Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Derek Skellchock, Petitioner v. Laurie K. Dean, Judge, 8th Judicial District Court, Larimer County, Colorado, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 12, 2025

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Appendix A

Class Action Suit to Enforce Due

Process of Law (Doc. #1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Case No.

Derek Skellchock, Pro Se, and

VeteranHope.org,

on behalf of

the United States of America,

Class Action Suit

to Enforce

Due Process of Law

and on behalf of other veterans

under similar circumstances

Plaintiffs,

and

Judge Laurie Kauzie Dean, et al.,

Jury Trial

to include

Judge Susan Blanco,

Magistrate Kandance Majoros,

Judge Juan G. Villasenor,

Magistrate Jolstad, and

The State of Colorado

Defendants.

I. FEDERAL QUESTIONS

Whether state judges are BOUND by Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 511

pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution, thereby REQUIRED to

OBEY the federal preemption of state jurisdiction found in § 511.

Whether state judges are BOUND by Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 5301

pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution, thereby REQUIRED to

OBEY § 5301 to the letter because § 511 eliminates the possibility of

jurisdiction to undermine VA decisions or disobey § 5301, which is

clearly intended to protect beneficiaries from the extraction of money by

assignment, seizure, garnishment, harassment, contempt or jail.

Whether the Defendant Judges and Magistrates are personally liable in

their Individual Capacity for violation of federal preemption that was

established over 30 years ago by the Veterans Judicial Review Act

(VJRA) Pub. Law 100-687 (1988) which definitively closed both of

the loopholes found in 38 U.S.C. § 211 by the Supreme Court decision

in Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987).

Whether the Defendant State is liable in a suit for damages because of the

predatory discrimination against a disabled veteran.

Whether the Defendant Judges, Magistrates and the State itself should be

held liable for the violation of Rights under the color of state law and in

the complete absence of all jurisdiction on the subject matter of Title 38.

II.

PARTIES

Plaintiffs:

Derek Skellchock, ... Pro Se

16316 Saint Paul St.

Thornton, CO 80602

(719)304-1500

das7674@hotmail.com

and

VeteranHope.org

c/o Director Robert Terrien

POBox 7213

Tacoma, WA 98417

253-499-5805

Bob@VeteranHope.org

Class: Thousands of veterans under similar circumstances are dying every year by poverty or

suicide because they are illegally stripped of their benefits by the predatory misconduct

of state judges and officials who corrupt the law for profit. When the veterans die by

poverty or suicide, their dependent family members usually go right back on welfare.

Defendants:

(They all share the same building except for the State itself)

1) Judge Laurie Kauzie Dean

E Individual Capacity

970-494-3720

2) Judge Susan Blanco

IS Individual Capacity

970-494-3620

3) Judge Juan G. Villasenor

E Individual Capacity

970-494-3610

4) Magistrate Kandance Majoros

E Individual Capacity

970-494-3540

5) Magistrate Jolstad (Larimer County)

Larimer County

201 La Porte Avenue, Suite 100,

Fort Collins CO 80521

E Individual Capacity

(retired)

8th Judicial District

201 La Porte Avenue, Suite 100,

Fort Collins CO 80521

6) The State of Colorado , c/o Secretary of State Jena Griswold

1700 Broadway, Suite 550

Denver, CO 80290

303-894-2200

III. BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Federal Question Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is established by presentation of

questions based exclusively on the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

This is a Life and Death Matter for thousands of disabled veterans all across the

country because they cannot defend themselves against judges and officials who

refuse to OBEY the Law.

The Cause of Action to enforce positive law 38 U.S.C. § 511 and § 5301 is found in the

plain text of these statutes pursuant to Article I, § 8 cis. 1, 12-13 of our Constitution.

Based on the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, et al., this Court has a duty

to answer the federal questions raised and protect the Rights of the Plaintiff.

According to 1 U.S.C. § 204, the text of Positive Law “shall be legal evidence of

the laws ... in all the courts of the United States, the several States,...”

These particular statutes PROVE the Clear and Unmistakable Intent of Congress

to protect beneficiaries by the Federal Preemption of ALL potential jurisdiction

to interfere with benefits provided by VA decisions.

As of Pub. Law 85-857, §1, (1958) 72 Stat. 1105, Title 38 became Positive Law.

Federal Preemption is expressed by statute and implied by the nature of Title 38

in relation to military service under the power of Congress to “[t]o raise and

support Armies” and “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy.” §8, cis. 1,12-13.

“Held: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield

to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may

exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting

States, as in USERRA.” Torres v. Texas Department ofPublic Safety, 597

U.S.

(2022).

IV.

INDISPUTABLE PROOF OF PREEMPTION

All by itself, the plain language of 38 U.S.C. § 511 eliminates the possibility of outside

jurisdiction to interpret any part of Title 38 or do anything that might affect the

provision of benefits to ANY veteran, dependent or survivor of the veteran.

38 U.S. Code §511

“(a) The Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a

decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits

by the Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans.

Subject to subsection (b), the decision of the Secretary as to any such

question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any

other official or by any court, whether by an action in the nature of

mandamus or otherwise.

(b) The second sentence of subsection (a) does not apply to—

(1) matters subject to section 502 of this title;

(2) matters covered by sections 1975 and 1984 of this title;

(3) matters arising under chapter 37 of this title; and

(4) matters covered by chapter 72 of this title.”

(emphasis added)

Over 30 years ago, the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA) Pub. Law 100-687 (1988)

definitively closed the loopholes found by the Supreme Court in Rose v. Rose (supra).

In 1987, the Court found that the EXACT words of 38 U.S.C. § 211, it did not happen to

give the Administrator “exclusive jurisdiction” or “clearly preempt state jurisdiction,” so

in 1988, Congress changed the EXACT words of § 211 to correct that problem.

Exhibit “A” shows the language of 38 U.S.C. § 211 in place at the time of Rose v. Rose.

Exhibit “B” shows the holding in Rose and describes the loopholes in § 211.

Exhibit “C” shows the amendment of § 211 which closed the loopholes revealed in Rose.

Exhibit “D” shows § 211 after the VJRA clearly preempting state jurisdiction.

According to the Supremacy Clause and 1 U.S.C. § 204, the direct amendment of

positive law § 211 became the Supreme Law of the Land, therefore BINDING upon

ALL judges in every state by the clear federal preemption of state jurisdiction.

ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF

All by itself, the plain language of 38 U.S.C. § 5301 makes it clear that the Plaintiff has

an enforceable Right to protection from any kind of interference with his benefits.

In Rose v. Rose, the Court poked a hole in § 3101 based on an “implied exception”

because of the loopholes in § 211, but when the VJRA closed those loopholes, it also

closed the “implied exception” hole in § 3101.

38 U.S. Code § 5301(a)

“(1) Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law administered by

the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically

authorized by law, and such payments made to, or on account of, a

beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exemptfrom the claim of

creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under

any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the

beneficiary. The preceding sentence shall not apply to claims of the United

States ... shall not be construed to prohibit the assignment of insurance

otherwise authorized under chapter 19 of this title, or of servicemen’s

indemnity."

(emphasis added)

The expression “due process of law” means that, regardless of the nature of proceedings

that bring the Plaintiff into state court, the Defendants must OBEY the federal laws that

are clearly intended to protect the Individual RIGHTS of the Plaintiff.

See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997).

"(a) A plaintiff seeking § 1983 redress must assert the violation of a federal right,

not merely of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U. S.

103, 106. Three principal factors determine whether a statutory provision creates a

privately enforceable right:

(1) whether the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the statute;

(2) whether the plaintiffs asserted interests are not so vague and amorphous

as to be beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce; and

(3) whether the statute imposes a binding obligation on the State."

Blessing at 330. (emphasis added)

VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In all of my interactions with the Defendants named above, I have respectfully asserted

my federal Rights established by VA decisions and the federal preemption of state jurisdiction.

