Opposition Brief — Joquetta Riley, Petitioner v. United States

No. 25-6876

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

JOQUETTA RILEY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

_______________

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

A. TYSEN DUVA

Assistant Attorney General

ALLAYA LLOYD

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the district court erred in ordering joint and several

liability for petitioner to pay restitution for losses caused by

conduct that it found to be within the foreseeable scope of the

conspiracy for which she was convicted.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Joquetta Riley. Respondent is the United States

of America.

(II)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

No. 25-6876

JOQUETTA RILEY, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

_______________

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-5a) is

available at 2025 WL 2977503.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on October

22, 2025.

On January 6, 2026, Justice Alito extended the time

within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and

including February 19, 2026, and the petition was filed on that

date.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

2

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas, petitioner was convicted on

one count of conspiring to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18

U.S.C. 1341 and 1349, and four counts of aiding and abetting mail

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 2.

Judgment 1.

Petitioner

one

was

sentenced

to

12

months

and

day

of

imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised release,

and was ordered to pay $454,077.61 in restitution.

3, 6.

1.

The court of appeals affirmed.

Beginning

in

September

Judgment 2-

Pet. App. 1a-5a.

2018,

petitioner

and

her

codefendant Joshua Daniels conspired to acquire telephones from

Verizon through fraudulent means.

Indictment

3.

At

the

time,

Pet. App. 1a; Superseding

Verizon

sold

mobile

customers who signed up for its cellular service.

Indictment 2.

automated

phones

to

Superseding

Before phones ordered online were shipped, an

program

would

attempt

to

verify

the

personal

information submitted by the purchaser by comparing the submitted

data to data found in commercial databases.

Ibid.

If the

purchaser’s identity could not be verified, then Verizon would

send the customer a “credit application number” and the contact

information for a live customer-service representative who would

need to verify the purchaser’s identity before the phone would

be shipped.

Ibid.

3

Daniels took advantage of that system:

website

to

order

multiple

iPhones

he used the Verizon

with

false

customer

information; sent the resulting credit application numbers to

handpicked

Verizon

representatives

who

would

approve

the

applications and ship the phones; and pay those representatives

$200-$250 under the table for each phone.

3-4.

Superseding Indictment

In the course of that scheme, Verizon representatives

Sandra Lock and Caitlyn Cobb, a mother-daughter duo, released

around

$500,000

worth

of

iPhones

to

Investigation Report (PSR) ¶¶ 8-9, 11.

Daniels.

Presentence

Cobb received the credit

application numbers and the compensation from Daniels and other

coconspirators, but sent some of the application numbers to Lock

to process.

Superseding Indictment 3.

Petitioner made some of the payments to Cobb.

Indictment 3.

Superseding

And several of the fraudulently obtained phones

were sent to her home address in Detroit, Michigan.

Id. at 3-

4.

2. A federal grand jury in the Western District of Texas

returned

a

multidefendant

indictment

that

included

charges

against petitioner of one count of conspiring to commit mail

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1349, and four counts

of aiding and abetting mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341

and 2.

Superseding Indictment 1-8.

Petitioner proceeded to

trial, and the jury found her guilty on all counts.

Judgment 1.

4

The Probation Office’s presentence report calculated the

recommended amount of restitution by reviewing the value of the

orders authorized by Cobb and Lock during the course of the

conspiracy, which resulted in a total loss of $454,077.61.

¶¶ 9, 12; Second Addendum to PSR ¶ 9.

PSR

Petitioner objected to

the calculation, asserting (inter alia) that the loss directly

attributable to her own conduct was more limited and that the

total

loss

caused

foreseeable to her.

by

the

conspiracy

was

not

reasonably

Second Addendum to PSR 1-3.

At sentencing, the district court overruled both objections.

Sent. Tr. 3, 7.

Among other things, the court found the evidence

of foreseeability to be “overwhelming.”

Id. at 4.

The court

observed that petitioner “was well aware of the activity of her

codefendant Daniels, whom she was close to” and that the activity

was “an ongoing fraud” and “a scheme” that “went on for a while.”

Id. at 3.

