Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Peyman Roshan, Petitioner v. Douglas R. McCauley, Individually, and as former Commissioner, California Department of Real Estate

Supreme Court briefOct 17, 2025

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APPENDIX A

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-659

PEYMAN ROSHAN,

Plaintiff - Appellant.

D.C. NO.

4:23-cv-05819JST

DOUGLAS R. MCCAULEY,

Defendant - Appellee.

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 11, 2025

San Francisco, California

Filed March 11, 2025

Before: John B. Owens, Lawrence VanDyke, and

Anthony D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Owens

SUMMARY*

Younger abstention

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

Peyman Roshan’s federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin

the California Department of Real Estate (“DRE”)

disciplinary proceeding against him.

After the California Supreme Court suspended

Roshan’s law license for misconduct, the DRE

initiated a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding against

Roshan’s real estate license. Roshan sued the DRE in

federal court for alleged constitutional violations.

Citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the

district dismissed the lawsuit and held that it must

abstain from hearing the matter in favor of the

pending state DRE disciplinary proceeding.

The panel held that the district court correctly

dismissed Roshan’s case under the Younger

abstention

doctrine.

Applying

the

Younger

requirements, the panel noted that Roshan did not

contest that the state proceedings were ongoing and

implicated important state interests. This court’s

precedents foreclosed his argument that the state

proceedings were inadequate because he could raise

his federal claims in judicial review of the DRE

action. Finally, the DRE proceeding was quasi

criminal given that (1) DRE initiated the action

after conducting an investigation, (2) DRE filed an

“accusation” against Roshan that was akin to a

complaint; and (3) the proceeding’s purpose was to

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the

reader.

determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned—

via the

suspension or revocation of his real estate license.

Because the Younger requirements were satisfied

and Roshan has not made a showing of bad faith,

harassment,

some

other

extraordinary

circumstance

that

would

make

abstention

inappropriate, the district court properly abstained.

COUNSEL

Peyman Roshan (argued), Pro Se, San Francisco,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jack C. Nick (argued), Deputy Attorney General,

Business Litigation; Michael D. Gowe, Supervising

Deputy Attorney General; Tamar Pachter, Senior

Assistant Attorney General; Rob Bonta, California

Attorney General; California Attorney General’s

Office, Los Angeles, California; for DefendantAppellee.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Peyman Roshan, a lawyer and real estate broker,

appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his

federal lawsuit to enjoin the California Department

of Real Estate (“DRE”) disciplinary proceeding

against him. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

After extensive California State Bar litigation, the

California Supreme Court in 2021 suspended

Roshan’s law license for misconduct. Shortly

thereafter, the DRE—an administrative agency

charged with the “protection” of “buyers of real

property and those persons dealing with real estate

licensees”—initiated

reciprocal

disciplinary

proceeding against Roshan’s real estate license. Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 10050(b); see also id. § 10177(f)

(disciplinary actions by another agency may be

grounds for license suspension or revocation).

Roshan’s fight against the DRE proceeding—which

included attempts to subpoena and depose the

California Supreme Court and California State Bar—

led him to sue the DRE in federal court for alleged

constitutional violations.

Citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the

district court dismissed the lawsuit and held that it

must abstain from hearing the matter in favor of the

pending state DRE disciplinary proceeding. It

concluded that the DRE action was “quasi-criminal,”

as, among other things, it could result in the

suspension or revocation of Roshan’s real estate

license. Roshan timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s decision to abstain

on Younger grounds de novo. Cook v. Harding, 879

F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018).

B. The District Court Correctly Dismissed

Roshan’s Appeal Under the Younger

Abstention Doctrine

1. Younger Abstention

“[A]bstention from the exercise of federal

jurisdiction is the ‘exception, not the rule.’” Sprint

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 82 (2013)

(citation omitted). “[R]ooted in overlapping principles

of equity, comity, and federalism,” 'Arevalo v.

Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018), Younger

abstention is a “national policy forbidding federal

courts to stay or enjoin [certain] pending state court

proceedings,” Younger, 401 U.S, at 41. “Younger

abstention is appropriate only when the state

proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2)are quasi-criminal

enforcement actionsor involve a state’s interest in

enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3)

implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow

litigants to raise federal challenges.” Seattle Pac.

Univ. v. Ferguson, 104 F.4th 50, 63—64 (9th Cir.

2024) (citation omitted).

Roshan does not contest that the first and third

Younger criteria apply to the DRE proceeding. And

because he can raise his federal claims in judicial

review of the DRE action, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 11523;

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1085, 1094.5, our precedents

foreclose his argument that the state proceedings are

inadequate, see Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329,

332-33 (9th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases and rejecting

argument that California’s administrative procedures

do not allow “meaningful opportunity” to raise

federal claims).1

1 Williams v. Reed, which held that state courts may not apply state

administrative exhaustion requirements “to immunize state officials

from § 1983 suits,” does not change the calculus. 604 U.S.__ , No.

23- 191, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 550, at *4 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2025). Unlike

Williams, this case concerns not exhaustion but abstention, which the

Supreme Court has explained is “fully consistent” with the principle

“that litigants need not exhaust their administrative remedies prior to

bringing a § 1983 suit in federal court.” Ohio C.R. Comm’n v. Dayton

Thus, the only question is whether the DRE

proceeding is quasi-criminal. If the answer is yes,

then Roshan’s request to enjoin the proceeding

“would interfere in a way that Younger disapproves.”

