Opposition Brief — Matthew Jones, et al., Petitioners v. Amber M. King, et al.

No. 25-658

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MATTHEW JONES, YSIDRO RENTERIA, AND

WILLIAM L. JONES CARR,

Petitioners,

v.

AMBER M. KING, CHRIS H. BUSSE, AND

BRANDON W. JONES,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

WILLIAM CHRISTIAN

Counsel of Record

DANIELA PEINADO WELSH

GRAVES, DOUGHERTY,

HEARON & MOODY, P.C.

401 Congress Ave.

Suite 2700

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 480-5600

wchristian@gdhm.com

Counsel for Respondents

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

In a proceeding to question a panel of potential

jurors under oath to determine whether they meet the

statutory qualifications to serve on a jury, does a

judge have judicial immunity from ruling that members of the panel are disqualified because they do not

satisfy the statutory residency requirement?

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The Petition omits the following related proceeding:

1. United States Court of Appeal (5th Cir.):

Jones, et al. v. King, et al., No. 25-51009

(pending)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented .................................................... i

Related Proceedings .................................................. ii

Table of Authorities .................................................. iv

Introduction ............................................................... 1

Statement of the Case ............................................... 2

Reasons for Denying Certiorari ................................ 5

I.

This Court does not have jurisdiction

over the issue raised in Petitioners’

Question Presented .................................... 5

II.

The interlocutory order Petitioners ask

this Court to review is currently pending before the court of appeals in a second appeal from final judgment ................. 7

III.

The court of appeals’ decision is correct

on the merits and does not conflict with

any decision of this Court or the other

courts of appeal ........................................... 9

Conclusion ............................................................... 13

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Adams v. McIlhany,

764 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1985) .............................. 10

Bradley v. Fisher,

80 U.S. 335 (1872) .............................................. 12

Crooks v. Maynard,

913 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990) .............................. 10

Daves v. Dallas Cty., Tex.,

22 F.4th 522 (5th Cir. 2022) .............................. 12

Ex parte Virginia,

100 U.S. 339 (1879) ............................................ 10

Figueroa v. Blackburn,

208 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000) ............................... 10

Giron v. Chaparro,

167 Fed. App’x. 716 (10th Cir. 2006) ................. 10

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,

240 U.S. 251 (1916) .............................................. 8

McAlester v. Brown,

469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972) ...................... 11, 12

Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9 (1991) ................................................ 11

v

Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511 (1985) .............................................. 6

Pierson v. Ray,

386 U.S. 547 (1967) ............................................ 12

Pulliam v. Allen,

466 U.S. 522 (1984) ............................................ 12

Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349 (1978) ...................................... 11–12

Thompson v. Betts,

754 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1985) .............................. 6

Statutes

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.21 ............................. 10

Tex. Gov’t Code § 62.015 ................................... 10–11

Rules

Fed. R. App. Proc. 41(d)......................................... 5, 8

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) ......................................... 2

Sup. Ct. R. 10 ............................................................. 9

Sup. Ct. R. 14 ............................................................. 7

1

INTRODUCTION

There is no appellate jurisdiction over the question presented as framed by Petitioners. Petitioners

ask whether ordering their “wrongful arrests” in a

jury qualification proceeding is shielded by judicial

immunity. But the district court granted judicial immunity for Judge King’s contempt orders, and there

is no interlocutory appeal from an order granting immunity. For this reason, the court of appeals dismissed Petitioners’ cross-appeal for want of jurisdiction. This Court likewise has no jurisdiction over the

issue of Petitioners’ allegedly unlawful arrests.

Subsequent developments in this case further

counsel against this Court’s review. The court of appeals has issued its mandate, the district court has

entered final judgment, and Petitioners have filed a

notice of appeal from that final judgment. The entire

case—including the immunity order Petitioners complain about here—is now pending before the court of

appeals in that second appeal. This Court should decline to review an issue on interlocutory appeal that

is currently under review by the court of appeals on

appeal from final judgment.

