Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Julius Jarreau Moore, Petitioner v. Arizona

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JULIUS JARREAU MOORE,

Petitioner,

V.

STATE OF ARIZONA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA

MARICOPA COUNTY

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PATRICK C. COPPEN

Counsel of Record

LAW OFFICE OF PATRICK C. COPPEN, PC

2735 W. SANDBROOK LANE

TUCSON, AZ 85741

(520) 301-0503

coppentpnr@aol.com

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

** CAPITAL CASE**

Petitioner Moore, who has always maintained his innocence in this case from the time of

his initial arrest in 1999, was convicted at trial of first degree murder and sentenced to death.

In state post-conviction proceedings, Moore was refused an evidentiary hearing and his

petition dismissed, despite his colorable claims of innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel at

trial and serious state misconduct, including claims police planted evidence to connect Moore to

the murders and deliberately destroyed exculpatory DNA evidence to prevent it from being

tested. Notably, this misconduct occurred after the State’s only eyewitness could not identify

Moore as the perpetrator of the crimes on multiple occasions.

Further, Moore suffered ineffective assistance of trial counsel, who failed to properly

investigate his case nor to even present a defense, despite substantial third-party culpability

evidence existing as to the original suspect, one Tony Brown. Instead, trial counsel improperly

frontloaded purported “mitigation” of Moore’s alleged crack cocaine addiction on cross

examination of the State’s witnesses, from which the jury could easily infer that Petitioner was

guilty of the homicides due to said alleged addiction.

Finally, Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were further violated because he was not

competent at the time of trial due to the severe diabetic ketoacidosis he suffered throughout the

guilt phase of trial, caused by the Maricopa County Jail’s contemporaneous refusal to properly

feed or medicate Moore during his guilt phase trial.

This case therefore presents three questions:

1) Whether the State’s alleged egregious misconduct in both planting evidence in Petitioner

Moore’s bed to wrongfully tie him to the homicides, and by deliberately destroying

exculpatory DNA evidence related to blood found on a knife near the first chronological

victim’s body, violated this Court’s authority in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,

93 S.Ct. 1637 (1973) and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988),

respectively holding that outrageous governmental conduct and the purposeful

destruction of evidence by police, if proven, require dismissal of his case with prejudice?

2) Whether Capital Petitioner Moore’s 6'" Amendment right to be represented by competent

trial counsel was violated due to substantial Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) as

defined by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984) and Hinton v.

Alabama, 571 U.S. 170, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) due to former counsel’s failure to not

only properly investigate and present readily available and compelling 3" Party

culpability evidence as to the original suspect, yet in his failure to call a single witness in

Petitioner's defense, and which resultant abdicated defense was most substantially

comprised of the cross examination of State’s witnesses to purportedly frontload

mitigation as to his alleged addiction, suggesting to the jury that he was guilty in this case

and constituting such grave ineffective assistance of counsel or misconduct so as to rival

that which occurred in McCoy v. Louisiana 584 U.S. 414, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018)?

3) Whether Moore’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment federal constitutional right to a fair

trial was violated by the lower Arizona court because he was not competent at the time of

his 2001 guilt phase jury due to diabetic ketoacidosis caused by the Maricopa County

Jail’s refusal to properly feed him nor give him prescribed insulin medication?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding are Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore and respondent the State

of Arizona. The Petitioner is not a corporation.

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

State v. Moore, CR1999-016742 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. June 6, 2007)

(convictions and sentences)

State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1 (Ariz. July 23, 2009) (opinion affirming convictions and sentences

on direct appeal)

Moore vy. Arizona, No. CR-07-0164-AP (November 30, 2009) (order denying petition for writ of

certiorari seeking review on direct appeal)

State v. Moore, CR1999-016742 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. September 23, 2021)

(ruling and order denying petition for post-conviction relief)

State v. Moore, CR23-0199 PC (Ariz. Sept. 9, 2025) (order denying review of lower court’s

order denying post-conviction relief)

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED......0.... 00. .ccc ccc ccceccccccuccueceeceeceeceeceuceustaseasseeceesenseuss i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS.............00cccccccecceccecuceecuseuceecueeuseuseecucensenees ii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS. .............cccccccececeeceececeecececeececeee ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS... cece ccc ecc ccc ece ec ececeesseceeceseucesenseeceesusetentasesensueces iv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.............0c.ccccccececeuceececeuceeceseuceucesesercees 1

Decisions Below............. ccc cec cece cece cceecceceuccueceuceeceuceececeeeaeeaeeeesenseueesns 1

Statement of Jurisdiction. ............. ccc cccccecceceececsceccceecucesetceseucensueeuseeseess 2

Statement of the Case... 00.0... cc ccc c ccc ecc eee ccucecsecucseseeeesenseeeasetseseasersrecees 3

A. Factual and Procedural Background for the Egregious

State Misconduct Issue............. 0... cc ccccccccccccccececevaeeeeseveceneess 4

B. Factual and Procedural Background for the Pervasive

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Issue...............c.cccecceceececeecees 13

Cc. Facts and Procedural Background regarding the Incompetence of

Petitioner at his Guilt Phase Trial due to Diabetic Ketoacidosis.......

