Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Flomo Tealeh, Petitioner v. David Steiner, Postmaster General, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 13, 2025
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®iriteb States Court of Appeals
Jfor tlje Cigljtfj (Circuit
No. 24-2155
Flomo Tealeh
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
United States Postal Service; Mohammad Ali; David Emerson; Scott Woltering;
John Does, 1-100
Defendants
Acting Postmaster General Doug Tulino; Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General1;
Andrew M. Luger, U.S. Attorney General District of Minnesota
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
Submitted: June 11, 2025
Filed: June 16, 2025
[Unpublished]
’Doug Tulino has been appointed to serve as Acting Postmaster General, and
Pamela Bondi has been appointed to serve as Attorney General of the United States,
and are substituted as appellees pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
43(c).
Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Flomo Tealeh appeals following the district court’s2 dismissal and subsequent
adverse grant of summary judgment in his employment discrimination action against
the United States Postal Service. Upon careful review, we conclude that dismissal
of the complaint was proper for the reasons articulated in the district court’s orders.
See Brown v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 131 F.4th 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2025) (de novo
review of court’s grant of motion to dismiss); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643
F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (de novo review of grant of summary
judgment).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
We also deny Tealeh’s motions to file an amended reply brief.
2The Honorable Wilhelmina M. Wright, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, now retired, partially granted the motion to dismiss. The
Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of
Minnesota granted the summary judgment motion.
-2-
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Case No. 21-cv-1318 (JNE/DJF)
Flomo Tealeh,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Postmaster General Louis DeJoy,
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Postmaster General Louis DeJoy’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 87.) For the reasons addressed below, the Court
grants the motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Flomo Tealeh, a former mail handler at the United States Postal Service
(“USPS”), filed this action alleging discrimination based on race and national origin,
retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Tealeh, who is Black and Liberian-American, was employed by USPS from February 2017
t
to February 2022. During his employment, Tealeh alleges he was subjected to various
instances of disparate treatment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment based on his
race and national origin. The alleged discriminatory and retaliatory acts include the
revocation of his Powered Industrial Truck (“PIT”) license, denial of overtime
opportunities, false accusations of unauthorized overtime, unjustified suspensions, and
failure to promote.
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Tealeh filed two Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints related to
these allegations, one in July 2019 and another in November 2020. After exhausting his
administrative remedies, Tealeh initiated this lawsuit on June 1, 2021, and filed an
amended complaint on August 5, 2021.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all of Tealeh’s claims. Defendant
argues that most of Tealeh’s claims are time-barred under the applicable 45-day statute of
limitations for federal employees and that Tealeh has failed to establish a prima facie case
or demonstrate pretext for his timely claims. Tealeh opposes the motion, contending that
he has presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact on his claims.
The Court, having considered the parties’ submissions and the record evidence, will
now address the merits of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
ANALYSIS
I.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). A fact is material if
it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248.
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving
party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth specific facts showing
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that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. In evaluating a motion
for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and any inferences drawn from
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
However, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586. “The mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party],”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
In employment discrimination cases, the Court applies the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 802.
If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to . the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If the defendant meets
this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason is a
pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 804.
IL
Timeliness of Claims
The parties dispute whether Tealeh’s disparate treatment and retaliation claims are
timely under the applicable statute of limitations for federal employees.
Before a federal employee can sue their employer for violating Title VII, they must
“initiate contact” with an EEO counselor at their agency “within 45 days of the date of the
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matter alleged to be discriminatory.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 549-50 (2016)
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1)).
Tealeh first contacted the EEO office on November 9, 2020. Consequently, only
alleged discriminatory acts occurring within the preceding 45 days—from September 25,
2020, to December 20, 2020—would be timely under the applicable statute of limitations.
Tealeh argues that the standard filing period for Title VII employment
discrimination claims is 180 days and 300 days, citing Green. However, the Supreme
Court in Green explicitly recognized the different limitations period for federal employees,
noting that a federal civil servant must initiate contact with an EEO counselor “within 45
days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory” before filing a Title VII suit.
578 U.S. at 549-50.
Tealeh also contends that his claims relating to the suspension of his PIT license are
timely because he had a follow-up meeting regarding licensure during the relevant time
period. However, Tealeh testified that the alleged decision to suspend his PIT license was
made nearly two years earlier, in February 2019. A follow-up meeting with management
does not revive an otherwise untimely claim, as the 45-day limitations period runs from
the date of the alleged discriminatory act, not from the date of any subsequent discussions
about that act. Id.
A review of the record reveals that most of the alleged discriminatory acts
underlying Tealeh’s disparate treatment and retaliation claims occurred well before
September 25, 2020. For example, the suspension of Tealeh’s PIT license allegedly
occurred in February 2019, the denial of overtime opportunities allegedly occurred from
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late 2019 through January 2,2020, and the failure to promote Tealeh to the Data Collection
position allegedly occurred on January 30, 2020. These claims are time-barred under the
45-day limitations period. See id.
Based on the applicable law and the evidence in the record, the Court concludes that
the 45-day limitations period for federal employees is controlling, and Tealeh has not
shown that his claims are timely under this standard. See id. Accordingly, any claims
based on alleged discriminatory acts occurring before September 25, 2020, are time-barred
and must be dismissed.
III.
Disparate Treatment Claims
A.
Overtime Claims
Tealeh alleges that he was denied overtime opportunities based on his race and
national origin, while Defendant maintains that overtime was assigned according to the
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and that Tealeh has failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination or demonstrate pretext.
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring under Title VII, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) they belong to a racial minority; (2) they applied and were
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite their
qualifications, they were rejected; and (4) after their rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the plaintiffs qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id.
The plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for
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discrimination. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1047 (8th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (stating that a plaintiff may show pretext by demonstrating that the defendant’s
proffered reason is unworthy of credence because it has no basis in fact, is not the true
reason for the adverse action, or is insufficient to explain the adverse action).
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Tealeh’s overtime claims
are timely. Tealeh alleges that he was denied overtime opportunities from late 2019
through November 2020. However, as discussed in the previous section, claims based on
alleged discriminatory acts occurring before September 25, 2020, are time-barred under
the applicable 45-day limitations period for federal employees.
