Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lawrence Rhoden, Petitioner v. Brittany Greene, Warden

Supreme Court briefOct 24, 2025

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'.'I

NO:

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCT 2 k 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LAWRENCE RHODEN ( PRO SE PETITIONER)

VS.

BRITTANYGREEENE/WARDEN ( RESPONDENT)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAWRENCE RHODEN ( PRISONER ID # N70820)

WESTERN ILLINOIS CORRECTIONAL CTR.

2500 RT. #99

MT. STERLING, ILL 62353

' R^5EiVED

NOV-4 IMS

QUESTION PRESENTED

WHETHER A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IS LEGALLY ENTITLED TO A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALAB1LTITY

WHERE:

(1)

IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT A SUBSTANTIAL SHOWING OF THE DENIAL OF A

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT HAS OCCURRED.

(2)

THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT'S PROCEDURAL RULING IS AT LEAST DEBATABLE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINIONS BELOW

■................................................................................... ( Hi)

................................................................. (jv)

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

................................

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3-5

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

8-23

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 23-25

NOTICE OF FILING//CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

APPENDIX

25-26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

—-CK'

■!■

FEDERAL CASES,

Barefoot v Estelle, 463 U.S. 880(1983) ........................... .....................................................

Berger v United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)

..................................... .................................. 14,15

DeLuca v Lord, 77 F 3d. 378 ( 7th. Cir. 1998) ............................................................................

Eastefwood v Champions, 213 F.3d. 1321 (9th. Cir. 2000).............. ..........................................

Guay vSigSauer, Inc., 610 F. Supp 3d. 423 ( DNH 2022) .........................................................

Hohn v United States, 524 U.S. 236 ( 1998) ............................ .... ................ ............................

Johnson v Dretke, ^4-2 F3d. 901 (5th. Cir. 2006)................... .......................................................

Martinez v Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 ( 2012) ........... ................................................................................

Miller-Eli v Cockrell, Appeal #18- 35027 ( 9th, Cir. 2018) ............................................................

Panetti v Quaterman, 551 U.S. 930 ( 2007) ....... ........................................................................

22,23

Shannon v Newland, 410 F3d. 1083 ( 9th. Cir. 2005) .... .............................................. .................

Slack v McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 ( 2000) ............................. .......................................................... 6-9,18,22

Steward v Martenez-Villard, 523 U.S. 637 (1998)...................... ..................... ...........................

Strickland v Maryland, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) ............................................................. .................

Roe v FCA US LLC, 42 F 4th 1175 (10th. Cir. 2022) ....... ..............................................................

Traedal v Wainwright, 667 F. Supp 1456 ( S.D. Fla. 1985).............................................................

14,15

U.S. v Melbusch, No 15-485 ( 2nd Cir. 2021).......................... ............. ...........................................

17,18

STATE

CASES

People Ex Rel Wiseman v Nierstheimer, 401 III 260 (1948)

.........................................................

People v Rhoden, NO 1-93-0484 (1995)..................... ...................................................................

STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

28 U.S.C. 2254

....................................................

1,2,4,6,7,8,10,12,14,22

28 U.S.C 2244

.................................... ..................

6,7,9,10,22,23

28 U.S.C. 1254

....................................

28 U.S.C. 2253 ........................................

5,13,21

18 U.S.C. SEC. 4241

18, 20

725 ILCS 104-11 (C)

18,20

ILL. REV. STAT- CHAP. 38/ 1005-2-11 ........

18, 20

OPINIONS BELOW

(1)

THE 8/18/2025 ORDER OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AS EXHBIT "A"

IN THE APPENDIX

(2)

THE 5/30/2025 DOCKET TEXT ORDER OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT AS EXHBIT "B"

IN THE APPENDIX

(3)

THE 4/9/2025 ORDER OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT AS EXHBIT "AA" IN THE APPENDIX

(iv)

JURISDICTION

THIS HONORABLE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS FULL SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) TO REVIEW THE 8/18/2025

DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

BY THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT/ EXHIBIT "A"

IN APPENDIX. THUS, THIS PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS TIMELY

PRESENTED PURSUANTTO 28 U.S.C. 21201(C).

THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF A STATE PRISONER TO SEEK FEDERAL HABEAS COPRUS RELIEF IS

EXPRESSLY GUARANTEED IN 28 U.S.C. 2254 AND THE STANDARD FOR SUCH RELIEF UNDER

" AEDPA" IS SET FORTH IN 28 U.S.C. 2254 (D)(1).

THE 14th AMENDMENT TO OUR UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IS HEREBY INVOKED WHICH

EXPRESSLY PROVIDES:

" ALL PERSONS BORN OR NATURALIZED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND

SUBJECTTO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF, ARE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES,

AND OF THE STGATE WHEREIN THEY RESIDE. NO STATE SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE

ANY LAW WHICH SHALL ABRIDGE THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS

OF THE UNITED STATES; NOR SHALL ANY STATE DEPRIVE ANY PERSON OF LIFE,

LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; NOR DENY TO ANY

PERSON WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(1) Since June of 1989, Petitioner has been significantly mentally Impaired due to his longstanding

an well documented clinical diagnosis of serious personality disorders and substance abuse35 Judicially recognized and noted by Social Security Administrative Law Judge Lovert F Bassett

in his attached September 27,1991 written decision// EXHIBIT "AAA" in Appendix.

(2) More speciallyon September 27,1991 Admin. Law Judge Lovert F. Bassett issued his attached

wntten decision that Petitioner was mentally " disabled " under Section 1614(a)(3)(a) of the

Social Security Act, and succinctly found and held that Petitioner had been " disabled" since

June 12,1989 " because he suffers a personality disorder and substance addiction disorder

which medical evidence established to be severe " and had precluded Petitioner" from working

tor at least 12 continuous months". ( See attached EXHIBIT "AAA" in Appendix)

(3) Moreover, Judge Bassett also included in his said attached written decision/ EXHIBIT "AM"

that he considered evidence from 1990, including Petitioner's self-reported alcohol use since

age 14 and his consumption of " 1-2 fifths of liquor and $300 to $400 of cocaine per day"

an IQ score " in the lower end of the borderline range ", and the clinical Dx of " MIXED

BY DEPRESSION"^' C0NT'N°US ALC0H0L,SM AND A PERSONALITY DISORDER ACCOMPANIED

(4) On December 25,1991, Petitioner tragically shot and killed his common law wife and her 13

year old son due to his aforementioned and well-documented severe personality disorder

and substance addiction.

(5)

On December 16,1992, following a very short bench trial, Petitioner was found guilty and

convicted by a Cook County Circuit Court judge on (2) counts of 1st Degree Murder; and

sentenced to natural life in prison. On March 21,1995, Petitioner's said conviction was

affirmed on direct appeal in an unpublished Order.

(6) In September of 2006, Petitioner court-filed his pro se Federal Habeas Corpus Petition with

the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging his aforementioned

conviction; which was summarily denied as time-barred on January 11, 2007; and Petitioner

didn't appeal the decision.

(7) In June of 2024, Petitioner court-filed his pro se State Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition with the

Illinois State Supreme Court pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/10-124(3) based on a well-documented

unconstitutionally defective legal criminal process in a substantial form in wilful violation

of his 6th and 14th Amendment Due Process Rights in the following respects:

(A) Wilful prosecutorial misconduct

(B) No legally required pretrial fitness hearing due to well-documented incompetency.

(D) Wilful ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

(8)

On September 27, 2024, the Illinois State Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner's said

State Habeas Corpus Petition in a (1) sentence Order without any explanation for its decision

or any ruling on the merits of said Petition.

(9)

On November 24, 2024, Petitioner court-filed his pro se Federal Habeas Corpus Petition under

28 U.S.C 2254 based on the same above-mentioned (4) constitutional claims/violations set

forth in his said Illinois State Habeas Corpus Petition.

