Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Emir James Phillips, Petitioner v. Board of Curators of Lincoln University, fka Lincoln University, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 8, 2025

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DR. EMIR JAMES PHILLIPS,

Petitioner,

DEC 0 8 2025

IupremTcourt-u^

ORIGINAL

BOARD OF CURATORS OF LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner is an individual, and Respondent Board of Curators of Lincoln University is a

public body. No corporate disclosure statement is required under Rule 29.6.

(On Petition from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit)

Dr. Emir James Phillips (pro se)

806 Chancery Lane • Cave Springs, AR 72718 • (310) 930-6360 • emirphil@yahoo.com

Filed under Supreme Court Rule 33.2 (8/2 x 11 inch paper; < 40 pages)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Compelled alteration I nullification of academic-dishonesty grades.

Whether compelled alteration or administrative nullification of a professor’s final

academic-dishonesty grade is speech “related to scholarship or teaching” that falls

outside Garcetti's “official duties” rule and is therefore subject to Pickering v. Bd.

of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)

balancing—and to this Court’s compelled-speech limits when the professor’s

endorsement is required.

2. State-created entitlements and “follow-your-own-rules.”

Whether public-university policies and handbooks that expressly delegate final

academic-dishonesty grading to faculty create a state-law entitlement the

institution must honor under Roth, Sindermann, and the Accardi “follow-yourown-rules” principle, thereby requiring Ato/?ews-calibrated process before an

administrator may nullify a professor’s final dishonesty grade.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented.......................................................................

Opinions Below....................................................................................

Jurisdiction...........................................................................................

Parties to the Proceedings...................................................................

Related Proceedings...................................................................

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions...................................

..8

Statement...............................................................................

..9

Summary of the Argument.......................................................

Reasons for Granting the Petition..............................................

18_

I. Circuit conflict on compelled grade alteration...............

II. Roth/Sindermann & Accardi conflict.............................

III. Accreditation, integrity, and public funding....................

IV. Vehicle............................................................................

Relief Sought...............................................................................

Conclusion....................................................................................

Appendix......................................................................................

App. A — Order Granting Motion to Dismiss...............................

App. B — Eighth Circuit Judgment.........................................

App. B-l — Order Denying Rehearing......................................

App. C — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions.....................

Rule 33.2 Statement......................................................................

Proof of Service...........................................................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adams v. Trustees of the Univ, of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011)18

Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)

passim

Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2001)

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)

19. 25

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)

Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014)

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)

passim

Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995) 19

Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018)

Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2005)

Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)

Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1996)

Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014)

Lovelace v. Se. Mass. Univ., 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986)

passim

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)

passim

Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218(2017)

Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021)

passim

Moore v. Bd. of Curators, 838 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)

16, 23

Nat’l Inst, of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755 (2018)

Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)

Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989)

passim

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)

passim

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)

passim

Regents of Univ, of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985)

passim

Schuler v. Univ, of Minn., 788 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1986)

Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957)

Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 596 U.S. 243 (2022)

State ex rel. Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1995)

16, 23

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)

17, 26

United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)

passim

Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959)

Winegar v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 1994)

Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2001)

passim

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)

W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)

Statutes, Rules, and Regulations

20 U.S.C. § 1099b

17,25

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(l)(ii)-(v)

passim

42 U.S.C. § 1983

8,11

8th Cir. R. 47B

6,8,13

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri (May

19, 2025) granting the motion to dismiss is unreported and reproduced in the appendix.

(App. A.)

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Nov. 7, 2025)

summarily affirming under Eighth Circuit Rule 47B is unreported and reproduced in the

appendix. (App. B.)

The court of appeals’ order denying the petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en

banc (Dec. 5, 2025) is reproduced in the appendix. (App. B-l.)

JURISDICTION

The district court entered final judgment on May 19, 2025. (App. A.)

On November 7, 2025, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered

judgment in Phillips v. Board of Curators ofLincoln University, No. 25-2051, summarily

affirming under 8th Cir. R. 47B. (App. B.)

On November 10, 2025, Petitioner timely filed a combined petition for panel rehearing

and rehearing en banc. The court of appeals denied rehearing on December 5, 2025.

(App. B-l.)