See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.105(a)(1); Green, 578 U.S. at 549-50. Therefore, the Court will only consider
Tealeh’s overtime claims to the extent they are based on events occurring between
September 25, 2020, and November 2020.
Turning to the merits of the timely portion of Tealeh’s overtime claims, the Court
f
finds that Tealeh has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. While Tealeh,
as a Black Liberian-American, is a member of a protected class, and he claims he was
available and willing to work overtime, he has not shown that the circumstances
surrounding the allocation of overtime give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Tealeh identifies Jean-Marie Longi and Craig Wendt as comparators who allegedly
received more overtime than he did.
However, Tealeh has not provided evidence
demonstrating that he was similarly situated to Longi and Wendt in all relevant respects.
See Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 956 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that
comparators must be “similarly situated in all relevant respects”). Defendant has presented
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evidence that several factors, such as employees’ scheduled days off, tour preferences, and
work section, could impact overtime allocation. Tealeh has not shown that he and his
proposed comparators were similarly situated with respect to these factors.
Moreover, the fact that Longi, one of Tealeh’s proposed comparators, is himself a
Black African immigrant undermines Tealeh’s claim that overtime was allocated based on
race or national origin. This weakens any inference of discrimination that might otherwise
be drawn from the alleged disparity in overtime hours. See Askari v. L.A. Fitness Int.’l,
LLC, 2010 WL 3938320, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[A] plaintiff faces a difficult
burden of establishing discrimination when the decision-maker is a member of the same
protected class as the plaintiff.”).
Even if Tealeh could establish a prima facie case, Defendant has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allocation of overtime: adherence to the
provisions of the CBA.
Tealeh has not presented evidence demonstrating that this
proffered reason is pretextual. He has not shown that Defendant’s reliance on the CBA has
no basis in fact, that it was not the true reason for the overtime allocation, or that it was
insufficient to explain the alleged disparity in overtime hours. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at
1047.
Based on the record evidence and the applicable legal standards, the Court
concludes that Tealeh has not established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect
to his overtime claims. Tealeh has not shown that the circumstances surrounding the
allocation of overtime give rise to an inference of discrimination, nor has he demonstrated
that he was similarly situated to his proposed comparators in all relevant respects.
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Moreover, even if Tealeh could establish a prima facie case, he has not presented evidence
showing that Defendant’s proffered reason for the allocation of overtime—adherence to
the CBA—is pretextual. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is
warranted on Tealeh’s overtime claims.
B.
Emergency Placement and Suspension Claims
Tealeh alleges that his emergency placement on October 28, 2020, and subsequent
suspension were the result of disparate treatment based on his race and national origin.
Defendant argues that these actions were taken due to Tealeh’s threatening behavior toward
his supervisor, Mohamed Ali, and that Tealeh has not established a prima facie case of
discrimination or shown that Defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
they are a member of a protected class; (2) they met their employer’s legitimate
expectations; (3) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances
give rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. The plaintiff must then demonstrate
that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Torgerson, 643 F.3d
at 1047.
As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Tealeh’s emergency
placement and suspension constitute adverse employment actions. The Eighth Circuit has
held that a suspension with pay is not an adverse action. Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr.,
423 F.3d 886, 891-92 (8th Cir. 2005). Tealeh was issued a “no-time-off’ suspension,
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which, according to Defendant, means that he was paid during the suspension period.
However, Tealeh claims that he lost wages as a result of the emergency placement. Given
this factual dispute, the Court will assume, for purposes of this motion, that Tealeh has
suffered adverse employment actions.
Turning to the remaining elements of the prima facie case, it is undisputed that
Tealeh, as a Black Liberian-American, is a member of a protected class. However, Tealeh
has not presented evidence showing that the circumstances surrounding his emergency
placement and suspension give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Defendant has consistently maintained that Tealeh was placed on emergency
placement and subsequently suspended due to his threatening behavior toward his
supervisor, Mohamed Ali. According to Mohamed Ali, Tealeh stated, “If you talk to me
again, there’s going to be a disaster in this building.” Defendant contends that this threat
was reported to Senior Manager of Distribution Operations Dave Emerson, who then
instructed supervisors to place Tealeh on emergency placement.
Tealeh attempts to cast doubt on Defendant’s proffered reason by highlighting
inconsistencies in Mohamed Ali’s account of the incident. However, the Court finds that
these inconsistencies are relatively minor and do not give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Whether the threat was made over the phone or in person, and whether
Tealeh was working a regular or overtime shift that day, does not change the fundamental
nature of Defendant’s proffered reason—that Tealeh was disciplined for threatening his
supervisor.
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Notably, in attempting to demonstrate pretext, Tealeh does not offer affirmative
evidence showing that Defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse actions was false or
that discrimination was the true motivation.
Instead, Tealeh relies on highlighting
perceived inconsistencies in Mohamed Ali’s account of the threatening incident. However,
when “an employer has articulated a legitimate reason for its actions, it is permissible for
courts to presume the existence of a prima facie case and move directly to the issue of
pretext. . ..” Stewart v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 481 F.3d 1034, 1043 (8th Cir.
2007) . To prove pretext, a plaintiff must both discredit the employer’s asserted reason and
show that the circumstances permit drawing the reasonable inference that the real reason
was discriminatory. See Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d 756,763 (8th Cir. 2005). Minor
discrepancies in a witness’s account are not sufficient to establish pretext, absent
affirmative evidence that the employer’s reason was false and that discrimination was the
real reason. See Roeben v. BG Excelsior Ltd. Partnership, 545 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that minor inconsistencies in an employer’s explanation did not raise an
inference of pretext).
Moreover, Tealeh has not presented evidence of similarly situated employees
outside his protected class who were treated more favorably under comparable
circumstances. The Eighth Circuit has held that “(a]t the pretext stage, the test for whether
someone is sufficiently similarly situated, as to be of use for comparison, is rigorous.”
Johnson v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Tealeh has not identified any non-Black or non-Liberian employees who engaged in
similarly threatening behavior but were not disciplined.
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The Court also notes that two of the key decision-makers involved in Tealeh’s
emergency placement and suspension—Mohamed Ali and Ali Said—are themselves Black
African immigrants. While not dispositive, this fact further undermines any inference of
discrimination based On race or national origin. See Askari, 2010 WL 3938320, at *5.
