Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Christopher Michael Arredondo, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefJan 12, 2026
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. ______________
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
___________
Christopher Michael Arredondo,
Petitioner,
v.
United States of America,
Respondent.
___________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
___________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
___________
Jason D. Hawkins
Federal Public Defender
Maria Gabriela Vega
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Federal Public Defender’s Office
Northern District of Texas
525 South Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, TX 75202
(214) 767-2746
gabriela_vega@fd.org
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment.
2.
Whether Congress may criminalize intrastate firearm possession based
solely on the firearm crossing state lines at some point before the defendant came to
possess it.
i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner is Christopher Michael Arredondo, who was the Defendant-Appellant in the court below. Respondent, the United States of America, was the PlaintiffAppellee in the court below.
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
•
United States v. Arredondo, No. 4:24-cr-00093-Y, U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. Judgment entered on September 25, 2024.
•
United States v. Arredondo, No. 24-10886, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. Judgment entered on October 14, 2025.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented ....................................................................................................... i
Parties to the Proceeding .............................................................................................. ii
Related Proceedings....................................................................................................... ii
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................... iii
Appendices ..................................................................................................................... v
Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... vi
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari .................................................................................... 1
Opinions Below .............................................................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................... 1
Provisions Involved ........................................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Case ................................................................................................... 2
I.
Facts and Proceedings in District Court....................................................... 2
II.
Appellate Proceedings ................................................................................... 3
Reasons For Granting This Petition ............................................................................. 4
I.
II.
Lower courts require guidance on how to adjudicate Second Amendment
challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prosecutions. ......................................... 4
A.
The courts of appeals are deeply divided over the scope of the
Second Amendment right. .................................................................. 5
B.
This issue implicates the prosecution and incarceration of
thousands of individuals. .................................................................... 9
This Court should delineate the boundaries of federal authority under the
Commerce Clause in the firearm context. .................................................. 10
A.
Federal appellate courts differ on the relationship between
Scarborough and Lopez. .................................................................... 13
B.
An unchecked Commerce power would significantly expand
Congress’s reach into state affairs. .................................................. 15
iii
III.
This Court should hold the instant petition pending the outcome in United
States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2025). .................................. 17
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 18
iv
APPENDICES
Appendix A Opinion, United States v. Arredondo, No. 24-10886
(5th Cir. October 14, 2025) ............................................... Pet. App’x a001
Appendix B Judgment and Sentence, United States v. Arredondo, No. 4:24-cr00093-Y (N.D. Tex. September 25, 2024) ........................ Pet. App’x a012
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) ................................................................................................ 15
Alderman v. United States,
562 U.S. 1163 (2011) ....................................................................................... 13, 16
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) .................................................................................................. 6
Kanter v. Barr,
919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) .................................................................................... 8
Lawrence on Behalf of Lawrence v. Chater,
516 U.S. 163 (1996) ................................................................................................ 17
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519 (2012) ................................................................................................ 16
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022) .................................................................................................. 4, 5
Pitsilides v. Barr,
128 F.4th 203 (3d Cir. 2025) .................................................................................... 8
Range v. Att’y Gen.,
124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc) .................................................................... 8
Scarborough v. United States,
431 U.S. 563 (1977) ................................................................................................ 11
United States v. Arredondo,
No. 24-10886, 2025 WL 2917089 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025) ...................................... 3
United States v. Bishop,
66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 1995) ...................................................................................... 14
United States v. Chesney,
86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996) .................................................................................... 15
vi
United States v. Cockerham,
— F.4th —, No. 24-60401, 2025 WL 3653336 (5th Cir. Dec. 17,
2025).......................................................................................................................... 7
United States v. Cortes,
299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................ 14
United States v. Crump,
120 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................. 14
United States v. Diaz,
116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) ..................................................................... 3, 7, 8, 17
United States v. Dorris,
236 F.3d 582 (10th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................ 14
United States v. Duarte,
101 F.4th 657 (9th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................... 7
United States v. Duarte,
137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) ............................................................................... 6, 7
United States v. Dubois,
94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 145
S. Ct. 1041 (2025) ..................................................................................................... 6
United States v. Gateward,
84 F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................... 14
United States v. Hanna,
55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................. 14
United States v. Hemani,
No. 24-1234 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2025) ............................................................................ 17
United States v. Hunt,
123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................... 6, 7
United States v. Jackson,
110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024) ............................................................................. 6, 7
United States v. Johnson,
42 F.4th 743 (7th Cir. 2022) ................................................................................... 11
United States v. Kelly,
No. 3:22-CR-00037, 2022 WL 17336578 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022) .................. 10
vii
United States v. Kimble,
142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................... 8
United States v. Kirk,
105 F.3d 997 (5th Cir. 1997) ................................................................................. 13
United States v. Kuban,
94 F.3d 971 (5th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................... 13
United States v. Lemons,
302 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................. 14
United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) .............................................................................. 11, 12, 15, 16
United States v. Moore,
666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................... 4
United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) .......................................................................................... 13, 16
United States v. Patterson,
853 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................. 13
United States v. Patton,
451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006) ................................................................................ 14
United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680 (2024) ........................................................................................ 5, 9, 12
United States v. Rawls,
85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................. 13, 14
United States v. Santiago,
238 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................................................................... 14
United States v. Schnur,
132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................... 8
United States v. Seekins,
52 F.4th 988 (5th Cir. 2022) ............................................................................. 11, 16
United States v. Shelton,
66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................... 14
United States v. Simpson,
152 F.4th 611 (5th Cir. 2025) ................................................................................. 17
viii
United States v. Smith,
101 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 1996) ................................................................................... 14
United States v. Williams,
113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) ................................................................................... 8
United States v. Wright,
607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................ 14
Vincent v. Bondi,
127 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2025) ............................................................................... 6
Zherka v. Bondi,
140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025) .................................................................................. 6, 7
Federal Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) .................................................................................... 2, 4, 5, 7, 17
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) .................................................................................................... 17
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) ........................................................................................................ 11
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ........................................................................................................ 1
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, § 1202, 82 Stat. 197 ........................................................................................ 10
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. amend. II ............................................................................................ 1, 3, 4
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3....................................................................................... 1, 15
Other Authorities
Fiscal Year 2021 Overview of Federal Criminal Cases, U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N (April 2022) ................................................................................................. 9
FY 2024 Quick Facts 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) Firearms Offenses, U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N.................................................................................................................... 10
Pet. for Cert., United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. June 2,
2025), 2025 WL 1593262 ........................................................................................ 17
Statistics - Inmate Offenses, Federal Bureau of Prisons .............................................. 9
Statistics, Federal Bureau of Prisons ........................................................................... 9
ix
United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report Fiscal Year 2024,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ............................................................................................ 10
x
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Christopher Michael Arredondo seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished opinion is available at United States v. Arredondo, No. 24-10886, 2025 WL 2917089 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025). It is reprinted in
Appendix A to this Petition. The district court’s judgment and sentence in United
States v. Arredondo, No. 4:24-cr-00093-Y (N.D. Tex. September 25, 2024), is reprinted
in Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The Fifth Circuit entered judgment on October 14, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes[.]
