App. 27a–29a. Kentucky’s residual

personal injury limitations period that was applied to

the Wrights’ claims, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140, is

reproduced at App. 29a–31a.

2

INTRODUCTION

Section 1983 “provides ‘a uniquely federal remedy

against incursions under the claimed authority of

state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and

laws of the Nation.’” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,

271–72 (1985) (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.

225 (1972)). Because Congress did not include an express limitations period in Section 1983, courts have

thus far borrowed limitations periods from state law.

The fifty-state borrowing framework, however, has resulted in federal civil rights plaintiffs across the

Nation facing inconsistent access to this “uniquely

federal remedy.” Id. For example, while Section 1983

plaintiffs in Florida or Maine have four or six years

respectively to bring their federal claims, Section 1983

plaintiffs in Kentucky—like Petitioners Jennie and

Saul Wright—have only a single year.

This petition raises two related questions of national and critical importance concerning the

appropriate limitations period for Section 1983 that

only this Court can address. First, this petition provides the Court an opportunity to revisit the fiftystate borrowing framework in light of Congress’s enactment of a federal residual limitations period—28

U.S.C. § 1658(a)—which can serve as a “suitable” and

uniform federal rule of decision far more consistent

with Section 1983. Second, the petition squarely presents the question this Court expressly reserved in

Owens v. Okure: whether a one-year state statute of

limitations period is too short to be consistent with the

federal interest of Section 1983. 488 U.S. 235, 251

n.13 (1989).

3

Since the Court decided Owens, Congress enacted

a four-year statute of limitations for all subsequently

enacted federal causes of action that do not include

their own express limitations periods. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1658(a). Under Section 1988’s framework and the

Court’s precedent, courts can borrow from that federal

rule to provide a uniform limitations period for all Section 1983 claims. Now that Congress has enacted

Section 1658(a), there is no longer any reason to subject plaintiffs to a patchwork of different state

limitations periods for their federal civil rights claims.

The Court also can address the question that it expressly reserved in Owens of whether a one-year state

limitations period is too short to apply to Section 1983

claims. Kentucky’s one-year limitations period is an

outlier, tied with only Tennessee and Puerto Rico for

the shortest in the Nation. Because of the practicalities inherent in federal civil rights litigation—

including the time needed to recover from trauma, to

understand the constitutional implications of an injury, to find counsel or learn to navigate federal

litigation pro se, to conduct a factual investigation,

and to prepare a plausible, well-pleaded complaint—

the imposition of Kentucky’s one-year limitations period effectively obstructs many meritorious federal

civil rights claims in a manner that Congress never

countenanced.

The Wrights’ experience is illustrative.

The

Wrights’ civil rights were violated when police officers

searched their home with a defective search warrant

and held them at gunpoint. Because the Wrights live

in Kentucky, they were required to file their federal

civil rights claim against the police department and

individual officers within one year. But the Wrights

4

needed additional time to discover the identities of the

officers. After conducting discovery pro se, the

Wrights sought to substitute the individual officers for

the John Doe defendants, but the courts below held

that their amended complaint did not relate back to

their initial complaint. In other words, the Wrights

had to have conducted discovery into the officers’ identities and served an amended complaint within

Kentucky’s unreasonably short one-year limitations

period.

The combination of Kentucky’s one-year statute of

limitations with the strict relation-back rule allows

the Commonwealth to run out the clock on civil rights

claims against their officers through the state’s own

delay. Such a result runs precisely counter to the purpose of Section 1983.

The Court should grant review to assess whether

courts should borrow from a uniform federal limitations period to govern the quintessential federal civil

rights statute.

STATEMENT

A. Legal and Statutory Background

After the Civil War, Congress passed the Ku Klux

Klan Act, which included as its central enforcement

mechanism the provision now codified as 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Pub. L. No. 42-22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983

empowers citizens with a cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws” by any person

acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. For Congress, Section 1983 “was not

5

directed at the [Klan] as much as at the state officials

who tolerated and condoned them . . . [and who] were

unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.” Owens,

488 U.S. at 250 n.11 (citations omitted).

Section 1983 “has emerged as easily the most important statute authorizing suits against state

officials for violations of the Constitution and laws of

the United States.” W. Baude, et al., Hart and

Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1280 (8th ed. 2025); see also Martin A. Schwartz,

Section 1983 Litigation (3d ed. 2014). Because Section

1983 does not contain its own express limitations period, federal courts have had to look elsewhere to

determine the timeliness of such claims. This exercise

has proved challenging for courts and was addressed

by this Court in a trilogy of cases decided in the 1980s.

The first case was Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42

(1984), where the Court underscored that the “central

objective of § 1983” is “ensur[ing] that individuals

whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are

abridged may recover damages or secure injunctive

relief.” Id. at 55. This Court applied 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

which, “[i]n the absence of specific guidance . . . direct[s] federal courts to follow a three-step process to

borrow an appropriate rule” to identify a limitations

period for federal civil rights claims. Id. at 47. Under

that approach, federal courts first “look to the laws of

the United States ‘so far as such laws are suitable to

carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into

effect.’” Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 1988). Second, “[i]f no suitable federal rule

exists,” courts consider “application of state ‘common

law, as modified and changed by the constitution and

statutes’ of the forum State.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.

6

§ 1988). Third, to ensure “the predominance of the

federal interest, courts are to apply state law only if it

is not ‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of

the United States.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).

Given the uncertainty among federal courts regarding which state limitations period to apply, this

Court returned to the issue in Wilson v. Garcia, 471

U.S. 261 (1985). The Court held that Section 1983’s

statute of limitations was a federal question and that

all Section 1983 actions should be categorized as personal injury actions for the purpose of determining the

appropriate limitations period. See id. at 268–69, 276.