Even if Tealeh could establish a prima facie case, he has not demonstrated that
Defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse actions is pretextual.
The minor
inconsistencies in Ali’s account do not show that Defendant’s reason has no basis in fact,
is not the true reason, or is insufficient to explain the adverse actions. Torgerson, 643 F.3d
at 1047.
Tealeh’s contention that Plant Manager Roy Reynolds “warned that Ali’s
accusation lacked substance” mischaracterizes the record. Reynolds was not involved in
the disciplinary decision and merely requested additional information in his role as a
member of the facility’s Threat Assessment Team.
Based on a thorough review of the record evidence and the applicable legal
standards, the Court concludes that Tealeh has not established a prima facie case of
discrimination with respect to his emergency placement and suspension claims. Even
assuming Tealeh has shown that he suffered adverse employment actions, he has not
demonstrated that the circumstances surrounding these actions give rise to an inference of
discrimination. Tealeh has not presented evidence of similarly situated employees outside
his protected class who were treated more favorably under comparable circumstances, and
the fact that key decision-makers were themselves Black African immigrants undercuts
any inference of discriminatory intent.
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Moreover, Tealeh has not shown that Defendant’s proffered reason for the adverse
actions—his threatening behavior toward his supervisor—is pretextual.
The
inconsistencies in Mohamed Ali’s account are relatively minor and do not cast doubt on
the fundamental reason for Tealeh’s discipline.
Accordingly, the Court finds that
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Tealeh’s emergency placement and
suspension claims.
IV.
Retaliation Claim
Tealeh alleges that he was subjected to various adverse actions in retaliation for
engaging in protected activity, such as filing EEO complaints and grievances. Defendant
argues that Tealeh’s retaliation claim is entirely time-barred and that, even if it were timely,
Tealeh has not established a prima facie case of retaliation or shown that Defendant’s
proffered reasons for the adverse actions are pretextual.
“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee has the initial burden of
establishing retaliation by showing that (1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she
suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally
linked to the protected conduct.” Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist, Dep‘t of Corr. Servs., 728
F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir.
2011)).
“An adverse employment action is defined as a tangible change in working
conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage, including but not limited to,
termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s future career
prospects, as well as circumstances amounting to a constructive discharge.” Jackman, 728
F.3d at 804 (citing Wilkie v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 638 F.3d 944, 955 (8th
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Cir. 2011)). “However, minor changes in duties or working conditions, even unpalatable
or unwelcome ones, which cause no materially significant disadvantage, do not rise to the
level of an adverse employment action.” Id.
The Court must first address the timeliness of Tealeh’s retaliation claim. As a
federal employee, Tealeh was required to initiate contact with an EEO counselor within 45
days of the alleged retaliatory act. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Tealeh first contacted an
EEO counselor on November 9, 2020, making the actionable time period September 25,
2020, to December 20, 2020.
In his Amended Complaint and opposition brief, Tealeh identifies several alleged
retaliatory acts, including denials of promotion, exclusion from training opportunities, and
unwarranted discipline. However, a close examination of the record reveals that all of
these acts occurred before September 25, 2020, and thus fall outside the actionable time
period.
For example, Tealeh claims that he was denied a promotion to a Data Collection
position in January 2020 and that he was not selected for 204B training in February 2020,
both in retaliation for his prior EEO activity. However, these alleged retaliatory acts
occurred more than 45 days before Tealeh initiated contact with an EEO counselor and are
therefore time-barred. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).
Tealeh also appears to argue that his October 2020 emergency placement and
suspension were retaliatory. However, Tealeh did not include these allegations in his EEO
complaint or Amended Complaint. As such, any retaliation claim based on these actions
is not properly before the Court. See Parisi v. Boeing Co., 400 F.3d 583, 585 (8th Cir.
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2005) (holding that a plaintiffs discrimination claims in a lawsuit are limited to the scope
of their EEO charge and investigation, and dismissing claims not included in the EEO
complaint).
Even assuming, arguendo, that Tealeh’s retaliation claim were timely and properly
exhausted, the Court finds that Tealeh has not established a prima facie case of retaliation.
While Tealeh engaged in protected activity by filing EEO complaints in July 2019 and
November 2020, he has not presented sufficient evidence of a causal connection between
these complaints and any adverse employment action.
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that “more than a temporal connection
between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a
genuine factual issue on retaliation.” Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136
(8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); see Feltmann v. Sieben, 108 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 1997); see
Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 F.3d 343, 346-47 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, Tealeh relies
primarily on the temporal proximity between his EEO activity and the alleged retaliatory
acts to support his claim.
However, he has not presented any additional evidence
suggesting that his protected activity was the reason for the adverse actions. The decision
makers involved in the challenged actions have consistently cited legitimate, non-
retaliatory reasons for their decisions, such as the selection process for the 204B training,
Tealeh’s misconduct, and the allocation of overtime under the CBA.
Moreover, the record evidence undercuts Tealeh’s retaliation claim. For instance,
Tealeh alleges that Supervisor Greg Tate retaliated against him by not registering him for
the February 2020 204B training. However, the record shows that Tate did, in fact, register
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Tealeh for the training on the same day Tealeh requested registration. At the time of
registration, the class was already full, and Tealeh was placed on a waitlist for a subsequent
session that was ultimately canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Similarly, Tealeh’s claim that he was disciplined in October 2020 in retaliation for
his EEO activity is not supported by the record. Defendant has consistently maintained
that Tealeh was placed on emergency placement and suspended due to his threatening
behavior toward his supervisor, not because of his EEO complaints. Tealeh has not
presented any evidence to the contrary.
Tealeh’s attempt to analogize his case to Gilooly v. Missouri Department ofHealth
& Senior Services, 421 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 2005), is unpersuasive. In Gilooly, the plaintiff
was terminated for allegedly making false statements during an investigation and grievance
hearing that followed his accusations of sexual harassment against former co-workers. 421
F.3d at 740. The court found that this termination could potentially support a retaliation
claim, as the reasons for firing must be sufficiently independent from the employee’s
protected activity. Id. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence that Tealeh was disciplined
for his EEO activity or for statements made during an investigation following EEO activity.
Rather, the record shows that Tealeh was disciplined for threatening his supervisor, a
legitimate and non-retaliatory reason unrelated to any protected conduct.