Reasons for Granting Certiorari............... ccc cccecceceececcusceeceeceuceteeucenseeeaness

A. Because the State’s alleged egregious misconduct in both planting evidence in

Petitioner Moore’s bed to wrongfully tie him to the 1999 Yale Crackhouse

homicides, and purposely destroying exculpatory DNA evidence related to

blood plainly evident on knife found near the 1‘ chronological homicide

victim’s foot violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and respectively constituted prima facie violations of the

U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings in U.S. v. Russell and Arizona v. Youngblood

by which such plainly outrageous governmental conduct and the purposeful

destruction of evidence by the State respectively require dismissal of his case

with prejudice.

B. Because Capital Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore’s Sixth Amendment right to

be represented by effective trial counsel as applied to the State of Arizona

under the Fourteenth Amendment was pervasively violated throughout his

case due to substantial Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) under

Strickland v. Washington and Hinton vy. Alabama by which former counsel’s

failure to not only properly investigate and present readily available 3" Party

culpability evidence, yet failure to call _a_single witness in Mr. Moore’s

defense effectively pleading him guilty before the jury, along with defense

counsel’s cross examination of the State’s witnesses in order to frontload

“mitigation” as to Mr. Moore’s drug addiction, suggesting to the jury that he

was actually guilty in this case, constituting such grave ineffective assistance

of counsel or misconduct so as to rival that which occurred in McCoy y.

Louisiana.

C. Because Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore’s Sixth Amendment constitutional

right to a fair trial was violated because he was not competent at the time of

his 2001 guilt phase jury trial due to suffering from a very serious medical

condition or diabetic ketoacidosis caused by the State’s misconduct in failing

to properly feed him during the guilt phase of trial nor give him prescribed

diabetes medication, which failures combined had a synergistic effect to

render him incompetent throughout the proceeding.

O10). 6) Fi Ol) (0) Br

APPENDIX

Appendix A: Minute Entry, Conviction and Sentencing, State v. Moore,

No. CR1999-016742 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. June 6, 2007) .......0..0.ccceee eee eees la

Appendix B: Opinion, State v. Moore, No. CRO7-0164 AP

(Ariz, Sly 23.5 2009 sss ss s+ anemia st 49 tomemenmn as +1¢s mmecnunneen 4.44406 mapeoeeees $444 epeRaemATE as 10a

Appendix C: Minute Entry, Ruling Dismissing PCR, State v. Moore,

No. CR1999-016742, Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. (Sept. 23, 2022)... eee 70a

Appendix D: Order denying Amended Petition for Review,

State v. Moore, CR23-0199 PC (Ariz. Sept. 9, 2025)........cccecccceceeccececeuceuceeeuns 115a

Appendix E: Amended Petition for Review, State v. Moore,

CRZ3-O1B9 BC (OGL, Gy, ZO Ve ss sscncin £1524 teshinmaneme «0 + +nmcmnemmoe + +4 mamconeage +405 + pews 119a

Appendix F: Amended Petition for Review to Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner’s Exhibit #40, Affidavit of former Maricopa County

Medical Examiner Dr. Archilaus Mosley...........0.0.0..cccccseecececececcucecaeeuceeeeens 266a

Appendix G: Amended Petition for Review to Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner’s Exhibit #52, Affidavit of Criminalist R. Watkins................cc0ceeeeeess 283a

Appendix H: Amended Petition for Review to Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner’s Exhibit #53, Affidavit of Crimescene & Fingerprint

Expert Fi, ROG6S <5 ssmnsnos:sssaoanieads..+.cnneeamnnss+s0euamnmmeooanaory 59 ¥epennsenne 4s vReyaleDs 36la

Appendix I: Amended Petition for Review to Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner’s Exhibit #83, Declaration and Sworn Interview Transcript

Of Ray Krone...... eee eee ec cece ces eceseccescuesecuceesecuceeeucecaceseueaveneusaeeneuss 425a

Appendix J: Amended Petition for Review to Arizona Supreme Court,

Petitioner’s Exhibit #84, 2"! Supplemental Declaration of Larry A.

Hammond... 0... cece cee ee ec ee eee eee ease eeeesseeeeeuseesunscececcnieteceavenenseeens 465a

Appendix K: Amended Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme

Court, Petitioner’s Exhibit #85, 6" Supplemental Declaration of

Ballistics/Firearms Expert R. Watkins ...........0.00ccccecceccseeeuceccuceucescuseuceeeasaes 482a

Appendix L: Amended Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme

Court, Petitioner’s Exhibit #86, 6" Supplemental Declaration of

Crimescene Expert Frank Rodgers...... ......cccccccccececccssececeeeucuseucencencuseusenees 490a

vi

APPENDIX

(Cont'd)

Page No

Appendix M: Amended Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme

Court, Petitioner’s Exhibit #32, Affidavit of J. Canby, Esq...........0..cccceceeeeueeuee 498a

Appendix N: Amended Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme

Court, Petitioner’s Exhibit #44, Affidavit of Capital Representation

Legal Expert Larry Hammond..............0.00.0cccccecceccessseceececeuceeeeceuceneaeeneans 506a

Appendix O: Amended Petition for Review to the Arizona Supreme

Court, Petitioner’s Exhibit #48, Affidavit of Dr. Stephen Williams................... 537a

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal cases:

Page(s)

Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)... . 0. cece ccc cc cee esecee ene eeeeees

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988).........cccc cece e eee eee

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 124 S.Ct. 1256 (2004.0... 0... cece cc eceeee eee e ees