The court pointed to evidence that showed that

petitioner discussed the scheme with Daniels in conversations

that predated Cobb’s involvement; was aware that Daniels received

more phones than the ones for which petitioner sent money to

Cobb; and had specifically told Daniels she wanted to be involved

in the phone scam he had discussed with her.

Id. at 7, 29-31,

37; Second Addendum to PSR 1.

Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996

(MVRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, Tit. II, Subtit. A, 110 Stat. 1227,

the district court ordered petitioner to pay restitution in the

5

amount of $454,077.61, to be paid jointly and severally with

Daniels and Cobb.

Judgment 6; PSR ¶ 67; Second Addendum to PSR

¶ 9.

3.

The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.

Pet. App. 1a-5a.

The court rejected petitioner’s contention that

she should only be liable for the portion of restitution for her

direct

conduct,

noting

that

under

longstanding

precedent,

coconspirators “may be held jointly and severally liable for all

foreseeable

losses

within

the

scope

of

their

conspiracy

regardless of whether a

specific

loss is attributable to a

particular conspirator.”

Id. at 4a-5a (quoting United States v.

King, 93 F.4th 845, 854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 213

(2024)).

And the court of appeals, like the district court,

found that the trial evidence showed that petitioner “understood

the extent of Daniels’ scheme.”

Id. at 5a; see id. at 2a, 5a.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner

renews

her

contention

(Pet.

20-23)

that

her

restitution order should not have included losses within the

scope of the conspiracy unless she directly and personally caused

them.

The decision below is correct, and does not conflict with

any decision of this Court or another court of appeals.

No

further review is warranted.

1.

The district court properly ordered petitioner jointly

and severally liable to pay restitution for losses attributable

6

to

the

foreseeable

activities

of

the

conspiracy

to

defraud

Verizon in which she willingly agreed to participate.

a.

The MVRA authorizes a court to order a defendant to pay

restitution to

a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the

commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered

including, in the case of an offense that involves as an

element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal

activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant’s

criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or

pattern.

18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2).

As petitioner acknowledges (Pet. 17),

every court to consider the question has held that “the MVRA

permits a district court to order restitution for losses caused

by

co-conspirators”

foreseeable.

when

those

losses

are

reasonably

United States v. Shelton, 694 Fed. Appx. 220, 224

(5th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (per curiam). 1

As

the

Second

‘specific

conduct’

agreement

to

the

Circuit

in

a

‘common

has

emphasized,

conspiracy

plan

of

“the

[offense]

the

defendant’s

includes

conspiracy’

and

his

the

See Shelton, 694 Fed. Appx. at 223-224 (5th Cir. 2017)

(collecting cases); United States v. Hilliard, 823 F. App’x 80, 84

(3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (collecting cases); United States v.

Collins, 209 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (“In the context of a

conspiracy, it is clear that a defendant is liable in restitution

to all the victims of the reasonably foreseeable acts of his

coconspirators. No court has ever held to the contrary.”). The

relevant language in the MVRA is identical to language used in

Congress’s 1990 amendment to the Victim and Witness Protection Act

of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, see 18 U.S.C.

3663(a)(2), and courts have used the case law interpreting those

provisions interchangeably.

See, e.g., United States v.

Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S.

937 (2004).

1

7

‘reasonably foreseeable acts of all coconspirators’ advancing

that plan.’”

United States v. Goodrich, 12 F.4th 219, 228 (2d

Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3d 47, 51 (2d

Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).

As this Court “has repeatedly said,”

“the essence of a conspiracy is ‘an agreement to commit an

unlawful act.’”

United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270,

274 (2003) (citation omitted).

evil”

“That agreement is a distinct

that both “makes more likely

crimes”

and

“decreases

the

the commission

probability

that

the

of

individuals

involved will depart from their path of criminality.”

274-275

(brackets,

citations,

and

internal

other

Id. at

quotation

marks

omitted).

It has been the case for centuries that “once the conspiracy

or combination is established, the act of one conspirator, in

the prosecution of the enterprise, is considered that act of all,

and is evidence against all.”

460,

469

(1827)

(Story,

United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S.

J.);

see,

e.g.,

1

Joel

Prentiss

Bishop, New Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 629, at 385 (8th

ed. 1892) (“When two or more persons unite to accomplish a

criminal object,

* * *

each individual whose will contributes

to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same

as though performed by himself alone.”);

Accordingly, “so long

as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each

other in carrying it forward.”