Even if Tealeh could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Defendant has
articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the challenged actions, and Tealeh has
not demonstrated that these reasons are pretextual. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1047
(stating that a plaintiff may show pretext by demonstrating that the defendant’s proffered
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reason is unworthy of credence). Tealeh’s arguments regarding pretext are largely based
on unsupported allegations and mischaracterizations of the record. He has not presented
evidence showing that Defendant’s proffered reasons are unworthy of credence.
After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court
concludes .that Tealeh’s retaliation claim is time-barred, as all of the alleged retaliatory acts
identified in his Amended Complaint and opposition brief occurred outside the actionable
45-day time period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Moreover, to the extent Tealeh seeks
to base his retaliation claim on his October 2020 emergency placement and suspension,
those allegations are not properly before the Court because Tealeh did not include them in
his EEO complaint. See Parisi, 400 F.3d at 585.
Even if the Court were to consider the merits of Tealeh’s retaliation claim, the record
evidence does not support a prima facie case of retaliation. Tealeh has not presented
sufficient evidence of a causal connection between his EEO activity and any adverse
employment action, relying instead on mere temporal proximity. See Kiel, 169 F.3d at
1136 (“more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse
employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation.”).
Furthermore, Defendant has articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the
challenged actions, and Tealeh has not demonstrated that these reasons are pretextual. See
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1047.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Tealeh’s retaliation claim. The claim is time-barred, and even if it were timely, Tealeh has
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not presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation or to show
that Defendant’s proffered reasons for the adverse actions are pretextual.
V.
Hostile Work Environment Claim
Tealeh alleges that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his race
and national origin.
He contends that various incidents, including harassment by a
coworker, management’s failure to address his complaints, and unwarranted discipline,
created a work environment permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult.
Defendant argues that the conduct and comments identified by Tealeh are
insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim and that Tealeh improperly
attempts to recast his disparate treatment and retaliation claims as a hostile work
environment claim.
To succeed on a harassment or hostile work environment claim under Title VII, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) they are a member of a protected class; (2) unwelcome
harassment occurred; (3) there is a causal nexus between the harassment and their
protected-group status; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take proper remedial action. See Jackman, 728 F.3d at 805. The harassment must
be so severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment. Sutherland v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 580 F.3d 748, 751 (8th
Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). The standard for demonstrating a hostile work environment
is demanding, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
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discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. Carpenter v. Con- Way
Cent. Express, Inc., 481 F.3d 611,618 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
The Court begins by noting that Tealeh’s hostile work environment claim appears
to conflate discrete acts of alleged discrimination and retaliation with the severe or
pervasive conduct required to support a hostile work environment claim. The Supreme
Court has made clear that these are distinct concepts, emphasizing that discrete
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts
alleged in timely filed charges. Nat’lR.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113
(2002). In contrast, “[a] hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of
separate acts that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Id. at 117
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l).).
As such, the Court will focus its analysis on the specific conduct and comments that
Tealeh alleges created a hostile work environment, rather than the discrete acts of alleged
discrimination and retaliation that form the basis of his other claims. The record evidence
shows that Tealeh identified three main categories of conduct and comments that he
believes support his hostile work environment claim: (1) race-based comments by
supervisors and coworkers; (2) harassment by a coworker, Shawn Smegal; and (3)
management’s failure to adequately address his complaints.
Turning first to the race-based comments, Tealeh testified that Supervisor Greg Tate
made two comments that he found offensive: (1) during a May 2019 incident, Tate
allegedly said he was going to call the police because “this is what Black people understand”
or “[t]hat’s the only language you people understand”; and (2) in October 2020, Tate said
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he was “tired of hearing about discrimination” and referenced his own race, stating that he
t
himself was Black. Tealeh also alleges that in November 2019, a Black coworker told him
he should “take [his] Black ass back to Africa” if he did not like the way things were done.
While these comments are certainly inappropriate and facially charged, the Court
finds that they do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive conduct necessary to support
a hostile work environment daim. The Eighth Circuit has consistently held that “a few
isolated or sporadic incidents will not suffice; rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate the
alleged harassment was ‘so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work
environment.’” Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir.
2006) (quotation omitted). Racial slurs alone do not necessarily render a work environment
hostile as a matter of law. See Singletary, 423 F.3d at 893. For conduct to be actionable
as a hostile work environment, it must be severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions
of employment and be viewed by a reasonable person as hostile. Id.
Here, the comments identified by Tealeh, while offensive, were relatively isolated
incidents that occurred sporadically over a period of more than a year. This is similar to
the situation in Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., where the Eighth Circuit held that a
supervisor’s use of racial slurs about customers, competitors, or other employees, occurring
approximately once a month over a two-year period, was insufficient to create a hostile
work environment for the plaintiff. 378 F.3d 756, 759-60 (8th Cir. 2004). Likewise, in
Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., the court found that sporadic racially-
motivated misconduct by the plaintiffs coworkers, including racial epithets and offensive
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graffiti, was “neither severe nor pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.”
302 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002).
The Court reaches a similar conclusion with respect to Tealeh’s allegations of
harassment by his coworker, Shawn Smegal. While Tealeh testified that Smegal blocked
his path, disrupted his work, called him names, and made threatening gestures, he has not
presented evidence showing that Smegal’s conduct was based on Tealeh’s race or national
origin. To support a hostile work environment claim, the harassment must be based on a
protected characteristic. Singletary, 423 F.3d at 893.
Moreover, the record shows that USPS management took steps to address Tealeh’s
complaints about Smegal, such as separating the two employees and instructing them not
to work in the same area. This undermines Tealeh’s argument that management failed to
take appropriate action in response to his complaints. While Tealeh may have been
dissatisfied with management’s response, Title VII “does not require an employer to fire”
a harasser; rather, what an employer must do is to take prompt remedial action reasonably
calculated to end the harassment. Engel v. Rapid City Sch. Dist., 506 F.3d 1118, 1125 (8th
Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Finally, to the extent Tealeh argues that management’s failure to investigate his
complaints or take appropriate disciplinary action contributed to a hostile work
environment, the Court finds that the record does not support this claim. The evidence
shows that USPS management did respond to Tealeh’s complaints, even if not always to
his satisfaction. As noted above, Title VII does not require an employer to take specific
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disciplinary action against an alleged harasser; rather, the employer must take prompt
remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Id.