(10) On December 23, 2024, Respondent Warden Brittany Greene court-filed a Motion to Dismiss

Petitioner's said Federal Habeas Corpus Petition for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C

2244(b)(3)(a) alleging that Petitioner's said Petition is a " second or successive petition " and

that Petitioner has not obtained authorization to file it from the Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals, citing Burton v Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 ( 2007).

(11)

On January 2, 2025, Petitioner court-filed his pro se Response to Respondent's said Motion

to Dismiss based on well-settled and controlling federal law that his Federal Habeas Corpus

Petition is NOT a " second or successive petition " subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C 2244

(b)(3)(a); since a " constitutional claim in a second or successive federal habeas corpus

petition and not previously presented in a prior federal habeas corpus petition shall not be

dismissed when the second petition is based on an incompetency claim, as clearly

found and fully addressed in Petitioner's said Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, citing

Stewart v Martinese Villareal, 523 US 637 ( 1998), Panetti v Quarterman, 581 U.S. 930 (2007)

And Slack v McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 ( 2000).

(12) On April 9, 2025, U.S. District Court Judge Sue E. Myerscough held in her attached

written decision/ EXHIBIT "AA" in Appendix that none of Petitioner's proffered

cited cases allowed him to circumvent the plain statutory language of 28 U.S.C

2244 (3)(a) requiring him to " move in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for

an order authorizing the U.S. District Court to consider the application for a

Writ of Habeas Corpus before a second or successive application is filed in the

district court" However, it is extremely important to note that this same US

District Court judge expressly underscored that " Petitioner is free to file a

motion before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to authorize the filing of

a successive petition to the prior petition that was previously court-filed in the

Northern District of Illinois U.S. Court". (See attached 4/9/2025 Order/ EXHIBIT

"AA" in Appendix)

(13) On April 21, 2025, Petitioner timely court-filed his pro se Notice of Appeal from

the attached 4/9/2025 Order/ EXHIBIT "AA"; which was also docketed with the

U.S. Court of Appeals/ Seventh Circuit.

(14) On May 30, 2025, U.S. District Court Judge Sue Myerscough in her attached Docket

Text Order/ EXHIBIT "B" in Appendix declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability.

(15) Shortly thereafter, Petitioner court-filed his pro se Application for Certificate of

Appealability with the U.S. Court of Appeals/ Seventh Circuit pursuant to 28

U.S.C 2253; which was summarily denied in the attached totally baseless ORDER

of August 18, 2025/ EXHIBIT "A" in Appendix.

(16) Thus, to redress and further litigate his aforementioned and well-documented

Constitutional violations of his 6th and 14th Amendment Due Process Rights,

Petitioner respectfully and timely submits his factually and legally well-supported

Writ of Certiorari.

QUESTION PRESENTED// ARGUMENT

This Honorable United States Supreme Court in -Slack.v McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000)

firmly held and expressly underscored that IN DETERMINING WHETHER A CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY (COA) SHOULD BE ISSUED WHERE A FEDERAL HABEASCORPUS PETITION UNDER

28 U.S.C. 2254 HAS BEEN DISMISSED BASED ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS, THE STANDARD OF

REVIEW SHALL CONSIST OF THESE (2) COMPONENTS:

(1) Whetherthe U.S .District Court's procedural ruling is at least debatable under

28 U.S.C. 2244 (b)(1) and/or 28 U.S.C. 2244 (3)(a), AND

(2)

Whether the petitioner has demonstrated a substantial showing of a denial of

his/her Constitutional Right, as expressly stated in his/her Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C 2254.

Here, as found by this Honorable U.S. Supreme Court in its aforementioned holding

in_Sla-Ck-V_ McDaniel , supra., the attached ORDERS of the U.S. District Court/ EXHIBIT" B"

( 5/30/2025) and EXHIBIT "AA" (4/9/2025) in Appendix, both succinctly state that Petitioner's

subject Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, court-filed under 28 U.S.C 2254, was dismissed,

without prejudice, solely due to a procedural issue under 28 U.S.C 2244 (b)(3)(a).