Finally, the court of appeals’ ruling below is correct on the merits. Judge King is immune from civil

damages claims premised on the disqualifications of

potential jurors who appeared on a jury summons to

her court. And if this Court had jurisdiction to reach

the issue, her contempt orders are also judicial acts

entitled to immunity. There is no conflict with any decision of this Court or other court of appeals on these

issues, nor any other reason for this Court to grant

review.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Facts as alleged by Petitioners. Because this

case comes to this Court on a 12(b)(6) motion, it is

framed by the following allegations as quoted from

Petitioners’ complaint. R.228. 1

Amber King, the Justice of the Peace presiding

over the Loving County Justice Court, “informed the

Loving County clerk that she needed a jury for an

upcoming trial.” R.236. “Shortly thereafter, each

Plaintiff received a summons to appear for jury

selection in Justice of the Peace Court in Loving

County.” Id.

“[E]ach Plaintiff appeared as summoned to a

meeting room (not a courtroom) in the annex of the

Loving County Courthouse, along with several other

individuals.” R.237. “King began by addressing the

assembled group. She first stated that any of those

summoned who were not ‘qualified jurors’ could leave

voluntarily. She then stated that any person who is

found not to be a ‘qualified juror’ would be ‘submitted

to the district attorney for a [sic] aggravated perjury,

a third-degree felony’ and held in contempt of court.

None of the ‘jurors’ left.” R.238.

A deputy sheriff “asked the summoned jurors to

stand, raise their right hand, and swear to tell the

truth in response to King’s questions regarding their

‘service and qualifications as a juror.’ Each person

affirmed.” Id.

The appellate record is cited as: “R.[page number].”

Documents filed in the trial court since the appellate record was filed are cited as “Doc. No. [docket number].”

1

3

“King then proceeded to ask the assembled group

a series of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions:

• ‘You are all 18 years of age or older?’ The

summoned jurors responded in unison, ‘yes.’

• ‘You are all citizens of this country and

residents of this county?’ The summoned

jurors responded in unison, ‘yes.’

• ‘You are all able to read and write?’ The

summoned jurors responded in unison, ‘yes.’

• ‘You are currently eligible to become a

qualified voter of this country under the

Constitution and the laws of this state?’ The

summoned jurors responded in unison, ‘yes.’

• ‘You’re not convicted of a misdemeanor theft

or any felony?’ The summoned jurors

responded in unison, ‘no.’

• ‘You’re not under indictment for legal

accusations for misdemeanor theft or felony?’

The summoned jurors responded in unison,

‘no.’”

R.238–39.

“Immediately thereafter, King stated: ‘So it’s

come to this Court’s attention there are several jurors

who are not residents of this county. And you were

given the opportunity to leave. Since you have not left

you will be held in contempt of court, and you will be

remanded to the Winkler County Jail for obstruction

of the proper administration of justice as well as

disrespect to the Court.’” R.239 (emphasis in original).

“King then identified each Plaintiff by name and

ordered them to be arrested.” Id. Judge King signed

orders finding each Plaintiff in contempt. R.285–90.

The orders “remanded” each Plaintiff to the Winkler

4

County Jail. Id. Loving County Constable Brandon

Jones and deputies of Sheriff Chris Busse “escorted

Plaintiffs out of the room and into an enjoining

hallway, where Plaintiffs were ordered to empty their

pockets. R.239. Deputies then placed handcuffs on

each Plaintiff and walked them to waiting vehicles.

The deputies drove Plaintiffs to the Winkler County

jail[.]” Id. Plaintiffs were released after approximately five hours. Id.

2. Proceedings below. The district court granted

judicial immunity to Judge King for her orders holding Petitioners in contempt and committing them to

jail. Pet. App. 32a–37a. But the district court denied

immunity for Judge King’s disqualification of Petitioners from jury service, concluding that a jury qualification proceeding was not a “judicial act.” Id. at

29a–32a.