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc).

2. The DRE Proceeding Is Quasi-Criminal

Under Younger

“[T]hree ‘exceptional’ categories” of proceedings

warrant Younger treatment: (1) “state criminal

prosecutions,”

(2)

“certain

‘civil

enforcement

proceedings,’” and (3) “civil proceedings involving

certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state

courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”

Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (quoting New Orleans Public

Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368

(1989) CNOPSPf).

This case implicates the second category.

“[D]ecisions applying Younger to instances of civil

enforcement have

generally concerned state

proceedings ‘akin to a criminal prosecution.’” Id. at

79 (citation omitted). “Such enforcement actions are

characteristically initiated to sanction the federal

plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging the state action,

for some wrongful act.” Id. “[A] state actor is

routinely a party to the state proceeding and often

initiates the action,” and “[i]nvestigations are

commonly involved, often culminating in the filing of

a formal complaint or charges.” Id. at 79-80.

In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden

State Bar Association, this Court held that Younger

barred federal courts from enjoining a pending state

Christian Schs. Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 n.2 (1986) (abstaining from a

§ 1983 suit under Younger).

bar disciplinary action. 457 U.S. 423, 425, 437 (1982).

That action was “akin to a criminal proceeding”

because “an investigation and formal complaint

preceded the hearing, an agency of the State’s

Supreme Court initiated the hearing, and the

purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the

lawyer should be disciplined for his failure to meet

the State’s standards of professional conduct.” Sprint,

571 U.S. at 81 (characterizing Middlesex).

The DRE proceeding here is similarly quasi

criminal. The DRE, a state agency acting pursuant to

its authority to “exercis[e] its licensing . . . and

disciplinary functions” for the “[p]rotection of the

public,” initiated the action. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §

10050.1; see also id. § 10100. Before doing so, it

performed an investigation, as indicated by its

awareness of the order suspending Roshan’s law

license and its request that Roshan complete an

“Interview Information Statement” for it to review. It

then filed an “accusation” against Roshan, which is

akin to a complaint: It is “a written statement of

charges that” identifies “the acts or omissions with

which the respondent is charged” and “speciffies] the

statutes and rules that the respondent is alleged to

have violated,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 11503(a), and it

must be served on the respondent, see id. § 11505(a).

And critically, the DRE proceeding’s purpose is to

determine whether Roshan should be sanctioned—

via the suspension or revocation of his real estate

license, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 11503(a))—for “act[ing]

or conducting [him] self in a manner that would have

warranted the denial of [his] application for a real

estate license” or performing “acts that, if done by a

real estate licensee, would be grounds for the

suspension or revocation of a California real estate

license,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 10177(f)- This

disciplinary purpose is “the quintessential feature of

a Younger-eligible ‘civil enforcement action.’” Applied

Underwriters, Inc. v. Lara, 37 F.4th 579, 589 (9th

Cir. 2022). “Because a license [is] at issue and could

be suspended or revoked, the state proceedings . . .

[a]re ‘quasi-criminal.’” Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing

Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003); cf. Gibson v.

Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1973) (observing

that “administrative proceedings looking toward the

revocation of a license to practice medicine may in

proper circumstances command the respect due court

proceedings”).2

Sprint is not to the contrary. In that case, the

Supreme Court declined to abstain from enjoining

proceedings before a state utilities board concerning a

national telecommunications company’s obligation to

pay access fees to a local telecommunications company.

2 Our conclusion is bolstered by the DRE’s procedures, which

provide for formal hearings that include the taking of testimony,

see Cal. Gov’t Code § 11511; the finding of facts, see id. §§

11507.6, 11507.7 (discovery), 11512 (admission of evidence),

11513 (party rights respecting witnesses and other evidence),

11515 (taking of notice); and the granting of relief, see id.

§§11511.5, 11511.7 (settlement), 11517(c)(2) (power to adopt,

alter, or reject administrative law judge’s decision), 11518.5(a)

(corrections), 11519 (stays of execution, restitution), 11521

(reconsideration), 11522 (license reinstatement, penalty reduction).

See Fresh Int’l Corp. v. Agric. Labor Reis. Bd, 805 F.2d 1353,

1357 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting as relevant to the Younger inquiry

the California agency’s authority to “take testimony, make findings

of fact and grant relief’); Hirsh v. Justs, of the Sup. Ct., 67 F.3d

708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting as relevant another California agency’s

authority to “conductf] a formal hearing and make[] findings”).

571 U.S. at 72. There, unlike the proceeding at issue

here, “[a] private corporation, Sprint, initiated the

action. No state authority conducted an investigation

into Sprint’s activities, and no state actor lodged a

formal complaint against Sprint.” Id. at 80. Moreover,

the state’s “adjudicative authority . . . was invoked to

settle a civil dispute between two private parties, not to

sanction Sprint for commission of a wrongful act.” Id.