In doing so, Wilson sought to “minimize[] the risk that

the choice of a state statute of limitations would not

fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by

§ 1983.” Id. at 279.

Lower courts, however, continued to struggle with

the fact that many states had multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, any number of

which could apply depending upon the nature of the

federal claim.

The Court therefore returned to this question in

Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). There, the Court

considered whether a Section 1983 claim brought in

New York and arguably subject to a one-year statute

of limitations for assault should instead be measured

against New York’s residual catchall personal injury

statute of limitations of three years. The Second Circuit applied the three-year residual limitations

period, recognizing that the longer time limit “more

faithfully represents the federal interest in providing

an effective remedy for violations of civil rights than

does the restrictive one year limit.” Okure v. Owens,

7

816 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1987), aff’d, 488 U.S. 235

(1989). The court observed that a longer limitations

period was necessary because “[i]njuries to personal

rights” are not “necessarily apparent to the victim at

the time they are inflicted” as “[e]ven where the injury

itself is obvious, the constitutional dimensions of the

tort may not be.” Id. at 48.

This Court unanimously affirmed that decision

and explained that, where a state law provides multiple statutes of limitation for personal injury actions,

courts generally should borrow the general or residual

personal injury statute of limitations. Owens, 488

U.S. at 250.

Because the Court endorsed the Second Circuit’s

decision to use New York’s three-year residual limitations period, it expressly noted that it “need not

address [respondent’s] argument that applying a 1year limitations period to § 1983 actions would be inconsistent with federal interests.” Id. at 251 n.13.

The Court thus signaled that there could be circumstances in which a state’s statute of limitations is too

short to be consistent with the federal interests underlying Section 1983, and it explicitly reserved the

question of whether a one-year limitations period is

too short.

In 1990, after Owens was decided, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658, which adopted for the first

time a federal catchall statute of limitations. This

Court has not yet addressed whether Section 1658(a)

provides a more “suitable” federal analogue under the

three-step test in Section 1988 and Burnett. See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47–48.

8

B. Factual Background

On May 7, 2020 (several weeks after the onset of

the COVID pandemic), officers with the Louisville

Metro Police Department executed early-morning

searches on Columbia Street in Louisville, Kentucky.

Petitioners Jennie and Saul Wright (the “Wrights”)

lived at 1732 Columbia Street along with their two

then-minor great-nephews. Complaint, Doc. 1-1,

¶¶ 1–2. They were all home that morning when

LMPD Officers Eric Stafford, Timothy Huber, Timothy Liksey, David Eades, Kyle Seng, and Steven

Macatee (collectively, the “Officers”) arrived at the

house, announced that the residents of 1736 Columbia

Street should come outside, and eventually ordered

the Wrights outside and effectively ransacked their

home while conducting a search for evidence based on

a sealed search warrant which later was determined

to be deficient. Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 8–13; Amended Complaint, Doc. 42 at 3. The Officers also ordered the two

minors out of their home at gunpoint and placed the

Wrights in handcuffs. Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 11–13.

The Wrights, who were only partially dressed,

were detained while the Officers extensively searched

their home, damaging it in the process. Doc. 1-1,

¶¶ 11–12. The Officers did not recover any evidence

of illegal activity, and criminal charges were never

filed against the Wrights. Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 16–17. Officer

9

Huber gave the Wrights a copy of the court order sealing the deficient warrant for their residence dated two

days before the search. Doc. 42 at 2. 1

C. Procedural Background

On May 6, 2021, the Wrights, by counsel, filed a

state court action on behalf of themselves and their

great-nephews against the Louisville Metro Government and the then-unknown officers who ransacked

their home, who were listed as John Doe defendants.

App. 2a–3a, 18a. The Wrights asserted federal claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their federal

constitutional rights, as well as several state law

claims. Id.

Louisville Metro timely removed the action to federal court, and then successfully moved to dismiss the

claims against it, leaving only the John Doe defendants in the case. Then proceeding pro se, Jennie

Wright filed additional papers, including a request to

take discovery before the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference.

The Wrights submitted an Open Records Act request to Louisville Metro, seeking public records that

would identify the full names and badge numbers of

those officers whose last names appeared on LMPD’s

Seized Item Report. After Louisville Metro initially

denied that request, stating there were “no responsive

police reports for the” May 7, 2020, search by LMPD

at 1732 Columbia Street, the Wrights moved pro se to

1 After a subsequent Inspector General investigation, a report

was issued confirming that the search warrant lacked probable

cause.

10

compel the production of public records fully identifying the officers. The magistrate judge granted that

motion so that the Wrights could “discover the names

and service addresses of the unknown officer defendants.” Order, Doc. 37.

On June 13, 2023, the Wrights moved for leave to

amend their Complaint to name Stafford, Huber,

Liksey, Eades, Seng, and Macatee as the Officers,

whose identities had previously been unknown, which

the magistrate judge granted.

The Officers then moved to dismiss the Amended

Complaint, arguing that the Wrights’ claims were untimely and that the Amended Complaint did not

“relate back” to their initial Complaint. At this time,

the Wrights were still pro se and argued that their

amended claims were timely because they related

back to the initial Complaint. The district court

agreed with the Officers and dismissed the Wrights’

claims. App. 19a. It determined that the Wrights’

amended claims “arrived years after the cause of action accrued” and were thus barred by Kentucky’s

one-year statute of limitations. App. 21a.

