Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Marvin Bowman, Petitioner v. City of Chicago Board of Education

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

3fn tlje Supreme Court of tlje ®[niteb States.

DEC 2 9 2025

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Marvin Bowman, Petitioner

V. ’

Chicago Board of Education, et al.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

To the United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Marvin Bowman, Pro Se

11033 S. Union, ave

Chicago, IL 60628

(773) 322-7328

marvinbowmanl@yahoo.com

RECEIVED

JAN -5 2026

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

Legal Question Presented

Whether or not the courts errored when they applied the significant­

harm standard to this case when this court had already ruled against

it? Whether or not the lower courts errored when/they granted

summary judgement to the Defendants and whether or not the

Appellate court errored by affirming this ruling?

Parties to the Proceeding’s

Petitioner, Marvin Bowman, was the Plaintiff in the district court and

the appellant in the court of appeals.

Respondent, Board of Education of Chicago or CPS, et al, was the

defendant in the district court and the appellee in the court of

appeals.

Related Proceedings

United States District Court (Dirksen Federal)

Bowman v. Bd of Education, et al, No. 21-CV-03015 ( Sept. 27,

2024)

United States District Court (Dirksen Federal)

Bowman v. Bd of Education, et al, No. 24-2938 ( Sept. 29, 2025)

Table of Contents

Question Presented

............................... ii

Parties to the Proceedings...........................................

... .iii

Related Proceedings

.............................................. iii

Appendix Table of Contents

V

Table of Authorities

...........

VI

Introduction 1

Opinions Below 2

Jurisdiction

Statutory Provisions Involved 2

Statement of the Case 4

A. Religious Discrimination as constituted by

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Federal

Statute)

.................................................A

B. The Supreme Court’s decision interpreting Title VH’s“Significantharm-standard”

require

-ment. ..7

C. Marvin Bowman’s employment with Chicago Public Schools

.............................................................................. 7

D D. What should be added and taken away from Tide VII cases

E

Reasons for granting the petition

I.

A

B

C

II

A

B

Conclusion

V

Appendix Table of Contents

Appellate court decision

District Court Decision

>

vi

Table of Authorities

Pages

Cases

Boss v. Castro, 816 F. 3d 910, 918 (7th Cir. 2016).

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 967 - Supreme Court 2024

.....................4,5

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 US 75 - Supreme Court

1998................................................................ 5

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973),

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 774,135 S.Ct. 2028,192

L.Ed.2d 35 (2015)”.............................. 7

Burlington N.

F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d

345.

Eord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016)

Meritor Savings-Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,.64,106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed. 2d

49................................................. 5

Ortiz v. Werner Enters, Inc, 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2017)

Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2025)

Igasaki v. III. Dep’tofFin. &Pro. Regul, 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021)

Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335,1337 (7th Cir. 2024)

Vance v. Ball state Univ, 570 U.S. 421, 427 (2013)

vii

Other Authorities

Constitution, Statutes, Regulations and Rules :

42 USC 2000e-2al Discrimination race, religion, sex, etc

42USC 2000e-3a Unlawful to discriminate because a person opposed

a practice or participated in investigation

1st amendment US Constitution

IAC 266.730 (a)(b)

Other Authorities

IAC Title 23 226.730 (a)(b)

Board Rule 4-10©

INTRODUCTION

Bowman v. Board of Education is a case where under Tide VII an employment

action brought some harm but it was not necessary for him to show that that

harm was significant. In fact, an actual transfer had not happened because in

this profession (education), you can’t seamlessly place a person in a place they

are not certified to be. But rather changes to compensation, terms, conditions

and privileges were directed at him by a supervisor who Petitioner contends was

doing it for discriminatory reasons.

The Respondent, Chicago Public Schools, had already been doing this for years

before the year in question when the lawsuit was filed in 2020-2021 school year.

To add insult to injury, these employment actions were illegal according to

contractual, state and federal laws. Petitioner Bowman reported these matters as

he should have to the Union or CTU, Employer, Illinois State Board of

Education or ISBE, EEOC or equal employment opportunity commission and

the Illinois Department of Human Rights or IDHR. The state Attorney general

office as well as the Federal Attorney Generals office. Instead of these entities

doing something about the illegal and unethical acts, they all did absolutely

nothing. This is why these acts became a lawsuit in the federal courts.

In addition, both courts ruled that the Petitioner may have suffered retaliation

and harassment but that it wasn’t that significant for the court to rule in his favor.

It had already been ruled in the Muldrow case that harms need not have been

significant. It only needed to be shown that a violation happened with respect

to a term or condition of employment and I will add privilege or compensation

because that’s what the statute says. Muldrow v. St. Louis pp. 974-977, 42 USC§

2000e(a)(l).

Retaliation and Harassment

During the course of this case the Petitioner suffered numerous acts of retaliation

and harassment. When attempting to report it to the District court, while

summary judgement was going on, varying acts took place that made that

difficult. Motions that were turned in by the petitioner to the District court never

made it to the docket. Petitioner turned the documents in again to the court.

Spoke to the Local School Council and Wrote a letter to the chief judge of the

District court house. After these acts that chief judge was removed and another

letter was produced and written to the current chief judge. Shortly thereafter the

decision was handed down.

Opinions Below

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is (App.la-5a). The District Court’s opinion is

(App. 6a-21a)

Jurisdiction

The Seventh Circuit issued it’s judgement on September 29, 2025. This court

has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1-2)

Statutory Provisions Involved

42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(l) provides in relevant part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to

hire or to discharge

Statement of the Case

A.Religious Discrimination as constituted by Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act (Federal Statute)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids employers from discriminating against

any individual with respect to their “compensation, terms, conditions or

privileges of employment, because of such individuals *** religion, ***. “ 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

In its initial rendition, Tide VII did not require

employers to provide accommodations for employees religious practices.

As worded in the statute Title VII asks employers to, within reason, “ provide

for all aspects of religious observance and practice as well as belief, unless an

employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an

employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without

undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000e(j). In this case the Petitioner did not ask the Respondent for any

accommodation that would bring an undue hardship on the employer in any

shape or fashion. '

B. The Supreme Court’s decision interpreting Title VII’s“Significantharm standard” require -ment

The Muldrow decision was a decision where Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn

Muldrow had her position, responsibilities, perks and schedule change.