Roshan contends that in Seattle Pacific, we held that

Sprint vitiated Younger’s applicability to California

administrative proceedings. See 104 F.4th 50. Not so. In

Seattle Pacific, we declined to apply Younger “[b]ecause

there [we]re no ongoing enforcement actions or any

court judgment” from which to abstain. Id. at 64. We

emphasized that there was no “state court proceeding”

or “administrative proceeding or other enforcement

action.” Id. However, there is an ongoing

administrative proceeding here. As the Supreme Court

has observed, “lower courts have been virtually uniform

in holding that the Younger principle applies to pending

state administrative proceedings in which an important

state interest is involved.” Ohio C.R. Comm’n, 477 U.S.

at 627 n.2. Indeed, since Sprint, our sister circuits have

continued to abstain from state administrative

proceedings dealing with licensing and disciplinary

matters in particular. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.

Waterfront Comm’n of the N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d

176, 180-85 (3d Cir. 2014) (employee discipline); Doe

v. Univ, of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 368-71 (6th Cir. 2017)

(school discipline); Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457,

472—73 (5th Cir. 2019) (medical discipline); Igbanugo

v. Minn. Off. of Laws. Pro. Resp., 56 F.4th 561, 565—

66 (8th Cir. 2022) (attorney discipline); Wassef v.

Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1086-91 (8th Cir. 2023)

(medical discipline); Leonard v. Ala. State. Bd. of

A10

Pharm, 61 F.4th 902, 908-15 (11th Cir. 2023)

(pharmacy ethics rules).

In effect, Roshan’s “challenge amounts to an

attack on California’s administrative review

procedures as a whole.” Baffert, 332 F.3d at 619. But

there is no Younger exception for California

administrative proceedings. See id. at 621-22

(abstaining under Younger from a California

administrative action suspending a horse-racing

license). Thus, as a quasi- criminal enforcement

proceeding, the DRE proceeding is “of a character to

warrant federal-court deference.” Middlesex, 457 U.S.

at 434.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the Younger requirements are satisfied

and Roshan has not made out a “showing of bad

faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary

circumstance

that

would

make

abstention

inappropriate,” the district court properly abstained.

Arevalo, 882 F.3d at 765-66 (quoting Middlesex, 457

U.S. at 435).

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

FILED

MAR 11 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER,

CLERK

U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS

No. 24-659

PEYMAN ROSHAN,

Plaintiff - Appellant.

DOUGLAS R. MCCAULEY,

Defendant - Appellee.

D.C. NO.

4:23-cv-05819-JST

Northern District of

California, Oakland

ORDER

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and JOHNSTONE,

Circuit Judges.

Appellant’s motion to file a supplemental brief

(Dkt. No. 55) is DENIED.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEYMAN ROSHAN,

Plaintiff.

DOUGLAS R.

MCCAULEY,

Defendant.

Case. No. 23-cv05819-JST

ORDER DENYING

MOTION FOR

PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION;

ORDER

GRANTING

MOTION TO

DISMISS

Re: ECF Nos. 17, 28

Before the Court is Plaintiff Peyman Roshan’s

motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 17, and

Defendant Commissioner Douglas R. McCauley’s

motion to dismiss, ECF No. 28. For the reasons

stated below, the Court will deny Roshan’s motion for

preliminary injunction, and grant Commissioner

McCauley’s motion to dismiss.1

I. BACKGROUND

1 The Court finds the motion suitable for disposition without oral

argument and hereby vacates the February 15, 2024 motion hearing. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civil L.R. 7-1(b).

For the purpose of resolving the present

motions, the Court accepts as true the following

factual allegations from the complaint, ECF No. 1.

Roshan alleges that he “has obtained a license

from the California Department of Real Estate

(“DRE”),” and “is an attorney admitted to practice in

California.” Id.

2. He brings this action against

Douglas R. McCauley, the Commissioner of the DRE,

as well as Does 1—10, whose “capacities and role in

violating the rights of Plaintiff are unknown at this

time.” Id.

3-4.

On December 20, 2022, the DRE filed an

accusation against Roshan, which is to be decided by

an Administrative Law Judge in the Office of

Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). Id.

6, 20, 53.

Pursuant to California Business and Professions

Code Section 10177, the accusation seeks to suspend

or revoke Roshan’s real estate license based upon the

California Supreme Court’s 2021 order suspending

Roshan’s license to practice law. Id.

5, 8. The

accusation references the Supreme Court’s order

suspending Roshan’s license to practice law. It does

not, however, specifically identify which violation(s)

Roshan was found to have committed by the State

Bar Review Department. Roshan therefore contends

that there is no “express finding of a violation of law”

on which the DRE may discipline him. Id.

7, 12,

14.

Roshan’s complaint further alleges that he

served various subpoenas and requests for

production of documents on the California State Bar,

the DRE, the California State Bar Custodian of

Records, and the California Supreme Court

Custodian of Records. Id.

19-23. Because all of

Roshan’s requests were denied, he alleges that he

“has no procedural avenue in the DRE disciplinary

proceedings to obtain evidence supporting [his]

defenses.” Id.

24. The remaining allegations in

Roshan’s

complaint

generally challenge the

constitutionality of State Bar proceedings, as well as

the California Supreme Court’s suspension order. See

generally id. TH, 26- 47. Roshan’s complaint seeks

injunctive relief and relief under Ex Parte Young

enjoining any disciplinary action by the DRE, as well

as declaratory judgment that the DRE “does not have

jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary matters,” and

that the attorney disciplinary proceedings initiated

against him did not meet “minimum due process

requirements.” Id. at 25-28.