The Wrights, with the assistance of new pro bono

counsel, appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Wrights

raised several arguments on appeal. The Wrights

first argued that their Amended Complaint substituting the names of the John Doe defendants that the

Wrights only learned through post-complaint discovery should “relate back” to the date of their original

complaint. The Wrights further argued that if Rule

15 required the Wrights to file their complaint, conduct discovery, and substitute John Doe defendants

all within Kentucky’s one-year limitations period that

11

applies to Section 1983, then that limitations period

itself is too short to be consistent with the federal interests underpinning Section 1983. The Wrights

argued both questions presented here, including that

Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations does not

control their claims because it is inconsistent with

Section 1983’s federal interests and because, as a matter of federal law, Section 1658(a) provides the

controlling limitations period for their claims. C.A.

Doc. 22.

The Officers responded that Section 1658(a) does

not apply to Section 1983 claims by its own terms, ignoring that Section 1988’s borrowing framework does

not require a federal statute to be expressly applicable. Additionally, the Commonwealth of Kentucky,

through the Attorney General, filed an amicus brief

addressing only the statute of limitations argument

because the Commonwealth “has a strong interest in

defending its statute of limitations for Section 1983.”

C.A. Doc. 38 at 1. The Commonwealth did not address

any other issues raised in the Wrights’ appeal.

On July 16, 2025, in a published opinion, the Sixth

Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Wrights’ claims.

App. 2a. The court squarely addressed the Wrights’

legal challenge to Kentucky’s one-year limitations period. It first determined that it could not conclude

that Section 1658(a) applies to Section 1983 claims because this Court held in Burnett, before Section

1658(a)’s enactment, that “[i]t is now settled that federal courts will turn to state law for statutes of

limitations in actions brought under the civil rights

statutes.” App. 12a (alteration in original) (quoting

Burnett, 468 U.S. at 49). The court acknowledged that

it was “neither here nor there” that Section 1658(a)

12

did not govern Section 1983 claims by its own terms,

but it could not evaluate whether Section 1658(a) is

“suitable” because “[a]s an inferior court,” it could not

“upend th[e] settlement” that this Court reached in

Burnett. App. 12a. So “absent a change in law or Supreme Court precedent,” the Sixth Circuit would “not

buck Burnett.” App. 13a. The court separately addressed the Wrights’ argument that Kentucky’s oneyear statute of limitations is too short to be consistent

with the federal interests underpinning Section 1983.

The court also rejected this argument based on the

fact that Congress enacted a one-year limitations period in a different provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1986, even

while the Court recognized that the statutory contexts

are “distinct.” App. 13a (quoting Brown v. Pouncy, 93

F.4th 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2024)).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

The Court Should Grant Certiorari to

Recognize that Section 1658(a) Provides a

“Suitable” and Uniform Federal Limitations

Period to Govern Section 1983 Claims.

When Burnett, Wilson, and Owens were decided in

the 1980s, there was no “suitable” federal law that

could supply the limitations period for Section 1983

claims. Courts were therefore left to apply a patchwork of fifty different state limitations periods that

created arbitrary results for similarly situated civil

rights victims. That system has also allowed some

states—like Kentucky—to apply an unreasonably

short limitations period to Section 1983 claims that

effectively undermines a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate

their important federal civil rights.

13

In 1990, Congress enacted Section 1658(a), which

provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,

a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted

after the date of the enactment of this section may not

be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). This Court has not

yet considered how the existence of this federal residual limitations period affects which statute of

limitations courts should borrow for Section 1983

claims. This petition presents the Court with the opportunity to recognize that this catchall federal

limitations period provides a “suitable” federal rule of

decision, under the Section 1988 framework, that is

far more predictable, uniform, and consistent with the

federal interests of Section 1983.

When the Court previously evaluated Section

1983’s limitations period, it explained that Section

1988 “direct[s] federal courts to follow a three-step

process” to supply the appropriate rule of decision.

Burnett, 468 U.S. at 47 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Under Section 1988, courts first “look to the laws of the

United States ‘so far as such laws are suitable to carry

[the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.’” Id. at 48 (alteration in original) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 1988).

If a federal law is “suitable,” then the federal law

controls and the court’s job is done. See id. Only if “no

suitable federal rule exists” do courts proceed to steps

two and three of Section 1988’s framework: considering the application of the forum state’s law and

determining whether state law “is not ‘inconsistent

with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’”

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). These steps, however,

14

“should not be undertaken before principles of federal

law are exhausted.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.

As explained, when the Court decided Burnett,

there was no “suitable” federal law to provide a limitations period for Section 1983 claims. 468 U.S. at 48–

49. The Court determined that other twentieth-century civil rights laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of

1964, could not supply the limitations period for Section 1983 claims because the laws had “independen[t]”

“remedial scheme[s].” Id. at 49 (discussing O’Sullivan

v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324–25 (1914), Johnson v. Ry.

Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459–61 (1975), and

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 416–17 &

n.20 (1968)). Because no federal law in existence at

the time could supply the appropriate limitations period, the Court proceeded to the second step of Section

1988’s framework, and thus directed federal courts to

“turn to state law for statutes of limitations” in cases

brought under the paramount federal civil rights statute. Id.; accord Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268–70.

Section 1658(a) now provides a federal solution to

this problem. And because the lower courts are bound

by precedent, only this Court can reevaluate its prior

Section 1988’s analysis in light of congressional action

that now displaces the use of state limitations periods

for the “uniquely federal remedy” of Section 1983.

Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271–72. Indeed, the Court has observed that “when a rule from elsewhere in federal

law clearly provides a closer analogy than available

state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake

and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a

significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial

lawmaking,” the Court has “not hesitated to turn

15

away from state law.” DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).

