Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gregory Scott Person, Petitioner v. Pennsylvania
Supreme Court briefMay 30, 2025
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANlk MAY 30 2Q®
RESPONDENT
vs.
GREGORY SCOTT PERSON
PETITIONER
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT AT 550 MAL 2024 ISSUED MARCH 5, 2025 DENYING
REVIEW OF THE ORDER OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR
COURT AT 1249 MDA 2023 FILED ON OCTOBER 1, 2024
AFFIRMING THE SENTENCE ISSUED ON MAY 16, 2023 AND
FILED ON MAY 18, 2023 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CLINTON COUNTY, CRIMINAL DIVISION, AT NO. CP-18CR-0000323-2021 BY THE HONORABLE MICHAEL CRAIG P.
MILLER, PRESIDENT JUDGE.
PETITIONER
Gregory Scott Person QP-7768
pro se
Smart Communications/PADOC
Sci-Waymart
PO BOX 33028
St. Petersburg FL 33733
RESPONDENT
R. Thom Rosamilia, Esquire
Assistant District Attorney
Attorney I.D. # 208311
Clinton County Dist. Atty. Office
230 East Water Street
Lock Haven, PA 17745
570-893-4141
trosamilia@clintoncountypa.gov
HECEiVLD
JUN - 6 20S
OFFiCE OF THF C|
SUPREME COl !Rf Fio'
Statement of Questions Involved
1. Is the phrase "any act which corrupts or tends to corrupt" the morals of any
minor in 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 (a)( 1 )(i) vague and indefinite in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution ?
J
2. Are defendants Facebook messages constitutionally protected free speech under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution ?
3. Is there a limitation on the scope of criminal liability of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2904(a)
as indicated by the legislative comments by the Joint State Government
Commission, and a fair reading of Model Penal Code section 212.4(1) and the
commentary related to that section ?
1
Table of Contents
Statement of Questions Involved
Page 1
Table of Contents
Page 2
Table of Authorities
Page 3
Citations of Reports and Opinions
Page 4
Jurisdiction of Court
Page 5
Constitutional Provision and Statutes
Page 6
Statement of the Case
Page 7
Argument
Pages 8-16
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order
Appendix A
Pennsylvania Superior Court Opinion
Appendix B
Trail Court Opinion & 1925(a) Opinion
Appendix C
Joint State Government Commission Report Pages 105-107
Appendix D
Model Penal Code Section 212.4(1)
Appendix E
Trial Transcript page 151
Appendix F
2
Table of Authorities
Papachristou v. Jacksonville
Smith v. Goguen
Chicago v. Morales
City of South Euclid v. Richardson
Commonwealth v. Selbolka
Reno v. ACLU
Coates v. Cincinnati
Houston v. Hill
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania
lancu v. Brunetti
Commonwealth v. Slocum
United States v. Galo
Lewis v. City of New Orleans
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
Marinello v. United States
Commonwealth v. Howard
Commonwealth v. Alexander
Jenkins v. Georgia
Commonwealth v. Krasner
Brown v. Entertainment Merchant Assn.
Packingham v. North Carolina
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
Ashcroft v. ACLU
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
Texas v. Johnson
Commonwealth v. H.D.
Commonwealth v. Rushing
Ruhlman v. Ruhlman
Commonwealth v. Gamby
Indian Rocks Own. Assn. v. Gladfelter
Commonwealth v. Stewart
Commonwealth v. Tompkins
Perrin v. State
Model Penal Code Section
405 U.S. 156
415 U.S. 566
527 U.S. 41
551 N.E.2d 606
205 A.3d329
521 U.S. 844
402 U.S. 611
482 U.S. 451
255 U.S. 81
382 U.S. 399
588 U.S. 388
86 A.3d 272
239 F.3d 572
415 U.S. 130
422 U.S. 205
584 U.S. 1
257 A.3d 1217
258 A.3d474
418 U.S. 153
352 A.2d 479
564 U.S.786
582 U.S. 98
576 U.S. 155
535 U.S. 564
505 U.S. 377
491 U.S. 397
247 A.3d 1062
99 A.3d416
291 A.3d916
309 A.3d298
28 A.3d 1261
544 A.2d 1384
253 A.3d301
66P.3d21
212.4(1)
3
Page 8, 10
Page 8
Page 8- 9
Page 8
Page 9
Page 9
Page 9
Page 9- 10
Page 9
Page 9- 10
Page 9, 13
Page 10- 11
Page 10
Page 10
Page 10, 13
Page 11
Page 11
Page 12
Page 12
Page 12
Page 12-13
Page 12
Page 12
Page 12
Page 12
Page 12
Page 14
Page 14
Page 14
Page 14
Page 14
Page 14-15
Page 15
Page 15
Page 14-16
CITATION OF REPORTS AND OPINIONS
I. Trial Court Opinion at Docket No. CP-18-CR-0000323-2021 Filed August 2,
2023
II. Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion at Docket No. CP-18-CR-0000323-2021 Filed
October 6, 2023
III. Pennsylvania Superior Court Opinion 1249 MDA 2023; 325 A.3d 823; 2024
PA Super 229 Filed October 1, 2024
IV. Pennsylvaina Supreme Court Order at No. 550 MAL 2024 Filed March 5,
2025
4
Jurisdiction of Court
This Court has jurisdiction to review the order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
filed March 5, 2025 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (a): Final judgements or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by Writ of Certiorari where the validity of a treaty
or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a
statute of any state is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or
treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the
United States.