On November 11, 2023, Roshan filed a motion

for a temporary restraining order and order to show

cause for preliminary injunction that sought to enjoin

Commissioner McCauley “from continuing any [DRE]

proceedings based upon the California Supreme

Court’s order suspending Roshan’s license to practice

law.” ECF No. 2 at 2. In denying Roshan’s motion for

a TRO and his order to show cause, the Court

reasoned that Roshan “ha[d] not ‘clearly show[n]’

that the loss of his license [was] certainly impending

before the adverse party [could] be heard in

opposition.” ECF No. 7 at 2 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(b)(1)). The Court subsequently denied Roshan’s

motion for reconsideration on November 20, 2023.

ECF Nos. 9, 12.

On December 7, 2023, Roshan filed a motion

for preliminary injunction. ECF No. 17. He again

asks the Court to issue a preliminary injunction

“restraining and enjoining [Commissioner McCauley]

. . . from continuing any [DRE] proceedings based

upon the California Supreme Court’s order

suspending Roshan’s license to practice law.” ECF

No. 17 at 2. Six days later, on December 13, 2023,

Commissioner McCauley filed a motion to dismiss

Roshan’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 28.

Because the two motions contain overlapping

arguments, the Court will resolve them together.

II.

JURISDICTION

Roshan alleges that this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,

that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City

of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555

U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Injunctive relief is “an

extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded

upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to

such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.

To grant preliminary injunctive relief, a court

must find that “a certain threshold showing [has

been] made on each factor.” Leiva-Perez v. Holder,

640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

Assuming that this threshold has been met, 7“serious

questions going to the merits and a balance of

hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can

support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long

as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of

irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the

public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

B. Motion to Dismiss

1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) tests

the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. See Fed

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction is a

threshold issue that goes to the power of the court to

hear the case, and it must exist at the time the action

is commenced. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v.

Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380

(9th Cir. 1988).

A motion to dismiss on Younger abstention

grounds may be brought under Rule 12(b)(1). See

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

100 n.3 (1998) (treating Younger abstention as

jurisdictional); Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty.

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)

(holding that “a Younger dismissal should be treated

like a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction”).

2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter

that, when accepted as true, states a claim that is

plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While this

standard is not a probability requirement, “[w]here a

complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent

with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to

relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has met

this plausibility standard, the Court must “accept all

factual allegations in the complaint as true and

construe the pleadings in the light most favorable” to

the plaintiff. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072

(9th Cir. 2005).

IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Before turning to the merits, the Court

addresses Commissioner McCauley’s request for

judicial notice. ECF No. 28-1. “Generally, district

courts may not consider material outside the

pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics,

Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). Judicial notice

provides an exception to this rule. Id. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), “[t]he court may

judicially notice a fact that is not subject to

reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known

within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2)

can be accurately and readily determined from

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be

questioned.” If a fact is not subject to reasonable

dispute, the court “must take judicial notice if a party

requests it and the court is supplied with the

necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2).

Commissioner McCauley requests judicial

notice of (1) the complaint in Roshon v. Lawrence,

Case No. 3:20-cv-04770-AGT (Lawrence I) (ECF No.

1); (2) the January 18, 2021 order in Lawrence I (ECF

No. 34); the complaint in Roshan v. Lawrence, Case

No. 4:21-cv- 01235-JST (Lawrence II) (ECF No. 1);

the May 23, 2023 order dismissing Roshan’s third

amended complaint in Lawrence II (ECF No. 139);

the September 26, 2023 order extending time to file a

fourth amended complaint in Lawrence II (ECF No.

160); and the November 17, 2023 order relating cases

in the present action, Roshan v. McCauley, Case No.

4:23-cv-5819-JST (ECF No. 8). ECF No. 24-1 at 1-2.

While the Court “may take judicial notice of

the existence of unrelated court documents ... it will

not take judicial notice of such documents for the

truth of the matter asserted therein.” In re Bare

Escentuals, Inc. Sec. Lit., 745 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1067

(N.D. Cal. 2010). Accordingly, “[t]he judicially noticed

fact in each instance is limited to the existence of the

document, not the truth of the matters asserted in

the documents.” Salas v. Gomez, No. 14-CV- 01676JST, 2016 WL 3971206, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 25,

2016).

V. DISCUSSION

A. Younger Abstention

The central argument contested by the parties

in both the motion for preliminary injunction and the

motion to dismiss is whether this Court has subject

matter jurisdiction to enjoin the ongoing state

proceeding, or whether the Court must abstain from

hearing Roshan’s claims pursuant to Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Having reviewed all

arguments presented in each motion, the Court

determines that Younger applies to the present

action, and abstention in favor of the state

proceedings is required.

“Younger abstention is a jurisprudential

doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity,

comity, and federalism.” San Jose Silicon Valley

Chamber of Com. Pol. Action Comm. v. City of San

Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). “In

Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the

long-standing principle that federal courts sitting in

equity cannot, absent exceptional circumstances,

enjoin

pending state

criminal proceedings.”

ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund,

754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Younger, 401

U.S. at 43— 57). In a case known as Middlesex

County, the Supreme Court expanded this abstention

doctrine to apply to civil proceedings. See Middlesex

County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,

457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). To assist courts in applying

Younger to civil cases post-Middlesex, the Supreme

Court issued guidance once again in Sprint

Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013).

Sprint squarely held that Younger abstention is

limited to “three exceptional categories” of cases,

including: (1) “parallel, pending state criminal

proceeding[s],” (2) “state civil proceedings that are

akin to criminal prosecutions,” and (3) state civil

proceedings that “implicate a State's interest in

enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Id.

at 72—73. “In civil cases, therefore, Younger

abstention is appropriate only when the state

proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal

enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in

enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3)

implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow

litigants to raise federal challenges.” ReadyLink

Healthcare, Inc., 754 F.3d at 759. “If these ‘threshold

elements’ are met, [courts] then consider whether the

federal action would have the practical effect of

enjoining the state proceedings and whether an

exception to Younger applies.” Id. With these

principles in mind, the Court turns to the current

dispute.

1. Ongoing State Proceedings

First, “Younger abstention requires that

federal courts abstain when state court proceedings

[are] ongoing at the time the federal action was

filed.” Beltran v. State of Cal., 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th

Cir. 1988). Here, the DRE proceeding was “ongoing”

for Younger purposes at the time Roshan’s complaint

was filed. As Commissioner McCauley points out,

Roshan “concedes in his complaint and his

declaration supporting this motion that the DRE

proceeding was pending at the time he filed this

lawsuit on November 11, 2023[.]” ECF No. 30 at 11;

see ECF No. 1

21-22. Accordingly, this element is

satisfied.

2. Quasi-Criminal Action

Second, the Court must determine whether the

present action is a “quasi-criminal enforcement

actionf] or involve[s] a state’s interest in enforcing

the orders and judgments of its courts[.]” ReadyLink

Healthcare, Inc., 754 F.3d at 759. In assessing

whether an enforcement proceeding is quasicriminal, courts evaluate whether the proceeding at

issue shares three specific features of criminal

prosecutions: (1) the action was initiated by the State

in its sovereign capacity; (2) the action involves

CIO

sanctions against the federal plaintiff—i.e., “the

party challenging the state action”—for some

wrongful act; and (3) the action commonly involves

an investigation, often culminating in formal

charges. Sprint, 561 U.S. at 79-80.

The administrative proceeding against Roshan

is sufficiently “quasi-criminal” for Younger abstention

to apply. First, the action was initiated by the DRE, a

state agency tasked with conducting enforcement

proceedings to suspend or revoke real-estate sales

licenses in California. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §

10100; see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433—35

(holding that Younger barred a federal court from

hearing a lawyer’s challenge to a New Jersey state

ethics committee’s pending investigation of the

lawyer); Zummo v. City of Chicago, 345 F. Supp. 3d

995, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff’d, 798 F. App’x 32 (7th

Cir. 2020) (finding proceeding “quasi- criminal”

where it began with a police officer issuing a

citation). In addition, if the DRE prevails in the

enforcement proceedings, the result will entail

sanctions against Roshan for violation of state ethics

and statutory rules governing the conduct of licensed

attorneys that also apply to real- estate professionals.

Finally, it appears that the DRE conducted some

form of investigation into Roshan’s actions, as the

accusation against Roshan references the California

Supreme Court’s order suspending Roshan’s license

to practice law. See ECF No. 1 If 7.

Roshan’s primary argument in opposition is

that the DRE proceeding is not a “judicial proceeding

to which Younger applies.” ECF No. 31 at 8. He avers

that Sprint holds that “the initial state proceeding

must be judicial in nature,” and that this

Cl 1

requirement must be “strictly met” for Younger to

apply. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Roshan’s

reading of Sprint is incorrect. In concluding that

Younger abstention did not apply in Sprint, the

Supreme Court reasoned that the Iowa Utilities

Board proceeding at issue did not constitute a “civil

enforcement action” because it was (1) not initiated

by the state; (2) no state authority conducted any

investigation or filed a complaint; and (3) the

proceeding was intended “to settle a civil dispute

between two private parties, not to sanction Sprint

for commission of a wrongful act.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at

80- 81. In other words, the Sprint court determined

that abstention was inappropriate, but not because

the underlying state proceeding was insufficiently

judicial in nature. Indeed, the Supreme Court in

Sprint provided explicit “guidfance] [to] other federal

courts . . . that Younger extends to the three

“exceptional circumstances” identified . . . but no

further.”2 Id. at 82; see Franklin v. City of Kingsburg,

No. l:18-CV-0824 AWI SKO, 2020 WL 2793061, at *4

(E.D. Cal. May 29, 2020) Younger abstention can

apply to administrative proceedings just as it can

apply to judicial proceedings.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the DRE

proceedings are quasi-criminal for Younger purposes.

3. Important State Interests

2 As mentioned above, see supra Section V-A., these “exceptional

circumstances” include: (1) “parallel, pending state criminal

proceeding[s],” (2) “state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal

prosecutions,” and (3) state civil proceedings that “implicate a State’s

interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Id. at 72-73.