This petition is filed within 90 days of the order denying rehearing and is therefore timely

under Supreme Court Rule 13.3. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

Preservation. Both questions presented were pressed below and passed upon. The district

court resolved them on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. (App. A at 2.) The court of appeals

summarily affirmed under Rule 47B. (App. B at 1.) No alternative grounds were invoked,

so the issues are cleanly teed up.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner. Dr. Emir James Phillips is a tenure-track faculty member at Lincoln

University, a public land-grant institution, at the time of the events giving rise to this

case.

Respondents.

•

The Board of Curators of Lincoln University, formerly known as Lincoln

University, the governing body of the institution;

•

Dr. Stevie Lawrence, then-Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs of

Lincoln University;

•

Dr. Cornelius Brownlee, an administrator in the Office of Student Conduct

responsible for student-discipline processes;

•

Dr. Deneia Thomas, then-Dean of the School of Business; and

•

Does 1-20, additional institutional officials whose identities were unknown at the

time of filing.

All individual Respondents were sued in their official capacities in the district court. No

additional parties appeared in the court of appeals.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Phillips v. Board of Curators ofLincoln University, No. 2:25-cv-04025-BP (W.D. Mo.)

— Judgment entered May 19, 2025 (grade-override/academic-dishonesty case; this

petition).

Phillips v. Board of Curators ofLincoln University, No. 2:25-cv-04024-BP (W.D. Mo.)

— Final judgment entered (companion governance and search-committee case; now on

appeal).

Phillips v. Board of Curators ofLincoln University, No. 25-2051 (8th Cir.) — Judgment

entered November 7, 2025, summarily affirming under 8th Cir. R. 47B; rehearing and

rehearing en banc denied December 5, 2025 (this case).

Phillips v. Board of Curators ofLincoln University, No. 25-2169 (8th Cir.) — Judgment

entered November 7, 2025 (companion govemance/search-committee case; subject of a

separate petition for a writ of certiorari filed contemporaneously).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

This case involves:

•

U.S. Const, amend. I;

•

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause);

•

42U.S.C. § 1983; and

•

Federal accreditation and recognition provisions at 20 U.S.C. § 1099b and 34

C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(l)(ii)-(v), which govern accrediting-agency standards for

curricula, faculty, student achievement, and academic policies.

The relevant texts are reproduced in full in Appendix C.

STATEMENT

1. Academic-dishonesty process and faculty grading authority.

Lincoln University is a public land-grant institution in Missouri. Its Faculty and Student

Handbooks codify an academic-dishonesty process in which faculty investigate suspected

misconduct and, where dishonesty is found, assign final academic-dishonesty grades. The

district court expressly acknowledged that the Student Handbook “explicitly grants

faculty the authority to assign grades in cases of academic dishonesty.” (App. A at 2.)

Those policies reflect longstanding understandings in higher education: faculty bear

primary responsibility for academic content, standards, and grading, while administrators

provide support and oversight but do not substitute their own non-academic judgment for

faculty academic determinations. Those written procedures are also part of the framework

through which Lincoln satisfies accreditor expectations and maintains Title IV eligibility.

2. Petitioner’s investigation and final dishonesty grades.

In the 2024-2025 academic year, Petitioner taught a business-law course at Lincoln.

During the course, he detected plagiarism and other academic misconduct in student

work. He followed the codified process: investigating the suspected misconduct,

notifying the students, documenting the evidence, and applying the criteria for academic

dishonesty contained in the University’s policies.

At the end of that process, Petitioner assigned failing grades for academic dishonesty in

accordance with the Handbook. These were not preliminary marks entered as

placeholders; they were final dishonesty grades reached through faculty investigation and

professional judgment and communicated to the affected students.

3. Administrative nullification of faculty-final dishonesty grades.

After Petitioner assigned those final dishonesty grades, Lincoln’s administrators removed

the matter from the faculty-governed process and transferred it to the Office of Student

Conduct, overseen by Assistant Dean Cornelius Brownlee. That office has responsibility

for student-discipline processes but no grading authority under the adopted academic

policies. Nevertheless, non-academic staff, acting outside the faculty-governed grading

framework, nullified Petitioner’s final dishonesty grades and replaced them with non

dishonesty outcomes.

The University did not notify Petitioner in advance, did not afford him an opportunity to

be heard before the override, and did not convene any faculty body with authority to

review his determination or to substitute an academic judgment grounded in the

curriculum.