The Defendants insist on taking my benefits and retaliating against me for asserting my

constitutional rights. They are damaging my relationship with my son to pressure me into giving

up my rights, benefits, and privacy.

On March 22, 2024, Defendant Judge Villasenor forcefully ordered me to disclose my

service connected medical conditions in open public court just to humilliate and manipulate me.

He violated my Right to privacy of that information established by 38 U.S.C. § 511, the ADA,

HIPPA and the Privact Act, as well as the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Defendants are fully aware of the FACT that I have ZERO income from work

because I am a 100% unemployable disabled veteran with only VA benefits to live on.

They are also fully aware of the FACT that 38 U.S.C. § 511 eliminates the possibility

of state jurisdiction to question, or to ignore the legally established FACT of Disability.

They are fully aware of the FACT that 38 U.S.C. § 511 eliminates the possibility of

jurisdiction to interfere with benefits provided by VA decision.

They are fully aware of the FACT that 38 U.S.C. § 5301 establishes an enforceable

Right to protection from the extraction of money from VA benefits by assignment,

garnishment, seizure, contempt or jail, because § 511 clearly preempts state jurisdiction.

They also know that canceling my driver license, or any other form of harassment to

manipulate me, is also a violation of federal rights by the violation of federal preemption.

They have knowingly and willfully taken advantage of me because of my disability

and have continued to abuse me by using parental alienation from my son.

They simply refuse to OBEY the Supreme Law of the Land.

VII. Relief

This Court has a duty to issue Declaratory Judgment by affirmative

answer to all of the Questions presented above because the Defendants are

indeed BOUND by federal law pursuant to the Constitution, thereby

REQUIRED to OBEY the statutes intended to protect my rights from their

misconduct.

This Court has a duty to hold each one of the Defendants personally

liable in their Individual Capacity, along with the state itself, jointly and

severally for their violation of my Rights by violation of the federal

preemption of state jurisdiction. In other words, the Defendant judges and

magistrates have NO judicial immunity because the violation of my rights

was done in the complete absence of jurisdiction on Title 38.

The ONLY choice open to the Court is to decide whether to grant

Punitive Judgment in the amount I have claimed or to assemble a jury to

decide on the judgment for punitive damages . See Torres (supra).

Sum Certain: $ 500,000 (Five hundred thousand dollars)

This Court has a duty to publish the Judgment in order to help

other families of veterans under similar circumstances by holding

states and judges liable and accountable for the violation of rights by

the violation of federal preemption.

VIII. Conclusion and Certification

These Defendants have NO excuse or defense because they cannot say anything that

might change or cancel the Federal Preemption established by the Supreme Law of the Land.

It is well settled law that Immunity does NOT exist where jurisdiction is clearly wanting.

See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55

L.Ed.2d331 (1978), et al.

"A distinction as to their liability made between acts done by them in

excess of their jurisdiction and acts done by them in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction over the subject matter." Bradley at 336.

"Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter any

authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such

authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is

permissible." Bradley at 351-352. (emphasis added)

Congress made it absolutely clear that veteran benefits are TOTALLY EXEMPT from

state jurisdiction to protect our whole families, and our whole country, from lawyers and judges

who corrupt the law for fun and for profit.

My experience is just one example of this nationwide failure in the court system which

has cost our country billions of dollars and thousands of veteran lives to poverty and suicide.

This will very likely set a precedent that should upset over 30 years of predatory fraud

and discrimination, thereby upset the profiteering focused on our military and veteran families.

It might even draw more retaliation against veterans like myself, but the Constitutional

RIGHT to Due Process of Law can be enforced again and again under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

‘It is well -settled that "[a]n action motivated by retaliation for the exercise of a

constitutionally protected right is actionable, even if the act, when taken for a

different reason, might have been legitimate." Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 306

(4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995)).’

Wilson v. Wexford Med., No. 3:18-cv-00890, at *46 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 4, 2021)

This is a time-sensitive matter because thousands of veterans are in similar danger

because of the harm caused by state officials and judges who simply refuse to obey the

Federal Preemption of state jurisdiction established by the Supreme Law of the Land.

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64, (1987)”and

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) ('There does exist, however, an

"independent corollary" to the well-pleaded complaint rule,... known as the

"complete preemption" doctrine.... Once an area of state law has been completely

preempted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered,

from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.’) (internal

citations omitted)

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify this Complaint is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge,

information, and belief, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11;

(1) This Complaint is presented for clear and legitimate purpose, therefore is not to harass,

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of any litigation;

(2) This Complaint is well supported by existing law and reasonable argument based on

that law, therefore is is not frivolous and it is not intended to extend, modify, or reverse

any existing law;

(3) The factual contentions have evidentiary support and will very likely have more support

after a reasonable opportunity for investigation and discovery; and

(4) The Complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Rule 11.

I agree to provide the Clerk's Office with any changes to my address where case-related

papers may be served. I understand that my failure to keep a current address on file with the

Clerk's Office may result in the dismissal of my case.

Respectfully submitted fry:.

VeterahHope.org

Robert Terrien, Director

PO Box 7213

Tacoma, WA 98417

Derek Skellchock, Pro Se

16316 Saint Padl St.

Thornton, CO 80602

(719) 304-1500

das7674@hotmail.com

253-499-5805

Contadt@VeteranHope.org

Exhibit A

Legal Evidence of 38 U.S.C. § 211

prior to the Veterans Judicial Review Act

as read by the Supreme Court in Rose v. Rose.

Page 311

TITLE 38—VETERANS’ BENEFITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Laws of 1982

Title 38

Section 211

Before the VJRA

As read by the

Supreme Court in

Rose v. Rose

1987

-Office of

ie VeterOffice of

ation, by

it of 1978

16 6, Govion .2 Of

ineral.

JOLY 3,

All func.vested In

e Act of

I in effect

RDERS

*A11 rules,

privileges

Veterans'

sffeet on

'ich date)

modified,

V the Ad-

SMS

have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision

by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise,

for provisions that, except as provided in the enumer

ated sections, the decisions of the Administrator on

any question of law or fact concerning a claim for

benefits or payments under any law administered by

the Veterans' Administration be final and conclusive

and no other official or any ceurt of the United States

have power or Jurisdiction to review any such decision.

1686—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 89-358 struck out refer

ences to sections 1661 and 1761.

1965—Subsec. <a). Pub. L. 89-214 inserted reference

to section 775.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Writ of mandamus abolished In United States dis

trict courts, but relief available by appropriate action

or motion, see rule 61, Title 28, Appendix, Judiciary

and Judicial Procedure.

§212. Delegation of authority and assignment of

duties

(a) The Administrator may assign duties, and

delegate, or authorize successive redelegation

of, authority to act and to render decisions,

Library of Congress

with respect to all laws administered by the

Veterans’ Administration, to such officers and

1982

employees as he may find necessary. Within

laredness the limitations of such delegations, redelega

functions'to tne'Adminiatratorot veterans’ Affairs, tions, or assignments, all official acts and deci

see Parts 1, 29, and 30 of Ex. Ord. No. 11490, Oct. 28, sions of such officers and employees shall have

1969, 34 F.R, 17567, set out as a note under section

2251 Of Title 60, Apjgjjg^BHjgyjndNEtionalDefense. the same force and effect as though performed

or rendered by the Administrator.

^^^^Cross Reference^^^^

(b) There shall be included on the technical

Canonisation of Administrator, see sectl^ *313 of and administrative staff of the Administrator

TitUroTGovernment Organization and Employi

such staff officers, experts, Inspectors, and as

Arompensatlon of Deputy Administrator, see selklon sistants (including legal assistants), as the Ad

JB14 of Title 6.

ministrator may prescribe.

' § 211. Decisions by Administrator, opinions of Attora (PUb. L. 85-857, sept. 2, 1968, 72 Stet. 1115;

ney General

’ *Pub. L. 89-361, $ 2, Mar. 7,1966,80 Stat, 30.)

(a) On and after October 17,1940, except as

Amendments

provided In sections 775, 784, and as to matters

166

—

Subsec.