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.
U.S. Const. amend. II.
1
Section 922(g)(1) of Title 18, which provides in relevant part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year…
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
Facts and Proceedings in District Court
The government indicted Christopher Michael Arredondo for unlawful posses-
sion of a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ROA.31-33. Arredondo
moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional because it violated the Second Amendment and lay beyond the scope of Congress’s commerce power. ROA.34-53. The district court denied the motion. ROA.126-27.
Arredondo then pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. ROA.31, 242, 302.
As part of his guilty plea, Arredondo executed a written stipulation of facts where he
admitted that the firearm he possessed “had traveled at some time from Arizona to
the state of Texas in and affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” ROA.139; see also
ROA.243-47. The stipulation did not specify when the firearm last traveled in commerce, or whether Arredondo’s conduct or even a commercial transaction caused the
firearm’s last movement in commerce. ROA.139. Arredondo also agreed that prior to
2
possessing the firearm, he was convicted of Aggravated Robbery and received a 10year state sentence. ROA.139.
At sentencing, the district court calculated: Offense Level 20, Criminal History
Category IV, advisory guideline range of 51–63 months’ imprisonment. ROA.140, 178,
193. The district court imposed 63 months imprisonment and a three-year term of
supervised release. ROA.162, 270-71.
II.
Appellate Proceedings
On appeal, Arredondo raised three challenges to his conviction and various
issues related to his sentencing. As to his conviction, Arredondo first argued that
precedent misinterpreted “in or affecting commerce” as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
If precedent correctly interpreted the statute, then Arredondo maintained that Congress exceeded its commerce power when it enacted § 922(g). Lastly, Arredondo maintained that § 922(g)(1) could not pass constitutional muster under the Second Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. United States v. Arredondo, No. 24-10886, 2025 WL 2917089 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025) (reprinted at Pet.
App’x a001–a011). On his conviction-related claims, the panel held all challenges
foreclosed, relying exclusively on United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471–72 (5th
Cir. 2024), to dispose of the Second Amendment challenge. Id. at *6; Pet. App’x a011.
3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION
I.
Lower courts require guidance on how to adjudicate Second Amendment challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prosecutions.
The Second Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to keep and bear
arms.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Yet § 922(g)(1) indiscriminately denies that right to
anyone previously convicted of a crime punishable by a year or more. Although the
constitutional and statutory texts conflict, Second Amendment challenges to
§ 922(g)(1) prosecutions historically and uniformly failed. See United States v. Moore,
666 F.3d 313, 316–17 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting authorities).
Then came New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S.
1 (2022), and a new text-and-history test for Second Amendment claims. “When the
Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct,” the government now
must “justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. No longer may the
government defend a regulation by showing that it is narrowly tailored to achieve an
important or even compelling state interest. Id. at 17–24. As for the particulars of the
“historical inquiry” courts must conduct, Bruen explained that “whether a historical
regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly modern firearm regulation” depends
on “whether the two regulations are ‘relevantly similar.’” Id. at 28–29 (quoting C.
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993)). Relevant similarity, as sketched out by Bruen, means that the regulations must match on “how
and why” the Second Amendment right is burdened. Id. at 29. Otherwise stated,
“whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right
4
of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified are central
considerations….” Id. (cleaned up).
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), applied Bruen to a federal firearm crime. But Rahimi “conclude[d] only this: An individual found by a court to pose
a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added).
True, Rahimi clarified that “the appropriate analysis involves considering whether
the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692 (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26–31) (emphasis added). And it
found that “Section 922(g)(8)[’s]…prohibition on the possession of firearms by those
found by a court to present a threat to others fits neatly within the tradition th[at]
surety and going armed laws,” both “founding era regimes,” “represent.” Id. at 698.
But Rahimi’s reasoning left unresolved whether the government could invoke this
tradition to justify a statute like § 922(g)(1)—which imposes an uncabined and permanent firearm possession ban irrespective of any threat, judicially determined or
otherwise, that a person may pose. Rahimi, in other words, left plenty unresolved.
A.
The courts of appeals are deeply divided over the scope of the
Second Amendment right.
As Justice Jackson observed in Rahimi, “lower courts applying Bruen’s approach have been unable to produce consistent, principled results, and, in fact, they
have come to conflicting conclusions on virtually every consequential Second Amendment issue to come before them.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 743 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(cleaned up). Some circuits see no need to conduct Bruen’s text-and-history analysis
5
in the § 922(g)(1) context, relying instead on dicta predating Bruen. Others apply
Bruen’s text-and-history framework but disagree about whether felons are part of
“the people” protected by the Second Amendment. The courts of appeals have also
split on the traditions that justify § 922(g)(1), and they vary as to whether the statute
is vulnerable to as-applied challenges.
