Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Malik Allah-U-Akbar, fka Odraye G. Jones, Petitioner v. Harold May, Warden

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MALIK ALLAH-U-AKBAR, FKA ODRAYE G. JONES

PETITIONER

V.

MARGARET BRADSHAW, WARDEN,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ELISA A. LONG

Federal Public Defender

KATHRYN BAILEY

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Capital Habeas Unit

Counsel of Record

KIRK J. HENDERSON

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Capital Habeas Unit

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

1001 Liberty Avenue

Suite 1500

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

(412) 644-6565

kara_bailey@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner Malik Allah-U-Akbar

CAPITAL CASE}

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In 1998, Malik Akbar was sentenced to death after his courtappointed psychologist told an all-white jury he was thirty times more

likely to have antisocial personality disorder and be dangerous because

he was black. In 2022, a unanimous panel of the Sixth Circuit granted

habeas corpus relief, ordering that a new penalty trial be conducted

within 180 days. The panel later granted the state 190 additional days.

When Ohio failed to retry the penalty phase within the allotted

time, the district court granted the unconditional writ and ordered the

vacatur of Mr. Akbar’s infirm death sentence and his “unconditional

release” within five business days of February 29, 2024. Ohio took three

months to vacate the death sentence. As of today, Mr. Akbar has

remained in continuous physical custody for over 28 years and has not

been re-tried. One possible sentence he could receive at retrial is parole

eligibility after 25 years of imprisonment.

The questions presented are:

1. Where a sovereign fails to comply with a conditional writ of

habeas corpus, does a district court’s subsequent order of

“unconditional release” entitle the petitioner to actual physical

release? See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia &

Thomas, JJ., concurring).

Z.. Where a sovereign fails to comply with an unconditional writ of

habeas corpus, is the petitioner entitled to physical release

without being subject to rearrest?

1 This petition arises from a capital habeas appeal and challenges, inter alia,

the court of appeals’ refusal to bar a penalty phase retrial. Counsel continues to

include the capital designation because the questions presented control Mr. Akbar’s

risk of future execution by Ohio.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner Malik Allah-U-Akbar was the petitioner in the district court and

appellant below.

Respondent Warden Margaret Bradshaw was the respondent in the district

court and the appellee below.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Allah-U-Akbar, fka Jones, v. Bradshaw, No. 24-3581 (October 9, 2025)

Jones v. Bradshaw, Nos. 07-3766/15-4308 (August 22, 2022)

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio

Jones v. Bradshaw, No. 1:03-cv-01192 (June 24, 2024) (multiple judgments)

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented ........ceccccssssssccccececsssssceececceceeeeseesaeceeeeeceeeseeessseeseceeeseessseseeeeeseees 1

Parties to the Proceedings .................cccccsesessessssssssssssssessssessssssssssessesessssssssssnssseeeeceeeeees il

Statement of Related Proceedings ...........ccccccccccccccccccccccccceecccecccecccscceeeesessessesseteeesseeneess ll

Palle Of AUCH OP TC arr sence ssn same aawn.nsicsisasied sins ekisitcsinimnanemennnennammeensnanunsaneaseovesiaemuneessemnncens Vv

Opinion Below ..........cccccccsscccssccccceccceesceecceeceeeeeeceeccccccccccccesceseccescecceceeseseeessseseeeteeettsereraea 1

JULISCICCION 2.2.2... ee eeeeeeeceeeessenseeeeeeeeeceeeseenaeceeceessseseeeeeeeeeceessesessaaseeeeeceeeesessssseeeeeessssaaeeeees 1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .................ccccccceccseeeesssssssssssessseseeeees 1

Statement of the Case ..........ccccccccccsseccesssseeeeessseecceessaeeecceccuseececesseeeeeeesaseeeeeseseeeesseseesens 2

Reasons for Granting the Petition ..0............cccccccccccccceeeseseesecececcescessssssssssseseeeeessseseeeeeees 8

iL. The Sixth Circuit’s assessment of “unconditional release” conflicts

with an opinion of this Court and other circuit opinions ...................0006 9

II. Lower federal courts require guidance on the available remedies

flowing from the failure to comply with writs of habeas corpue........... 15

III. Ohio is a frequent Respondent in writ enforcement litigation ............ 21

IV. Judicial enforcement of writs of habeas corpus is an issue of national

importance, and this case is an ideal vehicle to address it ................... 23

ConcluSiOn .0.......cceeccceecccseccceccccecccseccecceuscccuccecucccccccuceceecccueccesecucccecccaccccsecasscsascceseceaacs 25

APPENDICES

Published Opinion and Judgment,

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

Allah-U-Akbar v. Bradshaw, No. 24-3581 (October 9, 2025) ..............ce Appendix A

Opinion and Judgment denying Motion for Relief from Judgment,

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,

Jones v. Bradshaw, No. 1:03-cv-1192 (June 24, 2024)........ ec ccceeeeeeeeee Appendix B

ili

Judgment granting in part and denying in part Motion to Issue

Unconditional Writ of Habeas Corpus and to Bar Retrial,

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,

Jones v. Bradshaw, No. 1:03-cv-1192 (June 24, 2024)... eeecesssseeceeeeeee Appendix C

Opinion granting in part and denying in part Motion to Issue

Unconditional Writ of Habeas Corpus and Bar Retrial,

United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,

Jones v. Bradshaw, No. 1:03-cv-1192 (February 29, 2024) ......eeeeee eee eee Appendix D

Published Opinion and Judgment,

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

Jones v. Bradshaw, Nos. 07-3766/15-4308 (August 22, 2022)... Appendix E

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Allah-U-Akbar v. Bradshaw, 154 F.4th 482 (6th Cir. 2025) wo... cececceeesssseeeeeeees 1

Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437 (2016) 0.0.0.0... ccccccssssssesecsssscccccecssnssssnstttsteeeeeeeees 20

Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017)... ccccccsssscceceeeessssesecceecceccessessessssseeeseceeeesssaeees 17

Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) ....ccccce eee ceeceeseecececccccccccceesseesseestesttseececeeees 11

Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1992),

cert. dented, 507 U.S. 1048 (1998)... cece cccceeccccsscccccccccccccccceccccecceccceccccececeececeeecerers 18

Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350 (10th Cir. 1998) 0.0... ccccceeeeeessssssssececceceesseeeees 18

Carter v. Boesen, 10 F.4th 715 (7th Cir. 2021) ......ceccec cece scesssscseceessseeccessseeeeees 21

D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 656 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2011),

cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1185 (2012) oo... cccccecccccceseessssssseccecceeseessssssstececeeeesees 18, 21

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020) wo. eeeeeeeeee 8, 24

Eddleman v. McKee, 586 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2009) ou... ccc cceceeessssscccecceeeesssnseceeeees 15

Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 1998) ..........cccccceessssssssssssssssssssssssssssesssnteceeeees 18

Gillispie v. Warden, London Corr. Inst., 771 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2014) 0... 22

Girts v. Yanai, 600 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 891 (2010)........ 21

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011).........cccccccccccsssssscccceesessssssssssssesececcesessnseeeeees 21

Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737 (Oth Cir. 2008)... ceeeececccccccececceeceesesssstscececees 7, 20

In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894)... ccccessssccececessssssssesseccceesssssssssseeceesesensetsaeeess 11

In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890)... ccccessssssccccccessssssescsesesecsesessssssaeeeeees 9, 10, 11

Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S. 271 (2015).......cceccccssccccceceeessssssecceeeeeeseseeeees 16, 17, 18

Juan T.r. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-0107, 2026 WL 232015 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2026)........ 23

Lovins v. Parker, 604 Fed. Appx. 489 (6th Cir. 2015)... ccceeeccccessesceceeesssseeesssseeee 14

Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) ou... eeeeeeeeseeesesssceseeesssssesseeesettnteeeeees 11

Mason. v. Mitchell, 729 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied,

2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20654 (Oct. 9, 2013), cert. denied, 572 U. S. 590 (2014)....22

Means v. Phillips, 136 F. Supp. 3d 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) ........eeeceeeeeeeceeeeeeeees 14, 15

Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294 (8d Cir. 2004)... eee cece eeeeesseeeeeees 18

Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)........ccecceccccccceeessssssceccecessseessssenececeeeeesens 11, 24

Moore v. Zant, 972 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007 (1993) ....21

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008) .........cccecccceesssecceessccecessscecesecsseeseccesssssseceestasesensaaes 8

Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975)........cccccccccccccssssssscccecccsscesssssesceseceeeessssstteeceeeeees 15

Pope v. Kemper, 689 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. Wis. 2023),

aff'd as modified sub nom. Pope v. Taylor, 100 F.4th 918 (7th Cir. 2024) ......... 13

Pope v. Taylor, 100 F.4th 918 (7th Cir. 2024) oo... ccccccecceeeseeeececeeeeeeeeeeeeeesenenes 13

Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2006),

cert. dented, 549 U.S. 1281 (2007) ...... ccc eeeccccccesesesecccecceeeccceessseeeceseaaeeseesensaaeeeeees 20

Smith v. Davis, No. 25-3381, 2025 WL 1826652 (6th Cir. July 2, 2025) ......... 22,

Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 985 (2000)............ 18

Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670 (2025) 00... cccccccceeccseessssssssesasseeeessseeeeaeaaeceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 23

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) .0......cccccccceceeececcceseeeecceeceeeeceeeeeeeeeess i, 8, 11, 22

Wolfe v. Clarke, 718 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2018),

cert. dented, 571 U.S. 1197 (2014) ou... eeecccccceseseececceeeeeeeeeeseneeeeeceeeseeeeees 12, 13, 18

Wolfe v. Dotson, 144 F.4th 218 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. pending, No. 25-6664 (2026) ...19

STATUTES

2B U.S.C. § L254 (1) ceececceccecsessessessessesecsesessucsucsecsessesussucsecsecseceesassuesessesessecsessesensatsueaneaeess 1

2B U.S.C. § 1291 ccecccccecsecsessessessessessesucsuesessesucsucssssesussussussucsusaesatsuesusansaesuessstesessesaesneaeeee 1

QB U.S.C. § 2241 o.cccecceccecsessessessessessesuesecsesussussucsucsesessussucsussucsesarsucsessessesaesusseseveateseaneeees 11

QB U.S.C. § 2243 ccccccceccecsecsessessesscsscsscessessesucsussessesuesucsucsucsesaesussusaessesuesesaessesaesueeeeecs 1, 18

2B U.S.C. § 2253 vccccceccessesssessessecsecsessussucsucsecsussussassasssessecsecsussussucsassussessavsavenesaveaeeseaeaven 1

2B U.S.C. § 2254 voeececceccessessessessesucsucseseesucsucsessessesuesuceessessessesacsussesaesuesusaessesatsucanseseacs 1,11

28 U.S.C. § 2255 cceccecceccecsessessessessesucsussesersussecsessessnsassussecsussesersavsessesarsaesueatesesareateeeaveaees 11

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, ch. 2 oc ccccccccccccccccccscseesseeeeceececcccceeeeeaseaseeeeeeeceeeeessaaaeesaseeeeeees 1

TREATISES

Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and

Procedure (6th ed. 2O11)..........cccccccccccccccccccseeeseseecceccccceeeeeeeauseseeeeeeeeeeeesseeaaaaaenees 15, 21

OTHER

Wolfe v. Clarke, 2013 WL 5883718 (U.S.) (Petition for Writ of Certiorari)

(October 13, 2018)... cecccccccceeseecccccesseecccceesseeecceccuaeeccecueasecceessuaeecceseuaaneeeeesaues 19

Wolfe v. Clarke, 2014 WL 216156 (U.S.), at *1—-3 (Reply Brief of Petitioner)............ 19

vi

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Malik Akbar respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, along with a

dissenting opinion, is reported at Allah-U-Akbar v. Bradshaw, 154 F.4th 482 (6th Cir.