After a thorough and independent review of the record evidence and the relevant
legal standards, the Court concludes that Tealeh has not presented sufficient evidence to
support a hostile work environment claim. The race-based comments and incidents of
harassment identified by Tealeh, while offensive, are not sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the terms and conditions of his employment, as required by Eighth Circuit precedent.
See Sutherland, 580 F.3d at 751 (holding that to prove a hostile work environment claim,
the harassment must be so severe or pervasive that it alters the employment conditions);
see Nitsche, 446 F.3d at 846 (holding that to be actionable, the conduct complained of must
be extreme in nature and not merely rude or unpleasant, and that allegations of a few
isolated or sporadic incidents will not suffice; rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate the
alleged harassment was ‘so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work
environment.’); see Bainbridge, 378 F.3d at 759-60 (holding that sporadic racial slurs, no
more than one per month, not directed at the plaintiff or his family, did not render the work
environment objectively hostile or alter the terms and conditions of employment); see
Woodland, 302 F.3d at 844 (holding that sporadic racially-motivated misconduct by
coworkers, including racial epithets and graffiti, was ‘neither severe nor pervasive enough
to create a hostile work environment’ where the employer took prompt and adequate
remedial action in response to reported incidents).
Moreover, the record does not support Tealeh’s claim that USPS management failed
to take appropriate action in response to his complaints.
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management did take steps to address Tealeh’s concerns, such as separating him from
Smegal and instructing them nbt to work in the same area. While Tealeh may have been
dissatisfied with management’s response, Title VII does not require an employer to. take
specific disciplinary action against an alleged harasser; rather, the employer must take
prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Engel, 506 F.3d at
1125.
Accordingly, based on the evidence in the record and the applicable legal standards,
the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Tealeh’s hostile work
environment claim. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Tealeh, the evidence
is insufficient to support a finding that he was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment
that altered the terms and conditions of his employment.
VI.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on all of Tealeh’s claims.
First, the Court finds that the majority of Tealeh’s disparate treatment and retaliation
claims are time-barred, as they are based on alleged discriminatory acts that occurred more
than 45 days before Tealeh initiated contact with an EEO counselor. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.105(a)(1).
Second, with respect to Tealeh’s timely disparate treatment claims, the Court
concludes that Tealeh has not established a prima facie case of discrimination or shown
that Defendant’s proffered reasons for its actions are pretextual. Tealeh has not presented
evidence showing that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees
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outside his protected class or that the circumstances surrounding the alleged adverse
actions give rise to an inference of discrimination. Moreover, Defendant has articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his actions, and Tealeh has not demonstrated that
these reasons are unworthy of credence.
Third, even if Tealeh’s retaliation claim were timely, the Court finds that Tealeh has
not established a prima facie case of retaliation or shown that Defendant’s proffered
reasons for the alleged retaliatory acts are pretextual. Tealeh has not presented evidence
of a causal connection between his protected activity and any adverse employment action,
relying instead on mere temporal proximity. Furthermore, Defendant has articulated
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the challenged actions, and Tealeh has not
demonstrated that these reasons are pretextual.
Finally, the Court concludes that Tealeh has not presented sufficient evidence to
support a hostile work environment claim. The race-based comments and incidents of
harassment identified by Tealeh are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
and conditions of his employment. Moreover, the record shows that USPS management
took prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to address Tealeh’s complaints.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant General Louis DeJoy’s motion for summary
judgment, (Dkt. 87), is GRANTED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: April 29, 2024
s/Joan N. Ericksen
Joan N. Ericksen
United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Case No. 21-cv-1318 (JNE/DJF)
Flomo Tealeh,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Postmaster General Louis DeJoy,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Flomo Tealeh brought this action against his former employer, Defendant
Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, alleging employment discrimination based on race and
national origin, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all
claims. Tealeh has now appealed the Court’s order to the Eighth Circuit and has applied
to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). After careful consideration of Tealeh’s financial
situation and the potential merits of his appeal, the Court finds that Tealeh has sufficiently
demonstrated his inability to pay the filing fee and that his appeal is taken in good faith.
Accordingly, the Court grants his request for IFP status.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Flomo Tealeh, a former mail handler at the United States Postal Service
(“USPS”), filed this action alleging discrimination based on race and national origin,
retaliation, and hostile work environment. Tealeh, who is Black and Liberian-American,
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alleged that he was subjected to various instances of disparate treatment, retaliation, and a
hostile work environment during his employment from February 2017 to February 2022.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on all of Tealeh’s claims. On April 29,
2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion, finding that the majority of Tealeh’s disparate
treatment and retaliation claims were time-barred and that, for the timely claims, Tealeh
failed to establish prima facie cases of discrimination or retaliation or to show pretext. The
Court also concluded that Tealeh did not present sufficient evidence to support a hostile
work environment claim.
Tealeh appealed the Court’s order to the Eighth Circuit and applied to proceed IFP.
The Court now considers his request.
ANALYSIS
A litigant who seeks to be excused from paying the filing fee for an appeal in a
federal case may apply for IFP status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. To qualify for IFP status,
the litigant must demonstrate that they cannot afford to pay the full filing fee. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1).
In his IFP application, Tealeh has provided detailed financial information
demonstrating that his monthly income is close to his monthly expenses, leaving little
disposable income to pay the appeal fees. Tealeh has also stated that paying the fees would
cause him significant financial hardship, including the inability to pay for essentials like
rent, utilities, and food. Based on this information, the Court finds that Tealeh has
sufficiently demonstrated his inability to pay the filing fee.
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In addition to financial eligibility, the Court must also determine whether the appeal
is taken in good faith. An appeal is taken in good faith if it presents an arguable basis in
law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). While the Court found
significant weaknesses in Tealeh’s claims at the summary judgment stage, Tealeh has
identified specific issues he intends to raise on appeal, suggesting that the appeal is being
brought in good faith and not for an improper purpose.
The Court acknowledges that reasonable jurists could find Tealeh’s appeal to be
frivolous given the apparent weaknesses in his claims. However, the Court also recognizes
that granting IFP status would allow Tealeh to present his arguments to the appellate court,
even if his chances of success on the merits may be low.