4. Petitioner’s internal objections.

Petitioner notified senior administrators, including the Provost, that the override violated

Lincoln’s codified academic-dishonesty procedures, undermined faculty authority, and

conflicted with accreditation standards and state-created expectations of faculty primacy

in grading. He explained that the override was not merely an internal personnel dispute,

but an institutional decision that erased faculty-final dishonesty grades and replaced them

with non-academic outcomes, compromising both academic integrity and the integrity of

the record.

Lincoln declined to restore the grades or to provide process keyed to the faculty

delegation. Instead, the University ratified the override and treated the non-dishonesty

outcomes as final for institutional purposes.

5. District-court proceedings.

Petitioner filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment and dueprocess violations. He alleged that:

•

First Amendment. Compelled alteration or administrative nullification of his

final dishonesty grades infringed core academic speech and professional academic

judgment, subject to Pickering!Connick and this Court’s compelled-speech

precedents, especially given Garcetti's reservation of speech “related to

scholarship or teaching.”

•

Due Process / Accardi. Lincoln’s formal delegation of final academic-dishonesty

grading to faculty, through policies adopted under state law and relied upon for

accreditation and public funding, created a protected interest that the institution

could not disregard without due process and adherence to its own rules, under

Roth, Sindermann, Loudermill, and the Accardi line.

The district court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the federal

claims with prejudice. It held that there is no First Amendment right to insist that the

University “assign a particular grade,” relying on Brown v. Armenti, Lovelace v.

Southeastern Massachusetts University, and Wozniak v. Conry to characterize grades as

purely institutional acts, rather than as faculty academic speech and professional

judgment. (App. A at 2-3.) At the same time, the court acknowledged that the Student

Handbook explicitly grants faculty grading authority in academic-dishonesty cases. (App.

A at 2.)

On the due-process claim, the court concluded that Petitioner had no cognizable liberty or

property interest in “the grade a student receives.” It treated the claim as if Petitioner

sought control over the institutional transcript, rather than process before nullification of

a faculty-final dishonesty grade that the institution itself had delegated to him. The court

declined to apply Roth, Sindermann, or Accardi to Lincoln’s own delegation of grading

authority, and it declined to engage in Mathews balancing keyed to the actual governance

structure. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law

claims.

6. Eighth Circuit proceedings.

On appeal, Petitioner argued that:

•

Under Parate, Johnson-Kurek, and Demers, compelled alteration or

administrative nullification of professor-final grades is protected academic speech

and professional academic judgment subject to Pickering/Connick, particularly

given Garcetti' s express reservation for speech related to scholarship or teaching,

and in line with the Sixth Circuit’s later protection of faculty classroom

expression in Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021).

•

Under Roth, Sindermann, Loudermill, and the Accardi line, Lincoln’s codified

delegation of final dishonesty-grading authority to faculty created a state-law

entitlement and reliance interest that could not be nullified by non-academic

administrators without constitutionally adequate process and adherence to the

promulgated framework; and

•

Ata minimum, the complaint required development of the policy record and

application of Mathews to the actual governance structure in place, including the

accreditation and Title IV implications of overriding faculty-final dishonesty

grades.

On November 7, 2025, the Eighth Circuit issued a consolidated per curiam decision in

Nos. 25-2051 and 25-2169, summarily affirming under 8th Cir. R. 47B. The court stated

only that it had carefully reviewed the record and found no error in the dismissal or abuse

of discretion in the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, and it denied pending motions as moot. It

did not discuss Garcetti, Parate, Demers, Roth, Sindermann, Accardi, or Mathews, nor

did it identify any alternative ground for affirmance. (App. B.)

On November 10, 2025, Petitioner filed a combined petition for panel rehearing and

rehearing en banc, explaining that the panel’s summary affirmance left unresolved a

square circuit split over the academic-speech status of grading and a conflict with statecreated-entitlement and “follow-your-own-rules” precedent. The Eighth Circuit denied

rehearing on December 5, 2025. (App. B-l.)

This petition for a writ of certiorari followed.