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196 (1963)..........cee

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)... cc cece cscs ec ecenceeesusseeeueeeeees

Blazak v. Ricketts, 1 F.3d 891, 893 (9" Cir. 1993)......ccccccccceecceesteeeesee sees

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984)......... cece eee

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1966)..........cccccccccesseces ees eueeseneenenees

Cullin v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 479, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011)......0.00c eee

Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)......... 0... cece ccecee ec eceeseeenes

Donnelly v. DeChristofono, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)... cc cece cc ec ec ec cscs eeeseeeeeeeeas

Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317 (1st Cir. 2005)... ccc ccc ec ccc ce ueneeeseeaes

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960)....... 0... cceeeeeeeeees

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896 (1975)... ccc ccc cc ec eee e cence eesees

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972)... 0. cece cece cece eee

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)........ccccecec cscs eneeeeseueetneeeenenen

Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 at 203 (2001).........0ccc cece cece cece ee eeee

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993)... 0. cec ee ee ee ee eens

Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 170, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2011)...... 0c eee eee

Kimmelman vy. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574 (1986)..........c0c cece

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Cont'd)

Federal cases:

Page(s)

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995)... 0. cece ec ec ee eee eens

McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018)...eeceeccecsseeeeees

Medina vy. California, 505 U.S. 437, (1992)

Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 785 (1967)

Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721 (1998)

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959)

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836 (1966)........ccccccececeeeeeeeeu ens

Phillips v. White, 851 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2017)

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1982)

Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. ___ (2022)

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984)

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745 (1963)...

Dore eee were ence rere ec ccene

Trombetta v. California,

467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984)

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct 2392 (1976)

U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984)... 0. cece cece cece a eeeseees

United States v. Crumby, 895 F.Supp. 1354 (D.Ariz. 1995).............0.0.cceee

United States v. Glover, 531 U.S. 198 at 203 (2001)...........c cece eeeeeee eens

United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954 (9" Cir. 1998) ........cecccecceceeeeeeceeeeees

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637 (1973)

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Cont’d)

State cases:

Page(s)

Federal Statutes

Constitutional Provisions

U.S Const. amend VI

U.S. Const. amend XIV

The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI

Other Authorities

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore, an indigent prisoner sentenced to death in

Arizona, respectfully requests that this most honored Court grant certiorari to correct the

Arizona state courts’ multiple violations of his federal constitutional rights in this case

based upon this United States Supreme Court’s decisions related to the following: 1) that

a criminal defendant has the federal constitutional right to a fair trial under the Sixth

Amendment and to Due Process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment which

collectively prohibit state misconduct bringing about a contrived conviction, Mooney v.

Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), which misconduct specifically includes both outrageous

governmental conduct in planting evidence to falsely implicate his guilt under United

States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637 (1973) and the purposeful destruction of

exculpatory DNA evidence to prevent his exoneration under Arizona v. Youngblood, 488

U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988); 2) that a criminal defendant in a death penalty case has the

federal constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to a fair trial which includes the

right to competent counsel throughout having the duty to properly investigate his case

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), as reaffirmed by

the United States Supreme Court in Hinton vy. Alabama, 571 U.S. 170, 134 S.Ct. 1081

(2014), and to present all available material evidence in his defense, rather than

effectively pleading him guilty by both failing to call a single witness when compelling

third party culpability evidence exists, and by purposely cross examining the State’s

witnesses about the defendant’s alleged drug addiction at the time of the underlying

Crackhouse homicides, suggesting his guilt to the jury which overall attorney misconduct

rivals that which occurred in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018);

and 3) that a criminal defendant has the federal constitutional right to a fair trial under the

Sixth Amendment and to Due Process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment which

prohibit him from being tried while incompetent as recognized by the United States

Supreme Court in both Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960) and

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), especially when said incompetence is due to a

serious medical condition, such as diabetic ketoacidosis, caused by the State’s

misconduct in failing to properly feed the Defendant during trial or give him prescribed

insulin for his diagnosed diabetes.

Decisions Below

The Arizona Supreme Court denied discretionary review of Mr. Moore’s postconviction claims on September 9, 2025, in an unpublished order. App. 115a-116a. The

Maricopa County Superior Court summarily denied Mr. Moore’s post conviction claims

in an unpublished minute entry entered on September 23, 2021. App. 70a-114a.

The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision affirmed Mr. Moore’s convictions and

death penalty sentences on direct review in a written opinion on July 23, 2009, App. 10a-

69a, and is reported at State v. Moore, 213 P. 3d 150 (Ariz. 2009). The Maricopa

County Superior Court entered the convictions and sentences in Mr. Moore’s case in an

unpublished order on June 6, 2007. App. la-9a.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The Arizona Supreme Court entered judgment against Mr. Moore on September

9, 2025, when it denied review of his post conviction case. App. 15a-l6a. Mr. Moore

applied for additional time to file the instant petition and Justice Elena Kagan extended

the time to seek certiorari to February 6, 2026. Moore v. Arizona, No. 25A645 (U.S.

Dec. 4, 2025). This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257 (a) and 28

U.S.C. Sec. 2106.

Constitutional Provisions

The Sixth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. VI. provides in relevant part:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and

confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining

witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

The Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend XIV, provides in relevant part:

No state shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law[.]

The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VL, para. 2, provides in relevant part:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof ***shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every

State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding.