Judge King and the other Respondents filed a notice of interlocutory appeal from the part of the district court’s order that had denied them absolute or

qualified immunity. R.479. Petitioners filed a notice

of cross-appeal, appealing the part of the district

court’s order that had granted Judge King judicial immunity for the contempt orders. R.482.

The court of appeals held that the jury qualification proceeding was a judicial act entitling Judge

King to immunity, reversing the district court’s contrary conclusion. Pet. App. 19a. The court of appeals

also dismissed Petitioners’ cross-appeal. Id. The court

of appeals determined that it had no jurisdiction over

the cross-appeal because the collateral order doctrine

applies only to interlocutory orders denying immunity, not interlocutory orders granting immunity. Id. at

16a–17a. The court further ruled that the cross-

5

appeal did not meet the stringent requirements for

the assumption of “pendent” appellate jurisdiction.

Id.

No party sought to stay the mandate pending certiorari under Fed. R. App. Proc. 41(d). The court of appeals therefore issued its mandate, conferring jurisdiction on the district court. The district court entered

final judgment. Doc. No. 37. Petitioners filed a notice

of appeal from that final judgment, specifying that its

appeal “encompasses all orders of the district court,

including the previously appealed November 4, 2023

order” that granted Judge King judicial immunity for

the contempt orders. Doc. No. 38. This second appeal

is currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit as Cause No. 25-51009.

REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI

I.

This Court does not have jurisdiction over

the issue raised in Petitioners’ Question

Presented.

This Court’s limited appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders does not extend to a district

court’s orders granting judicial immunity. Because

Petitioners include within the scope of the Question

Presented the district court’s interlocutory order

granting immunity to Judge King, this Court has no

appellate jurisdiction to review that issue. The petition for certiorari should therefore be denied.

Below, Petitioners challenged by cross-appeal the

district court’s grant of judicial immunity to Judge

King for her orders committing Petitioners to jail for

contempt. The court of appeals dismissed the crossappeal for want of jurisdiction, ruling that, on interlocutory appeal, it had no appellate jurisdiction to

6

review an interlocutory order granting immunity. Pet.

App. 16a–17a. Petitioners ask this Court to grant review of this interlocutory order without addressing

this jurisdictional obstacle.

Under the “collateral order” doctrine, “the denial

of a substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for the essence

of absolute immunity is its possessor’s entitlement

not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525

(1985) (emphasis added). But the same is not true of

a trial court’s order granting immunity: “Ordinarily,

grants of immunity are not immediately appealable

because they may be fully and effectively reviewed

upon entry of final judgment.” Pet. App. 16a–17a (citing Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir.

1985)).

Here, the district court denied immunity to Judge

King for conducting the jury qualification proceeding,

id. at 29a–32a, but the district court granted immunity for ordering Petitioners to jail on a finding of contempt. Id. at 32a–37a. As the Fifth Circuit held, only

the denial of immunity for the jury qualification was

reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Id. at 5a. Petitioners attempted to invoke the court of appeals’ “pendent

appellate jurisdiction,” but the court ruled the doctrine did not apply, in part because disqualifying Petitioners from jury service and ordering them to jail

on a finding of contempt were factually and legally

distinct issues: “[T]he differences—both factual and

legal—between the jury proceeding issue and the

contempt-orders issue led the district court to treat

7

them as distinct, analyzing them in separate sections

of its ruling.” Id. at 17a–18a.

In their Question Presented, Petitioners ignore

this distinction between appealable and nonappealable interlocutory orders by asking this Court

to review the alleged “wrongful arrests” of Petitioners

with their disqualification from jury service. This

Court has no jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal

of the order granting Judge King’s immunity for

Petitioners’ alleged “wrongful arrests.” Immunity was

granted for that conduct by the district court, and the

court of appeals dismissed Petitioners’ cross-appeal of

that issue for want of jurisdiction. The petition

neither argues this Court has jurisdiction over the

district court’s interlocutory order granting immunity

to Judge King for this conduct, nor challenges the

court of appeals’ dismissal of their cross-appeal for

want of appellate jurisdiction. Because there is no

jurisdiction for this Court to decide the Question

Presented as framed by Petitioners, certiorari should

be denied.

