Amicus Curiae Brief — City of Cleveland, Ohio, Petitioner v. Albert Pickett, Jr., Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, et al.

No. 25-677

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO,

PETITIONER,

V.

ALBERT PICKETT, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE OHIO MUNICIPAL

LEAGUE AND INTERNATIONAL MUNICIPAL

ATTORNEYS ASS’N SUPPORTING PETITIONER

CHARLES B. GALVIN

COUNSEL OF RECORD

FBT GIBBONS LLP

9277 Centre Pointe Dr., Ste. 300

West Chester, Ohio 45069

(513) 870-8200

cgalvin@fbtgibbons.com

and

STEPHEN J. SMITH

YAZAN S. ASHRAWI

JESSE J. SHAMP

ANTHONY R. SEVERYN

FBT GIBBONS LLP

10 W. Broad St., Ste. 2300

Columbus, Ohio 43215

Counsel for Amici Curiae Ohio

Municipal League and

International Municipal Lawyers

Association

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................. 1

Ohio Municipal League ...................................... 1

International Municipal Lawyers Association ... 2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................... 3

ARGUMENT ............................................................. 7

A. The Sixth Circuit’s injury analysis ignores

this Court’s clear holdings on class

certification and concrete injuries and

hinges on an unreasonable reading of

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) ............................................. 7

B. Liens are a critical tool in municipal

corporations’ kit to encourage and obtain

utility compliance, but Respondents aim

to end their use ................................................... 8

C. Without this Court’s intervention,

municipalities with racially diverse

populations will be mired in FHA disparateimpact cases, even while municipalities

with largely homogenous populations likely

will not .............................................................. 12

CONCLUSION........................................................ 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Texas Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v.

Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,

576 U.S. 519 (2015) .......................................... 12

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413 (2021) ............................................ 6

Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., Minnesota,

598 U.S. 631 (2023) .......................................... 11

Statutes, Regulations and Rules

42 U.S.C. § 300g-1..................................................... 4

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) ..........................................5-7, 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-511.02 (2019) ................... 8

ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-218-114 (2019) ........................ 8

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 43008 (West 2019) ..................... 8

COLO. REV. STAT. § 31- 20-105 (2019) ....................... 8

CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-239, 49-72 (2019).............. 8, 9

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2901 (2019) ....................... 8

D.C. CODE ANN. § 34-2407.02 (West 2019) ............... 8

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 153.67 ........................................... 9

FLA. STAT. § 159.17 (2019)......................................... 8

GA. CODE ANN. § 36-60-17 (2019) .............................. 8

IDAHO CODE § 42-3212 (2019) ................................... 8

65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-139-8 (2019) ...................... 8

IND. CODE ANN. § 36-9-23-32 (West 2019) ................ 8

iii

IOWA CODE § 384.84 (2019) ................................... 8, 9

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-808C (2019)......................... 8, 9

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.265

(LexisNexis 2019) ............................................... 9

LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:3969 (2018) ............................... 9

MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 40, §§ 42A, 58 (2019) .............. 9

MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-804

(LexisNexis 2019) ............................................... 9

ME. STAT. TIT. 35-A, § 6111-A, tit. 38, § 1208

(2019) .................................................................. 9

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 123.162 .................................... 9

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.121(3)

(West 2019) ......................................................... 9

MINN. STAT. § 444.075 (2019) .................................... 9

MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-19-2 (2019) ............................ 9

MO. REV. STAT. § 250.234 (2019) ............................... 9

MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-13-3024 (2019) ....................... 9

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-682

(LexisNexis 2019) ............................................... 9

NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.36605 (2019) ......................... 9

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-314 TO -314.1 (2019) ......... 9

N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-24-01 (2019) .......................... 9

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:22 (2019)......................... 9

N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:14A-21, :14B-42 (2019) .......... 9

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-28-16 (2019) ............................. 9

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 642 (West 2019) ............ 9

iv

2B ORD. LAW ANN. GARBAGE § 6

(Aug. 2025 Update)........................................... 10

OR. REV. STAT. § 223.594(2) (2019) ........................... 9

53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7106

(West 2019) ......................................................... 9

R.C. § 701.10 ........................................................... 10

R.C. § 715.261 ......................................................... 10

R.C. § 729.49 ........................................................... 10

R.C. § 743.04(A) ........................................................ 4

R.C. § 743.04(A)(1) ................................................ 4, 8

R.I. GEN. LAW § 39-15-12........................................... 9

44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-3 (2019) ............................. 9