(a).

Pub.

L. 89-361 empowered the Adarising under chapter 37 of this tltle. the deci-'

dstrator, as he may find necessary, to authorize the

f slons of the Administrator on any question of , mill

Lessive redelegation to officers and employees of

, law or fact under any law administered by the i suc|

anjllauthority delegated by the Administrator to act

J Veterans* Administration providing benefits for and!Bender decisions with respect to laws administered

veterans and their dependents or survivors . by Ae

I Veterans' Administration, and provided that

I shall be final and conclusive and no other offi- actsi Ind decisions performed within the limitations of

. dal or any court of the United States shall suchhl redelegatlons shall have force and effect as

have power or Jurisdiction to review any such . thoitab performed or rendered by the Administrator.

t decision by an action in the nature of manda §21 9 Contracts and personal services

mus or otherwise.

(b) The Administrator may require the opin

'■c Administrator may, for purposes of all

ion of the Attorney General on any question of lavi■ administered by the Veterans' Admlnlstralaw arising in the administration of the Veter tio]I, accept uncompensated services, and enter

ans* Administration.

info contracts or agreements

with private or

(Pub. L. 86-867, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stet. 1116; pjblic agencies or persons (including contracts

Pub. L. 89-214, § 1(b), Sept. 29, 1965, 79 Stat. ffr services of translators without regard to any

886; Pub. L. 89-358, § 4(h), Mar. 3,1966, 80 Stat. fther law), for such necessary services (Includ

24; Pub. L. 91-376, $ 8(a), Aug. 12, 1970, 84 Stat, i ing personal services) as he may deem practica

k.790.)

J ble. The Administrator may also enter into con

tracts or agreements with private concerns or

Amendments

J public agencies for the hiring of passenger

HKO-SUbsec, (a), Pub. L. 01-376 substltuted^ovi* motor vehicles or aircraft for official travel

stonWiat on or after Oct. 17,1940, except a^rovided Whenever, in his judgment, such arrangements

In 8ecti^^775, 784, and chapter 37 of thistle, the are In the interest of efficiency or economy.

decisions oWjjcAdmlnlstrator on an^prestfon of law (PUb. L. 85-857, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stet. 1116;

or fact underlRMt|Mdm|gj|teirtH)y the Veterans'

Administration providing Benefits for veterans and Pub. L. 89-785, title III, §302, Nov. 7, 1966, 80

their dependents or survivors be final and conclusive Stet. 1376; Pub. L. 91-24, § 2(c), June 11, 1969,

and no other official or any court of the United States 83 Stat. 33.)

Exhibit B

Summary of Rose v. Rose

showing the holding

and the ruling on 38 U.S.C. § 211

ROSE v. ROSE

619

Syllabus

ROSE v. ROSE et al.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

No. 85-1206. Argued March 4, 1987-Decided May 18, 1987

Appellant, a totally disabled veteran whose main source of income is fed

eral veterans’ benefits, was held in contempt by the state trial court for

failure to pay child support, the amount of which had been fixed by the

court after considering appellant’s benefits to be income under a Tennes

see statute. The State Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting appellant’s

contention that the Veterans’ Administration (VA) has exclusive juris

diction to specify payments of child support from the disability benefits

it provides. The Court determined that Congress intended disability

benefits to support the beneficiary anOts. and held that the

trial cOurfSQgdej illl’ec Ling appellant to pay a pui Llun uLtfoosebenefits as

chil<j>Hpport or be held in contempt did not undermine a sm5§t»«£ial fedinterest.

•Held: A state court has jurisdiction to hold a disabled veteran in contempt

for failing to pay child support, even if the veteran’s only means of sat

isfying this obligation is to utilize veterans’ benefits received as com

pensation for a service-connected disability. The Tennessee statute, as

construed by the state courts to authorize an award of disability benefits;

as child support, is not pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause of Arti<cle VI since it does not conflict with federal law.j Pp. 625-636.

^S^ATitle 38 U. S. C. §3107(a)(2), which gives the VA discre^jpft^ry

authoPfaUa apportion disability compensation on behalfjQ^er^eteran’s

children, | iiu^ZLn ij in 1 n y p grant; of a 111 ] | h i j |ji I u LllCvA tu order that

child support be,paid from disability benefits,, and does not indicate that

exercise of the VA’s discretion could yield 'independent child support

determinations in conflict with existing state-court Orders. Moreover,

the implementing regulations, Which simply .authorize apportionment if

“the veteran is not reasonably discharging his or her [child support]

responsibility .. . . ,” contain few guidelines for apportionment and

no specific procedures for bringing claims. Furthermore, to construe

§ 3107(a)(2) as pre-emptive could Open for reconsidefation a vast number

of existing divorce decrees affecting disabled veterans and lead in future

cases to piecemeal litigation before the state courts and the VA. Given

the traditional authority of state courts over Child support, their unparal

leled familiarity with local economic factors affecting the issue, and their

experience in applying state statutes that contain detailed support guide

lines and procedures, it seems Certain that Congress would have been

620

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Svlhhns

....

481 U. S.

more expliffOiad it meant the VA’s apportionment powerR^ii^Dlace

st^^ourt authority. Pp. 626-628.

^^j(b) Title 38 U. S. C. §211(a), which provides that VA decisions on

■ j benefits for veterans and their dependents are final, conclusive, and not i

subject to review by any other federal official or federal court, does not

| vest exclusive jurisdiction in the VA nor pre-empt state-court jurisdic- *

tion to enforce a veteran’s child support obligation. Section 211(a)

[makes no reference to state-court jurisdiction, j Moreover, its purpose of

achieving uniformity" in the administration of veterans’ benefits is not

threatened by state child support contempt proceedings, which do not

review the disability eligibility decisions that are the primary focus of

the section. Furthermore, since the VA is not a party in a contempt

proceeding, it is ‘not subjected to an additional litigation burden, the pre^vention of which is also a purpose of § 211(a). Pp. 628-630.

^S(g) State-court jurisdiction is not pre-empted by38 U. S. C. § 3101(a)^

whicl^Mjovides that veterans’ benefits payments made to, or on acg^rfft

of, a beneiwfS^^hall not be liable to attachment, levy, o^gjaart? Nei

ther of § 3101(a7spi!^5WB«e^^^Xiaid-iJta-^AA«r,ffiT??gplaced in the

position of a collection agency and to prevent the deprivation and deple

tion of veterans’ means of subsistence—is constrained by allowing the

state courts to hold appellant in contempt. The VA is not obliged to

participate in the state proceedings or pay benefits directly to appellee.

Moreover, the .legislative history establishes that disability benefits are

intended to provide compensation for disabled veterans .and their fam

ilies. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655, Hisquierdo v; Hisquierdo,

439 U. S. 572, and Ridgway v. .Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46, distinguished.

Pp. 630-634.

(d) Provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act, which provide

that moneys payable by the Government to any individual are subject to

child support enforcement proceedings (42 U. S. C. § 659(a)), but which

specifically exclude VA disability benefits, do not establish a congres

sional intent to exempt such benefits from legal process. Section 659(a)

was intended to create: a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that

state courts could issue valid orders directed against Government agen

cies attaching funds in ’their possession. Thus, although veterans’ dis

ability benefits may be exempt from attachment while in the VA’s hands,

once they are delivered to the veteran a state court can require that they

be used to satisfy a child support order. Pp. 634“635.

Affirmed.

Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,

C. J., and Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined, and in Parts I,

II-A, II-B, II-D, and III of which Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., joined.