Statement of the Case

The first federal constitutional issue in this case involves alleged State misconduct

in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and are effectively the very issues

and contemplated fact patterns which this most honored Court respectively outlined or

decided in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637 (1973) and Arizona v.

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), as to whether the planting of evidence by

police into a criminal defendant’s bed to falsely tie him to a crime constitutes outrageous

governmental conduct and whether the purposeful destruction of DNA evidence by

police to prevent the testing of the evidence that inferentially would exonerate the

defendant and implicate the original suspect mutually require the dismissal of Petitioner

Moore’s case with prejudice.

The second federal constitutional issue in the case at bar involves the fact that

during Mr. Moore’s trial in this case he was not represented by competent counsel in

violation of the Sixth Amendment. During the pretrial and guilt phase of trial, former

trial counsel was admittedly gravely ineffective because he not only failed to properly

investigate Mr. Moore’s case as required by longstanding United States Supreme Court

authority in Strickland v. Washington (1984) as confirmed by this most honored Court’s

2014 decision in Hinton v. Alabama related to the 3" Party culpability of Tony Brown

and present this defense at trial, yet failed to call a single defense witness to testify at trial

in Petitioner’s defense and essentially cross examined the State’s witnesses in order to

frontload mitigation concerning Petitioner’s drug use contemporaneous to the homicides

effectively admitting his guilt, with such blatant error by counsel rivaling that recently

found by the United States Supreme Court to have in McCoy v. Louisiana in which

3

former trial counsel admitted Defendant McCoy’s guilt at the beginning of trial,

improperly waiving his right to the presumption of innocence without his client’s

consent, leaving Mr. Moore in this case without any effective representation at a critical

phase of trial in apparent additional violation of United States vy. Cronic which found that

the lack of legal representation at a critical phase of trial is per se ineffective assistance

requiring a new trial.

The third federal constitutional issue presented in Petitioner’s Writ for Certiorari

involves the alleged fact that at the time of his guilt phase trial, Petitioner Moore was not

competent to stand trial, whereby his trial proceeded in violation of both the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments as his alleged incompetency was due to a serious medical

condition called diabetic ketoacidosis that was alleged to the Arizona court to have been

caused by the State or the Maricopa County Jail itself by failing to properly feed him

throughout trial nor give him his prescribed insulin, which misconduct caused him to be

so mentally and physically compromised or incompetent at the time of trial, that he was

unable to understand the nature of his case, nor assist counsel in his defense.

A. Factual and Procedural Background for the Egregious State Misconduct Issue

The factual and procedural background for the alleged egregious State

Misconduct which took place in this case are as follows. Petitioner Moore’s federal

constitutional rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution respectively guaranteeing his rights to a fair trial and due process were

plainly violated. He was the victim of a contrived conviction due to very serious

misconduct by the State of Arizona as tacitly approved by the subsequent denial of

review and/or relief in this case by the Arizona Supreme Court despite the specific

uncontroverted factual allegations of police misconduct relating to the planting of

inculpatory evidence, the tampering with material evidence to cover up the planted

evidence, as well as the purposeful destruction of DNA evidence. Petitioner submitted

the following in post-conviction to obtain his vindication and freedom, and to the

Arizona Supreme Court in his Amended Petition for Review. Appendix E, Petitioner’s

Amended Petition for Review, pp. 107-120.

It is particularly noteworthy that capital Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore, who

definitely benefitted from the near ten (10) year post conviction investigation in this case

which merited ongoing investigation and evidentiary submissions, respectfully

recognizes the awesomeness of United States Supreme Court’s task at hand in

considering whether his case may be worthy of granting certiorari or further review.

The ever increasing evidence of State Misconduct resulted in multile amendments

and supplemental briefing to his original Petition for Post Conviction Relief, culminating

in the Court ordered filing of a Unified Petition which memorialized the discovery of the

above referenced alleged State Misconduct found to be of an increasingly grave nature.

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, pp. 19-84.

With the growing discovery of forensic discrepancies and ever-mounting

evidence of improprieties by the State of Arizona at the Maricopa County Superior Court

level, a definite pattern of purposeful police misconduct was uncovered by retained

defense forensic experts Watkins and Rodgers who were former Assistant Directors of

the Phoenix Police Department (PPD) Crime Lab. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Review, pp. 29-78.

These discoveries by career Phoenix Police Department Crimelab Experts

Richard Watkins and Frank Rodgers included both the actual planting of incriminating

evidence by police in Petitioner Moore’s bed in the first instance (E.g., Items 26, 26A,

and 26B) meant to falsely implicate Petitioner, and the destruction of physical or

ballistics evidence from the Yale Crackhouse Homicides’ (YCH’s) crime scene to coverup the wrongdoing in planting the evidence, including the purposeful destruction of DNA

evidence, which implicitly would have exonerated Petitioner. Petitioner’s Amended

Petition for Review, pp. 70-74.

For each of these issues it was respectively argued that applicable federal law

required that Arizona Courts to dismiss Mr. Moore’s underlying case with prejudice or at

least grant him an evidentiary hearing because if the evidence presented in post

conviction were true, such would undermine confidence in his death penalty and related

convictions. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, pp. 107-120.

First, it was argued that the blatant planting of evidence in this case constituted

outrageous governmental conduct pursuant to this most honored Court ‘s holding in

United States v. Russell, 93 S.Ct 1637, 1641-43, 411 U.S. 429, 430-32 (1973).