S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 5-31-1560, -2040 (2019) ............. 9

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46A-10B-24 (2019) ................ 9

TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-35-202 (2019).......................... 9

TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.0025(d)

(West 2019) ......................................................... 9

UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-17 (LexisNexis 2019) ........ 9

VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2118 (2019)............................ 9

VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2119 ....................................... 9

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3306 (2019) ........................ 9

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.21.290

(LexisNexis 2019) ............................................... 9

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-18-23

(LexisNexis 2019) ............................................... 9

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0809 (West 2019) .................... 9

v

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-10-117 (2019) ........................ 9

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 ......................................................... 1

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 ......................................................... 1

Other Authorities

Kelly Burch, How Many Days A Person

can Survive Without Food or Water,

INSIDER, Sept. 3, 2021,

https://www.insider.com/guides/health/dietnutrition/how-long[1]can-you-go-without-food...... 3

Coty Montag, Water/Color: A Study of Race &

the Water Affordability Crisis in America’s

Cities, THURGOOD MARSHALL INST. AT THE

NAACP LEGAL DEF. & ED. FUND, May 2019,

https://www.naacpldf.org/wpcontent/uploads/Water_Report_FULL_5_31_

19_FINAL_OPT.pdf........................................ 5, 8

QuickFacts Brecksville city, Ohio, U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/

fact/table/brecksvillecityohio/PST045224

(last visited January 6, 2026) .......................... 13

QuickFacts Cleveland city, Ohio, U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/

fact/table/clevelandcityohio/PST045224

(last visited January 6, 2026) .................... 13, 14

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Information About

Public Water Systems (Nov. 15, 2022),

https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/informationabout-public-water[1]systems#:~:text=

There%20are%20over%20148%2C000%20

public,water%20systems%20in%20the%20

United%20States ................................................ 3

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

Ohio Municipal League

The Ohio Municipal League (“OML”) was

incorporated as an Ohio non-profit corporation in

1952 by city and village officials who saw the need

for a statewide association to serve the interests of

Ohio municipalities. It represents the vast majority

of Ohio’s 925 cities and villages and has five

affiliated organizations: (1) the Municipal Finance

Officers Association; (2) the Ohio Mayors

Association; (3) the Ohio Association of Public Safety

Directors; (4) the Municipal Engineers Association

of Ohio; and (5) the Ohio Municipal Clerks

Association. OML is affiliated with the National

League of Cities and the International Municipal

Lawyers Association.

OML represents the collective interest of Ohio

cities and villages before the Ohio General Assembly

and the state elected and administrative offices. In

1984, OML established a Legal Advocacy Program

funded by voluntary contributions of the members.

This program allows OML to serve as the voice of

cities and villages before the United States Courts of

Appeals and Supreme Court by filing amicus briefs

on cases of special concern to municipal

governments. OML has been accredited by the

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.2, amici provided timely

notice to all parties of their intent to file this brief. Further,

pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, amici state that: (i) The

undersigned counsel authored the foregoing brief in whole; (ii)

the City of Cleveland is an OML member (and a member of

IMLA), and OML member dues are used in part to fund

preparing or submitting amicus curiae briefs—including this

brief—in various Ohio and federal courts; and (iii) only OML

and IMLA contributed money that was intended to fund

preparing or submitting this brief.

1

2

Supreme Court of Ohio as a sponsor of both

Continuing Legal Education Programs for attorneys

and the required Mayors Court training for Mayors

hearing all types of cases.

International Municipal Lawyers Association

The International Municipal Lawyers

Association (“IMLA”) is the nation’s largest

organization devoted solely to local government law.