2025) and is reproduced at Appendix A to the petition. The judgment of the court of

appeals was entered on October 9, 2025, and appears on the last page of Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

The district court had jurisdiction over this habeas corpus action pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court of appeals had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291

and 2253. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion on October 9,

2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution states:

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,

unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may

require it.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

Section 2243 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides:

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of habeas

corpus...shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of

the matter as law and justice require.

28 U.S.C. § 2243.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 17, 1997, Ashtabula Police Officer William Glover was shot and

killed. Less than six months later, Ohio tried twenty-one-year-old Malik Allah-U-

Akbar (then known as Odraye Jones) for aggravated murder. The jury returned a

guilty verdict and the trial advanced to a penalty phase, where the jury was tasked

with sentencing Mr. Akbar to either (1) life in prison with parole eligibility after 25

years; (2) life in prison with parole eligibility after 30 years; (8) life in prison without

the possibility of parole; or (4) death. See Appendix E at 3-5.

At the penalty phase, a court-appointed attorney presented a local psychologist

who testified that Mr. Akbar had anti-social personality disorder, and that it was “too

late to make any effective real change” in Mr. Akbar’s life after his birth mother died

when he was thirteen. The psychologist opined that up to thirty percent of “African-

American urban males”? suffer from this disorder and that this group, which included

Mr. Akbar, commit more crimes and more murders than the general population. The

psychologist told the jury that the only treatment for these men was to “throw them

away, lock them up.” After hearing this testimony, the jury recommended the death

penalty, and the trial court then sentenced Mr. Akbar to death. Id. at 2, 5-8.

Without a hearing, the Ohio courts denied Mr. Akbar’s direct appeal, petition

for post-conviction relief, and post-conviction appeal. Without a hearing, the district

court denied all claims Mr. Akbar raised in his federal habeas petition, an

2 Mr. Akbar is from Ashtabula City, Ohio, a small town located in the largely

rural county of Ashtabula, which borders Lake Erie. In 1997, the town’s population

was approximately 20,000 residents.

amendment to that petition, and a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, but

the court granted a certificate of appealability on various claims. Id. at 8-9.

After an oral argument, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a separate

certificate of appealability to examine whether Mr. Akbar’s appointed trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance with respect to the “racialized testimony.” Id. at 2.

After additional briefing and a second oral argument, the panel unanimously found

that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing “racist evidence” to “infect” Mr. Akbar’s

penalty phase. It held that the psychologist’s “racially prejudicial” expert opinion cast

Black men as “violence prone” and offended the Constitution “on its face.” Id. at 35-

36 (citing Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017)). The court of appeals remanded to the

district court with “instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating [Mr.

Akbar]’s death sentence unless the State of Ohio conducts a new penalty-phase

proceeding within 180 days of the remand.” Appendix E at 37.

Still protesting that the expert’s opinions were not racist, Ohio petitioned for

rehearing en banc. Mr. Akbar filed a response, and Ohio’s petition was denied without

a single judge requesting a vote. Ohio moved to stay the mandate, but not long

thereafter informed the Sixth Circuit that the state would no longer seek certiorari.

The mandate issued on November 17, 2022. See Appendix D at 3.

After the mandate issued, Ohio transferred Mr. Akbar to the supermaximum

Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), increasing his level of custody above his death row

classification. Though the trial court ordered Mr. Akbar to be housed at the local

county jail, the Ashtabula Sheriff refused to comply. During the mandate period and

beyond, Mr. Akbar was regularly transported to and from OSP for court proceedings.

On day 141, Ohio asked the Sixth Circuit to be excused from the strictures of

its mandate, arguing that “[i]Jt is manifest that the State has complied with the

conditional writ.” See Case No. 07-3766, Doc. 333-1 at 3. The court of appeals denied

the motion, first noting “there is no indication that the state court has vacated

[Akbar’s] death sentence.” Jd., Doc. 335-1 at 4. The court was clear “the State has not

yet satisfied the imposed obligation or demonstrated substantial compliance.” Id.

With only five days remaining until the mandate deadline, Ohio requested an

extension of 190 days. The court of appeals granted the request, more than doubling

the time for Ohio to fulfill its obligations under the conditional writ. The new date of

compliance was November 22, 2023. On October 24, 2023, Ohio returned to the Sixth

Circuit, this time requesting an additional 248 days within which to comply. After

Mr. Akbar opposed, the court denied the state’s motion. Without another word from

Ohio—in either state or federal court—the mandate period expired.

On November 30, 2023, Mr. Akbar filed a Motion to Issue an Unconditional

Writ of Habeas Corpus and Bar Retrial with the district court. The district court did

not hold argument on the motion until February 15, 2024. In the interim, the state

court continued to subject Mr. Akbar to retrial proceedings, despite the mandate’s

expiration.

Two weeks after argument, the district court granted the motion to issue the

unconditional writ, but declined to bar retrial. See Appendix D. It plainly ordered

Ohio “to vacate the death sentence imposed by the Ashtabula County, Ohio, Court of

Common Pleas in Case No. 1997 CR 00221 and unconditionally release [Akbar] from

custody no later than five business days from the date of entry of this Order.”

Appendix D at 22.