O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the

Exhibit C

Legal Evidence of the

Veterans Judicial Review Act

amendment of 38 U.S.C. § 211

PUBLIC LAW 100-687—NOV. 18,1988

Public Law 100-687

100th Congress

102 STAT. 4105

An Act

To amend title 38, United States Code, to establish certain procedures for the

adjudication of claims for benefits under laws administered by the Veterans'

Administration,* to apply the provisions of section 553 of title 5. United States Code,

to rulemaking procedures of the Veterans' Administration; to establish a Court of

Veterans* Appeals and to provide for judicial review of certain final decisions of the

jsjqv jg tggg

Board of Veterans’ Appeals; to provide for the payment of reasonable fees to --- —— ------attorneys for rendering legal representation to individuals claiming benefits under

'®- *^1

laws administered by the Veterans’ Administration; to increase the rates of

compensation payable to veterans with service-connected disabilities; and to make

various improvements in veterans' health, rehabilitation, and memorial affairs

programs; and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

United States ofA merica in Congress assembled,

Veterans'

Judicial Review

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; REFERENCES TO TITLE 38. UNITED STATES Act

CODE.

Division A—Veterans’ Judicial Review

(a) Short Title.—This division may be cited as the “Veterans’ 38 use 101 note.

Judicial Review Act".

(b) References.—Except as otherwise expressly provided, when

ever in this Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an

amendment to, or repeal of, a section or other provision, the ref

erence shall be considered to be made to a section or other provision

of title 38, United States Code.

TITLE I—ADJUDICATIVE AND RULEMAK

ING

vEtfpamc>

AJJAMNIStKATION

^&EC. 101. DECISIONS BY ADMINISTRATOR.

f (a) Matters To Be Decided by Administrator.—Subsection (a) of

section 211 is amended to read as follows:

“(aXl) The Administrator shall decide all questions of law and fact

necessary to a decision by the Administrator under a law that

! affects the provision of benefits by the Administrator to veterans or :

' the dependents or survivors of veterans. Subject to paragraph (2) of

; this subsection, the decision of the Administrator as to any such

I question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by

I any other official or by any court, whether by an action in the

1 nature of mandamus or otherwise.

^1^(2) The second sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsectiond^s

no^Rnlyto—

^Tw^saUers subject to section 223 of thistitle^^^^

“(B) matteV^%WMMUtifaMfitiABM*0Mfflar84 of this title;

“(C) matters arising under chapter 37 of this title; and

Exhibit D

Legal Evidence of 38 U.S.C. § 211

after the Veterans Judicial Review Act

This statute controlled jurisdiction

on Title 38 from 1989 to

September 1, 1991

when § 511 became effective

Page 413

TITLE 38—VETERANS' BENEFITS

tlon's obligations to those who serve will always be

.honored:

;________________

’ie principal

leneflts and

| a potential

Laws of 1988

Title 38

Section 211

After the VJRA

illlon veterendents;

II distribute

;e payments

g, and reha| fiscal year

imeht's two

ih over four

Unlsters the

Nation, and

[vides burial

,'eterans anperates the

re system—

2 hospitals,

home care

6211

issued or granted by the Administrator of Veterans*

Affairs before December 31, 1958, and in effect on

such date (or scheduled to take effect after such date)

shall remain in full force and effect until modified,

suspended, overruled, or otherwise changed by the Ad

ministrator.”

Emergency Preparedness Functions

For assignment of certain emergency preparedness

functions to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, see

Parts 1, 2. and 27 of Ex. Ord. No. 12658, Nov. IB, 1988,

53 F.R. 47491, set out as a note under section 2251 of

Title 50, Appendix, War and National Defense.

Cross References

Compensation o^^^NM9V^^terans Affairs, see

section 5312 o^plne5, Govemmer^^Kanlzatlon and

Employees^^^

CompuKtion of Deputy Secretary of Vrerans Af

fairs, sdesectlon 5313 of Title 5.

~ Section Referred to in Other Sections

iIs section Is referred to In section 021 of this tifl

health-care

the medical

__________________________________ 5 In time of *6 211. Decisions by Administrator; opinions of Attor->

ney General

war or national emergency Involving the use of thg

Armed Forces in armed conflict;

(a) (1) The Administrator shall decide all ;

"(8) ih terms of share of the annual Fedei<1

budget, the Veterans' Administration ranks si|fh questions of law and fact necessary to a deci- >

among Federal departments and agencies, JInd slon by the Administrator under a law that af

among Federal departments and agencies onljA;he fects the provision of benefits by the Adminis

Department of Defense employs more personnel

trator to veterans or the dependents or survi“(9) the Administrator of Veterans* Affairs the vors of veterans.' Subject to paragraph <2)_of

principal executive branch official response for this subsection.'the decision of the Administra-1

the administration of the benefits, services, ad11 pro*

grams of the Veterans* Administration and fcjI seek- tor as to any such question shall be final and

Ing the coordination of veterans' programs a unin is conclusive and may not be reviewed by any

other official or by any court, whether by an"

tered by other Federal departments and agen les;

"(10) there is a need for greater coordlnd Ion be- action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.

tween the Veterans' Administration and ot| >r Fed

(2) The second sentence of paragraph (1) of

eral entities administering veterans progrl es and this subsection does not apply to—

between the Veterans* Administration arl other

(A) matters subject to section 223 > of this

Federal entities providing similar benefits tilllndividtitle;

uals on a basis other than their status as 1e terans;

(B) matters covered by sections 775 and 784

"(11) by virtue of the Administrator of 11bterans'

of this title;

Affairs not being included In the PresidentIs Cablnet, the Administrator generally is not inc]uded in

Cabinet meetings and deliberations and glLnerally

title; and

does not have the ready access to the Presld|nt and

(D) matters covered by chapter 72 of this

senior advisers on the President's staff that I■ablnet

title.

members have; and

"(12) as a consequence, Presidential decisl as af(b) The Administrator may require the opin

fectlng veterans and the Veterans* Admlnlsl ration ion of the Attome'y General on any question of

are made from time to time without an undei

rand- law arising in the administration of the Veter

Ing of their full impact on veterans and on thMvet- ans* Administration.

erans* Administration's performance of its statutory

missions.

(Pub. L. 85-857, Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1115;

Pub. L. 89-214, J 1(b), Sept. 29. 1965, 79 Stat.

"sense op the congress

886; Pub. L. 89-358, $ 4(h), Mar. 3, 1966, 80 Stat.

"Sec. 502. In view of the findings In section 501, ire 24; Pub. L. 91-376, $ 8(a), Aug. 12,1970, 84 Stat.

the sense of the Congress that the Administrator ok

Veterans' Affairs should be designated by the PresH 790; Pub. L. 100-687, div. A, title I, 5 101(a), J.

dent as a member of, and a full participant in all ac Nov. 18,1988,102 Stat. 4105.)

tivities of, the Cabinet and as the President's principal

References in Text

adviser on all matters relating to veterans and their V

^ction 223 of this title, referred to in sul

dependents."

(a)(WA), probably refers to the section 223 "Ruj^makContinuation or authority Under Act of July 3,

Ing: PR cedures and judicial review" of this titw 'hlch

1930

was em tad by section 102(a) of Pub. L. lOO^n.

Section 4 of Pub. L. 85-857 provided that: "All func

Amendments

tions, powers, and duties conferred upon and vested in

the President and the Administrator by the Act of

1988—Subsec. (a)^ftSR>PW^uB7 amended subsec.

July 3, 1930 (46 Stat. 1016) and which Were in effect (a) generally. Prior to amendment, subsee. (a) read as

on December 31,1967, are continued In effect."

follows: "On and after October 17,1940, except as pro

vided in sections 775, 784, and as to matters arising

Outstanding Rules, Regulations, and Orders

Section 7 of Pub. L. 85-857 provided that: "All rules,

regulations, orders, permits, and other privileges

1 Sec References In Text note below.

Library of Congress

95-014 0 — 90 — 15 (Vol. 14), Q13

CIVIL COVER SHEET

JS 44 (Rev. 04/21)

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as

provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the

purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS

Derek Skelchock and VeteranHope.org, on behalf of the

USA and other veterans under similar circumstances

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff

Larimer

Judge Laurie K. Dean, et al., and

The State of Colorado

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant

NOTE:

Attorneys (IfKnown)

Unknown

16316 Saint Paul St., Thornton, CO 80602,

(719) 304-1500

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an -X- in One Box for Plaintiff

(For Diversity’ Cases Only)

and One Box for Defendant)

DEF

PTF

DEF

PTF

Citizen of This State

> Incorporated or Principal Place

of Business In This State

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

□l U.S. Government

Plaintiff

U.S. Government

Defendant

|, arimer

(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF

THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

Federal Question

(U.S. Government Not a Party)

Diversity

(Indicate Citizenship ofParties in Item 111)

Citizen of Another State

Incorporated and Principal Place

of Business In Another State

Citizen or Subject of a

Foreign Country

Foreign Nation

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X” in One Box Only)

Click here for: Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.