Pinkerton v. United States, 328

U.S. 640, 646 (1946); see Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52,

8

63-64 (1997) (“[P]artners in [a] criminal plan [who] agree to

pursue the same criminal objective

* * *

may divide up the

work, yet each is responsible for the acts of each other.”).

b.

Here,

petitioner

charged in the indictment.

was

convicted

Verdict 1.

of

the

conspiracy

The indictment charged

that beginning around September 2018 through April 2019, Daniels,

Cobb, and petitioner engaged in a conspiracy, the object of which

was to defraud Verizon by obtaining cellular phones that the

conspirators

were

Indictment 1-6.

not

entitled

to

receive.

Superseding

Specifically, Daniels provided Cobb with credit

application numbers for fraudulent phone purchases, which she,

or another coconspirator, would falsely verify and authorize to

be shipped.

Id. at 3, 5.

In exchange, Daniels or another

coconspirator would pay Cobb for each successfully authorized

fraudulent order.

Id. at 3, 5-6.

Petitioner agreed to participate in that conspiracy, made

some of the payments herself, and also received several of the

fraudulently

shipped

cellular

phones

at

her

home

address.

Superseding Indictment 4, 7-8; Sent. Tr. 7; Second Addendum to

PSR 1.

Consequently, the district court held petitioner liable

for all of Verizon’s losses caused by the shipments Cobb or Lock

authorized

indictment.

for

Daniels

during

the

PSR ¶ 9; Sent. Tr. 7-8.

period

stated

in

the

The court found that

petitioner “was well aware of” Daniels’s scheme and activity,

and that such losses were within the reasonably foreseeable scope

9

of the conspiracy that she had willingly signed up for, given

that she knew Daniels was engaged in an ongoing fraud scheme and

was receiving far more phones than the ones for which petitioner

specifically sent money to Cobb.

Sent. Tr. 3, 7; see Second

Addendum to PSR 1.

2.

Although petitioner disputes or denies (e.g., Pet. 23)

the scope of what she could have reasonably foresee, the district

court’s factbound foreseeability determination does not warrant

this Court’s review.

See Sup. Ct. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ

of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists

of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly

stated rule of law.”).

This Court “do[es] not grant certiorari

to review evidence and discuss specific facts.” United States v.

Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925).

And “under what [the Court]

ha[s] called the ‘two-court rule,’ the policy has been applied

with particular rigor when [the] district court and court of

appeals

are

requires.”

in

Kyles

agreement

v.

as

Whitley,

to

514

what

conclusion

U.S.

419,

the

record

456-457

(1995)

(Scalia, J., dissenting); see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde

Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949).

To the extent that petitioner contends (Pet. 21-22) that

the district court erred by failing to make a finding “about the

scope of [petitioner’s] jointly undertaken activity,” Pet. 21,

that contention is meritless.

Part of petitioner’s “specific

conduct” in furtherance of the conspiracy was her “agreement to

10

the ‘common plan of the conspiracy.’”

Goodrich, 12 F.4th at 228

(citation

scheme

omitted).

Here,

“the

to

defraud

was

specifically defined in the indictment -- i.e., the indictment

described in detail the duration of [Daniels and petitioner’s]

scheme and the methods used”, United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d

916, 928-929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837, and 510 U.S.

919

(1993),

and

the

jury

found

participating in that scheme.

her

guilty

Judgment 1.

of

joining

and

The specificity of

those charges provides ample support for the restitution order

here.

See Stouffer, 986 F.2d at 928-929 (affirming restitution

order

where

indictment

specifically

defined

exact

period

of

violations and methods used); see also United States v. Henoud,

81 F.3d 484, 488 (4th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases).

3.

Petitioner errs in contending (Pet. 23-25) that this

Court’s decisions

in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411

(1990), or Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. 163 (2026), cast

doubt on the decision below.

Hughey interpreted a decades-old

version of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, which Congress

specifically

amended

after

the

Court’s

decision

to

expand

conspiracy liability using the same MVRA language relevant here.

495 U.S. at 415-416; compare 18 U.S.C. 3579(a)(1) (1982), with

18

U.S.C.