Under an updated analysis, this Court can conclude that Section 1658(a) is a “suitable” federal law

for courts to apply as the limitations period for Section

1983 claims. It is far more consistent with Section

1983’s federal interests to fill its missing gap with a

uniform federal residual statute of limitations than to

borrow from a patchwork of fifty different states’ residual personal injury limitations periods. At least

where a “suitable” federal rule exists, subjecting federal civil rights claimants to wildly divergent time

periods for bringing similar federal claims based on

the vicissitudes of state tort law is contrary to Section

1983’s core purpose of providing a remedy against

state officers who violate people’s federal civil rights.

In other contexts where a reasonable federal limitations rule is available, this Court has recognized

that “state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law.”

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 161. The Court has thus “declined to borrow state statutes” and “instead used

timeliness rules drawn from federal law—either express limitations periods from related federal

statutes, or such alternatives as laches.” Id. at 162.

See, e.g., McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357

U.S. 221, 226 (1958) (applying federal limitations period to admiralty action so seamen obtain “the full

benefit of federal law to which they are entitled” (citation omitted)); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169 (applying

analogous federal limitations period to suits by employee against employer and union because Court

“ha[d] available a federal statute of limitations actually designed to accommodate” the relevant interests);

16

Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394–95 (1946)

(declining to apply state limitations period to federal

equitable right).

In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, for example, this Court rejected the application of

California’s one-year limitations period to cases

brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). The Court explained that it

“has not mechanically applied a state statute of limitations simply because a limitations period is absent

from the federal statute.” Id. Rather, because “[s]tate

legislatures do not devise their limitations periods

with national interests in mind,” it is the “duty of the

federal courts to assure that the importation of state

law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies.” Id. And because the

federal interests at stake weighed towards additional

time to bring a claim, it was not appropriate to subject

the “federal lawsuits” at issue there “to the vagaries

of diverse state limitations statutes, some as short as

one year.” Id. at 370–71.

Application of a state limitations period is particularly improper in a case like this where there is

“available a federal statute of limitations” that could

“accommodate” the relevant interests and is “more apt

than any of the suggested state-law parallels.”

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 169. Here, applying the federal residual limitations period to Section 1983 claims

is much “more apt” than applying the patchwork of

fifty different state law residual or personal injury

statute of limitations.

17

This is especially appropriate because Section

1988’s framework requires courts to look to federal

law first. Under the first step of Section 1988’s borrowing framework, courts survey federal law to

determine whether a “suitable” limitations period exists. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 42. Section 1658(a) meets

that bar. That provision represents Congress’s considered determination of the appropriate balance

between providing federal plaintiffs sufficient time to

bring their claims and ensuring that all claims are

brought in a timely manner. See Joseph E. Worcester,

A Dictionary of the English Language 1444–45 (1860)

(defining “suitable” as “[f]itting; fit; meet; conformable; proper; appropriate; becoming; agreeable;

answerable; convenient”); Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 808 (1857)

(defining “suitable” as “[f]itting;” and “[a]dequate”).

Writing for the court of appeals, Judge Thapar recognized that Section 1658(a) may be “suitable” for

Section 1983 claims. As he explained, Section 1658(a)

can “apply” to Section 1983 claims “if it is ‘suitable’ to

section 1983” and it is “neither here nor there” that

Section 1658(a) applies by its terms to subsequently

enacted statutory causes of action. App. 12a. The relevant question is whether Section 1658(a) is “suitable”

for Section 1983 claims. Id. And it is: to be sure, Section 1658(a) is no less suitable than a state-law

limitations period for state-law personal injury torts.

Indeed, the very premise of the inquiry under Section

1988’s framework is that the federal law supplying

the rule of decision need not be expressly applicable.

If a statute were directly applicable, there would be no

need for the separate borrowing analysis.

18

While federal courts currently borrow state law

under steps two and three of Section 1988’s framework, the Court has always acknowledged that

borrowing state law is a second-best solution. “Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts

and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative

function of defining and characterizing the essential

elements of a federal cause of action.” Wilson, 471

U.S. at 269. And the “applicability of different state

statutes of limitations” to Section 1983 claims has

“bred chaos and uncertainty.” Owens, 488 U.S. at 243.

The state-borrowing scheme is a particularly odd

fit for Section 1983 actions given that Section 1983

provides a “uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon

rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation,” and operates to “override certain kinds of state

laws.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271–72 (citations omitted);

see also Kimberly Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitations Period with Real Limitations, 69 Ind. L.J. 477,

513–14 (1994) (“If . . . the ineffectiveness of state law

was the reason for § 1983’s enactment, there is little

logic in allowing state law to govern how long the federal claim should survive.”). In other words, the stateborrowing scheme empowers states to unduly restrict

the sweep of Section 1983—the federal cause of action

that itself serves as a check on state officials’ exercise

of their authority.

The Court has previously stressed the virtue of the

uniform application of federal law as “[i]t is, of course,

true that uniform operation of a federal law is a desirable end, and other things being equal, we often have

interpreted statutes to achieve it.” Davies Warehouse

Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944) (collecting

19

cases). And that straightforward proposition has been

further emphasized in the Section 1983 context because “the federal interest in uniformity and the

interest in having ‘firmly defined, easily applied

rules,’ support the conclusion that Congress intended

the characterization of § 1983 to be measured by federal rather than state standards.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at

270 (citation omitted).

Applying Section 1658(a) as the appropriate reference point would ensure federal uniformity and

eliminate the arbitrariness and unfairness of the current fifty-state approach. With the benefit of Section

1658(a) as a “suitable” rule of decision, courts no

longer need to perpetuate a flawed regime in which

plaintiffs in Maine and North Dakota have six years

to vindicate their federal civil rights under Section

1983 whereas citizens in Kentucky, Tennessee, and

Puerto Rico have only a single year. Similarly, plaintiffs (and defendants) would no longer be forced to

navigate the differences and complexity of state law

to determine what statute of limitations applies to

their federal claims, including determining whether

their state has a single or multiple personal injury

limitations periods. The four-year residual limitations period that Congress provided in Section 1658(a)

enhances predictability—which is “a primary goal of

statutes of limitations,” Owens, 488 U.S. at 240—

while maintaining the national interest in the uniform application of federal law.