Founded in 1935, IMLA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit,

professional association of counsel encompassing

more than 2,500 local government entities

(including cities, counties, townships, and

subdivisions thereof), represented through their

chief legal officers, state municipal leagues, and

individual attorneys. IMLA’s mission is to advance

the responsible development of municipal law

through education and advocacy by providing the

collective viewpoint of local governments around the

country on legal issues before the Supreme Court of

the United States, the United States Courts of

Appeals, and state appellate courts.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Among the services municipalities across the

nation provide to Americans, virtually nothing is

more important than water. While we can endure

the absence of electricity, cable, trash pickup, snow

removal, and similar services for relatively lengthy

periods, we know that water—even more than

food—is at the apex of life’s essentials. Without it,

human survival is reduced to a matter of days.2

Accordingly,

residents

in

thousands

of

municipalities across the country— nearly 90

percent of America’s population—look to some

50,000 community water systems to provide this

basic human need.3

This is an expensive responsibility. Municipal

suppliers must cover the relentlessly increasing

costs of ensuring residents with a reliable supply of

clean, safe, potable water, meaning that

infrastructure must be maintained and upgraded,

testing must be continually refined, and security

must be elevated every minute of the day. Threats to

water quality and supply, whether due to aging and

ineffective treatment facilities, decrepit pipes,

natural phenomena such as freezing, drought,

earthquake, or hurricane, the emergence of hitherto

2 Kelly Burch, How Many Days A Person can Survive Without

Food

or

Water,

INSIDER,

Sept.

3,

2021,

https://www.insider.com/guides/health/diet-nutrition/howlong[1]can-you-go-without-food

3 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Information About Public Water

Systems

(Nov.

15,

2022),

https://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/information-about-publicwater[1]systems#:~:text=There%20are%20over%20148%2C00

0%20public,water%20systems%20in%20

the%20United%20States.

4

undetected bacteria, or the malevolence of those who

wish to harm society are never far away. And the

federal government, while recently allocating

record-breaking funding to help upgrade local water

infrastructure, continues to raise the bar that local

water utilities must meet, through mandating an

ever-increasing menu of dangerous substances that

must be eliminated from public water supplies. See

Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1

(National drinking water regulations.). Like all

states, Ohio allows its municipal corporations to

“assess and collect a water rent or charge of

sufficient amount and in such manner as the

director, other official, or body determines to be most

equitable from all tenements and premises supplied

with water.” R.C. § 743.04(A).

But for one reason or another, customers do

not always pay their water bills. To address this

critical shortfall, state laws contain clear, fair, and

constitutional procedures for addressing water-bill

delinquencies. In Ohio, the municipal corporation

can either: (1) certify the debt to the county auditor,

who then places a lien on the property for the unpaid

debt and any related penalties; or (2) initiate a

collection action in the courts. R.C. § 743.04(A)(1).

Because the first option conserves administrative

resources and is far less intrusive on the customer,

municipal corporations almost always take the first

option.

This practice is not unique to Ohio. In fact, a

2019 study done by the NAACP Legal Defense and

Educational Fund found that every state in the union

authorizes a process for placing liens on properties

5

due to unpaid water debts to public utilities.4 Put

simply, water liens are a tried and true compliance

inducer and enforcement tool for public utilities.

Respondents here attempt to upend that

familiar process. They advance the dubious

argument—with which the trial court has

provisionally agreed—that merely placing a water

lien on a property can “make[s housing] unavailable”

under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). And Respondents

magnify that fallacy by alleging that there is a

certifiable single class of individuals affected by

purported municipal overreach—even though they

acknowledge that many of the members of the

putative class have not suffered any concrete injury

whatsoever. Despite clear precedent from this Court

to the contrary, both the trial court and the Sixth

Circuit agreed with Respondents on class

certification.

But as the petition explains, the path to that

result is problematic on multiple levels—and the

court’s flawed logic is most glaring in disparate

impact cases. Both lower courts accepted

Respondents’ arguments that all class members

have the same injury even though only some class

members can show a concrete injury because of a

City of Cleveland water lien (while the evidence

confirms that many have suffered no injury because

of the same kind of water lien). By taking that

approach, the lower courts effectively fashioned a

4 See Coty Montag, Water/Color: A Study of Race & the Water

Affordability Crisis in America’s Cities, THURGOOD MARSHALL

INST. AT THE NAACP LEGAL DEF. & ED. FUND, May 2019,

https://www.naacpldf.org/wpcontent/uploads/Water_Report_FULL_5_31_19_FINAL_OPT.

pdf, at p. 4.

6

class of individuals who share just one thing in

common: the fact that each has alleged a violation of

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), regardless of any concrete injury

caused by that alleged statutory violation. But that

conclusion disregards this Court’s analysis in

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, and it should be

rejected for all cases, including those sounding in

disparate impact. See 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021).