BANKRUPTCY

OTHER STATUTES

375

False Claims Act

422 Appeal 28 USC 158

PERSONAL INJURY

| | 365 Personal Injury 376 Qui Tam (31 USC

_ 120 Marine

423 Withdrawal

0310 Airplane

3729(a))

_ 130MillerAct

315 Airplane Product

Product Liability

28 USC 157

3] 690 Other

367 Health Care/

_ 400 State Reapportionment

_ 140 Negotiable Instrument

Liability

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS

3j 410 Antitrust

_ 150 Recovery of Overpayment

| 320 Assault, Libel &

Pharmaceutical

__ 430 Banks and Banking

& Enforcement of JudgmentI

Slander

Personal injury

820 Copyrights

_ 450 Commerce

330 Federal Employers’

Product Liability

830 Patent

0151 Medicare Act

| | 368 Asbestos Personal

_ 460 Deportation

152 Recovery of Defaulted

Liability

835 Patent - Abbreviated

0340 Marine

Student Loans

Injury Product

New Drug Application _ 470 Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations

345 Marine Product

Liability

(Excludes Veterans)

840 Trademark

3| 480 Consumer Credit

| 1153 Recovery of Overpayment

Liability

LABOR

PERSONAL PROPERTY

880 Defend Trade Secrets

(15 USC 1681 or 1692)

of Veteran’s Benefits

_ 370 Other Fraud

] 710 Fair Labor Standards

Act of 2016

B 350 Motor Vehicle

485 Telephone Consumer

355 Motor Vehicle

_ 37 I Truth in Lending

Act

_ 160 Stockholders’ Suits

Protection Act

Product Liability

720 Labor/Management

* SOCIAL SECURITY

_ 380 Other Personal

_ 190 Other Contract

n 861 HIA(1395ff)

_ 195 Contract Product Liability

360 Other Personal

Property Damage

Relations

0 490 Cable/Sat TV

| | 385 Property Damage

_ 862 Black Lung (923)

850 Securities/Commodities/

196 Franchise

Injury

B740 Railwayf Labor Act

362 Personal Injury Exchange

Product Liability

751 Family and

a Medical

_ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))

Leave Act

Medical Malpractice

_ 890 Other Statutory Actions

864 SSID Title XV]

PRISONER PETITIONS"" 3 790 Other Labor Litigation

865 RSI (405(g))

REAL PROPERTY

_ 891 Agricultural Acts

CIVIL RIGHTS

893 Environmental Matters

791 Employee Retirement

_ 210 Land Condemnation

» 440 Other Civil Rights

Habeas Corpus:

Income Security Act

_ 220 Foreclosure

441 Voting

463 Alien Detainee

FEDERAL TAX SUITS ~ _ 895 Freedom of Information

| 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff

| 510 Motions to Vacate

Act

442 Employment

_ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment

or Defendant)

_ 443 Housing/

Sentence

_ 240 Torts to Land

0 896 Arbitration

871 IRS—Third Party

2J 530 General

899 Administrative Procedure

_ 245 Tort Product Liability

Accommodations

2] 445 Amer. w/Disabilities 535 Death Penalty

26 USC 7609

Act/Review or Appeal of

_ 290 All Other Real Property

IMMIGRATION

462 Naturalization Application

Agency Decision

Employment

________

Other:

3] 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - _ 540 Mandamus & Other

950 Constitutionality of

465 Other Immigration

State Statutes

Other

550 Civil Rights

Actions

555 Prison Condition

.148 Education

560 Civil Detainee Conditions of

Confinement

V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)

CONTRACT

TORTS

FORFEITURE/PENALTY

33 625 Drug Related Seizure

of Property 21 USC 881

110 Insurance

[~7] 1

Original

Proceeding

2 Removed from

State Court

|—| 3

Remanded from

4 Reinstated or

Appellate Court

Reopened

Q 5 Transferred from

Another District

(specify)

q 6

Multidistrict

Litigation -

Q 8 Multidistrict

Litigation Direct File

Transfer

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not citejurisdictional statutes unless diversity):

42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on federal preemption established by 38 U.S.C. § 511 and rights established by § 5301

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:

Enforcement of due process by holding individual Defendants liable for violation of clear federal preemption

VII. REQUESTED IN

3 CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION

COMPLAINT:

VIII. RELATED CASE(S)

jjp

UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

($ee instructions):

JUDGE

DEMAND S

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

$500,000

JURY DEMAND:

bere-k, SkMchecfc

04/02/2024

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT #

AMOUNT

E]No

_______________________________________ DOCKET NUMBER____________________________

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

DATE

0Yes

APPLYING IFP

JUDGE

MAG. JUDGE

Appendix B

Suit to Enforce Due Process of

Law (Complaint) (Doc #5)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No.

24-cv-00892-SBP

Derek Skellchock. Pro Se. and VeteranHOPE.org

Plaintiff

Suit to Enforce

Due Process of Law

Judge Laurie Kauzie Dean, et al..

to include

Jury Trial

X Yes

Judge Susan Blanco.

Magistrate Kandance Mai pros.,

Judge Juan G. Villasenor.,

Magistrate Jolstad. and,

The State of Colorado, Defendant(s).

(List each named defendant on a separate line. Ifyou cannot fit the names ofall defendants in the space provided, please write “see attached”

in the space above and attach an additional sheet ofpaper with the full list ofnames. The names of the defendants listed in the above caption

must be identical to those contained in Section B. Do not include addresses here.)

COMPLAINT

NOTICE

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 addresses the privacy and security concerns resulting from

public access to electronic court files. Under this rule, papers filed with the court should not

contain: an individual’s full social security number or full birth date; the full name of a person

known to be a minor; or a complete financial account number. A filing may include only: the

last four digits of a social security number; the year of an individual’s birth; a minor’s initials;

and the last four digits of a financial account number.

Plaintiff need not send exhibits, affidavits, grievances, witness statements, or any other

materials to the Clerk’s Office with this complaint

PLAINTIFF INFORMATION

You must notify the court ofany changes to your address where case-related papers may be served by filing a notice ofchange ofaddress.

Failure to keep a current address on file with the court may result in dismissal ofyour case.

Derek Skellchock. Pro Se_____ 16316 Saint Paul St., Thornton. CO 80602__________________

(Name and complete mailing address)

6719) 304-1500

derek.skellchock@,gmail.com_______________________________________

(Telephone number and e-mail address)

DEFENDANT(S) INFORMATION

Please list the following information for each defendant listed in the caption of the complaint. Ifmore space is needed, use extra paper to

provide the information requested. The additional pages regarding defendants should be labeled "B. DEFENDANT(S) INFORMATION. ”

Defendant 1: Judge Laurie Kauzie Dean 201 La Porte Ave.. Ste 100. Fort Collins CO 80521

(Name and complete mailing address)

El Individual Capacity

970-494-3720______ Email Unknown__________

(Telephone number and e-mail address if known)

Defendant 2: Judge Susan Blanco 201 La Porte Ave.. Ste 100. Fort Collins CO 80521

(Name and complete mailing address)

% Individual Capacity

970-494-3620______ Email Unknown__________

(Telephone number and e-mail address if known)

Defendant 3: Judge Juan G. Villasenor 201 La Porte Ave., Ste 100, Fort Collins CO 80521

(Name and complete mailing address)

El Individual Capacity

970-494-3610______ Email Unknown__________

(Telephone number and e-mail address if known)

Defendant 4: Magistrate Kandance Majoros 201 La Porte Ave., Ste 100, Fort Collins CO 80521

(Name and complete mailing address)

El Individual Capacity

970-494-3540 Email Unknown_________________

(Telephone number and e-mail address if known)

Defendant 5: Magistrate Jolstad 201 La Porte Ave., Ste 100, Fort Collins CO 80521

(Name and complete mailing address)

El Individual Capacity

(Phone and Email Unknown)____________________

(Telephone number and e-mail address if known)

Defendant 6: The State of Colorado. 1700 Broadway. Suite 550. Denver. CO 80290

303-894-2200

c/o Secretary of State Jena Griswold

(Telephone number and e-mail address if known)

secretary@,sos.state.co.us

JURISDICTION

Identify the statutory authority that allows the court to consider your claim(s): (check one)

Federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (claims arising under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States)

List the specific federal statute, treaty, and/or provision(s) of the United States Constitution

that are at issue in this case.