C12

Third, Younger abstention is appropriate

where “important state interests are implicated so as

to warrant federal-court abstention.” Middlesex, 457

U.S. at 434. Whether a proceeding implicates

important state interests “is measured by considering

its significance broadly, rather than by focusing on

the state’s interest in the resolution of an individual

case.” Baffert v. California Horse Racing Bd., 332

F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing New Orleans

Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491

U.S. 350, 365 (1989)). As Commissioner McCauley

rightfully notes, “[t]he Legislature intended to ensure

that real estate brokers and salespersons will be

honest, truthful and worthy of the fiduciary

responsibilities which they will bear.” ECF No. 30 at

12 (quoting Harrington v. Dep’t of Real Est., 214 Cal.

App. 3d 394, 402 (Ct. App. 1989)). The State of

California has a vested interest in ensuring the

professional conduct of its real-estate licensees.

Accordingly, the Court agrees with McCauley that

“the standard requiring there to be an important

state interest at issue is met.” ECF No. 30 at 12.

4. Federal Constitutional Challenges

Next, the Court must determine whether

Roshan had “an adequate opportunity in the state

proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.”

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432. “[A] federal court should

assume that state procedures will afford an adequate

remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to

the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1,

15 (1987). “[T]he burden on this point rests on the

federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law

barred presentation of [their] claims.” Id. at 14

(internal quotations omitted). While Roshan argues

C13

that he was unable to obtain various documents and

conduct certain depositions in his administrative

proceeding, ECF No. 17 at 29, he does not contend

that he did not have an adequate opportunity to raise

his constitutional challenges before the ALJ. It is

well-established that judicial review of an

administrative proceeding “may be had by filing a

petition for a writ of mandate.” Cal. Gov. Code. §

11523. And further, the Ninth Circuit has made clear

that “even if a federal plaintiff cannot raise his

constitutional claims in state administrative

proceedings . . . his ability to raise the claims via

state judicial review of the administrative

proceedings suffices.” Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d

329, 332 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Ohio Civil Rights

Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch. Inc., 477 U.S. 619,

629 (1986). Accordingly, this element is also satisfied.

5. Practical Effect of Enjoining the State

Proceedings

Having established that the four “threshold”

Younger elements are met, the Court must determine

whether the requested relief in the instant action

would “enjoin—or have the practical effect of

enjoining—ongoing state proceedings.” ReadyLink

Healthcare, Inc., 754 F.3d at 758. Here, Roshan’s

motion for preliminary injunction seeks an order

“restraining and enjoining [Commissioner McCauley]

. . . from continuing any [DRE] proceedings based

upon the California Supreme Court’s order

suspending Roshan’s license to practice law.” ECF

No. 17 at 2. His complaint similarly seeks injunctive

relief and relief under Ex Parte Young enjoining any

disciplinary action by the DRE, as well as declaratory

judgment that the DRE “does not have jurisdiction

C14

over attorney disciplinary matters,” and that the

attorney disciplinary proceedings initiated against

him did not meet “minimum due process

requirements.” ECF No. 1 at 25-28. Because

Roshan’s requested relief would “enjoin—or have the

practical effect of enjoining— ongoing state

proceedings,” this requirement is met, and the Court

must dismiss this case pursuant to the Younger

abstention doctrine unless an exception applies.

ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc., 754 F.3d at 758; see, e.g.,

Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th

Cir. 2019) (“when a court abstains under Younger,

claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are

typically dismissed.”).

6. Extraordinary Circumstances

Finally,

this

case

does

not

involve

“extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant

Younger abstention inappropriate. Middlesex, 457

U.S. at 437. The Supreme Court has recognized

limited exceptions to mandatory abstention under

Younger upon a “showing of bad faith, harassment, or

some other extraordinary circumstance that would

make abstention inappropriate[.]” Id. at 435. Such

exceptions are “narrow.” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

420 U.S. 592, 602 (1975). Because no exception

applies here, the Court must abstain under Younger.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court

finds each of the elements of Younger abstention is

satisfied and that no exception applies. Because

Roshan is unable to demonstrate a likelihood of

success on any of his claims, or even serious

questions going to the merits, the Court need go no

further in denying his motion for preliminary

C15

injunction. See California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575

(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Disney Enterprises, Inc. v.

VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017))

(“Likelihood of success on the merits is ‘the most

important’ factor; if a movant fails to meet this

‘threshold inquiry,’ we need not consider the other

factors.”); Arkansas Dairy Co-op Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Agr., 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(finding the court need not address “the other three

preliminary injunction factors” when there is no

likelihood of success on the merits).3

In regard to Commissioner McCauley’s motion

to dismiss, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction

in this case under the Younger abstention doctrine.4

Accordingly, Commissioner McCauley’s motion is

granted. Because this action is barred by Younger

abstention, the Court dismisses Roshan’s complaint

without leave to amend. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox

Inti, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Because any amendment would be futile, there is

no need to prolong the litigation by permitting

further amendment.”); Saul v. United States, 928

3 Commissioner McCauley also argues that this Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if the disposition in

the state court proceeding is adverse to Roshan. ECF No. 30 at 14. While

this may be true if the state court decision favors Commissioner

McCauley, the Court declines to prematurely weigh-in on this argument.

Similarly, because the Court finds that Younger applies to the present

action, and abstention in favor of the state proceedings is required, it

declines to reach Commissioner McCauley’s argument regarding

standing. Id. at 15.