The state court docket reflects that on March 1, 2024, the trial prosecutor filed

a request for an arrest warrant on the existing 1997 indictment with the state court

clerk’s office. The indictment was unaltered and was still linked to Mr. Akbar’s intact

convictions and death sentence.

On or about March 5, 2024, deputies with the Ashtabula Sheriffs Office took

Mr. Akbar from OSP to the Ashtabula County Jail in the exact same manner they

had been transferring him since the conditional writ issued. The only difference was

that the deputies showed Mr. Akbar a copy of his original arrest warrant. Mr. Akbar

was never physically released by prison officials; rather, as usual, the county deputies

came inside the prison and took custody of him. He was not given any Miranda

warnings. Though the arrest warrant ordered the sheriff to bring him “before said

court without unnecessary delay,” Mr. Akbar did not see a judge until 98 days later.

He was never re-arraigned or afforded a bond hearing. But see Appendix B at 2

(district court finding that “[Akbar] was rearrested under the warrant and placed in

the Ashtabula county Jail.”)

At no point during the compliance period did Ohio file a copy of the district

court’s unconditional writ order with the state trial court or file a motion to vacate

the unconstitutional death sentence. Ohio’s first communication with the state trial

judge concerning the unconditional writ came on March 22, 2024, over two weeks

after the deadline for compliance had expired.

On April 1, 2024, Mr. Akbar filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in the district court and asked that the court

reorder Mr. Akbar’s unconditional release and bar retrial given Ohio’s continued

noncompliance with the terms of the unconditional writ. See Appendix B.

On May 29, 2024, three months after ordered to do so by the federal court, and

554 days after the Sixth Circuit issued the conditional writ of habeas corpus, Ohio

finally vacated Mr. Akbar’s original, unconstitutional death sentence.

On June 24, 2024, the district court denied Mr. Akbar’s Motion for Relief under

Rule 60(b). See Appendix B.

Mr. Akbar again appealed to the Sixth Circuit, challenging the district court’s

initial denial of the retrial bar and its later denial of the Rule 60(b) Motion. See

Appendices B & C. Mr. Akbar argued that the district court erred by finding that

Ohio had substantially complied with the unconditional writ and improperly blamed

Mr. Akbar for the state’s failure to comply with the unconditional writ. Mr. Akbar

also argued that the district court erred when it held that no extraordinary

circumstances existed to warrant a retrial bar, including, inter alia, Ohio’s

reintroduction of the racist expert evidence into retrial proceedings, Respondent’s

repeated triangulation of responsibility for Ohio’s failure to comply with federal

orders, and Ohio’s inexcusable neglect in failing to comply with the unconditional

writ. Mr. Akbar asked the court of appeals to re-order his unconditional release and

bar any further proceeding against him. See Case No. 24-3581, Docs. 13 & 20.

Following briefing, the court again heard oral argument. After supplemental

briefing on jurisdiction, the Court issued a published opinion affirming jurisdiction

and affirming the judgments of the district court.

Fewer than four pages of the Sixth Circuit’s seventeen-page opinion addressed

the merits. The court of appeals properly found that the state’s motion for vacatur

“came well after the deadline imposed by the unconditional writ” and agreed with Mr.

Akbar that “more could have been done to ensure the unconditional writ was fully

complied with in a timely manner” but failed to address why the state’s failure to

take those unspecified actions did not constitute bad faith or inexcusable neglect.

Appendix A at 16-17. But see Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 746 (9th Cir. 2008)

(granting release where the state’s attorney general “provided no reason at all for the

error” for her failure to communicate with the trial prosecutor and waited three

additional days before alerting the federal court of her inadvertent non-compliance).

The court of appeals also agreed that the collective lack of responsibility from state

actors was “troubling” but held that because the delay was “only temporary” and

resentencing proceedings were “advancing,” the years-long delay and Ohio’s repeated

noncompliance did “not rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances warranting

relief.” Appendix A at 17.

This timely Petition for Certiorari follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

“Habeas corpus is at its core a remedy for unlawful [sovereign] detention.”

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,

591 U.S. 103, 119 (2020). The consequence for non-compliance with a conditional writ

of habeas corpus is “always release.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 87 (2005)

(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring).

Before securing habeas relief from the court of appeals, Mr. Akbar spent more

than two decades suffering from a death sentence braced by expert opinions the court

of appeals unanimously found to be “racist.”? One of Ohio’s first moves after the

mandate issued in November 2022 was to affirmatively re-introduce the 1998 report

from the same disgraced expert into Mr. Akbar’s retrial proceedings.

Even with a doubled mandate period, Ohio failed to comply with the terms of

the conditional writ. When it issued the absolute writ, the district court ordered Ohio

to “unconditionally release [Mr. Akbar] from custody.” Appendix D at 22. Instead,

Mr. Akbar received a transfer from an Ohio supermax penitentiary to the county jail

with his infirm death sentence intact. Ohio took three more months to vacate the

unconstitutional death sentence, though the court had ordered it to do so within five

business days.

3 Counsel of record began to represent Mr. Akbar only during his habeas

appeal, and she filtered the unconstitutional evidence through Strickland to avoid an

otherwise certain procedural default. However, it was Ohio’s prosecutor who first

elicited the racist “statistics” about Black men’s proclivity for dangerous behavior

during the court-appointed defense psychologist’s testimony. The prosecutor then

leveraged these race-based opinions in closing argument when asking for death.

8

In denying Mr. Akbar any remedy, the Sixth Circuit upcycled the

“extraordinary circumstances” framework it employs when analyzing a state’s

noncompliance with a conditional writ. Its opinion wrongly credited Ohio’s custodial

transfer of Mr. Akbar as “unconditional release” and gave no weight to the

extraordinary—if not unprecedented—circumstance of Ohio’s non-compliance with

an unconditional writ of habeas corpus in a capital case because “the delay was only

temporary.” Appendix A at 17.

