Reply Brief — Julius Jarreau Moore, Petitioner v. Arizona

No. 25-6873

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

__________________________

JULIUS JARREAU MOORE,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Respondent.

______________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA

MARICOPA COUNTY AND ARIZONA SUPREME COURT

_______________________________________

REPLY BRIEF SUPPORTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_______________________________________

PATRICK C. COPPEN

Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICE OF PATRICK C. COPPEN, PC

2735 W. SANDBROOK LANE

TUCSON, AZ 85741

(520) 301-0503

coppenfpnr@aol.com

Counsel for Petitioner

1

PETITIONER’S REPLY TO STATE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

**CAPITAL CASE**

Once again, as previously asserted in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Capital

Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore has consistently maintained his innocence in this case for

over twenty-five (25) years, from the time of his initial arrest in 1999, until the present.

While it is true that Petitioner Moore was convicted at his 2001 jury trial of

multiple counts of first degree murder, his convictions were actually discovered on

collateral or post conviction appeal to have been the result of previously unknown grave

constitutional improprieties, which included the sad and most troubling fact that former

trial counsel failed to properly investigate his case nor call a single witness at trial despite

compelling exculpatory evidence being readily available, including that the State only

had one (1) eyewitness, Deborah Ford, who, herself, could not identify Mr. Moore as the

perpetrator of the YCH homicides on multiple occasions, and that the credibility of the

State’s physical and corroborating evidence was put into serious question by not only the

third party culpability evidence as to the original suspect Tony Brown, yet by

uncontroverted expert testimony supporting egregious police misconduct. Regrettably,

these egregious failures and hidden police misconduct resulted in Mr. Moore being

sentenced to death in 2007.

Thereafter, Petitioner’s Post Conviction Relief (PCR) team and subsequent

collateral appeal brought to light the referenced egregious police misconduct, the brazen

ineffective assistance of counsel, and that Petitioner Moore was definitely incompetent at

the time of his 2001 guilt phase trial. These powerful and colorable claims, though first

discovered in post conviction, were subsequently denied by the Maricopa County

Superior Court without a hearing, being erroneously precluded under Rule 32.2

ARCrimP because they were all constitutional in nature and of significant constitutional

magnitude, whereby under Arizona law in Stewart v. Smith, they could not be precluded

by the Court absent a finding that each claim had been knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily waived by the Defendant, Id. 202 Ariz.446, 46 P.3d 1067 (Ariz. 2002), which

finding was never made by the lower Superior Court in its summary dismissal.

Petitioner’s post conviction claims are further described as follows.

First, as to the alleged egregious state misconduct, Petitioner’s PCR claims

included that police had not only planted evidence in Mr. Moore’s bed to wrongly tie or

connect him to the murders, yet that the State had deliberately destroyed exculpatory

DNA evidence to prevent it from ever being tested. Most notably, this alleged

misconduct occurred after the State’s only eyewitness could not identify Moore as the

perpetrator of the crimes on multiple occasions. Uncontroverted expert testimony was

presented by the defense in post conviction led by experts who had both worked as

Assistant Directors of the Phoenix Police Department Crimelab, Criminalist Richard

Watkins and Crime scene Expert Frank Rogers.

Second, it was alleged that Petitioner Moore had also suffered grave ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, who failed to properly investigate his case nor to even present

a defense, failing to call a single witness at trial though readily available, this despite

substantial third-party culpability evidence existing as to the original suspect, one Tony

Brown. Instead, trial counsel improperly frontloaded purported “mitigation” of Moore’s

2

alleged crack cocaine addiction on cross examination of the State’s witnesses, from

which the jury could have easily inferred that Petitioner was guilty of the homicides due

to said alleged addiction. Though the State suggested in post conviction that former

counsel’s failures were strategic, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held

that a defense attorney has a duty to investigate, whereby the failure’s to so is never

strategic, yet grossly ineffective.

Finally, it was alleged that Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were further

violated because he was not competent at the time of trial due to the severe diabetic

ketoacidosis he suffered throughout the 2001 guilt phase of trial, which medically

induced incompetency was caused by the Maricopa County Jail’s contemporaneous

refusal to properly feed and give prescribed medications to Moore at that time even

though he was diagnosed as a Type I Diabetic at age 18.