II. The order that Petitioners ask this Court to

review is currently pending before the court

of appeals in a second appeal.

The Court should decline review, because a second appeal from final judgment in this case is pending

before the court of appeals. Petitioners fail to include

this second appeal in the list of directly related proceedings required by Sup. Ct. R. 14(b)(iii).

The relevant procedural background is as follows:

• In an order dated November 4, 2023, the district court signed its interlocutory order on immunity. Pet. App. 43a.

8

• The court of appeals reversed the district

court’s order to the extent it had denied immunity to Respondents. Id. at 1a.

• The court of appeals issued its mandate, as no

party sought to stay the court of appeals’ mandate pending certiorari under Fed. R. App.

Proc. 41(d).

• On receipt of the mandate, the district court

entered final judgment. Doc. No. 37.

• On November 28, 2025, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment – an appeal that Petitioners stated: “encompasses all

orders of the district court, including the previously appealed November 4, 2023 order.”

Doc. No. 38. This appeal is currently pending

before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit as Cause No. 25-51009.

• On December 8, 2025, Petitioners filed this petition seeking review of the interlocutory order.

This procedural posture warrants denial of the

petition. The interlocutory nature of a case “alone furnishes sufficient ground for the denial of the application.” Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co.,

240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916). Further, the same interlocutory order Petitioners ask this Court to review is currently under review by the court of appeals in a second appeal. Denying certiorari of the interlocutory order promotes judicial efficiency by avoiding duplicative or conflicting dispositions and allowing consolidation of issues considered at earlier stages of the litigation. That is especially true here, where the court of

appeals dismissed Petitioners’ cross-appeal because

the court had no appellate jurisdiction over the

9

interlocutory order. Now, on appeal from final judgment, the court of appeals may reach the merits of the

issue that forms part of the Question Presented.

Granting review before the court of appeals has the

chance to rule on the merits would be, at best, premature. In its current posture, therefore, this case is a

poor vehicle for reviewing the issues as presented by

Petitioners.

In sum, certiorari should be denied because Petitioners present a question from an interlocutory appeal of a non-final order when that question has not

yet been decided by the court of appeals and is currently pending before the court of appeals in an appeal from the final judgment.

III. The court of appeals’ decision is correct on

the merits and does not conflict with any decision of this Court or the other courts of appeal.

On the merits, the court of appeals’ disposition of

the issue of judicial immunity was correct. The decision does not conflict with this Court’s precedents, nor

does it conflict with any decision of another court of

appeals. Even if the court of appeals’ decision were erroneous in some respect, Petitioners’ complaint is, at

bottom, that the court of appeals misapplied settled

law, which is not a sufficient reason for certiorari.

Sup. Ct. R. 10.

The jury qualification proceeding conducted by

Judge King is a judicial act entitled to immunity.

Judge King questioned under oath the panel of potential jurors who appeared in response to a jury summons to her court. She made factual determinations

on whether each met the statutory qualifications to

10

serve as a juror. That is normally a judicial task, especially so in Texas state court, where state law provides that the “court is the judge, after proper examination, of the qualifications of a juror.” Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. art. 35.21.

The contempt orders Petitioners seek to include

within the scope of the Question Presented are also

“judicial acts” for which judges have immunity. See,

e.g., Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir.

2000) (“There can be little doubt that holding an individual in contempt is an act normally performed by a

judge.”); Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th

Cir. 1990) (a judge’s contempt order is “clearly” a judicial act); Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th

Cir. 1985) (“There is no question” a judge’s actions in

imposing a contempt sentence are “judicial acts”); see

also Giron v. Chaparro, 167 Fed. App’x. 716, 720 (10th

Cir. 2006) (a contempt order “patently involves a judicial function which must be afforded the defense of

absolute immunity”).