3663(a),

3663A(a).

The

court

of

appeals’

interpretation of distinct statutory language does not conflict

with this Court’s statutory interpretation in Hughey.

11

And this Court’s holding in Ellingburg that restitution

under the MVRA is criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post

Facto

Clause,

607

U.S.

at

166,

decision below into question.

likewise

does

not

call

the

To the extent that the petition

can be construed as asserting a largely undeveloped claim that

the jury must determine the amount of restitution under Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that claim was not presented

below;

is

therefore

not

adequately

preserved;

and

would

be

subject at best to plain-error review, see Fed. R. Crim. P.

52(b).

In any event, every court of appeals to address the issue

has recognized that restitution under the MVRA does not implicate

Apprendi, primarily because “no statutory maximum applies to

restitution” under that statute.

United

States

v.

Read,

710

F.3d 219, 231 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 1031

(2013); see U.S. Br. at 26 n.3, Ellingburg, supra (No. 24-482). 2

Because there can be no “Apprendi violation where no maximum is

See also, e.g., United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390,

403-404 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65,

114-120 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 337338 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1071 (2006); United

States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,

569 U.S. 959 (2013); United States v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 408, 420

(5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1078 (2015); United States

v. Churn, 800 F.3d 768, 782 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v.

George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1008

(2005); United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 902-904 (8th Cir.

2005); United States v. Brock-Davis, 504 F.3d 991, 994 n.1 (9th

Cir. 2007); United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th

Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1123 (2006); United States v.

Williams, 445 F.3d 1302, 1310-1311 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated on

other grounds by United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir.

2007) (en banc).

2

12

prescribed,” Southern Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343,

353 (2012), the district court’s MVRA restitution order did not

require additional jury factfinding.

4.

Petitioner is also incorrect in asserting (Pet. 17-20)

that review is warranted because the courts of appeals do not

agree on whether “courts can award restitution losses based on

uncharged (or acquitted) conduct.”

Pet. 17.

Petitioner fails

to show that the result here -- based on findings from the trial

evidence

that

petitioner

“understood

the

extent

of

Daniels’

scheme,” Pet. App. 6a -- would have been different in any other

court of appeals.

Petitioner asserts (Pet. 18-19) that the Third, Seventh,

and possibly Eleventh Circuits have approaches to conspiracy

restitution

decision

awards

below.

that

But

diverge

none

of

from

the

those

court

of

decisions

circumstance like the one at issue here.

appeals’

involved

a

In United States v.

Akande, 200 F.3d 136 (1999), for example, the Third Circuit

concluded

that

reference

point”

ordered

to

pay

because

for

the

“offense

restitution,

restitution

for

a

of

conviction”

defendant

losses

that

could

is

“the

not

predated

be

the

conspiracy alleged in the indictment and referenced in the plea

colloquy.

Id. at 141.

Petitioner, in contrast, was not held

liable to pay restitution for losses that predate her agreement

to join the conspiracy.

13

In United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 546 U.S. 1008 (2005), the Second Circuit stated only that

a defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for “injuries

caused by offenses that are not part of the scheme of which [the

defendant] has been convicted.” Id. at 474.

Here, petitioner

was not ordered to pay restitution for losses that were outside

the scope of the conspiracy of which she was a member.

Finally, in United States v. Barry, 163 F.4th 1346, 1350

(11th Cir. 2026), which discussed loss calculation principally

in the context of the federal Sentencing Guidelines (rather than

the restitution statute itself), the Eleventh Circuit noted only

that “the scope of the defendant’s jointly undertaken activity

is

not

necessarily

conspiracy.”

the

same

as

the

scope

Ibid.; see id. at 1349-1352.

of

the

entire

That is consistent

with the district court’s extensive discussion of petitioner’s

specific involvement in the conspiracy, see Sent. Tr. 5-15, 37,

and the court of appeals’ determination that “evidence presented

at trial shows [petitioner] understood the extent of Daniels’

scheme” and petitioner’s “willing involvement in that scheme,”

Pet. App. 2a, 5a.

14

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

A. TYSEN DUVA

Assistant Attorney General

ALLAYA LLOYD

Attorney

MAY 2026