To start, six circuits “have upheld the categorical application of § 922(g)(1) to
all felons.” United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing United
States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 707–08 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Jackson, 110
F.4th 1120, 1129 (8th Cir. 2024); Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1265–66 (10th
Cir. 2025); United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025)); Duarte, 137 F.4th at 748 (“Today, we align
ourselves with the Fourth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and hold that
§ 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutional as applied to non-violent felons like Steven Duarte.”); Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68, 75, 78–79 (2d Cir. 2025). Each placed significant weight on this Court’s statement in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
626–27 & n.26 (2008), that “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” are
“presumptively lawful.” See Hunt, 123 F.4th at 703–04; Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1128–
29 Vincent, 127 F.4th at 1265; Dubois, 94 F.4th at 1293; Duarte, 137 F.4th at 750–52;
Zherka, 140 F.4th at 75 (relying on pre-Buren precedent that cited Heller’s presumptively lawful language to conclude that the statute is facially constitutional).
The Second, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits went farther. The Fourth Circuit concluded that both the text and history supported the exclusion of felons from
6
the arms-bearing right. See Hunt, 123 F.4th at 704–08. The Eighth Circuit reached
the same end point based on the history alone. See Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1126–29.
And the en banc Ninth Circuit most recently “agree[d] with the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits that…historical tradition is sufficient to uphold the application of § 922(g)(1)
to all felons.” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 761 (citing Jackson, 110 F.4th at 1127–28; Hunt,
123 F.4th at 706.).1 The Second Circuit recently joined the ranks on this side of the
split. Zherka, 140 F.4th at 78–79.
That said, the Sixth Circuit has endorsed that “§ 922(g)(1) might be unconstitutional as applied to at least some felons.” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 748 (citing United
States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2024)). “[T]he Third Circuit has
held that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a felon who was convicted of
making a false statement to secure food stamps.” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 748 (citing
Range v. Att’y Gen., 124 F.4th 218, 222–23 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc)). And the Fifth
Circuit most recently reversed a § 922(g)(1) conviction on as-applied grounds. United
States v. Cockerham, — F.4th — , No. 24-60401, 2025 WL 3653336, at *2 (5th Cir.
Dec. 17, 2025). See also United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 469–70 & n.4 (5th Cir.
2024) (first opening the door to as-applied constitutional challenges post-Bruen).
The Third Circuit, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits agree Heller’s “presumptively lawful” dicta could not “supplant the most recent analysis set forth by the Supreme Court
1 In Duarte, the en banc Ninth Circuit overruled a panel opinion holding the statute
unconstitutional as applied to a person with prior convictions for vandalism, drug
possession, and evading arrest. See United States v. Duarte, 101 F.4th 657, 661–63
(9th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 108 F.4th 786 (9th Cir. 2024), on
reh’g en banc, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025).
7
in Rahimi….” Diaz, 116 F.4th at 466. See also Range, 124 F.4th at 224–25; Williams,
113 F.4th at 646. But on the history, the Fifth Circuit endorsed capital punishment
at the founding as the dispositive historical analogue, see Diaz, 116 F.4th at 467–70,
whereas the Third Circuit found the historical availability of the death penalty irrelevant, see Range, 124 F.4th at 231; accord Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 461–62 (7th
Cir. 2019), abrogated by Bruen (Barrett, J., dissenting). The linchpin for the Third
Circuit’s constitutional holding instead relied on the lack of evidence that the claimant “poses a physical danger to others.” Range, 124 F.4th at 232.
For its part, the Sixth Circuit blessed “governments label[ing] whole classes as
presumptively dangerous,” Williams, 113 F.4th at 657, but “refuse[d] to defer blindly
to § 922(g)(1) in its present form.” Range, 124 F.4th at 230 (citing Williams, 113 F.4th
at 658–61). According to the Sixth Circuit, “history shows that § 922(g)(1) might be
susceptible to an as-applied challenge” by individuals who show they are “not dangerous….” Williams, 113 F.4th at 657. The Fifth Circuit later agreed in part with this
analysis. United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Williams,
113 F.4th at 661–62). But the circuits departed on the scope of the inquiry. Compare
United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308, 318 (5th Cir. 2025), with Williams, 113 F.4th
at 659–60. The Third Circuit aligns with the Sixth Circuit on this point. Pitsilides v.
Barr, 128 F.4th 203, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2025).
Disagreements abound not only inter-circuit, but intra-circuit too. In Range,
the en banc Third Circuit generated six opinions, including one dissent. The Ninth
Circuit in Duarte, also en banc, generated four opinions, including one partial dissent.
8
Williams, a panel decision, produced a concurrence in the judgment only. These splits
confirm that jurists “are currently at sea when it comes to evaluating firearms legislation” and in acute “need [of] a solid anchor for grounding their constitutional pronouncements.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 747 (Jackson, J., concurring).
B.
This issue implicates the prosecution and incarceration of
thousands of individuals.
As of January 1, 2026, the Bureau of Prisons reported that it imprisons 153,651
people.2 And as of December 27, 2025, 22.1% of inmates (31,350) were incarcerated
for “Weapons, Explosives, [and] Arson” offenses, the second largest category of offenses within the federal prison population.3 “For more than 25 years” in fact, firearm
crimes have been one of the “four crime types” that “have comprised the majority of
federal felonies and Class A misdemeanors[.]”4 In fiscal year 2021, “[c]rimes involving
firearms were the third most common federal crimes[.]”5 Of the 57,287 individuals
sentenced, 8,151 were firearm cases—a 14.2% share.6 This represents an 8.1% increase from the year before, despite the number of cases reported to the U.S. Sentencing Commission declining by 11.3% and hitting an all-time low since fiscal year 1999.7
2 Statistics, Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/popula-
tion_statistics.jsp (last visited Jan. 5, 2026).