Whether state judges are automatically BOUND by Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 511

pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution, thereby REQUIRED by the Supremacy

Clause to OBEY the federal preemption of state jurisdiction found in § 511.

Whether state judges are automatically BOUND by Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 5301

pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution, thereby REQUIRED by the Supremacy

Clause to OBEY the Statutory Injunction protecting beneficiaries like me from the

extraction of money by assignment, seizure, garnishment, harassment, contempt or jail.

Whether the Defendant judicial officials are personally liable in their Individual Capacity

for the abject violation of federal preemption established over 30 years ago by the

Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA) Pub. Law 100-687 (1988) which definitively

closed the loopholes in 38 U.S.C. § 211 by the Supreme Court decision in Rose v. Rose,

481 U.S. 619(1987).

Whether the Defendant State is liable in a suit for damages because of the harm caused

by the predatory discrimination against a disabled veteran.

Whether the Defendant Judges, Magistrates and the State itself should be held liable

jointly and severally for the violation of Rights under the color of state law and in the

complete absence of all jurisdiction on the subject matter of Title 38.

JURISDICTION (cont.)

Federal Question Jurisdiction is established by PROOF of Complete Federal Preemption

by the plain text of current Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 511, which provides the Secretary with

exclusive jurisdiction on “ALL questions of LAW and FACT ... that affects the provision of

benefits” and then clearly preempts the review of decisions to provide benefits by “ANY other

official or by ANY court.”

38U.S. Code § 511

“(a) The Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a

decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits

by the Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans.

Subject to subsection (b), the decision of the Secretary as to any such

question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any

other official or by any court, whether by an action in the nature of

mandamus or otherwise.

(emphasis added)

The ’’purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).

The VJRA amendment of § 211 proves the Clear and Unmistakable Intent of Congress to

protect veterans AND their dependents by the preemption of state jurisdiction.

These following Exhibits PROVE of the FACT that Congress superseded Rose v. Rose by

closing the loopholes found in § 211, thereby eliminating the “implied exception” to § 3101.

Exhibit “A” shows the language of 38 U.S.C. § 211 in place at the time of Rose v. Rose.

Exhibit “B” shows the holding in Rose and describes the loopholes in § 211.

Exhibit “C” shows the amendment of § 211 which closed the loopholes revealed in Rose.

Exhibit “D” shows § 211 after the VJRA clearly preempting state jurisdiction.

According to 1 U.S.C. § 204, the text of “positive law” is “legal evidence of law,”

therefore must be taken literally at face value as the supreme law because federal law pursuant to

the Constitution does not require judicial ratification to become the Supreme Law. It just IS.

There is NO expressed or implied exception to 38 U.S.C. § 5301 because there is

absolutely NO exception to the § 511 explicit preemption of ALL outside jurisdiction on benefits

provided by the VA. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012).

STATEMENT OF CLAIM(S)

State clearly and concisely every claim that you are asserting in this action. For each claim, specify the right that allegedly has been violated

and state allfacts that support your claim, including the date(s) on which the incident(s) occurred, the name(s) ofthe specific person(s) involved

in each claim, and the specific facts that show how each person was involved in each claim. You do not need to cite specific legal cases to

support your claim(s). Ifadditional space is needed to describe any claim or to assert additional claims, use extra paper to continue that claim

or to assert the additional claim(s). Please indicate that additional paper is attached and label the additional pages regarding the statement of

claims as “D. STA TEMENT OF CLAIMS. ”

CLAIM ONE:

I hereby claim the Constitutional RIGHT to enforce the § 5301 Statutory Injunction

protecting me from the extraction of money from benefits granted by the VA decisions based on

the § 511 complete Federal Preemption of state jurisdiction.

SUPPORTING FACTS:

The Defendants are fully aware of the FACT that I have ZERO income from work

because I am a 100% unemployable totally disabled veteran with only VA benefits to live on.

They are also fully aware of the FACT that 38 U.S.C. § 5301 establishes my Right to

enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, et al., because they have

NO possibility ofjurisdiction on Title 38 or benefits provided by VA. See Torres v. Texas

Department ofPublic Safety, 597 U.S.

(2022) and Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871);

Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215 (3d Cir. 1973) (“Where there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter,

there is, as well, no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.”).

Magistrate Jolstad only made temporary rulings to extract money from my VA benefits

that Judge Dean changed on February 23, 2021, but they both still violated my federal right by

pretending to have jurisdiction to take my VA benefits.

Magistrate Majoros repeated the violation by demanding more information about and

VA benefit money on January 23,2022 and May 22, 2023.

Judge Blanco acted with discrimination on February 7, 2022 and June 20,2023, even

though she recused herself on January 13, 2020 based on her own personal prejudice against me.

On March 22, 2024, Defendant Judge Villasenor acted with discrimination by forcefully

ordering me to disclose my medical information to the public in open court.

Whenever I have tried to claim federal rights based on 38 U.S.C. § 5301 and § 511, the

ADA, HIPAA, the Privacy Act, or anything else, they have all cut me off by quoting Rose v. Rose

or state court rulings to get around my federal rights.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM(S) ... (Cont.)

CLAIM TWO:

I hereby claim the Constitutional RIGHT to enforce the privacy of my VA medical

and claim files based on the crystal clear § 511 preemption of ALL jurisdiction to review

any Law or FACTS that might affect the provision of benefits under Title 38.

Furthermore, I hereby claim the Constitutional Rights to protection of my personal and

medical privacy under Fourth Amendment, the Privacy Act, the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

SUPPORTING FACTS:

On March 22, 2024, Defendant Judge Villasenor forcefully ordered me to list my

medical conditions and medications in open court for the general public to hear.

He violated my rights to privacy by the public exposure of medical information which is

clearly just an illegal act of personal harassment to extort more money from my VA benefits.

I objected as firmly as I could without being sent to jail for contempt, but the Judge made

a point of demanding that I obey his illegal order.

He cannot claim to be ignorant of the Fourth Amendment, the Privacy Act, HIPAA or the

ADA, but he deliberately ignored them to cause me pain and stress by public humiliation.

I do know something about my federal rights. When the VA made a decision on my claim,

the nature, degree and extent of my Disability became a FEDERAL Subject Matter of Law.

That means I have a Constitutional RIGHT to enforce the Federal Preemption of state jurisdiction

and the protection of my medical information based on the plain text of 38 U.S.C. §511.

Even IF the Defendant Judge Villasenor might have jurisdiction to make decisions on

state law regarding disability, he is required to protect medical privacy under sealed record.

He chose to humiliate me in open court by deliberate violation of § 511 preemption and

violation of all the safeguards in the Constitution and statutory laws that protect me by RIGHT.

The level of harassment and discrimination has been growing by the act of retaliation

every time I state a claim of rights based on federal law. All of that makes it harder to claim rights

because I cannot enforce the law providing those rights in a court influenced by prejudice against

me for trying to assert my rights based on federal law.