4 Because the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction over this

matter, it declines to reach Commissioner McCauley’s Rule 12(b)(6)

argument. ECF No. 28 at 10.

C16

F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of

leave to amend “where the amendment would be

futile or where the amended complaint would be

subject to dismissal”). The Clerk of the Court is

directed to enter judgment and close the case file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2024

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT

FILED

MAY 20 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER,

CLERK

U.S. COURT OF

APPEALS

PEYMAN ROSHAN,

No. 24-659

Plaintiff - Appellant.

D.C. NO.

4:23-cv-05819-JST

DOUGLAS R. MCCAULEY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Northern District of

California, Oakland

ORDER

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and JOHNSTONE,

Circuit Judges.

The panel has voted to deny Appellant’s petition

for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en

banc.

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has

requested a vote on it. Fed. R. App. P. 40.

Appellant’s petition for panel rehearing and

petition for rehearing en banc are therefore DENIED.

APPENDIX E

Relevant Statutes and Constitutional

Provisions

Supremacy Clause

This Constitution, and the Laws of the

United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under

the Authority of the United States, shall

be the supreme Law of the Land; and

the Judges in every State shall be

bound thereby, any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding.

Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const, art. VI, cl.2.

Seventh Amendment

In suits at common law, where the

value in controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury

shall be preserved, and no fact tried by

a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined

in any court of the United States, than

according to the rules of the common

law.

Civil Rights Act of 1871

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within

the

jurisdiction

thereof to

the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution

and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action

brought against a judicial officer for an

act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory

decree was violated or declaratory relief

was unavailable. For the purposes of

this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of

Columbia shall be considered to be a

statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. §1983.

Relevant Provisions of the California Code.

California Code of Civil Procedure §395 provides:

(a) Except as otherwise provided by law and

subject to the power of the court to transfer

actions or proceedings as provided in this

title, the

superior

court

in the

county where the defendants or some of them

reside at the commencement of the action is

the proper court for the trial of the action. If

the action is for injury to person or personal

property or for death from wrongful act or

negligence, the superior court ineither the

county where the injury occurs or the injury

causing death occurs or the county where the

defendants, or some of them reside at the

commencement

the

action, is a

proper court for the trial of the action. In a

proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the

superior court in the county where either the

petitioner or respondent has been a resident

for three months next preceding the

commencement of the proceeding is the

proper court for the trial of the proceeding. In

a proceeding for nullity of marriage or legal

separation of the parties, the superior court

in the county where either the petitioner or the

respondent resides at the commencement of

the proceeding is the proper court for the trial

of the proceeding. In a proceeding to enforce an

obligation of support under Section 3900 of the

Family Code, the superior court in the

county where the

child

resides

the

proper court for the trial of the action. In a

proceeding to establish and enforce a foreign

judgment or court order for the support of a

minor child, the

superior court in the

county where the

child

resides

the

proper court for the trial of the action. Subject

subdivision

(b), if a

defendant

has

contracted to perform an obligation in a

particular county, the superior court in the

county where the obligation is to be performed,

where the contract in fact was entered into, or

where the defendant or any defendant resides

at the commencement of the action is a

proper court for the trial of an action founded

on that obligation, and the county where the

obligation is incurred is the county where it is

to be performed, unless there is a special

contract in writing to the contrary. If none of

the defendants reside in the state or if they

reside in the state and the county where they

reside is unknown to the plaintiff, the action

may be tried in the superior court in any

county that the plaintiff may designate in his

or her complaint, and, if the defendant is about

to depart from the state, the action may be

tried in the superior court in any county where

either of the parties reside or service is made.

If any person is improperly joined as a

defendant or has been made a defendant solely

for the purpose of having the action tried in

the superior court in the county where he or

she resides, his or her residence shall not be

considered in determining the proper place for

the trial of the action.

(b) Subject to the power of the court to transfer

actions or proceedings as provided in this title,

in an action arising from an offer or provision

of goods, services, loans or extensions of credit

intended primarily for personal, family or

household use, other than an obligation

described in Section 1812.10 or Section 2984.4

of the Civil Code, or an action arising from a

transaction consummated as a proximate

result of either an unsolicited telephone call

made by a seller engaged in the business of

consummating transactions of that kind or a

telephone call or electronic transmission made

by the buyer or lessee in response to a

solicitation by the seller, the superior court in

the county where the buyer or lessee in fact

signed the contract, wherethe buyer or lessee

resided at the time the contract was entered

into, or where the buyer or lessee resides at

the commencement of the action is the

proper court for the trial of the action. In the

superior court designated in this subdivision

as the proper court, the proper court location

for trial of a case is the location where the

court tries that type of case that is nearest or

most accessible to where the buyer or lessee

resides, where the buyer or lessee in fact

signed the contract, where the buyer or lessee

resided at the time the contract was entered

into, or where the buyer or lessee resides at

the commencement of the action. Otherwise,

any location of the superior court designated

as the proper court in this subdivision is a

proper court location for the trial. The court

may specify by local rule the nearest or most

accessible court location where the court tries

that type of case.

subdivision (b) waiving that subdivision is void

and unenforceable.

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §395.