After weighing Tealeh’s financial situation, the potential hardship caused by paying
the appeal fees, and the good faith basis for his appeal, the Court finds that granting IFP
status is appropriate in this case.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on
Appeal, (Dkt. 108), is GRANTED.
Dated: June 5, 2024
s/Joan N, Ericksen
Joan N. Ericksen
United States District Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Case No. 21-cv-1318 (WMW/JFD)
Flomo Tealeh,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.
Postmaster General Louis DeJoy; Merrick
Garland, U.S. Attorney General', and
Andrew M. Luger, United States Attorney
for the District ofMinnesota,1
Defendants.
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 17), Plaintiffs pro se
motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 27), and Plaintiff s pro se “Motion to Hear Plaintiff s
Complaint,” (Dkt. 32). For the reasons addressed below, Defendants’ motion is granted in
part and denied in part, and Plaintiffs motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff Flomo Tealeh was a mail handler for
the United States Postal Service (USPS) at a USPS facility in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Defendants are Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, United States Attorney General Merrick
Garland, and United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota Andrew M. Luger.
1
By operation of law, United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota Andrew
M. Luger is substituted for former United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota
Erica MacDonald. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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Tealeh filed this lawsuit against Defendants on June 1, 2021, alleging that he was
discriminated against on the basis of his race and national origin while employed by USPS.
Tealeh has twice submitted administrative complaints to the USPS Equal
Employment Opportunity Office (USPS EEO). Tealeh submitted his first complaint in
2019 (2019 EEO Complaint), alleging that he was subjected to a hostile work environment
because of his race and national origin, and that he experienced retaliation. Tealeh alleged
that his co-workers made racist comments about him, that his co-workers engaged in
physical altercations with Tealeh and that management did not respond properly to these
incidents. On January 13,2020, USPS EEO issued Tealeh a document titled Dismissal of
Formal EEO Complaint that advises Tealeh of his right to file an appeal or a civil action in
federal district court within 90 days of his receipt of the decision.
Tealeh submitted his second USPS EEO complaint in 2020 (2020 EEO Complaint),
alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of race and national origin, that he
experienced retaliation and that he was subject to a hostile work environment. Tealeh
alleged that he was improperly denied career advancement opportunities, suspended and
falsely accused of wrongdoing. After receiving a right to file a formal complaint, Tealeh
did so on December 22,2020. On January 28, 2021, the USPS EEO issued a document to
Tealeh titled Partial Acceptance/Partial Dismissal of Formal EEO Complaint - Revised.
The document provides that the USPS EEO will investigate a portion of Tealeh’s
allegations and, after completing the investigation, the USPS EEO will provide a copy of
the investigative report to Tealeh. The document explains that Tealeh can thereafter elect
to have a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
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Administrative Judge or to obtain a final decision by the agency head or designee without
a hearing. On March 6,2021, the USPS EEO issued a document titled Dismissal of Formal
EEO Complaint that informs Tealeh that he is entitled to file an appeal or a civil action in
federal district court within 90 days of his receipt of the dismissal decision.
Tealeh commenced this action on June 1,2021, and filed an amended complaint on
August 5,2021, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16. His allegations include claims of disparate treatment (Count I), retaliation
(Count II) and a hostile work environment (Count III).2
Defendants seek dismissal of Tealeh’s amended complaint for four reasons. First,
Defendants contend that the allegations in Tealeh’s amended complaint that Tealeh
previously raised in his 2019 EEO Complaint were not administratively exhausted and are
now untimely. Second, Defendants maintain that the allegations in Tealeh’s amended
complaint that Tealeh raised in his 2020 EEO Complaint were not administratively
exhausted. Third, Defendants argue that any allegations related to conduct that occurred
after Tealeh filed his 2020 EEO Complaint should have been, but were not, raised
administratively. Fourth, Defendants seek dismissal of Tealeh’s claims against Garland
and Luger (DOJ Defendants) because Tealeh fails to allege facts that implicate DOJ
Defendants. Tealeh moves for summary judgment and separately moves for the Court “to
hear [his] complaint.” The Court addresses, in turn, Defendants’ arguments as they relate
Although Tealeh’s claims are not numbered in the amended complaint, the Court
assigns numbers to Tealeh’s claims for ease of reference.
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to the counts alleged in Tealeh’s amended complaint, Tealeh’s motion for summary
judgment and Tealeh’s motion to have the Court hear his complaint.
ANALYSIS
A complaint must be dismissed if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must
allege sufficient facts that, when accepted as true, state a facially plausible claim to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When determining whether the complaint
states such a claim, a district court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint
and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Blankenship v. USA Truck,
Inc., 601 F.3d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 2010). The factual allegations need not be detailed, but
they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,555,
570 (2007). A plaintiff, however, must offer more than “labels and conclusions” or a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. at 555. Legal conclusions
that are couched as factual allegations may be disregarded by the district court. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678-79. When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court may consider
“matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice,
matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits
attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned.” Dittmer Props., L.P. v.
F.D.I.C., 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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I.
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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
A.
Disparate Treatment (Count I)
Defendants argue that Tealeh’s disparate-treatment claim should be dismissed
because it has not been exhausted and is untimely. Tealeh disagrees.
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII, a plaintiff
must show:
(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he met his
employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (4) the circumstances give rise to an
inference of discrimination (for example, similarly situated
employees outside the protected class were treated differently).
Lake v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 596 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2010). If the employee makes
out this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to identify a legitimate reason
for the adverse employment action. Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000).
Tealeh alleges that he is an African/Liberian American but Tealeh does not specifically
allege that he experienced disparate treatment as a result of his membership of this
protected class. Tealeh alleges that he performed his job duties in an exemplary fashion
and that, following an on-the-job accident, his employer permanently revoked his driving
privilege despite other employees regaining their driving privileges following more serious
accidents. Tealeh also alleges that he was denied overtime while other drivers received
overtime and that his Emergency Federal Employee Leave (EFEL) request for leave to get
immunized against COVID-19 was denied while EFEL requests submitted by other
employees were granted.