Applying Section 1658(a) instead of the patchwork

of fifty state limitations statutes is the better answer

based on the text of Section 1988. At oral argument

in a similar case before the Fifth Circuit, Judge Ho

20

suggested that relying on Section 1658(a) and “replacing the state-by-state strangeness with a uniform four

year [limitations period]” “seems to be more textual”

than the current fifty-state borrowing regime. Oral

Argument at 15:30–16:58, Brown v. Pouncy, No. 2230691 (5th Cir. Oct. 4, 2023). 2

Despite recognizing that Section 1658(a) could provide a “suitable” federal solution under Section 1988,

the Sixth Circuit determined that only this Court

could address that question. “As an inferior court,”

the Sixth Circuit could not “upend” Burnett’s application of state limitations periods to Section 1983 claims

“absent a change in law or Supreme Court precedent.”

Id. Until this Court clarifies that Section 1658(a) now

provides a “suitable” federal rule of decision for Section 1983 claims, Burnett’s obsolete interpretation of

Section 1988 will continue to control across the Nation.

At a minimum, Section 1658(a) provides an alternative that courts can apply where a state’s residual

period fails the third step of Section 1988’s framework

2 https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/22/22-30691_

10-4-2023.mp3. Because “Congress has not prescribed a limitations period to govern” Section 1983 claims and because applying

Kentucky’s one-year period to the Wrights’ claims “would frustrate the purposes the of federal enactment,” the Court could also

determine that based on the statutory text, it “should apply . . .

no limitations period at all.” N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515

U.S. 29, 37 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). See

infra Part II. In such circumstances, federal common law can

provide alternatives—such as laches—to protect against stale

claims. See McAllister, 357 U.S. at 224–25; see also Robert M.

Jarvis & Judith Anne Jarvis, The Continuing Problem of Statutes

of Limitations in Section 1983 Cases: Is the Answer Out at Sea?,

22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 285, 291–93 (1988).

21

because it is “inconsistent with the Constitution and

laws of the United States.” Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Where, as here, a state’s

residual personal injury limitations period is practically too short to serve the federal interests of Section

1983, courts must find a more suitable alternative.

Rather than search for yet another state limitations

period, federal law provides a clear answer: Section

1658(a).

As further explained below, one year does not provide federal plaintiffs with sufficient time to vindicate

their federal rights—as illustrated by the Wrights’ experience in having their amended complaint deemed

time-barred after they worked without counsel to discover basic facts such as the identity of the officers

who violated their rights. After analyzing Section

1988 under Burnett and Owens, a court would still be

left without a limitations period to apply to these

plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims. In these circumstances, Section 1658(a) represents Congress’s

determination of the appropriate limitations period

where federal law has not otherwise provided a statute of limitations. Section 1658(a) thus serves as the

correct limitations period and failsafe for plaintiffs,

who have been stymied by a restrictive state-law provision, to vindicate their federal civil rights.

II. The Court Can Also Grant Certiorari to

Decide the Question It Left Open in Owens:

Whether a One-Year State Limitations

Period Is Inconsistent with the Federal

Interests of Section 1983.

In Owens, this Court cautioned that a state limitations period could be so short as to be “inconsistent

22

with [the] federal interests” underpinning Section

1983, and it explicitly reserved the question whether

a one-year period fit within that category for a future

case. Owens, 488 U.S. at 251 n.13. This petition

squarely presents this question.

The Wrights’ civil rights claims were held untimely because Kentucky has the shortest statute of

limitations for Section 1983 claims—tied with only

Tennessee and Puerto Rico—at a single year. Granting review here would allow the Court to address the

substantial and important question it reserved in Owens: whether a one-year state statute of limitations is

inconsistent with federal interests and undermines

Section 1983 by practically frustrating federal civil

rights claims. Regardless of whether the Court applies Section 1658(a) as a “suitable” federal law to

govern Section 1983 claims generally, it should at

least clarify that a one-year state limitations period is

too short to be consistent with federal law.

This Court has made clear that state procedural

rules—such as statutes of limitations—cannot operate in a way that contravenes Section 1983’s primary

legislative purpose to hold state actors accountable for

federal civil rights violations. See id. at 249 n.11; Burnett, 468 U.S. at 53. And when “particular state

concerns are inconsistent with, or of marginal relevance to, the policies informing the Civil Rights Act,

the resulting state statute of limitations may be inappropriate for civil rights claims.” Burnett, 468 U.S. at

53. As a result, courts do not apply a state’s limitations period if doing so “defeat[s] either § 1983’s chief

goals of compensation and deterrence or its subsidiary

goals of uniformity and federalism.” Hardin v.

Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (footnote omitted);

23

see also Johnson v. Garrison, 805 F. App’x 589, 593

(10th Cir. 2020) (holding that Oklahoma’s lack of a

tolling provision for Section 1983 was contrary to Section 1983’s goals and the practicalities involved in

litigating federal civil rights claims).

When the Court decided Owens, it determined that

the operative limitations period for Section 1983

claims is the forum state’s residual personal injury

statute of limitations. While the Court stressed that

the patchwork solution it fashioned would promote

“predictability in all 50 States,” it did so only in the

absence of a viable federal solution at that time. Owens, 488 U.S. at 243. To ensure that states could not

use this borrowing scheme to undercut federal interests, the Court reserved its ability to assess whether

a state limitations period might be too short to accommodate federal interests. Id. at 251 n.13.