However, in complete non-compliance with this Honorable Court's aforementioned

and succinctly mandated (2) component parts for Standard of Review in Slack v McDaniel,

supra., in determining whether Petitioner's requested Certificate of Appealability (COA)

should be issued, the attached and totally baseless ORDER of the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit/ EXHIBIT "A" in Appendix, succinctly denies Petitioner his requested COA

solely on the unfounded finding of " No substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right" and provides no mention of the aforementioned U.S. District Court's procedural ruling.

.h;S2tt5cbodOR3. Rofthe U.S. Cpurt „f ftppMs fortheSevonthCrct.it/

EXHBIT V tn Appendix Is dearly iB wBf,,.' no^WpliahdewitbffiisHohdfoWCdurt's

Sxptessiymandateil (S) c<>.rppn..n, p3rt, standard of Revlec. ItnjfoWfoinlng whate

WWner^WWest^^

and toe to to to S tores Ws Honored Court's review and issuanceof totoi toreto Writ of

Cer,iorarionthlspro<ed<,rolis,Uelnvolvineanexlr«n>elylrT,porlaoiandfUnrti,mcntol

Constitution rijhttoseelj fedtfal Habeas Corpus Relief, a, expressly guaranteed in

?S M.SX21S4 and the M*AB>Sntltt|Snt to ourUnited States Constitution. '

‘""“ver, this attached and laselcssCRaER of the D.S. Court of Appaal, far the

^^fh^rasH’/fXHiBli* "A" in Appendix^ represents the reason far the split ordec'sions

IftAelu.S.tturtofAppealsCircuiteonthfeirnpprtahtSt^

addressed below.

Therefore, the Question, ;o beifteseptedln this Writ ofCertiop,ri a re as.folId»s!

Whether Petitioner has demonstrated a substantial showing of a denial of his

addre!!ed in hfe

U.S.C. 2244 (B)(1) and/or (3)(A).

«WWe under

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(1)

(2)

“the rariOus ^itedStafeAppellateCircultCourts

con cermngthn Standardof ReviewforOCertiflcateof ApBealaWlity,asSu«:inctiy

ddresscd by this United States Supreme Court In Slack vMCDaniel.Siihra

Tills well-docurnented widespread of judicial m isapprehension of this Honorable Court's

extren-p|yimportant national Interests and has adversely imparted on many

SusraTa"V Prateiited

Fe^'»abeasWpBs petitioners under

zo U.b.C 2254.

SISMHCAM SPLIT DECISIONS IN VARIOUS US. APPELLATE CIRCUITCOURTS

.£ONCERIilW6.THE STAN BARD OF REVIEW FORACERTIFICATE OFAPPEALABIUtV

A.^CCINCTlYADDRFSSEDByTHISHffliORABtECOURTIN SLACKVMcnMlFi

Easterwood v Champion, 213 F3d. 1321 (10th Cir. 2000)

The petitioner's requested Certificate of Appealability was eventually granted

due to the U.S. District Court's error in dismissing the petitioner's Federal Habeas

Corpus Petition that wassignificantly based oh a substantial competency claim

and wrongfully considered time-barred under 28 U.S.C 2244(d).

Miller-Eli v Cockrell, 261 F3d. 445 ( 5th. Cir, 2001)

The U.S Court of Appeals Court erroneously evaluated arid denied the petitioner's

requested Certificate of Appealability under 28 U.S. C. 2253 (c)(2) and the

aforementioned holding by this Honorable Court in Slack v McDaniel, supra.

Morton v Gilbert, Appeal # 18-35027 (9th. Cir. 2018)

The U.S. Court of Appeals erroneously denied thepetitioner's requested Certificate

of Appealability indirect conflict with this Honorable Court's holding in Slack v

McDaniel, supra..

(4) Johnson v Dretke, 442 F. 3d. 901 (5th Ci r. 2006)

The U.S. Court of Appeals erroneously denied the petitioner's Certificate of Appealability

due to an alleged failure to timely comply with 28U.S.C.2244 (b) for a successive Federal

Habeas Corpus Petition.