Capital Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore therefore respectfully reasserts and presents

the following three key questions in his request for certiorari in the case at bar:

1) Whether the State’s alleged egregious misconduct in both planting evidence in

Petitioner Moore’s bed to wrongfully tie him to the homicides, and by

deliberately destroying exculpatory DNA evidence related to blood found on a

knife near the first chronological victim’s body, violated this Court’s authority in

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637 (1973) and Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), respectively holding that

outrageous governmental conduct and the purposeful destruction of evidence by

police, if proven, require dismissal of his case with prejudice?

2) Whether Capital Petitioner Moore’s 6th Amendment right to be represented by

competent trial counsel was violated due to substantial Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel (IAC) he received at his 2001 guilt phase trial as defined by Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984) and Hinton v. Alabama, 571

U.S. 170, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) due to former counsel’s failure to not only

properly investigate and present readily available and compelling 3rd Party

culpability evidence as to the original suspect, yet in his failure to call a single

witness in Petitioner’s defense, and which resultant abdicated defense was most

substantially comprised of the cross examination of State’s witnesses to

purportedly “frontload mitigation” as to his alleged addiction, suggesting to the

jury that he was guilty in this case and constituting such grave ineffective

assistance of counsel or misconduct so as to rival that which occurred in McCoy v.

Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018)?

3) Whether Petitioner Moore’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment federal

constitutional right to a fair trial was violated under United States v. Dusky by the

lower Arizona court because he was not competent at the time of his 2001 guilt

phase jury due to the serious medical condition diabetic ketoacidosis caused by

the Maricopa County Jail’s refusal to properly feed him nor give him prescribed

insulin medication?

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents…………………………………………………… 4

Table of Authorities………………………………………………… 5

Introduction…………………………………………………………... 6

Controverting Statement of Facts………………………………….. 11

Petitioner’s Reasons for Granting Certiorari …………………….. 13

Conclusion…………………………………………………………….`15

4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s):

State cases:

Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067 (Ariz. 2002)……………

6, 13

Federal cases:

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988)……..…….

10, 14

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960)……….…..

11

Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 170, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2011)…………….

8

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 1984)……….

8, 11

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 93 S.Ct. 2039 (1973)…………

11

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637 (1973)…………

10, 14

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 32.2 ARCrimP…………………………………………………..

13

Rule 32.9 ARCrimP…………………………………………………..

9

5

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the State’s suggestion otherwise, there are more than

compelling reasons to grant certiorari in this case.

First, this case is a very good vehicle for addressing the questions

presented. The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all three

(3) of the issues Capital Defendant Moore has raised in his Petition for Writ

of Certiorari because they are federal questions that squarely fall under the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution and were not

resolved on independent and adequate state law grounds given that the

issues were never discovered until Post Conviction, whereby they may not

be precluded as the State would hope, especially since Mr. Moore did not

knowingly, intentionally nor voluntarily waive them in the Arizona courts as

required by applicable Arizona law in Stewart v. Smith, Id., 202 Ariz. 446, 46

P.3d 1067 (Ariz. 2002).

The State is fully aware of the Arizona Supreme

Court’s decision in Stewart, yet apparently chooses to ignore that the

Maricopa County Superior Court made no finding, whatsoever, that Capital

Petitioner Moore had made a knowing, intelligent or voluntary waiver of his

constitutional claims, nor have they suggested that they are not of significant

constitutional magnitude requiring Petitioner’s waiver which alleged Police

6

Misconduct violating federal due process, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

and Mental Incompetency at Criminal Trial obviously are. Moreover, the

State should not be allowed to benefit from constitutional error which is

somehow concealed due to the circumstances, especially when the

constitutional error is due to the State’s own misconduct that it has tried to

conceal for over twenty-five (25) years and could be responsible for the

death of an innocent man.

Secondly, while no evidentiary hearing was held on any of the issues,

this was due to the Arizona Maricopa County Superior Court plainly erring

by violating Petitioner Moore’s due process rights in this regard because it

refused to believe that any of the evidence presented on behalf of Petitioner

Moore was true, in blatant violation of State and federal law by which due

process requires an evidentiary hearing be held when the evidence presented

in post conviction, if considered or presumed to be true for colorable claim

analysis purposes, undermines confidence in the outcome of a post

conviction case.

Given the lower Arizona Superior Court abused its discretion by

failing to presume the truth of the claims and related evidence presented,

and by entering summary dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction appeal

7

despite material issues of fact presented regarding each claim, and the

Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of review, Capital Petitioner should still be

given an opportunity for review by this most honored Supreme Court,

especially given the Arizona Courts failed to follow their own law and

procedural rules in denying Mr. Moore an Evidentiary hearing.