Although these terms and conditions changed, her rank and pay remained the

same. Muldrow v. City of St. Coms, Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 967, 969 - Supreme Court

2024. Muldrow filed a Title VII suit against the city to challenge the transfer that

occurred on the grounds that the terms and conditions of her employment had

been violated. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(l). The District court granted summary

judgement to the city. The Eighth Circuit affirmed stating that “ Muldrow had

to-but could not show the transfer caused her a “materially significant

disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th 680, 688. According to the Eighth Circuit, Muldrow’s

transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits” and had

caused “ only minor changes in working conditions.”

This court made it plain to be understood that under Title VII, a Petitioner must

show that the transfer or in this case, the illegal and unethical changing of work

terms and conditions of employment happened and “harm need not be

significant. 77 Pp. 974-977. ”

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “ discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s .. .Protected class. § 2000e2(a)(l). In

the Muldrow case, that was before this court it was sex discrimination where her

Title VII rights were violated. Both parties agreed in the Muldrow case that the

transfer implicated “terms” and “conditions” of her employment. The language

of the statute prohibits discrimination against an individual with respect to

“terms or conditions” of employment because of that person’s race, color,

religion, sex or national origin. Id.

Therefore, this court made a number of rulings regarding the Muldrow case that

gives guidance as to how other courts are to proceed as well as set a precedent

for how the statute of Title VII is to be followed. A couple of the first standards

mentioned in the Muldrow case is that worse treatment should be in relationship

to “terms and conditions of employment and it should cover more than the

economic or tangible. “ § 2000e-2(a)(l); Citing Muldrow, “Onoale. 523 U.S., at 78.

118 S.Ct. 998; Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57. 64.106 S.Ct. 2399.

91 L.Ed.2d 49.” Title VII required Muldrow to show that there were changes to

terms and conditions that were unfavorable to her. Muldrow v. City of St. Fonts,

Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 967, 970 - Supreme Court 2024. Other standards that the

decision this court handed down stated were to “show some harm respecting an

identifiable term or condition of employment, “ yet the affected employee, “does

not have to show that the harm incurred was significant or otherwise exceeded

some heightened bar. “ id

In addition, when it comes to 42 U.S.C. 2000e 3(a) this court ruled in Muldrow

that it did not need to apply a significant harms standard. Muldrow v. City of St.

Eouis, Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 967, 970, 971 - Supreme Court 2024. The reason that

this court ruled this is because it did not want to immunize employees from “

petty slights and minor annoyances that occur at work and that all employees

experience. But rather wanted to prevent employees from suffering the

infractions of the statute. This court states that the “ personality conflicts and

Snubbing by supervisors and co-workers are not actionable under § 2000e-3(a).

Citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126

S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006).” This court further stated that it “would

not add words to the statute that congress did not add. This expounded that if

congress wanted those words to exist in the statute they would have added them

and the court will not add words to the statute that Congress did not. Nor will

the court add verbiage to give employers a desired result. “ Muldrow v. City of St.

Eouis, Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 967, 976 - Supreme Court 2024” Citing “EEOC v.

Mbercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 774, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 192 L.Ed.2d

35 (2015)”

C. Marvin Bowman’s employment with Chicago Public Schools

Marvin Bowman, the Petitioner, is a minister with the Ministry of Reconciliation

bible study in Chicago, IL. He observes the Holy days of the bible which asks

adherents to recuse themselves from work. On the weekly Sabbath and 7 annual

Sabbaths. The Board of Education has given teachers of Chicago Public Schools

3 religious holidays that will allow employees to take the 3 religious holidays off

from work annually. Employees can not add religious holidays to the cache of

benefit days which means it’s not possible to abuse the system by adding days.

The company gives you 3 at the beginning of the year and they do not carry over

to the next school year nor are they stored like sick days. The Petitioner Marvin

Bowman was hired by the school system in September of 2004.

Mr. Bowman has took Religious High days off from work his entire career.

Usually only employees who practice faiths that ask them to recuse themselves

from work are the employees who know about them. Employees like the

Petitioner, Mr. Bowman, usually ask about this rule and they are usually the only

ones who know about it. It is one of the Board Rules (4-10 c)11 that allow

employees to take these days of from work. Employer CPS has a record of Mr.

Bowman taking these days off from work his whole career. For 13 years no

administrator or superior ever questioned the Petitioner about the faith he

practiced or the holidays he celebrated

In the spring of 2017, about the 3rd quarter of the school year Ali Muhammad

was installed as the interim principal of Corliss H.S. Principal Muhammad

invited the whole staff to meet him in the media center. There he told the staff

about how he was raised a Muslim but had now converted to some form of nondenominational Christianity. He then invited the staff to attend a religious event

at Corliss high school which his church was using as their meeting place. Many

employees said they would attend and the Petitioner declined to attend which is

his right under the 1st amendment and the establishment clause in the United

States of America. Immediately after this, Principal Muhammad began coming

to the Petitioners classroom regularly with a notepad and writing utensil.

Sometimes he would stay multiple class periods, which was highly unusual. He

told the Petitioner that his visits to his classroom were not punitive and that he

should not be alarmed. He stated he was just observing his classroom curriculum

and practices. This went on the rest of the 2016-2017school year.

Then at the very beginning of the first full school year of Ali Muhammad’s tenure

as Corliss’s interim principal in 2017-2018, the Petitioner noticed that very high

amounts of special needs students were crammed into certain of his classes. The

Petitioner sought the principal out to attempt to get the classroom into

compliance, and he repeatedly avoided him. Eventually he caught up with the

principal and engaged him about the out of compliance illegal classrooms and he

1 Board rule 4-10(c) only shad two stipulations. Employees notify supervisor or principal 2 days in advance

about the absence and pay for a substitute to cover.

just responded to the petitioner by saying “you don’t praise the Lord,” and “you

got to praise the Lord.” The Petitioner then began contacting the Chicago

Teachers Union because for the first time the terms, conditions and privileges of

his employment were being grossly violated.

Two of the places where the compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of

employment can be found is the contractual agreement between the Chicago

Board of Education or CBE and the Chicago Teachers Union or CTU in the

Chicago Board of Education’s Board Rules. When violations of these terms and

conditions happen one of the first ways that they can be resolved is through filing

a grievance. Another way is by filing an internal CPS or Chicago Public Schools

complaint with the EOCO or the Equal Opportunity Compliance Office. For

the first two full years of Muhammad’s tenure, the Petitioner spoke to the

teachers union who didn’t do anything about the violations that were taking

place.