(5) Shannon v Newland, 410F.3d. 1083 ( 9^. 2005)

The U.S. Court of Appeals erroneously denied the petitioner's Certificate of Appealability

due t6 the petitioner's alleged failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) with an untimely

filed Federal Habeas Corpus Petition and for the alleged no showing pf a violation of

a constitutional rightthrough improper jury instructions.

<11 >

THE WELL-DOCUMENTED AND WIDESPREAD OF JUDICIAL MISAPPREHENSION OF THIS

COURT'S AFOREMENTIONED COA STANDARD OF REVIEW CONCERNS EXTREMELY

IMPORTANT NATIONAL INTEREST AND HAS ADVERSELY IMPACTED ON THE MANY

CONSTITUTION ALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS UNDER 28 U.S.C. 2254.

The fundamental and legally protected right of a state prisoner to seek

(1)

Federal Habeas Corpus Relief from his/her wrongful conviction is expressly

guaranteed in 28 U.S.C 2254 and the standard of review for such relief is

set forth in 28 U.S.C 2254 (d).

(2)

Moreover, this fundamental right is also legally protected under the

14th Amendment to our United States Constitution, which expressly provides:

" All persons.born or nationalized in the United States, and subject to

the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the

State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any laws

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens; nor

hall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, Without

due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the

law."

(3)

More important, in the realm of Federal Habeas Corpus appeals for

prisoners, there exists a critical, yet often misunderstood element known

as a CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY (COA); which serves as an extremely

important legal procedural gateway to appellate review for the prisoner

petitioners seeking relief from unconstitutional imprisonment.

(4)

It is extremely important to note that a recent and well-published legal

study examined the COA granting process in the United States Court of

Appeal for the 11th Circuit in comparison to other U.S. Courts of Appeal;

which reflected a significant difference in the rate of which COAs for noncapitol crimes are granted (8.44 %) to the rate at which Capitol crimes are

granted (58.3 %) as well as the personal frequency of COA grants by individual

federal circuit courtjudges ranging from 2.33% to 25.81%.

Certificates of Appealability in Federal Habeas Corpus cases in the U.S. Courts

Of Appeal: A study " Yale University Law Journal Jan. 17, 2020.

Thus, the subject COA Standard of Review is On extremely critical element

of the legal procedural process for the fundamental and protected

Constitutional rights of countless state prisoners throughput the United States

for Federal Habeas Corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C 2254; and has beep

grossly misapprehended and/or disregarded by many Circuit Courts of the

U.S. Court of Appeals, and thus warrants this Honorable Court's review

through Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari herein submitted.

ARGUMENT

-CONTRARY TO THE ATTACHED AND TOTALLY BASELESS ORDER OF THE U.S COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT/ EXHIBIT "A" IN APPENDIX; THE ATTACHED AND

■ UNDISPUTED RECORD CLEARLY REFLECTS THAT PETITIONER HAS MADE A SUBSTANTIAL

SHOWINGOF THE DENIAL OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH

28 U.S.C. 2253jjCj[2)JJNDER WELL-SETTLED AND CONTROLLING LAW.

INTRODUCTION.

It has been well-settled and expressly underscored by this Honorable U.S.

Supreme Court for more than 40 years that a " substantial showing of the denial of

a Constitutional right" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253; includes a showing that

reasonable jurists could debate whether the subject federal habeas corpus petition

should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were

adequate to serve encouragement to proceed further. Barefoot v Estelle. 4f* U.S.

880 (1983)

(A)

(1)

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM BASED ON WILFUL PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

It has been well-settled and expressly underscored by this Honorable U.S.

Supreme Court that a state prosecutor owes a constitutional duty to refrain

from improper methods at trial; which are calculated to produce a wrongful

conviction, as clearly found and well-documented in the record for Petitioner's

underlying case.