The lower courts’ analyses have far reaching

practical effects in addition to logical flaws. Several

Ohio Revised Code sections authorize municipal

corporations to certify liens against properties in

other situations, such as utility delinquencies,

nuisance or zoning abatements, and other services

that municipal corporations render for a fee. And

Ohio is far from unique when it comes to laws that

allow political subdivisions to certify liens against

property owners; it is a universal practice in the

United States. If certifying a lien against a property

confers Article III standing on the basis that the lien

“put[s] properties at a higher risk of being taxed

and/or property foreclosure and place[s] the owner

or tenant at risk of eviction,” then any municipal

corporation—and especially those with diverse

populations—will face copycat disparate-impact

class action lawsuits very soon. (Of course,

municipalities with highly homogenized populations

would likely not face such lawsuits because the

statistical evidence necessary to state such a claim

may never exist.) That paradox upends a

fundamental relationship between the government

and the governed—and it stems from an

unreasonable reading of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Because the Sixth Circuit’s and the trial

court’s certification determinations conflict with this

7

Court’s holdings, and because the tangible impact of

Petitioners’ theory is enormous, amici curiae OML

and IMLA urge this Court to grant certiorari.

ARGUMENT

A.

The Sixth Circuit’s injury analysis

ignores this Court’s clear holdings on

class certification and concrete injuries

and hinges on an unreasonable reading

of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Petitioner accurately and pragmatically

describes the context in which this case arises. The

lower courts certified a class of individuals that

share only one thing in common: the possibility that

the City of Cleveland (through the Cleveland Water

Department) has violated the Fair Housing Act, 42

U.S.C. § 3604(a) (the “FHA”) by starting a process to

certify a lien against the customer’s property. The

record plainly shows that many of the putative class

members have suffered no concrete injury at all.

For the reasons set forth in the petition, Amici

Curiae OML and IMLA urge this Court to grant

certiorari to resolve splits between the Circuit

Courts and correct the lower courts’ errors before

this case proceeds to full judgment.

Amici Curiae OML and IMLA write to provide

critical context to the Court on the practical

implications of this action. Without the Court’s

intervention on the class-certification question

presented here, the lower courts’ decisions may

sound the death knell on municipal liens nationwide

in racially diverse jurisdictions (while likely having

no effect in largely racially homogenous

jurisdictions). That result would not align with the

text or intent of the FHA, and it would create further

8

confusion for parties within the Sixth Circuit. The

Court should grant certiorari to answer the critical

class-certification question presented in the petition.

B.

Liens are a critical tool in municipal

corporations’ kit to encourage and

obtain utility compliance, but Respondents aim to end their use.

Municipal corporations in every state rely on

liens to ensure that customers pay for the services

that local governments provide to them. These liens

are established—and even encouraged—by state

law,5 and Respondents have never questioned their

constitutionality. Instead, Respondents have chosen

to attack municipal liens from a novel direction:

their alleged disparate impact on the availability of

housing under the FHA.

The water liens at issue here are authorized

by Ohio law—and they are not particularly special.

See R.C. § 743.04(A)(1). Water liens are just as

common in other states; in fact, virtually every state

empowers a municipal water or sewer provider to

certify a lien on real property for failure to pay for

services. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-511.02

(2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-218-114 (2019); CAL.

GOV’T CODE § 43008 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. §

31- 20-105 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-239, 49-72

(2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2901 (2019); D.C.

CODE ANN. § 34-2407.02 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. §

159.17 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-60-17 (2019);

IDAHO CODE § 42-3212 (2019); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/11-139-8 (2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-9-23-32

(West 2019); IOWA CODE § 384.84 (2019); KAN. STAT.

5 See Montag, supra note 2 at p. 4.

9

ANN. § 12-808C (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.265

(LexisNexis 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 33:3969 (2018);

ME. STAT. TIT. 35-A, § 6111-A, tit. 38, § 1208 (2019);

MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 14-804 (LexisNexis

2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 40, §§ 42A, 58 (2019);

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.121(3) (West 2019);

MINN. STAT. § 444.075 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 2119-2 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 250.234 (2019); MONT.