During this period of time after the Petitioner spoke to the Union, about the

violations, the Petitioner continued to take religious Holy days off from work as

he had been doing during his whole career. However, Principal Muhammad

began at the beginning of the 2017-2018 school year asking him questions about

the holidays he celebrates. He would ask about the name of the holidays as well

as where those holidays could be found. He would then state to the Petitioner

that he had never heard of the holidays that he celebrates. The Petitioner

thought it was strange that Mr. Muhammad called himself a minister but had

never heard of the holidays that are in the Bible.

During the second full year (2018-2019), of Ali Muhammad’s tenure as principal,

he continued to provide classrooms that violated IAC 226.7302 of the Special

Education laws. In addition, came yet another incident involving Mr.

Muhammad’s beliefs. Mr. Muhammad conducted an observation of the

Petitioner. Observations are conducted annually of teachers in Chicago Public

Schools. Afterwards teachers do a post-observation meeting with the supervisor

that observed them. The Petitioner went to the post-observation meeting and

the whole entire time Mr. Muhammad talked about his opportunity to bring the

religious message at his church and didn’t allow the Petitioner to get one word

in about the observation. When the petitioner received his observation rating it

was all low marks that said he didn’t do things that clearly he had. Recognizing

2 IAC 226.730 (a) is the Illinois state law about the 70/30 rule where Regular Education teachers should

not have mor that 30% special needs students In their class, (b) certified Special education teachers

should not have more than 15 special needs students in their class

that yet another violation to the terms and conditions of his employment was

taking place, the Petitioner immediately contacted the labor union to report what

had taken place. Soon thereafter the ratings were changed on the Petitioners

markings to show that he had really done the things the observation said that he

did not.

By the third year, which was the 2019-2020 school year, it became clear to the

Petitioner that special education was being weaponized against him. Every year

there were numerous special education violations that were taking place. During

this particular year there was a special education student being brought to class

that needed a special education CTT or Cooperative Team Teacher with them

all the time. These are trained and certified special education teachers. However,

the CTT was being pulled out of the Petitioners classroom 1 day out of the week

despite it being against the terms, conditions and privileges of the teachers

Contract. This particular violation led to an attack so vicious it nearly ended in

a students death or severe injury.

When the grievance meeting happened between the Petitioner, Principal

Muhammad and the CTU representative Zeidre Foster, the conclusion was made

that the special education violations would stop. It was obvious that they were

violations of the CBA and the special Education laws. (CBA Article 21-19

Special Education) The CTU representative said that she would contact me in 5

days after this meeting in February 2020 and I did not here from here the rest of

the school year. I wasn’t aware of it at the time but the Union representative,

principal Muhammad and the CTT who had benefttted the most from these

violations all used to work at the same school and knew each other. This fact

was not disclosed to me at the first and after year 1 of Muhammad’s tenure,

Corliss H.S. was put on the case load of union representative Foster.

During the spring of 2020 on Approximately March 16th, the teachers of CPS

were sent home for the Covid Pandemic. The changes were never made that

were discussed the month earlier and the 2019-2020 school year was finished

remotely at home. Then came the 2020-2021 school year when the pandemic

was raging and it was the 4th year of AH Muhammad’s tenure as interim principal

of Corhss H.S. The majority of the school year would be done remotely at home.

The Petitioner had already made the resolve that he would seek remedy through

other venues if he and his students rights continued to be violated for a 4th year

in a row. The Petitioner felt that with the pandemic raging and all the death and

destruction happening globaHy that the discriminatory, retahatory and harassing

behaviors would stop. However, the other side intensified these violations.

When the 2020-2021 school year began the violations that were directed at the

Petitioner were very egregious. For years the Petitioner had been questioned by

Muhammad about the faith he practiced and the holidays he celebrated. In

addition, he also had to answer questions from the union representative Zeidre

Foster as well as people from numerous departments in CPS. The school system

even added steps to the terms conditions and privileges that are not part of the

verbiage that regulate these rights for employees. This didn’t happen to the

Petitioner just one year but became a regular annual practice directed at the

Petitioner. Muhammad would be waiting for the Petitioner at the time clock at

the end of the day and would state that he wasn’t the one who had stopped the

religious holiday pay but rather other departments in CPS had caused to

prevention to the Petitioners participation in the terms, conditions and privileges

that were related to religious holidays. The reality is through depositions,

declarations and other discovery documents a payroll administrator stated that

this department would only intervene if a supervisor or principal asked them to.

Principal Muhammad repeatedly states that he never played a roll in not signing

off on Petitioners participations in these terms, conditions and privileges. This

was another genuine dispute of FRCP 56 (a) .This rule states that if a genuine

dispute existed then summary judgment should not be granted.

When the 2020-2021 school year began the classroom of the Petitioner was

egregiously out of compliance with the law. According to the terms, conditions

and privileges of the regular education Social Studies teaching positions of CPS

classes are not supposed to be over 30% special education to 70% regular

education. The Petitioner had a class that was 65% special education and 35%

regular education. This violation did not exist in any other regular education

classes that were in the building. If this violation were legitimate, it would have

existed in the other core subject classes. Social studies, Science, English and

Mathematics are all core subject classes. This would be because reading is

universal.

To try and remedy the non-compliance and violations of the contract and special

education laws the Petitioner First filed grievances and the violations about the

religious holidays and the special education tenets and laws. Then the Petitioner

filed a complaint with ISBE or the Illinois State Board of Education. Then

almost immediately the CTU and representative Foster appeared.

The

Petitioner, Principal and Union representative sat through a hearing and then

afterward the union presentative Foster attempted to get the Petitioner to sign a

deviation form. The deviation would allow the school to get away with violating

the special education law which is what the principal had been trying to do for 4

years at this time. The fact is deviations are supposed to be filled out before a

school year begins if there is going to legitimately be a violation. Not one time

in the first 4 years did this happen.

The Petitioner during this year filed a complaint with the EEOC and IDHR. In

March of 2021 the Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the EEOC after

completing the administrative process. In June of 2021, The Petitioner file a Civil

suit under Title VII against the Respondent city of Chicago Board of Education,

CPS.

During the discovery and summary judgement phase numerous other violations

took place. From the Petitioner turning documents in to the court a couple of

times and those documents not making it to the docket to harassment and

retaliation happening at a high instance at work especially when things were due

to the court. Petitioner tried to notify the court with no success and then wrote

both the chief judge that left, as well as the replacement that arrived afterwards.

App

Heating and Airconditioning

In addition to weaponizing Special education the Respondent used manipulation

of the heating and air conditioning to retaliate and harass the Petitioner. Over

the course of the 4 years until the lawsuit was filed, the Petitioner was moved to

at least approximately 7 different classrooms. Despite all the moves and the

school receiving a brand new state of the art air conditioner, the problem has

always followed the Petitioner for the past 8 years.