5
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes
1. First Amendment
2. Fifth Amendment
3. Fourteenth Amendment
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (a)
5. 1 PA. C.S.A. § 1921 (a), (c)
6. 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1939
7. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2904 (a)
8. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5903 (a)(l-9), (c)(1), (c)(2)
9. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 (a)(l)(i)
10. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6318 (a)(4)
11. Model Penal Code section 212.4(1)
6
Statement of the Case
On October 19, 2022 petitioner was convicted by a jury of Corruption of
minors (18 PA. C.S.A. § 6301 (a)(l)(i)), Unlawful contact with minors (18 PA.
C.S.A. § 6318(a)(4)), Interference with custody of children (18 Pa. C.S.A. §
2904(a)). Additionally , the court convicted Mr. Person of Sale of Tabacco to
Minors (18 PA. C.S.A. § 6305(a)(2)). Petitioner was deemed a sexually violent
predator (svp) on may 16, 2023. He was sentenced to state prison.
Petitioner raised objections before trial in a Habeas Corpus petition presenting
all questions presented herein to the trial court which were denied. Petitioner
renewed these objections during trial which were again denied. Petitioner filed a
timely post-sentence motion which was granted in part by the trial court. The trial
court acquitted petitioner of Unlawful Contact With Monors (18 Pa. C.S.A. §
6318(a)(4)) finding that the conviction had no valid legal basis upon which to
convict the petitioner. The trial court denied relief on the remaining objections.
Timely appeals followed, from both sides, with the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirming the trial court in all regards on October 1, 2024. Petitioner filed a
Petition For Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which
denied review on March 5, 2025.
7
Argument
I. Is the phrase "any act which corrupts or tends to corrupt" the morals of any
minor in 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(l)(i) vague and indefinite in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution ?
Suggested Answer: YES
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 (a)( 1 )(i) is much akin to the statue struck down by this court
in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 405 U.S. 156, 165-170, 92 S. Ct. 839 in
that it is designed as a catch all statute for which a conviction is predicted.
Pennsylvania's statute cast a large net "any act" which literally emcompasses
everything and is constitutionally vague. After arrest the trial courts are left to
decide what actions "corrupt or tend to corrupt" the morals of a minor based on
nothing more than third party subjective determinations which create a
"standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, court, and juries to pursue
their personal predilections." See: Smith v. Goguen 415 U.S. 566, 575, 94 S. Ct.
1242; Chicago v. Morales 527 U.S. 41, 65, 119 S. Ct. 1849. That which "corrupts
or tends to corrupt lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement which has
been found to be unconstitutional. See: City of South Euclid v. Richardson 551
N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ohio 1990). The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that
"actions that tend to corrupt the morals of a minor are those that would offend the
8
Commonsense of the community and the sense of decency, propriety and morality
which most people entertain." See: Commonwealth v. Selbolka 205 A.3d 329, 339
(Superior Court opinion, Appendix B, Page 6). This holding specifies no standard
of conduct at all and allows for a completely subjective determination by third
parties, which allow those parties to react to nothing more than their own personal
predilections for which conduct is offensive to community standards, the sense of
being indecent, improper, or immoral. This court has consistantly invalidated
statutes which require nothing more than a subjective determination as to whether
conduct is "indecent" Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844, 870871, 117 S. Ct. 2329, or
"annoying" Coates v. Cincinnati 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S. Ct. 1686, or "words or
conduct that offend or annoy police" Houston v. Hill 482 U.S. 451, 464-467, or
"loitering" Chicago v. Morales 527 U.S. 41, 119 S. Ct. 1849, or whether
something is "unjust and unreasonable" United States v. Cohen Grocery Co. 255
U.S. 81, 89, 41 S. Ct. 298. Moreover the Superior Courts holding as to what
conduct violates the statute and the language of the statute itself encourage view
point bias by police, prosecutors, courts, and juries. See: lancu v. Brunetti 588
U.S. 388, 390-399, 139 S. Ct. 2296. The Pennsylvania legislature has not placed
any limiting language within the statute to guide law enforcement or which may
guide the courts as to what conduct violates the statute and this court has
invalidated statutes which fix no ascertainable standards. See: Giaccio v.