Petitioner is simultaneously filing a separate petition for a writ of certiorari seeking

review of a companion Eighth Circuitjudgment in No. 25-2169, arisingfrom related

Lincoln University events that present overlapping questions concerning academic

freedom, shared governance, and retaliation. Petitioner respectfully suggests that, if

certiorari is granted in either case, the Court may wish to consolidate the cases for

briefing and argument or hold the companion petition for disposition in light of the lead

case.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I. The courts of appeals are deeply and persistently divided over whether compelled

alteration or administrative nullification of a professor’s final academic-dishonesty grade

is protected academic speech and professional judgment, or merely institutional

administration outside the First Amendment.

The Sixth and Ninth Circuits treat grading as core academic expression and professional

judgment subject to Pickering!Connick, particularly in light of GarcettVs explicit

reservation for speech related to scholarship or teaching. Parate, Johnson-Kurek, and

Demers forbid compelled alteration of a professor’s final grade and recognize that

institutions may annotate transcripts without compelling faculty endorsement. The Sixth

Circuit’s approach is of a piece with its protection of professorial classroom expression in

Meriwether, which likewise treats faculty speech on academic matters as entitled to

constitutional weight.

The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits take the opposite view, characterizing grading as

an institutional act and denying First Amendment protection in this context. Lovelace,

Brown, and Wozniak embody that approach. The Fourth Circuit aligns with the Sixth and

Ninth in recognizing that Garcetti does not govern public-university academic speech.

Adams reflects that stance.

This Court’s decision in Zane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), confirms that Garcetti

does not swallow the Pickering framework: even where speech relates to professional

duties, it may remain protected when the employee speaks as a citizen on matters of

public concern. That clarification underscores why the circuits’ divergent approaches to

academic speech and grading warrant this Court’s intervention.

II. The judgment also conflicts with this Court’s state-created-entitlements doctrine and

the Accardi “follow-your-own-rules” principle. The district court acknowledged that

Lincoln’s Student Handbook explicitly delegates final academic-dishonesty grading to

faculty, yet held that this delegation created no protectable interest and allowed non

academic administrators to nullify the professor’s final dishonesty grades without

process.

Under Roth, Sindermann, and Loudermill, state-created rules and mutually explicit

understandings define protectable interests and require constitutionally adequate

procedures before deprivation. Under United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347

U.S. 260 (1954); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535

(1959); and Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), public institutions must follow their

own promulgated rules when adjudicating rights and statuses. Regents of the University

ofMichigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), recognizes deference to academic judgments,

but that deference presupposes an actual academic judgment made pursuant to

established procedures—not the abandonment of those procedures in favor of non

academic fiat. At a minimum, the complaint required development of the governance

record and application of Mathews to Lincoln’s actual academic-dishonesty framework,

including the accreditation and federal-funding implications. The courts below instead

treated faculty-delegated adjudications as constitutionally weightless, even when

administrators unilaterally override them.

III. Missouri law likewise assumes that public bodies will abide by the procedures they

adopt. Cases such as State ex rel. Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1995), and

Moore v. Board of Curators, 838 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), enforce the principle

that agencies must adhere to governing rules when exercising delegated authority. The

decision below effectively treats Lincoln’s formal delegation of dishonesty-grading

authority to faculty as hortatory rather than binding, in tension with these state-law

understandings and with the federal constitutional principles just described.

IV. The question presented is nationally important. Federal law requires recognized

accreditors to apply standards concerning curricula, faculty, student achievement, and

academic policies. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b; 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(l)(ii)-(v). Title IV

eligibility depends on institutions’ adherence to those standards and on the integrity of

their academic processes.

If public universities may quietly transfer academic-dishonesty matters from faculty to

non-academic administrators and nullify faculty-final grades without process or academic

review, the integrity of grading—and the reliability of degrees and transcripts—is

undermined. Because academic freedom is a “special concern of the First Amendment,”

Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234; Papish, 410 U.S. 667, and

because public funding depends on institutional integrity, uniform guidance is urgently

needed.

V. This case is an excellent vehicle. The posture is Rule 12(b)(6); the key governance

fact—Lincoln’s delegation of final dishonesty-grading authority to faculty—was

expressly acknowledged by the district court; the Eighth Circuit affirmed without

alternative reasoning; and there are no qualified-immunity, factual, or state-law

complications. This petition arises from the grade-override case (No. 25-2051), while a

separate companion petition challenges related governance and retaliation issues in No.