3
Statistics
–
Inmate
Offenses,
Federal
Bureau
of
Prisons,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last visited Jan.
5, 2026).
4 Fiscal Year 2021 Overview of Federal Criminal Cases at 4, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
(April 2022), available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2022/FY21_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
5 Id. at 19.
6 Id. at 1, 5.
7 Id. at 2.
9
In fiscal year 2024, 7,419 of the cases reported to the U.S. Sentencing Commission
involved convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) — 90.4% of those involved § 922(g)(1)
convictions specifically.8
These figures only capture the tail end of the criminal process. The scope of
prosecutions looms larger. “The Department of Justice filed firearms-related charges
in upwards of 13,000 criminal cases during the 2021 fiscal year.” United States v.
Kelly, No. 3:22-CR-00037, 2022 WL 17336578, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022) (citing
Executive Office for United States Attorneys, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Annual Statistical
Report Fiscal Year 2021 at 15 (Table 3C), available at https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1476856/download). That number remained above 10,000 in
fiscal year 2024.9 The scale of the question presented warrants this Court’s attention.
II.
This Court should delineate the boundaries of federal authority under
the Commerce Clause in the firearm context.
A predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 prohibited “[a]ny person who…has been convicted by a court of
the United States or of a State…of a felony” from receiving, possessing, or transporting “in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm.” Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1202, 82
Stat. 197. In Scarborough v. United States, this Court addressed “whether proof that
the possessed firearm previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted
FY 2024 Quick Facts 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) Firearms Offenses, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Felon_In_Possession_FY24.pdf.
9 United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report Fiscal Year 2024 tbl. 3(C), U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at https://www.justice.gov/usao/media/1399686/dl?inline.
8
10
felon and commerce.” Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 564 (1977) (emphasis added). Scarborough answered this question “yes,” but the Court did not linger on
the constitutional implications of its statutory construction. See id. at 577; see also
United States v. Johnson, 42 F.4th 743, 750 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that the decision
in Scarborough “was one of statutory interpretation”); United States v. Seekins, 52
F.4th 988, 991 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[T]he Court’s holding in Scarborough was statutory, not constitutional.”).
By contrast, this Court did examine the constitutional question presented by
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The statute “made
it a federal offense ‘for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.’” Id. at 551
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V)). The district court held that the
act constituted a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, but the appellate court
reversed. Id. at 551–52. This Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the statute lay “beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 552.
In so doing, the Court cabined Congress’s commerce power to “three broad categories of activity” subject to regulation: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate
commerce”; (2) activities, even if intrastate, that threaten “the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” Id. at 558–59 (internal citations omitted). The
Court quickly disposed of any justification for § 922(q) under the first two categories,
11
focusing its inquiry on the third. Id. at 559. It noted that § 922(q) was “a criminal
statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise,” elaborating in a footnote that “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law” and that federal criminalization of “conduct
already denounced as criminal by the States…effects a change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.” Id. at 561 & n.3. The Court also
expressed deep concern that the government’s arguments for why possession of a firearm in a local school zone substantially affected commerce lent themselves to no limiting principle, opening the door to a “a general federal police power.” Id. at 563–66.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that “possession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567. “Respondent was a local student
at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.” Id.
Given Lopez, it is “doubt[ful] that § 922(g)(8)” — and by extension § 922(g)(1)
— “is a proper exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.” Rahimi,
602 U.S. at 765 n.6 (2024) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring))
(Thomas, J., dissenting). But lower courts cannot conclusively resolve the tension between Scarborough and Lopez. The ultimate question posed by Lopez — “whether”
intrastate possession of a firearm that crossed state lines long before the regulated
12
possession “affect[s] interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate” — “can be settled finally only by this Court.”
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (cleaned up).
A.
Federal appellate courts differ on the relationship between
Scarborough and Lopez.
Federal courts have “cried out for guidance from this Court” on this issue for
decades. Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163, 131 S. Ct. 700, 702 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Simply put, “Scarborough is in fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the rationale of the United States Supreme
Court in [Lopez].” United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1996) (DeMoss,
J., dissenting). Still, the Fifth Circuit “continue[s] to enforce § 922(g)(1)” because it is
“not at liberty to question the Supreme Court’s approval of the predecessor statute to
[§ 922(g)(1)].” United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1015 n.25 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(per curiam). See also United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam) (Garwood, J., concurring) (“one might well wonder how it could rationally be
concluded that mere possession of a firearm in any meaningful way concerns interstate commerce simply because the firearm had, perhaps decades previously before
the charged possessor was even born, fortuitously traveled in interstate commerce,”
but concluding that Scarborough’s “implication of constitutionality” “bind[s] us, as an
inferior court,…whether or not the Supreme Court will ultimately regard it as a controlling holding in that particular respect.”).
The Fifth Circuit is not alone. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 853 F.3d
298, 301–02 (6th Cir. 2017) (“If the Lopez framework is to have any ongoing vitality,
13
it is up to this Court to prevent it from being undermined by a 1977 precedent,” i.e.,
Scarborough, “that does not squarely address the constitutional issue.” (quoting Alderman v. United States, 562 U.S. 1163, 131 S. Ct. at 703 (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari))); United States v. Cortes, 299 F.3d 1030, 1037 n.2 (9th Cir.
2002) (although “[t]he vitality of Scarborough engenders significant debate,” committing to “follow Scarborough unwaveringly” “[u]ntil the Supreme Court tells us otherwise”); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 587–88, 588 n.28 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting
that, until the Supreme Court is more explicit on the relationship between Lopez and
Scarborough, a lower court is “not at liberty to overrule existing Supreme Court precedent”); United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 634–35 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting
cases).
Nine courts of appeals have upheld § 922(g)(1) based solely on Scarborough’s
minimal nexus test. See United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 215 (1st Cir. 1996);
United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United
States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 671–72 (3d Cir. 1996); Rawls, 85 F.3d at 242–43;
United States v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769, 771–73 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d
1456, 1461–62, 1462 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 584–
86 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Only
two courts of appeals have engaged in Lopez’s substantial-effects test and reasoned
that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under it. See United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462,
466 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir.