At the time of these incidents there were also other things being done that were

retaliatory. Starting from full year one of Ali Muhammads tenure, the Petitioner

had been contacting the CTU about these violations of the terms conditions and

privileges of his job. CTT’s did not show up to classes sometimes for months

at a time. In violation of the Federal special education law, lEP’s were being

written at time to state that students didn’t need assistance in the Petitioner’s

class but needed assistance in classes using the same skill set. The Petitioners

classes were social studies classes where reading is one of the major skills honed

and crafted. The same skill is honed and crafted in the science and English

classes as well. Reading is universal and if a student needs help in Science and

English they need help in Social Studies as well. This is why the common Core

standards for English, Science and Social Studies are practically identical. Corliss

H.S., where this all occurred, was an early adapter school for the Common Core

Standards.

D. The District Court’s Decision

Petitioner Bowman sued alleging religious discrimination with retaliation and

harassment under Tide VII and the Illinois Human Rights act. The Board of

Education moved for summary judgement arguing that Bowman failed to

provide adequate evidence supporting his claims. The District court granted the

motion on September 27, 2024. App. 7

As to the religious discrimination, the court accepted the reasoning by the

Respondents that teachers were abusing the system. They also accepted their

reasoning that auditing was going on for all requests for paid time off for religious

holidays. They also accepted the justification that the Board had a list of major

religious holidays and if the requested religious holiday is not on the list the

department in the school system would not process that payment. App. 3

The school system and Mr. Bowman acknowledge that all of his career he has

made these request for days off through the payroll system. It was not until Ali

Muhammad became principal that these request by Bowman began not being

processed. In addition, the principal had also began regularly questioning

Bowman about the holidays and the faith he practices. The district court also

cites a grievance that was filed after this lawsuit for payment of religious holidays

that had not been paid out in 2021. Id. 3 The decision also states Petitioner’s

claim that the amount of special needs students began increasing in his classes

during the tenure of Ali Muhammad. The Collective Bargaining Agreement or

CBA is the contractual agreement between the Chicago Teacher’s Union or CTU

and the Chicago Board of Education or CBE. This is the Compensation terms,

conditions and privileges of the teachers as well as those found in the Board

Rules. Id. 8 Based on all of this Petitioner Bowman, a pro se litigant, brought

this suit against the Chicago Board of Education. This suit was brought under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act because of

discrimination, retaliation and harassment.

The court cites the special education violations that the Petitioner suffered as a

mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. The court feels that

these violations are not a materially adverse employment action. App. 8 Even

though these actions were clear violations of the CBA as well as the Special

Education state and federal laws, the ruling states that these violations were just

increased workload, and challenging for the Petitioner.

The Decision reasons that Principal Muhammad did not avoid Petitioner

Bowman while he was attempting to speak with him about getting his classes in

compliance with the CBA and Special Education laws during the 2017-2018

school year. It proffers as evidence an incident when Petitioner reached out to

Ali Muhammad 4 years later after he was ignored by Muhammad in 2017. The

decision states that this 4 year span as the Boards evidence disproves Petitioner

Bowman’s allegations. App. 15

Harassment

Then the decision weighs in on the weaponization of heating and air

conditioning. The decision states that the heating and air were controlled by the

building engineers and facilities department. App. 9 The decision then address

the Petitoner’s claim that the respondents secredy video taped him doctored the

video and posted it in a platform for all to see. App. 15

Retaliation

Under Tide VII employers are prohibited from retaliating against their

employees for participating in an investigation especially discrimination. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) The court reasons that the petitioner, to survive summary

judgement, would have to show that a reasonable jury could find that he engaged

in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action and the action was

motivated by the protected activity. The decision cites Lord v. High Voltage

Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016). The decision acknowledges that

the adverse action for retaliation purposes “need not be one that affects the terms

and conditions of employment. “ Citing Lewis, 9909 F.3d at 867 Courts rather

ask the simple question whether the acts “might have dissuaded a reasonable

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Boss v. Castro,

816 F. 3d 910, 918 (7th Cir. 2016). Then the decision states that Petitioner alleges

that Muhammad retaliates against him for filing Union grievances “. App. 13

E. The Court of Appeal’s Decision

Petitioner Bowman appealed. In the opening brief, he contended that

Respondent CPS discriminated against him based on his religion when he

refused to attend the opening religious event hosted by Principal Muhammad.

Immediately afterwards, in the spring of 2017, Muhammad then began frequently

coming to Bowmans’ classes observing and taking notes on his classroom

curriculum and practices. This went on from March 2017 until June 2017 at the

end of the 2016-2017 school year. App. 18 ....AOB In the decision by the

Court of Appeals the court incorrectly reports that the Principal had recently

converted from Islam and that the Petitioner had declined to participate citing

an opposition to using the school for religious purposes. It also incorrectly cited

the Petitioner “having confidence in his own faith.” Id This seems to be the

court making light of the violation to the establishment clause that prevents the

government from creating a state sponsored church, forcing religious observance

or singling out a specific religion for support. (U.S. Const, amend. I.)

The Board sought summary judgement on all claims and the court granted them

in its entirety. The court determined when it came to discrimination that

Bowman “failed to furnish evidence that supported a Title VII claim under the

burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802-03 (1973), and the holistic approach of Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,

834 F.3d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2016).

As stated before, the terms, conditions and privileges of teaching are laid out in

the collective bargaining agreement or CBA between the Chicago Teachers

Union or CTU and the Chicago Board of Education or CBE. The decision by

the appellate court determined that the Petitioner had not suffered an adverse

employment action and the Board provided legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons for its actions. App. 19

The decision reasons that Title VII cases are decided based on the inquiry of

whether a Plaintiff has produced evidence that a trier of fact would conclude

shows that the Petitioner’s religion caused the “discharge or other adverse

employment action. “ Citing Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 809 (7th

Cir. 2025) (quoting Igasaki v. 111. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th

Cir. 2021) The decision then goes on to state “ An adverse employment action

is any "harm" that leaves the plaintiff "worse off" with respect to an "identifiable

term or condition of employment." Citing Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S.

346,354-55 (2024)t; Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 F.4th 1335,1337 (7th Cir. 2024)

The decision acknowledges that a violation to the terms and conditions of

employment is necessary to show proof under Title VII. In addition, the appellate

decision acknowledges it need not be "material", "significant", or "substantial."