REQUEST FOR RELIEF

State the reliefyou are requesting or what you want the court to do. Ifadditional space is needed to identify the reliefyou are requesting, use

extra paper to request relief Please indicate that additional paper is attached and label the additional pages regarding relief as "E. REQUEST

FOR RELIEF. ”

1) Affirmative answer to the Federal Questions presented above by issuing both

Declaratory and Punitive Judgment against the Defendants.

2) Declaratory Judgment:

The Defendant Judges and Magistrates are personally liable in their Individual

Capacity, along with the Defendant State itself, jointly and severally, for the violation of

due process of law by the violation of federal preemption.

a) According to the Supremacy Clause, the Defendant judges are automatically bound by

the Constitution and Laws of the United States, whether they like it or not.

b) Title 38 is Positive Law for over 60 years, pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution,

therefore must be taken literally at face value because it is "Legal Evidence" of the

Supreme Law of the Land. See Pub. Law 85-857, §1, 72 Stat. 1105 (1958) and Torres v.

Texas Department ofPublic Safety, 597 U.S.

(2022).

c) The Veterans Judicial Review Act eliminated ALL possibility of state jurisdiction

because it defined every aspect of Jurisdiction on Title 38. Congress “occupied the field”

ofjurisdiction on Title 38 and "foreclosed" ALL possibility of other officials and courts.

See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012).

d) The Defendants are liable for any Retaliation against my claim of rights.

‘It is well -settled that "[a]n action motivated by retaliation for the exercise

of a constitutionally protected right is actionable, even if the act, when

taken for a different reason, might have been legitimate." Martin v. Duffy,

977 F.3d 294, 306 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161,

1165 (5th Cir. 1995)).’ Wilson v. Wexford Med., No. 3:18-cv-00890, at

*46 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 4, 2021)

e) The Defendants are BOUND by § 511 and § 5301, which means they are REQUIRED to

OBEY federal preemption, therefore have NO judicial immunity for their misconduct.

f) Likewise, the Defendant State has NO Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for the

discrimination against the totally disabled veteran. See Torres v. Texas Department of

Public Safety, 597 U.S.

(2022).

REQUEST FOR RELIEF (cont.)

3) Punitive Judgment:

Since there is NOTHING the Defendants or the Court might say to cancel the federal

preemption established by the plain words of Positive Law, the ONLY thing left open for this

Court to decide is whether to grant the Punitive judgment as claimed or to assemble a Jury to

decide on punitive damages.

PLAINTIFF’S SIGNATURE

I declare under penalty of perjury that lam the plaintiff in this action, that I have read this

complaint, and that the information in this complaint is true and correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746;

18 D S C. § 1621.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, by signing below, I also certify to the best of my

knowledge, information, and belief that this complaint: (1) is not being presented for an improper

purpbse, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) is supported by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending or modifying

existing law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,

wiil'iikely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or

Otherwise complies with the requirements of Rule 11.

(Date)

(Revised February 2022)

Appendix C

Judgment (Docs. #19 & 20)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 24-cv-00892-LTB-RTG

DEREK SKELLCHOCK, pro se, and

VETERAN HOPE.org,

Plaintiffs,

JUDGE LAURIE KAUZIE DEAN,

JUDGE SUSAN BLANCO,

MAGISTRATE KANDACE MAJOROS,

JUDGE JUAN G. VILLASENOR,

MAGISTRATE JOLSTAD, and

THE STATE OF COLORADO,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge dated August 14, 2024. (ECF No. 15). The Recommendation states

that any objection to the Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days after its

service. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Recommendation was served on August 14,

2024. Following the grant of an extension of time, on September 12, 2024, Plaintiff

submitted a timely written objection to the Recommendation. (ECF No. 18). The Court

has therefore reviewed the Recommendation de novo in light of the file and record in

this case. On de novo review the Court concludes that the Recommendation is correct

for the reasons stated therein.

In the Recommendation, United States Magistrate Judge Richard T. Gurley

recommended dismissal of this action for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The Recommendation also stated that “to the extent [Plaintiff]

challenges a decision concerning VA benefits, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the

claim.” (ECF No. 15 at 3-6). As an alternative basis for dismissal, the Recommendation

stated that “even if the Complaint satisfied Rule 8, any claim seeking judicial review of a

state court judgment would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (Id. at 8).

Finally, the Recommendation provided that “Plaintiff's allegations that the named judicial

officers violated his rights in connection with state court proceedings fail based on

absolute judicial immunity.” (Id. at 9).

As part of Plaintiff’s Objection, he requests that “the Court [] appoint a new judge

who can support the Constitution by issuing the Summons and Answering the Federal

Questions presented in the original Suit/Complaint (ECF No. 1).” (ECF No. 18 at 6).

Though not entirely clear, the Court construes this as a request that Magistrate Judge

Gurley be recused from this case. However, such a request is improperly raised in

objections to the Recommendation. Plaintiff does not articulate a supporting basis for

such a request and including the request as part of the written objections violates the

Local Civil Rules. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d) (“A motion shall be filed as a separate

document.”); see also Garfinkle, 261 F.3d at 1031 (“In this circuit, theories raised for the

first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s report are deemed waived.”).

Insofar that the Objection can be construed to request that this Court, as the

assigned Senior District Judge, be recused from this case, such request is denied for

the reasons that follow. Title 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides a procedure where a party to a

proceeding may request the judge before whom the matter is pending to recuse himself

or herself based upon personal bias or prejudice either against the moving party or in

favor of any adverse party. Section 144 requires the moving party to submit a timely and

sufficient affidavit of personal bias and prejudice. See Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296,

1305 (10th Cir. 1997). “The affidavit must state with required particularity the identifying

facts of time, place, persons, occasion, and circumstances.” Hinman v. Rogers, 831

F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1987). Although the court must accept the facts alleged in the

supporting affidavit under § 144 as true, the affidavit is construed strictly against the

moving party. See Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988). The moving

party has a substantial burden “to demonstrate that the judge is not impartial.” United

States v. Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (1 Oth Cir. 1992).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any

proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The goal of this

provision is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs.

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). Under § 455, the Court is not required to

accept all factual allegations as true “and the test is whether a reasonable person,

knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.”

Glass, 849 F.2d at 1268 (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard is completely

objective and the inquiry is limited to outward manifestations and reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff fails to make the required showings to warrant the undersigned’s recusal.

Plaintiff has not submitted the required affidavit under § 144, stating with particularity the

facts of time, place, persons, occasion, and circumstances that establish bias or

prejudice against him. And the claims of bias or prejudice Plaintiff does raise in the

motion are vague and conclusory. See Pride v. Herrera, 28 F. App’x 891, 895 (10th Cir.

2001) (unpublished) (“Unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation is an

inappropriate ground for recusal.”) (cleaned up). To the extent Plaintiff suggests that

prior rulings requires that the undersigned Senior District Judge recuse from this case, it

is well-established that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a

bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994); see also

United States v. Mendoza, 468 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Unfavorable judicial

rulings do not in themselves call into question the impartiality of a judge”). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s request that this Court, as the undersigned Senior District Judge, be recused

from this case is denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the Objection (ECF No. 18) is OVERRULED. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate

Judge (ECF No. 15) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED. It is

FURTHER ORDERED for the reasons stated in the Recommendation, the

Complaint (ECF No. 5) and the action are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule

41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to comply with the pleading

requirements of Rule 8, lack of jurisdiction, or, alternatively, as barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, and, alternatively dismissed with prejudice as against judicial officers

based on absolute judicial immunity to the extent that Plaintiff alleges the named judicial

officers violated his rights in connection with state court proceedings.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 30th day of September, 2024.