14
1995) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225
(2019)); United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568–70 (6th Cir. 1996). Because courts
often fail to apply the Lopez test to these firearm possession cases at all, defendants
across the country lack the constitutional protection from congressional overreach
provided by Lopez. For instance, applying Lopez would demand that § 922(g)’s “possess in or affecting commerce” element require either: 1) proof that the defendant’s
offense caused the firearm to move in interstate commerce; or, at least, 2) proof that
the firearm moved in interstate commerce at a time reasonably near the offense. But
Scarborough continues to control the outcome in a large majority of circuits, leaving
the “empty, formalistic” requirement of a jurisdictional provision as the only check on
Congress’ power to criminalize this kind of intrastate activity. Chesney, 86 F.3d at
580 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
B.
An unchecked Commerce power would significantly expand
Congress’s reach into state affairs.
The federal government’s enumerated powers are “few and defined,” while the
powers which remain in the state governments are “numerous and indefinite.” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 552 (citing The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292–293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)). One
such enumerated power is “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States[.]”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But without limits on federal regulatory power, our nationwide regulation would become “for all practical purposes . . . completely centralized” in a federal government. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 548 (1935). And “constitutional limits on governmental power do not enforce
15
themselves;” instead, “[t]hey require vigilant—and diligent—enforcement.” Seekins,
52 F.4th at 989 (Ho, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
“Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce” to regulate the activity, but Congress’s mere act of legislating “does
not necessarily make it so.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557
n.2) (cleaned up). Here, inserting the phrase “which has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce” after any object connected to intrastate activities
that Congress may want to police cannot fulfill the constitutional requirement. See
Alderman, 131 S. Ct. at 702 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(“Scarborough, as the lower courts have read it, cannot be reconciled with Lopez because it reduces the constitutional analysis to the mere identification of a jurisdictional hook.”). A judicial blessing of constitutional magnitude for this minimal nexus
would “effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). The Commerce
Clause power would be reduced to a rubber stamp, opening the door to a federal police
power in direct contravention of the federal government the Constitution enshrines.
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (“the Founders denied the National Government” “the
police power,” “reposed in the States”); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519, 536 (2012) (the Commerce Clause “must be read carefully to avoid creating a
general federal authority akin to the police power”).
16
III.
This Court should hold the instant petition pending the outcome in
United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2025).
The Court will consider this term whether the government may constitution-
ally prosecute persons under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) based on proof of habitual or regular marijuana use. See generally Pet. for Cert., United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234
(U.S. June 2, 2025), 2025 WL 1593262. Questions lurking in the adjudication of Hemani that are pertinent to Arredondo’s § 922(g)(1) conviction include:
•
The kinds of laws that may be understood as comparable to founding era
surety and going armed laws;
•
The significance of laws at founding that imposed punishment other than
disarmament for conduct committed by the defendant; and
•
The limits of Congressional authority to disarm people Congress believes to
be dangerous.
See 2025 WL 1593262, at *10–14, *22–23. These answers are critical to the resolution
of this case. See Diaz, 116 F.4th at 468–71 & n.5; United States v. Simpson, 152 F.4th
611, 614–15 (5th Cir. 2025). As such, Arredondo respectfully requests the Court to
hold the instant petition pending the outcome in Hemani. See Lawrence on Behalf of
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 166 (1996); Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 163,
181(1996) (“We regularly hold cases that involve the same issue as a case on which
certiorari has been granted and plenary review is being conducted in order that (if
appropriate) they may be ‘GVR’d’ when the case is decided.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
17
CONCLUSION
Petitioner Christopher Michael Arredondo respectfully submits that this Court
should grant certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, or at minimum hold the petition pending the outcome in Hemani.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of January, 2026.
JASON D. HAWKINS
Federal Public Defender
Northern District of Texas
/s/ Maria Gabriela Vega
Maria Gabriela Vega
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Federal Public Defender’s Office
525 S. Griffin Street, Suite 629
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (214) 767-2746
gabriela_vega@fd.org
Attorney for Petitioner
Christopher Michael Arredondo
18
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 1
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
October 14, 2025
No. 24-10886
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Christopher Michael Arredondo,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:24-CR-93-1
______________________________
Before Southwick, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Christopher Michael Arredondo was found guilty of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. He was sentenced to 63 months in prison and
three years of supervised release. On appeal, he argues the district court
erred in determining his offense level and imposing certain supervised release
conditions.
He also contends the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Pet. App'x a001
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 2
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
§ 922(g)(1), exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and violates
the Second Amendment. We AFFIRM.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Christopher Michael Arredondo pled guilty without a plea agreement
to possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. In the presentence report,
the probation officer calculated a total offense level of 20, including an
enhanced base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because
Arredondo had previously been convicted of Texas aggravated robbery,
which the probation officer found was a crime of violence. After a three-point
reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, his total
offense level was 17. Based on this and Arredondo’s Category IV criminal
history score, the PSR initially listed his Sentencing Guidelines
imprisonment range as 37 to 46 months.
Nevertheless, in the addendum to the PSR, the probation officer
recommended withdrawing the reduction for acceptance of responsibility
because Arredondo “failed to voluntarily terminate or withdraw from
criminal conduct or associations.” The addendum explained that after the
initial PSR was written, a detective reviewed live footage of jail tablet video
visits between Arredondo and his family in July 2024. In one of the videos,
the relationship between Arredondo and his fifteen-year-old daughter (the
victim) “appeared to be sexual as she exposed her vagina and breast to” him.
Because of the video, the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services scheduled an interview with Arredondo’s wife, Kristy. During jail
phone calls in early August 2024, a detective listened to Arredondo ask the
victim to tell her sister and Kristy about the incident and “about the sexual
activity going on between them.”