There is no conflict with this Court’s opinion in Ex

parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). As the court of

appeals’ opinion explains, the judge in Ex parte Virginia was performing the non-judicial act of compiling

a list of persons who could be called for grand-jury service. Pet. App. 12a–13a. Today, this task is performed

by clerks and other non-judicial officials who create

such jury lists from drivers-license and voter-registration databases. Judge King was, by contrast, questioning potential jurors under oath who had appeared

to court in response to a jury summons to determine

each person’s qualification to serve as a juror. This

was her judicial duty as a justice of the peace presiding over the Texas justice court. See Tex. Gov’t Code

§ 62.015(a) (“On the day that jurors appear for jury

11

service in a justice . . . court, the judge, if jury trials

have been set, shall select from the names on the jury

lists a sufficient number of qualified jurors to serve on

the jury panel.”). Her acts in conducting the

proceeding and ruling on the juror’s qualifications

were therefore judicial acts protected by immunity.

Contrary to Petitioners’ argument, Pet. App. 20,

the Fifth Circuit’s four-factor test for identifying

whether an act is judicial for purposes of immunity is

consistent with this Court’s precedent. This Court itself expressly endorsed the Fifth Circuit’s approach to

judicial immunity by citing with approval the very

Fifth Circuit case that first adopted the four-factor

test. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361 (1978)

(quoting McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.

1972)). In the nearly fifty years since, the Fifth Circuit has continued to use the four-factor test to guide

its analysis of whether an act is judicial for purposes

of immunity. There is no cause for this Court to review that practice now.

Each of the Fifth Circuit’s four factors, moreover,

find firm grounding in this Court’s decisions. The

first—whether the act complained of is “a normal judicial function”—is taken straight from this Court’s

precedent. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12

(1991) (judicial act inquiry considers “whether it is a

function normally performed by a judge”). The second

and third factors—whether the acts occurred in the

courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces and whether

the controversy centered around a case pending

before the court—have likewise been cited by this

Court as relevant factors to consider. See, e.g., id. at

12 (noting that plaintiff “was called into the courtroom for purposes of a pending case”). And the fourth

factor—whether the acts arose directly out of a visit

12

to the judge in his official capacity—was quoted with

approval by this Court in Stump. 435 U.S. at 361

(quoting McAlester, 469 F.2d at 1282). Finally, the

Fifth Circuit’s four factors are not a rigid test, but a

“case-specific” guide for evaluating a judge’s actions.

Daves v. Dallas Cty., Tex., 22 F.4th 522, 539 & n.13

(5th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Consideration of these factors in this way does not conflict with this Court’s

precedent.

Affording a judge immunity for damages in a private civil action does not leave the public without

remedy for judges’ misconduct. Judges may be removed from office by impeachment. They may be disciplined by judicial conduct commissions. In Texas

and other states that conduct judicial elections,

judges may be voted out of office. In appropriate cases,

prospective injunctive relief may be available against

a judge. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 542 (1984).

But as to claims for monetary damages, this Court

has long recognized that even when a judge is

“accused of acting maliciously and corruptly,” Pierson

v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), it is “a general

principle of the highest importance to the proper

administration of justice that a judicial officer, in

exercising the authority vested in him, [should] be

free to act upon his own convictions, without

apprehension of personal consequences to himself.”

Stump, 435 U.S. at 355 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80

U.S. 335, 347 (1872)). The decision below follows this

Court’s precedent on the purposes and scope of judicial immunity. There is no conflict with the decisions

of another court of appeals. Review should therefore

be denied.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM CHRISTIAN

Counsel of Record

DANIELA PEINADO WELSH

GRAVES, DOUGHERTY,

HEARON & MOODY, P.C.

401 Congress Ave.

Suite 2700

Austin, Texas 78701

(512) 480-5600

wchristian@gdhm.com

January 30, 2026

Counsel for Respondents