This Court should grant certiorari to vindicate the seriousness of its power to

release prisoners in unlawful custody, to affirm the original meaning of

“unconditional release,” to announce the remedy when a state fails to comply with an

unconditional writ of habeas corpus, and because this is a capital case.

I. The Sixth Circuit’s assessment of “unconditional release” conflicts

with an opinion of this Court and other circuit opinions.

The Sixth Circuit found that Mr. Akbar’s transfer to the county jail satisfied

the district court’s order that he be “unconditionally released.” See Appendix A at 4,

11 (finding that Ohio complied “in part” with the unconditional writ order). That

conclusion was wrong and conflicts with this Court’s treatment of release in the

capital habeas context and other circuit and district court opinions assessing

“unconditional release.”

Supreme Court opinions

This Court ordered the actual physical release of a death-sentenced state

prisoner over 130 years ago. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). After Colorado

condemned him to die, Medley petitioned directly to the Supreme Court for the writ

of habeas corpus. Jd. at 162. The Court found his death sentence to be

unconstitutional but declined to “remand the prisoner to the custody of the sheriff of

the proper county to be proceeded against.” Id. at 174. Because the Court had found

an ex post facto violation pertaining to the death sentence, the Court noted it was “not

advised whether the [state trial] court possesses any power to deal further with the

prisoner or not.” Id. Even so, the Court held that “it is neither our inclination nor our

duty to decide what the court may or what it may not do in regard to the case as it

stands.” Id. Not swaying from the “core” of habeas relief, the Court ordered Medley’s

physical release from the state penitentiary, with advance notice to be sent to the

state attorney general. Jd. The continuing validity (or invalidity) of the underlying

murder conviction did not affect the Court’s execution of the writ.

To be sure, retrial uncertainties are present in the instant case. At the time

the unconditional writ issued, Mr. Akbar already had served more than 25 years of

imprisonment; Ohio’s entitlement to the continuous holding of his body pending

retrial was, at the very least, subject to challenge. Further, the state court’s refusal

to vacate Mr. Akbar’s unconstitutional death sentence during and beyond the

mandate period was driven by the court’s stated belief that, under Ohio law, the

judgment against Mr. Akbar was not severable and that any vacatur would risk

disturbing his underlying murder conviction. As in Medley, however, the state law

implications of the writ were not before the federal courts here. The district court’s

proper concern was the “core” of habeas relief: freeing Mr. Akbar’s body from the

10

unlawful custody and enforcing the Supremacy Clause. But the ordered release here

simply did not happen.

Four years after In re Medley, this Court decided In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242

(1894), and conditioned the issuance of the writ on the state’s provision of a proper

(non-capital) resentencing proceeding. This case does not inform the proper

enforcement of the unconditional writ here, where Ohio already had been afforded

such an opportunity and failed to meet the proscribed condition.

As Justices Scalia and Thomas reminded the majority in Dotson, “the prisoner

who shows that his sentencing was unconstitutional is actually entitled to release,

because the judgment pursuant to which he is confined has been invalidated.” 544

U.S. at 86 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring). That Mr. Akbar’s body was being held

in violation of the Constitution pursuant to a singular, infirm judgment is entirely

consistent with this Court’s opinion in Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010).

Distinguishing the text of §2254 from §§ 2255 and 2241, which expressly allow for

challenges to “sentences”, this Court held that “[c]ustody is crucial for § 2254

purposes, but it is inextricable from the judgment that authorizes it.” Id. at 333. See

also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) (a capital penalty phase “is in many

respects a continuation of the trial on guilt or innocence of capital murder.”);

Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 480, 431 (1981) (capital sentencing phase has “the

hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence’).

11

Circuit Opinions

In Wolfe v. Clarke, 718 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1197

(2014), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals assessed Virginia’s compliance with a

conditional writ order that “presented the Commonwealth with a choice: it could

either provide [petitioner] with a new trial or unconditionally release him from

custody.” Jd. at 285. Virginia maintained that by transferring Mr. Wolfe from the

state prison to the county jail and providing him with a bail hearing, it had complied

with the unconditional release order. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district

court that Virigina had never unconditionally released the petitioner when

considering the plain meaning of the words:

[ijn presenting the option of releasing the Petitioner “unconditionally”

from custody, the Court used the word “unconditionally” in its

traditional and widely underst[ood] context: “Not limited by a condition;

not depending on an uncertain event or contingency; absolute.” Black’s

Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Under this meaning of the word

“unconditional,” it is self-evident that releasing Petitioner from the

custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections to Prince William

County for the purposes of retrial did not constitute releasing Petitioner

“unconditionally from custody.”

Id. at 286 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting from district court’s Order Enforcing Judgment).

Holding that Virginia had failed to comply, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the

state’s theory of compliance “fails to take into account the purpose of a new-trial

contingency in the habeas setting, which is to delay actual release of the successful

petitioner.” Jd. (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (emphasis

added)). The Sixth Circuit’s opinion here conflicts with Wolfe.

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The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of “unconditional release” is also in conflict

with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pope v. Taylor, 100 F.4th 918 (7th Cir. 2024)

(Easterbrook, J.). In Pope, the district court granted the conditional writ and ordered

that “[u]pon the failure of the circuit court to vacate the judgment of conviction and

grant a new trial within six months after the date of actual physical delivery of Pope

to the custody of the Wisconsin court, Pope shall be finally discharged from custody.