For example, Petitioner’s case has the appearance of validity, such

that, when the evidence presented as to each claim is considered as true for

colorable claim analysis purposes, such evidence would have changed the

outcome of the case by creating a reasonable doubt as to its result, thus

undermining confidence in the outcome of Petitioner’s case for post

conviction relief purposes. See Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 275, 134

S.Ct. 1081 (2014) citing Strickland v. Washington at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052

(1984) [“When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether

there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would

have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”]

In other words, if the

evidence presented, if true, creates a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Moore’s

convictions, then he should have at least been allowed an evidentiary

hearing because that is what due process requires.

This is also inherently true given the numerous fact and expert

8

witness affidavits provided by Petitioner Moore in post conviction briefing

at the State level, with the State having arguably waived its right to object to

the granting of such a hearing due to the fact that under Arizona law “the

State’s [post conviction relief] response must include a memorandum … and

must include any affidavits, records or other evidence that contradicts the

petition’s allegations”. Rule 32.9(a)(2) Ariz. R. Crim. P..

In this case, although Petitioner Moore provided multiple factual and

expert affidavits supporting each of his claims, the State never provided any

such evidence to contradict his compelling allegations or constitutional

claims of Police Misconduct related Due Process violations, Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel and Mental Incompetence at the time of trial.

Here, Petitioner Moore respectfully asserts that absent the alleged

errors which are supported by uncontroverted evidence, the factfinder would

have had a reasonable doubt respecting his guilt or the fairness of his

convictions entitling him to an Evidentiary Hearing, especially given the

reasonable doubt created by both the State’s misconduct in planting

evidence in his bed to wrongly tie him to the homicides and in purposely

destroying DNA evidence that would have inferentially exonerated him, as

well as given the strong and uncontroverted factual and expert witness

9

evidence supporting both the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in

failing to investigate and present compelling third party culpability evidence

regarding the original suspect in the case (Tony Brown) and Mr. Moore’s

mental incompetency claim.

Third, Petitioner Moore has identified unsettled legal questions and is

not merely asking for error correction. For example, by granting Certiorari

in the case at bar this most honored Court may clarify for the first time or

settle legal questions as to the practical application of the United States

Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Russell and Arizona v.

Youngblood, and whether the facts presented in this case respectively fulfill

what was contemplated by this most honored Court regarding both

outrageous governmental conduct, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93

S.Ct. 1637 (1973), and the purposeful destruction of evidence in a criminal

case, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), by which

the Arizona Courts were required to dismiss with prejudice. Further, as to

the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Competency issues presented in

this case, they are arguably unique and may constitute areas of the law never

previously explored or settled as to the following: 1) whether a failure to

investigate and present even a single witness in a criminal trial abounding

10

with third party culpability evidence may be ineffective assistance of

counsel under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984)

and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) and 2)

whether medically induced mental incompetency may be found to violate

the 6th Amendment and the principles of due process requiring a new trial

under Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 46280 S. Ct. 788 (1960).

PETITIONER CONTROVERTING STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In November, 1999 the Yale Crackhouse Homicides (YCH) which are

the subject of the case at bar occurred at 1808 E. Yale St. in Phoenix,

Arizona. While the State is correct that Defendant Moore was indicted by a

Grand Jury in November of 1999, his indictment was due in large part to the

State’s false claim before the Grand Jury that police had found a ziplock

plastic bag containing both a shell casing (Item 26A) and projectile or bullet

(Item 26B) in Mr. Moore’s bed purportedly connecting him to the YCH

murder weapon.

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pp. 7-8 citing

Appendix E, Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, pp. 115-16 citing

Petitioner’s Exhibit #84; 2nd Suppl. Declaration Larry A. Hammond, pp. 1012 attached as Petitioner’s Appendix of Exhibits (Volume 2), Appendix J.

Sadly, the evidence presented at trial was one-sided given defense

11

counsel failed to call a single witness to testify or to even properly

investigate the State’s case or available defense witnesses or trial defenses,

with the State focused on three (3) witnesses (Deborah Ford, Jessica

Borghetti and Sarry Ortiz) and initially uncontested forensic evidence.