BY THE COURT:

s/Lewis T. Babcock_____________

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Senior Judge

United States District Court

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 24-CV-00892-LTB-RTG

DEREK SKELLCHOCK, pro se, and

VETERAN HOPE.org,

Plaintiffs,

JUDGE LAURIE KAUZIE DEAN,

JUDGE SUSAN BLANCO,

MAGISTRATE KANDACE MAJOROS,

JUDGE JUAN G. VILLASENOR,

MAGISTRATE JOLSTAD, and

THE STATE OF COLORADO,

Defendants.

JUDGMENT

Pursuant to and in accordance with the Order of Dismissal entered by Lewis

T. Babcock, Senior District Judge, on September 30, 2024, it is hereby

ORDERED that Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants and against

Plaintiffs.

DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 30 day of September, 2024.

FOR THE COURT,

JEFFREY P. COLWELL, Clerk

By: s/ A. Garcia Garcia

Deputy Clerk

Appendix D

Tenth Circuit Order (Doc. #8-1)

Appellate Case: 24-1436

Document: 8-1

Date Filed: 07/07/2025

Page: 1

FILED

United States Court of Appeal

Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

July 7, 2025

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

DEREK SKELLCHOCK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

JUDGE LAURIE KAUZIE DEAN;

JUDGE SUSAN BLANCO;

MAGISTRATE KANDACE

MAJOROS; JUDGE JUAN G

VILLASENOR; MAGISTRATE

JOLSTAD; STATE OF COLORADO,

No. 24-1436

(D.C. No. l:24-CV-00892-LTB-RTG)

(D. Colo.)

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.

Derek Skellchock appeals the dismissal of his pro se action against

the State of Colorado and four state-court judges. The district court

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in

the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.

34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be

cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of

Appeal 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.

Appellate Case: 24-1436

Document: 8-1

Date Filed: 07/07/2025

Page: 2

dismissed the action on several different grounds, including Eleventh

Amendment

immunity

and

absolute judicial

immunity.

Exercising

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

Mr. Skellchock alleged the State of Colorado and several state-court

judges interfered with his benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs

(“VA benefits”). A federal magistrate judge twice directed him to amend his

pro se complaint to cure various pleading deficiencies, and although he

attempted to comply the first time, he refused to do so the second time.

Consequently, another magistrate judge reviewed the amended complaint

and recommended that the action be dismissed. Among other things, the

magistrate judge determined that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred

the claims against the State of Colorado and the state-court judges enjoyed

absolute judicial immunity. Over Mr. Skellchock’s objections, the district

court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the action.

We afford Mr. Skellchock’s pro se materials a liberal construction, but

we do not act as his advocate in searching the record and formulating

arguments on his behalf. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425

F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).

As an initial matter, Mr. Skellchock has waived appellate review of

Appellate Case: 24-1436

Document: 8-1

Date Filed: 07/07/2025

Page: 3

the district court’s dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment because his

brief does not address that issue. See Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct.

of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding inadequately briefed

arguments are waived).1

As for the district court’s judicial-immunity ruling, our review is de

novo. See Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). “A

judge acting in his judicial capacity is absolutely immune from . . . suit[],

unless the judge acts clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.”

Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990). “A judge may act in

excess of his subject matter jurisdiction and still retain absolute judicial

immunity; only in the unusual circumstances of complete and clear absence

of all jurisdiction is absolute immunity inappropriate.” Id. at 694. “[T]he

scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly when the issue

is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).

Mr. Skellchock contends the state judges exceeded their jurisdiction

1 Mr. Skellchock cites Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which

“creates an exception [to Eleventh Amendment immunity] under which

individuals can sue state officers in their individual capacities if the lawsuit

seeks prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law,” Free Speech

Coal., Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 736 (10th Cir. 2024). See Aplt. Br. at

6. But he does not develop any argument as to how this case helps him. See

Stein, 520 F.3d at 1189. Neither did he seek prospective relief; the amended

complaint sought only retrospective declaratory relief and punitive

damages. See R. at 31.

Appellate Case: 24-1436

Document: 8-1

Date Filed: 07/07/2025

Page: 4

by garnishing and allocating his VA benefits in contravention of federal law.

But even if they committed legal error, that would not mean they acted in

the clear absence of all jurisdiction such that they would be divested of

absolute immunity for actions taken in their judicial capacity. “A judge does

not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction even if the action he took was

in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Whitesei

v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Indeed, regardless of whether the state judges incorrectly

garnished or allocated his VA benefits in violation of federal law, the salient

question remains whether their actions were taken in their judicial

capacities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (“Stump made clear

that whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relates to the nature of the

act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and

to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in

his judicial capacity.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). On

that score, the amended complaint indicates the state judges acted solely in

their judicial capacities by entering orders that affected Mr. Skellchock’s

VA benefits. See R. at 29 (alleging judges made “temporary rulings to

extract money from my VA benefits,” “demand[ed] more information about

. . . VA benefit money,” recused, and “orderfed] me to disclose my medical

information to the public in open court”). And Mr. Skellchock’s appellate

Appellate Case: 24-1436

Document: 8-1

Date Filed: 07/07/2025

Page: 5

brief confirms “the state judges issued orders affecting veterans[] benefits,

which are exclusively governed by federal law.” Aplt. Br. at 5. These

averments are insufficient to divest the state judges of their absolute

judicial immunity.

Ill

The district court’s judgment is affirmed. Mr. Skellchock’s motions for

oral argument or for expedited consideration and to file electronically are

denied as moot.

Entered for the Court

Richard E.N. Federico

Circuit Judge

Appendix E

Brief list of current and prior

cases involving veteran benefits.

Brief list of current and prior cases involving veteran benefits

William R. Lott v. Maria V. Lott,

US Supreme Court No. 24-1160 (Pending Conference 9/29/2025)(Virginia)

The veteran is asking this Court to answer the Constitutional Questions about

whether the Virginia court is bound by federal preemption of state jurisdiction established

separately by the USFSPA and the VJRA. The Virginia Court has completely reinvented

the USFSPA to suit its own interpretation AS IF the clear preemption of state jurisdiction

found by this Court in McCarty, Mansell and Howell never existed.

Jeremy N. Miller v. Casi A. Miller,

US Supreme Court No. 24-1313 (Pending)(Tennessee)

The veteran is asking this Court to answer Constitutional Questions about whether

the Tennessee court is bound by the complete preemption of state jurisdiction established

by the VJRA and expressed in current positive law 38 U.S.C. § 511. The Tennessee

Courts claim to be bound by the Rose v. Rose decision instead of the plain text of 38

USC 511 pursuant to the Constitution.

Michael B. Yourko v. Lee Ann B. Yourko,

US Supreme Court No. 23-999 (Cert, denied 10/7/2024)(Virginia)

The veteran asked this Court to answer Constitutional Questions about whether

the Virginia courts violated federal preemption by ruling that state contract law would be

enforceable in conflict with the USFSPA and the VJRA.

Erich M. Martin v. Raina L. Martin,

US Supreme Court No. 23-605 (Cert, denied 10/7/2024)(Nevada)

The veteran asked this Court to answer Constitutional Questions about whether

the Nevada courts violated federal preemption by ruling that state contract law takes

precedent over the plain text of the USFSPA.

Dax Elliot Carpenter v. Julie Elizabeth Carpenter,

US Supreme Court No. 20-1511 (Cert, denied (Michigan)

The veteran asked this Court whether VJRA amendment of the jurisdiction statute

of Title 38 made it clear all jurisdiction on Title 38 benefits was assigned by Congress to

the VA and ONLY certain federal courts on appeal, thereby eliminated the most remote

possibility of state jurisdiction on Title 38.

Sean Braunstein v. Jericka Braunstein,

US Supreme Court No. 20-267 (Cert, denied ll/9/2020)(New Hampshire)

__ veteran

____________

__________________

jurisdiction

The

asked this________

Court whether

the VJRA amendment

of the

statute of Title 38 made it clear that states have NO possibility of jurisdiction on Title 38

benefits because ALL jurisdiction was assigned by law to the Administrator of the VA

(now Secretary of the VA) and ONLY subject to review by certain federal courts.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.