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, pp. 114-15.

Petitioner Moore submitted that in Russell, the United States Supreme Court had

held that, although entrapment by police in a criminal case may not constitute

“outrageous governmental conduct” barring prosecution, there was such a defense that

could be raised if the question presented constituted “whether the police conduct falls

below standards ... for the proper use of governmental power.” Jd. Petitioner’s

Amended Petition for Review, pp. 114-15. The Supreme Court suggested in the Russell

6

decision that although such a threshold may be elusive, the Court “may someday be

presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so

outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from

invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.” Jd., at 43; see also, Miller v. Pate,

386 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 785 (1967) [‘“the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state

criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence” citing Mooney vy.

Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)]. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, p. 114.

In Petitioner’s case, he submitted to the Arizona Courts that the government’s

egregious misconduct in planting evidence in his bed in order to falsely tie him to a

crime for which the State lacked both physical and eyewitness related evidence,

constituted outrageous governmental conduct whereby the principles of due process

would absolutely bar the government from benefitting from such misconduct in a

resultant death penalty conviction, and mandated vacating such conviction or related

convictions, and the dismissal with prejudice of the underlying case or prosecution.

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, p. 115. Unlike the defendant in Russell, in

which a predisposition to commit a crime by a particular defendant barred such an

outrageous governmental conduct finding - despite that defendant being effectively

‘aided and/or abetted’ by the State to commit the crime - the government did not act to

promote criminality; here, the government committed a criminal act to falsely convict an

innocent individual, one for whom the government lacked the requisite probable cause to

arrest, and literally “created” the evidence used to effect the arrest in the first place. Id.

As described by Legal/Exonerations Expert Hammond who had founded the Arizona

Justice Project, the police and prosecution basically “rode” their own criminal

7

misconduct in planting the evidence and repeatedly raised its egregious head throughout

Petitioner’s case, from the time of his indictment by the grand jury through conviction,

then at the jury’s death penalty imposition. See Petitioner’s Amended Petition for

Review, pp. 115-16 citing Petitioner’s Exhibit #84; 2"? Suppl. Declaration of Larry A.

Hammond, pp. 10-12.

Secondly, Petitioner submitted that the purposeful destruction of exculpatory

evidence by police in his case, including critical DNA evidence, entitled him to dismissal

of his charged offenses under Arizona v. Youngblood. Id., 488 U.S. 51 [Purposeful or

bad faith destruction of evidence by police creates the inference that evidence when

purposely destroyed is exculpatory, entitling a defendant to dismissal in such a case].

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, p. 116.

Specifically, Petitioner Moore had argued that both the purposeful destruction of

both ballistics evidence or shell casings (to cover up the planting of evidence by police),

as well as DNA or blood evidence which plainly was present on the tip of a knife (Item

#22) found at the crimescene near the foot of the first chronological homicide victim’s

foot (which the original Medical Examiner, Dr. Archilaus Mosely, opined likely

contained the blood of the actual perpetrator), required Petitioner’s case be dismissed

with prejudice. Id. This remedy, it was respectfully submitted, was the only remedy

available under applicable federal constitutional authority for such an egregious and

ultimate Brady type due process violation considering the principles of fundamental

fairness, especially given that unlike Brady violations which are remedied by a new trial

at which the previously undisclosed evidence would be presented leveling the playing

field for both the State and defense, a Youngblood violation, which is effectively the

8

ultimate “Brady violation”, must be remedied by a dismissal with prejudice given that

the undisclosed evidence was destroyed and could never be presented at a later trial.

Youngblood y. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 335-38 (1988). Petitioner’s

Amended Petition for Review, p. 116.

In his argument to the Arizona Supreme Court, Petitioner Moore submitted that

evidence destruction by the State in a criminal case constitutes a due process violation

entitling him to an appropriate federal constitutional remedy. Id. citing Trombetta v.

California, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984), Petitioner explained that in holding

that the State of California’s failure to preserve DUI-related Intoxilyzer breath samples

was not a violation of due process because the State was merely following its normal

practice, it was nonetheless pointed out that the United States Supreme Court had

recognized that a conscious or calculated effort to circumvent disclosure requirements

related to exculpatory Brady evidence may result in a violation of due process. Jd. at

2532-35. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, pp. 116-17.

Thereafter, Petitioner argued that absent the bad faith destruction of evidence by

the State (as distinguished from mere negligent evidence destruction), no due process

violation occurs when the State or police merely fail to properly preserve evidence.

Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, pp. 116-17. However, the Youngblood

holding recognized that the actual bad faith evidence destruction, such as occurred in this

case, implies the evidence purposely destroyed was, in fact, exculpatory, providing the

most drastic remedy: dismissal. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review, pp. 117-19.

Mr. Moore further argued to the Arizona Supreme Court that for this most egregious due

process or ultimate Brady violation (i.e., the actual destruction of exculpatory evidence),

9

given that the evidence will never again be available to use at a later trial or retrial due to

such inexcusable police misconduct or purposeful destruction of evidence, the most

dramatic constitutional remedy was required: dismissal with prejudice under the United

States Supreme Court’s holdings in Youngblood and Brady. Petitioner’s Amended

Petition for Review, pp. 118-20.