In reserving this question, the Court recognized

that, so long as Section 1983 depends upon state procedural rules, federal courts—and, in particular, this

Court—must act as a check on impermissible state legal regimes. Otherwise, states would be free to

undermine the scope and efficacy of Section 1983, limiting federal civil rights plaintiffs’ ability to seek

redress from the very state actors that statute is designed to hold accountable. Owens, 488 U.S. at 249

n.11. Put differently, the “predictability” promoted by

Owens was never meant to vitiate the requirement

that a state statute of limitations “afford a reasonable

time to the federal claimant.” Id. at 251 n.13 (quoting

Burnett, 468 U.S. at 61).

Kentucky’s one-year limitations period presents

these exact concerns. In Burnett, this Court explained

24

that “[a] state law is not ‘appropriate’ if it fails to take

into account practicalities that are involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies that are

analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts.” 468

U.S. at 50; see also McDonald v. Salazar, 831 F. Supp.

2d 313, 319 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A proper limitations provision must account for the characteristics of

litigation under the analogous federal statute, including the policies underlying and the practicalities

involved in litigating the federal cause of action.”).

Under that standard, a one-year statute of limitations, like Kentucky’s, simply does not provide

claimants enough time to address the several practicalities involved in filing federal civil rights suits. As

the Second Circuit explained in Okure, a three-year

timeframe “more faithfully represents the federal interest in providing an effective remedy for violations

of civil rights than does the restrictive one year limit.”

816 F.2d at 49, aff’d, 488 U.S. 235 (1989).

Federal civil rights plaintiffs face myriad practical

hurdles to bringing a Section 1983 action. The Court

has recognized that “[l]itigating a civil rights claim requires considerable preparation.” Burnett, 468 U.S.

at 50. At the outset, a plaintiff must “obtain counsel,

or prepare to proceed pro se,” “conduct enough investigation to draft pleadings that meet the requirements

of federal rules,” “establish the amount of his damages, prepare legal documents, pay a substantial

filing fee or prepare additional papers to support a request to proceed in forma pauperis, and file and serve

his complaint.” Id. at 50–51. And these steps all take

time because injuries to civil rights are not “necessarily apparent to the victim at the time they are

25

inflicted,” and “[e]ven where the injury itself is obvious,” Okure, 816 F.2d at 48, “[a]n injured person must

recognize the constitutional dimensions of his injury,”

Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50.

The Wrights’ case illustrates many of these and

other practical hurdles that Section 1983 plaintiffs

face. For example, the Wrights had to spend considerable time trying to understand the nature of their

claims and then finding counsel who could help them

advance those claims. Finding counsel for Section

1983 claims in Kentucky is particularly challenging

given the limited number of attorneys willing to take

on such cases—especially with Kentucky’s unduly

short time restriction—and the costs of hiring paid

counsel. 3 And those attorneys who do take on Section

1983 litigation may lack the appropriate civil rights

expertise, resulting in deficiencies in the quality of

representation. 4 For those unable to afford paid counsel, finding pro bono assistance is also difficult and

time-consuming. As with many Section 1983 plaintiffs, the Wrights eventually proceeded pro se, which

created additional challenges to understand and navigate complex federal litigation, including threshold

discovery disputes. The Wrights were forced to try to

3 See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Rights Without Representa-

tion, 64 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 641, 650–52 (2023).

4 See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Katelyn Elrod & Matthew Nilsen, Plead-

ing Failures in Monell Litigation, 72 Emory L.J. 801, 804 (2024);

see also Jason Marcus, All Quiet on the Eastern Front: Legal Malpractice, Tolling, and the Systemic Barriers Facing Eastern

Kentuckians, 114 Ky. L.J. Online (2025) (“three out of four

adults” in Eastern Kentucky “read[s] below an eighth-grade

level” so they “depend entirely on their lawyers to navigate the

legal system”).

26

learn the relevant laws and procedures all while processing and addressing the physical and mental

trauma they experienced after a police squad unlawfully raided their home and held them at gunpoint. 5

In fact, under Kentucky’s restrictive regime, the

Wrights’ great-nephews—who were also at home during the raid—were expected to bring their claims

within just one year of their eighteenth birthdays.

Like many Section 1983 plaintiffs, the Wrights

also faced the challenge of trying to discover the identities of the unnamed state officers—the John Doe

defendants—who ransacked their home. Because

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) has been interpreted not to permit “relation back” when plaintiffs

amend their complaints to name John Doe defendants, see Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 482 (6th

Cir. 2022), the Wrights were effectively forced to file

their complaint, conduct discovery to learn the Officers’ identities, and then substitute those names in an

amended complaint all within the single year permitted under Kentucky law for Section 1983 claims. This

combination of Rule 15(c)’s rigid standard and Kentucky’s restrictive one-year limitations period imposes

an impossible hurdle for many civil rights plaintiffs.

And it leads to outcomes that, as the district court put

5 See Martin S. Greenberg & R. Barry Ruback, After the Crime:

Victim Decision Making, 1–15, in 9 Perspectives in Law & Psychology (1992) (explaining that after suffering trauma, victims

often struggle in deciding whether they should report the crime).

27

it here, “may understandably appear harsh from the

perspective of a pro se litigant.” App. 24a. 6

Kentucky’s rule even applies in a case like this

where the defendants stymie plaintiffs’ efforts to discover even basic information. The Louisville Metro

Government resisted the Wrights’ Open Records Act

requests, and the Wrights were therefore forced to file

motions in district court seeking discovery. Under

this regime, the Wrights were at the mercy of the local

government—the defendants in their case—to provide

the Officers’ names quickly enough to allow them to

file their claims within one year of their injuries. But

allowing state officials to restrict a civil rights plaintiff’s access to federal court is in serious tension with

Congress’s “realiz[ation] that state officers might, in

fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of [federal]

rights.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).