25-2169. Together, the pair offers the Court a clean way to resolve core questions about

academic freedom, grading, and shared governance at public universities.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The circuits are in open conflict over compelled alteration or nullification of

professors ’final grades.

This case squarely presents an entrenched conflict among the circuits on the status of

faculty grading under the First Amendment and Garcetti.

1. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits treat grading as protected academic speech and

professional judgment.

In Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit held that a professor’s

grading is expressive activity and that the university could not compel the professor to

change a grade. The court recognized two distinct interests: the institution’s right to

control the official transcript and the professor’s right not to be compelled to endorse a

grade he believed to be inaccurate or undeserved. The institution could annotate or

correct the record, but it could not force the professor to sign off on a changed grade.

Later, in Johnson-Kurek v. Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit

again treated grading as part of academic speech and professional judgment, applying

Pickering to evaluate the balance between faculty speech and institutional interests. And

in Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021), the court recognized a professor’s

classroom expression on contested topics as protected under the First Amendment,

reinforcing that faculty speech in the core teaching context is not easily dismissed as

unprotected employee speech.

The Ninth Circuit, in Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014), held that Garcetti

does not apply to speech related to scholarship or teaching in the university setting and

that such speech is instead governed by Pickering. That rule necessarily covers grading,

which is at the heart of scholarship and teaching, and recognizes that academic speech

warrants special protection.

2. The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits treat grading as unprotected

institutional administration.

In contrast, the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have held that grading is institutional,

not expressive, and have rejected First Amendment claims in this context.

In Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts University, 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986), the

First Circuit held that a professor had no First Amendment right to insist that the

university accept a particular grade. Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2001),

reached a similar conclusion, rejecting a professor’s claim that his grading decisions were

constitutionally protected. Wozniak v. Conry, 236 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2001), treated

grading as an administrative function, denying First Amendment protection.

These decisions read grading as purely institutional conduct rather than as academic

speech or professional judgment, effectively placing faculty grading outside the First

Amendment.

3. The Fourth Circuit aligns with the Sixth and Ninth.

The Fourth Circuit has likewise held that Garcetti does not automatically apply to public

university academic speech and that academic expression warrants heightened protection.

See Adams v. Trustees of the Univ. ofN.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).

Adams recognizes that scholarship and teaching occupy a special constitutional position

within the Pickering framework.

4. This case squarely presents the conflict that Garcetti reserved and implicates

core compelled-speech doctrine.

In Garcetti v. Ceballos, this Court expressly reserved whether its holding should apply

“to speech related to scholarship or teaching.” 547 U.S. at 425. Since then, the circuits

have taken divergent paths. The Sixth, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits have developed a line

of cases protecting academic speech and professional academic judgment, including

grading, under Pickering. The First, Third, and Seventh have taken the opposite view.

This Court’s decision in Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014), confirms that Garcetti

does not automatically displace Pickering', even when speech relates to information

learned through public employment, it may remain protected when the employee speaks

as a citizen on matters of public concern. Id. at 238-42. That principle is particularly

salient in the university setting, where faculty are expected to speak candidly about

academic integrity.

This case squarely presents Garcetti's reserved question in a clean posture. Petitioner’s

claim is not about general employment grievances; it is about compelled alteration and

administrative nullification of final academic-dishonesty grades—an area where

professional academic judgment is central and where compelled endorsement of a

different outcome raises classic compelled-speech concerns under Barnette, Wooley,

Hurley, NIFLA, Janus, and Matal. See Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017) (plurality)

(rejecting attempts to recast private expression as government speech to avoid First

Amendment scrutiny); Nat’I Inst, ofFamily & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 585

U.S. 755 (2018); Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,

Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. ofBos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705

(1977); W. Va. Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Nor is this a government-speech case like Shurtleff v. City ofBoston, 596 U.S. 243

(2022), where the issue was whether the government could choose which flags to fly as

its own message. Petitioner does not seek to force Lincoln to host his private expression;

he asks only that the State not compel him, in his own professional capacity, to endorse a

grade that he has determined—through procedures the University itself adopted—to be

academically false.

The Eighth Circuit’s silent affirmance leaves the conflict unresolved in a context that

affects thousands of faculty members and institutions nationwide. This Court’s

intervention is needed.

II. The decision below conflicts with Roth, Sindermann, Loudermill, and the Accardi

“follow-your-own-rules” line.