Thomas, 120 F.4th at 1337. Then the decision gives examples which include

"delaying," "denying," or "transferring" terms, conditions and privileges of

employment. App.19

The decision then weighs in on the Petitioner's plight during this ordeal as just

feeling "unsupported." Id Then the decision states that this would not count under

the Muldrow decision rendered by this court. The reason given is that the issue

was school wide. The evidence cited by the decision is incidents that happened

outside of te time in question after the Title VII lawsuit was filed. Id

The decision then reasons that denial of Petitioner's request for religious time off

is not supported by the record. It states that there were "delays in approvals and

payments" but that the " district policy requires audits of such requests. " App.20

There was no such evidence provided by the Respondent nor is it part of the

evidentiary record. In addition the decision states that having temperature

extremes in winter time, the principal avoiding him to correct the issues, and

teachers secretly video taping him do not affect the terms and conditions of the

Petitioners employment. The court feels every aspect of his job remained the same.

The court states that "these petty slights do not constitute adverse employment

actions under Muldrow, "id

The court expressed that it felt Petitioner cannot establish a Title VII retaliation

claim under. The court felt in order to do establish a retaliation claim the Petitioner

needed to show he engaged in protected activity, that he suffered an adverse

employment action, and that there existed a connection between the two

aforementioned. Citing Anderson, 104 F.4th at 654 The court then states that the

standard for retaliation is "more demanding." Instead of showing "some harm"

the action must have been, " "materially adverse, " producing "significant harm."

Citing Est. of Harris v. City of Milwaukee, 141 F.4th 858, 869 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing

Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 350, 357-58); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co v.

White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Here as for each claim in this case, the court is using

the Significant-Harm standard repeatedly.

Lastly, the appellate court reasons that the Petitioner cannot establish a

harassment claim because he did not endure conduct that was severe or pervasive.

The decision states in so many words that the Petitioner in order to prevail needed

to show: that his work environment was "objectively and subjectively offensive,"

the "harassment was based on his religion," the acts were so severe they altered

the terms, conditions and privileges of employment. This would then render these

acts as a basis for employer liability. Citing Anderson, 104 F.4‘h at 652 (citation

modified); see also Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 427 (2013) App.20

However it must be noted that the CBA contract can’t contradict the state law

on special education. In the Illinois Administrative Code or IAC Tide 23 226730

Arguments/Reasons for Granting the Petition

LThe court should overturn discrimination decisions where the

“significant-harm standard” was used in ruling against the case.

The significant harm standard has played a roll in Petitioner’s losing cases where

clearly they should have won. There is clearly no language in the federal statute

to justify its use and it should not be mentioned in cases as a basis for ruling

against a Petitioner who has potentially already suffered discrimination,

retaliation and harassment.

A. Tide VII prohibits discrimination with respect to a persons compensation,

terms, conditions and privileges based on such individuals ***, religion, etc. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-(a)(l) This case raises an important and recurring question that

needs to be reviewed: whether or not significant-harm standards should exist in

Tide VII case decisions about discrimination^ retaliation and harassment? In the

Muldrow case, the lower courts applied the practice of adding significance-harm

standards at the district and appellate levels. However, once the case made it to

this court, the honorable justices made rulings that should have set a firm

precedent for cases like this. However, cases tike this one were still ruled using

significance-harm standards of the past.

B. The proper reading of Tide VII states in so many words that “It is unlawful

for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to

compensation, terms conditions, or privileges of employment because of such

individuals sex, race, religion, etc.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a)(1) This court states in

the Muldrow decision that “Petitioners just needed to show that there was some

disadvantages change in an employment term or condition. “ citing Oncale v.

Sundown Offshore Services, Inc,. 523 U.S. 75, 80,118 S. Ct. 998. 140 L. Ed. 2d 201.

This court then states that a Petitioner can lay out a Tide VII case by showing

through the actions of the employer “some harm” respecting an identifiable term

or condition of employment.” Id 2. What the court is stipulating here is that

numerous decisions in some courts have added verbiage that does not exist in

the Federal Statute.

C. Difference between Muldrow and this case

In the Muldrow decision a transfer occurred because in that profession, that’s

how things are done. In education, which the Petitioner practices, transfers cant

be done that easily. In fact, a person has to have specific certifications to do

certain jobs. The Petitioner is a certified regular education social studies teacher.

Yet, the classroom composition of some of his classes were changed to that

which only a certified Special education teacher should have.

It was a violation of the law as well as the CBA to have the Petitioner’s classes

programmed in this way and if the non-compliance was legitimate, the school

system would have sought legal ways to be in compliance beginning in the 20172018 school year when Ali Muhammad served his first full year as principal of

Corliss H.S.

However, he did not seek to be in compliance with the contract and the law but

rather stated “ you don’t praise the lord” and “you got to praise the lord.” In

fact, this statement as well as the special education violations came after the

Petitioner refused to attend the religious service held by Principal Muhammad at

Corliss H.S. The religious ceremony occurred towards the end of the 2016-2017

School year in the spring. The frequent classroom visits by Principal Muhammad

to Petitioner’s classroom began immediately after he did not attend this

ceremony until the end of the 2016-2017 school year in June. Then the noncompliance violations and statements occurred at the beginning of the 2017-2018

school year beginning in September of 2017. The court states in this case just as

in the Muldrow case that the Petitioner’s pay or benefits was not changed.

However, the Privileges, terms and conditions were changed. Again the

privileges, terms and conditions of the Petitioner and other employees are

detailed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Board Rules.

D. What should be added and taken away from Title VII cases

Clearly this court has made it clear in the Muldrow case that Significant-harm

standards should not exist in every case with a high bar . The federal statute of

Tide VII does not use such verbiage. In fact, based upon the wording of the

statute certain verbiage should be added. Besides just speaking of terms and

conditions of employment, cases should magnify compensation and privileges

as well. These terms should be used because a case such as this one where we

are speaking of a privilege like an employees right to participate in religious pay

privilege is necessary.

E. The Significant-harm standard should also be waved for the retaliation

and harassment claim

In the statute it terms such as severe, pervasive, terms, conditions and privileges.

The statute uses good verbiage already and harm is a very subjective experience

and it can further harass victims when people are telling them that their harm

wasn’t severe enough.

II. This court should overturn the prior rulings by the lower courts on

Bowman v. Board of Education of Chicago because of numerous errors

Discrimination in American history has not been static. It has consistendy

morphed throughout the course of American History. In order for justice to be

victorious in defeating this great evil of discrimination, the court must be ready

to morph as well to confront and remedy this scourge on American society.