State officers cannot be permitted to obstruct plaintiffs’ access to Section 1983’s federal remedy, which

operates to “override certain kinds of state laws”—not

be constrained by them. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271–72.

6 See Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John

Doe Defendants: A Study in Section 1983 Procedure, 25 Cardozo

L. Rev. 793, 797–98 (2003) (the use of John Doe defendants is

“most common and most necessary” in Section 1983 actions because those cases “emphasize[] the liability of the individual

officer” rather than the “government entity”); Teressa Ravenell,

Unidentified Police Officials, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 891, 898–99 (2022)

(In Section 1983 actions, plaintiffs are “unlikely to have a preexisting relationship with the defendants,” and are thus “less

likely to have the information necessary to identify the defendant.”).

28

The application of Kentucky law to the Wrights’

Section 1983 claims—especially combining the extremely short limitations period with the court of

appeals’ restrictive interpretation of Rule 15—unduly

restricts their and other federal civil rights plaintiffs’

ability to bring these “uniquely federal” claims. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272. Both courts below expressed

sympathy for the Wrights’ plight, including by acknowledging that “it does seem ‘harsh from the

perspective of a pro se litigant’ when their amended

complaint is dismissed as time-barred after being ordered ‘to discover the identities of unknown officers.’”

App. 11a (quoting App. 24a). Absent meaningful guidance from this Court, states like Kentucky can

continue to impose whichever limitations period they

see fit—including as short as one year—without regard to whether such state-law rules defeat Section

1983’s purpose of vindicating federal civil rights violated by state officers.

In the decision below, the court of appeals held

that a one-year limitations period is not necessarily

too short to vindicate Section 1983’s federal interests

because Congress imposed a one-year limitations period in a different provision, for actions against those

who conspire to deprive individuals of their civil

rights. App. 13a (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1986). But, as the

court below itself acknowledged, “[o]f course, section

1983 and section 1986 claims ‘are distinct.’” App. 13a

(quoting Brown, 93 F.4th at 337). Section 1986 addresses a discrete type of claim involving conspiracy

liability, which was the result of a compromise

reached after Congress rejected the controversial

Sherman Amendment. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

29

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665–69 (1978) (discussing history of Sherman Amendment). The one-year statute

of limitations in Section 1986 cabined the reach of a

provision that imposed liability far more broadly than

Section 1983 on persons that failed to prevent civil

rights violations. The lack of such a comparably short

limitations period in the text of Section 1983 demonstrates that Congress did not believe that a one-year

period would be appropriate for the core federal civil

rights remedy for direct violations. And if Justice

Rehnquist’s concurrence in Burnett had already made

clear that one year was also sufficient for Section 1983

claims, there would have been no reason for this Court

to expressly reserve this question in Owens. 488 U.S.

at 251 n.13.

This Court can grant the petition to answer that

question it explicitly reserved in Owens and make

clear that “applying a [one]-year limitations period to

§ 1983 actions [is] inconsistent with federal interests.”

Owens, 488 U.S. at 251 n.13. And when a state limitations period is too short, courts can instead apply

Section 1658(a)’s four-year federal catchall limitations

period. That provision “clearly provides a closer analogy” for Section 1983 claims than the outlier one-year

limitations periods, and “the federal policies at stake

and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a

significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial

lawmaking,” so the Court should not “hesitate[] to

turn away from state law.” DelCostello, 462 U.S. at

171–72. See also supra at 14–16.

30

III. The Application of Fifty Different State

Limitations Periods Creates Unequal Access

to Federal Civil Rights Claims.

This Court’s review is warranted because the questions presented raise issues of national and critical

importance regarding this Nation’s core federal civil

rights remedy. Currently, all fifty states (and U.S.

territories) are effectively split about the appropriate

statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims.

Based solely on geography, plaintiffs in the outlier jurisdictions face an unreasonably short limitations

period that effectively thwarts their ability to bring

meritorious Section 1983 claims.

The application of Kentucky’s one-year residual

personal injury statute of limitations to the Wrights’

Section 1983 claims illustrates that federal civil rights

plaintiffs are afforded different access to a federal

remedy for federal civil rights violations based solely

on where they live. Kentucky’s one-year period is tied

for the shortest in the Nation. See also Tenn. Code

Ann. § 28-3-104; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2).

Had the Officers violated the Wrights’ civil rights in

nearly any other state, their claims would have been

governed by a longer limitations period that would

have provided them more time to develop and investigate their claims before being forced to race to the

courthouse. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. L. § 600.5805(2)

(three years); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (five years);

Me. Stat. tit. 14 § 752 (six years). This “disparate

treatment is particularly troubling when the individual’s federally protected civil rights are at stake.”

Katharine F. Nelson, The 1990 Federal “Fallback”

Statute of Limitations: Limitations by Default, 72

Neb. L. Rev. 454, 483 (1993).

31

There is no good reason that plaintiffs’ access to a

foundational federal cause of action should turn on

the benevolence of their state legislatures, which “do

not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind.” Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 367.

That is especially true here because “[t]he high purposes of [Section 1983] make it appropriate to accord

the statute ‘a sweep as broad as its language.’” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272 (quoting United States v. Price,

383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). Section 1983 was designed

to “override certain kinds of state laws”—not be constrained by them. Id. Applying fifty different state

limitations periods is therefore inconsistent with the

text and purpose of the statute, especially in lieu of a

suitable federal catchall limitations period devised by

Congress. Section 1658(a), a “suitable” uniform federal limitations period that did not exist when

Burnett, Wilson, and Owens were decided, can now

end the current system of disparity among federal

civil rights victims.