CODE ANN. § 7-13-3024 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 16-682 (LexisNexis 2019); NEV. REV. STAT. §

244.36605 (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:22

(2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:14A-21, :14B-42 (2019);

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-28-16 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§

160A-314 TO -314.1 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-2401 (2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 642 (West

2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 223.594(2) (2019); 53 PA.

STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7106 (West 2019); 44

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-3 (2019); S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 531-1560, -2040 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46A10B-24 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-35-202 (2019);

TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.0025(d) (West

2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-17 (LexisNexis 2019);

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3306 (2019); VA. CODE ANN.

§ 15.2-2118 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

35.21.290 (LexisNexis 2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 818-23 (LexisNexis 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0809

(West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-10-117

(2019).E.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-239; FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 153.67; MASS. GEN. LAWS 40 § 42A; ME.

REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 35-A, § 6111-A; MICH. COMP.

LAWS § 123.162; IOWA CODE § 384.84; OKLA. STAT TIT.

82, § 642; R.I. GEN. LAW § 39-15-12; S.C. CODE ANN. §

5-31-1560; VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2119.

Several other Ohio Revised Code sections

authorize municipal corporations to certify liens

10

against properties in other situations, such as other

utility delinquencies, property abatements, and

other services that municipal corporations render

for a fee. E.g. R.C. § 701.10 (providing for a lien for

non-payment of disposal services); R.C. § 715.261

(providing for a lien for failure to pay for nuisanceabatement services); R.C. § 729.49 (providing for a

lien related to non-payment of sewer-service

charges). Unsurprisingly, it is just as common for

other states to have laws that allow for the

certification of liens for other failures to pay for

government services. E.g. 2B ORD. LAW ANN.

GARBAGE § 6 (Aug. 2025 Update) (annotating cases

across the nation in which government liens were

certified against consumers who failed to pay for

services they received). Put simply, liens—and

especially water liens—are a key resource in any

municipality’s utility-payment compliance efforts.

If the lower courts are correct that a class can

be certified in the circumstances here—i.e., where

the record shows that many individuals in the

putative class have not suffered any harm

whatsoever—then the days of using municipal liens

to oblige payment of legitimate utility bills may be

ended by judicial fiat. Under Respondents’ ultimate

theory, every property lien necessarily makes

housing “unavailable” because—as the trial court

wrote—“attaching liens to indebted properties could

have an effect on a person’s ability to maintain their

housing.” (R. 92, PageID # 4784 (emphasis added)).

That is an absurd and unworkable result, and it

plainly reveals the flaws in the lower courts’ injury

analysis.

If this Court does not correct the compounded

class-certification and Article III–standing errors

11

discussed in the petition, then the trial court’s novel

FHA disparate-impact analysis will undoubtedly

spread beyond water delinquencies—and far beyond

Ohio. It is very expensive to defend against class

action lawsuits, and the possibility that a court will

certify an expansive class that includes those

without concrete injuries (as it did here) is likely to

chill most municipalities’ appetite to place liens on

qualifying properties. If otherwise-lawful lien

activity were to be chilled, then local governments

would lack a cost-effective mechanism to enforce

customer non-payment for water and sewer services.

And if that were the case, local governments would

have to consider increasing access and usage rates

across the entire utility system to account for the few

customers who do not pay their bills. That result—

which would be felt by those customers that do pay

their bills—makes neither legal nor practical sense.

Relatedly, without liens, local governments

may have significant challenges upgrading any

infrastructure or paying for much-needed quality

control mechanisms for their water systems. This

scenario is particularly troubling given the need for

localities to replace millions of lead pipes throughout

the nation and address PFAS and other forever

chemicals in their water systems, which will cost

billions of dollars.

As this Court recently noted in the local

government property tax context: “The taxpayer

must render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.” Tyler v.

Hennepin Cnty., Minnesota, 598 U.S. 631, 647

(2023). The same is true here; every customer should

pay their fair share. Accordingly, this Court should

grant certiorari to ensure that local governments

12

can continue to use liens as a cost-effective way to

enforce water bill collection.

C.

Without this Court’s intervention,

municipalities with racially diverse

populations will be mired in FHA

disparate-impact cases, even while

municipalities with largely homogenous

populations likely will not.