As an example of the State Misconduct discovered during post conviction, the

Arizona Courts learned that evidence discovered during capital Petitioner’s ongoing

investigation had prompted further review of forensic evidence by Petitioner’s retained

experts Watkins and Rodgers! principally concerning major discrepancies and

improprieties they had found related to three (3) different items of highly material

evidence which included both the alleged planted and tampered with evidence by police

and the DNA evidence alleged to be purposely destroyed while in the custody of the

Phoenix Police Department Crimelab as follows:

1) That regarding Item #26A [a shell casing found in a plastic ziplock bag

(Item 26) with a spent bullet or projectile (Item #26B)] purportedly collected

by police from 1833 E. Coronado or Petitioner’s residence, the proper

collection protocols were not followed by police requiring that evidence be

photographed in place where it was purportedly first discovered (ie. under

the bedspread of Petitioner Moore’s bed), not moved from the location of

discovery (to the top of the bed spread with items #26A and #26B in bag

perfectly lined up), and that a numbered placard also be used or placed with

the evidence before being photographed;

Amended Petition for Review at p. 51 citing Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of

' Petitioner’s retained Firearms/Ballistics expert Richard Watkins and

Fingerprints/Crime Scene expert Frank Rodgers respectively served as Assistant

Directors of the PPD Crime Lab in 1997 and 1998-2001 See Petitioner’s Unified

Appendix of Exhibits, Petitioner’s Exhibit #52 (Affidavit of R. Watkins at. pp. 1-2) and

Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of F. Rodgers) at p. 1).

10

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

F.Rodgers at pp. 2, 4-5)].

That the picture of Item #26A taken at the time of its purported collection

definitely shows an obvious or plainly visible “dent” in the side of the

cartridge casing

Amended Petition for Review at p. 51 citing Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of

F.Rodgers at pp. 2, 4-5)]; [Petitioner’s UAE, Exhibit #52 (Affidavit of

R.Watkins at pp. 3-4, Para. 12).

That the “dent” in the side of original Item #26A is now no longer present

in existing Item #26A

Amended Petition for Review at p. 51 citing Exhibit #52 (Affidavit of

R.Watkins at pp. 3-4, Para. 12) and Petitioner’s Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of

F.Rodgers at p. 5, Para. 16-17).

That inspection of other cartridge casings related to the present case to

determine if original Item #26A had been lost or misplaced among the other

cartridge casings yielded a determination that original Item #26A was not

lost or misplaced among the other case related cartridge casings given none

of them have such a dent, yet purposely removed from the present case

Amended Petition for Review at pp. 51-52 citing Exhibit #52 (Affidavit of

R.Watkins at pp. 4-5, Paras. 14-16) and Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of F.Rodgers

at p. 5, Paras. 16-18).

That Item #45 consists of a cartridge casing found in tire track at the YCH

crimescene by PPD Detective Dillian, with Item #45 found on the ground

inside tire track immediately after shooting having been run over by vehicle.

Amended Petition for Review at pp. 51-52 citing Petitioner’s Exhibit #52

(Affidavit of R.Watkins at p. 3, Para. 10) and Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of

F.Rodgers at pp. 5-6, Para. 19).

That a vivid description of Item #45 at the time of its collection from the

YCH crimescene was given by PPD Det. Sally Dillian during Moore’s trial

in which Item #45 was “compressed” or “crushed”, “and” having other

“damage”.

Amended Petition for Review at p. 52 citing Exhibit #59 (Supplemental

Affidavit of R.Watkins at p. 3, Paras. 10-11) and Exhibit #60 (Supplemental

Affidavit of F.Rodgers at pp. 2-3).

11

7)

8)

9)

That a visual inspection or analysis of Item #45 at the present time has

resulted in a finding that the Item #45 currently in existence in Moore’s case

has absolutely no visible damage whatsoever, whereby original Item #45 has

also been removed or taken out of the present case, with a wholly different

cartridge casing replacing it.

Amended Petition for Review at p. 52 citing Exhibit #59 (Supplemental

Affidavit of R. Watkins at pp. 3-4, Paras. 110-14) and Exhibit #60

(Supplemental Affidavit of F.Rodgers at p. 3, Para. 11).

That the destruction of blood on the tip of YCH crimescene Item #22 or

State’s Exhibit #130 (knife found near foot of first chronological victim

Sergio Mata) pursuant to State agent’s order causing destruction of the

evidence before any DNA testing could be performed under the Superior

Court DNA testing Order and said destruction is “unprecedented” and

greatly calls into question the integrity of the State’s case.

Amended Petition for Review at p. 52 citing Exhibit #52 (Affidavit of

R.Watkins at p. 5-6, Paras. 17-19).

That a review of the Chain of Custody documents related to Exhibit #130

or Yale Crackhouse crime scene Item #22 (knife with blood stain found near

foot of first chronological victim Sergio Mata) shows after that PPD

Detective Olson had ordered that the evidence not be preserved for DNA

testing on 12/15/99, and that it was immediately checked out of evidence by

Evidence Technician C.Westbrooks for over 60 days from 12/17/99 thru

2/24/00 without any testing taking place until it was forwarded to Latent

Print Examiner J.Cynowa on 2/24/00.

Amended Petition for Review at p. 52 citing Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of

F.Rodgers at p. 3, Para. 11.c)

10) That the latent fingerprint recovered from the knife blade of Item #22 may

be a good source of biological material for supplemental DNA testing.