In a phone conversation involving
Arredondo, Kristy, and the victim, Kristy was “distraught about the news”
Pet. App'x a002
2
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 3
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
and Arredondo made “comments about hanging himself in his jail cell for
what he had done to the family.”
At a subsequent interview with detectives, Arredondo admitted that
on three occasions in January 2024, there were “incidents” involving him
and the same daughter.
Although he did not provide many details,
Arredondo “stated the victim pulled his penis out of his pants during one of
the incidents.” A detective then informed Arredondo that “he would be
charged for Possession of Child Pornography for the videos he received from
the victim.” The probation officer explained that, as of the date of the PSR
addendum, local authorities “plan[ned] to pursue charges” and were still
investigating. Based on the removal of the acceptance-of-responsibility
reduction, Arredondo’s new Guidelines imprisonment range was 51 to 63
months.
At sentencing in September 2024, the district court overruled the
defense’s objection to the denial of acceptance-of-responsibility points and
adopted the 51-to-63-month Guidelines range from the PSR addendum. It
sentenced Arredondo to 63 months, to be followed by three years of
supervised release.
The district court imposed standard and mandatory supervised
release conditions. It then stated that the special conditions of supervised
release had been set out in a separate order, but that the order had not been
signed and returned. Defense counsel objected to conditions “number 7
[and] down,” which were “related to the conduct alleged in the
addendum.” 1 The district court immediately overruled the objection and
_____________________
1
In the judgment, the restriction on pornography is the seventh listed condition;
the eighth, ninth, and tenth conditions relate to internet use, sex offender treatment, and
contact with minors, respectively.
Pet. App'x a003
3
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 4
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
read a list of special conditions, which included a ban on possessing
pornography and a limitation on computer use and contact with minors.
Defense counsel then clarified the objection to the special conditions. Again,
the district court overruled the objection.
Consistent with the oral pronouncement, the judgment included
special conditions of supervised release requiring that Arredondo
neither possess nor have under his control any pornographic
matter or any matter that sexually depicts minors under the age
of 18 including, but not limited to, matter obtained through
access to any computer and any matter linked to computer
access or use; [and]
not possess, have access to, or utilize a computer or internet
connection device, including, but not limited to Xbox,
PlayStation, Nintendo, or similar device, without permission
of the probation officer. This condition requires preapproval
for categories of computer or internet access or use. It does not
require separate pre-use approval every time the defendant
accesses or uses a computer or the internet[.]
Arredondo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Guidelines Calculations
We begin with Arredondo’s arguments that the district court erred in
its Guidelines calculations. 2 First, Arredondo contends the district court
wrongly enhanced his base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)
because it erroneously concluded that Arredondo had been convicted of a
_____________________
2
As Arredondo concedes, and the Government agrees, plain-error review applies
to the first issue. Arredondo failed to preserve it because he did not object in the district
court to the characterization of his Texas aggravated robbery conviction as a “crime of
violence.” In any case, Arredondo’s argument is foreclosed, as we explain.
Pet. App'x a004
4
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 5
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
“crime of violence” based on his Texas aggravated robbery conviction.
Arredondo asserts that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), which defines “crime of
violence” for purposes of the enhancement, “requires a causal nexus
between the taking and force elements of the offense,” which Texas robbery
lacks.
A recent decision of this court forecloses that argument. See United
States v. Wickware, 143 F.4th 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2025). There, too, the
defendant asserted that the Guidelines require “a ‘causal connection’
between the defendant’s assaultive conduct and the unlawful taking.” Id. at
674. We rejected that reasoning and held that Texas robbery constitutes a
crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Id. at 675. The district court
therefore did not err in enhancing Arredondo’s base offense level.
Second, Arredondo argues the district court wrongly denied him a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Arredondo preserved this issue
for appeal by objecting in the district court. “A district court’s refusal to
reduce a sentence for acceptance of responsibility is reviewed under a
standard ‘even more deferential than a pure clearly erroneous standard.’”
United States v. Najera, 915 F.3d 997, 1002 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
“Such a decision will not be reversed unless it is ‘without foundation.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
The Guidelines provide for a two-level decrease to the offense level of
a defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility.”
U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(a). Pleading guilty before trial “combined with truthfully
admitting the conduct comprising the offense” constitutes “significant
evidence of acceptance of responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3. Such
evidence, though, “may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is
inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility.” Id.
Pet. App'x a005
5
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 6
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
The Guidelines include a non-exhaustive list of several considerations
for a sentencing court to consider when determining whether a defendant has
clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1.
One is “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or
associations.” Id. A court may therefore deny a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility when a defendant continues criminal conduct. United States v.
Puckett, 505 F.3d 377, 387 (5th Cir. 2007). This is true even where that
conduct was not directly related to the offense with which the defendant was
charged. See United States v. Hinojosa-Almance, 977 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir.
2022).
Here, the district court concluded based on the evidence in the record
that Arredondo’s sexually explicit video call with his minor child constituted
illegal conduct demonstrating a failure to cease criminal behavior,
outweighing his guilty plea and admission to illegally possessing a firearm.
Arredondo argues that because the record is silent about whether he elicited
or responded positively to the sexual displays, his involvement in the video
call does not negate other evidence of his acceptance of responsibility. This
is unpersuasive. The district court had a foundation for the inference that
Arredondo elicited or responded positively to the displays, especially given
Arredondo’s admission to recent physical sexual contact with his daughter.
II.
Supervised Release Conditions
Arredondo contends the district court erred by imposing supervised
release conditions restricting access to pornography and requiring computerand-internet-use monitoring. We review for abuse of discretion because
Arredondo preserved his challenges to the supervised release conditions by
objecting in the district court. See United States v. Ellis, 720 F.3d 220, 225
(5th Cir. 2013). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision
on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” United
Pet. App'x a006
6
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 7
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230, 238–39 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation and
citation omitted).