Defendants do not contend that Tealeh has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
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claim for disparate treatment on the basis of race or national origin. Rather, Defendants
maintain that Tealeh’s disparate-treatment claim is time barred or not justiciable because
Tealeh failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The parties dispute whether Tealeh’s disparate-treatment claim arising from facts
first alleged in his 2019 EEO Complaint is time barred. Under Title VII, “[w]ithin 90 days
of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit... an employee...
if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint... may file a civil action ... in which
civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the
defendant.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Dismissal of a formal EEO complaint is a final
disposition of an employee’s complaint. On January 13,2020, USPS EEO notified Tealeh
of the dismissal of his formal EEO complaint and informed Tealeh that he had 90 days to
file an action in federal court challenging the dismissal. Tealeh did not file the instant
lawsuit until June 1,2021, and he does not allege that he filed an earlier lawsuit challenging
the dismissal of the claims raised in his 2019 EEO Complaint. For this reason, Tealeh is
barred from raising in this lawsuit disparate-treatment allegations that he raised in his 2019
EEO Complaint.
The parties also disagree as to whether Tealeh’s disparate-treatment claim arising
from facts first alleged in his 2020 EEO Complaint is time barred. On March 6, 2021,
USPS EEO notified Tealeh that it was dismissing his formal complaint. On June 1,2021,
Tealeh filed this lawsuit, alleging claims related to the discriminatory employment
practices that he challenged in his 2020 EEO Complaint. Even assuming Tealeh received
the USPS EEO’s notice of dismissal on March 6,2021, the day the notice was sent, Tealeh
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filed this lawsuit within 87 days thereafter. Tealeh, therefore, filed a lawsuit challenging
the USPS EEO’s decision on the claims alleged in his 2020 EEO Complaint within the 90day limit.3 For this reason, any allegations Tealeh raised in his 2020 EEO Complaint
related to disparate treatment on the basis of race or national origin are not time barred.
The parties also dispute whether Tealeh is barred from raising claims related to
incidents that occurred after Tealeh filed his 2020 EEO Complaint and which Tealeh has
never raised administratively. “A charge under this section shall be filed within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). An employee is required to exhaust his or her administrative
remedies with respect to each “discrete act[ ] of alleged discrimination” before the
employee may litigate the alleged discrimination. See Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc.,
686 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2012). Tealeh has not alleged that he filed a third EEO
complaint pertaining to offensive conduct that post-dates his 2020 EEO Complaint. For
this reason, Tealeh’s allegations of disparate treatment that involve conduct that occurred
after he filed his 2020 EEO Complaint have not been administratively exhausted and,
therefore, cannot be raised in the first instance in this lawsuit.
For the reasons addressed above, Tealeh’s disparate-treatment claim, as supported
by facts first raised in his 2020 EEO Complaint, is not time barred. The Court, therefore,
3
Defendants cite decisions from other Circuits in support of their argument that this
Court should dismiss Tealeh’s lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. At
most, those cases offer persuasive authority for this Court. Because the text of Section
2000e-16 and the USPS EEO’s notice of dismissal clearly state that Tealeh has a right to
sue in federal district court so long as he files his case within 90 days of receipt of the
notice, Defendants’ arguments on this point are not persuasive.
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denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I of Tealeh’s complaint to the extent that it is
supported by facts raised in Tealeh’s 2020 EEO Complaint.
B.
Retaliation (Count II)
Defendants argue that Tealeh’s retaliation claim should be dismissed because it has
not been exhausted and is untimely. Tealeh disagrees.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show:
“(1) that he or she engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse employment
action was taken against him or her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the two
events.” Blackwell v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 822 F.3d 431,436 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The defendant may rebut the plaintiffs claim by advancing a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action, which the plaintiff must then show was only
a pretext for discrimination.” Id. Tealeh alleges that he reported to management that
certain mail handlers were taking long breaks while at work, even though Tealeh and other
mail handlers received citations for taking thirty-minute breaks. Tealeh told management
that he believed that this difference in treatment was discriminatory. Tealeh alleges that
management retaliated against him by intimidating him and portraying him as a
troublemaker. Tealeh further alleges that he was humiliated in front of coworkers, removed
from assignments, suspended without pay, denied training opportunities, and denied career
advancement opportunities due to his report to management.
Defendants do not contend that Tealeh has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
retaliation claim. Rather, Defendants maintain that Tealeh’s retaliation claim is time barred
or not justiciable because Tealeh failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
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The parties dispute whether Tealeh’s retaliation claim arising from facts first alleged
in his 2019 EEO Complaint is time barred. As addressed in the preceding analysis, under
Title VII, an employee has 90 days from the employee’s receipt of notice of the employer’s
dismissal of the employee’s formal EEO complaint to file a lawsuit in federal district court
challenging the dismissal. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Dismissal of a formal EEO
complaint is a final disposition of an employee’s complaint. On January 13, 2020, USPS
EEO notified Tealeh of the dismissal of his formal EEO complaint and informed Tealeh
that he had 90 days to file an action in federal court challenging the dismissal. Tealeh did
not file the instant lawsuit until June 1,2021, and he does not allege that he filed an earlier
lawsuit challenging the dismissal of the claims raised in his 2019 EEO Complaint. For
this reason, Tealeh is barred from raising in this lawsuit the retaliation allegations that he
raised in his 2019 EEO Complaint.
The parties also disagree as to whether Tealeh’s retaliation claim arising from facts
first alleged in his 2020 EEO Complaint is time barred. On March 6, 2021, USPS EEO
notified Tealeh that it was dismissing his formal complaint. On June 1,2021, Tealeh filed
this lawsuit, alleging claims related to the discriminatory employment practices that he
challenged in his 2020 EEO Complaint. Even assuming Tealeh received the USPS EEO’s
notice of dismissal on March 6,2021, the day the notice was sent, Tealeh filed this lawsuit
within 87 days thereafter. Tealeh, therefore, filed a lawsuit challenging the USPS EEO’s
decision on the claims alleged in his 2020 EEO Complaint within the 90-day limit. For
this reason, any retaliation allegations Tealeh raised in his 2020 EEO Complaint are not
time barred.