Ultimately in post conviction both the State’s misconduct and defense

counsel’s failures were discovered, along with substantial evidence that

Defendant was incompetent at the time of trial. These discoveries put into

serious question the fairness of Petitioner’s trial and the accuracy of his

convictions undermining the credibility of each key State witness1, and

presented compelling third party culpability evidence related to the original

suspect, together with uncontroverted experts who challenged the forensic

evidence to the point that the State’s claim of overwhelming evidence is not

only highly questionable, it must be set aside, along with Defendant’s unjust

convictions.

1

For example, the main witnesses and scientific evidence used by the State to contrive his

conviction at trial were arguably substantially discredited to the PCR Court based upon the post conviction

investigation and the following new evidence: 1) that the State’s only eye witness Deborah Ford was

unable to identify Petitioner Moore as the perpetrator of the homicides on multiple occasions including

immediately prior to trial, 2) that State’s key witness Jessica Borghetti admitted that she had lied to police

during the homicide investigation involving Mr. Moore, and had even laughed when confronted by the

State about her dishonesty, advising the State would have “to figure it out”, 3) that the State’s 2 nd key

witness, Sarry Ortiz, admitted for the first time in post conviction that she had actually seen the original

suspect Tony Brown running from the crimescene immediately after the shooting and that he was known to

be a dangerous/violent individual, while Petitioner Moore was a nice young man, and 4) that the validity of

the physical or forensic evidence tying Petitioner Moore to the crimes had been called into serious question

by two (2) former Assistant Directors of the Phoenix Police Department Crimelab, Richard Watkins and

Frank Rodgers. ]

12

PETITIONER’S REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

For obvious reasons the State of Arizona may not want Capital

Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore’s case to ever receive a fair hearing or his

alleged contrived conviction may come to light. However, notwithstanding

the State’s alleged incorrect or limited facts and questionable legal

argument, there are still compelling reasons to grant certiorari in his case

which he respectfully requests to be allowed to summarize as follows.

First, the case at bar is a good vehicle for reviewing the questions

presented which involve arguably unsettled areas of federal law or United

States Supreme Court authority requiring clarification and requested

application in order to benefit a death row inmate who is progressively

becoming totally blind due to diabetic retinopathy. Infra.`

Second, contrary to the State’s incorrect assertions, the superior

court’s decision allegedly precluding two of the three issues raised by

Petitioner Moore was not correct under Rule 32.2 ARCrimP and applicable

law in Stewart v. Smith, supra, because neither the Police Misconduct nor the

Incompetency issues existed at the time of Mr. Moore’s trial and were not

discovered until post conviction, and both issues are of significant

constitutional magnitude requiring a waiver by Petitioner which never

13

occurred.

Third, a review of his certiorari petition reveals the United States

Supreme Court’s intervention in this case is required to finally resolve

unsettled legal questions involving both Outrageous Governmental Conduct

and the Destruction of Evidence as respectively discussed by the U.S.

Supreme Court in U.S. v. Russell and Arizona v. Youngblood and how they

may be or should have been applied to his case. Moreover, such review may

also allow unsettled legal issues as to the specifically alleged Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel and medically induced Mental Incompetency at

criminal trial to be resolved as well.

Fourth, a review of the evidence in Capital Petitioner Moore’s case,

which has been included in his previously filed Petition for Writ of

Certiorari and related Appendices and are deserving of appropriate review

by this most honored United States Supreme Court, shows that his case is

meritorious and worthy of this most honored Court’s granting of certiorari in

order to properly settle the referenced issues of federal law and apply any

favorable holding by this great Court to his case.

14

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing facts and legal argument, including

Petitioner Moore’s previously filed Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari and

related Appendices, Mr. Moore’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be

granted.

While it may be argued that there is no urgency in taking up review in

this case which still has federal habeas review available, such would be most

sadly incorrect. As referenced in State proceedings and to this honored

Court in requesting an extension of time to file his Petition for Writ of

Certiorari, due to his progressing diabetes Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore is

most tragically losing ground each day as to his eyesight which had been

greatly compromised by the bilateral retinal detachments resulting from the

diabetic retinopathy he has suffered over the last 10-15 years, and from

which he is sadly going from being substantially legally blind to being

totally blind with each passing day, month and year.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2026.

________________/s/________________

Patrick C. Coppen, Esq.

Attorney for Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore

15

Copy of the foregoing hand

delivered/faxed/e-mailed this

24th day of June, 2026 to:

Mr. Greg Hazard, Esq.

Asst. Arizona Attorney General

Arizona Attorney General’s Office

Phoenix, AZ 85701

16