(2)

Merger v United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)

It is important to note that consistent with the aforementioned holding

in Berger v United States, supra., a U.S. Federal District Court vacated a

wrongful conviction as federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C 2254;

where the state prosecutor improperly manipulated material expert

evidence, through the introduction of unqualified expert trial testimony

that was essential to the prosecutor's case, as clearly found and well-

documented in Petitioner's underlying case. Traedal v Wainwright, 667

F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

(3)

Here, the trail court record clearly reflects that the state prosecutor

during Petitioner's criminal trial knowingly introduced the unqualified

medical expert testimony of Dr. Robert Reifman as the only expert

witness to dispute Petitioner's viable insanity defense based on

voluntary intoxication; when Dr, Reifman expressly admitted that he

had no professional experience or knowledge of the diagnosis and/or

treatment of alcoholism, and that alcoholism was not his area of

specialty. (See TR. B. 296, 300-301)

(4)

Thus, consistent with the aforementioned holdings in Berger, and

-Traedel, supra., the above cited trial court record clearly reflects

outrageous prosecutorial misconduct through the knowing use of

improper and unqualified expert testimony of the state's only

expert witness ( Dr. Reifman); when Dr. Reifman himself expressly

admitted that he had no professional experience or knowledge of

of the subject matter for which he was presented at trial.

(B)

constitutional claim based on ineffective assistance of trial counsfi

It has been well-settled that the legal purpose of a pre-trial Frye/Daubert

Hearing is to exclude unqualified trial experts due to their lack of professional

experience, knowledge, or training for the subject matter that is being presented.

Roev.FCAUSLlC,,42 F 4th 1175 (10™ dr. 2022) and Suav v SieSauer, Inc 610 F.

Supp. 3rd. 423 ( DNH 2022)

Here, the aforementioned trial court record clearly reflects that the State's

only medical expert, Dr. Robert Reifman, had no professional experience,

knowledge, or training for the subject matter that he was being presented; namely

Petitioner's viable insanity defense based on mental illness secondary to alcohol

abuse, to which Petitioner's defense trial counsel never challenged his

qualifications in a pre-trial Frye/Daupert Hearing.

Thus, consistent with the aforementioned holdings in Roe and Guay,

supra., such wilful failure to request a pre-trial Frye/Daupert Hearing to

effectively challenge the obvious lack of qualifications of the State's only

medical expert, constituted clear and wilful ineffective assistance of

trial counsel under well-settled and controlling law.

Moreover, it also has been well-settled that ineffective assistance of

trial counsel clearly exists to support the vacatur of a wrongful conviction as

Federal Habeas Corpus relief, where a criminal trial defense counsel failed to

investigate and present available material evidence of his client's history of

extreme emotional disturbance ( EED) to support a viable insanity defense.

DeLuca v Lord, 77 F3d. 578 ( 2nd Cir. 1998).

Here, the attached record clearly reflects that Petitioner had a well-

documented history of longstanding and extreme mental illness; which

was never investigated and presented by his trial defense counsel at trial

to support Petitioner's viable insanity defense.

Thus, consistent with the aforementioned holding in DeLuca v

lord, supra., the record here clearly reflects evidence of wilful ineffective

assistance of Petitioner's trial counsel through his wilful failure to

investigate and present available and material medical evidence at trial

in support of Petitioner's viable insanity defense based on his welldocumented history of longstanding and extreme mental illness.

In addition, it has been well-settled that ineffective assistance of

trial counsel clearly exists where a criminal defense counsel fails to

investigate and present available expert medical testimony on his

client s severe mental health condition to support a viable insanity

defense. _U.S v Melhuish, NO 19-485 ( 2nd Cir. 2021).

Here, the record clearly reflects available and material medical

records of Petitioner's longstanding and severe level of unsuccessfully

treated multiple personality disorders secondary to his chronic history

of alcohol/drug abuse that were never presented at trial by

Petitioner's trial defense counsel in support of Petitioner's said viable

insanity defense.

(9)

Thus, consistent with the aforementioned holding in

U.S, v Melhuish, supra., the record in this case clearly reflects

overwhelming evidence of wilful ineffective assistance of

Petitioner's trail defense counsel by his wilful failure to present

at trial such available medical evidence in further support of

Petitioner's viable insanity defense.