At minimum, all federal civil rights plaintiffs—regardless of geography—are entitled to a reasonably

sufficient time to bring their claims. As almost all

other states have recognized, the mere one year applicable under Kentucky law does not provide plaintiffs

like the Wrights with sufficient time to develop the information and evidence necessary to bring their

federal claims. This is particularly true where, as

here, plaintiffs are not permitted to substitute the

names of unknown state officials after that one year

has run. States must, at minimum, provide a limitations period that satisfies the threshold federal

interests underlying Section 1983. By granting review here, the Court can ensure the availability of

32

Section 1983 to all Americans by recognizing that outlier states may not curtail their residents’ federal civil

rights with a one-year limitations period.

Review is necessary because the lack of uniformity

in the application of a federal remedy for the infringement of federal rights can only be corrected by this

Court. The decision below recognized that Section

1658(a) could provide a “suitable” federal solution under Section 1988, but the panel believed it was bound

by the Court’s express statement in Burnett that “‘it is

now settled’” that state limitations periods apply to

Section 1983 claims. App. 12a (alteration in original)

(quoting Burnett, 468 U.S. at 49). Similarly, the Fifth

Circuit held that it was bound by Burnett and Owens

to continue applying state-limitations periods to Section 1983 claims. Brown, 93 F.4th at 338. In short,

“[o]nly the Supreme Court” can provide the answer

about whether a one-year limitations period, like Kentucky’s, can continue to hinder Section 1983 claims.

See id.

IV. This Case Provides an Ideal Vehicle to

Resolve Important Questions That Will Be

Difficult to Raise in Future Cases.

The Wrights’ petition is an excellent vehicle to address the questions presented. The Wrights’ Section

1983 claims against the Officers were dismissed solely

based on timeliness. App. 7a. Because the Wrights

were unable to learn the Officers’ identities and

amend their complaint to name them within Kentucky’s one-year period, the courts below held, the

33

Wrights could not pursue relief. App. 8a–11a, 19a–

24a. 7

The Sixth Circuit squarely addressed the core

question the Wrights raise here: whether Kentucky’s

one-year limitations period is insufficient for Section

1983 claims as a matter of federal law. App. 11a–13a.

The court of appeals addressed both arguments the

Wrights present to this Court: that Section 1658(a)

controls under Section 1988’s framework and that one

year is insufficient to vindicate the federal interests

underpinning Section 1983. App. 11a–13a. And the

court did so in a published opinion after full briefing,

including an amicus brief from the Kentucky Attorney

General that solely addressed the propriety of applying Kentucky’s one-year limitations period to Section

1983 claims.

Review is particularly warranted here because the

Court is unlikely to have many additional opportunities to address these important questions. Now that

the Sixth Circuit has squarely addressed these arguments in a published and reasoned decision, it is

unlikely to do so again in a future case. The opinion

below will be binding on all future challenges brought

against Kentucky’s and Tennessee’s one-year limitations period—both of which are in the Sixth Circuit.

This Court need not consider the additional arguments the

Wrights raised below to show that their claims are timely, including that their amended complaint “relates back” to their

initial complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). A

decision holding that Kentucky’s one-year limitations period

does not control the Wrights’ claims would grant complete relief

and allow the lower courts to consider the merits of the claims.

7

34

Recent experience in the Fifth Circuit confirms

that future opportunities to review these questions

will be sparse. After that court decided Brown, which

raised a similar challenge to Louisiana’s one-year

statute of limitations, it summarily dismissed later

cases in unpublished per curiam decisions. See, e.g.,

Monroe v. Conner, 2024 WL 939735 (5th Cir. Mar. 5,

2024). 8

Because of the binding nature of this Court’s decisions in Burnett and Owens, the Sixth Circuit believed

it was not empowered to take a fresh look at Section

1988’s framework despite the later enactment of Section 1658(a). See App. 12a–13a. The Fifth Circuit

similarly observed that “[o]nly the Supreme Court”

can resolve the question of continuing to apply unduly

short state limitations periods to Section 1983 claims.

Brown, 93 F.4th at 338.

This petition thus presents this Court with the

rare but important opportunity to revisit its outdated

precedent interpreting the statutory framework that

governs the Nation’s core federal civil rights statute.

By granting certiorari, this Court can recognize that

Congress’ enactment of Section 1658(a) now provides

a “suitable,” uniform, and federal alternative to the

current fifty-state borrowing framework. This Court

can also answer the question it explicitly reserved in

8 After the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Brown, the Louisiana state

legislature extended the operative limitations period so that Section 1983 plaintiffs would have two years to bring their claims.

See 2024 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 423, § 4. Kentucky, however,

has not expressed any intent to lengthen the statute of limitations applied to Section 1983 claims, as further evidenced by the

Kentucky Attorney General’s amicus brief filed below.

35

Owens and hold that a one-year state limitations period is too short to serve the federal interests of

Section 1983. On both questions presented, this Court

can ensure that all federal civil rights victims, regardless of state, are guaranteed access to Section 1983’s

“uniquely federal remedy.”

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Cecillia D. Wang

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES

UNION FOUNDATION

425 California St. Ste. 700

San Francisco, CA 94104

Corey M. Shapiro

William E. Sharp

Bethany N. Baxter

ACLU OF KENTUCKY

FOUNDATION

325 W. Main Street

Suite 2200

Louisville, KY 40202

Lauren Willard Zehmer

Counsel of Record

Sameer Aggarwal

Emma Keteltas Graham

Ryan S. Sandler

COVINGTON & BURLING LLP

850 Tenth Street, NW

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 662-6000

lzehmer@cov.com

Counsel for Petitioners

December 12, 2025