California Code of Civil Procedure §1094.5 provides:

(a) Where the writ is issued for the purpose

of inquiring into the validity of any final

administrative order or decision made

as the result of a proceeding in which by

law a hearing is required to be given,

evidence is required to be taken, and

discretion in the determination of facts

is vested in the inferior tribunal,

corporation, board, or officer, the case

shall be heard by the court sitting

without a jury. All or part of the record

of the proceedings before the inferior

tribunal, corporation, board, or officer

may be filed with the petition, may be

filed with respondent’s points and

authorities, or may be ordered to be filed

by the court...

(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend

to the questions whether the respondent

has proceeded without, or in excess of,

jurisdiction; whether there was a fair

trial; and whether there was any

prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of

discretion

established

if the

respondent has not proceeded in the

manner required by law, the order or

decision is not supported by the

findings, or the findings are not

supported by the evidence.

Cal. Code Civ. Pro. §1094.5.

California Business and Professions Code §10080.9

provides:

(a) If, upon inspection, examination, or

investigation, the commissioner has cause to

believe that a person who does not possess a

real estate license is engaged or has engaged

in activities for which a real estate license is

required, or that a person who does not possess

a prepaid rental listing service license or a real

estate broker license is engaged or has

engaged in activities for which a license is

required pursuant to Section 10167.2, or that a

licensee is violating or has violated any

provision of this division or any rule or order

thereunder, the commissioner or his or her

designated representative may issue a citation

to that person in writing, describing with

particularity the basis of the citation. Each

citation may contain an order to correct the

violation or violations identified and a

reasonable time period or periods by which the

violation or violations must be corrected. In

addition, each citation may assess an

administrative fine not to exceed two thousand

five hundred dollars ($2,500), which shall be

deposited into the Recovery Account of the

Real

Estate

Fund

and

shall,

upon

appropriation by the Legislature, be available

for expenditure for the purposes specified in

Chapter 6.5 (commencing with Section 10470).

In assessing a fine, the commissioner shall

give due consideration to the appropriateness

of the amount of the fine with respect to

factors such as the gravity of the violation, the

good faith of the person cited, and the history

of previous violations. A citation issued and a

fine assessed pursuant to this section, while

constituting discipline for a violation of the

law, shall be in lieu of other administrative

discipline by the commissioner for the offense

or offenses cited, and the citation against and

payment of any fine by a licensee shall not be

reported as disciplinary action taken by the

commissioner.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), nothing in

this section shall prevent the commissioner

from issuing an order to desist and refrain

from engaging in a specific business activity or

activities or an order to suspend all business

operations to a person who is engaged in or

has engaged in continued or repeated

violations of this part. In any of these

circumstances, the sanctions authorized under

this section shall be separate from, and in

addition to, all other administrative, civil, or

criminal penalties.

citation or the citation and fine, the person

cited fails to notify the commissioner that he or

she intends to request a hearing as described

in subdivision (d), the citation or the citation

and fine shall be deemed final.

(d) Any hearing under this section shall be

conducted in accordance with Chapter 5

(commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of

Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code.

(e) After the exhaustion of the review

procedures provided for in this section, the

commissioner may apply to the appropriate

superior court for a judgment in the amount of

any administrative penalty imposed pursuant

to subdivision (a) and an order compelling the

person cited to comply with the order of the

commissioner. The application, which shall

include a certified copy of the final order of the

commissioner, shall constitute a sufficient

showing to warrant issuing the judgment and

order.

(f) Failure of any person to comply with the

terms of a citation or pay a fine assessed

pursuant to this section, within a reasonable

period specified by the commissioner, shall

subject that person to disciplinary action by

the commissioner. In no event may a license be

issued or renewed if an unpaid fine remains

outstanding or the terms of a citation have not

been complied with.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §10080.9.

Relevant Provisions of the California Code of

Regulations.

California

provides:

Code

of Regulations,

section

2907.1

(a) A citation issued pursuant to Business and

Professions Code Section 10080.9 will address

a violation or violations of the Real Estate Law

and Subdivided Lands Law (Division 4 of the

E10

Business and Professions Code), and any

regulations adopted pursuant to those laws.

The Commissioner is authorized to issue a

citation containing an order of correction

and/or assessing a fine for the violation of the

laws referred to above.

(b) A citation may be issued to a person or

entity, including partnerships, corporations, or

associations, whether licensed or unlicensed by

the Bureau.

describe with particularity the nature and

facts of the violation, including a reference to

the statute or regulation alleged to have been

violated.

(d) Service of a citation shall be made in

accordance

with

the

provisions

Sections 8311 and 11505(c) of the Government

Code. Service of a citation issued under

Business

and

Professions

Code

Section 10080.9 may be made by certified mail

at the address of record of a licensee cited, or

to the last known mailing, business, or

residence address of an unlicensed person or

entity cited.

(e) The time allowed to comply with an order of

correction shall be specified in the citation,

taking into account the nature of the

correction required. Failure to correct the

violation shall be grounds for further discipline

under Section 10177(d) of the Code.

(f) The cited person or entity may request an

Ell

extension of the time to comply with the order

if the cited person or entity is unable to

complete the correction or pay the fine within

the time set forth in the citation. The request

must be made in writing, within the time set

forth for correction or payment of fine, and

must set forth extenuating circumstances and

good cause warranting the extension.

Determination of an extension is within the

discretion of the Commissioner.

Cal. Code of Regs. §2907.1

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.