(10)

Lastly, it has been well-settled and expressly mandated

for numerous years that a criminal defendant has a legal and

Constitutional right to a pre-trial fitness hearing for determination

of mental competency to stand trial under Federal and Illinois

statutory law. 18 U.S.C Sec. 4241, 725 ILCS 104-ll(c) and III Rev.

Stat. Chap. 38/1005-2-11.

Here, the trial court's record clearly reflects that

(11)

despite the trial court's pre-trial judicial finding of a bono fide

doubt of Petitioner's mental fitness during a status pre-trial

proceeding; Petitioner's trial defense counsel wilfully failed

to file and present a pretrial motion requesting a pretrial

fitness hearing under 725 ILCS 104-ll(c).

Thus, consistent with the said statutory mandate

(12)

In 18 U.S.C Sec. 4241, 725 ILCS 104-ll(c),and III. Rev. Stat.

Chap. 38/ 1005-2-11, such wilful inactions by Petitioner's

defense counsel constitutes wilful ineffective assistance of

counsel.

( c ) .constitutional claim based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

f1)

l1: has been well-settled and expressly underscored by this Honorable U.S.

Supreme Court that ineffective assistance of an appellate counsel in a criminal

appeal or post-conviction proceedings is a valid Constitutional claim for Federal

Habeas Corpus review. Martinez v Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)

(2)

Here, the published record reflects in People v Rhoden, NO 1-93-0484

(1995) that Petitioner's appellate counsel wilfully failed to raise and argue

any of aforementioned meritorious constitutional claims in the direct appeal

and post-conviction proceedings relative to Petitioner's wrongful conviction.

(3)

Thus, consistent with the aforementioned holding in Martinez v Ryan,

sugra., the said record clearly reflects that Petitioner's state criminal legal

process has been unconstitutionally defective in a substantial form through

the aforementioned wilful ineffective assistance of Petitioner's appellate

counsel.

( D ) CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM BASED ON TRIAL COURT'S WILFUL FAILURE TO PROVIDE A

PRE-TRIAL FITNESS HEARING.

(1)

It has been well-settled for more than 75 years by the Illinois Supreme Court

that a criminal defendant's prior adjudication of mental unfitness raises the legal

presumption of that the unfitness remains; and this presumption is continuous

until there has been a valid subsequent fitness hearing adjudicating his/her

fitness, since the issue of fitness to stand trial is one of a constitutional dimension.

People Ex Rel. Wiseman v Nierstheimer, 401 III. 260 (1948) (See also 18 U.S.C

Sec. 4241, 725 1LCS 104-ll(c), and III. Rev. Chap 38/ 1005-2-11)

(2)

Here, the well-documented and undisputed record clearly reflects that the

trial court wilfully failed to provide Petitioner with a pre-trial fitness hearing under

725 ILCS 104-11 (c); despite the trial court's prior judicial finding of a bono fide

doubt as to Petitioner's mental fitness during a status pretrial proceeding.

(3)

Thus, based on the aforementioned holding in People Ex Rel Wiseman v

Nierstheimer, supra., and the statutory mandate in 18 U.S.C Sec. 4241 and 725

ILCS 104-11 (c), the well-documented and undisputed record clearly reflects that

Petitioner's state criminal legal process was unconstitutionally defective in a

substantial form through the trial court's wilful failure to provide him a

pretrial fitness hearing despite overwhelming indications for same.

THEREFORE, in direct contradiction to the attached and totally baseless ORDER

of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit/ EXHIBIT "A" in Appendix, and

totally consistent with the aforementioned holding in Barefoot v Estelle, supra.,

and the various aforementioned holdings cited above in Subsections (A)- (D),

the above mentioned and undisputed record clearly documents that Petitioner has

clearly " made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" in

full compliance with 28 U.S.C 2253 (c(2) under well-settled and controlling law.