Amended Petition for Review at p. 53 citing Exhibit #53 (Affidavit of

F.Rodgers at p. 4, Para. 12)]; and

11) That given the discrepancies or improprieties involving not just one (1),

yet three (3) different items of material evidence in the present capital case

(ie. Items 26a, 45 and 22), the integrity of the State’s

investigation/prosecution of Petitioner is gravely suspect.

12

Amended Petition for Review at p. 53 citing Exhibit #59 (Supplemental

Affidavit of R.Watkins at p. 4, Para. 15) and Petitioner’s Exhibit #60

(Supplemental Affidavit of F.Rodgers at pp. 3-4, Para. 12)].

12) — That given unexplained discrepancies/improprieties related to YCH Item

#45 and purported Item #26A, the destruction of evidence related to Item

#22 or State’s Trial Exhibit #130 (knife found at crime scene next to victim

Mata) which destruction occurred in a capital case in regards to readily

apparent blood on the knife tip at the time of the initial police investigation

as shown in State’s Exhibit 110 which former assigned Maricopa County

Medical Examiner Dr. Archilaus Mosley may have identified assailant) said

destruction was not routine or accidental, yet done to eliminate any possible

evidence undermining State’s theory that the shooting was committed by

Moore.

Amended Petition for Review at p. 55 citing Exhibit #40 (Affidavit of former

Maricopa County Medical Examiner Dr. A. Mosley) at p. 2, Paras. 4-9.

Following the foregoing initial discoveries related to both the

planting/tampering with evidence and the purposeful destruction of DNA

evidence in this case, key additional discoveries were made by which forensic

experts as well as both fact and other professional expert witnesses by which it

was determined that the following additional findings were made with respect to

Petitioner Julius Jarreau Moore’s capital or death penalty post conviction relief

case and presented to the Arizona Courts in order to prove the alleged State’s

Misconduct and highlighted in Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review to the

* It is highly questionable why, in the present capital case, such evidence

destruction as to Item #22 would have occurred in the first place, let alone, why it would

have occurred in conjunction with the destruction of other material items of the State’s

evidence discovered during the present collateral appeal as to Items #45 and #26A. It is

especially telling that none of these discrepancies were ever favorable to Moore, for if

they were merely happenstance or just coincidental, the law of averages would suggest at

least one (1) favorable occurrence.

13

Arizona Supreme Court at pp. 75-77 as follows:

1) That evidence had been planted in Petitioner Moore’s bed [Items

26 (Ziplock Plastic Bag), 26A (Shell Casing) and 26 B (Projectile) in

order to falsely tie him to the homicides in this case and shell casing

evidence had been tampered with to cover up the planting of the

evidence in the first instance.

Amended Petition for Review at pp. 75-77 citing (Affidavits of

Forensic Experts R. Watkins and F. Rodgers, Exhibits 85 and 86, See

Petitioner’s Appendix K and L, respectively.

2) That DNA evidence had been destroyed apparently while still in

the custody and control of the PPD Crimelab and that the PPD

Detective who had ordered the destruction of evidence in this case was

the same Detective (Detective Olson) who had also been responsible

for hiding DNA evidence in the Ray Krone case, with the planted

evidence in Petitioner Moore’s bed being used throughout his case to

wrongly convict him and sentence him to death.

Amended Petition for Review at pp. 75-77 citing Affidavits of R.

Krone & Larry Hammond, Exhibits 83 & 84, See Petitioner’s

Appendix I and J, respectively.)

B. The Factual and Procedural Background for the Pervasive Ineffective Assistance

of Counsel Issue.

With regard to the factual and procedural background for the alleged violations

by Arizona Courts of Petitioner Moore’s federal constitutional rights under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution respectively guaranteeing his

rights to a fair trial and due process at the State level, including the right to be

14

represented by competent legal counsel at trial Petitioner submitted the following in postconviction consideration and to the Arizona Supreme Court in his Amended Petition for

Review. Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review at pp. 37-39, 98-106.

As presented in substantial briefing to the Arizona Courts, especially, the Arizona

Supreme Court, the allegations as to trial counsel’s deficient performance was primarily

related to his total failure to properly investigate and present readily available evidence

supporting Petitioner’s consistent claims of innocence, including compelling evidence

supporting third-party culpability as to original suspect, Tony Lamont Brown.

In fact, it was uncontroverted that Petitioner Moore had an alibi which was never

presented to the jury in that he was 1.5 hours and five (5) miles removed from the crimes

at the time they were committed. Additionally, there was compelling evidence of his

good character and non-violent nature, which when considered together, would likely

have created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

Petitioner made the following arguments related to the IAC claim in his Amended

Petition for Review at pp. 98-106.

The right to effective counsel is a well-established fundamental tenant in criminal

cases. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350 (1963); U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,

104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984). Although generally a presumption that counsel was effective for

6" Amendment purposes, in some cases a presumption of ineffectiveness may arise. If

sO, it is not necessary to inquire as to counsel’s actual performance. Kimmelman vy.

Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574 (1986); Cronic, supra. In Cronic, ineffective

assistance will be presumed under the following pertinent circumstances:

15

1)

2) Where defense counsel fails to subject the prosecution’s case to

meaningful adversarial testing;

3) Where surrounding circumstances may justify such presumption of

ineffectiveness; and

4) ... . Cronic at 2045-49.