The courts below effectively held that a public university may delegate final academic

dishonesty grading authority to faculty, acknowledge that delegation in official policies,

and then disregard it without process and without consequence. That holding cannot be

squared with this Court’s state-created-entitlements doctrine or with the Accardi

principle.

1. State-created rules and mutual understandings define protectable interests.

In Bd. ofRegents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593

(1972), this Court explained that liberty and property interests can be created by “rules or

mutually explicit understandings” that secure certain benefits and support claims of

entitlement. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), held that once the State confers such an

interest, it must provide constitutionally adequate procedures before deprivation.

Here, Lincoln’s Student Handbook and related policies do more than describe a general

culture of academic freedom. They explicitly assign final academic-dishonesty grading

decisions to faculty. The district court recognized as much. (App. A at 2.) That

delegation—adopted by a public institution and relied on by faculty and students—

creates a state-law entitlement and a reasonable expectation that final dishonesty grades,

once assigned by faculty under the codified process, will not be nullified by non

academic administrators without process.

The Eighth Circuit has applied similar reasoning in recognizing protected interests

created by institutional rules and practices. See, e.g., Winegar v. Des Moines Indep.

Cmty. Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 1994); Schuler v. Univ, ofMinn., 788 F.2d 510

(8th Cir. 1986); Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1996).

Missouri courts likewise enforce the principle that public bodies must follow their own

governing rules when exercising delegated authority. See, e.g., State ex rel. Yarber v.

McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1995) (en banc); Moore v. Bd. of Curators, 838 S.W.2d

314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). The decision below is difficult to reconcile with those

expectations.

2. The Accardi line requires public institutions to follow their own rules.

In Accardi, Service, Vitarelli, and Morton, this Court held that when an agency

promulgates rules to govern decisionmaking, it must follow those rules in adjudicating

rights and statuses. That principle applies with full force to public universities that adopt

formal policies allocating academic authority and defining procedures.

Lincoln chose to codify an academic-dishonesty process that vests final grading authority

in faculty. It did so in part to satisfy accreditors and to assure students, faculty, and the

public that academic judgments would be made through a defined, faculty-governed

process. Once adopted, those rules cannot be disregarded at will by non-academic

administrators without implicating due process and Accardi.

The district court nonetheless held that Lincoln could nullify faculty-final dishonesty

grades without process, as if the delegation of authority had no constitutional

significance. That result conflicts with both the state-created-entitlements framework and

the “follow-your-own-rules” doctrine.

3. Ata minimum, Mathews balancing and Ewing’s limited deference were

required.

Even if the Court were to conclude that faculty-final dishonesty grades implicate a more

modest interest than a tenure contract or a property right in continued employment,

Mathews requires courts to evaluate: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of

erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the

government’s interest, including fiscal and administrative burdens. 424 U.S. at 334-35.

Here, the private interest includes Petitioner’s professional reputation and academic

integrity; the students’ interest in fair and consistent application of dishonesty rules; and

broader interests in the integrity of the institution’s degrees and transcripts. The risk of

erroneous or arbitrary overrides is high if non-academic administrators can nullify

faculty-final grades in disregard of codified procedures. The value of simple

safeguards—notice, an opportunity to be heard, faculty review—is readily apparent. And

the administrative burden of following the existing rules is minimal.

This Court’s academic-deference decisions, such as Regents of the University of

Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), presume good-faith application of academic

standards and procedures; they do not license institutions to ignore their own rules.

Deference to substantive academic judgments does not extend to situations where, as

here, the decision is not an academic judgment at all but a non-academic administrative

override of a faculty-final academic determination.

The courts below did not engage in any Mathews analysis. They treated the interest as

non-existent and allowed the university to disregard its own delegation. That approach is

irreconcilable with this Court’s precedents.

III. The questions presented are nationally important and affect accreditation, federal

funding, and the integrity ofpublic higher education.

Federal law does not treat accreditation and academic integrity as an internal matter of

institutional preference. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1099b and 34 C.F.R. § 602.16(a)(l)(ii)—(v),

accrediting agencies must adopt and apply standards addressing curricula, faculty, student

achievement, and academic policies. Institutions depend on recognized accreditors for

eligibility to participate in Title IV student-aid programs.