9
Pennsylvania 382 U.S. 399, 86 S. Ct. 518. The Pennsylvania Superior Courts
decision in Commonwealth v. Slocum 86 A.3d 272, 277-280 explains that 18 Pa.
C.S.A. § 6301 (a)( 1 )(i) is designed to broad statute, and "that it would be
impossible to enumerate every particular act" for which this statute would apply,
this fact makes it impossible for any individual of average intelligence to know
what the statute proscribes. Likewise, Federal Courts have found the statute
"broad enough to include allowing a minor to view an "R" rated video." See:
United States v. Galo 239 F.3d 572, 582. Obviously the language of the statute is
so indefinite that it allows application of the statute to a multitude of
constitutionally protected activity at the sole discretion of the police and local
prosecutor. This court has invalidate statutes which give the police the power to
choose the offending conduct. See: Houston v. Hill 482 U.S. 451, 464-467; Lewis
v. City of New Orleans 415 U.S. 130; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 405
U.S. 156, 165-170. As demostrated above, not all "R" rated videos or movies
contain proscribed material. Individuals have the opportunity to avoid both the
audio and video portions of said videos. See: Erznoznik v. Jacksonville 422 U.S.
205, 212-214. This court has counseled that to rely upon presecutorial discretion
to narrow the otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute's highly abstract
general language places great power in the hands of the prosecutor. Doing so risks
the persuit of personal predilections which result in nonuniform execution of that
10
power across time and geographical locations resulting in arbitrary prosecutions
which undermine the public confidence in the criminal justice system. A criminal
statute should not be construed on the assumption the the government will use it
responsibly. See: Marinello v. United States 584 U.S. 1,11. The Commonwealth
pursued prosecution based on the personal predilections of the state trooper and
the local prosecutor that petitioner's facebook messages were obscene. See:
Appendix F (trial transcript page 151, line 8-12); Appendix B (Superior Court
opinion, pages 18-25). The state prosecutor's personal predilections are made more
prevalent here and evidenced by the fact that the state persued prosecution of 18
Pa. C.S.A. § 6318(a)(4) (Unlawful contact with a minor), which both the trial
court and the Superior Court found had no valid legal basis. See: Appendix C,
(trial court opinion, pages 5-8); Appendix B, (Superior Court opinion, pages
18-25). This fact alone should give this court pause and warrant further review of
this matter. Additionally two current justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
have questioned the constitutionality of this statute. See: Commonwealth v.
Howard 257 A.3d 1217, 1233-1237 (Pa. 2021) (Justice Wecht); Commonwealth v.
Slocum 86 A.3d 272, 285 & N.5 ( Justice Donohue).
II. Are Petitioner's Facebook messages constitutionally protected free speech
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution ?
Suggested Answer: YES
11
The Commonwealth pursued prosecution of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 (a)(1 )(i) based
on the personal predilections of the state trooper and local prosecutor's belief that
the content of petitioner's Facebook messages were obscene in violation of 18 Pa.
C.S.A. § 5903(a). Pennsylvania has adopted the Miller standard of obscenity. See:
Commonwealth v. Alexander 258 A.3d 474. Only depictions of patently offensive
hard-core pornography or hard-core sexual conduct may be subjected to
prosecution. See: Jenkins v. Georgia 418 U.S. 153, 160; Commonwealth v.
Krasner 352 A.2d 479, 481-482. Speech on the internet receives First Amendment
protection. See: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assoc. 564 U.S. 786, 790;
Packingham v. North Carolina 137 S. Ct. 1730. Government regulation of speech
is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed
or the ideas or message expressed. See: Reed v. Town of Gilbert 576 U.S. 155,
164. Government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content. See: Ashcroft v. ACLU 535 U.S. 564, 573.
The State may not proscribe speech due to its own disagreement with the ideas
expressed or because those ideas are unpopular in society. See: R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul 505 U.S. 377, 382; Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397, 414. The obscenity
exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever the legislature, the
police, or a local prosecutor find shocking. See: Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Assoc. 564 U.S. 786, 792-793. Likewise, the state does not posses a
12
free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which minors are exposed, nor may
speech be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that the
police, local prosecutor, or a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. See:
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assoc. 564 U.S. 786, 794; Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville 422 U.S. 205, 212-214. Petitioner reiterates that none of the content
of the Facebook messages violate any part of Pennsylvania's obscenity statute. 18
Pa. C.S.A. § 5903 (a)(l-9), (c)(1), (c)(2). Clearly the state has engaged in view
point bias by claiming that petitioner's Facebook messages "offend the
commonsense of the community, and the sense of decency, propriety, and morality
which most people entertain." Speech which offends is itself a view-point. See:
lancu v. Brunetti 588 U.S. 388, 390-399, 139 S. Ct. 2296. Thus petitioner posits
that the Facebook messages are not obscene as a matter of law, and are therefore
constitutionally protected speech under the First Amendment.