ITS, DISTRICT COURTS PROCEDURAL RULING IN DISMISSING HIS FEDERAL HABEAS

CORPUSPETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C 2244 (B)(1)(3)(A) WAS AT LEAST DEBATABL F

UNDER WELL-SETTLED AND CONTROLLING LAW.

(1)

It has been well-settled and expressly underscored by this Honorable

U.S. Supreme Court for more than 45 years that a second Federal Habeas

Corpus Petition court-filed under 28 U.S.C. 2554 SHALL NOT BE DISMISSED

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2244 UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; SUCH AS

AN INCOMPETENCY CLAIM IN THE SAID PETITION, as expressly found by

the U.S. District Court in Petitioner's subject Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

and expressly stated in its attached ORDER/ EXHBIT "AA" in Appendix.

Ranetti v Quarterman, 551' U.S. 830 ( 2007)

(2)

Moreover, in^tewart v Martinez-Villarel. 523 U.S. 637 (1998), this

honorable U.S. Supreme Court specifically underscored that a second federal

habeas corpus petition court-filed under 28 U.S.C 2254 involving an incompetency

claim, as clearly found in Petitioner's subject Federal Habeas Corpus Petition,

would be LEGALLY TREATED AS A SINGLE PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. 2244

(B)(2)(A-B). See also Slack v McDaniel, 529 U.S. 493 ( 2000).

(3)

Instead, in direct conflict with the aforementioned holdings in Panetti,

Steward, and Slack, supra., the U.S. District Court should had readily found

and concluded that Petitioner's subject Federal Habeas Corpus Petition was

a single and NOT a second/successor Petition under 28 U.S.C 2244 (B)(2)(A-B)

THUS, the aforementioned dismissal of Petitioner's Federal Habeas

Corpus Petition by the U.S. District Court is clearly debatable under well-

settled and controlling law.

CONCLUSION/-

(1)

ln Hahn v United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) this Honorable

U.S. Supreme Court firmly held and expressly underscored that pursuant

to 28 U.S.C 1254 (1), this Court has statutory subject matter jurisdiction

to review the denial of a request for Certificate of Appealability by a

circuit court judge or panel of a Federal Court of Appeals.

(2)

Here, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in its attached and totally

baseless ORDER/ EXHIBIT "A" in Appendix, erroneously denied Petitioner's request

for a Certificate of Appealability based on an unexplained finding of no substantial

showing of the denial of a Constitutional Right and made no mention of the

aforementioned procedural dismissal of Petitioner's Federal Habeas Corpus Petition,

in direct conflict with this Honorable Court's two part (COA) Standard of Review, as

succinctly mandated in Slack v McDaniel. 529 U.S. 473 ( 2000).

(3)

Moreover, in direct contradiction to the said attached and baseless ORDER of

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit/ EXHIBIT "A" in Appendix, the said

attached and well-documented record clearly reflects that Petitioner has made a

substantial showing of a denial of his Constitutional Rights for the following (4)

Constitutional Claims, as fully addressed above:

(a) Wilful Prosecutorial Misconduct

(b) Wilful Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

(d) Wilful denial of a pre-trial fitness hearing

(4)

Lastly, the said record also clearly that the procedural ruling of the U.S.

District Court in dismissing Petitioner's second Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

was clearly debatable under well-settled and controlling law, as also fully

addressed above.

(5)

THUS, THE ATTACHED AND WELL-DOCUMENTED AFOREMENTIONED RECORD

CLEARLY REFLECTS WELL-SUPPORTED AND SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR GRANTING

PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR REVIEW THROUGH HIS WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

Respectfully submitted

LAWRENCE RHODEN ( PROSE PETITIONER)

NOTICE OF FILING// CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

TO:

ASSISTANT ATTY GENERAL GOPI KASHYAP

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

115 SOUTH LASALLE STREET

CHICAGO, ILL 60603

I, Petitioner, certify that on t&f'A ^$5—, the foregoing Writ of Certiorari with Appendix was

Court-filed via U.S. Mail with the U.S. Supreme Court and a copy of same was mailed to counsel for

Respondent at the address listed above.

LAWRENCE RHODEN ( PRO SE PETITIONER)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.