See Pope v. Kemper, 689 F. Supp. 3d 657, 679 (E.D. Wis. 2023), aff'd as modified sub

nom. Pope, 100 F.4th 918. With only two weeks left on the mandate clock, Wisconsin

moved to stay the mandate and appealed the order, asserting that the district court

lacked the authority to order a state court to vacate a judgment of conviction. The

Seventh Circuit confirmed the granting of the conditional writ, but modified its terms.

Its order makes clear that the Seventh Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit in Wolfe,

understood “unconditional release” to be total physical release:

In September 2023 the district court gave Wisconsin six months to

vacate Pope’s conviction and begin the process of retrial. That time has

passed. The state does not get another six months from our decision. It

should have been preparing for a trial to follow on the heels of our

decision—if a fair trial is possible so long after the events of 1995.

(Indeed, prosecutors should have begun preparing in 2017, when the

state’s circuit court held that Pope is entitled to another trial.) Pope

must be released on bail unless that trial begins within two months— _

and, if the trial has not started in three months, the conviction must be

vacated and Pope released unconditionally. The district court’s decision

is modified to include these deadlines and, as so modified, is

AFFIRMED.

Id. The Seventh Circuit’s understanding of “unconditional release” is in line with that

of the Fourth Circuit and at odds with the Sixth Circuit’s opinion here.

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Sixth Circuit internal inconsistency

That the “unconditional release” ordered by the district court here should have

resulted in Mr. Akbar’s physical release also is supported by the authority invoked in

the district court’s own opinion authorizing the unconditional writ. See Appendix D

at 12 Gnvoking Lovins v. Parker, 604 Fed.Appx. 489 (6th Cir. 2015) and Means v.

Phillips, 136 F. Supp. 3d 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2015)).

Though not published, Lovins was decided by two of the same Sixth Circuit

judges on Mr. Akbar’s panel. 604 Fed.Appx. 489. Like Mr. Akbar, Mr. Lovins

prevailed on habeas review and the state (Tennessee) failed to resentence him in

accordance with the Constitution within the mandate period. Id. at 490. Also like Mr.

Akbar, the district court granted the unconditional writ, but denied Lovins’ request

to bar reprosecution. Id. Unlike Ohio here, Tennessee complied with the

unconditional writ order and physically released Lovins from prison, though he was

“immediately rearrested.” Id. Notably, Lovins had not reached the minimum period

of incarceration for second-degree murder at the time he was physically released. Id.

Likewise, in Means v. Phillips, 136 F. Supp. 3d 872 (W.D. Tenn. 2015), the

district court issued the unconditional writ of habeas corpus after Tennessee failed to

reduce a successful habeas petitioner’s sentence for multiple aggravated robberies.

The state argued that unconditional release was “not justified” where the petitioner’s

convictions were still valid and the [minimum] sentences “for those offenses had not

expired.” Jd. at 880. The district court rejected this argument and correctly ordered

the state to “unconditionally release Petitioner from custody on the judgments”

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within five business days. Id. at 896.4 Accord Eddleman v. McKee, 586 F.3d 409, 413

(6th Cir. 2009) (the “release power” under § 2254 releases a prisoner from “the custody

pursuant to the unconstitutional judgment.”). See also Randy Hertz & James S.

Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 33.2 at 1903-1904 (6th

ed. 2011) (where unconditional release without prejudice to retrial is ordered, “the

order is analogous to a grant of bail pending appeal or retrial.”)

This Court should grant certiorari where the Sixth Circuit’s published opinion

is in tension with all of these decisions, and where, left uncorrected, the opinion will

carry great weight in a limited, but supremely consequential, area of law.

II. Lower federal courts require guidance on the available remedies

flowing from the failure to comply with writs of habeas corpus.

Guidance is needed regarding non-compliance with an absolute writ

This Court should grant certiorari to announce the remedy where a state fails

to comply with an unconditional writ deadline. This Court has addressed an absolute

writ only once, over 50 years ago. See Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U.S. 482 (1975) (reversing

and remanding for vacatur of unconditional writ on jurisdictional grounds). The Sixth

Circuit’s opinion here is precedential and is not anchored in any controlling authority

concerning unconditional writs. Its holding can be reduced to the proposition that

Ohio deserved a more vigorous finger-wagging the second time around. See Appendix

A at 17 (“We agree with Allah-U-Akbar that more could have been done to ensure the

4 The district court in Means took care to note that the only reason that its writ

did not result in the petitioner’s physical release from prison was because Means “has

other sentences to serve.” See 136 F. Supp. 3d at 875, n.2.

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unconditional writ was fully complied with in a timely manner.”); id. (“it is troubling

that the Warden, the county prosecutor, and the state court did not take

accountability to ensure compliance with a federal court’s unconditional writ.”).

Without weigh-in from this Court, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion will remain the only

constitutional roadmap available to other federal courts. When a sovereign

repeatedly fails to effectuate a prisoner’s release, another substantive constitutional

injury occurs. The buck must stop somewhere. Certiorari should be granted to

announce how federal courts should proceed in such a circumstance.

Guidance is needed regarding the propriety of a reprosecution bar

Mr. Akbar requested that the district court bar Ohio from reprosecuting him

nearly thirty years after his original trial on two separate occasions: when he sought

the unconditional writ and after he had waited more than a month for Ohio to comply

with the terms of the unconditional writ order.

Reprosecution bar where the defect recurs

Relying on the multi-justice dissent in Jennings v. Stephens, Mr. Akbar argued

that Ohio’s reintroduction of Dr. Eisenberg’s racist expert opinions into his penalty

phase retrial proceedings, evidence that Ohio admitted was “used to determine [Mr.

Akbar] was competent,” sufficiently frustrated the defect-curing purpose of the

habeas grant and should warrant a retrial bar. See Jennings v. Stephens, 574 U.S.