III. Is there a limitation on the scope of criminal liabilty of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2904
as indicated by the legislative comments by the Joint State Government
Commission, and a fair reading of Model Penal Code section 212.4(1) and the
commentary related to that section ?
Suggested Answer: YES
Petitioner posits that 18 PA. C.S.A. § 2904(a) (interference with custody of
13
children) does not apply to a brief act, thus petitioner's 22 minute trip to the store
can not trigger criminal liability. The Pennsylvania Legislature has declared that
courts must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. See: 1 PA.
C.S.A. § 1921; Commonwealth v. H.D. 247 A.3d 1062, 1067 N.4: Commonwealth
v. Rushing 99 A.3d 416, 424-425 (Pa. 2014). When interpreting or applying a
statute, it is appropriate to consider official comments. See: 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1939;
Ruhlman v. Ruhlman 291 A.3d 916, 921. It is also appropriate to consult the
Model Penal Code authors explanation of a provision. See: Commonwealth v.
Gamby 309 A.3d 298, 309: Commonwealth v. H.D. 247 A.3d 1062, 1067, 1070
N.5. Notably the Superior Court did not consult the Model Penal Code, nor read
any of it's commentary related to section 212.4(1) and specifically avoided any
discussion of that specific section. Reports and comments available to the general
assembly at the time of final passage of a statute may be used to construe the
statutory provision. See: Indian Rocks Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Gladfelter 28 A.3d
1261, 1272 (Pa. 2011). Thus the Superior Court should have consulted both the
Joint State Government Report (Appendix D, pages 105-107) and Model Penal
Code section 212.4(1) (Appendix E), and its commentary which is unavailable to
this petitioner at pages 257-258. In Commonwealth v. Stewart 544 A.2d 1384,
1388 the Superior Court stated "we are persuaded that it is not merely the act of
taking or enticing that constitutes the offense, but rather the continued
14
maintainance of the child outside of the custodian's dominion." Additionally the
court stated (indeed as appellee correctly observes, if the statute was only intended
to prohibit the physical taking, there would be no reason for the Joint State
Government Commission to have commented that "removal of the child for a brief
period is not covered by this section.)" (Appendix B, Superior Court opinion,
pages 14-15). The Superior Court later reiterated this point in Commonwealth v.
Tompkins 253 A.3d 301, No. 939 MDA 2020 stating " After the initial taking, the
act of interference continues only if the individual continually maintains the child
outside of the custody of the legal custodian." Citing Stewart 544 A.2d at 1388.
The second element of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2904(a) "the continued maitainance of the
child outside of the custodian's dominion" is premised upon the comment by the
Joint State Government Commission that "removal of the child for a brief period is
not covered by this section" (Joint State Government Report, Appendix D, page
106) and is supported by Model Penal Code & Commentaries, part II, section
212.4(1), pages 257-258, (Am. Law Inst. 1980). See: Perrin v. State 66 P.3d 21, 39
(discussion of a protracted period). The commentary to section 212.4(1) explains
that this definition was not intended "to reach every de minimus instance of
unauthorized movement of a child." The commentary then discusses an earlier
draft which undertook to distinguish between significant and insignificant acts of
custodial interference by limiting liability to acts of removal "for so extended a
15
period as would be likely to substantially supplant the custodian's authority over
the child." The council found this language cumbersome and concluded the same
idea is conveyed adaquately by defining the offense as a taking from custody. This
formulation connotes a substantial interference with parental control, as
distinguished from mere physical removal from the custodial premises for a brief
period. Without reading the accompanying commentary, one would be hard-
pressed to deduce this limitation on the scope of liability from the wording of
212.4(1) itself. Model Penal Code & Commentaries, pp.257-258. Petitioner posits
that the Pennsylvania Courts have deprived petitioner of fair due process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by not
performing a function the courts are required by the legislature to perform, thus
depriving petitioner of an immunity from prosecution which the Pennsylvania
State Legislature clearly intended to be available.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing facts plead herein petitioner request this honorable court to
order a review of this case.
ll-M-25
Date
Signature
16
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.