When a public university codifies an academic-dishonesty process that vests final grading

authority in faculty, it is not merely allocating internal responsibilities; it is representing

to accreditors and to the federal government that faculty will exercise primary academic

judgment in this domain. If administrators may quietly set those rules aside—reassigning

authority to non-academic offices and overriding faculty-final dishonesty grades without

process—the integrity of the institution’s academic record is compromised.

This case thus raises more than an individual employment dispute. It goes to:

•

Whether public institutions may circumvent faculty-governed academic processes

without constitutional constraint;

•

Whether students, employers, and accreditors can rely on grades as the product of

faculty academic judgment rather than unreviewable administrative fiat; and

•

Whether federal oversight of accreditation and Title IV eligibility has any bite

where institutions are free to disregard the very academic policies they rely on for

recognition.

The Court has long recognized that academic freedom is “a special concern of the First

Amendment.” Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234; Papish, 410

U.S. 667. Those cases underscore that the constitutional stakes are highest where

academic freedom and governance are intertwined with public obligations and federal

funding.

IV. This case is an excellent vehicle and complements the companion petition in No.

25-2169.

This petition arises from the “grade-override” case, Phillips v. Board of Curators of

Lincoln University, W.D. Mo. No. 2:25-cv-04025-BP; 8th Cir. No. 25-2051. It presents a

focused record about compelled alteration and administrative nullification of academic

dishonesty grades.

The issues are purely legal and were resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The district

court expressly acknowledged that the Student Handbook “explicitly grants faculty the

authority to assign grades in cases of academic dishonesty.” (App. A at 2.) The Eighth

Circuit summarily affirmed under Rule 47B and later denied panel rehearing and

rehearing en banc, without identifying any alternative ground for affirmance. (App. B, B1.) There are no qualified-immunity complexities, no disputed facts, and no state-law

issues clouding the federal questions.

At the same time, Petitioner is filing a separate petition seeking review of the companion

Eighth Circuit judgment in No. 25-2169, arising from related events that present

overlapping questions about academic freedom, shared governance, and retaliation in the

governance and search-committee context. The two petitions are distinct but

complementary:

•

This petition (No. 25-2051) provides a clean vehicle to resolve the Garcetti

academic-speech question, the grading-specific circuit split, and the

Roth/Sindermann/Accardi issues in the context of academic-dishonesty grades.

•

The companion petition (No. 25-2169) situates those issues within a broader

pattern of governance, search-committee control, and academic-retaliation

practices at a public land-grant university.

The Court can grant this petition and hold the companion petition, grant both and

consolidate them for briefing and argument, or grant, vacate, and remand in one case in

light of its resolution of the other. In any of those paths, this petition is a strong vehicle

for resolving the questions Garcetti reserved and for clarifying the constitutional status of

faculty-delegated academic decisions.

RELIEF SOUGHT

The Court should grant the petition and resolve the conflict by holding that:

1. Compelled alteration or administrative nullification of a professor’s final

academic-dishonesty grade is speech related to scholarship or teaching and

therefore lies outside Garcetti's “official duties” bar, subject to Pickering/Connick

balancing and this Court’s compelled-speech doctrine when endorsement of the

change is required; and

2. University-promulgated policies delegating final academic-dishonesty grading

authority to faculty create protectable interests under Roth, Sindermann, and

Loudermill, and the Accardi principle requires public institutions to follow those

rules, with procedures calibrated under Mathews before nullifying a faculty-final

dishonesty grade.

In the alternative, the Court should grant, vacate, and remand for consideration of:

•

The entrenched circuit split over compelled alteration and administrative

nullification of professors’ final grades; and

•

Whether Lincoln’s delegation of final dishonesty-grading authority to faculty

created a protectable interest under Roth/Sindermann and Accardi, warranting

tailored process under Mathews consistent with the accreditation and funding

framework governing public universities.

CONCLUSldN

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. In the alternative, the Court should

grant, vacate, and remand for further consideration in light of the circuit conflict and this

Court’s state-created-entitlements and Accardi jurisprudence.

Respectfully submii

r. Emir James Phillips

Petitioner, pro se

806 Chancery Lane

Cave Springs, AR 72718

(310) 930-6360

emirphil@yahoo. com

Dated: 12/8/25

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.