A. Timing with discrimination and retaliation

Towards the end of the 2016-2017 school year Ali Muhammad was appointed to

be the interim principal of Corliss H.S. and tells the story of his religious journey

in life. He then offers for the staff to attend a religious ceremony that his church

was having at Corliss H.S. Petitioner Bowman chose to not attend as is his right

under the establishment clause of the Constitution of the U.S. Almost

immediately Ali Muhammad began coming to his classroom frequentiy with a

pad and a writing utensil to take notes that “would not be punitive.” This

behavior continued until the end of that school year.

B. Summer break is the only thing that slowed adverse behavior dow

There was a break but only because the school year let out. Immediately as the

next school year begins, certain of the Petitioners classrooms become out of

compliance with the CBA and the special education laws. These violations were

not just one but multiple all in the classroom of one teacher: the Petitioner. At

no time did Corliss H.S. apply for a deviation from the law. The non-compliance

with the law was illegal and a violation of the terms and conditions of the CBA

when it came to the Petitioner’s rights.

Article 21-19 states “When a student’s IEP calls for services in a general

education classroom, the student must be served in a class that is composed of

students of whom at least 70 % are regular education and not more than 30%

are special education. (CBA 2019-2024) ( R 82-11, Article 21 19)

At the same time principal Muhammad began asking Petitioner Bowman as he

took religious holidays off at the beginning of the 2017-2018 school year, “which

holidays do you celebrate?” When Bowman told him he responded “I never

heard of those holidays before.” Bowman thought it was strange that a person

who calls himself a minister never heard of the holidays that he celebrates but

thought nothing of it at first. As time went on the inquiry into which holidays he

celebrated and what religion he practiced became more frequent.

C.The district court ruled on the side of the Respondent without evidence

that backs their position

As stated in section D of the Statement of the Case for this Writ of Certiorari or

WOC, the Petitioner sued the Respondent alleging religious discrimination

coupled with retaliation and harassment under Tide VII and the Illinois Human

Rights Act. The Board of Education moved for summary judgment arguing that

the Petitioner failed to provide adequate evidence supporting his claims The

district court granted summary judgement to the respondents on September 27,

2024. App . 2

Discrimination

When it comes to discrimination the Respondents proffered the excuse that

teachers were abusing the system as a reason why they were bothering the

Petitioner about the faith he practices and what holiday’s he celebrates.

However, they did not offer one piece of evidence that demonstrates this. The

Petitioner contends that the religious holiday privilege cannot be abused because

the days are given to the teachers at the beginning of the year and they can’t add

religious high days to their benefit days at all. If teachers do not use them, they

do not carry over like sick days do. This is just one instance where the

Respondents state a reason that makes no sense and the court just believed them

with no evidence or proof. Neither did the Respondents offer 1 piece of

evidence to show that the Petitioner warranted repeated audits for years as was

the case. Not one time did the Respondent contact the Petitioner throughout

the years and state that he was being audited during the tenure of Principal AH

Muhammad. This tenure would span 5 years from 2017-2022. In fact, whenever

there is a change in processes in the school system and it is system wide, they

always send a communication to the whole school system to inform them of the

change. A perfect example would be this communication internal letter about

the changes that would be occurring with the religious holidays. App. Example

Under Federal Rules of Civil procedure 56(a) summary judgement should only

be granted when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entided to judgment as a matter of law. As will

be demonstrated at various stages of this document, there were material disputes.

The List

The court also accepted the explanation by the Board that there is a list of major

religious holidays and if the holiday that the person is taking off is not on the list,

the department in the school system would not process that payment. App 8

The prospect of the school system accepting some holidays and rejecting others

is discriminatory in itself. The Petitioner requested the list of holidays during the

request for production and the school system refused to hand over the list.

The Petitioner has asked since the beginning for the list to be released so that

there was transparency and the Respondents said things like “religious holidays

are governed by board rule 4-10 (c).” AOB S.A.l at pg. 5 15 In other words

the 2 tenets of the board rule which are notification to the administrator and that

should be at least 2 days in advance. These are things that the Petitioner has

done since 2004 and the majority of that record is part of the evidentiary record

for the cases in the lower courts. They can be found on the record attached to

document 89 Plaintiff s local rule 56.2 Statement of Additional Facts exhibits 16,

17 and 18. R# 89-16, 17, and 18. The Respondent claims that the questioning

and delays in payment were standard procedure but again offer absolutely no

proof.

Then began the 2017-2018 school year. To the surprise of the Petitioner his

classrooms began being over crowded above the CBA rights and the state and

federal laws. The Petitioner sought the principal out to remedy the situation and

get the classroom in compliance with the law, but the principal avoided him. The

Petitioner only received the comments from him of “you don’t praise the Lord”

and you got to praise the Lord.” AOB at 4., Citing R. 92, PRMSJ at 2.

The timing of the animus was immediate when the principal arrived at Corliss

H.S. He showed up, Petitioner refused to conform religiously, he began trying to

intimidate him by frequendy coming to his class writing down information on a

note pad. The break we received over the summer didn’t quell the behavior, it

intensified when the next school year began. When the 2017-2018 school year

began multiple tenets of the special education law was being broken. The state

law that regulates education in Illinois is IAC 226.730 (a)(b).

The

Aforementioned state laws deals with the 70/30 rule and the law of 15.

Adverse Employment Action

In the decision from the district court reasoned that the Petitioner did not show

evidence that an “adverse employment action occurred.” App7 It then defines

this as a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing

to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a

decision causing significant change in benefits. “ App 7-8. The court states in so

many words that the Petitioner suffered “some inconveniences but none caused

a major change in the status of his employment.” Id at 8 It states that his “pay

and benefits did not decrease neither was there a change in his work schedule. “

Id at 8 This language all sounds familiar because it is basically the same language

used by other circuits and a perfect example again is the Muldrow case. In

Muldrow, the lower courts reasoned that that case did not cause her a materially

significant disadvantage.” 144 S. Ct.967, 969. Citing Muldrow from lower court

30 F. 4th 680, 688. They also stated that her transfer “did not result in a

diminution of her title, salary and benefits” and had caused “only minor changes

in working conditions.” This court had already on April 17, 2024, made a

decision on that case which is tantamount to this one. This cases decision was

not pronounced until September 27, 2024 in the district court and September 29,

2025 for the Appellate court.