If not presumed, a successful claim requires finding the attorney's conduct was

both deficient and sufficiently prejudicial so as "to undermine confidence in the outcome"

of the case, creating the current standard two-part showing. Strickland v. Washington,

446 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L-Ed.2d 674 (1984).

First, Petitioner must show that counsel made errors so serious that he [] was not

functioning pursuant to the 6 Amendment guarantee. Strickland, supra. The 6th

Amendment right to counsel envisions counsel playing a role critical to the ability of the

adversarial system to produce a just and fair result. Id.

3 In its recent decision in Hinton v. Alabama, involving an African American

death penalty inmate who had similarly and consistently as Petitioner has, maintained his

innocence, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Strickland and

found that former counsel had essentially failed to properly investigate and present

evidence in his case undermining the State’s ballistics evidence used to convict Mr.

Hinton.

* Justice Stevens, in his opinion in Strickland, noted that the “purpose of the

effective assistance guarantee of the 6" Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal

representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system”,

16

Next, the term “deficient performance” has been generally defined as counsel's

actions falling below objective standards of reasonable representation measured by the

prevailing professional “norms” which would unquestionably

include the duty to fully investigate a case.* Strickland, supra at 691.

Second, Petitioner must also show trial counsel's performance prejudiced him

such that the errors deprived him of a fair disposition. Strickland at 691. Recently

affirming that prejudice in the Rule 32 context is established if the facts presented on

collateral appeal undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.

Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 170, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) citing Strickland, supra.

The Supreme Court also held that prejudice from the Strickland test is met if

deficient performance or error by counsel leads to any deprivation of a substantive or

procedural right, and would include “[aJny amount of [additional] actual jail time”

caused by the deficient performance. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 at 203

(2001).

In this case, Petitioner submitted in post-conviction and to the Arizona Supreme

Court that his 6'" Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during the guilt,

penalty, and appellate phases of the proceedings had been violated. This included both

former counsels’ failures to investigate and present readily available evidence supporting

but that “[t]he purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial” or

related proceeding. Id.

> Under the Strickland holding, “[c]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary”. Id.

17

innocence (including compelling third-party culpability regarding original suspect

Brown, substantial evidence supporting Petitioner’s alibi defense, and Petitioner’s good

character/non-violent nature). Additionally, other highly prejudicial deficient

performance at trial, including ‘frontloading mitigation’ for a drug-induced rage theory

that may have prejudiced the jury against Petitioner.

Notwithstanding ample IAC evidence, the post-conviction court found that

former counsel’s performance was not prejudicially deficient despite the fact he failed to

properly investigate and present readily available third-party culpability, alibi, and good

character witnesses evidence because former counsel - though failing to call a single

witness in Petitioner’s defense - had cross examined the State’s witnesses somewhat as to

identification, and had used the defense cross examination to frontload mitigation.

Appendix C, Summary Dismissal dated 9/23/21 at pp. 3538. Despite submitting

uncontroverted IAC evidence, the Arizona Courts at both the Superior Court and Arizona

Supreme Court level refused to properly consider the alleged grave Ineffective

Assistance of Counsel in this case.

Trial counsel admittedly failed to properly investigate evidence supporting

Petitioner’s innocence and three (3) compelling, complimentary defenses (E.g., thirdparty culpability, alibi, and good character/non-violent nature). First, it was pointed out

to the court that former counsel Canby was not qualified to represent Petitioner.

Appendix M, Amended Petition for Review, Exhibit #32, Affidavit of J.Canby @pp. 1-2;

and Appendix N, Amended Petition for Review, Exhibit #44; Affidavit of Capital

Representation Expert L.Hammond. at p. 10, Para. 27. Moreover, according to Canby he

was assigned forty (40) other felony cases, and was so busy he did not have time to

18

adequately investigate/prepare Moore’s case. Appendix M, Amended Petition for

Review, Exhibit #32, Affidavit of J. Canby at pp. 1-2; Appendix N, Amended Petition

for Review, Exhibit #44; Ibid. at p. 10.

Secondly, it was submitted Canby admitted in failing to investigate he did not

challenge the State’s prosecution, effectively pleading Moore guilty at trial without

consent, and merely frontloaded “drug induced rage” mitigation. Appendix M, Amended

Petition for Review,Exhibit #32, Affidavit of J. Canby at p. 3. Canby admitted if he had

investigated the TPC evidence concerning suspect Brown, he would have put on a TPC

defense with Moore’s good character and non-violent nature evidence. Appendix M,

Amended Petition for Review, Exhibit #32, Affidavit of J. Canby @pp. 5-6.

This decision not to investigate was made even before deciding upon a trial

strategy that essentially abdicated counsel’s duty to properly challenge the State’s case

by effectively pleading Petitioner guilty. Supra. These failures by counsel may have

been, in part, due to his admitted inexperience and heavy caseload, and is strongly

supported by other evidence submitted to the lower court confirming the factual basis for

each defense and included in affidavits of both Expert Hammond, Esq. Appendix N,

Amended Petition for Review, Petitioner's Exhibit #44, Declaration of Capital Legal

Expert L. Hammond at pp. 7-18.

As Petitioner’s expert, Mr. Hammond opined, counsel had the duty to investigate the

guilt phase, which was never properly conducted. He stated:

“First, it is my opinion that [Petitioner] did not have constitutionally effective

representation in connection with the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. In large

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