Emergency Application — Ronald Palmer Heath, Petitioner v. Florida, et al.

*** CAPITAL CASE ***

No. ______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

____________________________________________________________________

RONALD PALMER HEATH,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

____________________________________________________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Florida

____________________________________________________________________

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

____________________________________________________________________

EXECUTION SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 10, 2026, AT 6:00 P.M.

____________________________________________________________________

To the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of

the United States and Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit:

Petitioner Ronald Heath requests a stay of his scheduled February 10, 2026,

execution pending this Court’s consideration of his concurrently filed petition for a

writ of certiorari. See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006); Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 889 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f); Supreme Court Rule 23.

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The standards for granting a stay of execution have been distilled into four

factors:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will

substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and

(4) where the public interest lies.”

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (internal citation omitted).

First, Heath has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the

merits as to the substance of his Eighth Amendment maladministration-of-lethalinjection claim, described in more detail in his accompanying certiorari petition. In

sum, Heath’s claim is based on undisputed Florida Department of Corrections

(“FDOC”) records showing that, over the course of an unprecedented 19 executions in

the last 12 months, FDOC officials have on numerous occasions administered lethal

injections using expired drugs, incorrect dosages of drugs, and drugs not called for in

the State’s protocol. The records also reflect mishandling of drugs and other

deviations from the protocol, raising serious concerns about the FDOC’s ability to

properly store, transport, and maintain its supply of lethal chemicals.

By way of example, on June 25, 2025, a date corresponding to Florida inmate

Thomas Gudinas’s execution (which actually occurred on June 24), the inventory logs

only show 10 x 10ml vials of rocuronium bromide were removed (1000mg), suggesting

that FDOC only prepared half of the required paralytic drug, in violation of the

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Protocol

which

requires

2000mg,

withdrawn

into

20

x

10ml

vials:

On June 12, 2025, a date corresponding to Anthony Wainwright’s execution

(which occurred on June 10, 2025), seven vials of potassium acetate were removed

from FDOC’s inventory. This suggests that FDOC prepared only 280 milliequivalents

of potassium acetate in violation of the protocol, which requires 480 milliequivalents

(12 x 20ml vials):

At times, FDOC implements a four-drug protocol beyond what is authorized in

the current method. The logs show that during the executions of Edward James and

Michael Tanzi, FDOC administered lidocaine, a drug not called for in the protocol.

This indicates a level of improvisation and unpredictability beyond what is

authorized.

And finally, the records show that etomidate with an expiration date of

January 31, 2025, was used during the executions of Victor Jones on September 30,

2025; David Pittman on September 17, 2025; Curtis Windom on August 28, 2025; and

Kayle Bates on August 19, 2025, which is in direct violation of the protocol:

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These errors have already manifested in anomalous executions: during at least

one recent execution, the inmate labored for 20 minutes before dying and was

observed moving well into the execution when movement is not expected, indicating

a problem with the administration of the drugs, and distress.

Heath proffered these records, as well as a medical expert’s opinion that the

specific protocol deviations reflected in the FDOC logs place Heath, the next inmate

Florida intends to execute, at substantial risk of severe pain if they are repeated

during his execution, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Florida Supreme

Court, treating Heath’s maladministration-of-protocol claim as a traditional methodof-execution challenge, summarily denied relief, holding that Heath’s claim failed

under the traditional requirements of Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), and Glossip

v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015), did not warrant discovery, and was based purely on

speculation and conjecture—notwithstanding the undisputed FDOC records and

medical opinion that Heath proffered.

The Florida Supreme Court wrongly dismissed the importance of the

maladministration evidence Heath proffered, which should at least have resulted in

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further evidentiary development or some kind of explanation from the State. The

Florida Supreme Court also contravened this Court’s precedent in analyzing Heath’s

claim under the traditional method-of-execution framework, rather than as a claim

based on Florida’s maladministration of its chosen method. The decision below thus

provides an opportunity for this Court to clarify a question left open Baze: what are

the requirements for an Eighth Amendment pattern-of-maladministration claim?

Under the proper analysis, and consistent with this Court’s decision in Baze

and Glossip, Heath properly pleaded and provided strong evidentiary support for his

claim that Florida’s pattern of maladministration creates a substantial risk of severe

pain during his execution, and that Florida should be required to pause its current

ad-hoc practices for an independent review and implementation of appropriate

safeguards, as has been done in other states where maladministration occurred.

Heath has a substantial likelihood of success on his Eighth Amendment argument.

The other stay factors favor Heath as well. It is indisputable that Heath will

be irreparably harmed without a stay because he will be executed in a manner that

wantonly inflicts pain and suffering, violating the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, as

courts have widely suggested, irreparable injury is presumptive under warrant. See,

e.g., Wainwright v. Booker, 473 U.S. 935, 937 n.1 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The

third requirement that irreparable harm will result if a stay is not granted is

necessarily present in capital cases.”); see also In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1177

(11th Cir. 2003) (“We consider the irreparability of the injury that petitioner will

suffer in the absence of a stay to be self-evident.”).

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The irreparable injury in a case challenging the administration of an execution

protocol is not only the execution itself, but also the superadded pain that would occur

during that execution. See Powell v. Thomas, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1283 (M.D. Ala.),

aff'd, 641 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding “the alleged irreparable injury is not

the fact alone that [plaintiff] will die by execution,” but that he may experience

superadded pain “under present protocols” during that execution) (citing Baze, 553

U.S. at 50). This is not only because the pain during execution may be torturous, but

also because a violation of constitutional rights is presumed to cause irreparable

injury. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996).

A stay would not substantially harm the State. While the State has a

legitimate interest in the timely enforcement of valid criminal judgments, it has no

legitimate interest in executing Heath in a manner that would risk the wanton

infliction of pain of suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., In re

Holladay, 331 F.3d at 1177 (finding “no substantial harm that will flow to the State

of Alabama or its citizens from postponing petitioner’s execution to determine

whether that execution would violate the Eighth Amendment”). In fact, the State has

been on notice of its documented maladministration for at least two months, and has

had ample opportunity to remedy the repeated maladministration.

Finally, a stay would not be adverse to the public interest. On the contrary, the

public always has an interest in the preservation of constitutional rights and, most

certainly, in the dignified carrying out of a death sentence. See Ford v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (The Eighth Amendment seeks “to protect the dignity of

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society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance” when carrying out

an execution.) The legitimacy of the penological system turns on its adherence to

constitutional bounds. Thus, it is in the public interest to address and resolve the

merits of Heath’s claim to identify and prevent the unconstitutional risk of causing

gratuitous suffering. Allowing the State to execute Heath without meaningful review

of whether that execution violates the Constitution is adverse to the public interest.

Florida shows no signs of slowing its pace of executions or correcting the

repeated and serious violations in the administration of its lethal injection protocol.

It is clear that the State is unable to keep up with this pace while remaining within

constitutional bounds, and unwilling to correct its errors, leaving Heath to risk

suffering the consequences. The casual indifference that Florida courts have shown

to this severe and imminent danger should not result in rewarding Florida with its

twentieth execution in a year before a court can at least consider the merits of Heath’s

maladministration claim. This Court’s intervention is imperative.

The Court should stay Heath’s execution and grant his petition for a writ of

certiorari to address the important constitutional questions raised in this case.

/s/ Sonya Rudenstine

Sonya Rudenstine

Counsel of Record

531 NE Blvd

Gainesville, FL 32601

(352) 359-3972

srudenstine@yahoo.com

Counsel for Petitioner

DATED: FEBRUARY 6, 2026

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