“A district court has wide, but not unfettered, discretion in imposing
terms and conditions of supervised release.” United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d
392, 398 (5th Cir. 2015). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), conditions must meet
three requirements. First, a condition must be “reasonably related” to at
least one statutory factor, including:
(1) the nature and characteristics of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the deterrence of
criminal conduct, (3) the protection of the public from further
crimes of the defendant, and (4) the provision of needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment to the defendant.
United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 153 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 18
U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D)). When applying these factors,
a court may consider the defendant’s conduct regardless of whether it is
related to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. See id. at
153–54 (collecting authorities). With respect to the first factor, there must
be “some connection” between the defendant’s offense, history, or
characteristics and the condition imposed, but a “perfect fit” is not required.
United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 2015).
Second, the condition must be “narrowly tailored” so that it does not
involve a “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to
advance the goals of these statutory factors. Duke, 788 F.3d at 398 (quotation
and citation omitted). Where, as here, a district court does not explain the
reasons for imposing a condition, the condition should still stand “if the
justification can be inferred from the record.” United States v. Iverson, 874
F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 2017).
Pet. App'x a007
7
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 8
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
Third, the condition must be “consistent with any pertinent policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3). 3
A. Access to Pornography
Arredondo argues the district court erred by prohibiting him from
possessing “any pornographic matter or any matter that sexually depicts
minors under the age of 18,” because that condition is neither reasonably
related to any of the statutory factors nor narrowly tailored to Arredondo. He
contends there is no nexus between pornography and his history of criminal
sexual encounters with his daughter, comparing his circumstances to two
cases decided by this court. See United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445 (5th
Cir. 2014); United States v. Huor, 852 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2017).
In Salazar, this court held the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a special condition prohibiting the defendant’s access to
pornography because the condition was not reasonably related to his
conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. 743 F.3d at 450–53. The
Salazar court reasoned that nothing in the defendant’s criminal history
suggested that his past crimes were “fueled” by sexually stimulating
material, there was no indication that the defendant had ever used
pornography, there was “no evidence of predatory sexual behavior beyond
his singular and now-remote sexual offense,” and there was no indication of
likely recidivism. Id. at 452.
Here, by contrast, Arredondo’s criminal sexual conduct was
connected to sexually stimulating material that closely resembles, and might
constitute, child pornography; there is evidence of several recent incidents
of predatory sexual behavior; there also is reason to suspect Arredondo may
_____________________
3
Arredondo does not challenge the conditions on this ground.
Pet. App'x a008
8
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 9
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
be prone to committing future sex crimes. These facts provided a foundation
for the district court to conclude that prohibiting Arredondo’s access to
pornography was reasonably related to his history of engaging in sexual
encounters with his daughter (including by receiving sexually stimulating
material from her) and reasonably necessary for the deterrence of, and
protection of the public against, further sexual criminal conduct by
Arredondo.
Similarly distinguishable is Huor, where this court also concluded the
district court abused its discretion by imposing a condition prohibiting the
possession of sexually stimulating materials. 852 F.3d at 396. There, as in
Salazar, the offense of conviction was failure to register as a sex offender, and
we similarly emphasized that the defendant’s sole sexual offense was remote
and that there was no evidence pornography use contributed to his original
offense. See id. at 400.
Arredondo also supports his assertion that there is no connection
between pornography and his involvement in the video visit by arguing there
is no evidence that he intended to record any sexual interaction or that he
solicited or responded positively to the displays. It is a federal crime,
however, to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct “for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such
conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Another panel of this court has held in an
unpublished opinion that Congress intended this statute to “broadly
criminalize the dissemination of any visual image of child pornography.”
United States v. Nichols, 371 F. App’x 546, 548 (5th Cir. 2010). We agree with
that analysis. Additionally, another circuit has held that a FaceTime call can
constitute a “visual depiction” for purposes of applying a Guidelines
enhancement for producing a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexual
acts. United States v. Gould, 30 F.4th 538, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2022). In sum,
Pet. App'x a009
9
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 10
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
the district court reasonably could have inferred that Arredondo’s video call
with his daughter resembled child pornography such that there was “some
connection” between pornography and his criminal conduct. Fields, 777 F.3d
at 803.
Given the evidence that Arredondo engaged in criminal conduct that
was “sexual in nature[,] it was reasonable for the district court to restrict [his]
access to sexually stimulating material more broadly in an effort to prevent
future crimes or aid in his rehabilitation.” Ellis, 720 F.3d at 227 (citation
omitted). In promoting deterrence and rehabilitation in this manner, the
condition does not impose “a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably
necessary to accomplish statutory sentencing goals.” Duke, 788 F.3d at 399.
B. Computer and Internet Access
Arredondo also challenges the condition limiting his computer and
internet access to categories pre-approved by the probation office. He cites
two opinions where this court vacated internet access restrictions. See United
States v. Tang, 718 F.3d 476, 488 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Fernandez,
776 F.3d 344, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2015). Tang held the district court abused its
discretion by imposing a blanket ban on internet use without the probation
office’s approval, because Tang “never used computers for illicit purposes.”
718 F.3d at 484. Similarly, Fernandez held the district court abused its
discretion when it required that Fernandez install a filtering software on his
computer to block access to sexually oriented websites. 776 F.3d at 348. We
based our decision on the fact that Fernandez had “a single, prior sex-related
conviction” and that neither his “offense, nor his related criminal history,
involved computer or Internet use.” Id. at 346. Arredondo’s reliance on
these cases is mistaken, however, because his criminal behavior —
specifically, his sexually explicit video call with his daughter — involved
internet use. See Ellis, 720 F.3d at 225 (noting that “restrictions on Internet
Pet. App'x a010
10
Case: 24-10886
Document: 73-1
Page: 11
Date Filed: 10/14/2025
No. 24-10886
and computer use are often imposed in cases involving child pornography,
and this circuit has routinely upheld such restrictions”). The condition
limiting Arredondo’s computer and internet access is thus reasonably related
to his history of criminal sexual conduct. The district court therefore had a
foundation for imposing this condition.