271, 287-88 (2015) (Thomas & Kennedy & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“But neither will a

conditional-release order permit a State to hold a prisoner under a new judgment

16

infected by the same constitutional violation that justified the order’s entry in the

first place.”)

The Sixth Circuit dismissed “the state’s continued reliance on Dr. James

Hisenberg’s tainted testimony” as a reason to bar retrial, because “[w]e first granted

Allah-U-Akbar habeas relief only because he received ineffective assistance of counsel

at his penalty-phase trial.” Appendix A at 17. The court of appeals then admonished

that Mr. Akbar must wait to re-litigate Dr. Eisenberg’s influence on his retrial

through another full round of state appeals and federal habeas review. See id.

The Sixth Circuit forgets that it also found that the substance of Eisenberg’s

expert opinions that Black men are “violence prone”, like those of the expert in Buck

v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017), “offends the Constitution on its face.” Appendix E at

36. Mr. Akbar’s original trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective only because he

put on an expert who presented unconstitutional, unreliable evidence.

The court of appeals’ reasoning also conflates a constitutional vehicle with a

constitutional defect. This approach conflicts with the dissent in Jennings, which

endorsed that ineffective assistance of counsel errors in successful habeas actions

should be assessed according to the underlying violation. See 574 U.S. at 289 (dissent

pointing out that a Wiggins ineffective assistance error is distinct from a Spisak

ineffective assistance error). The writ here issued to grant Mr. Akbar a penalty phase

trial that was not “infected” with racist expert evidence, i.e., a “Buck error.” Ohio’s

near-immediate reintroduction of Dr. Eisenberg’s impermissibly race-based expert

opinions thwarted the very purpose of the retrial, to cure a penalty phase infected by

17

racism. And, because no one—the trial judge, the prosecutors, or new trial counsel—

objected to the reintroduction of Dr. EKisenberg’s opinions, the ineffective assistance

of counsel also recurred.5 This Court should weigh in on whether the standard

discussed by the dissenting justices in Jennings has been met here.

Reprosecution bar where a state acts in bad faith

Nearly all circuits interpret § 2243 to include the authority to bar a successful

habeas petitioner’s reprosecution in the appropriate circumstances, including a

state’s bad faith or inexcusable neglect. See, e.g., D'Ambrosio v. Bagley, 656 F.3d 379,

389 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1185 (2012); Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350,

352-53 (10th Cir. 1993); Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993); Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294, 309-10 (3d

Cir. 2004); Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Groose, 205

F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 985 (2000).

In Wolfe v. Clarke, discussed previously, the petitioner prevailed on a Brady

claim and sought certiorari in this Court from the denial of his request to bar retrial.

718 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 1197 (2014). Wolfe claimed that

Virginia was in violation of the conditional writ and was continuing the same,

“extraordinary” Brady misconduct along with other “deliberat[e]” steps to deny him

a fair trial. Wolfe v. Clarke, 2013 WL 5883718 (U.S.), at *1 (Petition for Writ of

5 Though the Respondent has been aware of these events since at least Mr.

Akbar’s November 2023 Motion to Issue Unconditional Writ, Ohio has taken no steps

in the trial court to strike Eisenberg’s report from the record or request a court ruling

that all parties and future penalty phase experts be precluded from relying on it.

18

Certiorari) (October 13, 2013). He also claimed a circuit split between the Sixth and

Fourth Circuits where the latter’s “rigid approach” to retrial bars reflected a

“dramatic departure from the more flexible principles embraced by other courts of

appeals.” 2014 WL 216156 (U.S.), at *1-3 (Reply Brief of Petitioner). This Court

declined to grant certiorari and delineate the circumstances in which a state’s

misconduct and/or bad faith could warrant a reprosecution bar. Eleven years later,

in July 2025, the Fourth Circuit found that Wolfe had satisfied the near-impossible

Schlup actual innocence gateway and remanded his case to the district court for full

adjudication of his (otherwise defaulted) substantive habeas claims. See Wolfe v.

Dotson, 144 F.4th 218, 221 (4th Cir. 2025), cert. pending, No. 25-6664 (2026). Even if

this Court does not find that the Fourth Circuit’s approach to “bad faith” retrial bars

constitutes a true split, it should grant certiorari to resolve the question of whether a

state’s persistent bad faith and/or inexcusable neglect are appropriate bases on which

a federal court sitting in habeas can impose a reprosecution bar.

This Court should weigh in on the Sixth Circuit’s post-writ jurisprudence

Courts below would also benefit from this Court’s assessment of the Sixth

Circuit’s approach to assessing compliance with conditional writs of habeas corpus,

which it expanded in Mr. Akbar’s case to reach unconditional writs. Its post-writ

jurisprudence is the most developed of any Circuit and shows no signs of slowing. The

Sixth Circuit expressly allows for retrial bars in “extraordinary circumstances,” that

include a state’s bad faith or inexcusable neglect, even where the prior defect can

theoretically be cured at a retrial. See Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362, 370

19

(6th Cir. 2006) Gnexcusable or abusive failure to act can constitute extraordinary

circumstance), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1281 (2007). If the Sixth Circuit’s framework is

proper, this Court should say so and examine Mr. Akbar’s case against it where he

again faces the death penalty. If the framework requires correction, the time is ripe

for the Court to do so.