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and Article III standing

principles would create two different playing fields:

one in the municipalities that have racially diverse

demographics, and another in municipalities that

have largely homogenous demographics. In the first,

facially neutral municipal liens would be off the

table because they may have a disparate impact on

racial minorities. And in the second, facially neutral

municipal liens would remain viable enforcement

tools because the jurisdiction’s largely homogenous

demographic makeup would likely never produce

the statistical evidence necessary to satisfy this

Court’s “robust causality” requirement for FHA

disparate impact cases. See Texas Dept. of Hous. and

Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,

576 U.S. 519, 542 (2015) (“A robust causality

requirement ensures that “‘[r]acial imbalance …

does not, without more, establish a prima facie case

of disparate impact’ and thus protects defendants

from being held liable for racial disparities they did

not create.”).

Consider the City of Brecksville, Ohio, a

Cleveland suburb that is served by the Cleveland

Water Department. According to the U.S. Census

Bureau, 86.3 percent of the city’s roughly 14,000

13

residents identify as “White alone,” while just 5.4

percent of the city’s population identifies as “Asian

alone” (the second-largest racial group), and only 1.3

percent of the city’s population identifies as “Black

alone” (the city’s third-largest racial group).6

Brecksville’s racial composition looks nothing like

Cleveland’s racial composition; Cleveland’s threelargest racial groups are (1) Black alone (46.8

percent); (2) White alone (36.7 percent); and (3)

Hispanic or Latino alone (12.8 percent).7

The record here indicates that a water lien is

certified on a property only if the customer fails to

pay a significantly delinquent water bill. In cities

with a largely homogenous racial makeup (like

Brecksville), it is likely that the racial makeup of

those upon whom a water lien is certified will look

markedly different from the racial makeup in more

racially diverse cities (like Cleveland). Put another

way, the racial makeup of a putative class of

Brecksville residents against whom a water lien has

been certified would likely lack the statistically

significant racial datapoints to ever satisfy the

robust causality standard. Because of these

statistical differences, these kinds of class actions

are likely to be filed only in racially diverse

jurisdictions—and perhaps never in largely

homogenous jurisdictions—even if the applicable

lien policies are facially neutral and nonQuickFacts Brecksville city, Ohio, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/brecksvillecityohi

o/PST045224 (last visited January 6, 2026). Additionally, 6.9

percent of the population identify as “Two or More Races.” Id.

7 QuickFacts Cleveland city, Ohio, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/clevelandcityohio

/PST045224 (last visited January 6, 2026). Additionally,

9.2 percent identify as “Two or More Races.” Id.

6

14

discriminatory. It defies logic that only

municipalities across the nation with diverse racial

makeups could violate the FHA by certifying water

liens when municipalities with less diverse racial

makeups would not violate the FHA despite

engaging in the very same conduct.

Looking further into robust causality and this

Court’s holding that municipal defendants are not

liable for racial disparities that they did not create,

data from the U.S. Census Bureau reveals

significant economic imbalances in American society

along racial lines, including nearly one-quarter of

Black-alone households having a household wealth

of “zero or negative” dollars.8

These baseline economic realities are more

than subtext for this case—they are very likely the

root cause of the statistical disparities that

Respondents have highlighted. The Brecksville–

Cleveland illustration and the national economicrealities statistics show why Respondents’ ultimate

disparate-impact-liability theory is unsustainable in

light of Inclusive Communities. There is ample

evidence that the imposition of municipal water

liens here—and nationwide when a customer fails to

pay a water bill—are grounded in unfortunate

economic realities, and do not implicate the wellintended rehabilitative purposes of the FHA. Yet

because of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, plaintiffs will

be able to obtain class certification and Article III

standing merely because a class has been subjected

to these intangible water liens—likely forcing

settlement regardless of the merits of their claims

8

Id.

15

and spelling a death knell for these widely used and

helpful lien practices.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Amici Curiae OML and

IMLA urge this Court to grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES B. GALVIN

COUNSEL OF RECORD

FBT GIBBONS, LLP

9277 Centre Pointe Dr., Ste. 300

West Chester, Ohio 45069

(513) 870-8200

cgalvin@fbtgibbons.com

and

STEPHEN J. SMITH

YAZAN S. ASHRAWI

JESSE J. SHAMP

ANTHONY R. SEVERYN

FBT GIBBONS, LLP

10 W. Broad St., Ste. 2300

Columbus, Ohio 43215

Counsel for Amici Curiae Ohio

Municipal League and

International Municipal Lawyers

Association