Additionally, Arredondo refers to the district court’s forbidding him
from contacting minors online, arguing that this more tailored condition
demonstrates that the broader internet use preauthorization condition he
challenges is too broad. A condition, however, need not be as narrowly
tailored as possible to pass muster under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Rather, the
law merely requires that the condition not constitute “a greater deprivation
of liberty than reasonably necessary to accomplish statutory sentencing goals.”
Duke, 788 F.3d at 399 (emphasis added). As we have described, Arredondo’s
history provided ample grounds on which the district court could have found
that the preauthorization condition was reasonably necessary for the
deterrence of, and protection of the public against, further sexual criminal
conduct by Arredondo.
III.
Remaining Challenges
Arredondo’s other arguments are, as he concedes, foreclosed by our
precedent. Arredondo’s contention that Congress exceeded its authority to
regulate commerce when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is foreclosed by
United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 574 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S.
Ct. 1081 (2024).
His argument that Section 922(g)(1) is facially
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment is foreclosed by United
States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 471–72 (5th Cir. 2024).
AFFIRMED.
Pet. App'x a011
11
Case 4:24-cr-00093-Y
Document 54
Filed 09/25/24
Page 1 of 4
PageID 221
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Fort Worth Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
v.
Case Number: 4:24-CR-093-Y(1)
Eric B. Chen, assistant U.S. attorney
Rachel M. Taft, attorney for the defendant
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL
ARREDONDO
On May 15, 2024, the defendant, Christopher Michael Arredondo, entered a plea of guilty to count one of
the one-count indictment. Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged guilty of such count, which involves the following
offense:
TITLE & SECTION
NATURE OF OFFENSE
OFFENSE CONCLUDED
COUNT
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(8)
Felon in Possession of a Firearm
June 25, 2023
1
The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages two through three of this judgment. The sentence is imposed
under Title 18, United States Code § 3553(a), taking the guidelines issued by the United States Sentencing
Commission under Title 28, United States Code § 994(a)(1), as advisory only.
The defendant shall pay immediately a special assessment of $100.00 for count one of the one-count
indictment.
The defendant shall notify the United States attorney for this district within thirty days of any change of
name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment
are fully paid.
Sentence imposed September 24, 2024.
_______________________________
TERRY R. MEANS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Signed September 25, 2024.
Pet. App'x a012
24-10886.161
Case 4:24-cr-00093-Y
Document 54
Judgment in a Criminal Case
Defendant: Christopher Michael Arredondo
Case Number: 4:24-CR-093-Y(1)
Filed 09/25/24
Page 2 of 4
PageID 222
Judgment -- Page 2 of 4
IMPRISONMENT
The defendant, Christopher Michael Arredondo, is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 63 months on count one of the one-count indictment. This sentence shall
run concurrently with any future sentence that may be imposed in case no. 1787215 in the 485th Judicial District
Court, Tarrant County, Texas.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States marshal.
SUPERVISED RELEASE
Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of 3 years
on count one of the one-count indictment.
The defendant, while on supervised release, shall comply with the standard conditions recommended by the
U. S. Sentencing Commission at §5D1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, and
shall:
not commit another federal, state, or local crime;
not possess illegal controlled substances;
not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;
cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer, as authorized by the Justice for All
Act of 2004;
report in person to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of
release from the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons;
refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. The defendant must submit to one drug test within
15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the
Court;
neither possess nor have under his control any pornographic matter or any matter that sexually depicts minors
under the age of 18 including, but not limited to, matter obtained through access to any computer and any
matter linked to computer access or use;
not possess, have access to, or utilize a computer or internet connection device, including, but not limited to
Xbox, PlayStation, Nintendo, or similar device, without permission of the probation officer. This condition
requires preapproval for categories of computer or internet access or use. It does not require separate pre-use
approval every time the defendant accesses or uses a computer or the internet;
participate in sex-offender treatment services as directed by the probation officer until successfully
discharged, which services may include psycho-physiological testing to monitor the defendant's compliance,
treatment progress, and risk to the community, contributing to the costs of services rendered (copayment) at
the rate of at least $25 per month; and
have no contact with minors under the age of 18 (not including his own children provided an adult family
member is present), including by correspondence, telephone, internet, electronic communication, or
communication through third parties. The defendant shall not have access to or loiter near school grounds,
parks, arcades, playgrounds, amusement parks or other places where children may frequently congregate,
except as may be allowed upon advance approval by the probation officer.
Pet. App'x a013
24-10886.162
Case 4:24-cr-00093-Y
Document 54
Judgment in a Criminal Case
Defendant: Christopher Michael Arredondo
Case Number: 4:24-CR-093-Y(1)
Filed 09/25/24
Page 3 of 4
PageID 223
Judgment -- Page 3 of 4
FINE/RESTITUTION
The Court does not order a fine or costs of incarceration because the defendant does not have the financial
resources or future earning capacity to pay a fine or costs of incarceration.
Restitution is not ordered because there is no victim other than society at large.
FORFEITURE
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), it is hereby ordered that the defendant’s interest in the
following property is condemned and forfeited to the United States: a Ruger, model Security 9, 9-millimeter pistol,
bearing serial no. 38499782, and any associated ammunition recovered with the firearm.
Pet. App'x a014
24-10886.163
Case 4:24-cr-00093-Y
Document 54
Judgment in a Criminal Case
Defendant: Christopher Michael Arredondo
Case Number: 4:24-CR-093-Y(1)
Filed 09/25/24
Page 4 of 4
PageID 224
Judgment -- Page 4 of 4
RETURN
I have executed this judgment as follows:
Defendant delivered on ___________________________ to ____________________________________
at ____________________________________________________________, with a certified copy of this judgment.
United States marshal
BY ________________________________
deputy marshal
Pet. App'x a015
24-10886.164
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.