The Court’s intervention here is particularly warranted where Mr. Akbar

secured habeas relief in August of 2022 and is still without a constitutionally valid

sentence despite having surpassed the minimal carceral sentencing term. See Harvest

v. Castro, 5381 F.3d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (granting unconditional writ and

petitioner’s release from custody where, “[c]ertainly, staying in prison when one

might have been released constitutes prejudice.”).6 See also Betterman v. Montana,

578 U.S. 437, 441, n.2 (2016) (reserving the question of whether the Speedy Trial

Clause applies to capital sentencing proceedings); Moore v. Zant, 972 F.2d 318, 320

(11th Cir. 1992) (“In this case, if Georgia waits too long, the state could lose the right

to sentence [successful habeas petitioner] to death.”), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1007

6 It is far from clear how Mr. Akbar’s new capital jury will assess the four

sentencing options without perceiving from Mr. Akbar’s age, the date of the crime or

the date of his arrest that he has remained in custody far beyond the minimum

sentence. The jury will reasonably presume that someone—whether a judge or parole

board—already has deemed Mr. Akbar unfit for release into society. The converse

assumption is equally prejudicial—that Mr. Akbar somehow has evaded custody or

arrest in the interim.

The jury will also face the unpalatable task of weighing Mr. Akbar’s execution

against his immediate eligibility for release. Undersigned counsel cannot fathom a

curative instruction that would adequately guard against these prejudices and

insulate the presumption of life. Yet again, Mr. Akbar faces a penalty phase trial

where untrue assumptions will be drawn about his putative dangerousness, which is

not a valid statutory aggravating circumstance in Ohio.

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(1993); Hertz & Liebman § 33.2 at 1903 (unconditional release with prejudice to

retrial may be appropriate “even when the prosecution itself is not unlawful and the

error found by the federal court is theoretically susceptible to correction by retrial, if

the violation nonetheless is so egregious, its consequences so grave, and the unlawful

restraints already imposed on the petitioner’s liberty so lengthy or severe that law

and justice mandate unconditional discharge”) (emphasis added). Carter v. Boesen,

10 F.4th 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding a four-year delay in resolving even a

criminal appeal makes state procedures “ineffective to protect the rights” secured by

the United States Constitution pursuant to §2254(b)(1)(B)(ii)).

This Court should grant certiorari to give needed guidance to the lower courts.

III. Ohio is a frequent Respondent in writ enforcement litigation.

Federal habeas standards for relief are difficult to meet, because they “were

meant to be.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). Habeas grants are

infrequent by design, and, as any habeas practitioner knows, a high percentage of

cases where a petitioner has succeeded on habeas review either do not proceed to

reprosecution or are resolved by plea deal. Even so, Ohio has appeared before the

Sixth Circuit in a post-writ posture more frequently than any other state. See, e.g.,

Girts v. Yanai, 600 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 891 (2010);

D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 656 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (retrial bar granted on account of

repeated prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1185 (2012); Mason v.

Mitchell, 729 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS

21

20654 (Oct. 9, 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 590 (2014); Gillispie v. Warden, London

Corr. Inst., 771 F.3d 323 (6th Cir. 2014).

Last year, Ohio was defending its inexcusable noncompliance in Mr. Akbar’s

case at the same time it was defending its questionable actions in Smith v. Davis, a

murder retrial out of Toledo. See Smith v. Davis, No. 25-3381, 2025 WL 1826652, at

*] (6th Cir. July 2, 2025) (citing Jennings) (vacating stay and enforcing unconditional

writ ordering petitioner from custody “immediately” after Ohio failed to comply with

Sixth Circuit's order not to again utilize suggestive identification procedures at

petitioner’s retrial.) Ohio's Department of Rehabilitation and Correction was also the

non-prevailing party before this Court in Dotson. See 544 U.S. 74.

In Mr. Akbar’s case, the Respondent made considerable and repeated efforts to

distance herself from the “State of Ohio” in briefing and argument before the district

court and court of appeals.” Asserting that the Ohio Attorney General represented

the Warden only, the Respondent was unprepared at both oral arguments to account

for Ohio’s actions in the state trial court with respect to critical aspects of the

conditional and unconditional writs. See Appendix D at 18 (district court finding that

the Respondent’s communications to the federal courts were “confusing at best and

misleading at worst”); Case No. 07-3766, Doc. 345 at 4 (Respondent disavowing to the

court of appeals that the Ohio Attorney General’s Office represents the State of Ohio).

7 As undersigned counsel pointed out during oral argument before the Sixth

Circuit, the state’s lack of accountability was also frustrated by the sequential

appearance of no fewer than seven lawyers from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office

on behalf of the Warden between 2022 and 2025 in Mr. Akbar’s case.

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This Court should grant certiorari to dispel any confusion about the role the Ohio

Attorney General’s Office should play in the effectuation of habeas writs and to

prevent future resource-heavy post-writ litigation for both Ohio and her prisoners.

IV. Judicial enforcement of habeas corpus relief is an issue of national

importance, and this case is an ideal vehicle to address it.

As the Court is aware, federal courts are experiencing a “tsunami” of habeas

corpus filings.’ And the executive response to habeas orders issued by district courts

for presentment and/or release has been underwhelming. See Juan T.r. v. Noem, No.

26-cv-0107, 2026 WL 232015, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2026) (Chief Judge Schiltz

appending list “hurriedly compiled by extraordinarily busy judges” of 74 habeas cases

in which 96 orders were not obeyed in January 2026 alone). Certiorari is appropriate

here to announce the consequence(s) where a sovereign fails to comply with habeas

orders, especially where the Court has funneled immigration transfer claims

exclusively into the habeas sphere. See Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 674 (2025).

See also Juan T.r., 2026 WL 232015 at *1 (district court inviting immigration

detention petitioner to file a properly supported motion for “monetary sanctions”

against ICE).

Even setting aside the brewing habeas crisis, Mr. Akbar’s case is of great public

importance where the same state that expressly leveraged his race as a reason to put

him to death the first time seeks to extinguish his life once again. As the imposers of

such punishments, the American people have a critical stake in the fair

8 See https:/‘www.cbsnews.com/news/tsunami-immigration-detention-casesstrains-doj-us-attorneys-offices-across-america/ (accessed February 21, 2026).

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