Investigator

In addition, during discovery the Petitioner had just one material witness left that

was important to the case but was dodging the deposition. This was the ISBE

investigator Karen Handy who supposedly granted the deviation to Corliss H.S.

even though the Petitioner had already filed a complaint about the repeated

special education violations that had been occurring annually. The magistrate

judge closed fact and expert discovery and did not allow this extension to get

one more very important material witness deposed who could have settled a lot

of disputes that involved the numerous special education violations that were

occurring in the Petitioners classroom.

The appellate decision declares that Petitioner did not show that his harassment

was caused by his religion. However, if you look at the timing in the case, as well

as, when statements were made, it is obviously clear why Principal Muhammad

committed the acts that he did and what his intentions were. AOB at 3-7

Statement of the case.

Even though the Petitioner had pointed out the Muldrow decision and how

discrimination retaliation and harassment should be viewed in the country, the

lower courts still used the significant harm standard, coupled with the

frameworks of McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz Werner. McDonnell Douglas

Corp v. Green 411, U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)., Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,

834 F.3d 760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2016) App.16 and 17

McDonnell Douglass Framework

Even under the old direct standards the Petitioner met the requirements. He

was definitely his whole career a person of faith ( Bible Christian) and the court

acknowledges, a person who filed grievances, complaints and eventually this

lawsuit about the illegal, and unethical things that were occurring in his

classroom. He also met his employers legitimate expectations showing up to

work under these extreme circumstances and doing his job to the best of his

ability all while the laws are being violated and his statutory rights under CBA

trampled on. And finally he did not receive the same treatment as similarly

situated teachers which would be other core subject teachers that are teaching

the same grad level as the Petitioner. The Petitioner is a Social Studies teacher

and he essentially teaches reading just like the Science and English teachers.

Corliss H.S. was an early adapter school for the Common Core standards. If you

look at the Common Core standards for Social Studies, Science and English you

will see that they are essentially the exact same. AOB at 5, or (R.89-25, Lofton

Dep. at 22-24)

Reading is universal and repeatedly students lEP’s would be written stating that

students did not need services for the Petitioners subject but need them for the

other subjects like Science and English. Miswriting of lEP’s was done to try to

justify overcrowding the Petitioners classroom above what the law allows

violating the Federal special education law. If you say in the IEP that a student

gets no services or accommodations and modifications that can be damaging to

a students ability to learn.

Ortiz Werner Framework

Under the Ortiz Werner Framework, a Petitioner does not have to have direct

evidence that discrimination , retaliation and harassment happened. The

Petitioner just needs circumstantial evidence that would convince a factfinder

that they were a victim under Title VII and it was motivated by their protected

class and caused the adverse employment action. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc.,

834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2017) The court reasoned that that Petitioner did not

offer evidence to show that he suffered an adverse employment action. The

reality is he proffered numerous pieces of evidence at the summary judgement

phase that seems to keep getting ignored by both lower courts. In the evidentiary

record at number 89, Petitioner Bowman submitted 55 pieces of evidence

attached to the Local Rule 56.2 Statement of Additional Facts. Number 90 and

91 in the record is a Memorandum of Law in Dispute of the Defendants Motion

for Summary Judgement and a Rule 56.1 Response by the Plaintiff to the

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. R 90, 91 These documents are

complete with responses and citations to things that were stated by the

Respondents. There is even a response by the Petitioner to the Motion for

Summary Judgement at document 92.

Either way the decisions apply the significant-harm standard which should not

have been applied when either decision was handed down. Both decision came

after the Muldrow decision even though the outdated standards were applied to

this case. Again, the Muldrow decision was decided April 17, 2024 while these

two decisions were September 27, 2024 and September 29, 2025. The appellate

decision even incorrectly states in a foot note that the district courts summary

judgment ruling predates Muldrow. App.3

Retaliation

When it comes to retaliation, the federal statute states “It shall be an unlawful

employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his

employees... because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”

42 U.S.C.§ 2000e(3)a The decisions repeatedly states that the Petitioner filed

grievances, complaints and eventually this lawsuit. App.2, 6, 9

In the appellate decision it speaks about adverse employment actions needing to

be of the type that left an employee worse off with respect to identifiable terms,

conditions and I will have to add privileges. Citing Muldrow v. City of St.Louis,

601 U.S. 346, 354-55 (2024); Thomas v. JBS Green Bay, Inc., 120 FA* 1335,

1337 (7th Cir. 2024) Then it states “it need not be material, significant or

substantial.” Thomas, 120 F. 4th at 1337. “Some examples it then states are

delaying training, denying vacation times, and transferring shifts.”

What’s really shocking is that the court then weighs in on how the Petitioner may

have felt saying “he didn’t feel supported” the evidence he produced didn’t show

he “ suffered an adverse employment action.” App. 3 Then the decision offers

up as evidence the false narrative proffered by the Respondents that the situation

was not unique to the Petitioner. The decision then cites as evidence some class

compositions from outside of the time in question from when the Respondents

were retroactively trying to change the environment of the school to justify the

illegal and unethical acts they directed at the Petitioner for multiple years. App.3

The lawsuit was filed in June of 2021 and the citation of an out of compliance

classroom is for after the lawsuit was filed in a future school year. Id

If the special education violations were legitimate they would have sought to

correct them starting year one. The violations existed 2017-2018, 2018-2019,

2019-2020, 2020-2021 and 2021-2022. During all 5 years the Petitioners classes

were out of compliance and this was not an institution-wide phenomena. The

only time this shifted else where in the school was when the lawsuit was filed.

Retroactively the violators were covering their tracks. The Petitioner filed a

complaint with ISBE in 2020 and during the same school year the school applied

for a deviation. Deviations are supposed to be applied for before a school year

begins out of compliance with the special education law. The school didn’t apply

for a deviation before the 2020-2021 school year and even though the corrective

action that was put forth by ISBE or Illinois State Board of Education, said that

it was supposed to, they did not. The deviation is what is filed when a school is

legitimately out of compliance. The deviation was not filed or granted until late

in the 2020-2021 school year. This was late in the 4th year of Ali Muhammad’s 5

year tenure as Corliss’s principal. If there was legitimate concern about noncompliance and no sinister intent, they would have been applied for year 1 of his

tenure. In addition, there is an area on the deviation that allows the teacher who’s

classroom is impacted to give input and Petitioner is emphatic that he was

unaware that the school had applied for a deviation. District officials helped Ali