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The parties also dispute whether Tealeh is barred from raising a retaliation claim
related to incidents that occurred after Tealeh filed his 2020 EEO Complaint and which
Tealeh has never raised administratively. “A charge under this section shall be filed within
one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). An employee is required to exhaust his or her administrative
remedies with respect to each “discrete act[ ] of alleged discrimination” before the
employee may litigate the alleged discrimination. See Richter, 686 F.3d at 851. Tealeh
has not alleged that he filed a third EEO complaint pertaining to offensive conduct that
post-dates his 2020 EEO Complaint. For this reason, Tealeh’s retaliation allegations that
involve conduct that occurred after he filed his 2020 EEO Complaint have not been
administratively exhausted and, therefore, cannot be raised in the first instance in this
lawsuit.
For the reasons addressed above, Tealeh’s retaliation claim, as supported by facts
first raised in his 2020 EEO Complaint, is not time barred. The Court, therefore, denies
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II of Tealeh’s complaint, to the extent that it is
supported by allegations of retaliation first raised in Tealeh’s 2020 EEO Complaint.
C.
Hostile Work Environment (Count HI)
Defendants argue that Tealeh’s hostile-work-environment claim should be
dismissed because it has not been exhausted and is untimely. Tealeh disagrees.
To establish a hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff must show:
1) [he] belongs to a protected group; 2) [he] was subjected to
unwelcome harassment based on [membership in that group];
3) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
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[his] employment: 4) [his] employer knew or should have
known of the harassment; and 5) the employer failed to take
proper action.
Stewart v. Rise, Inc., 191 F.3d 849, 859 (8th Cir. 2015).
To be actionable, the
“objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that
a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did
perceive to be so.” Clearwater v. Jndep. Sch. Dist. No. J 66,231 F.3d 1122, 1128 (8th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 787 (1998)). Here, Tealeh alleges that he is an African/Liberian American.
Tealeh alleges that he was accused of stealing overtime, humiliated, suspended, and falsely
accused of threatening a coworker. Tealeh alleges that he lost wages and benefits and was
denied career advancement opportunities as a result of the harassment he experienced.
Tealeh alleges that he reported issues to management and filed EEO complaints. Beyond
Tealeh’s allegation that he is an African/Liberian American, however, Tealeh does not
specifically allege that the hostile work environment resulted from his status as a member
of a protected group. But Defendants do not contend that Tealeh has failed to allege facts
sufficient to make out a hostile-work-environment claim. Rather, Defendants maintain that
Tealeh’s claim is time barred or not justiciable because Tealeh failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
The parties dispute whether Tealeh’s hostile-work-environment claim arising from
facts first alleged in his 2019 EEO Complaint is time barred. As addressed in the preceding
analysis, under Title VII, an employee has 90 days from the employee’s receipt of notice
of the employer’s dismissal of the employee’s formal EEO complaint to file a lawsuit in
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the USPS EEO’s notice of dismissal on March 6,2021, the day the notice was sent, Tealeh
filed this lawsuit within 87 days thereafter. Tealeh, therefore, filed a lawsuit challenging
the USPS EEO’s decision on the claims alleged in his 2020 EEO Complaint within the 90day limit. For this reason, any claim Tealeh raised in his 2020 EEO Complaint related to
a hostile work environment is not time barred.
The parties also dispute whether Tealeh is barred from raising a hostile-work
environment claim related to incidents that occurred after Tealeh filed his 2020 EEO
Complaint and which Tealeh has never raised administratively. Ordinarily, an employee
must exhaust his or her administrative remedies with respect to each “discrete act[ ] of
alleged discrimination” before the employee may litigate the alleged discrimination. See
Richter, 686 F.3d at 851. However, with respect to hostile-work-environment claims, so
long as “an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time
period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of
determining liability.” Nat’lR.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 117. “That act need not,
however, be the last one,” because “[a]s long as the employer has engaged in enough
activity to make out an actionable hostile environment claim, an unlawful employment
practice has ‘occurred,’ even if it is still occurring.” Id.
In his 2020 EEO Complaint, Tealeh raised actionable conduct that allegedly
contributed to a hostile work environment. In his amended complaint, Tealeh alleges that
similar actionable activity continued after he filed the 2020 EEO Complaint.
In
determining liability, the Court may consider the actions that post-date Tealeh’s filing of
the 2020 EEO Complaint that allegedly contributed to the hostile work environment.
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For these reasons, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Tealeh’s
hostile-work-environment claim to the extent that it is supported by alleged activity that
forms part of a pattern of hostile-work-environment conduct that Tealeh raised in his 2020
EEO Complaint.
D.
Dismissal of DOJ Defendants
Defendants also move to dismiss Tealeh’s claims as alleged against DOJ Defendants
because Tealeh fails to allege any facts pertaining to either defendant. Because Tealeh
alleges no facts that implicate the conduct of DOJ Defendants, Tealeh fails to state a claim
against DOJ Defendants upon which relief may be granted. The Court, therefore, grants
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Tealeh’s claims against DOJ Defendants.
II.
Tealeh’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Tealeh moves for summary judgment. The Court notified Tealeh that his motion
for summary judgment did not comply with Local Rule 7.1 because it failed to include a
meet-and-confer statement, memorandum of law, notice of hearing, word-count
compliance certificate, or proposed order. Tealeh never remedied this noncompliance.
Tealeh’s motion for summary judgment, therefore, is procedurally improper. Tealeh’s
motion for summary judgment also is premature because discovery has yet to commence.
See Brown v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 971, 978 (D. Minn. 2010)
(concluding that a party’s motion for summary judgment was “premature at [the] early,
pre-discovery juncture”). For these reasons, the Court denies Tealeh’s motion for summary
judgment.
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Tealeh’s “Motion to Hear Plaintiff’s Complaint”
Tealeh moves for the Court “to hear [his] complaint,” but the Court cannot discern
the purpose of the motion or the relief Tealeh seeks. The Court, therefore, denies Tealeh’s
motion.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 17), is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART as follows:
a.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint is
GRANTED as to Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Merrick
Garland and Andrew M. Luger; and
b.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint is
DENIED as to Plaintiff s claims against Defendant Postmaster General
Louis DeJoy as addressed herein.
2.
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 27), is DENIED.
3.
Plaintiffs motion to hear his complaint, (Dkt. 32), is DENIED.
Dated: July 18, 2022
s/Wilhelmina M, Wright
Wilhelmina M. Wright
United States District Judge
15
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