Muhammad get the deviation and they were not even aware of what was going

on at Corliss high school. This information is part of the evidentiary record in

the depositions of Latoya Lofton. R.89-25 at 24-27

4-5

The appellate decision claims that the Petitioner can’t survive the Title VII

retaliation claim. It then goes on to state to survive a retaliation claim you must

show you “engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action

and that there is a causal connection between the two.” (Citing Anderson, 104

FA* at 654.) App.4 The decision then contradicts itself by saying “the standard

for an adverse employment action is more demanding than in a discrimination

claim: Instead of requiring “some harm,” the action must be materially adversemeaning it results in “significant” harm. Id

On one instance it says you have to suffer significant harm which is to apply the

significant-harm standard. Then it cites Muldrow but doesn’t cite it in the proper

context. Muldrow explains “an action causing less serious harm will not deter

Title VII enforcement and so falls outside the purposes of the ban on

retaliation.”App.4 Muldrow v. City of St. Eoms, Missouri, 144 S. Ct. 967 at 971 Supreme Court 2024 Instead of using Muldrow as a guide, it seems to use a case

that misstates the Muldrow decision on Significant harm standards. Est. ofHarris

v. City ofMilwaukee, 141, F. 4th 858, 869 (7th Cir. 2025) This all seems to cause

a bunch of confusion about how these types of cases should be ruled on by our

federal courts. In the Est.of Harris case the desire is to use the significant-harm

standard unlike the Muldrow decision where that was discarded. In this case that

desire to exercise significant-harm standard is also prevalent in the appellant

decision. App.4

The comments made by Muhammad were not an isolated incident as stated in

the appellate court decision. Timing when it comes to the statements “You don’t

praise the Lord” and “you got to praise the lord, ” are instrumental and key.

App.5 They were made after the Petitioner decided not to attend the religious

event, after Muhammad frequendy visited the Petitioners classroom taking notes

and after his classes were programmed out of compliance with the CBA and the

special education law.

The decision to have out of compliance classes for years changed the terms and

conditions of the Petitioners classes which is why the grievances, complaints and

eventually this lawsuit was filed. The retaliation came as an attempt to dissuade

the Petitioner from filing documents to stop the illegal and unethical practices.

Under Title VII a Petitioner who is alleging retaliation must be able to show that

he engaged in protected activity, he suffered and adverse employment action and

the adverse employment action was motivated by protected activity. Eord v. High

Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016) It is acknowleged by both

sides that the Petitioner participated in protected activity when he filed one of

the numerous documents to attempt to stop the behavior that was being directed

at him. There were multiple special violations in the Petitioners classroom. There

was the 70/30 rule violation, the law of the 15 and the miswriting of students

lEP’s under the federal law. (IDEA ) Throughout the years the Petitioner

contacted or filed grievances with the union and other agencies when the

violations to the laws and contract happened.

For example, in January 2020 a grievance was filed about the special education

violations that were happening at the beginning of the school year. There was a

meeting between the principal union representative and Petitioner in February

of 2020. Muhammad was supposed to move a number of students out of the

Petitioner’s class. That , never happened the rest of the school year. The

Petitioner then, after the start of the 2020-2021 school year noticed a very

egregious amount of special needs students were crammed into his classrooms.

The tenure of Ali Muhammad is littered with these types of incidents where the

Petitioner takes action and then things are done to the compensation, terms,

conditions and privileges as retaliation. The evidentiary record is littered with

evidence that demonstrates the retaliation. R.89 #1-55 and at the beginning of

the 2020-2021 school year.

The district decision says that no evidence existed that Muhammad or the Board

took their actions be Cause the Petitioner took actions by filing grievances,

complaints, and suits. In year 2 of Muhammad as principal during the 2018-2019

school year, Petitioner sat in an evaluation with principal Muhammad.

Muhammad spent the whole evaluation post-conference talking about him being

at his church giving the message and would not allow the Petitioner to get one

word in about his observation. For nearly the whole 5 year tenure of Ali

Muhammad as principal CTT’s would either not show up to class or show up

late regularly. Even when they would show up, they would also not do any work.

This practice continues to this day where CTT’s do not do the full responsibilities

of a CTT.

Harassment

The Appellate decision says that Petitioner cant show that he suffered an

“adverse employment action”. An adverse employment action is defined as a

significant action such as firing or demotion. It can also be more subtler acts

best described as a “death by a thousand cuts”. Heating and Air at the school

has been used in this manor to vex and frustrate die Petitioner for years at Corliss

H.S.

Harassment conduct that is severe or pervasive . Must show (1) work

environment was objectively and subjectively offensive, (2) harassment was

based on his religion, (3) conduct was so severe or pervasive as to alter the

conditions of employment and create a hostile and abusive working environment

and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.”

Anderson v. Street, 104 F. 4th

646,652 (7th Cir. 2024); See also Vance v. Ball state Univ., 570 U.S. 421,427 (2013)

During the years of Ali Muhammad’s tenure as principal, numerous things were

done to harass the Petitioner. One of those things was frequently turning the

heat up real high in the Petitioner’s classroom in the winter time and sometimes

turning the heat very low. It gets pretty cold in the winter time in Chicago and

both extremes happening on a regular basis is very disruptive to a teachers ability

to teach.

Other harassing things that were occurring were frequently video taping, creating

doctored secret video tapes, harassment of Petitioner for trying to follow the

Covid-19 protocals. To exacerbate the heat while summary judgment phase was

happening a huge cap was place on the thermostat in the Petitioners classroom

and a huge chain and lock was placed on the additional door which would not

allow the Petitioner to get any relief when the heat was being turned high on

him.

These acts created a work environment that was objectively and subjectively

offensive, this harassment all started with the Petitioner’s refusal to conform

religiously and this conduct was so severe (harsh) or pervasive (persistent) so as

to alter the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. These

aforementioned offenses creates a basis for employer liability. See Anderson v.

Street, 104 F. 4th 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2024) The lower courts seemingly ignored

the majority of evidence that the Petitioner turned in to be part of the evidentiary

body of these cases. Then the court seemed to weigh the Respondents word

against the Petitioners ignoring the evidence. Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp.,

Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) There are even false statements in the

decisions like the appellate decision stating things like the Petitioner “cited his

opposition to the school being used for religious purposes.” App 2 It also states

“Muhammad shared his recent conversion from Islam to a form of Christianity”

obviously making this false statement to try and attempt to cast me in a negative

light. Id

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted by,

Marvin Bowman, Pro Se

11033 S. Union, ave

Chicago, IL 60628

(773) 322-7328

marvinbowmanl@yahoo.com